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#8
TITLE: REMARKS BY USA AND CANADA STUDIES INSTITUTE DIRECTOR SERGEI ROGOV (sergeyrogov@hotmail.com) AT A ROUND TABLE ON RUSSIA-USA
[ALEXANDER HOUSE, 12:00, OCTOBER 25, 2001]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)

Rogov: First of all, I would like to thank you for the invitation. This is the first time I am taking part in the forum. Secondly, I should apologize because I have a lot of meetings to attend today, and thirdly, I would like to make some remarks -- in telegraphese -- about my trip to Washington from where I returned last week. I came back with a viral bronchitis, all the symptoms are the same as for anthrax. Because I was in the Senate building the day before they found the powder sent to Daschle. Well, an autopsy will tell.

So, my first point. September 11 marks a new stage, a new stage in the development of the United States and in the development of the system of international relations. The consequences are very far-reaching.

Second. The events of September 11 became the focus of all the internal and external policy of the United States. The things that are happening in the United States now would have been unimaginable a month and a half ago. It was a colossal shock for the nation, at least as powerful as that of Pearl Harbor.

Already the events of September 11, if one considers direct and indirect losses and extra expenditure on defense and the stimulation package for the economy cost about 1.5 percent of the GDP of the United States, a hefty 150 billion dollars.

Very serious processes are taking place in America connected with restrictions on civil freedoms and rights with the introduction of various measures that appeared to be unacceptable for an open society. Now they turn out to be acceptable and there is a clear shift of balance between the interests of the state and the rights of the individual.

In foreign policy the administration that came to power under the slogan of unilateral actions and thought that the multilateral principle was irrelevant and any agreements were just tying the hands of America, this administration now has put the stake in its response to September 11 not on unilateral military actions, but on the creation of a broad multinational coalition. Such a coalition is being formed before our eyes. It can be said that Russia has become a member of such a coalition. Although a final answer has yet to be given to what this coalition is all about.

Undoubtedly, the United States is prepared to pay a very serious price to ensure support for its actions in the world. I can refer to some events that it would have been hard to predict, such as the payment of the American arrears to the UN. And the resolution was initiated by Jesse Helms.

A very unusual trade agreement with Jordan whereby Jordan was granted the same trade rights, that is, total removal of all barriers and all tariffs, as Mexico and Canada, that is, as if it were a member of NAFTA. The economic moves the United States has made with regard to Pakistan are well known. In fact, they have recognized the nuclear status of Pakistan and India.

The Americans are paying, but they are not paying us. Another point. September 11 has given rise to a situation when the Russian and American leaders are proclaiming -- and I stress -- proclaiming international terrorism to be the main enemy. Assuming that this is so, the classical principle of international relations is coming into effect, my enemy's enemy is my ally and friend. If this is so, then Russia and the US have a common main enemy for the first time since 1945. And that means that a radical transformation of Russian-American relations is possible.

Not just relations of partnership but more serious relations of allies. Why didn't strategic partnership in the 1990s get off the ground? There were parallel interests, but there was no common enemy and the legacy of the Cold War was too strong. Now we have a common enemy and if this is so, it makes sense to examine the model of allied relations.

The model is not currently in place, but there is a possibility, in the first place because of the strong and resolute actions of the Russian president. So far, no reciprocal moves have been made by the American side. And it is worth pondering whether such reciprocal moves are possible or probable and what we should do to prevent the developments leading to just another string of unilateral concessions on the part of Russia which the Americans will accept, for which they will thank us before presenting the next list of demands.

I will now go over the issues that call for analysis. Is it true that international terrorism is the main enemy on the international arena, not in words but in reality? And to what extent is it an enemy in internal affairs for Russia and the US? Can we and the Americans agree on defining the concept of "international terrorism" to distinguish it from freedom fighters?

In principle this is possible, but very difficult. Unlike in the times of the Cold War we do not support any national liberation movements. We do not have our favorite freedom fighters but it does not mean that the Americans will abandon support of the KLA, support of the Chechens and so on. Can they abandon support? This is a big question mark.

But with respect to bin Laden and the Taliban the conclusion is clear, it is truly an enemy of America at present and the Americans are really determined to make short work of them although there are also nuances to the American policy. Think of the moderate Taliban.

But in the short term, tactically, the Taliban and bin Laden are a common enemy. This suggests the question, can the factor that is tactical develop into a factor that is strategic, and can the area of agreement on the issue of what is international terrorism be broadened? And can Russia and the US have other common interests except international terrorism?

I stress, if it is really so, then the agenda that divided Russia and the United States until September 10 -- ABM, NATO expansion, economic issues -- it assumes a derivative character compared with the basic interest.

