September 24, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4535• 4536 • 

Johnson's Russia List
#4536
24 September 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Angela Charlton, Putin Bringing Stability to Russia.
2. BBC MONITORING: RUSSIAN TV DESCRIBES NEW BALANCE OF POWER 
IN COUNTRY'S BUSINESS ELITE.
3. Carol Leonard: re Agricultural Reform/4535.
4. Irish Times: Seamus Martin, RUSSIAN PATRIARCH WAS A KGB AGENT, 
FILES SAY.
5. Interfax: RUSSIAN COMMUNIST LEADER DOWNBEAT ON THE CURRENT 
SITUATION.
6. Stanislav Menshikov: BE POLITE WITH THE IMF But Don't Heed 
Their Instructions.
7. Oles Smolansky: The Kursk.
8. Lawrence G. Kelley: Responses to Lieven re Kursk.
9. Los Angeles Times: Maura Reynolds, Oh, Say Can't You See Why 
We're Losing Out on Medals? 
10. Chicago Tribune: Colin McMahon, A DANGEROUS GAME. 
RUSSIAN SPORTS ARE PLAGUED BY FUNDING SHORTAGES AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
WOES. WORST OF ALL IS A GROWING LEVEL OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE. 
11. Conference in New York: The Nikitin Case: Victory for the Rule 
of Law in Russia?
12. Andrew Miller: Svanidze Interview.]
*******


#1
Putin Bringing Stability to Russia
September 24, 2000
By ANGELA CHARLTON

MOSCOW (AP) - Despite a fiasco over a sunken submarine and a feud over 
control of the media, President Vladimir Putin has brought a fragile 
political stability to his unwieldy nation, replacing the chaos that 
paralyzed Russia for much of the 1990s. 


Since he was elected six months ago, the former spy has confounded critics' 
predictions that his administration would succumb to the corruption that 
stained Boris Yeltsin's tenure or smother Russia's nascent democracy. 


Yet observers warn that Putin's position is precarious. Poverty and crime 
remain pervasive. Putin has stressed the need to tackle the problems that 
matter most to the majority of Russians - poverty and unemployment. But the 
economy remains in deep trouble and the government has yet to come up with a 
strategy to revive the economy beyond promises to continue market reforms. 


``The people believe in Putin. But they cannot wait forever. He must show 
through real actions that wages will always be paid on time, and that they 
will someday grow, and that the country has become safer than before,'' said 
Andrei Ryabov of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 


Putin has pushed through tax reforms and nuclear arms control pacts that 
snagged under Yeltsin. He has brought autocratic regional leaders to heel. 
While trying to revive Russia's international influence, he has been 
realistic in admitting that Moscow can't afford to be a superpower and has 
begun to trim the bloated military. He has charmed foreign leaders and wooed 
Western investors - and let a 10-year-old Japanese girl toss him on a judo 
mat. 


Political stability also has been boosted by major changes in parliament, 
where centrist parties recently ended the domination of the Communists, who 
fought Yeltsin and reform for years, often deadlocking the government. 


Human rights groups paint a darker picture. They say the security services 
under Putin have covered up atrocities in Chechnya and persecuted minorities, 
environmentalists and journalists. They are wary of Putin's KGB background 
and note that he rose to power with the help of the scandal-tinged Yeltsin. 


Still, Putin remains Russia's most popular politician. His ratings barely 
dipped amid criticism of his bungled reaction to the Kursk submarine disaster 
last month. Clearly surprised by public anger over the Kursk, Putin showed 
himself more sensitive to public opinion than any other modern Russian 
leader. 


Support for Putin has come from broadly differing camps - including renowned 
dissident writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, persecuted by the Soviet KGB that 
Putin served for 15 years, and former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. 


Solzhenitsyn said after meeting with Putin this week, ``the president has an 
excellent understanding of the incredible difficulties ... which he has 
inherited.'' 


Putin has ``a lively mind and a quick imagination, he has no personal thirst 
for power or intoxication with power,'' said Solzhenitsyn, who has derided 
almost every other Russian politician in recent years. 


Gorbachev said recently that he had observed ``a change for the better'' 
since Putin came to power. 


Putin's loudest opponents are two tycoons, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir 
Gusinsky, who accuse him of cracking down on the media - and are using TV 
networks they control, ORT and NTV, to air their complaints. Independent 
journalists also say Putin's government and security services pressure the 
media, a charge Putin denies. 


The Russian public has largely sided with Putin in this debate. That's 
because Berezovsky and Gusinsky represent a class of superrich, 
well-connected - and widely reviled - businessmen who built empires through 
shady privatization deals in the 1990s and who came to represent the worst 
excesses of the Yeltsin years. 


Putin has vowed to end the political power of these so-called oligarchs, and 
to tackle the corruption that bedevils Russian life. Russian media reports 
suggest Putin may fire Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who some say is too 
oligarch-friendly. 


Putin's success or failure in tackling corruption will be a key test of his 
presidency. For all his early talk, little has been done to take on 
government corruption. Nor have there been any major moves against the 
organized crime that grips large parts of the economy. 


Some analysts say Putin remains popular because he hasn't faced any major 
challenges. 


``He's been lucky,'' said Yevgeny Volk, director of the Heritage Foundation 
Moscow office. 


