July 18th, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4408 • 4409   •

Johnson's Russia List
#4409
18 July 2000
davidjohnson@erols.cm

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: China, Russia attack U.S. missile shield plan.
2. The Guardian (UK): John Gittings, Russia and China open new chapter.
3. The Times(UK) editorial: PUTIN'S G8 DEBUT. Showmanship on 
the road to Okinawa.
4. Alan Cohen: NGOs.
5. Wallace Kaufman: Mushrooms and Russian Attitudes Toward Risk.
6. Reuters: Russia's poison mushroom death toll rises to 95.
7. Izvestia: EXPERT DEPARTMENT BEING SET UP IN THE KREMLIN.
8. Stratfor.com: Superpower vs. Great Power: Inside the Russian Defense Debate.
9. Michael J. Carley: Re:4401-Hoagland/Chechnya.
10. RFE/RL: Michael Lelyveld, Russia: Peace Making Or Oil Interests?
11. gazeta.ru: Audit Chamber Attack Saves Chubais.
12. Reuters: Pro-Moscow Chechens row over who's in charge.
13. Moscow Times: Russell Working, LETTER FROM VLADIVOSTOK: 
A Maverick of the Far East.] 

*******

#1
China, Russia attack U.S. missile shield plan
By Paul Eckert

BEIJING, July 18 (Reuters) - Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian leader 
Vladimir Putin warned the United States of ``grave'' security consequences if 
it goes ahead with plans to build missile shields. 

``The plan by the United States to develop a National Missile Defence System 
(NMD) seeks unilateral military and security advantages,'' they said in a 
joint statement, referring to a shield for the United States. 

``Implementing this plan will have the most grave adverse consequences not 
only to the national security of Russia, China and other countries, but also 
to the security and international strategic stability of the United States 
itself.'' 

China and Russia said missile shields for the United States and Asia 
threatened a new arms race, according to the statement, which capped a summit 
between two formerly hostile neighbours brought closer by common suspicion of 
U.S. intentions. 

But diplomats said the statement revealed they were not united on the issue. 

``When you get down to the nitty gritty, they are still two countries with 
distinct strategic interests,'' a diplomat said. 

Nothing in the joint statement indicated that Russia was abandoning its 
position that it may be prepared to allow the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty to be changed to let the United States to build an NMD, he said. 

``This still is a step short of ruling out that Russia might at some stage 
accept amendments to ABM,'' he said. ``Russia doesn't want to foreclose that 
option.'' 

In a move that would be bitterly opposed by China, Russia is thought to be 
open to minor ABM revisions in an effort to negotiate nuclear weapons cuts 
with the United States to reduce Moscow's burden of keeping an expensive and 
unsafe arsenal. 

A RUSE? 

Washington has proposed building a NMD system against missile attacks from 
``states of concern'' such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq and a Theatre 
Missile Defence (TMD) system to shield its troops and allies in Asia. 

Such reasoning was ``actually a ruse to cover its attempt to violate the 
ABM,'' the Sino-Russian statement said. 

China, widely thought to have provided missile technology to some of the 
states Washington is most worried about, has suggested ominously it would 
rethink previous non-proliferation pledges if the United States goes ahead 
with the NMD. 

China is even more vehemently opposed to a TMD system. Beijing fears it would 
cover Taiwan, which China regards as a rebel province and has threatened to 
invade if the island declares independence or drags its feet on reunification 
talks. 

The statement made plain Russian support for that opposition. 

``The incorporation of Taiwan into any foreign missile defence system is 
unacceptable and will seriously undermine regional stability,'' it said. 

Putin's second meeting with Jiang this month followed a visit to China last 
week by U.S. Defence Secretary William Cohen. 

Cohen's trip was aimed at putting back on track military ties frozen after 
NATO's bombing of the Beijing embassy in Belgrade last year. 

He also tried to assure the Communist leadership the TMD plan was not aimed 
at China. But Beijing had said in advance nothing Cohen could say would ease 
the vehemence of its opposition to TMD. 

It says the U.S. belief that North Korea could build a missile capable of 
hitting the United States by 2005 exaggerates the threat from Pyongyang. 

Washington urged Putin, who flies on Wednesday to North Korea on the first 
visit by any Russian or Soviet leader to the Stalinist state, to press 
Pyongyang about its missile programme. 

NEW KIND OF RELATIONSHIP 

Despite the statement's focus on the United States, Jiang said the evolving 
Beijing-Moscow axis was ``a new type of cooperative relationship which is not 
an alliance, not confrontational and not aimed at any third country.'' 

