September 21, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4529  4530   4531

Johnson's Russia List
#4530
21 September 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Elaine Monaghan, Russia, U.S. honor Pushkin, hail 
deeper ties.
2. Reuters: Christopher Wilson, US State Department rejects 
criticism over Russia.
3. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: Onako Puts Kremlin on Fresh Path.
4. Reuters: Ravil Zaripov, New Yeltsin book to appear soon, 
says aide.
5. RFE/RL: Andrew Tully, Russia: Helsinki Commission Releases 
Report On Human Rights.
6. Anatol Lieven: Kursk/US response.
7. Reuters: Putin Visits Russian Great Solzhenitsyn at Home.
8. Moscow Times: Yevgenia Albats, Russia's Actors Highly Adept 
At Pretense.
9. Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia (Cox panel):
RECOMMENDATIONS.]
*******


#1
Russia, U.S. honor Pushkin, hail deeper ties
By Elaine Monaghan

WASHINGTON, Sept 20 (Reuters) - The 19th century Russian poet Alexander 
Pushkin on Wednesday made a pilgrimage he never made in life to the New 
World, where Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared him a goodwill ambassador 
and symbol of a stronger relationship. 


Ivanov and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, a key architect of 
President Bill Clinton's Russia policy, unveiled a towering bronze statue of 
Pushkin whose works condemned him to years of internal exile. 


``This is especially important as Moscow and Washington concentrate their 
forces on building a relationship of mutual trust and partnership, based on 
strategic stability, for the years and decades ahead,'' Ivanov said of the 
unveiling. 


The event coincided with the release of a report to Congress by Republicans 
which said Clinton's Russia policy had discredited America and fuelled 
Russia's 1998 economic crisis. 


Ivanov told reporters he had not seen the report itself but knew of its 
substance and that he had earlier met some of its authors, led by 
Representative Christopher Cox of California. 


``Any objective analysis today would say that the climate of our relationship 
has changed fundamentally compared to what it was 10 years ago,'' Ivanov 
said. 


``Today we do not look at each other through rockets. We do not point our 
nuclear weapons at each other. Together we are working to significantly 
reduce these weapons,'' he added. 


One of the report's targets was Talbott, one of a ``troika'' which was 
accused of ignoring the impact of corruption and brushing aside intelligence 
reports. 


Talbott's friendship with Clinton goes back to the days when they shared a 
house at Oxford University, where Talbott studied Russian literature, 
particularly 19th century poetry. 


``That planted in my head early on a conviction that the Russian people were 
possessed of a greatness of spirit that was sure to prevail some day over the 
bleakness and cruelty of so much of their history and of their political 
system,'' he said. 


He said Pushkin (1799-1837) stood not only for the best part of the old 
Russia but what had energised the new Russia. 


In his comments to reporters, Ivanov touched on some issues which have 
plagued relations -- particularly NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia which he said 
evoked ``revulsion'' among Russians. 


Talbott said tough issues faced them but added, ``Whatever the difficulties 
in U.S.-Russian relations, there really is such a thing as partnership 
between our two countries.'' 


The words of a Pushkin poem in a brochure about the statue sculpted by a 
Russian father-and-son team captured the spirit of a poet translated into 100 
languages and revered by Russians who can typically recite his poetry by 
heart. 


``And long the people yet will honour me 


Because my lyre was tuned to loving-kindness 


And, in a cruel Age, I sang of Liberty 


And mercy begged of Justice in her blindness.'' 


******

2
#2
US State Department rejects criticism over Russia
By Christopher Wilson

WASHINGTON, Sept 20 (Reuters) - The State Department on Wednesday rejected 
criticism of the Clinton administration's Russia policy by Republican 
lawmakers, citing sharp cuts in nuclear arms by both sides and other 
achievements. 


A dozen Republican members of Congress led by California Representative 
Christopher Cox presented House Speaker Dennis Hastert with a 209-page report 
blasting the administration for undermining Russia's transition to a 
free-enterprise democracy and for placing too much faith in President Bill 
Clinton's personal relationship with former Russian President Boris Yeltsin. 


The White House and Democrats have derided the report as politically 
motivated and targeted at Vice President Al Gore at the height of his 
presidential election campaign. 


Gore played a leading role in America's Russia policy from 1993 onward and 
the report criticised Clinton for delegating too much responsibility on 
Russia to a ``troika'' made up of Gore, now Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott and Lawrence Summers, who is now Treasury Secretary. 


``I don't want to go through and try to respond to all the various charges 
and the politics of this report,'' State Department Richard Boucher told 
reporters. ``I just want to make sure that people have the facts to what 
we've been doing with Russia.'' 


He cited sharp reductions in nuclear weapons by both the United States and 
Russia over the past eight years as well as law enforcement cooperation, the 
formation of a civil code in Russia and the creation of thousands of 
nongovernmental organisations as some of the achievements of U.S. policies. 


``Seventy percent of the economy is now privately controlled, and we would 
like to think that our contributions to building civil society, to helping 
entrepreneurs, to helping destroy nuclear weapons, that these have been 
valuable not only to the development of Russia, but also to the American 
people,'' Boucher said. 


The defence was bolstered by a comment by Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov, who is on a visit to Washington. 


``During the Clinton presidency perhaps we did not achieve everything we 
hoped to achieve in our bilateral relationship,'' Ivanov told reporters after 
unveiling a statue of 19th century Russian poet Alexander Pushkin at George 
Washington University. 