The economy is buoyed by high world prices for oil, Russia's top export 
commodity, but a drop could leave the government scrambling to pay wages and 
pensions in a painful encore of the Yeltsin years. And the year-old war in 
Chechnya, which Russians initially cheered, is dragging on with no end in 
sight. 


Sympathetic observers say Putin, who never before held elected office, is 
still finding his footing. 


``Russia has already left the Yeltsin road but doesn't know where to go 
next,'' Ryabov said. 


*******


#2
BBC MONITORING 
RUSSIAN TV DESCRIBES NEW BALANCE OF POWER IN COUNTRY'S BUSINESS ELITE
Text of report by Russian Centre TV on 23rd September 


[Presenter] Recent events have noticeably changed the balance of power
between Russian oligarchs. By the way, not every businessman, even a very
rich one, is an oligarch. Oligarchs are those who made their capitals and
continue to increase them by means of close relationship with the Kremlin
and the government, involvement in politics and direct influence on the
state authority. 


This is the way the positions of Russian oligarchs have changed since 1996,
according to our assessment based on the results of an expert poll. 


[Unidentified announcer] Two of 13 captains of Russian business who led
Boris Yelstin to power in 1996, Stolichnyy bank head Aleksandr Smolenskiy
and Inkombank head Vladimir Vinogradov, have completely disappeared from
the scene. 


Two ringleaders of the current oligarchic unrest, [Vladimir] Gusinskiy and
[Boris] Berezovskiy, are having their hardest time and fighting for
survival. Their financial and political influence has been seriously
undermined. 


The positions of the chief executive of the JSC Unified Energy System of
Russia, Anatoliy Chubays, and the president of the powerful oil company
LUKoil, Vagit Alekperov, are not very stable as well, judging by their
tense relations with tax police. 


Possible resignation of the head of Gazprom, Rem Vyakhirev, is on rumours
permanently. 


On the contrary, [Yukos oil company head] Mikhail Khodorkovskiy and
[Interros group head] Vladimir Potanin, seriously affected by the 1998
financial crisis, are gaining back their influence. 


The weight of the media minister and the head of Video International
[advertising company], Mikhail Lesin, is also growing. 


The influence of Alfa-group headed by Mikhail Fridman and [former foreign
trade minister] Petr Aven has increased most significantly. Alfa evidently
claims to be the closest to the present-day Kremlin. 


[The main shareholder of Sibneft and Russian Aluminium] Roman Abramovich
has most probably preserved and even strenghthened his positions. In 1996
he was just a proxy of Berezovskiy, but now he is an absolutely independent
financial and political figure. 


[Presenter] I must make two reservations, because the situation is changing
very rapidly. The last scandal with Media Most can thwart Mikhail Lesin's
ascent of the oligarchic pyramid. If the rumours about his imminent
resignation come true, it would be a heavy blow on him. 


Another reservation is related to Anatoliy Chubays. Russian Audit Chamber
Deputy Chairman Yuriy Boldyrev told our programme that the Audit Chamber
had nothing against Chubays at the moment. However, Unified Energy System
of Russia still is in the focus of attention of tax collectors. Moreover,
according to some information, a confidential memo about wrongdoings by UES
top managers is circulating in high places. Putin's entourage is always
tempted to get rid of Chubays and to replace him by a more close to Putin
and reliable person. 


*******
#3
From: "Carol Scott Leonard" <carol.leonard@economics.oxford.ac.uk>
Subject: Agricultural Reform/4535
Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 


This is to comment on Steve Wegren's update on agricultural policy reform
under Gordeev. Wegren's report, if it reflects the full measure of what the
government intends to do, shows how little progress the government has made
in working through tough political issues, and not the reverse. The update
leads with the promise of "significant changes", but there is nothing
encouraging in what followed.


The following underscores the familiarity rather than the novelty of
current policy:
1 Debt write-off is not new. This is a form of subsidy which undercuts
efforts to establish the market mechanism, and it has been used regularly
in transition. The government prefers this means of solving farm financial
problems to a more incentive-oriented mechanism, which would encourage
producers to form cooperatives to pay off debts and organise new sources of
credit;
2 That there is some intent to produce a Land Code without specification of
property rights to the arable and the means of disposal means that the
status quo, unclear property rights, will continue, leading to further
rent-seeking behaviour and other kinds of inefficiencies, setting back
Russian agriculture still further;
3 Extensive regulation of agriculture is what is not needed to encourage
entrepreneurship; indeed, since 1993, the words "more regulation" have been
a short-hand for status quo preference;
4 Wegren reports that Gordeev wants to "change
rural social policy, freeing agricultural enterprises from expenditures
associated with social services and rural infrastructure". De facto, most
already are;


When the Ministry of Agriculture makes a decision to give massive infusions
of funds into asphalting small rural roads (thus assisting farm income),
completing the land registry, and retraining the young in the farm community
in non-agricultural skills, among the positive developments already underway
in the other transition countries, where entry into the EU depends upon
making rural producers more competitive in global markets, then there will
have been a major policy shift.


******


#4
Irish Times
September 23, 2000 
RUSSIAN PATRIARCH WAS A KGB AGENT, FILES SAY
By Seamus Martin


The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Alexiy II of Moscow and
All Russia, was a long-serving KGB agent and even received the agency's
'Certificate of Honour', according to archive documents left behind by the
Soviet spy agency in Estonia. 