Jiang, a Soviet-trained engineer, called it an ``important success'' and said 
China and Russia would ``completely cooperate in the areas of politics, 
economics, science and technology, military affairs and international 
affairs.'' 

The cosiness of ties between Jiang and Putin was underscored by closed-door 
talks which ran nearly double the allotted one hour and opened with banter in 
Russian. 

Beijing and Moscow have found further common ground in opposition to 
international intervention in domestic conflicts on humanitarian grounds, for 
example over Kosovo last year. 

Both countries are targets of Western criticism over their human rights 
records, especially in Chechnya and Tibet. They say their domestic policies 
are their own affairs. 

China is a key customer for Russian oil, natural gas and arms while Russia 
wants better access to China's huge market. 

Xinhua news agency reported on Monday that two-way trade between the two 
giant neighbours rose 31.56 percent year-on-year to $3.56 billion in the 
first half of this year. 

Bilateral trade is on pace to eclipse last year's $5 billion, but it is far 
below recent pledges to hit $20 billion by 2000. 

After visiting North Korea, Putin heads for the southern Japanese island of 
Okinawa on Friday evening for the annual gathering of the Group of Eight 
nations, which also includes the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, 
France, Italy and Canada. 

*******

#2
The Guardian (UK)
18 July 2000
[for personal use only]
Russia and China open new chapter 
John Gittings, East Asia editor 

President Vladimir Putin arrives in Beijing today for a visit which will set 
a new course for Sino-Russian relations after 50 years of sharp twists and 
turns. 
"The visit will be a complete success," China's foreign minister, Tang 
Jaixuan, declared at the weekend after talks with his Russian counterpart, 
Igor Ivanov. Mr Ivanov said that it would "determine the strategic 
development of bilateral relations in the 21st century". 

The mood of unqualified optimism reflects a significant warming of relations 
between Moscow and Beijing, spurred by a common concern about US foreign 
policy and a revived Russian interest in Asia. 

The Sino-Soviet dispute in the 1960s which ended the two countries' cold war 
alliance is officially regarded as ancient history. 

"Mr Putin and President Jiang Zemin are in agreement on a lot of issues," a 
senior Chinese diplomat, Cui Tiankai, said. "They will reaffirm the strategic 
relationship and discuss US plans for a national missile defence system 
(NMD), security in Asia and extension of Nato." 

The two leaders are expected to sign joint statements condemning NMD and 
pledging themselves to strengthen bilateral relations in the future. 

Asia plays a significant role in the new Russian foreign policy doctrine 
announced by Mr Ivanov last week. His statement shared China's opposition to 
a "unipolar world" dominated by the US and said that Russia would seek to 
establish a multi-polar system. 

Closer relations with China are also seen as essential to reverse the erosion 
of Russian power in its Asian territories. 

Russia and China have common security interests in central Asia, both being 
anxious to promote stability in the former Soviet republics there, and deter 
terrorism. 

Relations between China and the former Soviet Union have followed a 
helter-skelter path since the Chinese communist victory of 1949. 

In the early 1950s Mao Zedong urged his people to "learn from the Soviet 
Union" - although in private he suspected Stalin of seeking to isolate China. 

Improved relations between the US and the Soviet Union led to the Sino-Soviet 
split in the 1960s. To fierce ideological polemics, the two countries almost 
went to war along their 2,500-mile border. 

The US seized the opportunity to reopen the door to China in the 1970s and 
1980s, in a strategic partnership directed against Moscow. It has taken time 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union for Russia and China to overcome the 
residual suspicion. 

"Our relations with Russia are always important for China," said Mr Cui, 
"whether in a good sense or a bad sense. But in the early 1990s, when the 
Soviet Union was dismantled, the Russians were at a loss in what direction 
they were going." 

A series of summits between the then Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, and Mr 
Jiang was based on a new policy of "strategic partnership" agreed in 1996. 
But the vital stimulus only came last year when the countries found common 
ground in opposing the US-led Nato bombing of Yugoslavia. 

Their mutual trade, running at an annual two-way total of $6bn, lags far 
behind the goal of $20bn set by Mr Jiang and Mr Yeltsin. 

Russia provides China with a supply of relatively cheap military hardware. 
The summit may finalise agreement on some pending contracts, including the 
building of two new destroyers for the Chinese navy. 

Although diplomats on both sides insist that their new stable relationship 
will last well into this century, some analysts believe the legacy of history 
is not so easily overcome. 

In a report last year for the Carnegie Endowment, the Russian expert Dmitri 
Trenin described Sino-Russian relations as looking "sterile and shallow". 
Subconscious fears, he argued, still lingered in Russia about the "yellow 
peril" loudly proclaimed by earlier Soviet propaganda. 