``But we did an awful lot and any objective analysis today would say that the 
climate of our relationship has changed fundamentally compared to what it was 
10 years ago.'' 


While Democrats dismissed the report as purely partisan, Republicans praised 
it as one of the most thorough studies of Russia-U.S. relations since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 


``I would ... say that it's unfortunate that every time there is a report or 
statement or hearing that is not favourable to the administration it is 
branded as partisan,'' said Condoleeza Rice, top foreign policy adviser to 
Republican presidential nominee George W. Bush. 


******


#3
Moscow Times
September 21, 2000 
EDITORIAL: Onako Puts Kremlin on Fresh Path 


President Vladimir Putin has good reason to be proud. His government has 
conducted its first privatization auction, and from all appearances it was 
carried out in a manner that was fair and square. 


Officials said Tuesday that an 85 percent stake in the Onako oil firm had 
been sold for a staggering $1.08 billion to a little-known firm owned by 
Tyumen Oil Co., or TNK. 


Yevrotek's winning bid was about 2 1/2 times above the starting price of 
$425.25 million. Two of the other three participants also submitted 
billion-dollar bids. 


The huge difference between the starting price and the bids shows that the 
offers were based on the perceived value of the stake f not on a preset deal 
with tender organizers. 


Accusations of insider dealing plagued the sell-offs of the 1990s, when 
investors snapped up companies with bids just kopeks above the starting 
price. And often only two bidders thought to be linked to a single magnate 
took part in each auction. 


The Onako tender, at a glance, does appear to bear a few similarities to 
those past sales from which Putin has so badly sought to distance his 
government. 


One of the more striking moments was the collective gasp of "Who???" from 
observers when Yevrotek was named the winner. Obscure companies have won 
assets in a number of previous tenders. Do other unknown winners like Reforma 
Investment Ltd. (for a 9 percent stake in LUKoil), Superior Ventures Ltd. 
(for a 100 percent stake in Moscow's Intourist Hotel), or Aroma Investments 
(for a 35 percent stake in the Astoria Hotel in St. Petersburg) ring any 
bells? 


Another parallel is the fact that yet again an oligarch has snapped up a 
valuable state asset. TNK is part of the sprawling Alfa Group holding headed 
by oligarchs Mikhail Fridman and Pyotr Aven, who is known to have 
long-standing ties with Putin. 


A third f and possibly most perplexing f occurrence that harks back to the 
1990s is the fact that a single company represented multiple bids. TNK 
apparently placed two bids, one in its own name and the other through 
Yevrotek, in an effort to ensure that the auction was found valid. Nobody 
admitted to having played those games in the '90s, although it probably 
happened many times. 


TNK was not admitting to it Wednesday. 


To TNK's credit, it did come right out and acknowledge that it was behind 
Yevrotek and the winning bid. 


It must be hard for companies to throw old practices out the window. And 
perhaps it is even harder for the Kremlin to abandon the rocky path cobbled 
by former President Boris Yeltsin's government. 


But with the successful Onako tender behind it, the Kremlin has showed its 
determination by taking a step in the right direction. 


******


#4
INTERVIEW-New Yeltsin book to appear soon, says aide
September 20, 2000
By Ravil Zaripov

MOSCOW (Reuters) - A new book by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, 
covering his final years in power up to his shock resignation last New Year's 
Eve, will appear in the coming weeks, a top aide said in an interview. 


Vladimir Shevchenko, Yeltsin's chief of protocol throughout his nine years in 
power, said the former president's book would on sale in Russia by Oct. 7, 
and abroad a few weeks later. 


He said Yeltsin was in fine form, following Russian events closely, enjoying 
visits from foreign guests, and planning to travel abroad without the 
trappings of a head of state. 


``The book is already written and a printed version is ready, with the 
photographs chosen. The print run is already under way,'' Shevchenko said in 
his Kremlin office. 


``The new book will reflect the events which occurred after 1996. And of 
course there is a detailed description of the final period -- his decision to 
resign right up to the address to the nation on Dec. 31, 1999. It will 
certainly be interesting.'' 


He said the book, which runs about 400 pages, amounted to ``reflections of 
the president. An account of how he took this or that decision and what was 
happening at the same time.'' 


Shevchenko said the print run would be at least 100,000 copies in Russian. 
English and German versions would be on view at the Frankfurt book fair, 
which starts on Oct. 18. 


Yeltsin has already written two books: ``Against the Grain'' (1990) which 
described his youth and years as a critic of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, 
and ``View from the Kremlin, a President's Journal'' (1994) dealing with his 
early presidency. 


Yeltsin's career hit a turning point in 1996, when he launched his campaign 
for re-election with his popularity at rock bottom. He defeated a communist 
challenger with the overt help of media barons, who presented the contest as 
a bid to prevent a return to Soviet-style ways. 


Shevchenko said Yeltsin was turning down most requests for media interviews 
to concentrate on the book. He was more relaxed and able to spend time with 
his family, while still playing close attention to Russia. 


``You have to give him credit, he's in good shape, a lot calmer and expending 
less energy. He's able to devote more attention to himself and his family,'' 
he said. 


If publication goes according to schedule, Shevchenko said, Yeltsin has 
plenty of plans, including travel to places where he had been limited by the 
demands of protocol. 


``But we will have to temper his wishes in terms of time with Boris 
Nikolayevich's ability to cope. He won't be traveling about like a 
globetrotter,'' he said. 


