December 13, 2000   

This Date's Issues:   4684 • 4685 • 4686

Johnson's Russia List
#4686
13 December 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. The Yomiuri Shimbun/Daily Yomiuri (Japan): Yoshio Hanada, From Russia without love -- sham marriages on rise in Moscow.
2. New York Times letter: Progress in Ukraine.
3. The Scotsman (UK): Bill Wallace, A year on, corruption-plagued Russia balks at deeper reforms.
4. RFE/RL: Michael Lelyveld, Decision On Gazprom Signals Caution In Reforms.
5. Interfax: Russian Communist leader critizes constitution, illusion of a market economy.
6. Moscow Times editorial: Red Flags Are Merely Uninspiring.
7. US Department of State: Emil Pain Named Galina Starovoitova Fellowship Recipient.
8. The Guardian (UK): Amelia Gentleman, Liberals put forward plan to bury Lenin.
9. Christian Science Monitor: Scott Peterson, Reporting from Chechnya? Take your ATM card.
10. New York Times: Patrick Tyler, Putin Nurturing Old Friendships of a Soviet Past.
11. strana.ru: Russian President Vladimir Putin interviewed by Cuban and Russian media. (transcript)]
 
******

#1
The Yomiuri Shimbun/Daily Yomiuri - Japan
December 13, 2000
>From Russia without love -- sham marriages on rise in Moscow
Yoshio Hanada, Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent

MOSCOW--Phony marriages are widespread in Moscow. According to one Moscow
journalist, one-third of marriages in the Russian capital are a sham.

Many Russians from outside Moscow want to make their fortunes in the capital,
where most of the country's wealth is concentrated, but it is hard to secure
the right to reside there through the proper procedures.

The problems facing those from outside Moscow are easily resolved by a piece
of paper--a certificate of marriage to a Muscovite.

As demand for phony marriages increases, businesses that broker such matches
are thriving.

An office of one such agency is located at the end of a dark corridor in the
basement of an old building in the northeast of the capital.

A young man who identified himself as Sergei explained: "I arrange an average
of four contracts a month. I make big money."

Many of his clients are men, including second-hand bicycle salesmen and
traveling merchants, who are aged between 30 and 35 and want to enter the
Moscow market.

Sergei arranges a meeting for them with a prospective bride, and, if a
contract is concluded, fills out the marriage registration documents and
submits them to the Moscow city government "with the cooperation of an
official of the government's family registration bureau," who is an "old
friend," he said.

The process takes about 10 days, and Sergei charges 2,000 dollars per client.

How does he find the women? "I get them through advertisements or sometimes
ask prostitutes I know," he said.

Some women even make a living by marrying for money. One such woman,
26-year-old Oksana, has entered into as many as seven sham marriages.

Oksana, who hails from the Ural region, was worried about the difficulty of
obtaining the right to reside in Moscow.

Six years ago, she spent 2,000 dollars--all her savings at the time--on
entering into a phony marriage with a Moscow man to obtain the right to live
in the capital. That was how she came across the service from which she now
makes a living.

Her first marriage was dissolved two months later, when she filed for divorce
on the grounds of "lack of love for spouse."

Znakomstvo, a weekly magazine that provides information about marriage, is
full of advertisements for marriage agencies. Most of them are said to handle
phony marriages.

The fact that so many Russians from outside Moscow want to obtain permission
to live in the capital, even if they have to enter into costly sham marriages
to do so, is proof of the extent of the poverty in other areas.

Ninety percent of Russia's wealth is concentrated in Moscow. According to the
Institute of Socioeconomic Problems, a central government think tank, the
standard of living in Moscow is four times the national average.

Understandably, numerous Russians living outside Moscow dream of making it
big in the capital.

But living in Moscow without being registered as a resident there is
extremely difficult. People who do so are treated as temporary residents and
must reregister every three months.

Screening is strict, and the procedures are complex and time-consuming. In
addition, temporary residents must go through further complicated procedures
if they want to take employment or enter schools in Moscow.

Furthermore, police view them skeptically as outsiders and sometimes demand
bribes.

The Moscow city government is powerless to stop the spread of phony
marriages. Olga Vilkova, deputy director of the city's family registration
bureau, said, "If both parties to a marriage have agreed to it, they are not
doing anything illegal."

About 69,000 marriages were registered with the Moscow city government last
year.

Elena Levina, a reporter with the daily newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda who
has researched the issue, said, "One-third of marriages in Moscow are phony."

******

#2
New York Times
December 13, 2000
Letter
Progress in Ukraine
 
To the Editor:

Re "Headaches Pile Up on Ukraine Leader" (news article, Dec. 6):

President Leonid Kuchma's decision to shut down the Chernobyl nuclear power
station is not a "headache," but rather a sign of the success of our reforms
and of cooperation with the international community. A 5 percent growth in
gross domestic product, a 12 percent rise in industrial output this year, the
recent decision of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to
provide Ukraine with a loan for winter fuel, and an agreement to reschedule
the gas debt to Russia show that we are on the right track.

The problems in Ukraine's relations with the International Monetary Fund have
been clarified, and we expect resumption of credits shortly.

On the disappearance of the journalist Georgy Gongadze: The government of
Ukraine and law enforcement agencies are doing everything in their power to
find Mr. Gongadze, we hope alive, and to get to the bottom of this case.

KOSTYANTYN GRYSHCHENKO
Ambassador of Ukraine
Washington, Dec. 7, 2000

********

#3
The Scotsman (UK)
December 12, 2000
A year on, corruption-plagued Russia balks at deeper reforms
BY BILL WALLACE

IT MIGHT be any western country. Less than a year after the elections, the
leader of the main opposition party has announced that the honeymoon is over:
since the government has let the people down, it must face a sustained
challenge.

