September 14, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4511  4512   4513

Johnson's Russia List
#4513
14 September 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Russia, U.S. Join Forces on Crime.
2. Moscow Times: Peter Ekman, BLACK AND WHITE. (re press
coverage of Russia)
3. UPI: Ariel Cohen, The TV program Putin didn't want Russians 
to see. (Dorenko)
4. Boston Globe: David Filipov, Fast lanes in Russia. 
For status-seekers, bowling is sport of the moment.
5. Wall Street Journal: Christian Caryl, The Tycoon And the World 
He Has Made. Review of Godfather of the Kremlin by Paul Klebnikov.
(Berezovsky)
6. Andrew Miller: re JRL #4512/election fraud.
7. Reuters: Russia, West to debate Yugoslavia strategy.
8. South China Morning Post: Fred Weir, Vodka's killer reputation 
grows as rivals slug it out for control.
9. Dipkurier NG: RUSSIA, THE USA STRIVING TOGETHER FOR 
STRATEGIC STABILITY.
10. BBC MONITORING: FACTION HEADS' MEETING WITH RUSSIAN 
PRESIDENT BACKS PRESS FREEDOM. (Primakov)
11. Reuters: Kazakhstan's capital slowly comes of age.
12. Obshchaya Gazeta: THE FOURTH ESTATE PRESCRIBED A DOCTRINE.]

******


#1
Russia, U.S. Join Forces on Crime
September 14, 2000

MOSCOW (AP) - Russia and the United States are rapidly improving their 
cooperation on crime-fighting and aim to set up a joint working group to 
boost their work, Russia's interior minister said Thursday during a visit by 
the director of the FBI. 


Minister Vladimir Rushailo and FBI head Louis Freeh praised each other's help 
in solving significant crimes. Freeh singled out as an example the help given 
by Russia in the case of Vyacheslav Ivankov, a now-imprisoned Russian emigre 
in New York who ran an extortion racket that included hundreds of gangsters. 


The first meeting of the joint group is expected to be in October, Rushailo 
said. Neither he nor Freeh gave details of how it would be set up, but Freeh 
said both sides were interested ``not only in organized crime, but 
transnational crime in general.'' 


``This bilateral relationship is one of the most important for the United 
States,'' Freeh said at a news conference with Rushailo after arriving for a 
two-day visit. 


Freeh is expected to have meetings with Russia's prosecutor-general and the 
head of the Federal Security Service, the main successor to the KGB. Both 
offices have been involved in the case of Edmond Pope, a U.S. businessman who 
has been charged with spying and jailed since April 3. 


Pope reportedly is in poor health and his family and the State Department 
have called for his release and for specialized medical treatment. 


Freeh, asked if he would bring up the Pope case in his meetings, said only, 
``I'm sure we will be discussing a range of issues.`` 


******


#2
From: "Peter D. Ekman" <pdek@co.ru>
Subject: 2 Kopeks
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 


David,
Friday's "Two Kopeks' Worth" from the Moscow Times
follows (I don't know what the headline will be). I don't really consider
it to be a criticism of Cohen's article in the Nation (JRL 4511 #6)
only on the article's timing - which just seems silly now. Of course
timing is determined by editors and publishers, as well as by authors.
Sincerely,
Pete Ekman


===============
BLACK AND WHITE


"America's professional journalists committed malpractice throughout 
the nineties," writes Stephen Cohen in the forthcoming edition of The 
Nation. Cohen, a well-known dissenter on America's foreign policy and 
former professor of Russian studies at Princeton University, 
correctly notes that American reporting has almost always described 
former President Boris Yeltsin as a reformer and stressed the rosy 
side of the transition from communism despite this country's economic 
and demographic collapse.


Surprisingly, Cohen sees this excessive optimism continuing, even 
though for more than two years almost all major stories on this 
country reported in the American press and in this newspaper have 
been negative: devaluation, default, bank failures, deception by the 
Central Bank, capital flight, money laundering, bombings, war, 
corruption, suppression of independent media and vote fraud. August 
marked a crescendo in this cacophony of bad news with another bombing 
and stories of the military and civil infrastructure collapsing.


There have been many negative stories to report in the last two 
years, and these stories deserve continued coverage. There were also 
many positive stories before 1998, and these stories need continued 
coverage: the growth of democratic and free-market institutions, the 
collapse of communism, reform and reformers in government. None of 
these trends ended in 1998. The Communist Party leadership still 
seems more inept each day. Privatization sales are resuming, almost 
without opposition. German Gref heads a block of reformers in the 
government.


Of course, the events behind the negative stories began much before 
1998. The government defaulted on its wage and pension obligations 
long before it defaulted on its obligations to Western investors. 
Depopulation, capital flight and money laundering started even before 
Yeltsin became president.


These positive and negative stories often cover the same people and 
events. Oligarchs held positions as "reformers" in government. The 
collapse of communism included the collapse of military and civil 
infrastructure. Privatization and corruption have gone hand in hand.


Cohen is correct if he means that most American reporting on this 
nation has been black and white, but he simplifies even further by 
ignoring today's black reporting. Events in this country are much 
more complex than usually reported.