``(Health) will of course be far from the last consideration. In 10 years ... 
we did nearly 60 trips. But we saw most of the countries we visited from a 
car window. There was little chance to see how people lived. ... Now he will 
have such a chance.'' 


Yeltsin, he said, was in Moscow when he learned of the sinking of the 
submarine Kursk with the loss of 118 men. ``He was handed reports and 
analytical notes. He was very anxious about what happened,'' Shevchenko said. 


Yeltsin enjoys receiving foreign guests at his Gorky-9 residence outside 
Moscow, most recently Chinese parliamentary chief Li Peng last week. ``All 
these meetings take place in an informal atmosphere, with a cup of tea. 
Chatting, memories,'' he said. 


``This was particularly apparent with Li Peng. They understood that he stood 
from the very beginning for the restoration of good relations with China. And 
these relations will remain unchanged.'' 


Even in retirement, Shevchenko said, Yeltsin's character remains the same -- 
he is still committed to work. 


``I've known him a long time and can tell you that he has worked more than he 
has relaxed in his life. He's a workaholic,'' he said. ``And unfortunately, 
Boris Nikolayevich is still unable to relax. This sad shortcoming has stayed 
with him.'' 


*******


#5
Russia: Helsinki Commission Releases Report On Human Rights
By Andrew F. Tully


The U.S. Helsinki Commission has published its latest annual report on human 
rights in Russia. At a hearing marking the release, witnesses urged the U.S. 
to help Russia improve its record in this area. They say it is important to 
show Moscow that improved human rights would serve the country's 
self-interest. RFE/RL correspondent Andrew F. Tully reports. 


Washington, 20 September 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Advocates for improved human rights 
in Russia say the U.S. should increase pressure on Moscow to improve the rule 
of law. But they stressed that Russia should not be treated as an "outcast."


The human rights advocates made the plea Tuesday at a hearing of the U.S. 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At the same hearing, the 
panel -- also known as the Helsinki Commission -- released its latest annual 
report on human rights in Russia.


The report consisted of evaluations of human rights in 60 of Russia's 89 
districts. The panel's chief of staff, Dorothy Taft, noted that this year it 
was able to report on twice as many regions as it did in 1999.


The document cited violations of human rights ranging from infringement on 
freedoms of speech and the press; corruption in judicial courts; limitations 
on religious liberty; poor prison conditions; and cruel treatment of children.


The information was gathered by private, non-governmental organizations in 
the 60 regions and compiled by the Moscow Helsinki Group.


The report did not summarize its findings, and gave no indication whether the 
evidence shows that the central government in Moscow -- or the regional 
governments -- are improving their human rights records.


But the document did pay particular attention to the war in Chechnya. It 
urged the Russian government to end what it called "deliberate murders, 
disappearances, and arbitrary and illegal detention of people," and demanded 
an end to the military campaign. It also sought justice for soldiers who 
commit atrocities, and it urged that refugees from the region be treated 
fairly.


One witness at Tuesday's hearing was Ludmilla Alexeyeva, a founding member of 
the Moscow Helsinki Group, and now its chairwoman.


The other witnesses were Micah Naftalin, the national director of the Union 
of Council of Soviet Jews, and Viktor Lozinsky, a human rights activist in 
the Russian province of Ryzan, about 100 kilometers southeast of Moscow.


At one point during the hearing, a questioner asked Lozinsky what role the 
U.S. should play in helping Moscow improve its human rights record. The 
administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton has been repeatedly accused by 
its opponents in Congress of ignoring problems like official corruption and 
human rights abuses in Russia. Clinton and his aides have responded that they 
believe it is important to "engage" Russia rather than to antagonize it.


Lozinsky apparently agrees. In his response to the questioner, he said he did 
not want to presume to tell the U.S. government how it should conduct 
relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin. But he said whatever 
Washington decides, it is important for Americans to work with Russians, not 
against them.


"Yes, let's work together by all means, but let's not make Russia an outcast. 
This would be very bad for the entire world."


Micah Naftalin -- the national director of the Union of Councils for Soviet 
Jews -- agreed, and amplified on Lozinsky's suggestion. He told the 
commission that it is important to show the Russian government that respect 
for human rights is important for the country's self-interest.


"The cost to their economy of the human rights abuses -- whether it's the 
terrible jails or whether it's the environmental safety or the pollution 
issue -- all of human rights issues have the other side. Notably that it 
would improve their country if they would work on them for their 
self-interest as well as for the human rights issue."


Naftalin accused the U.S. government of not emphasizing human rights enough 
in its relations with Moscow. He recalled that during the Soviet era, 
Washington led the West in pressing the communist leadership vigorously on 
human rights. As a result, Naftalin said, there was "tremendous improvement" 
in the Soviet Union's human rights record.


He says the U.S. has dropped the human rights issue in its relations with 
Russia. Naftalin says Washington today appears to believe -- wrongly -- that 
America's national security is dependent only on weapons and nuclear 
proliferation and similar issues.


"It's also dependent on the ability to encourage Russia and the other 
countries of the Soviet, the former Soviet Union, to create an environment of 
law and human rights and environmental safety that will contribute to the 
strength of their country, the rights of their people and the economic 
viability of their country. And that is absolutely -- almost absolutely -- 
missing from the priorities of our bilateral relationship today."