There have been reports of ministerial differences and a possible reshuffle;
but these have been dismissed as malicious rumours. The lower house of
parliament has voted against a privatisation measure because of lack of
detailed justification, while the upper house has threatened to block the
budget in the face of inroads on its powers. There are great arguments about
the state of the economy and the country's standing in the world. But in fact
it is not a western country - it is Russia.

Strange perhaps; but at first sight reassuring. Boris Yeltsin's overbearing,
confrontational bluster has gone. Vladimir Putin may have a secret service
background but he is engaged in an apparently constructive if occasionally
heated series of exchanges with a Duma and Federation Council that are trying
hard to find their place in an altering political constellation. Serious
problems are being openly discussed. Yet there are worrying signs.

The president's relationship with the Duma is certainly better. Thus there
have been initiatives and concessions on both sides in agreeing a balanced
budget for 2001.

But this has been partly because even the largest faction, the Communist
Party, has no more than 88 out of the 450 seats and partly because, at the
outset, Mr Putin ensured himself some support by securing it several
committee chairmanships. All the time, he has been building up a broad
supporting alliance around the pro-government Unity Party.

His treatment of the upper chamber has been very different. Concerned about
the power of many of the 89 regions represented on it, he was fairly quick to
establish seven super-regions firmly under central control and to remove the
89 locally elected governors from the Federation Council to a new State
Council. He has made it clear that, from now on, the function of each body is
simply to reinforce his chain of command - an unhappy precedent.

Mr Putin could not have achieved this much politically without a marked
improvement in the economy. Gross domestic product dropped almost 5 per cent
in 1998, but last year it rose 3 per cent and this year it is expected to
rise 7 per cent. The foreign trade balance is over $40 billion. Most people
remain poor, but they are being paid something and can buy reasonable Russian
goods. Maybe things will be even better next year. So why not let the
politicians get on with it?

The trouble is that prosperity generated by a sharp fall in the value of the
rouble and a huge rise in the prices of energy and minerals could disappear
as quickly as it came. But that apart, Russia owes $150 billion in foreign
debt. Mikhail Kasyanov, the prime minister, has secured a rescheduling from
the London Club of commercial creditors, but he has so far failed to persuade
the Paris Club of sovereign creditors to follow suit.

After two weeks in Moscow an International Monetary Fund delegation indicated
that it could recommend any further loans unless the Russian government
undertook the far-reaching economic reforms it has long promised.

Bang could go the balanced budget, not to mention its improved social
provision.

Early in July, Mr Putin published a list of reforms he hoped could be
implemented within the next ten years; and his ministers have already
persuaded the Duma to reshape the tax system. But the list was short on
detail and looks as if it will be long in receiving serious attention. In
particular, there has been very little overt movement towards creating the
favourable business environment that Russian as well as foreign companies
need if they are to create wealth - honest banking, transparent accounting,
proper corporate governance, legal redress.

This is where Mr Putin has so far failed. He has not clamped down on the
mafia, their smuggling of everything from guns and drugs to caviar, and their
crippling protection rackets. More importantly, he has not yet fulfilled his
promise to dispose of the oligarchs who run big business for their own
enrichment and to the impoverishment of the country.

True, he is supporting some shareholders in pursuit of their corporate
rights. He has also authorised legal proceedings against two of the more
prominent oligarchs, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, and is eyeing up
a few others. But he has not mounted a convincing campaign and, in targeting
media moguls whose outlets have been critical of him, he has allowed his own
motives to be questioned. So his rating in the opinion polls has slipped.

He achieved office on a pledge to improve everyone's standard of living. Yet,
there was his other pledge: to make Russia powerful again. That he has done.
He has been welcomed in most of the capitals of Europe and in the Vatican;
and he has formed strategic alliances with China and India and mediated
between the two Koreas. He has pounded the Chechens. And now he has elevated
the Taleban and their scattered followers to the status of an almost
invincible force threatening the entire Caspian region to the point where the
former Soviet republics there see their greatest protection in, of all
things, close military and economic co-operation with Russia.

If he cannot immediately achieve economic reform and be popular that way, he
can always be populist. But, traditionally, populist presidents are
dangerous. Hopefully, Mr Putin himself may realise this in time.

*******

#4
Russia: Decision On Gazprom Signals Caution In Reforms
By Michael Lelyveld

The Russian government has decided against any speedy restructuring of the
gas monopoly Gazprom, according to reports. The latest plan seems to be a
sign that President Vladimir Putin's economic team has had second thoughts
about the pace of reform.

Boston, 12 December 2000 (RFE/RL) -- The Russian government's decision to go
slow on restructuring the gas monopoly Gazprom seems to reflect the cautious
approach of President Vladimir Putin's economic reform team.

According to reports in the past week, Kremlin officials have decided that
any changes to the operation of giant Gazprom will be gradual. A Gazprom
board meeting called on Saturday to review shareholder complaints about the
company's questionable ties to the gas trader Itera also put off discussing
the issue until next month.

The delays appear to be a sign that the Putin government will not take on the
task of reforming the politically-powerful company quickly.

German Gref, the economic development and trade minister, told the newspaper
Vedomosti last week that "radical measures are not required for the reform of
Gazprom as they are for other natural monopolies like the Unified Energy
Systems and the Railways Ministry."

Critics including Boris Federov, a Gazprom board member and former finance
minister, have previously disagreed with that assessment. Federov asked for
the Saturday meeting to force a full disclosure of dealings with Itera, amid
suspicions that Gazprom's assets are being stripped to hide profits from the
state.