The papers detail the activities of Patriarch Alexiy, who was code-named
'Agent Drozdov' (the thrush), in actions against orthodox clergy and
believers. 


Patriarch Alexiy has been a strong supporter of President Putin, himself a
former KGB agent, and has issued public statements defending Mr Putin's
conduct of the war in Chechnya and his stance on the sinking of the nuclear
submarine Kursk. He has consistently opposed all proposed visits to Russia
by Pope John Paul II. 


Under his patriarchate the church has received special privileges,
including the right to import alcohol and tobacco at reduced rates of duty
for sale in the Russian Federation. 


There have been allegations against the Patriarch for some time but they
have been consistently denied by the church. The most recent denial was
made on Wednesday by a church spokesman, Father Vsevolod Chaplin, who said:
'There are no data indicating that Patriarch Aleksiy II was an associate of
the special services, and no classified documents bear his signature.' 


But the Keston Institute, an Anglican religious rights organisation, has
informed The Irish Times that it has 'reviewed all the available
documentary evidence from the various archives of the KGB' and has
concluded that the allegations are based on fact. 


Representatives of the Keston Institute have had access to documents in
Tallinn which reveal that the Patriarch was recruited by the Estonian KGB
on February 28th, 1958. Although he is referred to only as 'Drozdov' the
documents make it clear that they refer to the then Father Alexiy Ridiger
as the personal details given match those of no other priest of the
Estonian diocese. 


The document in the Estonian State Archive (record group 131, file 393,
pages 125-126) signed by the chairman of the Estonian KGB, Col I.P.Karpov,
and the head of the Fourth Department 'Belyayev' notes that Drozdov
'positively recommended himself' to the KGB. 


It adds: 'During secret rendezvous he was punctilious, energetic and
convivial. He is well-oriented in theoretical questions of theology and the
international situation. He has a willing attitude to the fulfilment of our
tasks and has already provided materials deserving attention which are
forming the basis for documentation of the criminal activity of a member of
the leadership of the Johvi Orthodox church . . . 


'In addition, 'Drozdov' also provided valuable material for the case under
way against the priest Povedsky. At present he is working on improving his
knowledge of German. After consolidating the agent's experience in
practical work with the organs of state security in the cultivation of
agents, we intend also to use him in our interests by sending him to
capitalist states as a member of church delegations.' 


KGB papers in the Moscow archive state that Drozdov was sent to England in
1969 as part of a church delegation, that he and another agent were
involved in 'educational work' with monks in Pskov in western Russian in
March 1983 and that he was sent on a mission to Portugal in 1985. 


According to Keston, a file in the archive dated February 1988 states: 'An
order of the USSR KGB chairman was prepared to award Agent Drozdov the
Certificate of Honour.' 


*******
#5
RUSSIAN COMMUNIST LEADER DOWNBEAT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION
Interfax 


Moscow, 23rd September: Chairman of Russia's National Patriotic Union and
Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennadiy Zyuganov has assessed
the situation in the country as "close to critical" despite optimistic
government statements. He gave such an assessment, addressing the union's
third congress which is under way in the Moscow countryside today. 


An official report obtained by Interfax quotes Zyuganov as saying that the
draft budget submitted to the State Duma is understated at least by
R150-200bn. 


He said the so-called "strategy of tension" is, in fact, being mounted
against Russia to further undermine it as a state. As elements of this
strategy, the Communist leader referred to an onslaught on the regional
power and attempts to legislatively scrap the social guarantees left over
from the Soviet times and to sell the land and the forests. 


Zyuganov described the union as the only political force consistently
upholding the interests of the people. He believes that those political
leaders who were among the founders of the movement in 1996, but then left
it, found themselves in a situation whereby "the people denied them trust
at elections". 


The union remained a mighty political force. Moreover, new organizations
and new leaders have joined the union, Zyuganov said, expecting the forum
to give a strong impetus to the movement. The congress will examine a new
concept of the union's development, approved by a number of our leading
experts. The implementation of this programme will enable the union to
transform into a more efficient organization, to involve young energetic
people and to attract new intellectual, information, and financial resources. 


The report says the acting chairman of the union's executive committee
Gennadiy Semigin, who is also the State Duma's deputy chairman, spoke about
the movement's development concept. He said the union could and should
express the interests of 65-70 per cent of compatriots. 


******


#6
From: "stanislav menshikov" <menschivok@globalxs.nl>
Subject: BE POLITE WITH THE IMF But Don't Heed Their Instructions 
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 


"MOSCOW TRIBUNE", 22 September 2000
BE POLITE WITH THE IMF
But Don't Heed Their Instructions 
By Stanislav Menshikov


We haven't heard about new loans from the IMF for some time. That's OK.
Considering Russia's external large surplus we do not really need those
loans as long as the payments balance remains as good as it is. The
government keeps saying that some new money would be helpful in repaying 
old debts to the Fund. But do we really want to prolong a situation in
which we have to succumb to IMF instructions (they call it "advice") in
exchange for new money? And instructions they are since any deviation is
treated as Russia's alleged breach of contract by the Washington crowd. As
explained by Mr. Illarionov we have to be good to those people because we
need IMF's approval of our behaviour in order to scale down Russia's much
larger indebtedness dating since Soviet times. If only we were good as
Poland (which saw her former debts cancelled in the early 1990s) all
problems with the IMF would be resolved years ago. But Russians are not
Poles, so there you are.


