August 18, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4463 4464

Johnson's Russia List
#4464
18 August 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Putin defends his distance from sub crisis.
2. AP: Rescue Capsule Reaches Russian Sub.
3. New York Times editorial: Russia's Unsafe Nuclear Submarines.
4. Boston Globe: David Filipov, Submarine crisis pummels Putin's 'take charge' reputation.
5. BBC MONITORING: MEDIA STRUGGLES FOR TRUTH ABOUT THE KURSK.
6. UPI: Ariel Cohen, The Russian Nuclear Sub Fallout: Let the Blame Games Begin.
7. Moscow Times: Andrei Zolotov Jr., From Sports to Cloning, the Church Speaks.
8. The Guardian (UK): CATASTROPHE ON THE CARDS: GWYN PRINS- THE TRAGEDY OF THE KURSK SHOULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR WASTE CRISIS.
9. Stanislav Menshikov: FINANCE NEEDS GENTLE HANDLING. And Should Not Be Used For Political Purposes.
10. Vremya MN: Oksana Karpova, PERSONNEL CHANGES IMMINENT IN THE GOVERNMENT. (Views of Mikhail DELYAGIN)]


******


#1
Putin defends his distance from sub crisis
August 18, 2000
By Elizabeth Piper

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin said Friday he knew
from the start there was only a very slim chance to save a submarine crew
trapped on the sea bed, and defended his low profile during the crisis. 


Putin, under fire at home and abroad for his decision to remain in a Black
Sea resort during a frantic rescue effort, said his first wish had been to
fly to the scene, but he stayed back because he feared he would hamper
rescue work. 


Russia's press has lambasted the former KGB spy for keeping quiet for more
than three days after the 118 sailors were trapped on the Kursk due to an
as yet unknown accident, and for delaying a call for foreign help. 


``Of course my first wish was to fly to the region of the fleet,'' said
Putin, who spoke slowly and looked grave. Russian television showed the
comments, made to Russian journalists on the sidelines of a summit of
ex-Soviet states in Ukraine. 


``I refrained, and I think I did the right thing because the arrival of
non-specialists from any field at the disaster area would not help
high-placed officials and more often would hamper work. Everyone should
keep to his place,'' he said. 


The Kremlin said Putin would return to Moscow later on Friday, cutting
short his stay at the summit. 


In a rare show of emotion, Putin said he knew personally the commander of
the Kursk and this made the disaster even harder to stomach, knowing that
the chances of success for the rescue mission were few. 


Putin, whose swift rise to power has been accompanied by a huge wave of
popularity, said his first question on learning about the accident was
whether there was danger from the sub's nuclear reactor, and he was told
there was none. 


Next he asked whether the crew and the vessel could be saved, and was told:
``There is an extremely small chance for rescue, but it exists.'' 


HAD TO DELAY TELLING RUSSIA 


Putin also defended a decision to delay informing his countrymen about the
crisis, saying the two days were essential for sailors to find out what
exactly was happening. 


The submarine sank Saturday after an as yet unexplained accident, but the
navy informed Russian media only Monday. The navy initially said the
submarine had sunk Sunday. 


Russia's press said the lack of information put out at the time of the
disaster was a throwback to the Soviet era, when people were given
information only when and if it would serve the Communist ideals and boost
the prestige of the Soviet Union. 


Putin said: ``Immediately when on August 12 at 11 p.m. (3 p.m. EDT) the
submarine lost contact, it became clear that the military had an
extraordinary situation on their hands. It is another matter that the media
received this information later. 


``You can criticize, but you can understand that first of all, before
giving out official information, the sailors had to sort out what happened.'' 


Putin said he still held out hope for the rescue of the crew. Officials say
some sailors must have died in Saturday's accident and the rest have shown
no signs of life since Tuesday. 


The president said he blamed no one and there would be no reprisals. 


Russian newspapers say that naval commanders held off from accepting help
from Britain and Norway because they were fearful Putin would sack them for
compromising Russia's pride. 


``I still trust the military. There is an old Russian saying -- find the
guilty. If we find them, then we will make it right. But no more,'' he said. 


Britain is sending a state-of-the-art -- but untried -- rescue craft which
Moscow agreed Wednesday to accept after spurning London's repeated offers
of help for four days. The British, sailing from Norway, will arrive in
Saturday. 


Norwegian divers are due to arrive Sunday. 


``The Russian side never refused help and accepted it as soon as
suggestions were made,'' Putin said, adding that the foreign assistance
would not have helped in the initial phase of the rescue because of poor
weather. 


******


#2
Rescue Capsule Reaches Russian Sub
August 18, 2000
By ANGELA CHARLTON


MOSCOW (AP) - A rescue capsule reached one of the escape hatches on a sunken 
Russian nuclear submarine for the first time Friday but was unable to gain 
access because it was so badly damaged, a navy official said.


The Russian rescue craft returned to the surface after repeated attempts 
failed, said navy spokesman Capt. Igor Babenko. A larger escape capsule took 
over and was trying to link up with the hatch, he said.


Four Russian rescue capsules have been trying since Tuesday to reach the 118 
men aboard the shattered hulk of the Kursk submarine, lying 350 feet below 
the surface. Powerful currents and poor visibility have repeatedly beaten the 
capsules back. The submarine is also leaning at a sharp angle.


One finally managed to reach one of the Kursk's two escape hatches Friday but 
was unable to latch on to it with a special mechanism designed to establish 
an airtight connection, said Babenko.


``The grabbing device could not get hold of the hatch'' because it was badly 
damaged, he said.


The capsules were having better success as the weather in the rescue area 
improved Friday, making it easier for them to maneuver, navy officers said. 
But one had to make an emergency ascent Friday after suffering mechanical 
problems, Russia's RTR television said.