The issue of Gazprom and its profits is seen as crucial to Russia's economic
future. As Russia's biggest taxpayer, Gazprom is said to owe the federal
budget $1.3 billion. At the same time, the world's biggest gas company is 38
percent state-owned.

Gazprom also plays a critical role in the life of Russia's consumers. As the
provider of gas within Russia at subsidized rates, the company supplies the
market with cheap energy. But Gazprom also sells all of Russia's exported gas
to Western markets at world prices, a trade that is likely to bring in
revenues of $15 billion this year.

Calls for reform of these multiple roles have come from many quarters.
Russia's independent oil producers, for example, want to gain access to
Gazprom's export pipelines to sell the gas they produce. Others see the
country's low tariffs as discouraging investment in Russia's aging gas fields.

But the government's plan, which has been leaked to publications including
Vedomosti and Petroleum Argus, suggest that change may come so slowly that
any meaningful reforms could take at least a decade. Under the three-stage
plan, Gazprom could remain a protected monopoly even longer than that.

On the subject of gas pricing, the government would reportedly raise the
domestic tariffs to between $18 and $20 per thousand cubic meters in 2003.
Gas in Russia sells for $10 to $15 per thousand cubic meters now. In 2005,
the price would rise to between $28 to $30. Two or three years later, it
would go up to between $43 and $45. After that the government would
relinquish all price controls, except on transport charges for gas.

The advantage of the plan is that it may avoid rude shocks for Russian
consumers. The problem is that it may take six years before the domestic
market is asked to pay even as much as Russia is now charged for the gas it
imports from Turkmenistan. Even in 2008, Russian gas users will be paying
less than half of what Gazprom charges to European customers now. It is
uncertain that such an approach will promote near-term investment in Russia's
gas fields.

But the government seems to be just as concerned about protecting Gazprom as
Russia's consumers. Plans to split the company into separate production and
transport units appear to have been dropped, Petroleum Argus said. Instead,
17 of Gazprom's transportation subsidiaries may be merged into one or two
larger companies, potentially creating an even more potent monopoly.

In perhaps seven years, independent oil producers would be allowed to pump
gas through Gazprom pipelines, but only to CIS countries, which generally pay
about half of European tariffs. The plan would permit the independent
producers to export to Europe by 2010, but even then, the deliveries would
take place under the supervision of Gazprom.

The pace of the plan suggests that Putin's reform team may be having second
thoughts about how far and how fast to press the restructuring of the Russian
economy.

Although the government has supported strong measures to increase collections
for electricity and gas, the plan for gradual change at Gazprom seems to be a
sign that the country will rely on heavy energy subsidies for years to come.
Even slow changes may require political support rather than conflict with a
monopoly as powerful as Gazprom.

*******

#5
Russian Communist leader critizes constitution, illusion of a market economy
Interfax

Moscow, 13 December: The Constitution of the Russian Federation should be
changed instead of celebrating the day on which it was adopted, says Gennadiy
Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party [of the Russian Federation] and of
its parliamentary [State Duma] faction.

In an interview with Interfax on Wednesday [13 December], he noted that he
refrained from attending the reception in the Kremlin on the occasion of
Constitution Day, because in his opinion the constitution "does not guarantee
anything but disastrous poverty for the people and fabulous wealth for a
handful of oligarchs".

"The present constitution does not guarantee the unity of the country or the
unity of the Russian people. It does not prevent separatist trends that may
lead to a split in the Russian Federation along the same pattern as the split
of the Soviet Union," said Zyuganov.

He referred to the example of Tatarstan, whose authorities have decided to
swap the Cyrillic formerly used for teaching the Tatar language at school for
Latin. He said he takes it as "a marked separatist step" which should not be
ignored by official Moscow.

Zyuganov said he disagreed with the opinion expressed the day before by
Russian President Vladimir Putin that left-wing forces support the market
economy and right-wing forces support measures for strengthening the power
vertical.

"I don't know what the right wing supports, but we never supported a market
economy and never will because the country simply hasn't got one. In all the
civilized countries of America and Europe a market economy means a great role
played by the state as a regulator of its processes. In our economy we see a
reign of chaos and a dictate of 'law' by mafia structures," he stressed.

He named as one of the gravest defects of Russia's economy the fact that the
government fails to create proper conditions for the competitiveness of
domestic producers. "Our producers literally suffocate under taxes, tariffs,
and so on - what kind of market economy can we talk about?" he asked.

Zyuganov pointed out that the people's patriotic forces have published their
programme for the country's economic development and "much of it will be put
into practice very soon".

*******

#6
Moscow Times
December 13, 2000
Editorial
Red Flags Are Merely Uninspiring

The president pays a warm visit to Fidel Castro. His Kremlin pushes
through the restoration of the Soviet anthem, and revives the red flag for
use by the armed forces. Moscow is eager to sell arms to places like Libya
and Syria, and has promised to send "advisers" to Angola to help "break the
back" of Jonas Savimbi?s UNITA rebels.

Is it really as back-to-Brezhnev as it sounds?

Probably not.

The interest in Soviet-era client states like Cuba and Syria seems in part
about trying to coax back billions in Cold War-era credits.

And while shaking hands with Castro may play poorly in Washington, Vladimir
Putin is probably right in ridiculing the 40-year-old U.S. embargo against
Cuba. After all, it does not seem to be working: Castro is still there, and
Canada has been snapping up years of good business while the U.S. harumphs.

The Angola "advisers," to take another example, were committed as part of a
deal under which Angola is also to pay off about $4 billion in debts.

It?s a different matter that this deal has been structured as a murky
oil-and-diamonds barter, and that it remains frighteningly vague about who
these "advisers" are and what they will be doing.

