#12
Center for Defense Information
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/
RUSSIA AND NATO: Now a Chance for Stability
By Ivan Safranchuk (isafranchuk@cdi.org)
Director of CDI Moscow
October 18, 2001
Relations between Russia and NATO have always been marked by extreme instability. In particular, internal contradictions plagued Russia's approach toward NATO throughout the past decade. After Sept. 11, there is finally a chance for Russia and NATO to stabilize their relationship, to co-exist within Europe without focusing on the irresolvable issue of Russia's future NATO membership, and even to work together on mutual problems stemming from globalization, including terrorism.
Russia-NATO in the 1990s: Stemming the Losses
The Soviet Union and NATO were enemies until 1991. But after 1991? Not enemies (at least not in the Cold War sense); almost everyone on both sides agreed with that. Friends, partners, rivals? Not a single definition suggested by politicians and experts during the past 10 years has fully reflected the essence of relations between Russia and NATO.
Part of the problem is that the Russian military-political leadership has felt, and continues to feel, deep psychological discomfort in its relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Unlike the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Soviet Union (the country where the majority of current Russian citizens were born), NATO survived the Cold War. Moreover, many NATO officials, even if they did not state it openly, felt like the winners.
Although Moscow officially declared "there was no winner in the Cold War," Russian officials, perhaps even more so than those at NATO, regarded NATO as the winner. Further, Russia feared that NATO would act as "a winner". Hence, suspiciousness, uncertainty and negativity were the features of Russian policy toward NATO through the 1990s. Understandably, this approach weakened, not strengthened Russia's stance with the alliance -- an organization with a complicated inner structure, intricate procedures of endless coordination at different levels, numerous contradictions at the stage of decision-making, but almost always exceptional unanimity after a decision is made.
One could say that Russia was losing to NATO of its own accord. For instance, during the first round of the NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, unlike NATO, failed to overcome its internal contradictions, make a definite decision and consistently carry it out. All that the Russian political leadership managed to do in 1996 was to send newly appointed Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov into a face-saving battle.
In other words Russia was not playing to win, but to reduce costs. To use a soccer analogy, Russia played not even to match the NATO score, but to miss as few goals as possible. By the time Vladimir Putin came to power, Russian foreign policy (with relations with NATO a prime example) was foundering, with Moscow gripped by wrenching domestic reform and anti-Americanism. Russia lacked faith in its own powers, inner confidence in the correctness of its own positions, and readiness to make serious foreign policy decisions with long-term consequences for the future of the nation.
Vladimir Putin: Slow U-turn
Putin evidently made an accurate evaluation of the foreign policy positions he inherited. In 2000, he did not make a U-turn or turn at even a right angle. Instead, he drew a wide arc -- consisting of numerous minor turns. But, in the end, Putin's policy changes equaled a U-turn.
The current stage of Russia's relations with the Western world is often compared with the early 1990s, the time of the greatest expectations and hopes. Some may suggest that Russia made a full circle and returned to where it started, but in much worse conditions. But it would be more accurate to say that Russia has finally regained an ideological foundation point. This implies a higher degree of purposefulness and single direction of Russia's future steps. Russia now can address its role in Europe and vis-a-vis NATO from a more stable and consistent position.
First off, it should be understood that Russia's admission to NATO -- discussed so much recently -- is impossible in practice. Admission may make sense only as the symbolic ritual for including Russia in the Western world. From a practical viewpoint, Russia's inclusion in NATO would not strengthen the alliance as a military-political organization, the main purpose of which still is common defense against outside threats.
Take for instance, the problem of standards in weaponry. If Russia is admitted to the alliance, the problem of differing standards for even simple things such as ammunition cannot be resolved without Russia being given special treatment. Another readily seen problem is personnel training and readiness. For instance, the required annual flight time for pilots in the United States is more than 200 hours. Russian pilots don't always get even 20. Such issues of military integration cannot be easily resolved, as they are closely connected with the progress of Russia's own military reform, its financing, structure, etc.
And it would be naive to believe that NATO could ignore all the technical problems, and admit Russia as ballast. Moreover, Russia itself doesn't need such a role.
However, Russia's lack of preparedness is not the only problem. NATO is not prepared either.
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty has been invoked after the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States. This should have lead to full-scale NATO involvement in the military operation in Afghanistan. However, NATO — as a collective military and self-defense organization -- is not actively involved. The United States prefers to act mostly through bilateral channels, without relying on NATO structures. Presumably, this reflects U.S. belief that NATO is not effective enough to command and coordinate this new sort of warfare. With the world now focused on the issue of transnational terrorism, NATO may not be as military reliable or relevant in the future as it was seen to be in the past.