The new wisdom forthcoming from the Fund after its latest annual session in
Prague is that Russia should take advantage of its current favourable
economic situation to boost its structural reforms. Previously we were led
to believe that reforms (whatever that means) were crucial in overcoming
our economic crisis. Now that Russia has resumed growth after largely
ignoring that advice, it is to "to take advantage" of growth in order to
accomplish what was never needed before. Officials from the IMF do not seem
to appreciate this paradox and are making a straight face when they should
be blushing from shame.


But what are the particular reforms the IMF is insisting upon this time
around? Apparently it is singling out three priorities: banking reform,
monetary policy and regulating oil exports. After examining these
recommendations, we can agree (with reservations) with the first and reject
the two others. The score is therefore 0.5 - 2.5, ergo IMF loses. 


Though the Fund is right about the banks, it is a decade late in
recognising that problem. Commercial banks in Russia are in dire need of
reform since the moment they appeared in the early 1990s. It is no secret
that they are not banks at all in the accepted meaning of that term in
normal market economies. Since their inception, they were not meant to
perform the public utility function of expediting money payments between
firms and individuals and channelling money savings into investment.
Instead their main function was to hide profits of sister companies earned
by various methods (legal and illegal) from tax authorities and use them
for making a quick hit in capital and exchange markets. Those who thought
that Russian banks were for safekeeping lost their shirts in August 1998.
They have not become much better since. Clients with a choice of using a
foreign bank refrain from using their services and the banks are still
reluctant to credit Russia's economy. They are also the main conduit for
stashing business profits abroad and are contributing to the perennial
black hole of multibillion capital flight.


The IMF is also telling Moscow to tighten its monetary policy. It's
hypothesis is that Russia is earning too many petrodollars and that the
Central Bank is printing too many roubles to pay for increasing its
currency reserves. The extra roubles are being accumulated by Russian banks
which are not using them to lend money to the economy. This could allegedly
create more inflation. Therefore, the advice goes, the Central Bank should
relieve the "money overhang" by raising its reserve requirements and by
other traditional measures.


The problem with this theory is that it is only partly true. Inflation in
Russia today is largely cost-push, not demand-pull. Extra money accumulated
by the banks is definitely not used to provide credit to consumers or to
finance capital investment. Therefore it creates no noticeable extra money
demand in the economy. A large part of it is used to convert rouble profits
into dollars and send them abroad. If the IMF believes that tighter
monetary policy will induce Russian banks to lend more to the economy then
they should have their brains inspected. That advice will have the adverse
effect of restraining economic growth and will therefore be
counterproductive.


The IMF is also protesting against quota regulations which the Russian
government has been using to try stem growth in oil exports. It is true
that when the word price of oil is nearly twice higher than the Russian
domestic price, quotas are not particularly effective. But there is little
else that the government can do short of directly channelling funds to the
oil industry to assist it in boosting capital investment and oil
production.


So what to do about IMF advice? Probably the best solution is to ignore it
but remain polite. Let's wait and see whether the Fund can indeed help
solve the larger indebtedness issue. If it cannot, there is still plenty of
time to use tougher language.


*****


#7
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000
From: Oles Smolansky <oms0@Lehigh.EDU>
Subject: The Kursk


David,
In case your readers missed it, the Subbotnik addition to
Nezavisimaia gazeta (September 16, 2000, p. 15) contains two extensive
letters to the Editor, one by a retired Navy captain and another by a
naval engineer, essentally destroying the government's case for an
underwater collision with an American submarine. These letters are an
eye-opener and should be read by all interested in the subject. 


*****


#8
From: "Lawrence G. Kelley" <lgkelley@vr-web.de>
Subject: Responses to Lieven
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 


Stephen Blank, Dale Herspring, and Robert English all make valid points on
the reasoning behind the US Government's rejection of the Russian request
to view the USS Toledo and Memphis, suspected by some in Moscow of
colliding with the Kursk. I would like to add another: precedent. This
is not the first, nor will it be the last incident at sea for which the
deteriorating Russian Navy would like to blame to the US/NATO, and
acquiescing in this instance would inevitably involve a Policy decision on
"where to set the bar." In other words, under what conditions, if any,
and how often would the US (and/or its Allies) be willing to accept what
amounts to on-site inspection of naval forces. Such a regime would
certainly result in operational disruption and would likely compromise
some technical capabilities. For a variety of reasons the US has
staunchly opposed this form of naval arms control and can be expected to
continue doing so. Although not the full reasoning, Robert English was
right on target in commenting on equipment technical capabilities and the
ability of a trained eye to ferret them out. This generalization applies
well beyond the realm of sonar as well, but the "silent service" has its
name for good reason. Dale Herspring makes a telling observation about
satellite photography: Russia certainly has the ability to ascertain the
information that it seeks by using national technical means (NTM). But
one caveat exists: The priority must be high enough. Moscow's satellite
system has corroded like virtually every other aspect of its defense
capability. Given the political impact of the Kursk sinking, one would
think that the priority here would be adequate, but one cannot be sure. I
recall another high-profile event -- a 1992 evaluation which Russia
attempted to do under Vienna Document-90, an arms control agreement on
confidence- and security-building measures. At that point Russian
capabilities were far more intact than they are today. To our
astonishment, Moscow declared its intent to evaluate a unit that no longer
even existed! It had been closed under the drawdown of US Forces in Europe
-- a fact that was clear not only from the site's appearance from above,
but also from abundant coverage that had appeared in the US and German
press. The unit's exodus should have surprised no one -- least of all the
GRU. It most certainly was no secret. Since this is my first
contribution to JRL, let me add this brief biographic note. I am a
retired Russian Area Specialist who served in US and NATO commands and had
extensive contact with Soviet/post-Soviet military forces in the USSR,
FSU, GDR, and Eastern Europe. Lawrence G. Kelley
Colonel USMC (Ret)