U.S. Helsinki Commission spokesman Ben Anderson says the panel does not issue 
regular human rights reports on other former Soviet republics or former 
Warsaw Pact members. But he says it does issue human rights evaluations on 
these countries as the information becomes available. 


******


#6
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2000 
From: Anatol Lieven <alieven@ceip.org> 
Subject: Kursk/US response


Anatol Lieven,
Carnegie Endowment,
Washington DC


Dear David,


I wonder if other Johnson's List readers are concerned by the refusal by
Cohen (or rather, perhaps, by the US Navy) to allow Russians to inspect US
submarines accused by the Russian Navy of collision with the Kursk? Of
course, the collision theory is by far the least likely of all those
seeking to explain the disaster, and has been fuelled by a mixture of
paranoia, chauvinism, buck-passing and cover-up on the part of the Russian
Navy.
Nonetheless, US subs were monitoring the Russian exercise, and collisions
have occurred on such occasions in the past. To dispel this, a superficial
inspection of the outside (NOT the inside) of the US submarines' hulls by
Russian observers and Western journalists does seem to be in order. It is
difficult to see how this would harm US security - we all know what the
outside of a sub looks like - and it would have the effect of dispelling
Russian paranoia; and by the way, in the process, undermining still further
the credibility of the Russian top brass and government who have played
such a contemptible role in this whole affair.


Of course, if - just supposing - the hull contained a large dent, or a
section of plating had recently been replaced, then the US Navy would have
some explaining to do. I don't think that's at all likely, but as long as
we refuse to be open ourselves in these cases, we inevitably fuel Russian
paranoia and secrecy, as well as a perception of double standards. For if a
US sub sank in these circumstances, and there were the very slightest
suspicion that a Russian sub played a role, the US government and media
would quite rightly demand full explanations and evidence from Moscow.


*******


#7
Putin Visits Russian Great Solzhenitsyn at Home 
September 20


MOSCOW (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin (news - web sites) met Russian 
writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn on Wednesday, visiting the Nobel laureate's 
plush home in a Moscow suburb.


State-owned RTR television showed Putin, accompanied by his wife Lyudmila, 
arriving at Solzhenitsyn's mansion in the Troitse-Lykovo district in the west 
of the capital.


He was greeted outside by Solzhenitsyn and his wife Natalya.


The president and his wife then entered the building and Putin sat down at a 
table in the writer's study.


The Kremlin said Putin and Solzhenitsyn had agreed on their meeting a few 
days ago, but gave no reason for their talk.


Solzhenitsyn, one of the Soviet Union's most famous dissidents, captured the 
horrors of the police state under dictator Josef Stalin in books like ``The 
Gulag Archipelago'' and ''One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.''


Solzhenitsyn, who sports a long beard, returned to Russia in 1994 after two 
decades of exile.


But he has not been happy with the state of modern day Russia, warning it 
risks dying out due to corrupt capitalists and reforms which have 
impoverished millions.


He says Russia should follow its own path and not blindly copy the West. 
- President Vladimir Putin (news - web sites) met Russian writer Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn on Wednesday, visiting the Nobel laureate's plush home in a 
Moscow suburb.


State-owned RTR television showed Putin, accompanied by his wife Lyudmila, 
arriving at Solzhenitsyn's mansion in the Troitse-Lykovo district in the west 
of the capital.


He was greeted outside by Solzhenitsyn and his wife Natalya.


The president and his wife then entered the building and Putin sat down at a 
table in the writer's study.


The Kremlin said Putin and Solzhenitsyn had agreed on their meeting a few 
days ago, but gave no reason for their talk.


Solzhenitsyn, one of the Soviet Union's most famous dissidents, captured the 
horrors of the police state under dictator Josef Stalin in books like ``The 
Gulag Archipelago'' and ''One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.''


Solzhenitsyn, who sports a long beard, returned to Russia in 1994 after two 
decades of exile.


But he has not been happy with the state of modern day Russia, warning it 
risks dying out due to corrupt capitalists and reforms which have 
impoverished millions.


He says Russia should follow its own path and not blindly copy the West. 


*******


#8
Moscow Times
September 21, 2000 
POWER PLAY: Russia's Actors Highly Adept At Pretense 
By Yevgenia Albats 


So you thought that we have a state in this country. You're kidding f did you 
really? 


Oh, well. I know, illusions die hard. But open your eyes: This is all about 
pretending. The state pretends that it is a state. Its agencies of law 
enforcement pretend that they enforce the law. Its courts pretend that they 
process justice. Its security organs pretend that they care about state 
security. And everyone else f politicians, media, the public f deep in their 
hearts, they know that they themselves aren't really what they pretend to be. 


Why do Russians love theater so much? Because this is our nation's only true 
institution: Theater does not pretend to play life; it actually does so. 
That's why Russian theaters are so good: They actually do their job. 


Thus, all the state has to do to escape the kinds of scandals it has 
experienced during the last few months f including the scandal of Media-MOSTf 
is simply to say openly, Hey, everybody, this is all about performing. And 
this season's premiere is "Building a Strong State." 


And the leading actors? President Vladimir Putin as the nation's boss, the 
one who pretends to be in charge. Mikhail Kasyanov as the head of the 
government who pretends to care about the nation's prosperity. And so it 
goes. Mikhail Lesin as the Information Minister who in fact functions as the 
lighting director f which scenes should be illuminated, which left in the 
dark. Vladimir Gusinsky as the Hero fighting for freedom of the press. The 
Duma as the people. And the people themselves line up at various box offices, 
which in turn are labeled as different media outlets f they sell tickets to 
the performances. 