It?s also not terribly smart for the Putin administration to keep hob-nobbing
with the world?s least popular nations. Selling arms to Tehran or drinking
tea with Kim Jong Il may have some small upside ? but the downside is that it
makes the Kremlin look dangerously out of touch with the rest of the world.

The same goes for making such a priority out of restoring the Alexandrov
music for the national anthem, and reviving the Soviet flag for the military.

Again, this is probably not as bad as it sounds. The Alexandrov music is more
rousing and more popular than the Glinka music adopted under Boris Yeltsin.
All it really needs is a new set of lyrics.

It is also true that Russia?s greatest military victories and sacrifices came
under the red flag. So we can understand and respect the logic of reviving
that flag for the army ? even as we find it disquieting to think of the
military having such a politicized separate flag to pledge allegiance to.

So none of this is as bad as it sounds. But none of it is terribly inspiring
either. We have a nation that looks almost exclusively to the president
before acting ? and a president who spends a startling amount of his time
abroad, while back home the nation concentrates on flags and songs.

******

#7
US Department of State
11 December 2000
Text: Emil Pain Named Galina Starovoitova Fellowship Recipient
(Was advisor on nationality problems to former President Yeltsin)
(660)

Emil Pain, an advisor on nationality problems to former Russian
President Boris Yeltsin from 1994-1999, has been named the Galina
Starovoitova Fellowship recipient for the academic year 2000-2001,
according to a December 11 State Department press release.

The Galina Starovoitova Fellowship is awarded to prominent scholars
and policymakers from the Russian Federation who seek to advance human
rights and conflict resolution. It was established in January 1999 at
the direction of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, in
memory of the slain Duma member. Starovoitova was killed by two
unknown assassins on November 20, 1998, in St. Petersburg.

Following is the text of the release:

(begin text)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.
Office of the Spokesman
December 11, 2000

MEDIA NOTE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ANNOUNCES EMIL PAIN AS GALINA STAROVOITOVA
FELLOW ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs announces that Emil Pain is the Galina Starovoitova Fellowship
recipient for the academic year 2000-2001. Pain will conduct nine
months of research on Russia's nationality policy at the Washington,
D.C.-based Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

An advisor to former Russian President Boris Yeltsin from 1994-1999 on
nationality problems, Pain analyzed conflict areas of the former
Soviet Union and took part in conflict resolution negotiations in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia. He was also involved in
negotiations during Russia's first war with the Chechen Republic. On
December 10, 1994, the day Russian troops entered the territory of
Chechnya, Pain was the first Yeltsin administration high-ranking
official to state on live television his disagreement with a military
solution for Chechnya. In 1999, he again stated his disagreement with
the Yeltsin administration's decision to resolve the Chechen problem
with military force. Prior to advising former President Yeltsin, Pain
served as deputy director of Presidential Analytical Service of the
Russian Federation and as head of the Group on Nationality Problems,
Presidential Council of the Russian Federation. He is the currently
the director of the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies of
INDEM Foundation.

Established in January 1999 in Moscow at the direction of U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, the Galina Starovoitova
Fellowship is awarded to prominent scholars and policy-makers from the
Russian Federation who seek to advance human rights and conflict
resolution. Starovoitova, one of the Soviet Union's leading
specialists on ethnicity, served in the USSR Supreme Soviet from
Yerevan and the Russian Supreme Soviet. She was a presidential advisor
on ethnic relations from 1991-1992, co-founded the Democratic Russia
movement, and ran as a candidate in Russia's 1996 presidential
elections. In 1995, she was elected to the Russian State Duma and
represented the 209th parliamentary district in northern St.
Petersburg. She was also a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of
Peace, a research scholar at the Kennan Institute and a distinguished
visiting professor at Brown University. Starovoitova was killed by two
unknown assassins on November 20, 1998, in St. Petersburg.

The fellowship, awarded through a competition administered jointly by
ECA and the Kennan Institute, is part of the Department of State's
public diplomacy effort to foster mutual understanding between the
U.S. and other countries through international educational and
training programs. Under the auspices of the Department of State, more
than 5,000 students, scholars, professionals and community leaders a
year from Russia and the New Independent States come to the U.S. to
study, conduct research and make linkages in schools, universities,
non-governmental organizations, think tanks, federal offices,
businesses and other communities.

For more information, please contact Catherine Stearns, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, phone
(202) 619-5053 or e-mail: cstearns@pd.state.gov.

*****

#8
The Guardian (UK)
December 13, 2000
Liberals put forward plan to bury Lenin
Amelia Gentleman in Moscow

A proposal to remove Lenin's embalmed corpse from Red Square and replace his
mausoleum with a memorial to victims of Soviet repression will be considered
today by a committee in the lower house of Russia's parliament.

One of the most potent remaining emblems of the Soviet Union, Lenin's body
has attracted renewed attention as debate continues to rage over the new
iconography selected to represent modern Russia.

A liberal political faction has demanded the prompt removal of the Bolshevik
leader from his shrine - arguing that this would be appropriate compensation
for the official resurrection by the president of the Soviet national anthem
last week.

The Union of Right Forces has recommended that Lenin should be buried and a
new memorial to those who perished in the century's political purges
constructed in place of the mausoleum.

Once a revered pilgrimage spot, the site is now just one of Moscow's weirder
tourist attractions. Waxy, shrunken and yellowing, the corpse lies in a
saint-like pose in a darkened chamber.

The Duma's agenda setting council will decide today whether to schedule a
debate on the issue but, even if time is found, the motion has little chance
of success. Neither President Vladimir Putin nor his Unity party have shown
any desire to move Lenin.
 
