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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

November 7, 2000    

This Date's Issues: 4625  4626  

 

Johnson's Russia List
#4626
7 November 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Interfax: Russian US expert predicts Bush victory, "extremely tough stance" to Russia. (Alexei Arbatov)
2. BBC Monitoring: Veterans, Communists mark revolution day amid tight security.
3. BBC Monitoring: November holiday is no longer special for Russians.
4. Interfax: Rocket Force commander comments on defense strategy.
5. Alastair Wanklyn: discrimination.
6. Nicolai Petro: New journal--Perspectives on European Politics and Society.
7. Financial Times (UK) letter: Russia welcome, but cannot replace US in EU security.
8. Financial Times (UK): Andrew Jack, Yeltsin's incredible memoir.
9. BBC Monitoring: Restructuring of Russian electricity industry imminent.
10. The Guardian (UK): Ian Traynor, Ukraine wages war on Russian language. Death of folk-singer fuels anger.
11. Wall Street Journal Europe: Rachel Debner, Punish Russia for Raping Chechnya.
12. Washington Post: David Hoffman, Lawless Capitalism Grips Russian Business.
13. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Fights To Control Regional Media Described with Ryazan Example.
 
******
 
#1
Russian US expert predicts Bush victory, "extremely tough stance" to Russia Interfax

Moscow, 7th November: A prominent member of the Yabloko faction in the
State Duma and Deputy Chairman of the Duma's defence committee Aleksey
Arbatov has predicted that George Bush Jr. will emerge victorious from the
presidential elections in the US on 7th November.

He said in an interview with Interfax that "unlike the other presidential
candidate, leader of the Democrats Al Gore, Bush is not experienced enough
in international affairs". George Bush and his team will follow the
situation in Russia a lot less closely than the Clinton- Gore
administration did. But if Bush wins, the US will take "an extremely tough
stance" with regard to Russia, primarily to Russian supplies of weapons and
nuclear know-how to China and to third world countries, he said.

Bush will also be more insistent in pushing forward the idea of creating a
national missile defence system, unlike Gore, who, if he wins, "will do
everything possible to reach an amicable agreement in this sphere and make
amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty".

"Bush will actually force Russia to decide whether to accept the United
States' plans to create a national missile defence system or start thinking
of withdrawing from the 1972 Treaty," Arbatov said.

He said that the Republican Party will most probably be more sceptical
about Russia's proposal on the restructuring of Moscow's foreign debt.

******

#2
BBC Monitoring
Veterans, Communists mark revolution day amid tight security
Source: Centre TV, Moscow, in Russian 0800 gmt 07 Nov 00

[Presenter] Today is a memorable date in the history of our country. Some
call it the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, others
the 1917 coup, while officially this is the day of accord and
reconciliation. In 1996, President Boris Yeltsin decreed 7th November a
public holiday, although without a vivid political context. [Omitted: few
show enthusiasm for the holiday] Aleksandr Samylin reports.

[Correspondent] World War II veterans associate this day with a different
sort of event. In 1941, they left the historic Red Square parade to defend
Moscow. Those who lived to see the year 2000 are now meeting in the centre
of the capital. In keeping with the tradition, they walked down the main
square, laying flowers by the unknown soldier grave and the Kremlin wall
where army commanders are buried. [Omitted: other events held for veterans]

Communists and other left-wing opposition are now marching through Moscow
in celebration of the 83rd anniversary of the October revolution. [Omitted:
route]

Throughout the holiday, police are on alert across the country, fearing
provocation and terrorist acts. The hard-line Communists of Viktor
Anpilov's Working Russia have threatened to break through into the Red
Square [despite the city council ban]. Therefore, some 10,000 police are on
a 12-hour alert in Moscow alone.

According to the latest polls, 50 per cent of Russians treat 7th November
as an ordinary day off, 31 per cent as the anniversary of the revolution
and only 10 celebrate accord and reconciliation.

******
 
#3
BBC Monitoring
November holiday is no longer special for Russians
Text of report by Russian NTV on 7th November

[Presenter] Today Day of Accord and Reconciliation is celebrated in Russia.
According to opinion polls, the majority of the Russian population, 51 per
cent regards this holiday as a usual day off. At the same time, marches and
rallies organized by various parties and social movements will be held in
Moscow and other Russian cities.

One of them has already been held in Vladivostok. At first a well-organized
column of demonstrators marched along the streets carrying bright red
slogans, flags and portraits of Soviet-time leaders. After that a rally was
held in one of the central squares of Vladivostok. About 2,000 people took
part in the rally.

The Vladivostok interior department said that no incidents during the rally
had been reported.