You can bet your bottom dollar that everyone will be happy, that the play 
will be a huge success. After all, who wants to face reality? And that 
reality is that the state i.e. the Kremlin, and its various departments and 
offices f the prosecutor general, the Interior Ministry, the Defense 
Ministry, the KGB and their ilk f are in fact semicriminal groups fighting 
for property against other groups who happened to be more successful at it 
during the regime of former President Boris Yeltsin. 


In this drama, the group by the name "state" has no money, but it does have 
valuables to trade: the freedom to sleep in your own bed, as opposed to one 
in a prison cell; the right to travel to comfortable countries, as opposed to 
being locked in your own, where everything is about to blow up. The list of 
those valuables suggested for trade are fully described in the infamous 
Appendix 6 to the agreement on the transfer and purchase of Media-MOST shares 
in its networks and other media outlets, signed by Press Minister Lesin. So 
now outsiders f investors and others who aren't fully acquainted with the 
terms of conducting business in this country f will know what they can put up 
as a bid for profits. 


The opposing group in this drama f call it Media-MOST f has no money either 
to sustain or maintain its business. But to be fair, the group never expected 
the state, which used Gazprom as a front, to ask for its money back. Because 
what have been termed "credits" and "collateral" were never assumed as such 
by either side involved; these were payments for services performed in 1996 
during the then-hit performance titled "Election of the President." 


But this group has another commodity to trade: the dirty deals of its 
opponent. For instance, it had the option of disclosing that very Appendix 6 
immediately after it was signed, and by doing so exercise its duty to the 
public: make information available. But in this case, the second group might 
have lost the freedoms outlined in the secret deal. So it did not inform the 
public. 


But the public shouldn't feel cheated. It wanted a performance f and it 
bought the tickets for it. 


Yevgenia Albats is an independent journalist based in Moscow. 


*******


#9
RECOMMENDATIONS
[http://policy.house.gov/russia] 
RUSSIA'S ROAD TO CORRUPTION
How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead of Free Enterprise 
and Failed the Russian People
By Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515
Report Date: September 2000 


RECOMMENDATIONS


The Advisory Group's recommendations for U.S.-Russia policy proceed from ten 
principles:


* Russia's immense economic potential as a trading partner, its ability to 
influence Europe, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and the Far East, 
its military importance as a friend rather than a foe, and the fundamental 
commonality of Russian and American interests make the U.S.-Russia 
relationship of continued central importance in U.S. foreign policy. Russia's 
importance in the world is multidimensional, and is not confined to its 
current or potential military power.


* The United States, our friends and allies, and the world are more 
threatened today by Russian economic, political, and social weaknesses than 
by Russian strength. Virtually every major problem in U.S.-Russia relations 
is directly or indirectly traceable to Russia's failure to complete a 
successful transition from Communism to free enterprise, and from a Soviet 
police state to a stable, securely democratic, and free society. U.S. policy 
should never seek to prolong or exploit Russia's weakness, but should seek to 
empower Russia to build upon her strengths.


* The unprecedented, across-the-board deterioration in Russian perceptions of 
the United States and of democracy and free enterprise during the past eight 
years represents a United States foreign policy disaster of the first 
magnitude. Unmitigated, the implications could be comparable to the collapse 
of democratic values in interwar Germany, or the early and mid-20th century 
triumph of Communist dictatorships in Russia, China, and Central Europe.


* It is a vital interest of the United States to revive the strong 
relationship with the newly-independent Russian Federation that existed in 
1992. Despite the extent of the damage U.S.-Russia relations have suffered 
during the intervening years, the United States must not perceive this damage 
as irreversible, nor that the current impasse in relations with Russia is 
intractable, nor that Russia's negative perceptions of the United States, 
democracy, and free enterprise are immutable.


* A stable, secure, democratic, and prosperous Russia is a vital American 
interest. Therefore, essential elements of rebuilding the U.S. relationship 
with Russia are an immediate focus upon the creation of the legal foundation 
for a free enterprise economy premised upon private economic decision making 
and the creation of intermediary financial institutions that serve the people 
of Russia rather than a corrupt elite. The counterproductive nature of 
American economic advice and aid in the past--in particular, support for 
massive, virtually unconditional subsidies to the Russian central 
government--should cause the United States to rethink the economic strategies 
it has promoted, not to abandon efforts to help Russia build a strong and 
free economy. These efforts must, however, be pursued in a different spirit. 
The Clinton administration's attempts to macromanage Russia's economy have 
harmed Russia and U.S.-Russia relations, just as Russian maintenance of 
Soviet-era controls on the economy have done. American policy must proceed 
from the premise that individual Russians--not the Russian government, or the 
U.S. government--must create their own economic future.


* U.S. friendship with Russia requires a clear articulation of American 
interests, values, and policies. It requires that the U.S. government speak 
frankly when and if Russia engages in activities harmful to America's 
national interests. This does not require hectoring or seeking unilateral 
advantage, and does not preclude acceptable compromises of honest 
differences. It does preclude the Clinton administration's lack of directness 
concerning such serious bilateral disputes as weapons proliferation to Iran, 
a U.S. defense against ballistic missiles, the war in Kosovo, the war in 
Chechnya, or NATO enlargement. By protracting negotiations over such 
fundamental issues and by failing to proceed with the execution of American 
priorities (as, for example, in its dragging out of NATO enlargement over 
more than the entirety of two presidential terms), the Clinton administration 
raised false hopes in Moscow, damaged American credibility, and significantly 
strengthened Russian hostility. An honest acceptance of such differences 
would have been healthier for U.S.-Russian relations. Honesty and 
forthrightness are far better long-term guarantees of friendship than 
disingenuous temporizing.


