Dear David,

I wanted to comment on Mike McFaul's Congressional testimony. In the spirit of full disclosure I should mention that I am scheduled to testify at the same hearing.

One issue on which I disagree with Mike is on Russia's status as the sole continuing Soviet successor state under international law. If the US were to announce that it no longer considers Russia as the sole sontinuing successor state of the Soviet Union, all international legal bets would be off. Of course, Russia could choose to join all the treaties and organizations that it would thereby be removed from, but I think it highly likely that it would be far more difficult to get Russia to re-join the CFE Treaty, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the OSCE, and so on, at least without seeking to re-negotiate some of the terms. I do not think we want a Russia free to choose multilateralism a la carte.

I spent years interivewing German and Russian officials about the role of international institutions, including of course international law, in managing the insecurity, uncertainty, and instability of the post-Cold War world. The premise of my book on German-Russian relations was that with the end of the Cold War (huge shifts in power relations, break up of the Soviet Union, German unification, and enormous uncertainty about the intentions and security strategies of states in Europe and Eurasia) was that security relations can be more cooperative than one would otherwise expect because of the information, stability-enhancing, and reassurance functions of international institutions.

One of the most important elements of these rules was Russia's status as the sole continuing successor state of the Soviet Union. That provision of international recognition of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state in the internaitonal system had and continues to have enormous security benefits, not only for the West, but I would argue for Russia AND for the newly indepedent states of the former Soviet Union. The examples are too numerous to go into here, but among them are living up to the terms of German unification and withdrawal of formerly Soviet forces in strict accordance with the 1990 agreements. In addition, the ultimately successful and cooperative disposition of Soviet nuclear forces among the countries on whose territory they were deployed (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan as well as Russia) was achieved in large measure due to the continuing claims of treaties on Russia. It could have been far worse.

In terms of current issues, I think it would be an enormous mistake and irresponsible to release Russia from its obligations to two international institutions in particular, the OSCE and the ABM Treaty (not to mention the Nuclear Nonprliferation Treaty), as would of course be the case if the U.S. declared Russia to no longer be recognized as the sole continuing successor state. The OSCE gives the West leverage over Russia's conduct in Chechnya. This leverage has not always been effective over the past two years, but just at the moment when there appears to be some moment on political negotiations, the claim and attention we have (actually, more Europe than the US) on Russia as an OSCE member is one of the few mechanisms we have for reinforcing growing awareness in Russia of the need to find a political solution that, among other things, distinguishes international terrorists operating in and out of Chechnya from innocent civilians. In particular, the obligations and claims on sovereign states in the area of human rights are far more intrusive under the OSCE than under the UN.

On ABM, the way in which it (currently) constrains the US has been made apparent in just the last day, with the Defense Department's decision to put off testing that would violate the treaty. But more to the point, I would argue that the ABM Treaty is a strong asset in keeping Russia's political and security elite engaged and interested in negotiating a new system of agreements on defensive and offensive nuclear systems. It is little secret that many of Russia's military hardliners would like to scrap not only ABM but START I so that they would be unconstrained in keeping and building the systems they would like to have with the US as enemy in mind. Our chance for a new strategic relationship with Russia depends on the processes of consultation and negotiation that have been ongoing for several months. That is, the treaties actually reinforce engagement with those in Russia who are willing to find compromise and cooperation.

Imagine that today neither Russia nor the US were constrained by the ABM Treaty, START I and so on. Would we seriously be trying to assess whether there will be a new strategic framework announced at or after the Crawford summit, a new framework and relationship that brings the US and Russia in line with post-post Cold War security realities? I think not. We have to remember that international treaties and institutions carry with them incentives and mechanisms (such as verification teams and transparency measures) that keep countries engaged. I have interviewed Russian officials and military officers who have been engaged in such processes, and we want to keep those engagements going, not lose them. In addition, these processes and interactions are a crucial part of increasing information exchange and providing reassurance about the non-competitive and non-hostile intentions that both Russia and the U.S. find easy to express, but not as easy to demonstrate.

And even if we are not worried about Russia, the Germans are not going to appreciate us making it easier for Russia to escape its debt obligations under the Paris Club, which are based upon Russia's status as the Soviet successor state.

This does not mean we should not get rid of Cold War laws designed to impose costs on the Soviet Union for behavior we did not like. But the way to do it is through changing national U.S. law, not by ripping a hole in the fabric of international law.

thanks, 
Celeste 

Celeste A. Wallander 
Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
1800 K St., NW 
Washington DC 20006 
Tel: (202)775-3233 
Fax: (202)775-3132 
Email: cwalland@csis.org
Back to the Top    Next Article