******

#4
Rocket Force commander comments on defense strategy 

MOSCOW.   Nov 4 (Interfax) - The Russian nuclear
force's composition and tasks may change "depending on the changing
situation," Commander- in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Force Vladimir
Yakovlev told Interfax on Saturday.
    However, "despite the radical changes in the world in the past
decade, the planning of the use of nuclear weapons, unfortunately, has
not changed fundamentally compared to the Cold War period," he said.  
"The notion in planning is still that nuclear arms are the armed forces'
supreme instrument," he said.
    "Several versions of the form and use of strategic force in the
future are being considered now - from preserving the current arsenal to
developing a fully non-nuclear strategic force," Yakovlev said.   "It is
important to note here that even now options are being checked for
hitting strategic enemy targets [including Russian] with high-precision
long-range arms, including intercontinental ballistic missiles with
conventional warheads," he said.
    The importance of the forces and means of air defense and missile
defense to shield strategic targets from such strikes is growing in these
circumstances, Yakovlev said.   "If it is impossible to destroy
high-security targets even with high-yield nuclear weapons, it is planned
to put them out of order by destroying elements guaranteeing their combat
capability [power supply systems, communications, etc.]," he said.   "The
United States considers high-security facilities as bargaining chips in
negotiations," he stated.
    "In the United States, serious discussions are under way at a fairly
high level on the difficulty or impossibility of modernizing nuclear
warheads without nuclear tests.   I cannot claim that this may be a
preparation of the public opinion for a corresponding modification of the
nuclear arms test ban, but the Untied States' current stance on ABM and
START shows such a precedent is possible," Yakovlev said.
    In foreign policy, the United States "has always been quite tough in
guaranteeing its own vital interests," he said.   "It considers nuclear
weapons as a component in a coordinated program to guarantee national
security also constituting diplomacy, arms control and conventional
forces," he said.
    Speaking about the state of his force, Yakovlev said that it
"guarantees the fulfillment of the given tasks." At the same time, "a
very thorough expert evaluation of the possibilities of maintaining the
group, modernizing it, and primarily advancing arms-control systems lies
ahead," he said.
    The force's press service has told Interfax that the force is
planning efforts to maintain the level of combat readiness set by the
defense ministry for 2001 and the nearest future as part of the army reform.

******

#5
Date: Mon, 06 Nov 2000
From: "Alastair Wanklyn" alastair.wanklyn@featurestory.co.uk 
Subject: discrimination

ROME 4 NOVEMBER:  Today Russia's justice minister, Yury Chaika, signed
Protocol 12 to the Convention on Human Rights. This states:

"1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.
2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any
ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1."

Protocol 12 becomes binding when ten states have ratified it. Some MID
officials present said they don't expect the document to encourage a rapid
sea change but it may be of interest to human rights and civil liberties
campaigners. (Incidentally, among 24 other nations signing up were Georgia,
Ukraine and Moldova.)

Alastair Wanklyn
Feature Story News, London bureau
Tel +44 207 580 4160
alastair.wanklyn@featurestory.co.uk

*****

#6
Date: Mon, 06 Nov 2000
From: "Nicolai N. Petro" <kolya@uri.edu>
Subject: Perspectives on European Politics and Society

I would like to alert colleagues in Russian Studies to a new journal,
"Perspectives on European Politics and Society" (PEPS).  PEPS focuses on
intra-European political studies in their broadest sense: east-west and
north-south; comparative and international.  It aims to promote discussion
between scholars in Western Europe and in the newly democratizing countries
of the former communist bloc.  To this end, the editorial board includes a
number of scholars with a particular interest in Russia:  Alexei Avtonomov,
Alexei Kuzmin, David Lane, Michael McFaul, Marie Mendras, Richard Sakwa,
Hans-Henning Schroeder, Olga Sidorovich, Stephen White, and myself.

The journal covers politics, political sociology, political theory,
international relations and modern history. The first issue, which will
appear in December, is devoted to the enlargement of the European
Union.  Possible ideas for other thematic volumes include identity politics
and political parties. Other ideas are most welcome. The next issue will
come out in March 2001 - this time there will be no theme and submissions
from all areas of European politics are welcome.

SUBMISSIONS. Articles submitted for publication should be submitted to the
Editor: Dr. Cameron Ross, Department of  Politics, University of Dundee,
Dundee, DD1 4HN, United Kingdom.  Two copies should be submitted.
Submissions should include an abstract of approximately 200 words. Papers
submitted for consideration by PEPS must be unpublished and not being
considered for publication elsewhere.

MANUSCRIPTS.  Articles should normally be between 6000 and 9000 words in
length (including endnotes). Review Articles should be between 4000 and
5000 words and Book Reviews 800 to 1000 words. The journal is published in
English, in which language contributions should normally be submitted. It
is understood, however, that the pan-European focus of the journal may mean
that certain articles will require special editing. Full translations will,
however, only be undertaken in exceptional circumstances. All articles,
including commissioned ones, will be refereed. E-mail inquiries may be
directed to <c.z.ross@dundee.ac.uk>.

With best wishes,
Prof. Nicolai N. Petro
Department of Political Science
Washburn Hall
University of Rhode Island
Kingston, RI 02881 (USA)
Direct Line: 401-874-2290               Fax: 401-874-4072

*****
 
#7
Financial Times (UK)
7 November 2000
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Russia welcome, but cannot replace US in EU security

From Mr Richard Spring MP.

Sir, Europe's new defence ambitions have not only diminished the centrality
of Nato's role in our security, but also threaten to undermine our
strategic relationship with the US. Ever since the St Malo agreement of
1998, we have witnessed a trend of decoupling the US from Europe. In this
context, the latest report that Russia and the European Union have "agreed
Russia could be involved in future EU-led crisis management operations"
("EU and Russia to strengthen energy and security ties", October 31) came
as no surprise.

The general trend in both Paris and Moscow is to welcome the EU's military
plans as a step towards creating a counterbalance to the US "hegemony" and
Nato centrism.

Last year Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian defence ministry
international co-operation department, greeted the European defence
ambitions by stating: "Such a structure can only be hailed if it does not
become an addition to Nato." Similarly, the European defence project has
been justified in France as an ambition that will help reassess the global
strategic balance by creating what the French foreign affairs minister
labelled a "multipolar world".