* It is vital that the U.S. government avoid exaggeration of success and 
concealment of failure in U.S.-Russia relations. Such practices have been a 
hallmark of U.S. Russia policy during the 1990s. Misleading the American 
people--for example, about the empty "detargeting" agreement that President 
Clinton and Vice President Gore trumpeted to the public--ultimately engenders 
cynicism and undermines the necessary base of American public support for 
stronger U.S.-Russian relations.


* Building a successful Russia policy requires the full attention and active 
direction of the President of the United States. President Clinton failed to 
make the reconstruction of Russia at the end of the Cold War his priority. He 
failed to devote sufficient time and sustained attention to formulating a 
Russia policy. He failed to promote the Russia policy of his subordinates to 
the Congress, to the American people, and to others within his own executive 
branch. Each failure made the U.S. policy-making process less disciplined and 
less focused. These failures contributed directly to economic and foreign 
policy debacles in Russia. The President must lead.


* The United States must build a broad base for its policy in Russia, 
extending beyond relationships among a handful of executive branch officials 
to a broad spectrum of government officials, factions of the State Duma, 
regional governors, legislators and political leaders, and, most importantly, 
Russian private citizens and private-sector organizations interested in 
developing not oligarchy but free enterprise.


* The United States and Russia share equal responsibility for our future 
relations. The Russian government should be expected to forthrightly advance 
the Russian national interest. But as we seek close relations with Russia we 
must do so on the basis of American values and international norms such as 
respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of national borders. A 
willingness to accept America's legitimate interests as a basis for a 
bilateral relationship based on mutual advantage remains an essential 
ingredient of successful U.S.-Russian relations.


With these principles in mind, the Advisory Group recommends:


1. Engage Russians across the political spectrum.


During the Clinton administration, a small group of American and Russian 
executive branch officials dominated the U.S.-Russia relationship. The 
Advisory Group recommends that the next administration undertake a much 
broader engagement across the Russian political spectrum and institutions of 
government. This engagement would extend to the full range of relevant 
executive branch decision makers and the main factions in the Duma, and also 
include the regional governors, regional legislatures, mayors, and other 
local government officials. The range of American interlocutors for Russia 
should also be expanded beyond the U.S. executive branch. The Advisory Group 
recommends the creation of institutional relationships and opportunities for 
increased communication and cooperation at all levels of government. The 
existing Duma-Congress Study Group is a model for creating institutional 
relationships between American and Russian governors, mayors, and legislators.


Of even greater importance, however, is an expansion of the U.S. government's 
engagement beyond the political sphere to the private sector, including the 
business community, non-governmental organizations, the academy, think tanks, 
the clergy, and rural and agricultural sectors in all regions of the Russian 
Federation.


The broader and deeper engagement these initiatives would promote is a 
prerequisite for U.S. policy makers to maintain perspective on events in 
Russia, and will give a wider range of Russians a direct account of U.S. 
policy and motivations.


2. Give priority to private, not government, solutions.


The most basic failing of U.S. policy during the Clinton and Yeltsin 
administrations was the emphasis on strengthening the Russian central 
government, instead of focusing on the essential task of limiting the role of 
the state in Russia and constructing the basis for a free enterprise system 
in which private individuals order economic affairs. The United States should 
redirect its efforts into assisting Russia to identify laws and regulations 
that continue to place the state in a central economic role in Russia, and to 
replace them with laws to fully legalize: private property; limited-liability 
private partnerships and corporations for the pursuit of commercial and 
agricultural enterprises of all types; private insurance; private 
intellectual property; private commercial, investment, and merchant banks; 
and private capital markets. This project should be undertaken in cooperation 
with the Duma, the executive branch, and regional executive and legislative 
branches--and should be pursued with more urgency than has thus far been the 
case.


Russia's private sector will not flourish, and foreign money will not be 
invested in sufficient quantity, until a world-class banking system, which 
pays and charges free-market interest rates and otherwise conforms to 
international norms of commercial behavior, is established, and until 
domestic and foreign investors enjoy reliable legal protections. The United 
States should stand ready to assist in the creation of such banking 
legislation to the extent requested by Russia or Russians.


The United States should assist in the further development of a uniform 
commercial code in the Russian parliament and each of Russia's 89 regional 
legislatures. Such a code remains necessary to provide a basic set of rules 
that can be relied upon by any person who wishes to participate in the 
Russian marketplace.


3. Engage the Russian people, not just the Russian government.


U.S. relations with Russia should be more broadly based than institutional 
relations among governmental bodies. The Advisory Group endorses expansion of 
existing people-to-people exchange programs such as the Library of Congress' 
Russian Leadership Program and the Center for Citizen Initiatives program, as 
well as programs run by the State Department such as the Fulbright Program, 
the Internet Access and Training Program, the Russian-U.S. Young Leadership 
Program, and the International Visitors Program. Such programs give 
individual Russians the opportunity to observe American democracy and the 
market economy, while helping Americans better understand the opportunities 
and challenges in Russia, and allowing both host and guest to share 
experience and expertise. Such programs are particularly valuable to the 
extent that they promote contacts with Russians living outside of the 
capital. The Advisory Group particularly endorses an expansion of the number 
of Russian exchange students at American universities, especially where the 
exchange programs assist students studying economics, business, marketing, 
and agriculture.