*******

#9
Christian Science Monitor
December 13, 2000
Reporting from Chechnya? Take your ATM card
By Scott Peterson
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

The price of getting a story often makes journalists inveterate hagglers.

Our skills are honed almost daily with taxi drivers, and local guides
routinely demand exorbitant fees for safe passage through bandit- or
guerrilla-held territory.

But a recent trip to Chechnya, as "guests" of the Russian Army, devolved into
its own survival test of negotiating skills.

In Moscow, our group of 12 journalists had agreed to pay 30,450 rubles
($1,100) to "rent" military helicopters for the trip. It was the final price
- or so we thought.

Almost anywhere else in the world, journalists travel free with military
units. But Russian forces - once a formidable cold-war adversary - are so
cash-strapped these days that we agreed to ante up about $90 each to cover
Russian costs.

The money was duly deposited in a Russian military account at a civilian
bank.


But after arriving in a neighboring republic just outside Chechnya, we got
our first taste of things to come: a military driver taking us to the helipad
took up a collection - 50 rubles each (about $2) - to pay for gas.

In Chechnya, it is Chechen warlords and their gangs that have the reputation
for roaming the breakaway Russian republic - kidnapping, extorting, and
blackmailing at will. But as the impoverished Russian military bogs down in
its fight against the Chechen "bandits" and "terrorists," the troops rarely
see a paycheck, and are themselves quick studies of the local forms of
banditry.

Military units are involved in a vast looting spree of Chechnya's oil,
metals, and other assets, says a recent report by the pro-Moscow Chechen
administration, that was detailed in The Moscow Times.

"The stealing of the republic is in full swing," it notes, including the
wholesale ripping off of oil company pipes and the stealing of re-installed
power lines.

State auditors in Moscow also say that senior finance and economic
development officials have siphoned off millions in reconstruction aid meant
for Chechnya.

After landing, we discovered that our Russian hosts, too, were preparing for
some petty larceny.

"Unfortunately, we've got some bad news," said Vice-Col. Constantine
Glukharenko, greeting us at Russia's main base of Khankala, a sea of mud and
snow-swept military misery 10 miles east of the destroyed Chechen capital,
Grozny.

"We got an order that, beginning from now, the price of the helicopter has
gone up. There is a bank near here," he said, nodding helpfully toward an
unlikely cluster of weather-beaten canvas tents.

A groan welled up from our party - especially among the Russian journalists,
who immediately smelled a swindle. A previous promise to take us on a rare
visit to Grozny seemed to be in the balance - if we didn't pay, we wouldn't
go. The total cost had soared to $2,949.

"Even Aeroflot [which operates in the red] lets you fly on the price you
bought the ticket," protested one photographer. "It's Russia," explained
another. "They couldn't just add 5 percent more - they had to charge three
times as much!"

A decision was put off until morning, and Colonel Glukharenko half-heartedly
promised to take up our case with Gen. Valery Baranov, commander of joint
Russian forces in Chechnya.

Russia, defeated by guerrillas in the first 1994-96 Chechen war, withdrew its
troops and granted self-rule. But it returned in September 1999. The result
of the current stalemate has brought more frustration - and looting.

"This war won't end, let me tell you," a soldier called Alec privately
confides. "The main reason for this war is money. The commanders enrich
themselves, so why should they stop?"

Any cash our group paid here, he said, "goes to the camp commanders, for
sure."

The next morning after breakfast - 36 rubles ($1.30) for food per day, please
- Glukharenko was in a sour mood. Our "insolence" was a problem, he said,
peering through thick glasses and still wearing his slippers at the door of
his tent-office. He had "never seen such an ungrateful group."

Therefore, General Baranov now insisted that we not only pay for the
helicopters, but also rental of the armored personnel carriers in Grozny -
the intricately calculated wear-and-tear those vehicles would receive, and
the cost of the special forces guard that would go with us.

"Baranov can do anything, and he personally ordered you to pay," the colonel
said. "You have to pay everything."

"How much?"

"They're counting."

Even for the graft-familiar Russians, this was met with an anxious gulp. To
make our decision easier, the colonel presented us with a printed calculation
of the helicopter fee, titled "Grounds for new payment, Order No.
9/3/919/91." Unlike any other official document in Russia that deals with
money, which is invariably pasted with innumerable stamps and signatures,
this letter had one pathetic scrawl at the bottom, the signature of an
unknown vice colonel.

"Someone invented this!" protested one journalist.

"If you want a seal, we can put a seal on it in 10 minutes and make it look
official," Glukharenko said. Several hours of steadfast protest put off a
final decision again, until after the visit to Grozny.

Upon return, the battle of wills continued. Negotiations dragged on until
darkness fell. The armored vehicle cost was set at 4,460 rubles, or $161 for
the group. We said we'd pay - but not for the helicopters.

"You are detaining us, we're hostages!" shouted one Russian journalist, who
had played this game before.

Late that night, word came that the commander wanted to apologize for the
"moral abuse," Glukharenko said, and we could fly back without emptying our
pockets.

"Money, money, money," sang a relieved Russian journalist, to the tune of the
Abba song, "makes the world go round." Even in Chechnya.

*******

#10
New York Times
December 13, 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin Nurturing Old Friendships of a Soviet Past
By PATRICK E. TYLER

MOSCOW, Dec. 12 - Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz of Iraq was in town doing some
lobbying on behalf of President Saddam Hussein last month, and while he was
here, he took the opportunity to say on national television what a number of
former Soviet client states may have been wanting to say for a long time.

"For the last 10 years, some people have held jobs in the Russian government
without knowing the country's history of relations" with its Soviet-era
friends, Mr. Aziz said. "Many of them viewed the West as the sole way to
resolve Russia's problems."