There is a risk that the EU could seem to be placing Russia, rather than
the US, in a crucial position in the debate on European security. While
Russian constructive engagement with the EU should be welcome, we should
bear in mind the fundamental importance of the US being effectively
involved in European defence in the 21st century.

Richard Spring, Shadow Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, House
of Commons, London SW1A 0AA

******
 
#8
Financial Times (UK)
7 November 2000 
Yeltsin's incredible memoir: The Russian former president provides intriguing explanations for his mercurial decisions
By Andrew Jack

In 1991 a wise family man became president of Russia. Nasty people
criticised him but he was far more clever than they. His decisions - even
those that looked embarrassingly like the result of indecision - were part
of a carefully calculated masterplan that has since come to pass.

That, at least, is the message of former president Boris Yeltsin's third
volume of memoirs, Presidential Marathon in Russian, or Midnight Diaries in
English. It might be better summed up as Presidential Fiction or Midnight
Banalities.

Reading through the 384 pages, which primarily cover the second term of his
presidency in 1996-2000, one has no doubt of the extraordinarily difficult
challenges Yeltsin faced. Few world leaders have overseen such a decade of
transition, beginning with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and ending
with the first peaceful handover to an elected successor.

He was in charge during - and deserves some credit for - the largely
bloodless unravelling of an empire, the dismantling of the system of state
planning and power and its replacement with a market economy and a
democracy of sorts. But, against the backdrop of such an amazing tale,
Yeltsin's reflections are deeply disappointing, largely because there are
few of them.

In rare parts of the book he is disarmingly frank. Recently he may have
portrayed himself as the guardian of democracy but he admits that in 1996,
with his popularity close to zero, he was set to cancel the presidential
elections and ban the Communist Party - the power base of Gennady Zyuganov,
his leading rival. Only a last-minute intervention by Anatoly Chubais, the
leading light among the young economic reformers, changed his mind.

Yeltsin concedes that he concealed the true, catastrophic state of his
health from the electorate after suffering a debilitating heart attack
between the two rounds of voting. He casually dismisses the drawbacks of
the system of campaign financing - unconventional even by the standards of
Russia's flimsy regulations - that allowed two of his aides to be caught
carrying a cardboard box with Dollars 500,000 in cash out of the White
House, the parliament building.

Yeltsin is sometimes linked to the preservation of freedom of speech. Yet
he proudly describes how Igor Malashenko, the right-hand man of Vladimir
Gusinsky, the media magnate, created a Soviet-like "firm vertical chain of
command" during the elections to co-ordinate journalists, who mortgaged
their objectivity out of fear of a return to "communist censorship".

Such, perhaps, were the necessary expediencies and compromises of working
in a system that was neither working nor a system. The problem, on which
Yeltsin does not dwell but that was clearly demonstrated during his second
presidential term, is that it was difficult to build the more just,
democratic and liberal society he sought on such unstable foundations.

Yeltsin comes up with intriguing "explanations" for his mercurial decisions
over the years, which, he argues, were all premeditated. The merry-go-round
of five prime ministers in less than two years was apparently all a cunning
plan to throw his political opponents off track. He claims, rather
implausibly, to have already selected Vladimir Putin as his successor, even
before naming Sergei Stepashin as prime minister in spring last year. "I
didn't want the public to get too used to Putin in those lazy summer
months", he says.

His absence from a number of important inter-national meetings was, it
seems, an attempt to raise Putin's profile. The long pauses during his
speech at his protege's inauguration in May were supposedly the result of
the autocue's breaking down.

One can sympathise with the stresses of office, and admire Yeltsin's
honesty in confessing to past alcoholism and present health problems. But
from a politician who was manifestly instinctive and impetuous, rather than
logical and coherent, his permanent rationalisations hardly convince.

Otherwise, there is little memorable in these memoirs. You get the
impression that Yeltsin is trying to make his peace with the Russian
people, portraying himself as a grandfather figure, the product of an
older, macho generation, proud of his family and trying to do his best for
his country while struggling with new-fangled gadgets such as dictaphones
and computers.

Instead, his writing comes across more like the Adventures of Vanka - his
little grandson - in Kremlinland. He breathlessly describes the telephones
in his office that allow him to contact anyone in the world. His
impressions of world leaders seem largely to be limited to the gifts and
food that they provided to each other.

Few in Russia believe the true history of Yeltsin is contained in these
pages, or that they were his words and thoughts rather than those of the
close circle of advisers that surrounded him. In that sense, at least, the
book is a fair reflection of how the latter presidential years operated.
 
******

#9
BBC Monitoring
Restructuring of Russian electricity industry imminent
Source: 'Kommersant', Moscow, in Russian 5 Nov 00

Text of report by Petr Sapozhnikov in Krasnoyarsk and Yevgeniy Bagayev in
Kemerovo "Restructuring begins in UES, Anatoliy Chubays announces in
Krasnoyarsk" by Russian newspaper 'Kommersant' on 5th November

Anatoliy Chubays, head of the Russian Unified Energy System (UES) Russian
Joint-Stock Company (RAO), has announced the start of the restructuring of
the company. Addressing power industry workers in Krasnoyarsk Territory on
Friday [3rd November], he said that he had already signed the relevant
directive on the company. Mr Chubays is sure that the reform programme will
be approved by the government. A political decision on this has already
been taken at the highest level.