4. Enlist the support of the U.S. private sector for the establishment of a 
cooperative surveying and titling project in each of Russia's 89 regions on a 
far more urgent basis than has thus far been undertaken.


The enactment of sturdy legal protections for private property, 
privately-made contracts, and commercial transactions is a fundamental 
prerequisite to the development of free enterprise in Russia. Entrepreneurial 
activity and the growth of competitors to the "privatized" monopolies will be 
severely stunted without the capital that private property rights will make 
available to the Russian economy.


The availability of marketable title to privately-owned real estate is an 
essential--and still missing--ingredient of the free enterprise system that 
Russia seeks to develop. Russia's land is a source of enormous potential 
wealth, both as security for commercial lending and as a valuable asset in 
its own right for the development of Russian housing, agriculture, commerce, 
and recreation. To permit Russia's citizenry to tap this existing source of 
wealth, a nationwide effort must be undertaken to precisely describe the 
boundaries and ownership history of all potentially marketable state-owned 
and privately-owned land in Russia--and to do so on a far more accelerated 
basis than has been considered feasible in recent years.


The legal descriptions of surveyed property and the complete record of its 
ownership, including all legally valid claims, liens, and rights of others 
besides the recorded landowner, should be published on the Internet, as well 
as stored in publicly-accessible land title registries within each region. 
The project should draw upon the expertise of American surveyors, 
cartographers, abstracters, title insurers, and other real estate, civil 
engineering, and land title professionals, and should have as its objective 
the establishment of the basis for a flourishing competitive market in 
private title insurance and real estate services throughout Russia by 2005.


5. Make U.S.-Russia relations a presidential responsibility of first 
importance.


The Advisory Group recommends that the next president and secretary of state 
take direct responsibility for U.S. relations with Russia, instead of 
diminishing their importance by delegating plenary responsibility to 
subordinates. The Advisory Group further recommends that the focus on summits 
be replaced with regular and frequent interactions similar to the 
relationships the U.S. maintains with its G-7 partners. This will broaden the 
scope of U.S.-Russia relations beyond the obvious issues where the two 
countries have diverging views, as well as promoting reasonable compromises 
that serve American interests on such issues.


6. Place greater reliance on available sources of U.S. intelligence and 
analytic capability regarding Russia.


During the Clinton administration, information developed by the U.S. 
government, either by the intelligence community or by the American Embassy 
in Moscow, was routinely disregarded if it clashed with the administration's 
policy views or political interests. The Advisory Group recommends that the 
next administration not only give more attention to reporting on the effects 
of its policies, but also strengthen intelligence and analytic capabilities. 
The deconstruction of a large part of the intelligence community's analysis 
and collection capability on Russia has proven to be a serious mistake. 
Russia's enormous strategic importance requires that it receive the most 
thorough attention and analysis. Congress should direct, through the 
intelligence oversight committees of the House and Senate, additional 
resources to rebuild our Russia-related intelligence capabilities--not to 
Cold War levels, but to levels reflecting Russia's relative importance.


The United States government should also give appropriate weight to the 
observations of Americans in Russia--including U.S. Embassy personnel, 
members of the intelligence community, U.S. correspondents writing from 
Russia, and private individuals--to provide for more thoughtful analysis of 
facts, trends, political developments, and financial, academic, and social 
information concerning Russia.


7. Consolidate U.S. assistance programs.


The Advisory Group, recognizing that the Clinton administration's 
macroeconomic assistance for Russia has failed, recommends the consolidation 
of U.S. assistance into a few core projects that will accelerate Russia's 
transition to free enterprise, including exchanges, training and compensation 
for judicial branch officials, enactment of legislation to establish 
enforceable property rights and a commercial code, and privately-owned 
housing, and building on regional initiatives started under the Freedom 
Support Act. Such aid should be properly directed whenever possible toward 
the regions, rather than Moscow, and should be focused on the creation of a 
broad-based Russian middle class.


8. Improve humanitarian assistance for Russia's health problems.


In light of the deepening health challenges following Russia's 1998 economic 
collapse, the Advisory Group recommends that the United States consider ways 
to improve the effectiveness of the pharmaceutical, medical, and health-care 
assistance provided to Russia, taking particular care to do no further harm 
to the only long-term solution to such challenges--the inclusion of these 
sectors in a growing market economy.


9. Protect the Russian people from further governmental abuse of IMF lending.


The Russian government's dangerous accumulation of debt via the International 
Monetary Fund and other international lenders, and the misapplication of that 
money through corruption within and without the Russian government, 
contributed to the total collapse of Russia's economy in 1998. It has also 
created a heavy burden of debt. The Advisory Group notes that for these 
reasons many reform-minded Russian officials have strongly advocated an end 
to further borrowing from the IMF.


The Advisory Group recommends that the United States condition any further 
support in the IMF of new Russian sovereign borrowing, and through its 
participation in the IMF Board of Governors work to condition any such 
lending to Russia (whether for refinancing of existing Russian debt or the 
extension of any new credit), on the enactment of legal reforms needed to 
establish a free enterprise economy in Russia, and to stem capital flight and 
money laundering. Among the other conditions that should be sought are an end 
to Russian barriers to international trade and cooperation with U.S. and 
other law enforcement authorities in combatting money laundering.