Navy officials said earlier there was no sign of life on the submarine, which 
went down six days ago during major naval exercises in the Barents Sea.


Underwater inspections of the Kursk show massive damage reaching from the bow 
to the conning tower, which was much more extensive than earlier thought, 
officials said.


Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, the head of a government commission that 
reviewed the rescue effort Thursday, said there was a ``terrifying hole'' on 
the starboard side of the submarine.


``A rather big part of the crew was in the part of the boat that was hit by 
the catastrophe that developed at lightning speed,'' Klebanov told reporters 
in Murmansk, home of the Russian Northern Fleet.


``There have been no sounds for quite a long time'' from within the Kursk, he 
added.


Both Klebanov and the Navy commander, Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov, have said that 
any survivors were expected to run out of oxygen Friday, but other 
high-ranking naval officers have given them until next week.


British and Norwegian rescue teams were not expected to reach the site until 
Saturday at the earliest, after Russia initially resisted accepting western 
aid. A British navy team with a sophisticated rescue submarine was heading to 
the area on a ship.


President Vladimir Putin abruptly returned to Moscow on Friday after 
criticism of his decision to stay on vacation when news of the disaster 
broke. He said he did not fly to the rescue site because ``the arrival of 
non-specialists and high-ranking officials to the scene of disaster does not 
help, but usually interferes,'' according to the Interfax news agency.


Russian officials have not determined how the Kursk got into trouble Aug. 12. 
Officials have offered various explanations, including a collision, an 
internal explosion or even contact with a World War II mine.


Klebanov said evidence suggested the submarine hit an unspecified ``huge, 
heavy object'' about 65 feet below surface and plunged to the sea bottom in 
seconds.


But officials could not explain how a highly sophisticated submarine could 
crash into a large object. Submarines use radar and other guiding devices 
that allow them to spot objects many miles away under water.


There have been no reports of other ships being damaged and the U.S. Navy has 
said its vessels in the area were not involved. Alexander Ushakov, deputy 
head of the Transport Ministry's northern sea route, said Friday there were 
no civilian ships in the area when the Kursk sank.


U.S. submarines monitoring Russian Navy exercises when the Kursk was lost 
detected two explosions at the time, the second much larger than the first, 
U.S. officials said.


A seismic monitoring center in Norway revealed Friday that it registered two 
explosions near the Kursk when it sank.


A likely scenario was that a torpedo in the Kursk's forward torpedo 
compartment exploded, setting off a much bigger explosion in the compartment 
which is packed with torpedoes.


The Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper published a special issue Friday with a 
list of the men aboard the Kursk, claiming it had paid navy officials $650 
for the names. The navy has not officially said who is aboard, angering 
family members and fueling criticism of the military's actions.


``There's a lot of hearsay about what's going on,'' Irina Lyachina, wife of 
the Kursk's commander, said in Murmansk. ``I hope they will tell me the truth 
when the time comes.''


*******


#3
New York Times
August 18, 2000 
Editorial
Russia's Unsafe Nuclear Submarines
The sinking of a Russian nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea is not just a 
tragedy for the sailors trapped aboard, it is a warning of the dangers of 
running a nuclear navy on the cheap -- the way an impoverished Russia must do 
everything these days. There is disagreement between American and Russian 
experts over whether the accident was caused by an explosion aboard the 
submarine or by a collision with another ship. But either way, the underlying 
cause may be more fundamental. Money is so short that submarines rarely put 
out to sea. They lack maintenance and the crews get little training. These 
problems, compounded by a longstanding disregard for safety, have caused 
accidents in the past and could have been contributing factors in this one. 


These problems have also obstructed rescue efforts. Until five days after the 
accident, the Russians were using primitive diving bells and a mini-sub with 
batteries that sustained it for only three hours. Their more advanced rescue 
sub may not have been ready for rapid deployment. The Russian government has 
also shown a chilling indifference to the sailors' fate. President Vladimir 
Putin has continued his Black Sea vacation, and offers of foreign assistance 
were rebuffed for days. 


The Russian Navy's deficiencies not only endanger its crew, they pose a risk 
to the local ocean environment. So far, Norwegian monitors have detected no 
radiation leakage from the downed submarine, the Kursk, but that could change 
if it breaks apart or if the reactors have not been completely shut down, as 
happened in a 1986 submarine accident despite official reassurances to the 
contrary. 


An even greater contamination danger comes from some 120 decommissioned 
submarines rusting off the coastlines near Murmansk and Vladivostok. Most 
were mothballed when Russia simply ran out of money to operate them. Some of 
the submarines are no longer watertight and are in danger of sinking. 
Radioactive waste is slowly seeping into the surrounding water and air. 
Neighboring Norway is worried about a possible explosion from one of the 
reactors, which could contaminate local waters, kill fish and marine mammals 
and harm both nations' fishing industries. 


The United States and Norway are helping Russia to design and build prototype 
facilities for storing the spent fuel. But Russia does not have the money to 
continue the efforts. One way to get it would be to expand a program 
championed by Senator Richard Lugar and former Senator Sam Nunn that pays to 
dismantle Russia's nuclear arsenal but does not cover most of the 
decommissioned submarines. 


The chief responsibility is Russia's, however, and its performance so far has 
been troubling. Moscow has blocked American and Norwegian officials from 
seeing some of the sites they are trying to clean up, prosecuted a former 
naval officer who has written reports exposing the problem, and slowed 
progress with internal battles over financing and demands for taxes on 
donations. It may be a long time before Russia has the funds to operate and 
decommission its nuclear submarines safely, but it should at least refrain 
from compounding the risks. 


*****


#4
Boston Globe
August 18, 2000
Submarine crisis pummels Putin's 'take charge' reputation 
By David Filipov


MOSCOW - The disaster on the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk has seriously 
imperiled, if not already taken, the lives of 116 sailors, and further 
tarnished the shaky reputation of Russia's crumbling military. 


