#6
The Moment of Truth for the Kremlin
Obshaya Gazeta, October 11-18, 2001 # 41.
By Michael McFaul and Nikolai Zlobin
Michael McFaul, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and professor at Stanford University and Senior Fellow
at the Hoover Institution
Nikolai Zlobin, Senior Fellow at the Center for Defense Information
Washington, DC and executive editor of Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of
Post-Soviet Democratization
After Japan attacked the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the United States
joined the military alliance in which the Soviet Union played a leading
role. The flagships of capitalism and socialism were suddenly thrown
together by a common problem: Axis aggression. Political, ideological,
economic and various other differences of opinion, differences that
seemed so fundamental and insurmountable just days earlier, were immediately
thrown aside. With time, however, it became clear, that they were
thrown aside only for the duration of the struggle against this enemy.
On the tragic day of 11 September 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin
was the first world leader to get in touch with George W. Bush. The
Russian President expressed resolute support for America in the fight
against a common enemy: international terrorism. On that day, here in
Washington, we received dozens of phone calls and e-mails from friends
and colleagues in Russia who wanted to express their condolences and their
desire to help. It became clearer than ever that Russia and the United
States, the Russians and the Americans, have so much in common that
they can become members of the same international system. Just like sixty
years ago, that which unites us is stronger than all of the discords
that draw us apart.
Vladimir Putin's address to the people of Russia demonstrated that he
had made his choice. However, as often happens in Russia, some of the
high-level presidential advisors immediately began to "explain" and
"elucidate" his propositions of Russian support for the
counter-terrorist
operation. Influential military and political experts recommended a
return to old Soviet traditions: in particular, they immediately began
to fret about NATO forces in Central Asia and about the fate of their old
Soviet allies - Iran and Iraq.
To give Putin his due - he made the most important decision of his
presidential career. The terrorist attack on the United States gave
Russia an opportunity to finally become a part of the West. The
disagreements that divided the US and Russia throughout the second half
of the 1990s seemed insignificant in comparison with the new common
interests. Yet even for the President of Russia, it was easier to announce his
decision than to realize it in practice.
Putin's address showed that, in his desire to join forces with America,
he was very far from the majority of the Russian political elite. Part of
the Russian elite was entangled by political and economic contracts with
various forces in the Islamic world, including those that would become
the focus of American retribution. Many representatives of that elite are
still guided by anti-American sentiments, still maintain nostalgic
hopes for the restoration of lost superpower status. Without a doubt, they
will attempt to tie President Putin's hands. If the Russian President falls
under the influence of those who still fit the molds of Soviet
geopolitical thinking, Russia could - again, and for a long time - lose
the chance to integrate itself into the contemporary Western
civilization.
The commencing war against terrorism will not be quick and easy. It will
not be a "cold" war, nor a "hot" war, but a "warm"
war of sorts. Many
of the method to be used, have been used until today strictly as domestic
means of guaranteeing national security and sovereignty: gathering
intelligence, providing weapons to political allies abroad, secret
diplomacy and etc. Russia and the US recognize their common interests,
which means they should combine their efforts. In a war against
terrorism, just as in any other war, the success of an ally becomes
your success, and his defeat becomes your defeat.
This is a unique chance to eliminate the lack of trust between our
nations. If that is accomplished, the prolonged process of abolishing
the political and ideological baggage of the Cold War can be completed
fairly quickly. In a situation like this, President Bush could help his
Russian colleague to make another right choice. He could remind the Russian
President of an obvious fact - that Russia cannot become a full-fledged
member of the Western society until it creates a stable democratic
system at home.
As the US administration gets caught up in a drawn-out conflict with a
new enemy, it will be tempted to set aside questions that are critical to
nations that support it. There should be no mistake here. For example,
Washington's reliance on local leaders in Asia will have a temporary
and limited character and will not make their regimes more attractive to
the democratic society.
In other words, regardless of the support Moscow shows for America, Russia
will not become an equal partner in the West until internal democratic
processes gather strength. It is not simply a coincidence that all of
the democratic nations - whether rich or poor - have good relations with
the United States, while America's enemies are - without exception -
dictatorial regimes. The strengthening of democracy is a key deterrent
in a civilized world.
America currently needs Russian assistance, and will be grateful for
it. Washington has already placed a high value on Moscow's decision to
cooperate in the struggle against terrorism and on the Russian "ok" of
the cooperation of its Central Asian allies. Vladimir Putin is probably
the only world leader who - by virtue of his education, experience and
mentality - is prepared for action in these circumstances. Russia has
invaluable experience with conflicts in the region of impending
military
action. As it takes a correct step at the beginning of a long journey,
Russia should not detract from its value. By stumbling around,
confronting Washington with endless political or economic conditions
and other such unimpressive actions, it would risk strangling the emergent
union in its infancy.
America would not stand for Russia's attempts to, once again, contest
the necessity of NATO, or drive a wedge between the United States and the
European Union. Over the last three weeks, both NATO and the
European-American friendship have demonstrated their importance and
strength. At the same time, Washington also needs to openly recognize
Russia's interests in Central Asia, in the Caspian, in Chechnya. The
situation will be aggravated if the two nations have different visions
for the future of Afghanistan or Iraq, or if Russia and the US conduct
their political games there in secrecy.
A democratic Russia is interested in establishing democracies in Asian
nations. America is interested in this as well. It is clear that
attempts to make political changes - in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, for
example - are complex and dangerous; they are tasks of the distant future.
It is pointless to talk about democracy in Afghanistan, where only 30%
of the men and 15% of the women can read, where the percentage of widows
and orphans is the highest in the world, where life expectancy is below 44
years and yearly income less than $100 per capita. The people who
planned, financed, and carried out the terrorist attacks in the United
States are not poor, not illiterate, not Afghans. Nonetheless, at the
root of the strategy for the fight against Islamic Fundamentalism must
be support for new ideas and new leaders in this region. Fundamentalism
of any sort is a monopoly. And the deadly enemies of monopoly are
pluralism, freedom, choice, openness and democracy.
Bush has to show Russia that new opportunities for cooperation exist. The
US must set democratic development in Russia as a prerequisite. At the
same time, Bush can convince other Western leaders that Russian
integration into the European-American civilization is a real and
achievable goal. He can begin by supporting Russian entry into the
WTO, lowering trade barriers for Russian imports and rejecting the majority
of visa limitations. Bush can promise to support Russia in strengthening
its position in Central Asia and to help it sell energy to NATO nations.
He can facilitate the growth of American investment in the Russian
economy.
Furthermore, the US president can designate the concrete steps that
should be taken to prepare Russia for entry into NATO.
On 11 September, many of our stereotypes faced a "reality check" -
and
they could not stand up to it. The terrorist attacks clearly
demonstrated
the threats America faces. Russia should not be one of these threats.
On the contrary, these days have shown us how much closer our countries
have gotten over the past decade. A united effort can destroy international
terrorism. The most important thing is that, at the end of the battle,
the winners are not - as before - on the opposite sides of the
barricades.
