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#9
New York Times
October 22, 2001
The Ultimate Hatred Is Nuclear
By BRUCE G. BLAIR (bblair@cdi.org)
Bruce G. Blair is president of the Center for Defense Information.
WASHINGTON

Bioterrorism, like the anthrax threats currently rattling America, is horrific. But perhaps the ultimate horror in our newly uncertain world is the prospect of terrorists with nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that any terrorist has nuclear materials now, but the possibility is serious enough so that the government should be heightening security at home by monitoring foreign nations' weapons more closely and planning for military raids, if necessary, to keep weapons out of the wrong hands.

Sophisticated terrorists would be able to make an atomic bomb if they could get the necessary fissile materials -- highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Huge quantities exist around the world. Detonated in Manhattan, a relatively small bomb -- say 15 kilotons in yield, equivalent to the one used on Hiroshima -- could immediately kill 100,000 and cause another 100,000 deaths in the lingering aftermath.

A terrorist wouldn't even need nuclear bomb materials to wreak nuclear havoc on a smaller scale: lethal radioactivity could spew out from a bomb made of nuclear waste and dynamite or from a nuclear power plant attacked by a hijacked plane or a truckload of explosives.

Our first line of defense against nuclear terrorism is at home. Security measures around nuclear power plants, like restrictions on how close planes may fly to them, are already being reviewed, and they should be strengthened as much as possible. But we should also immediately impose better inspection and security regimes at American seaports. Tens of thousands of cargo containers on ships arrive at American ports every day, and given the terrorist networks' extensive business ties around the world, the potential that one of those containers might carry a nuclear device is decidedly too high.

America's actual nuclear arsenal and its fissile materials are heavily guarded, but it's important to make sure security is just as tight abroad. There has been concern for years about the vulnerability of Russian bombs and bomb materials. More than 1,000 tons of bomb-grade plutonium and uranium remain in the former Soviet Union, half stored in its raw form and half inside 20,000 bombs. The United States is already working with Russia in a limited way to secure its nuclear materials and facilities by installing fences and surveillance sensors, but only half of the needed security improvements have been completed. Congress has been balking at continuing to finance this program with $1 billion a year, while it actually should be spending more. Last year, Russia's top security officials urgently sought American help in shoring up security at nuclear weapons sites, but bureaucratic squabbling between the Defense and Energy Departments delayed and diluted the American response. In the end, the Russians got little of the help they had sought.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and other American security agencies should be working with Russian law enforcement not only against terrorists, but to help Russia eliminate organized crime, which could make big profits selling nuclear materials to willing buyers.

Even more pressing, given the American military campaign in Afghanistan and the angry protests by some Pakistanis against their country's cooperation, is ensuring the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Pakistan is estimated to have between 30 and 50 partially disassembled atomic weapons, from 1 to 15 kilotons in yield, stored at several locations 50 to 250 miles from Afghanistan. If the regime were destabilized or toppled, nuclear security would weaken. Moreover, there are radicals within the Pakistani government and military forces, and it is possible that insiders might collude to steal bombs and add them to the arsenal of Osama bin Laden or some other extremist. Pakistani weapons are believed to lack sophisticated locks that would prevent their unauthorized use.

Besides urging Pakistan to strengthen security where its weapons are stored and/or to disable its nuclear devices, the United States should be offering to help out by providing security equipment and guards. And regardless of the degree of cooperation between the two countries, American surveillance and intelligence efforts should be aimed at independently keeping track of the Pakistani arsenal.

To guard against the worst possibility -- Pakistani weapons in the hands of our enemies -- America should have plans ready to provide security without Pakistan's permission, if emergency circumstances dictate, and even to take Pakistan's weapons out of the country if the need arises. Special operations forces in the region should be kept on high alert for quick, covert incursions to disable or even relocate the weapons to prevent their capture by unauthorized people. Nuclear emergency search teams, which are trained in bomb detection and dismantling, should be ready to accompany such military operations. The teams, some from Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, know the basic design of Pakistani weapons from defectors' reports and could devise disabling procedures on the spot.

An even better idea might be to get American and Russian military-civilian bomb response teams together to conduct search and disable missions in Central Asia -- and perhaps in Russia itself in an emergency. The mutual benefits would be considerable, and joint operations to protect everyone against nuclear terror could have lasting positive effects on future United States- Russian cooperation.

Obviously, the elimination of nuclear weapons would not eliminate terrorism. But just as obviously, the need for nuclear safety and security has never been clearer.

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