At the same time, NATO has not evolved into a purely political structure, either. Most of the European allies, as well as aspiring member countries, seem to be comfortable with NATO being in transition. But the alliance cannot be in transition forever. In the view of many in Russia, NATO has two potential tracks for development: to become a political organization in Europe (to preserve its current geographical scope plus Eastern Europe and Russia, but to change the mission); or to become an efficient military structure capable of tackling new threats world-wide and to defend a number of countries, defined as the civilized world, from outside challenges (to change the geographical scope, but to maintain its original mission). The latter would mean that NATO in future would do exactly what it was established for, but instead of within Europe and against Russia, outside of Europe and in close cooperation with Russia.
Even if NATO decided to take the first course -- transforming into a political organization within Europe, in which Russian membership would currently make practical sense -- this would take years. But Russia and NATO should be acting now to find better ways to work together to address the problems of the post- Cold War era.
Therefore, neither Brussels nor Moscow should be focused on Russia's virtual or symbolic membership in NATO. Instead, allied and Russian officials should concentrate on building a practical partnership on a wide range of issues: combating terrorism; finding ways to control the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; reviving arms control; addressing environmental problems; creating processes for the formation of joint contingents for peacekeeping operations with common command structures; exchanging intelligence data (including data collected by agents), and information about the intentions of third countries and non-governmental formations (their list may be defined separately) that may damage NATO countries or Russia.
Many of these tasks are related to areas outside Europe and the transatlantic zone proper, i.e., outside the traditional zone of NATO responsibility. Thus, cooperation between Russia and NATO should be developing in the context of the globalization of NATO and the buildup of its out-of-area operations (outside the responsibility zone defined by the 1949 Washington Treaty) -- something Russia strongly resisted in the recent past.
Regarding security questions within NATO's traditional geographic zone, it might be easier for the Western allies and Russia to tackle long-term tasks of maintaining peace and stability with the help of other, most likely new, security structures, rather than NATO. Much as Russia rejected a broadening of NATO's geographic scope throughout the 1990s, NATO and the United States, in turn, rejected efforts to transfer Euro-Atlantic political responsibilities outside of NATO. Instead, allied countries staked their collective future on developing a post-Cold War European security system centered around NATO, and largely succeeded in the short-term: some former Warsaw Pact countries were admitted, others are on the waiting list, and the rest belong to the alliance's Partnership for Peace program. Russia could not propose anything realistic in contrast, except strengthening the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In fact, Russia, itself, hardly believed the possibly of building a European security system relying on OSCE.
Now, however, with the U.S. and much of the world focused on combating global terrorism, the time is ripe for considering the development of a new, primarily political, organization to maintain long-term peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic zone. Such an organization would have Russia as an equal member, with Moscow fully involved in decision-making mechanisms. If a new organization were created, it could serve a dual purpose: relieve NATO from handling internal political relations in the transatlantic region, and free it to tackle new threats world-wide; and relieve the psychological discomfort now plaguing Russia with regard to NATO's evolution to take on more global missions.
Renaissance: Common interests and values, not concessions and rewards
The tragic developments in the United States were by no means the reason for the renaissance in Russia's relations with the Western world, rather a catalyst for a more rapid evolution. Russia, because of the dire need for internal economic and democratic reforms, already was on a path of repairing foreign policy relations with the West -- because without Western input and assistance, Russia is unlikely to be able to achieve its internal goals of stability and prosperity.
In fact, a catalyst for change was necessary primarily for the West. The saying "A friend in need is a friend indeed" clearly reflects the essence of the new U.S. and NATO view of Russia.
After Sept. 11, Moscow delicately remarked that for two years the West had ignored its declarations about an international terrorist network and the need to combat it. This low-key tact is probably the best indication of the maturity of Putin's new foreign policy course. Russian leaders managed to restrain themselves from telling everyone that they had been right (but nobody had listened), or from asking the West apologize for failing to do so. It can only be hoped that the pragmatic administration of President George W. Bush will appreciate Moscow's thoughtfulness and self-restraint.
It is also important to understand the following: Russia should not expect, and should certainly refrain from asking for, any "reward" for its helpful stance post Sept. 11. The expectation of reward in any form (even praise for doing what it does) will reduce the effect of the unspoken standard of solidarity currently permeating Russia's relations with the West. Russia is doing what it is doing not to please anyone or to try to prove something. Russia is acting in its own interests, relying on its own idea of security -- which happen to largely be in common with those of the United States and NATO. Russia's stance is not a tactical maneuver but a strategic line. Only with such an understanding will Russia's actions make sense in the present and produce positive results in the future.
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