Going back to the term "union", union does not imply total agreement on all the issues. Think about Stalin and Roosevelt. A more unnatural alliance could hardly have been imagined and yet it proved to be highly effective in the war on a common enemy. And there is a common enemy now. But one should not think of an alliance as absence of any differences. The United States and Europe, the States and Israel, the States and Japan, and so on have a lot of contradictions.

But there is a common interest that towers over all the rest. What are the problems that need to be addressed within the next few weeks, and I agree, that the meeting in Crawford is a crucial moment. Either the alliance materializes or it will be another missed opportunity which may be followed by tragic events.

I already spoke about the problem of defining terrorism, the would-be position of the Americans on Chechnya, where the new and serious nuances have appeared. Nevertheless, the American approach has not changed. And what will further happen to Central Asia, where there are two questions like the possibility to use the former Soviet military facilities, bases and air fields in Central Asia and Transcaucasia to strike blows at those countries which we do not regard as enemies -- such as Iraq and Iran, when we become accomplices in an undertaking which is not in our interests for at least we believe not to be in our interest.

The second point -- what will happen after, so to say? Will the Americans stay in Central Asia for good or they will go, which will be more in our interests?

And finally the old agenda -- the ABM Treaty, NATO and the economic issues. I will begin with the economic issues. It seems to me that, considering the clear readiness on the part of the US to pay a price, we will have very good opportunity to resolve the long-term problem of the Soviet foreign debt -- rescheduling it and partly writing it off. Here I do not quite agree; I may not have had time to carefully read the document, but here is the thesis: let us not raise this question and why not? Poland is a US ally, it has 50 percent of its debt written off, Israel has its debt written off, and Egypt, and now Pakistan. So why not raise this issue? What is there shameful? The Soviet foreign debt is like reparations to be paid by Germany in the Weimar period. It is the price to be paid for the Soviet Union's defeat in the Cold War. What is there to be ashamed of? And I cannot understand our present line on this question -- no, the more and the earlier we pay up, the better.

But the prices of oil have fallen and will continue to be low as long as the recession lasts. It means that our government will not be able to pay our citizens in the near future. So why not raise this issue at a time when the Americans are interested in our support? On September 10 they wanted only one thing from us: take the bitter pill, sign: the ABM Treaty has ceased to exit.

Today they need from us very many things and there is nothing shameful in acting like allies always do -- we oblige you, you oblige us. Our position when we do not ask for anything in return -- is naive, dangerous and offering the prospect of stepping again on the old rake.

ABM defense. Even a week ago there was no sign of a review of the US policy either on the ABM or on NATO's enlargement. But the first bell rang in Shanghai -- Powell for the first time squeezed out the phrase: "amendments to the ABM Treaty". It was an important point. I've already said that the line of the US administration was -- unilateral actions, any arms control treaty tied America's hands -- so all these should be thrown out into the dustbin of history.

Now we are talking about amendments to the treaty, which means that the regime, in the modified form, stays and this is profitable for us. There may also be other variants when this question may be complicated beyond understanding, when we would not take note of them cutting wood in Alaska or digging pits, continue the consultations if they do not announce withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. If in response to all that Putin did the Americans announce a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, this will mean that all I said about the possibility of an alliance, has remained a possibility, meaning that the Americans continue their policy of weakening Russia to the maximum extent.

NATO's enlargement. Here the situation regarding the accession of the Baltic states, is much worse. And I do not rule out the possibility of variants, especially if the Americans further bog down in Afghanistan, such a demonstrative act vis a vis Russia by incorporating the Baltic countries into NATO to be protected from Russia, while we are helping them to fight a common enemy in Afghanistan -- may be reviewed.

And lastly, I hope that the summit, if it is prepared well, will enable Putin to demonstrate that he has accomplished certain steps of response on the part of Russia. If this does not happen, I fear that a very dangerous situation may emerge. One will be economic, the drop in oil prices which will be inevitable: and all these victorious reports will very quickly be reduced to zero. But it is the first time that the President has found himself in this situation -- your data and surveys confirm that the change has started somewhat but still for the first time there is a kind of a clearance between the President and his dominant stereotype in public consciousness.

Maybe I did not quite understand your assessments. Yes, the society is supporting Putin but it still keeps the anti-American mood and does not very much approve of our support of the United States.

And the second point. There has arisen a clearance between the President and the bureaucratic consensus. The decision taken by the President was not based on the bureaucratic consensus but rather was at variance with it. And in my opinion the task is to close this gap of perception, which developed with the society and the bureaucratic consensus as soon as possible. But not through the President's about face, which will be exceedingly difficult to accomplish. The task is to get the society and the bureaucracy closer to the leader because Putin has demonstrated in this case that indeed he possesses the qualities of the most genuine national leader capable of "pulling" the country behind him. Thank you.

Moderator: Thank you.

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