It may yet claim another victim: President Vladimir Putin's reputation as a 
strong, dynamic leader who can turn this former superpower around after years 
of chaos and decline.


Putin's image as a man of action has made him popular in a land weary of the 
absentee leadership of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. But with all of Russia 
watching the tragedy unfold in the Arctic waters of the Barents Sea, Putin 
has refused to interrupt his vacation on the warm waters of the Black Sea, 
and appears not to have taken charge. 


The Kursk sank in the Barents Sea last Saturday, but it was not until 
Wednesday that Putin made his first, brief, statement on the situation. He 
then ordered the N avy to accept help from Britain and Norway, three days 
after it was offered. With oxygen on board the crippled submarine dwindling, 
the delay may have cost lives. 


Putin has pulled a Yeltsin. The public has taken notice.


''Last night the sailors on the Kursk fell silent,'' declared the Moscow 
daily Komsomolskaya Pravda yesterday, after officials said they no longer 
detected signs of life on board. ''Why has the president been silent?


''Why on earth did he think it was possible to keep mum for five days while 
the entire nation has spent those days consumed by only one thought - will 
they be saved or won't they?'' the newspaper asked.


Analysts, too, expressed surprise at the low profile of the president during 
the Kursk crisis. Since being elected in March, Putin has reined in the 
powers of unruly regional governors, snipped the wings of high-flying 
business magnates, and pushed through a tax code that could mark the 
beginnings of an ambitious economic reform agenda. 


Some analysts say Putin's inactivity now may have implications for how far he 
will be able to back up with action his ambitious statements about restoring 
Russia's Cold War-era status as a global sea power. The crisis also will 
likely fuel an unruly public dispute among senior commanders over the 
distribution of the skimpy resources Russia's budget is able to committ to 
defense.


''This may be the first chink in Putin's armor,'' said Alan Rousso, director 
of the Moscow office of Carnegie Center. ''You think he'd have it better than 
his predecessor, but there has been no coordination in the rescue effort. 
Putin's inability to get control over the armed forces in this crisis is 
telling.'' 


In Putin's place, military and civilian officials have offered conflicting 
and often false reports about the fate of the submarine. Stunned, sullen 
officials have refused to release the names of the crew, or any other 
information, to families and loved ones. In the port of Murmansk, home of the 
Northern Fleet where the Kursk was based, officials have held no briefings. 
Panicked residents, some of whom fear that a major environmental catastrophe 
is underway and the government is covering up, have been told only that 
Murmansk is ''prepared for any eventuality.''


Meanwhile, the Navy's apparently overmatched rescue fleet has tried 
repeatedly to latch a modified version of a diving bell to an escape hatch of 
the submarine. 


Foul weather and strong currents have hampered the efforts. But no one seems 
to be rushing to take charge. It was only yesterday that the naval chief and 
a senior Cabinet member, Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, flew to the 
Northern Fleet's base in Murmansk to assess the situation and decide, as an 
official statement put it, ''how to conduct the rescue.''


The government's handling of the submarine incident is likely to dent Putin's 
standing with the military.


''The sailors dying in the Barents Sea couldn't interrupt the summer leaves 
of our statesmen,'' the daily Izvestia said in a clear reference to Putin. 
''They are having a picnic on the shore with a view of the drowning men.''


As a British rescue mission equipped with a deep-sea submersible yesterday 
raced against time to reach the Kursk before the air supply ran out, the 
military for the first time said heavy damage to the front of the submarine 
meant that casualties were unavoidable. A Navy spokesman, reversing earlier 
statements that the sub had gone down under control of the crew, said 
yesterday that the Kursk sank rapidly.


So far, no official wants to say what many naval experts believe - that since 
the compartments that housed the sub's commander, officers, and 60 percent of 
the crew were destroyed and flooded, it is likely that they were unable to 
escape. Yesterday, Russia's prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, said only that 
the situation was ''close to catastrophe.''


A major disaster, such as the loss of much or all of the crew, would be an 
embarrassment for Putin, who has staked a lot of prestige on reviving the 
military. The president rarely misses an opportunity to pose with troops, and 
in April, dressed in naval officer's garb, he spent a night on a submerged 
submarine from the Northern Fleet where the Kursk was based.


Some analysts suggested that because Putin's popularity with the public at 
large has survived despite setbacks in the war in Chechnya, it is not about 
to diminish now. 


Putin's image was born in the Chechnya crisis, and he has managed its 
perceived setbacks well. And during the deadly bombing in central Moscow last 
week, Putin took control, promising to catch the perpetrators, while pleading 
not to rush to blame ordinary Chechens. 


''The Kursk catastrophe is a different matter altogether,'' said the 
newspaper Kommersant, which is owned by Boris Berezovsky, an erstwhile 
Kremlin insider increasingly critical of Putin.


''You can show a `successful' struggle against terrorists, as experience 
shows, without producing any detained masterminds of terrorist acts,'' the 
paper said. ''But to save a boat without saving it is something no one can 
do.''


Some observers say the government's conduct reminds them of Soviet-era 
disasters, such as the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 
1986, when officials were more preoccupied with keeping information under 
wraps and shifting blame than helping victims.


******


#5
BBC MONITORING
MEDIA STRUGGLES FOR TRUTH ABOUT THE KURSK
17-Aug-2000 12:00:00 am 


The independence of Russia's TV and radio stations was sorely tested by the
Kursk submarine accident. 


While the state media struggled to carry the authorities' reassurances,
private stations dropped their uneasy truce with President Putin to pursue
the harsh truth. 


The semi-state Russian Public TV channel and wholly state Russia TV
initially devoted much of their bulletins to lengthy interviews with naval
and government officials, allowing them to make their statements
unchallenged. 