Chinese memories of high-handed Soviet behaviour are perpetuated in widely 
sold books and magazines. Beijing's fear of Russian expansionism was finally 
dispelled only by the obvious decline of Moscow's military strength and 
economic power in the 90s. 

*******

#3
The Times (UK)
18 July 2000
Editorial
PUTIN'S G8 DEBUT
Showmanship on the road to Okinawa 

Vladimir Putin heads for his first G8 summit in Okinawa declaring that Russia 
joins the party "on an equal footing", neither expecting nor asking for "any 
sort of favour". But the Russian President is nothing if not realistic. He 
knows perfectly well how important it is to Russia to secure the support of 
the major industrialised nations, including hitherto reluctant Japan, for 
generous rescheduling of Russia's outstanding $42 billion debt. And, despite 
a recent series of high-profile police raids, he will be on the back foot 
when another G8 topic, money-laundering, is discussed; Russia's own estimate 
is that as many as 4,500 criminals are active in some 500 Russian syndicates. 
Relations with France are so glacial that President Chirac has declined an 
Okinawa tête à tête, a galling rebuff for a man whose appeal to Russians 
consists not least in his promise that Russia under his leadership will walk 
tall again. 
His visits to China and North Korea en route should be understood in this 
political context; it is important to Mr Putin to have goods of his own to 
put in the Okinawa shop window. Few things are better guaranteed to secure 
attention in the US to Russia as a global player than some skilful juggling 
of the "China card"; and few topics are more calculated to win the ear of 
Europeans (and thaw the heart of France) than a loud reaffirmation of 
Russo-Chinese objections to Washington's controversial plans to build a 
limited national missile defence system (NMD) to protect the US against 
attack from "rogue states". 

China, for two reasons, will be only too delighted to co-operate. Beijing, 
because it has only around 25 ICBMs, is far more vehemently opposed to NMD 
than Russia may in reality turn out to be; and Russia's readiness to sell it 
advanced military equipment is critical to China's efforts to upgrade its 
armed forces. Early this month, Moscow ensured red carpet treatment for Mr 
Putin by announcing the sale to China of two more destroyers armed with 
supersonic anti-ship missiles, powerful means of intimidating Taiwan. There 
will be much talk in Beijing about building on the "strategic partnership" 
established by Boris Yeltsin in 1996; and China is already waving the draft 
of a joint statement declaring Washington's plans to amend the 1972 US-Soviet 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to be a source of "regional and 
international instability". 

This is hardly novel, however; there was a similar statement last December 
during Mr Yeltsin's final visit to Beijing. And Mr Putin should consider hard 
how much state-of-the-art missile technology he sends Beijing's way; given 
China's record of selling missile technology to Iran, among other unsavoury 
customers, such deals will reinforce the Republicans' case for a much more 
ambitious missile defence system. 

By raising the profile of this issue pre-Okinawa, he may hope to bring 
European misgivings about NMD out into the open. He hopes also to extract 
from North Korea a declaration that it has no plans further to develop the 
long-range ballistic missile it tested in 1998, which on Pentagon estimates 
could reach parts of the US by 2005. NMD is specifically, although not 
exclusively, aimed at countering that risk. In the wake of the embarrassing 
failure of the Pentagon's latest missile defence flight test, any perceived 
downgrading of the threat could reinforce the pressures on President Clinton 
to leave his successor to decide on the future of NMD. 

But Mr Putin is playing this game from many angles, as the White House is 
well aware. He briefed Mr Clinton on his trip before leaving Moscow, he has 
suggested working with Nato in a theatre missile defence system, and Russian 
commanders have said publicly that Russia could be vulnerable to missile 
attack from five to eight nations. Given time, the lineaments of a potential 
security bargain are discernible. But Mr Putin needs for domestic purposes to 
be seen to be negotiating from strength. Mr Clinton knows that Russia could 
yet be brought onside. As Mr Putin plays to the Okinawa gallery, that is the 
objective the US should keep in view. 

*******

#4
From: "Alan Cohen" <alanlcohen@hotmail.com>
Subject: NGOs
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2000 

David --

I work for a large social service agency that will be providing direct
funding to social service agencies (NGOs) in the different successor states.
I am looking for research both about the condition of various populations
including elderly, children and families, the disabled, the poor, and people
with AIDS and about they availability of social services. Do you or any of
the other readers have suggestions or referrals where I can find the most
updated information? Also, could you suggest where I can get a list of
NGO's working in these areas throughout the FSU?