******


#9
Los Angeles Times
September 22, 2000
Oh, Say Can't You See Why We're Losing Out on Medals? 
By MAURA REYNOLDS, Times Staff Writer


MOSCOW--When Russian gold medal winners mount the Olympic podium this 
week and beam as their national anthem blares, they'll be at a loss for 
words. 
Even if they want to sing along, they can't. The song has no lyrics. 
Nine years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia is still 
officially anthem-less. It is also flag-less and emblem-less. The world's 
largest country is getting by with only temporary symbols of nationhood. 
There is a song, to be sure, which is being played for Olympic 
winners--a hard-to-hum tune called "Patriotic Song," written in the 19th 
century by composer Mikhail Glinka. But in addition to being only a 
provisional anthem, it's nearly tuneless and still completely wordless. 
"How can it be that the anthem has languished without words for 10 
years?" wrote the daily Komsomolskaya Pravda. "Surely we don't need to 
explain to anyone how important it is to be able to hear 'Patriotic Song' 
sung by a proper choir?" 
In recent months, a new push to solve the problem has come from an 
unlikely place: Russia's sports community. Athletes say they are tired of the 
fact that when they win, they have nothing to sing. 
"To see another country's athletes sing their anthem when you know that 
you can't even say a word of your own totally kills the fighting spirit of 
your team," said Valentin I. Pokrovsky, 68, deputy manager for Moscow's 
popular Spartak soccer team. 
In fact, his team recently sent a letter to President Vladimir V. Putin 
pleading with him to finally come up with some words for the song. The team 
members hinted that a recent losing streak was somehow mystically connected 
to the fact that they had nothing to sing if they won. 
"We don't want to hang our heads any longer when our country's anthem is 
played in domestic and international arenas," the players wrote. "This is the 
best way to lose a match before it even starts." 
Russia's stopgap symbols--the red, white and blue flag, the 
double-headed eagle emblem and the wordless Glinka anthem--were adopted by 
decree by former President Boris N. Yeltsin as he presided over the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The symbols were essentially the same ones used in 
Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution, just stripped of monarchical 
trimmings such as the crowns on the eagles' heads. 
While in wide use, the anthem, flag and emblem have never been ratified 
by parliament. And in the interim, some Communist Party deputies insist on 
wearing name tags adorned with the old hammer and sickle. 
Georgy V. Vilinbakhov, Russia's master of state heraldry, complains that 
it's only people who want to go back in time who make an issue of the anthem. 
"The issue of the 'wordless' national anthem is stirred only by those 
who are dissatisfied with the existing official symbols of state power, 
including the anthem," he said. "These people would like to return to the 
trappings of the past." 
But it's not that simple. The struggle over Russia's symbols is also a 
struggle over Russia's identity. And because they can't agree on where their 
country is headed, Russians don't agree on what anthem they should sing on 
the way. 
In fact, a recent poll by the Public Opinion Foundation found the public 
as divided as possible--21% said they'd prefer to stick with the words and 
music of the Soviet anthem, 18% would like to keep the old music but find new 
words, 15% want Glinka with words, and 15% want to start from scratch. 
For whatever reason, the issue doesn't go away. These days, Communists 
and frustrated singers are pushing to bring back the Soviet anthem, which 
nearly everyone can still sing. Putin himself is rumored to favor the old 
melody. 
Meanwhile, at their proudest moment, Russia's Olympic athletes will find 
themselves speechless. And, according to Pokrovsky, maybe medal-less as well. 
"I'm convinced that one of the reasons why we are losing medals to the 
United States in Sydney is because the Russian team does not have a national 
anthem," he huffed. 
Alexei V. Kuznetsov of The Times' Moscow Bureau contributed to this 
report. 


******


#10
Chicago Tribune
September 24, 2000
A DANGEROUS GAME 
RUSSIAN SPORTS ARE PLAGUED BY FUNDING SHORTAGES AND ADMINISTRATIVE WOES. 
WORST OF ALL IS A GROWING LEVEL OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE. 
By Colin McMahon 
Tribune Foreign Correspondent 


ST. PETERSURG, Russia -- Vasily Shestakov and the Olympic hopefuls he helps 
train are neither rich nor famous.


Lucky for them.


Wrestlers, judo players, boxers and the other men at Shestakov's school are 
pretty much left alone to train, eat, sleep and dream of Olympic glory. They 
get by on pride, a bit of meal money and worn but serviceable equipment.


What they don't get, Shestakov said gratefully, is much attention from the 
criminal groups that infest Russian sports.


Since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Russian sports machine has 
suffered funding shortages, administrative decay and high-profile departures. 
The effects of those ills are on display at the Sydney Olympics as the 
Russians struggle to keep up in the medals race.