For example, stories on the sinking of the Kursk usually stressed 
President Vladimir Putin's clumsy response to the tragedy and the 
outrage shown in the nation's press. The real story might have been 
that, for the first time in history, a Russian leader responded 
fairly quickly and openly to a national tragedy, and that the press 
felt free to castigate him. This newspaper's documentation of vote 
fraud in the presidential election is meaningful news, but perhaps 
even more important news is the fact that the president has 
widespread support from all levels of Russian society. Opinion polls 
consistently show Putin's approval rating at well over 60 percent, as 
compared to Yeltsin's, which were consistently well below 10 percent.


Who is to blame for over-simplified reporting? Each journalist and 
editor needs to look closely in the mirror. Perhaps the pressure for 
an understandable story each day has turned America's free press into 
a wolf pack that always travels together and always rips its victims,
whether Communists or "reformers," to shreds.


What is to be done? At the risk of over-simplifying, journalists must 
learn just one simple fact: Almost nothing in Russia is black and 
white.


Peter Ekman is a financial educator based in Moscow. He welcomes 
e-mail at pdek@co.ru.


******


#3
UPI Analysis: The TV program Putin didn't want Russians to see, Part One
By ARIEL COHEN


WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 (UPI) -- The latest scandal in Russia's ongoing media
wars involves the pulling of two popular news programs off the air last
Saturday. Russia is still reeling from this first exercise of overt
censorship since the days of Mikhail Gorbachev.


Russian media personnel and intellectuals from the left to the right have
united in their indignation over such an audacious exhibition of
heavy-handed government control.


The anchor of the first banned program was Channel One's (ORT) charismatic
Sergey Dorenko, a combination Peter Jennings and Geraldo Rivera. He is an
often-partisan, opinionated TV journalist with a flair for investigative
reporting.


Dorenko claimed that the order to kill his program came from none other
than President Vladimir Putin himself -- right after Putin told the world on
CNN's Larry King Live that he fully supports freedom of the press in Russia.


The second program to get the ax was the analytical "Week," hosted by
Vladislav Flyarkovsky, a popular, thoughtful and highly accomplished
journalist. "Week" used to be aired on the ORT-affiliated TV Center (TVC)
channel.


The reason for the cancellations is that Boris Berezovsky, a billionaire
tycoon who controls 49 percent of Channel One, is locked in a fight to
retain influence over the channel despite the Kremlin's threat to
incarcerate him if he does not sell his shares back to the State.


Berezovsky proposed a transfer of his shares to a trust of prominent
journalists, including Dorenko and Flyarkovsky, rather than giving them to
the Kremlin, claiming that he is against allowing the Russian government to
gain control of all the nation's TV channels.


Dorenko, a close associate of Berezovsky's, was preparing to air a
three-minute feature on the proposed shares transfer when he was told by
Konstantin Ernst, Director General of Channel One, that his program was off
the air.


But what is it that the Russian government decided its citizens should not
watch?


The transcripts of Dorenko's censored television program were published on
his personal Website.


UPI reviewed the Russian-language transcripts of Dorenko's program. It
included six features: three related to the first anniversary of the war in
Chechnya; one covering the investigation of the sinking of the submarine
Kursk; one reviewing Putin's visit to Japan; and the last segment featuring
a story on the Channel One shares. A summary of the transcript follows:


The war in Chechnya was provoked by two events, the explosions in Moscow
and other Russian cities, and the invasion of the Southern Russian province
of Daghestan.


Dorenko opens by saying, "the explosions in Moscow brought fear, fear of
your home exploding, fear (that comes) before falling asleep. They also
brought hatred. Not only of the terrorists, but of all Chechens. We
(Russians) gave the government the power to spill blood, to do anything,
including using nuclear weapons, in return for letting us fall asleep
peacefully."


"These explosions turned us into supporters of wide-spread searches of
cars, bags and pockets. Especially when those searched were people from the
Caucasus. These blasts turned us into supporters of the quickest and most
tough measures for installing order in Chechnya -- at any price."


This introduction by Dorenko was followed by heart-wrenching interviews
with survivors of the explosions in Moscow, who told about losing their
wives and children, about neighbors walking around with containers,
collecting body parts.


Many survivors received modest apartments, but some of them did not
receive enough money from the local and central government to buy furniture
for new flats, and are still forced to live with relatives.


People in houses that were not destroyed, but still severely damaged,
complain that the authorities refuse to repair the buildings. Cracked walls
are covered with whitewash. Authorities tell the tenants that there will be
no "freebee" repairs, because others will want them, too.


The next portion of the program focuses on other survivors of that war --
in Daghestan. Both the Chechens militants and the Russian troops destroyed
houses in many Daghestani villages.


The program shows archival footage in which then-Prime Minister Putin
calls the Chechens "scurrying hares," while the Dorenko demonstrates houses
those "hares" destroyed -- and the Russian government has thus far failed to
restore.


The program goes further, to cover the penetration of Daghestani village
administrations by Chechen radical Islamic sympathizers, the so called
"Wahhabis." This term is used in Russia and Central Asia loosely, and means
any Sunni fundamentalist, not necessarily a supporter of the Wahhabi sect
from the Arabian Peninsula.


"We knew who they are a year ago, their children are fighting in Chechnya.
But when captured, they were let go [by the Russian troops]. And those who
were office holders a year ago still remain," says one interviewee.


"It is unsafe to speak against the Chechens, and the (pro-Russian)
authorities are not doing much," says the anchor.


The program turns the spotlight on Daghestani peasants, who, like the
Russians in cities and towns, lost their houses and cattle. It tells how
Russian troops killed one man's eight cows -- his whole herd. "I expect
Putin to buy me new ones," the man laughs.


