#9
The Russia Journal
September 21-27, 2001
BRINGING THE WAR HOME
By John Helmer
Big events don't make small minds any bigger. Words uttered in passion
usually
produce drivel. So, if you are to understand the meaning of the American
events, listen carefully to this old, cold man.
In 1968, when I was an editor on Madison Avenue, New York's magazine row, I
hired a man called Edward Luttwak to write an article on how
terrorists could seize control of New York City. His plan of attack
focused on showing how vulnerable Manhattan was because it's an island.
Luttwak's hypothetical terrorists used small amounts of explosive to blow up
the bridge and tunnel approaches to the city. Luttwak himself went on from
there to make a career of persuading US governments to do what is in the
best interests of Israel's military establishment. That's exactly what one of
Luttwak's old friend, Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, is
doing at this moment. If Secretary of State Colin Powell doesn't stop him,
the US will follow Ariel Sharon, the Butcher of Beirut, into the latter's
bloodthirsty schemes. US governments have been tempted, but none has ever
been that foolish.
In 1972, when I was an academic at Harvard University, I published a book
called "Bringing the War Home." It was a sociological study of a large
group
of American infantrymen I interviewed after they returned from combat duty in
the Vietnam War. The book uncovered several important reasons, not thought of
then and not remembered today, for the collapse of the American Army's will
to fight in Vietnam. Remember that was a conflict that cost about 50,000
American lives, and millions of Vietnamese. At the time, casualties on the
scale the US suffered last week caused an irreversible loss of confidence in
the American ability to win. That translated into reluctance to fight on the
ground; and support to end the war at home. The refusal to accept
that lesson characterizes that era's war-maker, Henry Kissinger. He started
the US down the track of committing war crimes in pursuit of national
interest. His students in Washington have adapted his lessons, thinking they
could get away with their crimes with a minimum of American losses. In time,
they were bound to hit on reality. Reality struck on September 11.
In 1977, I was a member of President Jimmy Carter's staff, with the job
of analyzing what happens in White House decision-making that can send the
country down the wrong path. With a US Airforce colonel, I did studies of how
Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had been conducting his
role. But when Brzezinski learned what we had discovered, he applied pressure
on our superiors. The colonel and I were told that, if we said a word about
our findings when we met Carter, the colonel would be cashiered, and I
would be fired. We kept quiet. Brzezinski is another of the band of
passionate haters like Kissinger, who believe the US can extract
benefit from the destruction they like to dream up. Wolfowitz is one of
them; Sharon is their puppet.
If there is something fundamentally new for Americans in what happened last
week in the US, it is the interpretation, not the fact of violence as
state policy. That, of course, depends on who is on the receiving end. It is
hardly surprising that retaliation and revenge are now splitting the Bush
Administration. It has always been so. Even Franklin Roosevelt, a much wiser
man than George Bush Jr., believed symbolic revenge for Japan's attack on
Pearl Harbour was necessary, at least for public morale and presidential
ratings. Watch the film "Pearl Harbour", and you will realize that the
Jimmy
Doolittle raid on Tokyo that followed Pearl Harbour was a suicide mission
dressed up a symbol of resurrection.
Unfortunately, it is as difficult to convince a generation of American-haters
in the Middle East that this isn't so, as it is to convince Americans
that the Doolittle raid wasn't a victory. But an attack on Osama bin Laden
can't succeed, even if bin Laden himself is killed, because those who are
attacking the US don't need bin Laden's ideology or his money. A US attack on
Saddam Hussein, or Israeli attacks on Palestine and Lebanon, are just as
doomed to repeat and intensify the cycle, not terminate it.
If you understand that the US is now engaged in a war that will last as long
as Britain, France, Spain, and many other states understand, then the
implications for Russia, and for Russian business especially, become clearer.
Although the US is heaving itself on to one of the worst waves of
anti-semitism ever seen in the country -- Arabs are semites as well as Jews
-- Americans will soon lose patience with ineffectual war-fighting and
unsated thirst for blood. They will realize they are being led to the
slaughter for reasons they don't support. In reaction to that, they will get
used to terrorism as a calculated risk, like they have understood AIDs,
teenage muggers, and cigarette companies. Because there is no alternative,
they will get on with their business. If warmaking doesn't achieve
prosperity, they will insist it does. This sentiment is already obvious, as
the insurance, airline, and construction industries troop to Washington to
demand a share in the $20 to $40 billion-dollar benefit fund the Bush
Administration is promising the economy.
This injection may not revive consumer confidence and corporate
capital spending in equal measure throughout the US economy. But for sheer
size and speed, the volume of cash that is likely to be pumped into the US
economy soon will boost a number of sectors in which the Russian
economy has a prime interest. So Russia stands to gain from the new US boom,
if not the thinking that is behind it at the moment. Can Russia, can anyone
talk the Bush Administration out of thinking the worst, in order to secure
the best that is now possible?
As a producer of oil and metals, Russia will gain directly from the
combination of policies now being assembled in Washington and New York.
If oil prices rise on Middle Eastern supply risks, then Russian policy
benefits. Who now says a pipeline to carry Caspian Sea oil across
Turkey would be more secure for US interests than a pipeline across Russia?
If the US dollar weakens, and foreign risks begin to converge toward the
level of Russian risks, Russian capital currently held offshore is likely to
accelerate its return home, where investment will pay higher rates of
return. A decline in safe havens abroad can initiate more capital inflow into
Russia than most Kremlin policies, although annual 5% GDP growth rates can't
hurt. In a world of cheaper dollars, and rising real commodity export prices,
repaying the Yeltsin debts should be easier.
If international banks and investors must reassess their global risks, at the
same time as Washington starts priming the pump to record levels, then in
emerging markets, Russia and perhaps South Africa will stand out. Turkey,
Taiwan, Argentina are out of the question. By attacking the World Trade Centre
last week's attackers were hoping to start a revolution in the distribution
of
international capital, and not simply strike at an object of political or
ideological hatred. Again, if prudence in the pursuit of national interest
prevails, Russia will gain.
There is nothing especially novel about that either; certainly not for
Russia,
which has been undergoing its own capital revolution for a decade. Wall Street
has faced concerted attack before too. There is thus a chance for the two
to benefit more equally than was true here since 1991. But if the Wolfowitz
gang prevails, Wall Street will be the loser; Russia's gains will persist.