Calm sea, no need to abandon ship 


Russian Public TV, for instance, had an academic in its studio assuring
viewers there was no risk of nuclear contamination at a time when rescuers
were scrambling to make contact. 


"Our assessment is quite clear: the reactor has not been wrecked and
remains hermetically sealed," Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy said on 15th August. 


The radiation level inside was "not dangerous" and the crew could "act as
usual", he said. 


The state radio station Radio Rossia for its part was reporting on the day
news of the accident broke (14th August) that a diving bell had "restored
communications" with the Kursk and was also feeding it oxygen and fuel. 


Given the "calm sea", "the need for its crew to abandon the submarine, one
of the most advanced in the Russian navy's inventory, has not arisen yet",
the radio said. 


However, a Russia TV correspondent based at Severodvinsk was reporting the
same day that the last contact with the submarine had been a request by the
captain to commence firing torpedoes. 


Three days later, a different Russia TV correspondent was quoting "rescuers
and naval seamen" as saying a "collision" was the likely cause of the
accident. 


The original report, which seemed to confirm Western suspicions of a
torpedo explosion, vanished from bulletins for two days until Russia's
private NTV channel retrieved it. 


Another disaster, more lies 


NTV, which has often seen its owners locked in battle with the Yeltsin and
Putin administrations, interviewed the same naval officials as the other
channels but also went to retired naval officers for a more realistic
picture. 


As news broke, the channel went to the commander of the K-219 submarine
which suffered a missile explosion in the Atlantic in 1986. 


"It was the same thing - no information on how many were killed, what had
happened and so on," Captain Yevgeny Aznabayev told the TV. 


"The authorities just don't give out any information." 


Ekho Moskvy, NTV's sister radio station, for its part fielded a well-known
commentator on military affairs, Pavel Felgengauer, to savage official
reports. 


He said the submarine had hit the seabed "like an axe" and the crew, or
most of it, had probably perished immediately. 


The shame of losing an "unsinkable" submarine in peacetime had created
panic in the navy. 


For the radio's guest, the only hard conclusion about the Kursk was that
those who had ordered the navy to "lie to the whole world and to its own
people" should be made pay. 


The radio also conducted telephone opinion polls about how the authorities
were handling the crisis. 


With the TV channels showing Putin in his shirt-sleeves in the Black Sea
holiday resort of Sochi, the radio reported that 73 per cent of listeners
thought he should be up north at the scene of the rescue mission. 


According to another poll, 76 per cent of listeners believed the Kursk
accident had damaged Putin's reputation as supreme commander of the armed
forces. 


*******


#6
UPI ANALYSIS 
The Russian Nuclear Sub Fallout: Let the Blame Games Begin
by Ariel Cohen 
WASHINGTON, August 16, (UPI)


The failure of the third attempt by the Russian Navy to rescue sailors
trapped in the submarine Kursk coupled with the military's and the
Kremlin's failure to handle the crisis effectively may have done long-term
damage to President Vladimir Putin's popularity. If so, he can thank the
Russian Navy for torpedoing his prestige.



While Putin had enjoyed a high job approval rating following his assumption
of the office of the Russian presidency, his standing had begun to slip
even before the submarine disaster struck.


The incompetence the Navy to handle the situation was clearly demonstrated
by the fact that three days after the Kursk's dire situation became known,
it failed to even establish two-way communications with the trapped crew. 


One Navy spokesman appears to have lied by claiming that would-be rescuers
were in two-way contact with the submariners by tapping coded signals
through the sub's titanium hull. In fact, for a while, the trapped crew
could be heard banging a repeated SOS in Morse code, along with some
irregular noises, but even that stopped on Tuesday, suggesting the worst.


Five days after the accident, Russia's naval commanders are still floating
five different versions of the event, unable to come up with a clear cause
of the accident. 


Among possible causes: explosion of a torpedo in the sub's launching tube,
collision with a World War II mine, hitting an underwater rock, collision
with another submarine or a surface ship, or a hit by a Russian
anti-submarine ship during the maneuvers that the Kursk was involved in
prior to sinking.


The submarine's designers, fearful for their jobs, floated the rumor that
it was an American sub which rammed the Kursk. Later a Navy spokesman had
to repudiate the canard. 


Russian Navy spokesmen also mishandled information about the timing of the
disaster, first claiming that the sub suffered an accident on Sunday, only
to correct themselves and pinpoint Saturday as the date. This information
is vital for estimating the remaining supply of oxygen and energy in the sub.


The military, which has several submersible rescue vehicles, apparently has
not ordered these mini-subs to sea since 1990 and did not train their crews
in submarine rescue. Throughout the crisis, Navy spokesmen have
continuously referred to the disaster as a "non-standard situation," as if
this were a plausible excuse for failure and inaction.


While the few remaining hours of oxygen and energy that may still be left
in the marooned sub wane away, there is squabbling at naval headquarters.
Subordinates are demanding written orders in the fear that they may be held
responsible or made scapegoats if the rescue fails. There are rumors about
the firing of Navy admirals and an investigation and prosecution being
already prepared by the Chief Military Prosecutor's office.


The Russian military's top brass first refused Western offers of
assistance, commenting that all the West wanted was to get a close look at
the modern Oscar 2 class submarine. However, on Tuesday evening, the
Deputy Commander of the Russian Navy flew to Brussels to discuss rescue
options with NATO command. Meanwhile, time was running out for the trapped
sailors.


President Putin apparently was not informed about the event for 24 hours
after its discovery by the Russian navy. When he finally was informed,
Putin's response did nothing to reflect a leadership position. He did not
interrupt his vacation near the beach town of Sochi on the Black Sea. He
did not return to Moscow, nor did he fly to the Arctic Ocean to personally
supervise the rescue efforts. He did not even face the cameras until
Tuesday, four days after the disaster struck.


The slow and inadequate response on the part of the military command and
the presidential administration has generated an outcry from the parents of
the accident victims as well as the media.