There is a story of another peasant who has no money to rebuild his home.
His family now lives in what used to be their kitchen.


There are also stories of meager compensation -- $1,300 for a house;
$2,000 for furniture and agricultural tools -- and the lot being skimmed by
corrupt local officials who extract bribes from the villagers. Repeatedly,
the coverage spotlights the boiling hatred between the Daghestanis and the
Chechens.


Next, Dorenko's broadcast focuses on professional, salaried soldiers -- a
novelty in the traditionally conscript Russian army. These, the so-called
"Contract soldiers," or kontraktniki in Russian, are supposed to be the
promise and the future of the Russian army.


But the government is failing to pay. The families of kontraktniki are
being evicted from the cheap rented apartments they live in. Those who are
stationed in Daghestan were promised "battle money" -- a bonus paid for
serving in a combat zone, but they have seen none of it.


"I walked in these boots through all of Chechnya, but I have no money to
buy new ones," says one soldier. Some of them are on a hunger strike in
front of the North Caucasus Military Command building.


Dorenko adds, "Men cannot go to their deaths with the thought that their
families are doomed to hunger, unless the President doles out gifts of
thousands of dollars, as he did for the families of the victims of the Kursk
disaster."


"Men who go to battle cannot hope for presidential presents. They are
humiliated by gifts. They just need to do their work in a way that does not
violate their dignity.


"Agreements need to be honored. If the government cheats people into going
to their deaths, if the government cheats its soldiers, we have a hard time
believing in the sincerity of such a government," concluded Sergey Dorenko.


Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation and the
author of "Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis" (Praeger, 1998)


******


#4
Boston Globe
September 14, 2000
Fast lanes in Russia 
For status-seekers, bowling is sport of the moment
By David Filipov


MOSCOW - Bowling can be dangerous.


That is the vague subliminal message sent by the stern security guards who 
search belongings and send clients through a metal detector at the Asteroid 
Bowling Club, one of the hot spots driving Moscow's bowling craze.


Danger is not the only message. Bowling, it turns out, can also be luxurious, 
glamorous and sexy, a favorite pastime not only of guys with ''Larry'' 
stitched in red cursive letters on the breast pockets of their denim shirts, 
but also of the rich, hip and powerful.


This is what is going on in Moscow, and across Russia, where bowling alleys 
have become happening nightspots with postmodern decor and an upscale 
atmosphere. Affluent Russian families bowl by day, but after business hours, 
executives, politicians, and celebrities stay up all night, drinking 
expensive cocktails to the roar of high-speed dance music and the rumble of 
bowling balls.


''It is a rather prestigious pastime,'' Karina Nikiferova, general director 
of Asteroid, noting the tony nature of Russia's tenpin trend as she sipped an 
espresso at the establishment's well-appointed restaurant and bar, which 
features fine cognacs and Cuban cigars, along with the bowler's traditional 
libation, beer.


Prestigious, indeed. Prices for lane times at Asteroid, a 12-lane complex 
designed to look like a space shuttle rocketing through luminescent galaxies, 
soar to almost $30 per hour. The lanes have computerized scoring, and waiter 
service from the restaurant. There are VIP rooms (''for bowlers who have 
important meetings,'' Nikiferova said), and special events, including karaoke 
nights and striptease bowling.


The Moscow Tax Police has its own tournament, , as do officers of the Federal 
Security Service, the former KGB. Nikiferova has recognized former and 
current Cabinet ministers, movie stars and theater actors among her clients, 
as well as members of organized crime gangs, whose presence helps explain 
both the metal detectors and the club's no-photography rule.


''Some people come here to relax who are incognito, or not really legal,'' 
she said.


No one can say for sure what made bowling boom in Moscow, which had been home 
of only one bowling alley until 1997. Some of the sport's aficionados in 
Moscow cite the huge popularity here that year of Ethan and Joel Coen's film 
''The Big Lebowski,'' in which the main characters (guys with their names 
stitched in red cursive letters on their shirts) do and say darkly funny 
things while spending much of their time at the lanes.


Others credit the Moscow city government, which pushed to have bowling 
included as an exhibition sport at the 1998 World Youth Games in the Russian 
capital. In any case, soon alleys, sporting Brunswick automatic pin-setters 
and AMF balls, shoes and other equipment from the United States, were opening 
''like mushrooms after a rainstorm,'' as Alexander Yefimov, manager of the 
swank Bi-Ba-Bo complex in central Moscow, put it.


Bi-Ba-Bo, derived from Beer-Bar-Bowling, has bowling until 5 a.m., a 
nightclub atmosphere, and usually, a waiting list to get a lane. Other 
bowling alleys have 24-hour saunas, jacuzzis, discotheques and casinos to go 
along with the pool tables and coin-operated games. Hourly rates can run as 
high as $45, which tends to whittle the client base to the privileged few in 
a country where many people do not make that much in a month.


Even middle-class Russians cannot really afford to bowl. Gleb, who makes $500 
a month repairing cars, brought out-of-town friends to Sport Line Bowling, 
where day rates are $30 per lane.


''I wanted to show them a good time,'' said Gleb, who was ''embarrassed'' to 
give his last name. ''But we can't come here often.''


Russian bowlers do not mind their sport's unlikely image as pastime for the 
rich and famous. But they would like to attract more people like Gleb.


