#11
stratfor.com
October 17, 2001
Uzbekistan Seeking Regional Dominance
Summary
Uzbekistan has long considered itself the dominant power in Central Asia, and now with the United States establishing a military presence in the country for the long term, Tashkent is growing even stronger. But Russia's ambitions in the region and its importance to Washington will ultimately thwart Uzbekistan's plans.
Analysis
About three weeks ago, the United States began shipping men and materiel to the Khanabad air base near Karshi in southern Uzbekistan. U.S. forces look set to be engaged on Uzbek soil for several years, as the battle for Afghanistan's future is sizing up to be only the first in a series of protracted military campaigns.
Uzbekistan: Broadening its Horizons?
Uzbekistan is becoming more adversarial in relations with its Kyrgyz and Tajik neighbors. Using the admittedly real threat of Islamic militants as a pretext, Uzbekistan will begin seizing control of border regions with the intent of eventually controlling all of the Ferghana Valley.
Analysis
Talks between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan broke off in acrimony Feb. 15 after Uzbek negotiators insisted on concessions unrelated to border delimitation. With 140 points of disagreement, the talks are expected to drag on for some time.
Tashkent will use the U.S. presence and support to upgrade its military capabilities and further its goal of Central Asia domination. But Russia's cooperation with America will prevent Uzbekistan's ambitions from becoming a reality.
Uzbekistan is Central Asia's largest, richest and most populous state, and for 10 years, it has sought to build a regional hegemony. None of its neighbors can match the country's economic, military or diplomatic superiority, and as long as it doesn't try to take control of the Russian-dominated oil fields in Kazakhstan, even Moscow is largely content to let Uzbekistan play prince in the Central Asian sandbox.
Uzbek President Islam Karimov wants to expand his country's borders, including seizing the entire Ferghana Valley from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Control over this area would increase Tashkent's ability to root out the increasingly active Islamic militants who want to create their own state there and who launch numerous attacks against Uzbekistan.
Although security is the main concern, the Karimov government also wants control over various infrastructure such as pipelines, highways and power grids scattered through the region. Taking such infrastructure would drastically reduce Uzbekistan's dependencies on other countries, including giving it control of critical water sources.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are both too small and weak to broker serious opposition, and Turkmenistan's military isn't strong enough to even qualify as one. Several major Turkmen natural gas fields, with infrastructure in place, are within a few short miles of the Uzbek border and would be easy for the Uzbek military to seize.
For years, Uzbekistan has slowly been sculpting Central Asia in its own image. Its military forces have regularly pursued militants back into Tajikistan, its intelligence services operate unimpeded throughout the border region of the Ferghana and increasingly it has asserted control over the infrastructure that Tajik and Kyrgyz towns in the region need in order to function.
The major powers largely consented to Tashkent's strengthening grip. The United States categorized the problematic Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a terrorist group, giving the government relatively free rein to crack down.
And China quietly made it clear it preferred a strong Uzbek hold on the region to the weaker grip of either Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan because of its own concerns about the Islamic militancy. And even Russia, although leery of Uzbekistan becoming too powerful, appreciated that someone else in the region was willing to blast Islamic separatists whenever they showed their heads.
Now, however, Uzbekistan seems set to host a major U.S. presence on its soil indefinitely. The United States will upgrade the Khanabad base to America's unparalleled standards and collaborate greatly with Uzbeks in intelligence and special forces operations. Although the equipment and infrastructure that U.S. forces leave behind will be important, the expertise they will impart to their hosts will be equally as vital.
Uzbekistan's intelligence and military capability in fighting its Islamic insurgency will skyrocket due to U.S. assistance. America's operations against the Taliban are exactly the kind Tashkent needs to master if it is to effectively launch attacks against IMU forces in Tajikistan. And with Tashkent and Washington now seeing eye-to-eye on security, American criticisms of the harsh measures used to crack down on the rebels will likely be muted.
But the American presence also creates opportunities for one other exceedingly important player: Russia. American forces are operating in next-door Tajikistan thanks to Russian permission. U.S. forces have access to the intelligence and fighters of the opposition Northern Alliance thanks to Russian contacts. Anti-Taliban forces within Afghanistan are operational because of Russian supplies.
Uzbekistan is certainly necessary, but without Russia's unwavering backing, America's manhunt for Osama bin Laden in the deserts and mountains of Afghanistan would be severely handicapped.
Unfortunately for Uzbekistan, its leader lacks the wherewithal to sustain the country's gains. Karimov has consistently limited foreign investment, strangled both public and private companies and in general made Uzbekistan a thoroughly miserable place to live. Without continual injections from the United States, Uzbekistan would continue its downward economic -- and by extension military -- slide.
This is not to say Uzbekistan's neighbors are doing much better, but Russia has and will again take steps to mitigate Uzbekistan's influence. Karimov's government also has no staying power. The country is so politically sterile -- and centered around Karimov personally -- that should anything happen to him, Uzbekistan would almost certainly fall into chaos and under Moscow's control.
The bottom line is that although the United States certainly needs Uzbekistan and wants it to remain independent from Russia, U.S. forces will eventually leave. Once that happens, Russia's power and importance to the United States will more likely make Moscow, not Tashkent, the region's dominant force.
Next Article