*******

#5
From: "Wallace Kaufman" <wkaufman@arcticmail.com>
Subject: Mushrooms and Russian Attitudes Toward Risk
Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2000 

The Russian passion for wild mushrooms and the recent mushroom poisonings
suggest that Russians view risk differently than many westerners. It also
illustrates one legacy of the Soviet era--a reliance on self-taught talents.
First, a small mycological correction to Robyn Dixon's article.

No mushroom hunter with even a few seasons' experience could consider the
blednaya poganka (Amanita phalloides) similar to any of the Russulas
(Siroezhki). The death cap grows from an obvious white cup, has a ring on
its stem, and an egg shaped young cap. The Russulas have no cup, no ring,
and the caps are usually flat to depressed in the center. They even feel
different enough that a blind man could often distinguish between them (the
amanita cap usually very smooth and even a bit sticky while the russula is
dry to velvety. I've picked mushrooms from Moscow to Kazakhstan to Magadan
to Cape Schmidt and I've never seen a Russian make this mistake.

So, how did they come to eat the Death Cap amanita (or any of the other
highly poisonous members of that family)? Several possibilities come to
mind:

1. Some of the pickers was inexperienced
2. Someone was nearly blind (Dixon says some were old and had poor
eyesight) or picking over-mature or rain sodden mushrooms in which some of
the distinctions had withered
3. One or more of the pickers was blind drunk and made careless by the
alcohol that frequently accompanies forest outings
4. Suicide or murder

More interesting is how Russians handle the risk factor. First, they rely
almost entirely on folk knowledge. While Russian bookstores have always
offered cheap and well illustrated books on mushrooms, most showing both the
Amanitas and the Russulas, I know few Russians who use the books. They rely
on each other.

Second, they seldom double check. I remember picking two buckets of
mushrooms with four Russian friends in Kazakhstan (mushrooms are not a
Kazakh tradition) and watching them dump the entire load into a bucket of
water for a quick wash, then into a soup without rechecking the
identifications even though we had at least eight or ten different species.
When I asked how they knew all of them were good (including the ones I
gathered), they laughed and said but of course no one had picked any
poisonous mushrooms.

That is a level or risk and trust I would not rely on with even my most
experienced friends in America. This kind of risk taking is common in
everyday Russian life from personal habits like drinking, eating and smoking
to medicine, flying, and the installation of home heating systems and sewer
connections.

One of the most ignored and under-studied cultural differences between
Russians and people in other cultures is the attitude toward risk.
Statistician Ilya Lipkovich (VPI, Blacksburg, VA), an astute observer for
whom Russian and American culture are as distinct as Amanita and Russula,
agrees that a good study of Russian attitudes toward risk might be very
valuable for many foreigners working with Russians--insurance people,
exporters, public health workers, and treaty negotiators.

*******

#6
Russia's poison mushroom death toll rises to 95

MOSCOW, July 17 (Reuters) - Poison mushrooms have killed 95 people and 
hospitalised hundreds of others in Russia so far this summer, local news 
agencies said on Monday. 

Russia's RIA news agency reported that 32 people had died after eating the 
deadly fungus over the past weekend alone, 24 in the region of the central 
city of Voronezh and eight in Volgograd. 

Gathering wild mushrooms in the woods is a favourite Russian pastime during 
the summer season despite a yearly death toll from toadstools, mistaken for 
their more edible relatives. 

Russian Surgeon General Gennady Onishchenko told Ekho Moskvy radio on Monday 
some of the poisonings were due to the fact that a local variety of the death 
cap -- the world's deadliest mushroom -- had mutated to look like ordinary 
champignons. 

Many of the victims were also elderly people with failing eyesight. 

Radio and television stations in some regions were cautioning people against 
collecting any sort of mushrooms, saying even normally edible types could 
make people ill due to pollution. 

In Voronezh where the death count was the highest, traders were forbidden to 
sell mushrooms in markets and police with loudspeakers were posted at the 
edge of forests repeating a warning: ``Pick no mushrooms, they are 
poisonous.'' 

``But how long can you beg, plead and order these grown people?'' Onishchenko 
asked. 

*******

#7
Izvestia
July 17, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
EXPERT DEPARTMENT BEING SET UP IN THE KREMLIN
Byvetlana BABAYEVA