''The task of the federation is to show that bowling is for everyone, that 
this sport is not only for the rich,'' Sergei Lisytsin, president of Russia's 
bowling federation, said in a recent issue of Bowling Sport, a trade magazine 
devoted to the ''bowlingification of Russia.''


Bowling Sport reports that 67 bowling facilities have opened across Russia, 
including a complex on Sakhalin Island in Russia's Pacific Far East that 
offers free bowling for students from 12 to 2 p.m. (wonder how that affects 
class attendance?).


''Now we can say with certainty that all of Russia is bowling,'' the magazine 
declared. Russia now sends a men's and women's team to international 
competitions, and will host the 2001 European Cup individual championship; 
Bowling Sport runs the ratings of Russia's top 30 men and women bowlers, 
along with tips for amateurs on how to improve their scores. 
(''Synchronization is the main component of success.'')


Tournaments have hooked some Russians who otherwise would not be able to 
afford the cost, like Vasily Syrtsov, 20, who starting bowling a year ago 
when friends invited him, but recently has been playing for money.


''I'm trying to earn a living doing this,'' he said as he practiced at the 
Sport Line Bowling Club in central Moscow.


Nearby, Oleg Turok, commercial director at a Moscow factory, made frequent 
calls on his cell phone as he puffed on a cigarillo and downed cups of 
espresso brought to him by smartly clad waitresses. Turok has been playing 
for about 10 months, and just learned how to throw the ball with the hook 
that pros use. He said he still bowls for pleasure, but the prospect of 
making money has occurred to him.


Nikiferova of Asteroid Bowling Club says professional Russian bowlers can 
earn up to $25,000 a year, although her club attracts dozens of competitors 
at amateur tournaments that offer prizes of as little as $300. The level of 
competition is high in Moscow: Nikiferova, whose best score is 187, says she 
dares not enter. But the farther from the capital one travels, the easier it 
is for accomplished bowlers to clean up.


''I travel a lot and play wherever I go,'' said Vasiliy Ryabov, 29, a 
director of a Moscow telecommunications company, who has bowled in Rostov and 
Krasnodar in southern Russia, and in Vladivostok in the Far East.


''But they don't know how to play and I always go away the champion,'' he 
said.


Dmitry Shalganov, a Globe correspondent, contributed to this report.


*******


#5
Wall Street Journal
September 13, 2000 
The Tycoon And the World He Has Made
By CHRISTIAN CARYL


The author of "Godfather of the Kremlin" (Harcourt, 400 pages, $28) has the 
unenviable distinction of being at war with one of Russia's meanest robber 
barons. In 1997, Boris Berezovsky sued Forbes magazine for libel in a British 
court over a portrait of the tycoon that Paul Klebnikov published there. The 
article, which bore the same title as this book -- plus a question mark that 
is now gone -- featured the same photograph of a demonically grinning 
Berezovsky that now graces the book's dust jacket. (The libel suit is 
scheduled to go to trial in late 2001.)
'No man profited more from Russia's slide into the abyss' 
The article presented the argument that Mr. Klebnikov rehearses here in much 
greater detail: "I wanted to know who Russia's real bosses were. Who had 
brought the country to such a state? . . . In the autumn of 1996, I found 
him: Boris Berezovsky. No man stood closer to all three authorities at once: 
crime, commerce, and government. No man profited more from Russia's slide 
into the abyss."


These are grand claims, but Berezovsky's life has room for many a negative 
superlative. A mathematics professor in Soviet times, he took advantage of 
communism's collapse with a special ruthlessness. His first big business 
venture was a car dealership that allowed him to prey off a car factory by 
selling its production to consumers at a big markup -- and leaving the 
factory to carry the loss.


Later Berezovsky collected subscriptions from gullible Russians for what was 
supposed to be an affordable "people's car." That company simply evaporated, 
and none of the contributors ever saw their money again. Still later the 
tycoon acquired controlling interests in a giant oil company, the national 
airline Aeroflot and the main TV channel.


But his greatest achievement, according to Mr. Klebnikov, was the 
"privatization of the state." Berezovsky translated friendships with key 
members of President Boris Yeltsin's entourage (particularly Mr. Yeltsin's 
daughter, Tanya Dyachenko) into unprecedented leverage over the workings of 
government (which Berezovsky even joined, in various guises). Throughout, Mr. 
Klebnikov suggests, Berezovsky was aided by his proximity to Russian 
organized crime.


How Berezovsky managed to do these things isn't easy to explain, and Mr. 
Klebnikov does provide a readable, coherent account of his subject's 
incredible trajectory from the obscurity of academia to the position of one 
of the country's premier power brokers. For example, he relates a history 
showing how Berezovsky's predatory car venture managed to plunder the factory 
simply by buying off its directors with large chunks of stock in the 
parasitical dealership. For those who weren't willing to accept the "carrot" 
of complicity, Mr. Klebnikov suggests, there was always the "stick" of 
threatened violence.


At the same time the book has some serious shortcomings. Mr. Klebnikov stacks 
the cards against his nemesis and lets equally odious folk off the hook. 
Nowhere is this trend more evident than in Mr. Klebnikov's handling of the 
main witness for the prosecution, Gen. Alexander Korzhakov, the former head 
of Mr. Yeltsin's security service (called the SBP).