The most troubling phenomenon, however, has been the murders, kidnappings and 
shakedowns that have turned some Russian sports into dangerous enterprises.


In popular sports such as soccer and ice hockey, league administrators, team 
officials and star players all have been targeted. But bloodshed has visited 
even low-profile sports like team handball, water polo and the modern 
pentathlon. In some cities, martial arts or boxing clubs have been turned 
into training schools for mob-type foot soldiers.


As a result some Russian athletes have chosen to live abroad. Others have 
hired bodyguards.


"Sports is like anything else in the country," said Pavel Polychenko, a 
shooting instructor who works with Shestakov at the Comprehensive School of 
Higher Skill in Sports. "If there is money, there is a motive.


"Our sports are not big moneymakers, so we don't have the problems. If there 
were money here, then yes, maybe the gangsters would come."


Few of the attacks on athletes or officials are ever solved, even when police 
know the motive. Some of the more high-profile cases:


In May 18-year-old European junior boxing champion Sergei Latushko, an 
Olympic hopeful, was shot to death in front of a Ramenskoye stadium.


In February a group of men attacked Russia's 800-meter champion, Natalya 
Gorelova, in Moscow, beating her legs with metal bars. Gorelova nonetheless 
made the Olympic team.


In December 1999 a BMW belonging to figure skating champion Maria Butyrskaya 
was blown up in the parking lot of Moscow's Sports Palace. Butyrskaya took 
the incident as a warning, she said--"but I don't know as a warning of what."


In December 1998 St. Petersburg hockey player Nikolai Nikitin was shot dead 
in an apparent contract killing.


In June 1997 the financial director of Russia's national championship soccer 
team, Larisa Nechayeva, was killed when gunmen burst into her living room and 
opened fire.


In April 1997 Russian Ice Hockey Federation President Valentin Sych was shot 
dead.


Just last month four-time Olympic champion Alexander Tikhonov was arrested on 
suspicion of charges of plotting to assassinate a regional governor. 
Tikhonov, 47, a biathlete who ruled the sport in the 1970s and 1980s, built a 
successful business career after retiring following the Sarajevo Winter 
Olympics.


Some analysts say the well-publicized crimes and killings make things seem 
worse than they really are. They warn against reading too much into each 
individual act.


Yet the growing influence of organized crime in the sporting world is 
undeniable.


Most of the violence traces to the mid-1990s. Having run out of money from 
the federal budget for sports programs, the Kremlin allowed non-profit sports 
groups to import tobacco and alcohol duty-free and then pass it on to 
middlemen for retail sale.


Although the scheme brought in hundreds of millions in currency, federal 
investigators said relatively little of the money went to the right places. 
It also helped marry Russian sports to Russian gangsters, many of whom had 
their hands in the alcohol and tobacco businesses.


At the same time, criminal groups were rising up out of karate and other 
martial arts clubs that had existed underground during Soviet times.


The Moscow criminal group Sontsevo was born in a karate school. In St. 
Petersburg, the leadership of the Tambovsky ring, which controls petrol 
stations and some port activities in Russia's second city, is full of former 
karate instructors.


The marriage makes sense. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian 
criminal groups filled the vacuum of power with extortion and protection 
rackets. Beefy boxers and martial artists made good collectors and firm 
messengers.


Today, with government funding dried up for the thousands of youth sports 
programs that flourished under the Soviet Union, many clubs look to private 
sponsors to keep them going.


Some have luck with big companies. The Baltica brewery of St. Petersburg, for 
example, funds Shestakov's school.


But many smaller outfits have to rely on private sponsors. Some are just 
business people with a special interest in wrestling or skating, boxing or 
judo. Some are men of dubious background.


Shestakov's combat sports school is no mob training ground. Home to several 
Olympians, it was the school were Russian President Vladimir Putin learned 
judo while he was growing up in what was then Leningrad.


******


#11
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2000 
From: Karen johnson <karen.k.johnson@yale.edu> 
Subject: Conference: The Nikitin Case: Victory for the Rule of Law in Russia?


Dear David,
JRL readers may be interested in the following. It is open to the public, and
there is no need to RSVP.
Best,
Karen


The Nikitin Case: Victory for the Rule of Law in Russia?


A One-Day Conference at NYU School of Law, New York City
Friday, October 6, 2000


On September 13, 2000, the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Court rejected a
prosecutorial appeal to reopen the Nikitin case. The decision was final and
unappealable. Thus, after five years of fighting the prosecutor's office and
the Federal Security Service (FSB), a successor to the KGB, Aleksandr Nikitin
had finally beaten charges of high treason and divulging state secrets.
Western
newspapers, NGOs, and foreign government officials hailed the decision as a
victory for the rule of law in Russia. 


A former Soviet naval officer in the employ of Bellona, a Norwegian
environmental organization, Nikitin coauthored a 1995 report entitled "The
Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of Radioactive Contamination." The report
triggered an FSB raid on Bellona's St. Petersburg offices, and Nikitin was
arrested. He spent ten months in pretrial detention before being released and
was not allowed to leave the city for the next several years while the court
case dragged on. The accusations against Nikitin stemmed from a section of the
report detailing safety problems linked to third-generation nuclear
installations and another section describing accidents aboard nuclear
submarines. Nikitin argued that the material was unclassified, had been
previously published in the Russian press, and, furthermore, was critical to
the public health and safety. 