Last week-end the Kremlin announced about new appointments 
and resignations in its staff. The President finally signed the 
resignation of deputy head of the presidential administration 
Igor Shabdurasulov. 
Simultaneously, two new appointments were made in the 
administration. Vladimir Putin appointed Simon Kordonsky as 
head of the presidential expert department, while Maxim Meyer 
became head of the analytical department. The new employees of 
the Kremlin are closely linked with the Effective Policy 
Foundation led by Gleb Pavlovsky and worked actively at the 
parliamentary and then presidential elections. They constantly 
prepare various analytical materials for the Kremlin 
structures. However, professionally, they began to work 
together in the early 1990s in the magazine titled: "The 20th 
Century and the World." This semi-dissident magazine financed 
by western foundations was considered one of the best and one 
of the most advanced magazines on the mass media market of the 
time of reform. 
Apparently, at some moment, the Kremlin began to 
experience an acute shortage of high-quality analysis and 
forecasting. The change of state approaches requires a new 
comprehension and forecasts while the appointees have given 
accurate forecasts many times in the past few years. It is not 
yet known how effectively they will work in the state structure 
and to what extent the state would want to listen to their 
opinion. So far, it is possible to say that the appointees are 
not "court artists" and they perform orders from politicians 
only to the extent they determine themselves.
On the other hand, the views of Kordonsky quite coincide with 
the current Kremlin's aspirations. 

******

#8
Stratfor.com
Superpower vs. Great Power: Inside the Russian Defense Debate
17 July 2000

Summary

A critical debate inside the Russian defense establishment has burst into
public view. Moscow’s military and civilian leaders are weighing continued
dependence on nuclear weapons versus a new conventional focus. Russia is at
a crossroads, forced to choose between a global role and a regional one. At
stake are the future of Russian national security and the fledgling
presidency of Vladimir Putin.

Analysis

Last week, a critical debate that had raged inside the Russian defense
establishment broke into public view. Russian Chief of Staff Anatoly
Kvashnin recommended that Russia’s strategic nuclear force – long a
separate branch of the military – be absorbed into one of the other
branches of the armed forces. He also proposed that spending on nuclear
forces be instead directed toward conventional forces.

On Friday, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev publicly blasted Kvashnin’s
arguments, calling them a “crime against Russia and just plain madness.”
President Vladimir Putin was forced to intervene. Interestingly, he did not
intervene on either side; instead, he demanded that the public battling
cease. But clearly, the private battle will continue.

In a sense, the mere fact that the subject is being debated represents a
major victory for the Russian president. Post-Soviet Russia has not had a
coherent national security policy. Former President Boris Yeltsin neglected
national security on the premise that building the Russian economy, with
the bricks and mortar of Western investment, took priority. It followed
that political and military confrontation with the West was essential. Both
deliberation and investment in national security were deemed
counter-productive and anachronistic.

Yet, Russia under Yeltsin grew not only poor but also powerless. In Kosovo
and elsewhere, the West has treated Russian national security with an
indifference bordering on contempt. The explosive debate in Moscow
indicates that the new Russian president is succeeding in reviving the
notion that Russia requires a national security policy.

The outcome of this debate will define not just policy, but how Russia
views its place in the world. Nuclear weapons constitute less an instrument
of war than a measure of Russia’s self-image. The debate over them and the
way that Moscow constitutes its forces in the coming years will reflect
whether Russia intends only to be a great power or whether it aspires,
again, to the status of superpower.

The definition of each is more complex than it seems at first blush. The
Soviet Union saw itself as a superpower. But unlike the American definition
– projecting power globally – the Soviet Union relied instead on covert
operations in support of wars of national liberation to influence events.

Another definition of superpower lies in the ability to strike globally.
Although the Soviets had nuclear weapons during the 1950s, they did not
have an intercontinental delivery system until the mid-1960s. Nor did they
have facilities close enough to the United States for basing intermediate
range ballistic missiles and bombers. The United States, however, could
strike both from the continental United States and from bases surrounding
the Soviets. One half of the debate in Moscow carries at least faint echoes
of this bygone era.

Himself a career missile officer, Sergeyev certainly recalls the era of the
big bluff, during the 1950s and early 1960s, when the Soviets tried to
convince the world that they had the ability to annihilate the United
States when, in fact, they had nothing of the sort. Sergeyev participated
in the process where the Soviets first gained the ability to strike and
then achieved parity with the United States. For Sergeyev, this was and
remains the definition of a superpower. Giving up ground so painstakingly
won is unthinkable.

Sergeyev has a case. Washington must calculate the potential threat posed
by those weapons. As important, the mere threat of use can be a wedge
between the United States and its allies. So long as it enjoys formal
nuclear parity Russia can at least lay claim to being a superpower. Without
these forces, Russia is just another vast, Third World country.