In addition, in evaluating its support for lending by the IMF and other 
international financial institutions, the U.S. should insist on Russian 
cooperation in efforts to curtail the use of off-shore havens for "hot-money" 
transfers, and to identify and prosecute money laundering schemes. Such 
cooperation in rooting out money laundering would do much to reduce capital 
flight and instill foreign and domestic confidence in Russian financial 
institutions.


Any such lending agreement should itemize with specificity the proposed use 
of any loan proceeds, which should not include the financing of operating 
deficits of the Russian central government, subsidization of state-owned or 
private industry, or investment in state-owned or commercial projects. It 
should also include effective accounting and monitoring controls.


Finally, in considering whether to support such further lending the United 
States should assess Russia's progress towards seeking a political solution 
to the war in Chechnya, an end to Russian subsidies and loans to Serbia, 
Belarus, and Cuba, and the cessation of exports of potentially destabilizing 
weapons to countries of concern.
10. Consider only conditional rescheduling of Russia's inherited Soviet-era 
debt.


The Advisory Group recommends, in light of Russia's existing foreign 
reserves, that the United States oppose outright debt forgiveness for Russia, 
but offer support for conditionally rescheduling that portion of Russia's 
external debt incurred by the Soviet Union before 1992. Because the bulk of 
Russia's debt is owed to governments other than the United States, the 
Advisory Group specifically recommends that the United States not exert 
pressure upon other allied governments to agree to debt rescheduling, and 
further recommends that to the extent rescheduling is considered, the United 
States suggest meaningful and enforceable conditions, which should include a 
political solution to the war in Chechnya; an end to Russian subsidies and 
loans to Serbia, Belarus, and Cuba; the cessation of exports of potentially 
destabilizing weapons to countries of concern; an end to Russian barriers to 
international trade; and cooperation with U.S. and other law enforcement 
authorities in combatting money laundering.
11. Work to combat the spread of Russian crime abroad, and its influx into 
the United States.


The Clinton administration has failed to adequately respond to requests for 
assistance from international prosecutions of money laundering activities 
connected to Russia. The Advisory Group recommends that to combat the spread 
of crime from Russia the U.S. government improve cooperation with honest 
foreign law enforcement.


12. Repeal Cold War-era laws that impede relations with Russia.


The Advisory Group recommends that the committees of jurisdiction in the U.S. 
Congress carefully examine all aspects of the current statutory framework 
governing U.S. relations with Russia with the intention of removing outdated 
Cold War-era restrictions on full and normal U.S.-Russian relations. Much 
work in this area was accomplished by the 1993 Friendship Act, which sought 
to remove many of the legal impediments to normal relations with Russia. 
Congress should complete the process by re-examining remaining provisions 
imposed during the Cold War.


13. Promote Russia's integration into the world economy.


The Advisory Group recommends that the United States promote Russia's 
integration into the world economy. Today, many Russian policies directly or 
indirectly discourage foreign investment and international trade. The United 
States should encourage Russia to adopt and enforce laws and policies that 
will allow Russia to enjoy the benefits of participation in the international 
marketplace. The United States should work with Russia for the adoption and 
enforcement of laws and policies that would enable Russia to accede to the 
World Trade Organization under appropriate commercial terms.


14. Review the status of human rights in Russia.


The Advisory Group recommends in light of developments in Chechnya, as well 
as questions concerning the state of press, political, and religious freedoms 
in Russia, that Congress and the executive branch conduct a comprehensive 
review of the status of human rights and democracy in Russia (including in 
particular the treatment of minorities and religious freedom), building on 
the work of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, the 
Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad, the Annual Report on 
International Religious Freedom called for by the International Religious 
Freedom Act of 1998, and the State Department's annual country report on 
human rights.


15. Forthrightly defend America's interests.


The Clinton administration has delayed and undercut vital national security 
initiatives, including a U.S. national missile defense, in a failed attempt 
to palliate the Russian government's opposition. These efforts have damaged 
America's national interest without diminishing--indeed, while actually 
increasing--Russian opposition. The next President should seek to negotiate a 
new security framework with Russia that allows the United States to defend 
itself effectively against the threat of ballistic missile attack. Previous 
agreements with the Soviet Union during the Cold War were negotiated in a 
bipolar strategic environment that no longer exists. The global proliferation 
of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction necessitates a 
rethinking of this Cold War security paradigm. The United States should take 
all necessary actions to ensure that Americans and our allies and friends 
around the world are defended against this real and growing ballistic missile 
threat. To the maximum extent possible, this should be done cooperatively 
with Russia, in a way that makes clear that such defenses are not intended to 
secure unilateral advantage or to threaten Russia. However, U.S. policy 
should be clear and clearly articulated: the United States will not allow its 
people to be held hostage to the threat of ballistic missile attack.


The United States should forthrightly support continued enlargement of NATO, 
and should not mislead the Russian government through repetition of the 
Clinton administration's disingenuous promises of either an explicit or tacit 
veto over any nation's accession to the alliance, or of alliance activities. 
NATO and NATO enlargement promote stability and democracy, strengthen 
international peace, and do not threaten the legitimate interests of Russia 
or any other country. The United States should also strongly support the 
independence of the Baltic states, Ukraine, and the other nations that became 
independent at the fall of the Soviet Union. Their continued full 
independence and sovereignty are vital to international peace and security 
and a key goal of the United States.


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