In Krasnoyarsk Anatoliy Chubays and Territory governor Aleksandr Lebed
carried out an inspection of a number of the region's energy installations.
Evidently the old differences between them have become ancient history (let
us recall that in 1996 presidential staff head Chubays secured the removal
of Security Council Secretary Lebed from his post). At the sessions and
meetings with journalists, both officials said plenty of nice things to
each other. They signed an agreement whereby the administration is
committing itself to pay for the everyday energy consumption of
organizations financed out of the Territory budget and local budgets solely
in real money. Other documents signed by the governor and the head of UES
include an agreement on setting up a joint commission which will be
involved in preparing the Krasnoyarskenergo restructuring project within
the framework of the overall organization of the company.

At the concluding conference with Aleksandr Lebed and the Krasnoyarskenergo
chiefs, Anatoliy Chubays spoke of the latest events connected with the
reform of the company he heads. The government session which will examine
the restructuring project will be held on 14th December. The head of the
company stated that he has already discussed the concept with President
Vladimir Putin and premier Mikhail Kasyanov. As Mr Chubays stated,
following these meetings "it has become absolutely clear that a decision
has already been made on this and the creation of a real electricity market
has moved from the sphere of preliminary political discussions to the
practical sphere."

Without waiting for the government's approval, Anatoliy Chubays has signed
an order setting up six restructuring projects within the company. The
first envisages setting up generating companies that will compete with each
other on the electricity market and the second setting up a company, based
on the UES central control administration, that will take on the functions
of a non-commercial key market player. The other projects include
separating marketing companies and federal electricity supply networks out
into separate structures. Mr Chubays particularly stressed that these
subdivisions should be separated from each other once and for all.

The news of the beginning of the restructuring will scarcely be greeted
with enthusiasm by all of the Siberian regions' governors. The district
council sitting of the Siberian District, where Anatoliy Chubays will
present the UES restructuring programme to the heads of the regional
administrations, will be held on 10th November in Omsk. Leonid Drachevskiy,
the president's plenipotentiary representative for the Siberian District,
discussed the upcoming sitting with the Kuzbassenergo leadership in
Kemerovo yesterday. And he said that "Siberia should not be one of the
first regions where the implementation of the UES programme begins."

******

#10
The Guardian (UK)
7 November 2000
Ukraine wages war on Russian language
Death of folk-singer fuels anger
By Ian Traynor in Lviv

Orest Dzhmyl fully understands the language he was forced to learn in a
Soviet primary school. But the 20-year-old maths student will not speak a
word of it.

Slumped in front of a television in a hall decked with the paraphernalia of
Ukrainian nationalism, he and his three skinhead mates explain their loathing
for the language of Pushkin and recall with relish the day the local Russians
got their comeuppance in Lviv.

"I've not really got anything against Russians. Some of them are my friends.
But they've got to realise this is not Russia, this is Ukraine, and I love my
country."

"If the Russians don't like it here, they should leave."

Mr Dzhmyl is a foot soldier on the frontline of Ukraine's linguistic war. In
a country where Ukrainian - banned by Russian tsars and communists - is now
the official tongue but the majority still speak Russian, language is an
incendiary issue.

One evening in the summer, Mr Dzhmyl and fellow members of the Patriots of
Ukraine, the militaristic youth wing of the extremist Social National party,
went on the rampage in Lviv, trashing cafes and bars frequented by young
Russians.

Since then "Muscovites Out" graffiti have been daubed across Lviv, and
Russian Orthodox churches have been vandalised.

"You don't hear so much Russian spoken on the streets now," he grins.

"Anti-Russian hysteria," complains Roman Manyakin, an ethnic Russian
political scientist from the east Ukrainian city of Donetsk.

"Those nationalists are Nazis preaching a gospel of ethnic intolerance."

"It's depressing," says Inna Pidluska, a political analyst in Kiev. "And the
government is turning a blind eye."

Independent Ukraine is struggling to shake off centuries of Russification. As
any student of 19th-century European nationalism knows, language is central
to nation building. Ukraine is discovering that the principle remains
axiomatic in the 21st century.

Around 20% of Ukrainians are ethnic Russians, yet more than 60% of the
population of 51m speak Russian.

"Any real native of Kiev speaks Russian," says a Ukrainian man born and bred
in the city. "We learned Russian at school, we speak Russian at home, and I
can't be bothered learning Ukrainian now. I'm too old for that."

Mr Dzhmyl spends his weekends marching in a white shirt and black tie under
8ft Ukrainian banners or doing paramilitary training in the hills outside
Lviv.

"The Russians are our biggest problem," says his leader, Andri Parubi, 27.
"We're training young people for service in the army and developing their
patriotic spirit."

Since independence in 1991, the Ukrainian government has switched lessons in
thousands of schools from Russian to Ukrainian. But while Kiev may be banking
on schooling to revive the mother tongue, this is not enough for the
authorities in Lviv, the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism, which is Lvov
to the Russians, Lemberg to the Viennese, and Lwow to the Poles.

The Lviv city council has been trying to ban Russian-language pop music in
bars and cafes and to close down a Russian-language radio station, and
linguistic vigilantes have been cruising shops and kiosks, bullying retailers
into dumping Russian literature, newspapers and CDs.

It's a tall order. Russian-language newspapers still outnumber Ukrainian 10
to one across the country. At a second-hand book stall there are only tomes
in Russian. In an art gallery bookshop, Russian predominates.