"One could see why so many people who met Korzhakov could not help but like 
him," writes Mr. Klebnikov. "He had the aura of a high-school coach -- 
inspiring, brave, loyal, a pleasure to be with." That's not the impression I 
got from reading the man's memoirs, one of the sleaziest and most 
self-serving books I've ever read. (Korzhakov announces there his desire to 
"take revenge" on Mr. Yeltsin for "betraying" him; and of course, in anecdote 
after anecdote, Korzhakov keeps a cool head while everyone else is either a 
wimp or a crook.) Mr. Klebnikov uncritically quotes large chunks from these 
memoirs, as well as relying on testimony from Alexander Streletsky, a 
Korzhakov crony, and anonymous SBP helpers.


Yet Korzhakov and his confederates have plenty of axes to grind, and their 
methods of intimidating people and gathering information have been just as 
dubious as Berezovsky's. Korzhakov, after all, had the power to arrest his 
opponents; and he's been implicated in his share of murder plots. Mr. 
Klebnikov touches upon this, but it doesn't seem to matter. "If the attack 
had been ordered by Korzhakov," he writes, "it was a strangely amateurish 
job, considering that the security chief had his pick of the professional 
assassins." One can be sure that Berezovsky wouldn't have received such quick 
absolution. Incidentally, the resulting appearance of one-sidedness plays 
into the oligarch's hands: Just last week in Moscow, Berezovsky portrayed Mr. 
Klebnikov as a stooge of "the Russian special services."


At one point Mr. Klebnikov writes: "Though Korzhakov, Streletsky, and the 
rest of the SBP men were widely portrayed as a mysterious and sinister force 
within the Yeltsin regime, during the presidential campaign of 1996 they 
appeared to have been straight enough." But he might have taken the trouble 
to explain just how Korzhakov and Streletsky earned their bad reputation, 
leaving the reader to decide for himself how much weight to give their 
statements.


In his urge to bring some clarity to the murky world of Russian politics, Mr. 
Klebnikov ends up resorting to black and white. His potted bio of Moscow's 
authoritarian mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, sounds as though it were written by the 
mayor's press service. Mr. Yeltsin and his team of "young reformers" are, in 
Mr. Klebnikov's telling, unredeemably tarred by their toleration of 
Berezovsky and his like. By contrast, the communists -- Russia's main 
opposition -- look like regular guys.


These generalizations are about half right, but only half. The sad fact is 
that the course of Russian political reform over the past 15 years offers few 
heroes and almost no consolation for its failures. Mr. Klebnikov deserves our 
admiration for standing up to his powerful opponent. But he might have 
written a better book had he been more willing to acknowledge the ambiguities 
of his subject country.


Mr. Caryl is Newsweek's Moscow bureau chief.


*******


#6
From: "Andrew Miller" <andcarmil@hotmail.com>
Subject: JRL #4512/election fraud
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 


It was really incredible to see two lengthy comments in JRL #4512 about 
election fraud in Russia without reading a single solitary word about the 
people of the country. One might infer that the country's population is 
some faithful, dull-witted pooch to be patted on the head and slipped a 
cheeseburger under the table once in a while (and, of course, smiled at 
occasionally).


Both the eXile and the Nixon Center attacked Western politicians and 
journalists for endorsing the Putin regime, and of course this attack is 
well-founded, and decried their silence in the face of this evidence of 
fraud.


But what about the silence of the people of Russia?


What about the fact that if the alleged fraud was actually significant, it 
means that the Russian people preferred to elect communist functionary 
Genady Zuganov, creating a matched set with the Duma plurality they have 
already thrice created (and if it wasn't significant, well, doesn't that 
mean it was, er, insignificant?)? Both commentators seemed to believe that 
Zuganov would have stood no chance against Putin one-to-one, but does 
anybody think that the Russian people, should they be presented with 
conclusive proof that Zuganov actually won, would stand up and undo the 
ballot? Suppose Mr. Putin declines to stand down in 2008. Does anybody 
believe the Russians will show him the door?


The eXile boldly declares: QUOTE That Vladimir Putin stole the election was 
no big scoop, of course. Virtually everybody in Russia knew that there had 
been fraud at some level in the election. Allegations of election fraud had 
already been piled very high in Democratic Russia's short history, dating 
back in particular to the 1993 constitutional referendum, which Boris 
Yeltsin is widely believed to have stolen. The level of overt media 
manipulation has likewise risen at a parabolic rate in the past few years, 
to the point where anyone who has lived here for any time at all knows that 
the judgement of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
that the press in this country 'remains pluralistic and diverse' is absurd 
on its face. UNQUOTE


Really? Virtually everybody? And not a Russian made a peep, and Putin's 
opinion ratings soared? How odd! But let me see: As I understand it, they 
were just doing what they should have, lying respectfully under the table, 
looking up with big doe eyes and waiting for master to save them. Bad 
master! Bad!


Andrew Miller
St. Petersburg, Russia


PS: I have a friend who's a drug addict, and I thank the commentators for 
showing me how best to deal with this problem: Bad heroin! Bad! Frankly, 
he's not that good a friend, anyway.


*****
#7
Russia, West to debate Yugoslavia strategy
By Paul Taylor

UNITED NATIONS, Sept 13 (Reuters) - Western powers and Russia will debate a 
call for ``democratic change'' in Yugoslavia on Thursday when they hold their 
first ministerial Contact Group meeting since NATO's 1999 Kosovo war. 


The six-nation meeting is designed to show the restored unity of the 
international community two weeks before crucial elections in Yugoslavia. 