Putin's chief political adviser, Gleb Pavlovsky, explained that this
situation is not about "pushing others away from the camera, like in the
Yeltsin era," but also hinted that the President may prefer to have others
take the heat. What was lacking was an honest explanation to the people
about the causes and the scope of the tragedy. Finally, Putin made it clear
through a spokesman that saving the men's lives should be a top priority.


The catastrophe of the Kursk will be undoubtedly a serious blow to the
already low morale in the Russian military. Soldiers often go hungry, while
officers at times are not paid for months. Officers' families frequently
live in abhorrent conditions, including tent cities. 


The war in Chechnya, has already taken the lives of 2,300 members of the
Russian military, as well as the lives of over 12,000 of civilians and
rebels, and no end is in sight.


But even more importantly, the Kursk disaster may be a bad omen for
President Putin's popularity with the superstitious nation. 


The Russian media already is drawing parallels to the famous Khodynka
stampede which happened during the coronation of Nicholas II. In this
tragic event, over 300 people were trampled to death, providing a bloody
start to the rule of the last Russian tsar. 


Nicholas's term in power was a chain of disasters. The war with Japan was
lost, protesting workers were massacred by the Cossacks in what became
known as The Bloody Sunday (1905) and the Lena Shootings (1912), and
finally, World War I was lost, and with it, the Russian Empire. 


The Kursk tragedy is also reminiscent of the 1986 Chernobyl reactor blow-up
early in Mikhail Gorbachev's reign. The world's worst nuclear reactor
incident cast a radioactive glow over the remainder of Gorbachev's
ill-fated rule.


The Kursk disaster is also comparable with the sinking of two Soviet cruise
ships early in the Gorbachev era. The first was the Mikhail Lermontov,
which hit rocks and sank outside New Zealand on February 16, 1986. Only one
person died. But much more signifcant was the Admiral Nakhimov, which was
rammed by a Russian merchant ship outside of the port city of Novorossiysk
on August 31, 1986. 423 tourists and crew perished. 


It may take a miracle to save the crew of the Kursk. It will certainly
take a lot of hard work and straight talk to save the Russian Navy's badly
damaged reputation - and President's Putin sinking prestige.


******


#7
Moscow Times
August 18, 2000 
>From Sports to Cloning, the Church Speaks 
By Andrei Zolotov Jr.
Staff Writer


In a desperate dash to catch up with the departing 20th century, the Russian 
Orthodox Church this week proclaimed its values on virtually every aspect of 
modern life f from cloning to contraception, from homosexuality to divorce 
and from nationalism to globalization. 


It did so in a 100-plus-page document that was introduced for the first time 
this week to the church's 146 bishops f and adopted by them Tuesday after 
less than a day of discussion. 


The document itself was drafted in secrecy over a six-year period, under the 
supervision of the 12-man Holy Synod, which runs the church day to day. 
Although the Council of Bishops is supposedly a superior organization to the 
synod, the lightening speed with which such a sweeping and potentially 
controversial "social doctrine" was rammed through without debate suggests 
the synod is in the driver's seat. 


Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, which issued its first social doctrine in 
1891 f the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum f and which ever since has spoken 
out on many aspects of public and private life, the Orthodox Church has 
previously had only private opinions on many modern matters. 


That changes with the doctrine adopted this week and posted on the church's 
web site at www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru. Copies of it will be printed 
for every parish in the nation and included in the curricula of all 
seminaries. 


In some aspects, as in its unequivocal condemnation of homosexuality and 
abortion, the document simply reaffirms the biblical and canonical norms of 
the church f on topics largely avoided in the Moscow Patriarchate's official 
statements over the past decade. 


In others, it has dealt with new realities that could not have been imagined 
in the period up to the eighth century, when the body of Orthodox canons was 
codified. 


In some aspects, the Orthodox position is similar to the Catholic: The social 
doctrine condemns abortion as murder and euthanasia as murder or suicide. It 
says that cloning is "an undoubted challenge to the very nature of man," who 
is seen as the image of God. Reproductive technologies are also unacceptable 
f except for artificial insemination with a husband's semen, which is deemed 
a procedure that does not violate the sanctity of marriage. 


But watch for the details. While the Catholic church proclaims a wholesale 
rejection of contraception, the Russian Orthodox doctrine says that while use 
of contraception should be discouraged in Christian families, those methods 
that do not destroy an embryo "should not be equated with abortion." 


"Defining their attitude toward non-abortive means of contraception, 
Christian spouses should remember that the continuation of human kind is one 
of the main goals of the divinely established matrimonial union," the 
doctrine states, adding that to choose not to have children for "egotistical 
reasons" is a sin. 


Regarding abortions, there is also fine print. The doctrine advises 
"leniency" with women who have aborted a pregnancy that threatened their 
lives f particularly if she has other children. Priests are advised to give 
such women penance, but not to deny them communion. 


Temporary voluntary abstinence from sex is presented as the only truly 
Orthodox "responsible attitude to child-bearing." But, in what reads as a 
reminder to a number of radical priests, it is also stressed that sex as such 
should not be disdained f and that non-church marriages should not be 
considered adultery. 


"The church does not encourage second marriages in any way," the document 
says. Yet the list of legitimate reasons for a church divorce is extended to 
include cases when one's partner contracts AIDS, is a medically proven 
alcoholic or drug addict, or when a wife has an abortion without her 
husband's consent. Previously legitimate causes for sundering a church 
marriage have included when one partner commits adultery, becomes impotent, 
contracts syphilis or is sexually abusive. 


At a time when some Protestant churches have taken to performing homosexual 
marriages, the Orthodox Church reaffirmed its view of homosexuality as "a 
sinful damage of human nature" which can be overcome, as with other "passions 
of fallen man," through penance, fasting and prayer. 