"We specialise in philosophy and those books haven't been translated into
Ukrainian," explains the shop assistant. "We do have a Ukrainian version of
Kant's Critique of Reason if you're interested."

Another Lviv bookseller says the local authority is trying either to ban
Russian publications or to slap on punitive taxes. But Ms Pidluska in Kiev
says the reason for the domination of Russian is simple.

"Nobody will put any money into publishing books in Ukrainian."

Lviv's language war was ignited by the death of a popular local folk-singer,
Igor Bilozir. At an outdoor cafe one evening in May, he and a friend were
playing his Ukrainian ballads while a group of Russian youths at the next
table were singing songs in Russian.

The Russians warned Bilozir to stop singing in Ukrainian. He refused. They
came to blows. The fighting spilled along the street and the 45-year-old
slumped to the ground after a blow to the head. He died three weeks later in
hospital, becoming for Ukrainian nationalists an instant martyr.

"He was killed because he sang songs in his own language," says Mr Parubi.
Russian newspapers turned things around and said the dispute was over the
right to use the Russian language.

More than 100,000 people in Lviv turned out for Bilozir's funeral. The next
day the Patriots of Ukraine went on the rampage.

Two ethnic Russian youths were arrested on suspicion of murder. One was
released inexplicably on bail and left the country, the other is the son of
the local deputy police chief. Expectations of a fair trial are low.

A black cross, flowers and a picture of the songwriter mark the spot where he
died. "Igor Bilozir. Murdered here by Russian-speaking thugs," reads the
inscription across the road from the local McDonald's.

"Do you like McDonald's?" asks Orest Dzhmyl. "I don't. I like our national
food. Borshch. It's not Russian, it's Ukrainian."
    
*******

#11
Wall Street Journal Europe
November 7, 2000
[for personal use only]
Punish Russia for Raping Chechnya
By Rachel Denber, acting director of the Europe and Central Asia Division at
Human Rights Watch.

Time's up for the European Union on Russia. For months it has dragged its
feet, trying to avoid calling Russia to account for its ghastly conduct in
Chechnya. When President Vladimir Putin went to Paris last week, the EU
should have let him know that there will be hell to pay for this kind of
behavior. Alas, the opportunity was wasted.

Hell is exactly what it's like in Chechnya right now, especially for males
under the age of 60. Russian forces detain them on a massive scale, accusing
them of rebel collaboration. At detention centers throughout the region,
police systematically torture Chechen men -- and some women -- to coerce
testimony or confessions, or simply, it seems, out of wanton sadism. Human
Rights Watch documented this pattern of abuse in dozens of interviews with
former detainees. Their accounts, which we presented in a report published
October 26, are truly harrowing.

Chechens consistently told us of being greeted at detention centers by being
forced to run a gauntlet of guards who beat them with nightsticks, metal
bars, whatever they could find. This was how Aindi Kovtorashvili was killed
in January at the now-infamous Chernokozovo prison. When his family found him
in a Russian morgue after a three-week search, his corpse had a hole in the
head and fractured hands. Even a 14-year-old mentally retarded boy was not
spared the cruel "greeting" of the gauntlet.

Beatings in 'Men's Places'

Russian forces at a military base beat one Chechen, we'll call him "Idris,"
on the genitals during interrogation. Trying to retain his dignity, he told
Human Rights Watch: "They beat me in men's places." Such beatings, which for
Idris caused permanent damage, were common practice: A doctor in one regional
hospital reported about 30 cases of trauma injuries to the genitals.

Despite an ingrained reluctance in Chechnya to discuss sexual violence, we
also learned about the rape of men and women in Russian custody. Two sisters
were raped while detained in a pit near a border crossing. A 19-year-old
mentally retarded woman was repeatedly raped at a military base.

These arbitrary mass arrests, torture, and "disappearances" are among the
primary reasons why thousands of displaced Chechens are terrified to return
to their homes. They continue to live in squalid conditions in neighboring
Ingushetia, where the international community is forced to support them
because the Russians won't. The fear of rearrest on their way to the hospital
even prevents torture victims from seeking much-needed treatment.

Russian authorities claim they are conducting "criminal investigations." But
there are no lawyers, no evidence is presented, and no one seems to go to
trial. The slightest irregularity in a passport, or being found in a
neighborhood outside one's official residence, serves as cause for arrest.
Once in custody, a bribe is almost the only way out. Predatory Russian
officials, often abetted by Chechen intermediaries, demand anywhere between
$80 and $5,000 for release. This happened so frequently that in many cases,
detention itself seemed to be motivated by the promise of financial gain,
rather than by the need to identify rebel collaborators.

Information on detainees is a valuable commodity. One of the saddest scenes
is the crowds of family members outside prisons and detention facilities in
Chechnya, clinging to any information they can find, ready to buy lists of
detainees to see if their loved ones are on them.

The Russian government knows it has dirty secrets to hide, and uses clumsy
cover-up tactics to conceal them. In February it bused out hundreds of
detainees from Chernokozovo in preparation for a visit from Council of Europe
monitors. As soon as the monitors left, the inmates were bused back.

Why would Russia, a Council of Europe member state, think it could get away
with such brazen conduct? Because Russia has gotten away with it before. In
the 1994-1996 Chechen war, Russian troops treated Chechen detainees exactly
the same way they are doing now. Moreover, all around Russia, police torture
is an everyday fact of life in criminal investigations -- a fact we
documented in a 1999 report on the practice. So perhaps it should come as no
surprise that a country that so systematically thumbs its nose at the rule of
law during peacetime should do it during war as well.