Kvashnin, on the other hand, is confronting Russia’s immediate geopolitical
requirements. These consist of four elements: 

1. The territorial integrity of the Russian Federation must remain under
the control of Moscow. This means preventing secessionist tendencies in
places like Chechnya. Russia must also be in a position to defend its
frontiers and territorial waters.
2. Moscow must insist on the neutrality of the rest of the former Soviet
Union. Russia cannot afford to have NATO extend its membership to the
Baltics or Ukraine. Nor can Central Asia fall under Western or Chinese
influence.
3. Russia must have military forces sufficient to influence the calculation
of NATO, as well as the strategies of the former Soviet republics. Beyond a
buffer zone, Russia must work to create a sphere of influence throughout
the former Soviet Union and as far away as Eastern Europe. Forces must be
available both to threaten operations and to execute them
4. Russia must create a force capable of the first two missions within the
constraints of the Russian economy. This is actually a more complex issue
than it appears, since defense spending can dramatically stimulate economic
growth as well as drain resources. Nevertheless, in the immediate future,
there are limits to what Russia can do.

Ultimately, Kvashnin is arguing for a great power strategy rather than a
superpower strategy. Instead of projecting power globally, he seeks the
ability to project power regionally. A great power can defend itself from
all neighbors and project power along its frontiers and even, to some
extent beyond. Germany and China are both examples of great powers.

Kvashnin’s faction is also arguing that nuclear weapons are, in general,
irrelevant to the actual correlation of forces. The ability to launch a
first strike against the United States is devoid of meaning, since there is
no political circumstance under which such a strike would be meaningful.
Deterring Washington from a first strike is similarly meaningless. In
addition, deterrence does not require massive capability. A much smaller
force, on the scale of France’s or Israel’s, is sufficient.

But Kvashnin’s argument is really rooted in economics. If he is smart as
this debate unfolds, he can make the economic argument in two ways. The
first is to argue that Russia cannot afford everything; decision makers
must choose the essential strategy, influencing regional events.

The second approach is to point out the antiquated nature of nuclear
forces: These are technologies that matured more than a generation ago.
Sustaining them doesn’t help Russia’s contemporary economy. But spending
money on a modern conventional force would involve developing new
technologies in areas like communications, computing and logistics, all of
which would have a major stimulating effect on the Russian economy. Both
the American and Israeli economies, for example, have been stirred by
defense technologies.

In this debate, Kvashnin holds all the cards, and Putin’s sympathies
probably lie with him. Kvashnin is essentially making the same argument
that Yuri Andropov and Marshall Ogarkov made in the 1980s; Putin is their
intellectual and political heir. The president also shut down the debate
after Sergeyev went public – not when Kvashin did. The president is setting
the stage for a great power strategy.

Cutting back on the cost of pretending to be a superpower makes sense, but
Sergeyev has the upper hand both psychologically and emotionally. For older
Russians nuclear parity represented an essential achievement. Whatever else
is said about the Soviet Union, it instilled Russians with great pride,
particularly in their missiles and rockets. That pride is the emotional
link between Russia and its superpower pretenses.

Abandonment means breaking the last link with greatness – and opening a
dangerous window into the future. Russia, after all, is still an economic
cripple. Putin would be open to the charge of having finally turned Russia
into a Third World nation.

In office only a few months, Putin will find himself in a tough spot in
this debate. He needs to move on to a regional great power strategy. But he
does so only by placing himself at risk. Indeed, one of the themes of the
public debate can be found in Sergeyev accusing Kvashnin of serving U.S.
interests. Endorsing Kvashnin means that Putin will severely weaken his
power base among nationalists. This is a loss the Russian president cannot
afford.

So far, Putin has done the one thing he could: He told everyone to shut up.
This is only a political holding action, though. The Russian leader can
contain the debate behind closed doors, but he can’t end it there. If Putin
does nothing, Sergeyev wins by default. If the president acts in favor of
Kvashnin, the power base will crumble.

As a result, Putin is likely to try to have it both ways: contain the
debate and then try to quietly edge toward Kvashnin’s solution. The
president, as a result, will run the risk of temporarily trying to pursue
both strategies in an economy that can’t really quite afford one. If that
happens, the only solution will be to cut investment in the civilian
sector, focus on defense and hope for spin-offs. It will also mean the
heavy nationalization of the economy as defense expenditures soar. This is
an opportunity for half-measures where clear-cut decisions will be required. 

But this is one of the key issues that will define both Putin’s presidency
and Russia’s future. Watching him solve this problem – or not solve it, as
the case may be – will tell us a great deal.

******

#9
Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2000 
From: "Michael J. Carley" <mjcarley@uakron.edu>
Subject: Re: 4401-Hoagland/Chechnya 

When I read western coverage of Russia I expect to see shallow, 
self-interested, manipulative "analysis", but the piece by Jim Hoagland in 
the _Washington Post_ is a caricature of the genre. Was not Hoagland a 
contestant in Matt Taibbi's recent competition for the worst western 
coverage of Russia? One can see why.