But under President Vladimir V. Putin that is beginning to change, he said.
"Now Russian authorities can feel the traditions extending over the centuries
of good relations with the East, with Iraq, the Arab world, India and China."

He could have also listed North Korea, Iran, Libya, Angola and, this week,
Cuba, where Mr. Putin will touch down on Wednesday as the first Russian
leader since the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union to visit the island that
radiates so much history of cold war tension for Russians and Americans
alike.

Just nine months into office, the 48- year-old Russian president has cast
Russia's relations with the world as a much broader net than his predecessor,
rebuilding Moscow's ties with traditional client states of the Soviet era,
including some of the so- called "rogue states" that have been accused of
supporting terrorism or building weapons of mass destruction or both. But in
a significant step beyond the Soviet era, Mr. Putin has launched himself like
a foreign policy businessman onto the landscape of the old Soviet bloc, now
rife with newly emerging democratic states, market economies and not a few
stragglers like Cuba that have yet to make the transition to new economies
since the Soviet subsidies disappeared a decade ago.

On this old terrain, Mr. Putin has been searching for opportunities, both for
Russia's beleaguered national industries and for a more self- assured profile
for Russian foreign policy, at once more constructive on issues of war and
peace, but also more assertive when Russia's security and trade interests are
in the balance.

"Putin's foreign policy looks like a red-star cocktail to me," said Andrei V.
Kozyrev, foreign minister when Boris N. Yeltsin was president. "It's the old
stuff of anti-Americanism spiced by the support of rogue regimes from
Slobodan Milosevic to Saddam Hussein, with the addition of narrowly defined
commercial interests."

Still, Mr. Kozyrev has great hopes for Mr. Putin. He argues that the Russian
leader is trying to satisfy a broad array of domestic constituencies by
coddling old dictators on the one hand and moving closer to the West on the
other.

"Keeping this balance is an absolute prerequisite to keeping the
market-reform effort going, and I have to congratulate him," Mr. Kozyrev
said, adding that he fears that because of this internal balancing act, Mr.
Putin has failed to present a coherent Russian view to the world.

"There is an ambition to be independent and self-assertive, but without an
overall strategy." he said. "That boils down to awkward moves that make you
look different just to be different, and that may be a reflection of our
national inferiority complex."

Whatever the underlying motivation, Mr. Putin "has changed the dynamic of
U.S.-Russian relations," said Michael McFaul of the Carnegie Moscow Center,
who discussed Mr. Putin's foreign policy with a number of Kremlin officials
last month. "For a number of years under Yeltsin, we would always come to him
with the list of things we wanted to do, and it was always a task of trying
to get him to cooperate," Mr. McFaul said. "Putin has changed that dynamic.
Suddenly we are responding to him, and frankly some people don't like that."

Much of Mr. Putin's diplomacy seems pragmatic and constructive, experts said,
as when the Russian leader visited North Korea in the summer and warned its
leader, Kim Jong Il, that North Korea's ballistic missile program was posing
a threat to stability in Asia. In the Middle East, Mr. Putin has taken every
opportunity to keep the peace process moving forward and to quell the
violence, even getting Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel on the telephone
when the Palestinian leader, Yasir Arafat, visited the Kremlin last month.

But he has also challenged Washington's proposal to build ballistic missile
defenses and has suggested an alternative that would extend the protection to
Europe and preserve a crucial 1972 treaty that bans the development of
national missile defenses.

When Mr. Putin was elected in March, experts predicted that he would be a
domestic policy president. But he has ranged near and far abroad to reacquire
old customers and markets for Russian industries â?" oil, weapons, metallurgy
and civilian nuclear power â?" and to collect billions of dollars in debt
still
owed Moscow by clients of the Soviet era.

Russia has signed agreements to build nuclear power plants in China, India
and Iran, and Mr. Putin is expected to discuss with President Fidel Castro of
Cuba this week whether the one-time allies might restart work on an atomic
station abandoned there in 1992. The two might also discuss Russian
investment in Cuba's extensive nickel reserves.

This fall, Mr. Putin visited New Delhi, the first Russian leader to do so in
eight years, and he signed multibillion-dollar contracts to provide
supersonic fighters, tanks and other battlefield weapons for the Indian army.
In India and China, Russia is after a larger share of the international arms
market. And in Angola, where Soviet and Cuban forces once aligned themselves
against Western-backed forces, Moscow is trying to pick up business in oil
and diamonds. Moscow might also sell some weapons to government forces that
trying to put down the 25- year-old revolt of Jonas Savimbi.

In taking these steps, Mr. Putin is connecting Russia's interests with those
of the Soviet past â?" but without the old ideological content. The best that
Mr. Putin could say about Mr. Castro in advance of his visit was that "Cuba
is our traditional partner" and that "Cuba has been great and extremely
important for us because it always had an independent position." His comments
were not exactly the rousing rhetoric of old.

This fall, Mr. Putin abrogated an agreement to end Russia's conventional arms
sales to Iran under an agreement signed in 1995 between Vice President Al
Gore and Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, who was prime minister. Though a number of
Russian foreign policy experts disagree with Mr. Putin's reversal on Iran,
they have been defending his act.

"Just as Russia does not consider the United States its enemy, Iran is not
our enemy either, and Iran is paying in hard currency for all its weapons,"
said Aleksei Arbatov, a liberal Parliament deputy who sits on the Defense
Committee.

Mr. Kozyrev, the former foreign minister, disagrees with Mr. Putin's tilt
toward Iran, but argues that Russia has security concerns that only Iran can
help address.