Establishing Accountability

The EU has issued a lot of condemnations about torture in Chechnya, but like
the United States, will not take concrete action for fear of jeopardizing its
relations with Russia. Despite instructions by EU foreign ministers in
December, member states for the most part declined to send representatives to
the region to bear witness to the abuse (in sharp contrast to their practice
in Kosovo). To its credit, in April the EU sponsored a resolution at the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, urging Russia to launch a national
commission of inquiry that would establish accountability for abuse. But now,
six months later, there's no commission, nor even a public investigation,
about torture.

EU member states have declined for months to file an interstate complaint
against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. They claim that
Russia's human rights envoy to Chechnya, whose staff in the region collects
human rights complaints but has no prosecutorial authority, should be given
time to prove itself. But we don't need more time to conclude that there is
no commission. The EU member states, which were a leading force for
international justice in the Balkan wars, should at least make use of the
European Court -- and next time Mr. Putin comes to Paris the EU should let
him know they plan to do so.

Next month European ministers will descend on Rome to celebrate the 50th
anniversary of the European human rights convention. They will be searching
for new ways to improve the European system of human rights protection. They
would do well to start by using the ones that already exist. European
credibility on human rights depends on it.

******

#12
Washington Post
November 7, 2000
[for personal use only]
Lawless Capitalism Grips Russian Business
By David Hoffman

MOSCOW, Nov. 6  Black-masked riot police, wearing bulletproof vests and
bearing nightsticks, broke down the doors of a venerable Russian vodka
distiller this weekend, demonstrating anew how boardroom brawls continue to
turn violent in Russia's turbulent brand of capitalism.

The riot police were called to the headquarters of the Smirnov family vodka
company to help the new owners fight the old owners. Inside, Boris Smirnov, a
founder and president who owns 50 percent of the company, refused to leave.
Outside, Sergei Yuzefov, representing a company that has purchased the other
50 percent, demanded to be admitted so he could oust Smirnov.

A melee ensued in which Smirnov's security service barred the doors. The new
owners called the riot police, who stormed the main entrance, smashed a
wooden door and climbed in through the windows.

The raid was just the latest example of an abiding sore spot in the Russian
economy that has continued to worry foreign investors and has posed a
challenge to President Vladimir Putin. While Russia has privatized the vast
majority of formerly state-owned factories and companies, it has done far
less to secure property rights of owners and shareholders.

Hardly a week goes by when companies large and small are not enmeshed in
high-profile quarrels over property, which seem to defy the courts and spill
into raucous allegations of theft and cheating and, sometimes, into violence.

The outcome of the battle is important for Russia's economy. Although
currently enjoying a windfall from high oil prices, many economists have said
that in the long term Russia needs to create a stable and predictable
investment climate to attract the billions of dollars required to retool its
aging, Soviet-era industrial base.

Putin has said that creating a good climate for investment--governed by the
"dictatorship of law"--was one of his top priorities. During a visit to
France last week, Putin reasserted that Russia wanted to integrate itself
into the global economy and protect the rights of property owners.

But the reality inside Russia has been different. The boardroom scuffles,
which began under former president Boris Yeltsin, have continued unabated
since Putin took over Dec. 31, and he has done little about it. He appointed
a team of liberal economic advisers, and has often reiterated his commitment
to market reforms, but he has displayed no appetite for straightening out the
mess in what experts call corporate governance. This includes disputes over
ownership, over minority shareholders and their rights, and over a variety of
tactics to grab or conceal value in a company.

In the West, long-established rules and aggressive regulators have provided
transparency and protected investors. But in Russia, which has yet to
establish the rule of law, chunks of companies worth billions of dollars are
shuffled around at will. Mysterious shell companies are used to drain the
value from parent firms, at the expense of shareholders. The battles have
been especially intense in Russia's oil and gas industry, where many foreign
investors have bought up shares. Recently, for example, critics have raised
questions about whether the management of Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly,
was covertly transferring assets to another company in which the managers may
have their own private interests.

Driven by the higher oil prices, Russia's macro-economic outlook is brighter
than at any time since the 1998 ruble crash. There is a budget surplus, and
the Central Bank's hard currency reserves have returned to pre-crash levels.
However, stocks remain in the doldrums.

Peter M. Halloran, executive chairman of Aton Capital Group, a leading
brokerage house here, said the stock market is suffering because of worries
about the corporate governance risks. "It's the biggest problem for the
equities market," he said, adding that "as you unravel each one in a positive
direction, it helps the market."

In the Smirnov case, the dispute stemmed from the purchase last summer of 50
percent of the vodka company by Alfa Eko, a trading company that is part of
the Alfa Group, one of Russia's larger financial-industrial conglomerates.
The new owners wanted to boost Smirnov production in Russia from the current
200,000 to 300,000 bottles a month to more than a million.

But the sitting president, Boris Smirnov, who held the other 50 percent,
refused to yield. According to the newspaper Kommersant, Smirnov insisted
that his shares also be bought out and that he be appointed general director
for life.