"Discussions about the so-called sexual minorities in the modern society tend 
to recognize homosexuality not as a sexual perversion, but only as one of the 
'sexual orientations', one that has an equal right for public demonstration 
and respect," the document says. "Bearing pastoral responsibility for people 
with homosexual inclinations, the church at the same time decisively opposes 
attempts to present this sinful tendency as a 'norm' and even more, a subject 
of pride and an example to be followed." 


The document mildly "suggests" that people who "propagate" a homosexual way 
of life should not be allowed to teach at schools or hold positions of 
authority in the army or in penitentiary establishments. 


Much of the document is dedicated to church-state relations, its view of 
politics and its criticism of the liberal tradition. While recognizing the 
usefulness of the principle of "freedom of conscience" for the church's 
survival in a secularized world, it refuses to endorse it as truth. 


While monarchy is enshrined in Orthodox tradition, the doctrine reaffirms 
that the church accepts any form of government. But it also states that only 
a true spiritual rebirth in society can bring about conditions under which an 
Orthodox monarchy f carefully described as spiritually "higher" than 
democracy f could be restored. 


The doctrine praises "active patriotism" but condemns "aggressive 
nationalism" f the latter involves turning one's nation into a god. At the 
same time, the doctrine is sharply critical of the process known, for lack of 
a better word, as "globalization," which the church complains involves 
"unifying" the world on the basis of consumer-oriented, godless values. 


Sports as a way of improving one's health is approved of, but sports for the 
sake of pride or record-setting is discouraged. The doctrine stresses that 
the physically weak and the ill are as valuable to God as are the fit and the 
strong. 


While many in the church see the mass media as a straightforward evil, the 
doctrine emphasizes that the church's isolationism in regard to the media 
plays into the hands of the church's enemies. It calls on the media for 
responsible coverage of church affairs; it forbids priests from suing 
journalists for libel, recommending instead trying to resolve conflicts by 
mediation. Failing that, it allows priests to announce a public break with a 
particular journalist or media. 


It remains to be seen how the doctrine will play at the grassroots of the 
church f there is no tradition for the codification of doctrinal matters, and 
parish priests and the laity can be poorly educated and fanatically 
aggressive. 


But the Council of Bishops has declared that the church must shift its 
priorities from building cathedrals to filling them with Christian life, and 
insisted the doctrine would not be shelved. They say it has been written to 
cover the next several decades. 


******


#8
The Guardian (UK)
18 August 2000
CATASTROPHE ON THE CARDS: GWYN PRINS THE TRAGEDY OF THE KURSK SHOULD 
FOCUS ATTENTION ON RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR WASTE CRISIS


This week, before the horrified gaze of the world, the Kursk has become
part of the swelling armada of dead Russian nuclear submarines, most of
which are to be found in the ports of the Kola peninsula of north-west
Russia. If the tragedy focuses attention on Russia's ballooning nuclear
waste problem, then some good may yet come of it. What has been lacking has
been political will in Russian and abroad. The loss of the Kursk could
change that. There is still time - just. 


>From a radiation point of view, the Kola peninsula is one of the cleanest
places in Europe. A bit of strontium 90 from the atmospheric atom bomb test
of the 1950s, to be sure - you get that everywhere. On land, there is
background radon (as on Dartmoor). In the Barents, Kara and White seas,
there is caesium 137, but half of that comes from jolly old
Windscale/Sellafield. 


But Kola also boasts the greatest latent potential for catastrophic release
of radioactivity on the planet. An audit of 1993, ordered by President
Boris Yeltsin, opened the issue for scrutiny. Kola is home to huge numbers
of operating and defunct reactors. 


Between 1954 and 1996, the Soviet Union built 287 nuclear submarines,
containing more than 500 reactors. Of these, a minimum of 183 -and perhaps
as many as 245 - are now out of service, and at least 120 of those still
have fuelled reactors. The Northern Fleet has 142 subs and three
battlecruisers (300-plus reactors) in or out of service. Then there are 10
icebreakers and a container ship. In the tally are 16 dumped reactors,
including six with unrecovered fuel from nuclear accidents, such as the one
that overtook the icebreaker Lenin. To that must now be added the two
fuelled reactors of the Kursk. 


So Kola has an abundance of spent nuclear fuel from ships needing
containment. Then there is the Kola power station. Two of its reactors are
judged by the International Atomic Energy Authority to have a 25%
likelihood of critical failure in the next 20 years. There is no
containment. This, however, is the power station that powers the pumps that
cool the shut-down submarine reactors that await decommissioning and
disposal. When the electricity company cut the Russian navy off for non-
payment a few years ago, marines appeared, submachine guns in hand, to help
change its mind. A new Kola nuclear power station is planned. 


There is no adequate technical provision to deal with this stuff. The main
hope is the Russian reprocessing plant at Mayak, near Chelyabinsk, with
western-funded medium-term storage under construction there. However,
shortage of special rolling stock restricts the capacity to move material
from Kola by rail. A long-term repository is being discussed. The Russians
want to put it on the island of Novaya Zemlya - but it is hard to reach and
its geology is fractured by previous nuclear tests. Western experts favour
a site on Kola, near the stuff. No early agreement is expected. 


This situation is a product of the myopia that has been a characteristic of
nuclear industries, west and east. They think in straight lines, and then
only about the bits that they like, rather than of full-life cycles. Only
now, with the armada of dead vessels swelling, is the Rubin Design Bureau,
whose gifted engineers helped to build the Soviet submarine fleet
(including, very recently, the Oscar design of the Kursk), being asked to
un-design them. 