But diplomats said it in not clear whether Moscow, Serbia's traditional ally 
which bitterly opposed the NATO action, will join what amounts to a veiled 
declaration of support for opponents of President Slobodan Milosevic. 


Foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and 
Russia, plus European Union officials, will meet on the sidelines of the U.N. 
General Assembly. 


A statement drafted by the group's Italian chair, seen by Reuters, says 
``democratic change is the only avenue to ensure that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia will be able to reinstall its position in the international 
community and within the family of European countries.'' 


It also calls for the Sept. 24 presidential and parliamentary elections to 
respect international standards for a fair campaign, free of intimidation. 


Western diplomats said it would be a significant shift if Russia signed up to 
such language, which they stressed was still a preliminary draft. 


CONFLICTING OPINION POLLS 


A report circulated to European Union ministers this week showed that half a 
dozen opinion polls conducted since late August put democratic opposition 
candidate Vojislav Kostunica well ahead of Milosevic, indicted by a U.N. 
tribunal for alleged crimes against humanity in Kosovo. 


But a U.S. official said Russian diplomats claimed to have different surveys 
showing the Yugoslav strongman doing better. 


``Our polling data is showing Milosevic losing about two to one, and theirs 
is showing he's doing okay. We're saying the only way he could win is if he 
steals the election,'' the U.S. official said. 


Western governments have encouraged the Serbian opposition to contest the 
poll and promised an end to Belgrade's isolation if they win, while 
questioning whether the election will be free and fair because of a crackdown 
on independent media and harassment of opposition parties. 


The Contact Group last met at ministerial level in February 1999 during the 
unsuccessful Rambouillet peace talks on Kosovo, before NATO launched its 
11-week air war to force Yugoslav troops out of the predominantly ethnic 
Albanian province. 


The ministers are also expected to discuss local elections being organised by 
the U.N. authorities in Kosovo next month, which Russia has criticised 


The Russian Foreign Ministry said Minister Igor Ivanov told his Yugoslav 
counterpart Zivadin Jovanovic on Aug. 28 that Moscow believed there were no 
proper conditions in Kosovo for free and fair polls because of abuses by 
ethnic Albanians against the Serb minority. 


``The Russian side reiterated that in the current situation, when there are 
no elementary security guarantees, when hundreds of thousands of Kosovo 
residents cannot return home, when people who live in Kosovo cannot move 
freely, holding local polls... is counterproductive,'' a statement said. 


******


#8
South China Morning Post
September 14, 2000
Vodka's killer reputation grows as rivals slug it out for control
RUSSIA by FRED WEIR in Moscow 


The traditional belt of vodka is getting deadlier than ever for the average 
Russian as warring distillers kill each other in more exotic ways and bathtub 
liquor floods one of the country's most lucrative markets. 
"The Government is moving to take control of alcohol distribution, which has 
led to pandemonium in the market," says Vladimir Nuzhny, a specialist at the 
Institute of Narcology in Moscow. 


"Vodka producers are being squeezed by the state and in response they are 
turning on each other," he says. "It's becoming a bloody mess." 


After centuries of state vodka monopoly, alcohol production and distribution 
was freed after the collapse of the Soviet Union a decade ago. Overnight, 
empires were created as legitimate distillers and swarms of bootleggers 
flooded the market with all kinds of booze, some good, some 
headache-inducing, some lethal. 


A 1998 study found almost 50 per cent of liquor traded in Moscow was 
substandard, with much of it synthesised or even made from deadly methyl 
spirits. 


The market is nearly bottomless. The independent Centre for Alcohol Policy 
calculates that the average Russian man knocks back about 100 litres of vodka 
a year, one of the world's highest rates of consumption. 


Conversely, statistics show that Russian women drink radically less than 
their menfolk. 


According to Russia's Health Ministry, more than 250,000 people have died 
from drinking toxic liquor in the past decade. 


But death rates are climbing as the vodka war escalates. In the first half of 
this year 21,000 people died, or 45 per cent more than the comparable period 
last year. 


"There is no doubt the situation is growing worse because the state is 
muscling in," said Pavel Shapkin, chairman of the National Alcohol 
Association, an industry group. 


At the beginning of the year the Government raised excise duties on liquor by 
a whopping 40 per cent, leading to massive price rises. It also began 
reasserting control over key distilleries and moving to clamp down on illegal 
distribution. 


Mr Shapkin says higher prices and attempts at stricter regulation have only 
boosted illegal production, which has led to the higher death rates. A 
quality-inspected, all-duties-paid half-litre bottle of vodka costs about 60 
roubles (HK$15.56). A bottle of bootleg booze - often sold in the same kiosks 
and shops - sells for as little as 20 roubles. 


"The vodka monopoly was traditionally a huge source of income for both 
tsarist and communist Russian governments," says Alexander Matveyev, an 
analyst with the Russian Economic Barometer, an independent financial 
consultancy. "Under President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin has been moving to 
reassert influence in many sectors of the economy, and the liquor industry is 
an obvious target." 


But the re-entry of the state into the market appears to have triggered a 
vicious battle among the vodka producers. Since March, half-a-dozen vodka 
factory executives and liquor distributors have died in contract killings, 
gunfights and suspicious accidents. 


The famous Moscow Kristall factory, maker of Stolichnaya vodka, has been 
besieged by two groups of armed gangs, representing rival directors. One 
claimant, Alexander Romanov, says he is acting to "defend the interests of 
the state", which owns 51 per cent of the firm's shares. 