(Separately, Boris Smirnov has been fighting a long-running legal dispute
over the use of the brand name. He revived the Smirnov label on Russian vodka
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. He is a descendant of Pyotr
Smirnov, a merchant who founded the original vodka company in Russia in 1860.
However, the Smirnov vodka produced in Russia is not the same as Smirnoff,
the best-selling vodka brand in the world produced by multinational distiller
UDV--but not in Russia, though it is sold here. UDV claims its predecessor
company, Heublein, acquired the Smirnoff name in 1934 from a Russian emigre.
The emigre bought it from one of Pyotr Smirnov's sons, Vladimir, who had
changed his name to Smirnoff after leaving Russia. The case is in the courts.)

The new owners, Alfa Eko, then chose Yuzefov for the post of acting general
director, and tried to abolish Smirnov's post. Alfa Eko won a court ruling
allowing it to enter the Smirnov offices in central Moscow. When Yuzefov was
barred by Smirnov's security service, he called in the riot police. Boris
Smirnov vowed not to give up.

The Smirnov case pales by comparison to the stakes in a controversy
surrounding Norilsk Nikel, one of the world's largest producers of such
precious metals as nickel and platinum, which reported $2.2 billion in sales
and $1.1 billion in net profits for the first half of this year.

The company was privatized in the notorious 1995-96 "loans for shares"
auctions in which Russian tycoons gobbled up the country's biggest industrial
assets in sweetheart deals. Norilsk was taken over by the architect of loans
for shares, Vladimir Potanin, one of the group of tycoons known as the
oligarchs who came to prominence under Yeltsin.

Recently, Norilsk announced an extraordinarily complex "restructuring" in
which minority shareholders have said they are being undermined by Potanin's
conglomerate, Interos, the majority shareholder in Norilsk. James Fenkner, an
analyst with the brokerage house Troika Dialog, said recently that while the
plan "is incredibly complex, the end result is not. The majority owners get
far more of Norilsk Nikel, and the minority owners get far less."

Norilsk has said the restructuring, when complete next year, will eventually
help investors by consolidating into one company all its cash flows, which in
the past have gone through murky trading companies.

However, Eric Kraus, chief strategist of Nikoil Capital Markets, another
brokerage house, said this explanation was hypothetical and "Potanin made
fools of anyone who had trusted him . . . revealing to all just how
treacherous a place the Russian market can still be."

Dmitri Vasiliev, a former head of the Russian securities commission who now
runs an investor rights group, said that Putin's aides have sent a "clear
message" that they want to get more involved in corporate governance
disputes. But, Vasiliev added, "from the point of view of a rank-and-file
investor or a foreign investor, the situation has not improved."

******

#13
Fights To Control Regional Media Described with Ryazan Example 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta
27 October 2000
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Lyudmila Semina and Andrey Belyy: "The Magnates Open a
Second Front.  In the Regions.  The New Currency of the Local Elites" --

  It is no accident that people say, "A bad
example is contagious."   The monopolization of the press in Moscow by
the oligarchs did not escape the attention of the regional magnates.  
They also raced to establish their own "media empires," turning local
media into controlled weapons in the election battles.   Rossiyskaya
Gazeta recently wrote, for example, about the armed conflict over the
ancient newspaper Uralskiy Rabochiy; the chosen teams of the governor and
his former rival in the election cracked heads over possession of the
paper.   It is not the only example.   A new division of the information
market is taking place, at the regional level this time--this conclusion
rang out at the very opening of the Press-2001 exhibition and was then
repeated throughout the first day of its operation, including at the
press assembly of the RF Union of Journalists, which brought together
dozens of the country's journalists.

    The participants talked about how the degree of control that local
oligarchs have over the regional media is much greater than seen with the
Moscow and central press and television.   In the regions this shows up
more simply, it is more transparent and open, and therefore more
noticeable: these magnates are not embarrassed to show who is the master
of the house on every convenient occasion.   A controlled press for them
is a kind of new, modern curerncy--the more he has bought up, the more
significant and influential a boss he is.   After all, the influence of
the printed word and television speech on the minds of simple citizens
has reached that critical point where possession of his own media may be
the best protection against all sins for any businessman or politician
with a questionable reputation.

    The most priceless diamonds in the regional information market today
are the local television channels, especially after state television was
taken out of the governors' hands.   In many Russian oblasts the
administrations have quickly moved to set up new televisions studios
subordinate to them, just so they are not deprived of the powerful
attribute of power that television has become.   An example was given
that graphically reveals the "secret side" of the ardent attraction of
those in power to television in particular: one of the Yekaterinburg
studios was once exposed using the so-called "25th frame" for election
campaigning.   This is where information in favor of one candidate is
subconsciously fed to the viewer.   But even without such criminal
activity television is capable of manipulating public awareness very,
very effectively.   Especially when "dirty tricks" are now the norm in
election campaigns and provincial television journalism has, with
enviable agility, mastered the methods of "killer television" as the most
readily sold and highly paid commodity among candidates for governmental
positions.

    The tendency for the mass media to be monopolized by groups, whether
they are election staffs or main departments of governmental structures,
is extremely dangerous, as participants in debates at the exhibition
noted, for the country's security.   It is understandable why the new
Russian government started out so vigorously to tame the big and small
media magnates, including in the regions.   And it is understandable why
these efforts immediately ran into very marked resistance by the local
elites.   Just look, for example, at the verbal attack at the recent
meeting of the Greater Urals MAEV of the governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast
and the President of Bashkiria, which heatedly criticized the
governmental decision to transfer the power to appoint the chairmen of
the regional state television and radio companies to the federal Center. 
 After all, this process was formerly controlled entirely by the local
authorities, and the departments of state television were a powerful
administrative resource of the ruling forces.   And it passed by
inheritance to the victor in the form of the right to free use of the
most expensive tool in the fight for power.   Yes, the governors have
something to lose in this case.   And they have something to defend,
resisting attempts by the federal authorities to put the activities of
the mass media in the regions into at least some kind of order.