Accommodation for spent fuel has been much reduced by accidents. Two
storage ponds at the Andreyeva Bay naval facility had to be abandoned in
1982 because poor construction had led to leakage through cracked concrete
and failed welds. The storage pool and dry dock at Gremikha failed too, for
similar reasons. The Norwegian Bellona Foundation has evidence that
drunkenness in the workforce prevented repair. Spent fuel is stored in
Northern Fleet service tenders. Four (in Murmansk and Severodvinsk), are
over 25 years old and full. With nowhere better to put the stuff, all these
old, badly maintained barges are accidents waiting to happen. Spent fuel
stands, inadequately shielded, on the quayside. 


Like the brooms activated by the sorcerer's apprentice, the block
decommissioning of the Soviet fleet is producing increasing volumes of
fresh spent fuel. The Russian government plans to decommission 150
submarines by 2007. The present least-bad option is to leave the fuel in
reactors on board. But left too long, fuel channels may distort. Defuelling
then becomes impossible, so the entire reactors have to be disposed of.
Unmaintained, the submarine hulls corrode. Some have sunk at their moorings. 


The west wants to help. But at a recent meeting the cost of disposal quoted
by the Russians was twice the equivalent western figure. The Russians would
like to be paid to clean up; the west is reluctant to hand over cash.
People recall the European Union auditors' report on money for safety at
nuclear power-stations, which disappeared. 


The whole issue is darkened by a cloud from another source - the inveterate
culture of secrecy that hangs over Russian military, especially nuclear,
matters. Of principal concern today is the case of a former Russian navy
captain, Alexander Nikitin. The authorities decided to make an example of
him. Put on trial for high treason for revealing information about the
Russian navy (information that was actually already known to western
researchers from other sources), he was hounded through the courts for
years until he was acquitted by the St Petersburg city court last December.
The acquittal was confirmed by the supreme court in April, amid general
rejoicing by environmentalists and supporters of free speech. But Victor
Cherkesov, a friend of President Vladimir Putin, who was the Petersburg
prosecutor and is now governor of north-west Russia, has not given up. The
prosecutor's office has appealed against the acquittal and a supreme court
hearing is due next month. 


Even if his acquittal stands, Nikitin's case will have had dire
consequences because of the nature of his defence case. The courts found
that at the time of the offence, no law existed which Nikitin had broken:
by definition he was innocent. Now there is a law. It works like this, in
five Kafkaesque steps: one, there are secret matters not to be revealed;
two, they are listed; three, the list itself is secret; four, ignorance is
no defence; five, there is no 'public interest" defence. As a dissident in
the new Russia told me, in future no prudent Russian will dare to speak
publicly about any environmental issue except those that are wholly
innocuous: perhaps the welfare of sea-birds. 


The British government has offered pounds 5m toward the Kola clean up. But
any external aid must be targeted primarily at building a comprehensive
partnership in which western and Russian engineers and equipment work
together. Compromise is unacceptable because the safe management of
radioactivity is an activity unlike any other. That a British rescue team
was requested, late in the day, to assist with the Kursk, is one glimmering
point of optimism that may be seen as the swirling, murky waters close over
the disaster. 


Gwyn Prins is principal research fellow at the European Institute of the
London School of Economics. The Bellona Foundation website is at
www.bellona.no 


******


#9
From: "stanislav menshikov" <menschivok@globalxs.nl>
Subject: FINANCE NEEDS GENTLE HANDLING
Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2000 


"MOSCOW TRIBUNE", 18 August 2000
FINANCE NEEDS GENTLE HANDLING
And Should Not Be Used For Political Purposes
By Stanislav Menshikov


The loose way in which money matters are handled in this country are
leading to gross political errors and, on occasion, are used for political
intrigue. Recent instances leap to the mind ­ wrong financial assessments
are used to substantiate controversial military decisions; the role of oil
exports in the current economic upsurge is overrated with wrong political
implications; mutual debts between natural monopolies are used for dubious
political purposes.


Two crucial military decisions made by the President's Security Council ­
reducing strategic missiles and practically eliminating antiaircraft ground
missile defences ­ were made presumably due to money shortages in the
federal coffer and the need to redistribute the defence budget in favour of
traditional ground forces. While the general poverty of the Russian army
inherited from Yeltsin is well known and optimising military expenditure is
long overdue it is hard to understand why it is necessary to keep the
inadequate overall defence budget intact at this particular time. 


The fact is that, unlike the previous few years, the economy is growing and
government revenues are increasing even faster. Yeltsin continuously
decreed military expenditure to be not less than 3 per cent of GDP, but
tight fiscal policies of Chubais & Co. kept them down to 2 per cent. Now
that the economy is growing at the rate of 4-5 per cent per year, it is
quite possible to satisfy minimum defence requirements. In 2000 total
federal expenditure was planned at 16 per cent of GDP, but because actual
national product is much larger, only 13.2 per cent are being spent.
Instead of a budget deficit an overall surplus is expected at 1.7 per cent
of GDP, adding a whopping 110 billion roubles. In 2001 total federal
expenditure is projected to rise by 332 billion roubles, more than twice
larger than the total current defence budget. Surely, money should be
available to increase the defence budget by at least quarter a percent of
GDP next year and even more later on.


In normal times, spending for arms deducts resources from economic growth.
But when production capacity is badly under-utilised, as it is now, raising
military expenditure is a factor working for economic recovery by creating
twice as much GDP in real terms than is added to military expenditure. But
because fiscal aggregates are not appreciated the way they should be,
national security interests could be badly damaged under the false pretext
of money shortages. 


Another case is the erroneous conclusion that the current economic upsurge
is due solely or largely to high prices of oil in world markets. But what
is their actual contribution to Russian GDP? In the first half of 2000,
earnings from oil exports have risen by $9.2 billion compared to the same
period last year. Sounds large but this is only 29 per cent of the record
total trade surplus earned so far. More importantly, this dollar intake is
not used to buy more production resources abroad because imports remain
stagnant. Nor is it used for domestic capital investment because a large
part is being largely stashed abroad. Therefore, the actual contribution of
high oil prices to real GDP is minor. Of course the government benefits
since actual oil prices (at $ 28 per barrel) are much higher than the
budget projection of $18-19. But only less than 17 per cent of this excess
income is captured by the federal authorities through the export duty on
oil. Revenues collected via the value-added tax on Russian-made goods only
is twice as large ­ 34 per cent. Obviously, more money is earned by the
government from surging domestic manufacturing output than from oil
exports.