"Let's not forget that Iran is the counterbalance to the Taliban in
Afghanistan," he said, adding that Iran nonetheless will never supplant the
importance of Russia's dependence on the West for technology and investment.

Mr. Putin seems to understand that and, he has been seeking to bind Russia's
foreign policy closer to Europe and to secure for Russia a permanent seat at
the table among industrial nations and in the global trading system.

"He is first and foremost a Europeanist," Mr. McFaul of the Moscow Carnegie
Center said. "He sees that at the end of the day Russia's future is best
served if it is integrated as part of Europe."
 
******    

#11
strana.ru
December 10, 2000
Russian President Vladimir Putin interviewed by Cuban and Russian media
 
On the threshold of his visit to Havana, Russian President Vladimir Putin
granted an interview to Cuban TV Cubavision, the Prensa Latina News Agency
and the Russian ORT Television Company.

Question: Mr. President, you will be the first President of Russia to visit
Cuba, and Latin America in general. We would like to hear your assessment on
the development of bilateral relations between Russia and Cuba, and first of
all, what concerns the economic sphere.

Answer: Cuba is our traditional, long-standing and reliable partner. At one
time, relations with Cuba were based on ideology to the highest possible
level. Inter-state relations were founded on ideology. And after the events
that occurred in the Soviet Union, in Russia, ten years ago, after the
ideological base of our relations had been substantially impaired, relations
between our states were regretfully damaged. That was transferred to the
sphere of inter-state relations.

I do not think that that was done correctly. Cuba, I repeat, is our
traditional partner both in the world and, first of all, of course, in Latin
America. At the present time, Russia is devoting more and more attention and
this is correct, to the Latin American vector in its foreign policy. In this
sense, the role of Cuba for us is extremely important and very great because
Cuba's stand has always been independent, interesting, and it has always
benefited the development of democratic principles in international
relations.

It must be said that in recent years, during the years of the slump in our
economic contacts, regrettably for us, many of the priority vectors in our
joint activity were lost, and the positions of Russian enterprises were
occupied by our foreign competitors.

Canadian enterprises, businessmen from France, Spain and lately, from Germany
are working very actively today in the Cuban market. And I think it is very
gratifying that during 1999 we were able for the first time to reach a
significant trade turnover level of almost one billion dollars, and in the
first 10 months of this year it has already come to $700 million. This is a
good showing, and it points to the fact that both sides are positively
developing economic contacts. We have all the chances to assume that in the
same manner and at the same pace, we shall develop our cooperation in the
sphere of economics in the future.

Question: In your opinion, what are the main reasons why in recent years,
Russia has been demonstrating a tendency of coming closer to Cuba in various
spheres, including bilateral economic and other areas of relations?

Answer: I have already said that regretfully our place was, to a considerable
degree, occupied by representatives of the business world from other
countries. However, there is one circumstance which is obvious and which both
Cuba and Russia must utilize in full measure.

It lies in the fact that a significant number of enterprises, a substantial
part of Cuba's economy were created with the direct economic and technical
assistance of the Soviet Union. And who, if not we, should participate in the
reconstruction, the rebuilding of these enterprises, and to think together
about their future. I am absolutely convinced that in that direction we shall
be able to attain very significant results.

Question: Quite recently the UN General Assembly passed by a great majority
of 167 votes, including Russia's "aye" vote, a Resolution that censures the
anti-Cuba blockade by the United States of America.

Do you not consider that Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, could table a proposal for the adoption of a similar decision in the
Security Council so that the anti-Cuba blockade would be removed?

Answer: You know that if in the economics sphere we had certain drops and
slumps (incidentally, they were also caused by negative tendencies in the
economy of Russia itself), then on the question concerning the blockade
around Cuba, we have always taken a consistent and principled stand.

We consider, and we continue to maintain that the blockade around Cuba is
unfounded from any point of view: neither from the point of view of
international law, nor from the point of expediency, nor from the point of
view of justice and democratic principles of world order. We were not only
among those who supported such a stand in the United Nations, but we intend
to further uphold this point of view.

We consider that Cuba must be brought out of the regimen of unilateral
sanctions as soon as possible. I do not think that such a policy will result
in any kind of success, or will it yield anyone political or economic
dividends.

Question: You recently addressed a message of greetings to the participants
in the X Iberoamerican meeting in Panama. You urged the Latin American states
to attach a greater social aspect to globalization in the world. In many
respects, our country takes a similar stand.

Could you say in what other aspects of international life, international
politics, could Russia and Cuba have contiguous or similar stands?

Answer: What concerns the problem of globalization. We are in absolute
solidarity with the point of view of President Fidel Castro in that all the
globalization processes must take into account, to put it mildly, today's not
very fair world order. Globalization processes must not prolong the present
state of poverty of some countries and the super wealth of others.

It is noteworthy that such a point of view, such a stand is shared by many
also in western states. Because the various degree of wellbeing of the
population is the cause of instability in the world.

What concerns other aspects, other questions on which the stands of Cuba and
Russia could be similar, and on which we could support one another, then of
course, this is also the disarmament problem. They are problems, as I have
already said, concerning the democratic world order and problems of a
disarmament nature.

Cuba plays a very important role in Latin America. And we are very much
counting on Cuba's active role and active stand in resolving a whole number
of international problems on which we must find allies. I repeat, Cuba's
active stand on these questions, including on the problem of security could
be very useful and very constructive.

Question: Mr. President, do you consider that Russia has attained social
stability? Do you consider that Russia has also attained normalization in
economic life?

Answer: We have certain indications of stabilization both in the social
sphere, and in the sphere of economic development. However, we cannot
consider that we have such a state of affairs that could satisfy us.