The Nikitin case became the most closely watched Russian court case in the
post-Soviet period. Nikitin's acquittal by the St. Petersburg City Court in
December of 1999, and the Supreme Court's refusal in April 2000 and again in
September 2000 to overturn the verdict, show the judicial system's ability to
rebuff strong political pressure. The decisions are unarguably steps
forward in the development of the rule of law. 


But how much weight should the case carry? The decrees on state secrets upon
which the prosecutor urged conviction were not only unpublished but were
issued
after the arrest. A conviction would have been retroactive and arbitrary. Now,
however, the Law on State Secrets has been brought in line with the
Constitution, and the scope of information that constitutes state secrets has
been widened. What does this mean for future Nikitins? And what light does the
case throw on both the problem of government accountability and the freedom of
citizens to receive and exchange information about government actions in areas
the state considers sensitive?


Conference Schedule:


9:00 Welcome and Introduction
John Sexton, dean, NYU School of Law 
Stephen Holmes, professor, NYU School of Law
Aleksandr Nikitin speaks of his experiences


10:00-12:00 Anatomy of the Nikitin Case
Panelists:
Elena Barikhnovskaya, lawyer, Salans, Hertzfeld & Heilbronn, Russia
Jon Gauslaa, legal advisor to Bellona Norway
Mikhail Matinov, Nikitin legal defense team
Yuri Schmidt, Nikitin legal defense team
Moderator: Aryeh Neier, president, Open Society Institute


12:00-1:30 Lunch Break


1:30-3:00 The Legal Context: Freedom of Information, State Secrets, and
Whistle-Blowing
Panelists: 
William Cohen, president, Center for Human Rights Advocacy; visiting lecturer,
University of Denver College of Law 
Janos Kis, professor, NYU School of Law; chair, political science department,
Central European University
Ivan Pavlov, Nikitin legal defense team
Louise Shelley, director, Center for Transnational Crime and Corruption;
professor, American University
Moderator: Justice John Dooley, Vermont Supreme Court


3:30-5:00 The Political Context: Activism in Russia Today 
Panelists: 
Sarah Carey, partner, Squire Sanders & Dempsey; chair, Board of Directors,
Eurasia Foundation (invited)
Rachel Denber, deputy director, Europe and Central Asia Division, Human Rights
Watch
Stephen Handelman, author of Comrade Criminal: Russia’s New Mafiya;
coauthor of Biohazard; commentator on Russian affairs 
Yuri Vdovin, president, Citizens’ Watch, Russia 
Moderator: Norman Dorsen, director, Global Law Program; professor, NYU School
of Law


5:00-6:00 Public Reception


Date: Friday, October 6, 2000


Location: 
Lipton Hall
New York University School of Law
108 W. 3rd Street
(between Sullivan and MacDougal streets)
New York, N.Y.


For more information, contact:
Alison Rose
212-998-6199
ar55@is8.nyu.edu


Cosponsored by Bellona USA and New York University School of Law


We thank the Open Society Institute for its generous support of this event. We
are also grateful to the Goldman Fund and Bellona Norway.


******


#12
From: "Andrew Miller" <andcarmil@hotmail.com>
Subject: Svanidze Interview
Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 


Topic: Svanidze Interview
Title: Straight from the horse’s . . . er . . . mouth


In the September 21 issue of the weekly Russian tabloid Moskovsky 
Komsomolets v Pitere (Young Moscow Communist in Petersburg, MK-Piter for 
short), the paper sat down with Nikolai Svanidze, the Russian version of 
Mike Wallace (the Russian 60 Minutes is Svanidze’s program called “The 
Mirror”) and a major power broker in state media. What follows is a 
verbatim translation of the article, which appeared on page 29 of the issue 
(and it is an excellent test for the foreign reader to see how “up” he or 
she may be on basic Russian culture ­ for example, I would be interested to 
hear from any JRL reader who lives outside Russia and has seen the important 
popular film called Brother II referenced in the text). One can also see 
that the problem with Russian journalism, if any, isn't necessarily that the 
right questions aren't being publicly asked.


[TN] means a translator’s note



HEADLINE: THE TIME FOR BLACKMAIL IS OVER


CAPTION: Nikolai Svanidze calls himself a “liberal bureaucrat.” Not 
everyone understands exactly what he means by that, but one thing is clear: 
In this man the new regime has a formidable ally. While some are wondering 
what freedom of speech means to the people of our country, the point man at 
state-owned RTR television has no doubts and boldly declares: “We are for 
Mother Russia! We are for Putin!”


MK-PITER: Would you agree that generally with respect to Russian TV now we 
are seeing a sea change, a changing of the guard?


SVANIDZE: So far I’ve seen no such thing, just a lot of people pontificating 
and shouting. Naturally, as I predicted, there have been some changes in 
the influence of the various stations. What’s most emphatically clear is 
the growth of RTR’s influence, which has occurred because we’ve simply 
trounced our rivals in fair competition.


MK-PITER: During the Kursk tragedy, only RTR reporters were allowed on the 
scene, and government sources gave exclusives to the government-owned 
station. Is that an example of fair competition?