What happens if oil prices fall? The trade surplus will be smaller, less
export duties are collected, less dollars enter the Central Bank currency
reserves. But this will have a minor effect on real GDP provided domestic
output continues to grow. Not too good financially, but nowhere near the
generally predicted catastrophe.


Finally, consider the way natural monopolies are settling debts. Instead of
cancelling offsetting indebtedness, RAO UES insists on cash payments
threatening to cut off railways, plants, mines, hospitals, schools from
electric supply. This is a vicious circle since most of the debtors are
firms and institutions which are not themselves paid on time either by
other firms or the government. Cutting off electric power will not solve
the problem because non-producing firms and institutions are not by
definition in a position to pay.


Why then is Mr. Chubais insisting on payment at any cost like the legendary
Shylock in Shakespeare's drama? One possible explanation is that he is
blackmailing Mr. Kasyanov's cabinet and thus adding to right-wing pressure
on the premier to resign. It is rumoured that in that case Mr. Chubais
hopes to be appointed State Secretary of the newly formed State Council and
become, for all practical purposes, second man in the country, after Mr.
Putin. Whether these plans are realistic is another question. But it is
hardly normal that money matters are being used for unseemly political
purposes.


*******


#10
Vremya MN
August 16, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
PERSONNEL CHANGES IMMINENT IN THE GOVERNMENT
By Oksana KARPOVA

Director of the Institute of Globalisation Problems 
Mikhail DELYAGIN believes that this autumn the dismissal of 
chairman of the Russian government Mikhail Kasyanov is very 
probable. Most likely, this will happen until October 20. By 
this time the government will be able to visually assess the 
negative economic manifestations in society and clear up the 
situation with the restructuring of debts to the Paris Club.
The absence of success in this direction will be the formal 
reason for the government's reshuffle. 
So far, Mikhail Delyagin believes, one thing is evident - 
Mikhail Kasyanov fails to cope with his duties. He has not been 
able to organise the work for the formulation of the economic 
policy. The government has not become a single mechanism. The 
reduction of the number of departments has only intensified 
utter chaos in the apparatus and society. A proof of this is 
the statement by Minister of Economic Development and Trade 
German Gref about the annual review of the economic programme. 
Mikhail Delyagin believes that such statements, in principle, 
are inadmissible for the economy. 
The Prime Minister's disagreements with the chairman of 
the Central Bank on the issue of the exchange rate policy have 
also affected his career. Apart from the fact that these 
disagreements have been brought up for public discussion, they 
have also acquired the nature of political differences.
Shocking statements by the deputies of Mikhail Kasyanov also 
added fuel to the fire. Let us take, for example, Vice-Premier 
Ilya Klebanov. First, he hinted that already in a year the 13 
per cent income tax may be reviewed. For society this meant 
only one thing - the government intends to deceive taxpayers.
The excuses subsequently made by Gref to the effect that the 
government intends to modify the tax rates in no less than 
three years only made the people's doubts stronger.
Nevertheless, Klebanov went further and said that it is 
expedient for each federal district to implement its own 
economic development programme. "This statement created the 
greatest danger for the country's integrity after the 
Belovezhskaya Pushcha accords," Delyagin believes. Apart from 
that, the government has been clearly discredited by the 
obviously uncoordinated statements made by Finance Minister 
Alexei Kudrin and German Gref. Kudrin said that economic growth 
in our country would be halted. Gref again had to make an 
explanation for the public and dispute the opinion of the 
competent person. 
The activity of another Vice-Premier, Viktor Khristenko, 
also had a negative impact. He seemed to have agreed on the 
establishment of the institution of the government's 
representatives in the seven federal districts along with the 
presidential representatives. In the opinion of Delyagin, this 
fact "actually denies the President's guiding role and the 
government's claims for equality capable of creating diarchy 
even at the level of the executive power." Over the period of 
Kasyanov's stay in the post of the country's Prime Minister he 
has not come up a single time with programme economic 
statements. Either ministers or First Vice-Premier Kudrin have 
to speak about the government's strategy. This only adds to 
further uncertainty in society.
The government has failed to solve to this day the following 
most important economic problems: the anti-monopoly policy, 
de-criminalisation of the procedure of corporate bankruptcy, 
and the judicial reform, which are known to affect the 
political situation as a whole. This can be illustrated by the 
government's capitulation to natural monopolies. It has 
approved the increase of tariffs "without raising the degree of 
financial transparency." Economists believe that in autumn a 
fuel and energy crisis is inevitable in the country. RAO UES 
Rossii has already begun to look for culprits (this refers to 
the Railways Ministry) and shift responsibility onto other 
persons. Meanwhile, the government pretends not to notice 
anything. 
Who can replace Mikhail Kasyanov? The names of the most 
probable candidates were mentioned in the government lobbies:
Alexei Kudrin and German Gref. However, Delyagin believes that 
the appointment of any of them will be a disaster. Both of them 
belong to the Chubais clan whose members are unable objectively 
to be oriented to the interests of society. In the opinion of 
Delyagin, the current finance minister is a brilliant performer 
but not a strategist. At the same time, the economics minister 
does not have a sufficient economic background as he fails to 
notice the pressing problems in society. In this situation, the 
President should appoint to this post his representative. "Only 
in this case will there remain at least a possibility of 
carrying out a sensible and comprehensive economic policy," 
Delyagin believes. 

*******

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