*******


#9
Dipkurier NG 
No. 13
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA, THE USA STRIVING TOGETHER FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY


The Russian Foreign Ministry has circuited a report saying 
that the USA will hold a briefing for Russia, providing an 
updated information about the threat of ballistic missiles, 
recently prepared by US intelligence services, while Russia 
will provide the US side with its latest estimates. 
Russia and the USA have agreed on holding Russian-US 
exercises on planning and modeling in Colorado Springs 
(Colorado) in February 2001 and Russian-US field exercises in 
Fort Bliss (Texas) in late 2001 or early 2002. Meetings on 
planning exercises in 2001 will be continued in September this 
year in Moscow and in November-December on the joint proving 
ground in Colorado Springs. It is expected that Russia and the 
USA will get down to work to prepare the site for a joint data 
exchange center in Moscow and draft documents on the concept of 
its functioning and the staff procedures of functioning late 
this fall. Russia and the USA intend to start work in the 
center in June 2001. The center will start working to capacity 
in September 2001. Russia and the USA have agreed to set 
themselves the aim of completing work on a bilateral agreement 
on the system of preliminary notification of the launches of 
ballistic missiles and space booster rockets by the APEC summit 
in November next year and reach agreement on how this system 
will be opened for voluntary participation by all countries 
concerned. In September they will hold a meeting with a view to 
stepping up talks. Russia and the USA will work to reach 
consensus between countries responsible for monitoring the 
non-proliferation of missile technologies at a plenary session 
on October 9-13 and with other countries on plans for a global 
approach to missile non-proliferation. 


*******
#10
BBC MONITORING
FACTION HEADS' MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BACKS PRESS FREEDOM
Text of report by Russian Public TV on 13th September 


[Presenter] The meeting in the Kremlin with leaders of the Duma [lower
house of Russian parliament] ended literally a few minutes ago. It lasted
almost four and a half hours. The parliamentarians delegated the head of
the Fatherland[-All Russia] faction, Yevgeniy Primakov, to tell journalists
about the outcome of the meeting. 


So, the main thing at the meeting was discussion of the budget. Vladimir
Putin devoted 90 minutes to that, and the freedom of the press was also
talked about. 


[Fatherland-All Russia faction leader Yevgeniy Primakov] Issues relating to
freedom of the press were also touched upon, which is naturally of great
interest to everyone. And here too we all share the same view that freedom
of the press cannot be ensured, if there is nationalization of the press
and at the same time if the press is monopolized. by some financial groups
or individual financial tycoons. Everyone was unanimous about this. What is
more, the president stressed repeatedly - he commented on each speech - he
stressed the need to retain the freedom of the press, to strengthen it. But
he accepted an amendment expressed by one of those taking part in our
meeting that that freedom should be firmly based on the law. 


*******


#11
Kazakhstan's capital slowly comes of age
By Sebastian Alison

ASTANA, Kazakhstan, Sept 14 (Reuters) - At the very centre of the Eurasian 
land mass, as far from the open sea as it is possible to get, lies a 
limitless, flat, inhospitable landscape of Central Asian steppe. 


To gaze down on this bleak, brown terrain from the air is to see no rivers, 
no hills, just endless fields of wheat. If there is a `` middle of nowhere'' 
then surely this is it. 


With temperatures above 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) in 
summer, and below minus 40 degrees Celsius (-40 Fahrenheit) in winter, it 
seems a harsh environment in which to live and work. 


And a strange spot to build a capital city. 


Yet that is exactly what Kazakhstan's President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
decided to do. After independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, he moved the 
government to the steppe city of Astana, which means simply ``capital,'' in 
1997. 


Midway between Russia's Arctic seas to the north and the Indian subcontinent 
to the south, between Moscow to the west and Beijing to the east, Astana is 
truly remote. 


But three years on, it is already beginning to feel like a capital. 


SLOWLY TAKING SHAPE 


Its international airport is as efficient and comfortable as any in Western 
Europe. Plenty of grand buildings -- parliament, the government's 
headquarters, the president's official residence, a national museum, 
ministries, theatres, concert halls and the like -- are already built. 


True, a sign marked ``diplomatic region'' is fixed to a fence enclosing 
nothing but a patch of wasteland. And plenty of buildings look impressive 
from the front but from the back are as cheaply built and slipshod as any in 
the former Soviet Union. 


But residential districts are taking shape. Along the embankment of Astana's 
river, the Ishym, marches a line of well built bright yellow tower blocks, 
forming a fine river frontage facing an attractive park across the water. 


Cranes and construction workers are everywhere, as is an army of municipal 
workers sweeping, tidying, planting, watering and otherwise sprucing up the 
place. 


Any visitor who knows other parts of the former Soviet Union is immediately 
struck by the fact that economic activity -- any economic activity -- is 
going on, something depressingly rare in most post-Soviet lands, where decay 
not development is the norm. 


``I arrived in a completely different city,'' says Lev Tarakov, the head of 
Nazarbayev's press service and a resident of Astana for two and a half years. 


``It seemed unlikely then that from that town they'd build a capital.'' 


As the site of his new capital Nazarbayev chose an existing city, 
Tselinograd, founded under the Tsars, developed under the Soviet Union and by 
common consent as grim a place as it could boast. 


``The architecture was so poor then. Everything was built very quickly, that 
was the main factor in Soviet building,'' Tarakov said. 


