#6
The Russia Journal
October 26-November 1, 2001
Time for radical rethinking on NATO and Russia
By GORDON M. HAHN (Dr. Gordon M. Hahn is a visiting scholar at the Hoover
Institution, Stanford University.)
With "consultations" between U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov meandering toward a likely disappointing conclusion in the wake of Sept. 11, it is time for clear, integrated thinking on the problem of European security. Such thinking should become the basis for real negotiations on issues central to European security that include not only Americans and Russians, but the Europeans as well.
It is imperative that such thinking takes into account problems of NATO expansion, the Bush administration's plans for national missile defense (NMD) and Russian concerns regarding these issues. The first round of NATO expansion – which incorporated Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – had a negative effect on Russia’s relations with the West, particularly with the United States. Virtually the entire Russian elite became infused with the ideas of anti-Americanism.
With the Kosovo intervention and the bombing of Belgrade, the elite-run media turned the Russian public against America and especially NATO expansion; whereas in January 1996 only 18 percent of Russians surveyed considered NATO expansion a threat to Russia, in July 1999 roughly 66 percent thought it was a threat. In a more recent poll, 52 percent of Russian respondents considered the United States to be hostile to Russia, while only 32 percent regarded it as friendly.
It is almost a forgone conclusion that the second round of NATO expansion will include at least one of the former Soviet Baltic republics and that the Bush administration will move forward with NMD, unilaterally if necessary. Moscow has repeatedly warned that the extension of NATO to any of the former Soviet republics would provoke a harsh response by Russia.
To avoid a meltdown in Russian-American relations after, and in view of, the present alliance of convenience against terrorism, a review of the European security regime is in order. A basis for negotiations could include the following proposals:
First, NATO expansion in its present form should be brought to an end. It does not enhance security in Europe as long as Russia is excluded from the process. Neither the new members from the first round nor the new members of the second round are likely to be threatened by a weakened and still declining Russia, and any resurgent Russia in a theoretical future can be deterred by NATO as it stands. Further expansion only increases the likelihood that Russia will revert to its historical authoritarianism and imperialism.
NATO’s incorporation of all three Baltic States would cut off Kaliningrad, the military-oriented Russian enclave, from Russia’s heartland. The encirclement of this strategically important province, whose newly elected governor is a former admiral of the Russian Navy, will only pique the angst of the already beleaguered Russian military. If there is to be a second round of NATO expansion at all, it should involve only states not once part of the Soviet Union (Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania are possible invitees) and be accompanied by an announcement that the incorporation of new members is to stop.
Second, expansion of membership should be replaced by a new NATO outreach strategy of associate membership. It would be an expanded version of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.
The level of the military and cost-saving benefits of cooperation under the program should be expanded to offer real benefits to PfP participants that wish to move up to associate membership. This would be much cheaper than the cost of $27 billion to $125 billion projected for the first round of NATO expansion, according to the respective estimates of the Clinton administration and the Congressional Budget Office. The candidates for associate membership would have to meet minimal standards of democratic governance and observation of human rights.
Third, in exchange for a Russian compromise on permitting Western research, development, and eventual deployment of an NMD system and a possible second and last round of NATO expansion, the United States and its NATO allies should agree to significant changes in the flank sub-limits for conventional forces in the European theater. The Russians have sought to renegotiate these limits to strengthen their presently undermanned and under-equipped northern (Leningrad military district) and southern (North Caucasian military district) European flanks.
However, any strengthening in posture permitted by new limits is unlikely to be realized, since Russia has just announced plans to reduce the armed forces by 360,000 soldiers and over 100,000 civilians in the next few years.
Finally, in exchange for a cancellation of NATO's second round of expansion or its incorporation of only those states not once part of the Soviet Union, Russia should be required to demilitarize or at least reduce its forces in Kaliningrad. In return, under the EU's Northern Initiative, the West would develop venues for developing business-to-business contacts toward the goal of large-scale Western investments into the region's free economic zone.
Such an approach toward constructing a new European security regime would have the benefits of drawing a distinction between the more democratic and peaceful post-communist states and the de facto states of concern. At the same time, many of the security dilemmas facing Russia in its weakened condition could be assuaged without compromising European security. Equally importantly, the West will be able to focus on the real threats it faces, assisted by Russia.