Hoagland writes that "Russia's reconquest of Chechnya is being capsized 
by guerrilla attacks that now claim several hundred Russian soldiers 
killed or wounded a week". I find these statements to be without 
credibility, far more suitable for the propaganda of the Chechen web 
site. The war has not been "capsized", not yet anyway, and will 
not be if President Putin sticks to his strategy and sustains the will 
of his people to crush the lawlessness in Chechnya. And several hundred 
killed and wounded a week sounds like something beyond the wildest dreams 
of Chechen propagandists. I have seen no evidence to support such a claim.

Chechen forces which sought at first to fight a positional war of sorts 
have been driven out of all but the southern mountains. Small units 
disguised as civilians are operating in Russian occupied areas, and now we 
have had sensational Kamikaze attacks on Russian military barracks. It 
recalls the "terrorist" attack on U.S. forces in Beirut. When the Japanese 
tried these tactics during the second world war, they were rightly 
described as a desperate last gasp attempt to stave off defeat. But in 
Chechnya suicide attacks have "capsized" victory. I do not think this is 
so, for the only possibility of Chechen victory is a collapse of Russian 
will. The Russian army is slowly grinding down the Chechen guerrillas, 
capturing or killing their leaders. Their hiding places are being 
discovered and destroyed. The southern mountains, according to Russian 
military spokesmen, are under constant bombardment.

Like many other western commentators Hoagland enjoys referring to Russian 
"humiliation", defeat, withdrawal, and so on in 1996. And how many 
times have we seen references in the west to the rusting hulks of so many 
Russian tanks in Chechnya, the constant reminder of what lies in wait for 
Russia now? A new humiliation, a new defeat "is suddenly 
a plausible outcome", says Hoagland. Based on what evidence? Or is it 
the usual wishful thinking, that irrepressible western craving for a weak, 
crippled, compliant Russia?

Hoagland refers to the "worsening" Chechen conflict. Is it worsening, or 
are the Kamikaze attacks the inevitable setbacks which occur in any 
military conflict? How did the United States react to the Japanese 
Kamikazes? They hardened American determination, as they may do in 
Russia. The very public funerals of Russian war dead are more than the 
honouring of sacrifice and the grieving of families, they are a call to 
public determination to root out the lawless, murderous, kidnapping 
guerrillas and religious fanatics who operated freely after the Russian 
defeat in 1996.

Since few Russians will read Hoagland, he cannot create any panic or any 
decline in morale in Russia. So his purpose must be to alarm western 
leaders into more decisive pressure on the Russian government to negotiate 
with the Chechen felons. Putin wants more western investment, Hoagland 
says, he must be made to pay a price for it in Chechnya. But Putin is no 
corrupt, treasonous, drunken Eltsin. Putin appears to be made of tougher 
stuff, as the oligarchs and others of their ilk have begun to notice. They 
too want a weak Russia where they can continue freely their 
predations. Putin may not be a western "democrat" or a nice guy, but he 
might be the kind of leader Russia needs to protect its cohesion and 
independence and to reassert its power. S volkami zhit'--po-volch'i 
vyt'. In other words, when you live amongst wolves, you had better be 
able to speak their language.

Michael J. Carley
University of Akron

******

#10
Russia: Peace Making Or Oil Interests?
By Michael Lelyveld

Russia's new representative for Caspian affairs, Viktor Kaluzhny, has 
proposed a settlement of the border dispute between Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan. But it is unclear whether Moscow now plans to be a peacemaker 
in the Caspian or whether it is only advancing its oil interests. RFE/RL 
correspondent Michael Lelyveld reports: 

Boston, 17 July 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Russia's top official on Caspian Sea issues 
has urged Azerbaijan to end its border feud with Turkmenistan by allowing 
joint development of a disputed oilfield. 

Speaking Friday in Baku, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Kaluzhny 
proposed a settlement of the long standoff over the Kyapaz oilfield based on 
a principle that resources which straddle a Caspian border should be shared. 

Kaluzhny aired the proposal after meeting with Natig Aliev, the president of 
Azerbaijan's state oil company SOCAR. He plans to pursue it with Azerbaijan 
President Heidar Aliev and will also advance it in meetings with Turkmenistan 
officials in Ashgabat in the coming week, ANS News said. 

Russia is taking the same position on sharing several border oilfields with 
Kazakhstan in the northern Caspian, according to Kaluzhny. The responses from 
Kazakhstan to the proposed settlement have reportedly been positive. 

If Kaluzhny succeeds in establishing the principle for bilateral borders, it 
could help to solve the long-standing problem over a legal division of the 
Caspian Sea. The issue has clouded development since 1994, when Russia first 
raised objections to Azerbaijan's "deal of the century" offshore project, 
arguing that no pact existed among the Caspian's five littoral states. 