Indeed, although old Tselinograd is vanishing fast, one can still find many a 
run-down example of a Soviet housing estate, or ``Khrushchoba'' -- a pun on 
the Russian word ``Trushchoba,'' or slum, and Khrushchev, the Soviet leader 
under whom these particularly brutal blocks were built. 


But the centre is a different matter. Elegant squares, fountains, impressive 
modern buildings, some carefully restored 19th century houses, opulent 
shopping malls and a rapidly modernising car fleet are dispelling its 
provincial feel. 


WHY A NEW CAPITAL? 


Opinions differ as to why, or whether, Kazakhstan needs a new capital. It is, 
after all, a huge expense for a transition economy, although there are ways 
round this: when Chevron, the U.S. oil company, increased its stake in a big 
Kazakh oil project recently, a promise to invest $20 million in Astana was 
part of the deal. 


Some say Nazarbayev felt the old capital, Almaty, in the far southeast, was 
too close to China, and so unduly vulnerable. 


Others say Kazakhstan's main cities other than Almaty are too close to 
Russia, economically and culturally closer to nearby Siberia than to far-off 
Almaty, making a new capital necessary to unify the country. 


Not all residents of Almaty see it this way. 


``This is a senseless waste of precious money,'' says Yelena Georgievna, a 
music teacher. ``It would have been better to spend the money on Almaty which 
is the historical capital. 


``Why now when everyone is so poor? All our cities need improving -- why 
spend everything on Astana alone?'' 


Others say Nazarbayev simply wanted a monument to himself. 


Certainly a central capital cuts travelling times in the world's ninth 
largest country, as big as Western Europe. 


So vast is it that even defining its borders is far from complete nearly a 
decade after independence. The head of a commission to delineate the 14,000 
km (8,699 miles) of borders said recently the job would not be finished until 
2007 or 2008. Given Kazakhstan's size, Astana's location makes some sense. 


Almaty is also uncomfortably close to the borders of other, more volatile 
Central Asian states -- Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 


Those countries have seen fighting recently as Islamist rebels said to be 
based in Tajikistan and supported by Afghanistan's Taleban militia have 
pushed into Uzbekistan in an apparent drive to overthrow the secular 
President Islam Karimov. 


The area is also a key drug trading centre. Opium from Afghanistan comes over 
the region's porous borders, causing Karimov to describe it as a ``hotbed of 
international terrorism'' and a ``warehouse of world drug production.'' 


Astana is a world away from such threats, even though not all find it 
exhilarating. Flights back to Almaty on a Friday evening are booked solid as 
civil servants escape the new capital. ``It's certainly not Almaty,'' said 
one, speaking anonymously. 


True, but then Almaty is not Paris either. And for those who remember the old 
days before Nazarbayev hatched his grandiose plan, Astana is changing 
dramatically for the better. 


``The changes have been colossal in a very short time,'' says Rabiga 
Amanzholova, head of the lower house of parliament's press office and a 
resident of Tselinograd, then Astana, for 10 years. 


``Every day Astana is becoming a little more beautiful.'' 


******* 


#12
Obshchaya Gazeta
No. 37.
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
THE FOURTH ESTATE PRESCRIBED A DOCTRINE
By Oleg VLADYKIN

When the draft doctrine of information security was 
discussed in late June, President Vladimir Putin instructed 
Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov, heads of some 
ministries and departments and his envoys in the federal 
districts to take all requisite measures to "clearly and 
precisely inform" the Russian people of the government's policy.
As a result, these instructions took the form of an 
independent, or rather, a priority direction in the framework 
of ensuring information security as presented in the document. 
It is not surprising that this direction has attracted the 
attention of the mass media and the public in general. And the 
Security Council members had to interpret exactly this element 
of the doctrine. In particular, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
has explained to the general public that the instructions mean 
the need to "promptly draft proposals on the creation of a 
corresponding information instrument," which would help the 
authorities fulfil "the vital task of providing a more 
effective explanation of the country's domestic and foreign 
policies." Here is what Anatoly Streltsov, an author of the 
doctrine, said about what this really means: "The point at 
issue concerns the mass media with the help of which we should 
organise an effective coverage of the state policy. So, the 
'instrument' itself exists, but it cannot so far be used to 
inform the broad public of the government's position on this or 
other problem." According to Streltsov, the state structures 
directly control only a few central publications, such as 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta and Parlamentskaya Gazeta, the Defence 
Ministry's Krasnaya Zvezda and the Interior Ministry's Shield 
and Sword. But the trouble is that their readership and 
influence plummeted to meagre levels of late. The effectiveness 
of the state electronic mass media integrated into the VGTRK 
company is low, too. 
"Consequently, the task now is to mobilise their potential 
possibilities," says Anatoly Streltsov. "As for non-state 
publications, radio stations and television companies, we can 
only offer certain information to them and see how they 
interpret it. This calls for raising the quality of operation 
of the press services of state structures, whose collaboration 
with the mass media disappoints both sides so far."
Maybe this is where the doctrine will play a positive part?
We have grown used to the existence of a press service, or even 
a PR centre, in each state structure and to the regular press 
conferences they hold. The only thing the journalists cannot 
get used to is the style of work of these centres and the 
highly odious contents of their information. If the new 
doctrine helps resolve this problem, we will welcome its 
enforcement. In this case, we will have fewer reasons to worry 
about information security or fear to the freedom of the press. 

******