A very great deal must yet be done also on questions of consolidating
society. Very much must yet be done so that the positive tendencies in
economics, and they are, of course, there, acquire a stable nature. And here,
the Government, and the President, the State Duma and the entire Federal
Assembly must still do a very great deal in order to create the necessary
legal base, and the necessary social conditions for implementing those plans
that stand before the state.

Question: Russia is a most important factor of international stability. How
do you intend to guarantee or ensure this stability, given the United States'
plans to create a national missile defense system?

Answer: You know, there is a process under way of formation of a new
Administration of the United States. We would not like to suspect our
American partners in advance, a priori, of wishing to be destructive and
bring the matter as far as the dismantling of the existing international
security system.

We are counting very much that the new U.S. Administration, whoever heads it,
will take all the positive things that have been created in Russian-U.S.
relations over the past years, including in the sphere of international
security and in the disarmament sphere.

Our position is well known. We come out for the preservation of the 1972
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Our position on
this issue is not changing.

We continue to assert and insist that this international security system is
valuable in itself. And if there are some concerns on the part of individual
countries or groups of countries over their individual security, all these
problems may be solved without breaking the existing foundation, on the basis
of international consultations and on the basis of coordinated international
decisions. There are such decisions too. They may be finalized both on the
political plane and from the point of view of military-technical approaches
to the solution of this matter.

Question: Mr. President, certain political circles of Russia regard you as a
leader coming out from the left-wing positions. Others, on the contrary,
think you are a political figure keeping to the right-wing orientation. How
do you estimate it yourself? And in general, may one ask this question: where
is Russia heading?

Answer: As for how and who considers me, how and who calls me, we in Russia
have a good proverb for this occasion: "Call me whatever you like, even a
cooking-pot, but do not put me into an oven." I think it is not by chance
that today left-oriented political leaders of the country agree with and, in
effect, come out for market transformations. At the same time, supporters of
the liberal economy support the President's measures aimed at the
strengthening of Russian statehood. This is not happening by chance, because
it has become obvious during many past years that one is unable to exist
effectively without the other.

As of today, therefore, the most correct approach would be a pragmatic one
oriented to the interests of the overwhelming majority of the country's
population. On the basis of market transformations and broadest possible
democracy in the direct sense of this word, I am certain, Russia, a new
Russia will be able to achieve the goals, which we have set ourselves already
for several years.

My main positions on these conceptual questions of state development are
reflected in the annual Presidential Message to the Federal Assembly. Judging
by what is happening here in recent time, in the last one and a half years in
the economy, one ought to agree that the goals and assignments set before the
country, not only by the President, but also formulated by other political
figures of this country, are well substantiated.

Question: When the Cuban revolution won, you, Mr. President, were still a
secondary school student and certainly might have heard a lot about our
revolution and Cuba. Now that one can count the hours until the start of your
official visit to Cuba, could you tell us how you picture Cuba in your mind?

Answer: When the revolution took place in Cuba, I was not even in school. But
I remember the time quite well. Those were quite spectacular events in the
life of not only your country but mine too. Cuba was always associated with
something faraway and heroic.

We were always impressed by the courage of the Cuban people, their
orientation towards the attainment of concrete results, their orientation
towards dealing with large-scale tasks. What used to and continues, I think,
to strike one in particular is that the Cuban people succeeds in coping with
a considerable number of these problems despite the complexity of the
situation, which Cuba finds itself in.

That is why it is with great pleasure that I have accepted President Castro's
invitation to visit your country and will do so with pleasure.

Question: Vladimir Vladimirovich, throughout the last 10 years, Russian
diplomacy and Russia's leadership paid no attention not only to Cuba but also
to the entire Latin American region. Contacts were maintained mostly at the
parliamentary level.

Can your present visit to Cuba be considered as a beginning of some new stage
in Russia's attitude to the region as a whole and a manifestation of some new
tendencies in your foreign policy? After all, Latin America is one of the
centers of the burgeoning multipolar world.

Answer. Yes. I agree with you.

Of course, Latin America is one of the centers of a new world, which is
shaping up and developing rapidly. It is a very active part of the world. I
think, there are explanations to the fact that in recent years Russia failed
to pay the due attention to this sector in its foreign policy. They are
Russia's social problems, economic problems, internal problems.

You know, a well-known proverb comes to my mind again: "Beyond the sea, a
heifer is a halfpenny, but it costs a lot to bring one over." For this
reason, generally speaking, it is clear why a certain slump has occurred.

But it is clear to us now that the time has come for restoring not just our
interest in this region of the world, but for restoring our positions there,
because restoring those positions conforms to our economic interests,
conforms to the national interests of the Russian Federation. It will
strengthen Russia's positions in the international arena.

Many states in this region and the world want to see an active foreign policy
position of our state. They want to cooperate with us in the attainment of
common goals in the international arena. And that certain economic
normalization is accompanied by Russia's definite foreign economic activity
is quite justified and expedient.

Question: It means, in fact, a sign of the country's consolidation.

Answer: Yes, certainly. But not only purely political one; economic one as
well.

Here, for example, we already talked with your Cuban colleagues that even in
Cuba - I say "even" because it is our closest partner, it was our closest
ally for many years. A considerable portion of Cuba's economy was built with
the Soviet Union's technical and economic assistance.

But even in Cuba, not only in other Latin American countries, our partners
from other countries have outpaced us. The Canadians already account for as
much as 80 percent in certain branches of the Cuban economy. Therefore, there
is nothing surprising here, one may only feel sorry that this is being done
only today, not two, three, four or five years ago.

In conclusion, Vladimir Putin thanked the Cuban media and the Cuban people
for the interest they displayed in Russia.

******

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