SVANIDZE: The officials met with those they needed to meet with, those they 
found interesting. No one can tell them who they should or mustn’t 
communicate with. As far as access to the scene, perhaps were are now 
seeing just a leveling of the playing field. For many years, the directors 
of the private stations practiced a kind of political and informational 
blackmail, saying that if you don’t come to us we will “stomp” you [TN: 
here Svanidze is noticeably using the same slang verb, mochit, that Putin 
famously used when he said he would “stomp the Chechens in their toilets” if 
need be]. Now, perhaps, the shoe is on the other foot.


MK-PITER: You paraphrase Putin. When he talks about blackmail, isn’t that 
something like a snow job, an excuse for an assault on those stations by the 
state?


SVANIDZE: I can only say that there has in fact been blackmail, and I am 
prepared to stand behind what I say.


MK-PITER: It would appear that there is no love lost between you and Mssrs 
Berezovsky and Gusinsky.


SVANIDZE: I don’t know either one well enough to talk about love or hate. 
It’s simply that their conduct lately, and right now especially strikes me 
as negative, and in fact dangerous to the public interest.


MK-PITER: “Dangerous to the public interest?” That’s a stock phrase right 
out of 1937, isn’t it?


SVANIDZE: Not at all. If a person is objectively dangerous to the public 
interest but still behaving within the letter of the law, he should be left 
alone. If you are suggesting I think such a person should be arrested and 
shot, you are mistaken. God forbid. I’m concerned about something 
different: It’s clear that these people are just looking out for themselves 
and are calling their media dogs on their enemies, chiefly the state. They 
are crying “Wolf!” like in the Tolstoy story, but between them they haven’t 
got a single valid reason. If, God forbid, they ever actually do have one, 
by that time nobody will be listening. On the other hand, perhaps these 
tactics will push the authorities into a corner from which they will have no 
other way out. The TV oligarchs are risking not only the public interest 
but their own as well. But worst of all would be if they actually got what 
they wanted, because that would mean anarchy and then inevitably a “Brother 
II” [TN: The popular film “Brat-2”] government ­ that is, Russian fascism.


MK-PITER: What you’re saying now would be music to the ears of the former 
KGB officers who are now taking places in the regime.


SVANIDZE: What exactly do you have against the KGB? Would it be preferable 
to put Berezovsky in their place? Why should he be in control of the most 
widely received TV station and thus able even to influence the course of 
elections? Does the public interest dictate that? Is that what we mean by 
public television? This man is no Sakaraov, Einstein or Likachev. He has 
no scruples. And he’s dangerous to the public interest. If you want to buy 
a weapon, you need a permit and to get one you have to show that you’re not 
a psycho who will kill his own granny. I don’t think Berezovsky is 
qualified to get a license to own a weapon like a TV channel received by 
tens of millions.


MK-PITER: In that case, would you be for undoing all the privatizations from 
which Berezovsky has benefited?


SVANIDZE: No, that’s not possible. But Berezovsky has never received legal 
control of the first channel [TN: ORT]. The 49% of its shares he holds is 
a minority stake, and it is only through the special talents of Mr. 
Berezovsky that it can be made otherwise.


MK-PITER: If he offered you the shares, would you take them?


SVANIDZE: That’s just fantasy. He’d never do it, just as I wouldn’t in his 
place. But if he did, of course I would refuse to take them. It would be 
pure farce, a game I’d have no interest in playing.


MK-PITER: Some people think that criticism of the regime undermines the 
nation. Do you agree?


SVANIDZE: When news programs interpret facts and focus only on the negative 
where Putin is concerned, I think this won’t do. Criticism is necessary and 
there should be private TV networks. But there must also be ethics. In the 
final analysis, I am not blaming but simply nurturing journalists when I say 
that what they are doing now is simply not professional, which is reflected 
in their ratings and the general disgust with which the public views them.


MK-PITER: When you started at RTR, you were impartial. But then you found 
your way into the Yeltsin camp, even as the entire nation was leaving him. 
How did that happen?


SVANIDZE: I get no pleasure from recalling it, and I don’t intend to rehash 
it now. I will only say that at that time there was a real possibility of a 
return to communism and I was against it. Incidentally, nothing would have 
been safer then than for me to go after Yeltsin. One can be the slave of 
the public just as much as of the state.


MK-PITER: Why did you show faked documentary footage about the Moscow police 
during the parliamentary ballot?


SVANIDZE: If was not faked. I said that they were absolutely unprepared for 
terrorist acts and was proven accurate, which justifies the harshness of 
that broadcast. Moreover, of the many charges made about it not one has 
actually been substantiated and in fact everyone was pointing to just two 
brief episodes that had little to do with the central point.


MK-PITER: You claim that the TV oligarchs are assassins. Wasn’t that what 
you did to Primakov and Luzhkov, some say in cahoots with Dorenko?


SVANIDZE: I’ve never been an assassin. I’m not a low-blow artist. I’ve 
never been a master or had one. When I went after Primakov, I had plenty of 
problems at RTR, which is state-owned and after all, he was the PM. But I 
had a clear idea of what was right, and in such cases I never back down.


MK-PITER: What do you think about the currrent situation with Dorenko?


SVANIDZE: The state cannot support a journalist who serves the interest of 
only one person. That would be masochism, a dereliction of duty.


Andrew Miller
St. Petersburg, Russia


******