    Whereas in the past it was precisely the governors and mayors, making
use of their power, who trampled on the local media in a planned manner,
new "heroes of our times" have now arrived in the regional information
market.   They oriented themselves quickly and made use of the pressure
by the central power against the positions of the regional leaders,
simply buying up publications and journalists from them.   For example,
Russian governors formed their own newspapers specially to be able to
remind the inhabitants of the oblasts entrusted to them daily who was the
most important person, the nicest, the smartest.   And then suddenly the
newspaper nurtured by some governor passes into the control of different
people, who completely unexpectedly turn the menacing information weapon
against its own recent patron.

    Rossiyskaya Gazeta has already written about such a turn of events in
Ulyanovsk, where the local and fairly popular newspaper Simbirskiye
Gubernskiye Vedomosti suddenly, out of the clear blue sky, began
mercilessly attacking the governor, his sons, his friends, and others in
its pages.   And just a year or two before the current governor of
Ulyanovsk Oblast Yuriy Goryachev was a virtual father to the
editor-in-chief of this newspaper.   This case, it was said at the press
exhibition, no longer seems to be something exceptional today.

    The exhibit for the Ryazan area presented the newspaper Ryazanskiye
Vedomosti which, as was explained to us, is under the control of
Vyacheslav Lyubimov, the head of administration.   They also have five
rayon papers there, and a Sunday edition.   A little model of a little
media holding company.   But rumors are already circulating that the
leading oblast newspaper is coming under the influence of a new chief,
Valeriy Ryumin, who was once mayor of the city and is now a banker.  
Ryumin is one of the candidates to be the next governor of the oblast
and, needless to say, is a bitter opponent of the current governor,
Vyacheslav Lyubimov.   So now they say, he is arming himself.   A
journalist from the Ryazan newspaper Priokskaya Gazeta who came to the
exhibit with us told us that there are really no independent media in
Ryazan, and that her publication remains almost the only one in the
oblast that still does not have a concrete owner.   This status, of
course, allows the journalists of Priokskaya Gazeta to be more objective
than their colleagues from other local publications, but Prioksyaka
Gazeta has not paid wages for several months.   Naturally, this newspaper
did not have any money to spend for a place at the exhibit.

    The example of the Ryazan media forced us to ponder this subject: in
general how is it becoming possible for these press speculators to
operate?   To reduce everything to money is perhaps simplifying the
situation.   In the end, the governors do not victimize their own
publications too.   When the regional department of the State Television
and Radio Broadcasting Company (the Oka Television Company) was sold and
emerged from under the influence of Lyubimov and, as Mikhail Malakhov,
leader of the Ryazan division of the SP [Union of Rightist Forces] and
also a candidate for governor, said, "is in fact controlled by the local
Berezovskiy, Mr. Ryumin," the present governor opened the Ryazan Region
Television Company, subordinate to him alone, and provided it with first
class equipment.   Nominally it was set up to give detailed treatment of
local Ryazan events, but in reality it was as a tool to counter criticism
of the governor on the state-owned Oka channel.

    Other than money, how can the success of the new Ryazan media magnate
be explained?   Let us recall that in recent times Ryazan Oblast has
drawn public attention a little too often for scandalous occurrences: a
pogrom in a Jewish Sunday school, disconnecting the electricity,
explosions in the city market.   The assessment of these events by the
local media depends precisely, as expected in a dependent condition, on
the line ordered by the particular "patron": Mr. so-and-so is to blame
for everything, or vice versa.   But doesn't it follow from this
turbulent life in Ryazan that perhaps the government there is greatly
weakened?   And doesn't the local administration's loss of influence over
the press, which it is so feverishly trying to compensate for, illustrate
this?   The press is a sensitive instrument.   For example, 500
publications in Tatarstan (as their exhibit proudly proclaimed) for some
reason do not raise their voice against the president of the republic,
but back in Ryazan, or in Kursk, which simply refuses to obey Aleksandr
Rutskoy, the media readily subject the local authorities to tirades
expressed almost in profanity.   And where the point is being made
subtly, there too it breaks out....   There is no trust or respect for
the leaders of the region, there is not even elementary fear of
punishment, and so there is a bacchanalia of shameless commercialism in
the information market: magnates buy up papers, journalists are bought
and sold.

    There are many businessmen and governors in Russia, and in principle
each one has the right to form his own television station or newspaper.  
But the consequences of such unbridled "freedom of speech" may,
participants in the press assembly stressed, prove lamentable for the
as-yet-underdeveloped civil society in our country.   As the experience
of the Latin American countries (which, unfortunately, are close to
Russia in terms of the degree of development of civil institutions) has
shown, a disorderly system of central and regional mass media
threatens--strange as it may seem to some--not a clampdown on freedom of
speech, but rather the establishment of undemocratic oligarchic
conditions.   The system of mass media must be a system.   The state has
a right to have and should have publications to inform the public of its
activities.   Society, private persons, and political and financial
groups, including regions, should have the full gamut of mass media to
express and defend their own interests.   It is no good to divide the
whole press market up by the principle of "white" against "red" and "old"
against "new."   This will produce nothing but another round of
information wars, this time on the regional level.


*****

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