Since then, Russia has largely ignored its own objections by negotiating 
bilateral oil agreements with Kazakhstan. Many other offshore contracts have 
also gone forward, despite the legal argument over division. But the dispute 
over the Kyapaz field, which Turkmenistan calls Serdar, has had more 
immediate and damaging effects. 

The competing claims have largely ruined relations between Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan, making cooperation on any issue difficult. 

The row erupted in 1997 after the Russian oil company Rosneft signed a 1,000 
million dollar deal with Azerbaijan to develop the field in the center of the 
Caspian. Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Niyazov objected to Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin, laying claim to the deposit's estimated 50 million 
tons of oil reserves. The Russian Foreign Ministry quickly apologized and 
cancelled the agreement with Azerbaijan. 

For good measure, Turkmenistan also claimed the oil fields that were being 
developed as part of the "deal of the century," although they were closer to 
Azerbaijan's shore. At first, Baku tried to settle the matter by offering 
Ashgabat a share of its big 8,000 million dollar venture. But Niyazov 
refused, and relations have been sour ever since. 

Brief improvements have followed agreements to cooperate on a trans-Caspian 
gas pipeline. Both sides have stated publicly that the border dispute would 
not keep the pipeline from going ahead. But the agreements have had little 
lasting effect. 

Last January, Azerbaijan claimed half the capacity of the trans-Caspian line 
to export its own gas to Turkey. The demand made the economics of the line 
less attractive to Turkmenistan. Some analysts saw the move as retaliation 
for claims to Kyapaz-Serdar. 

Kaluzhny's solution offers promise, but there are at least three reasons to 
question whether it will succeed. Niyazov has previously rejected joint 
development, which was offered by Azerbaijan two years ago. Russia's interest 
in proposing the principle of sharing is also curious in this case, unless it 
is also seeking a share in the oilfield or reinstatement of contracts with 
Russian companies. 

In the case of sharing fields in the northern Caspian, Kazakhstan may have no 
choice but to accede to Russian demands. Nearly all of Kazakhstan's oil is 
transported through Russia. It must also defend against further claims to its 
rich Caspian offshore shelf. Any agreement with Kazakhstan may have far less 
to do with the sharing principle than with Russia's power. 

Lastly, it is unclear whether Kaluzhny speaks for the Russian government at 
the highest level. Kaluzhny, who failed to win reappointment as Russia's 
energy minister, has been given a new but less powerful post in Caspian 
affairs. So far, there seems to be no assurance that the sharing principle 
represents a policy that would be applied to an overall settlement of the 
Caspian division issue. It is also unknown whether the idea has been raised 
with Iran, which has sought an equal share in Caspian oil. 

Kaluzhny's proposal may be the start of a serious effort to solve the Caspian 
legal problems that Russia has helped to create, or it may simply be a ploy. 
In coming weeks, it may become easier to tell. 

******

#11
gazeta.ru
July 17, 2000
Audit Chamber Attack Saves Chubais

The Russian parliament’s budgetary watchdog, the Audit Chamber intends to
take legal action against RAO UES Chief Anatoly Chubais. The auditors
allege that in the course of the so-called voucher privatization, more than
15 percent of company’s shares were illegally sold to foreign investors. 

Things could not have turned out better for Mr. Chubais. Not so long ago
the company’s shareholders were accusing him of neglecting their rights and
deceiving them, and now he is acting as their advocate and staunch defender. 

On Friday the Audit Chamber issued a statement that the company was
illegally privatized. The matter concerns the foreign shareholders. The
auditors assert that the foreigners’ share of RAO’s equity exceeds the
legally imposed limit. The foreigners’ stake in RAO amounts to 33%, whereas
the law permits foreigners to hold a maximum of 25%. The chamber
representatives assert they will take the matter to court. 

This issue has been raised too many times. In 1998 the State Duma passed
the bill stipulating that the number of non-resident (foreign) shareholders
in RAO UES must not exceed 25%. When the bill was passed foreigners already
held a 33% stake in RAO. 

The situation was so absurd that even the then PM Yevgeny Primakov, who had
a relatively good working relationship with the Communist majority in the
previous calling of the State Duma (1995-1999), left the house in protest. 

In fact, everyone seemed happy as things were, for there were only two ways
to limit the foreign stake: either to take the shares away from them by
force, or buy them back at the market price. The first way was
unacceptable for the authorities: they simply did not have the nerve and
they did not have enough money to buy the shares back. 

But on Thursday the Audit Chamber resolved to place the issue under the
spot light once again. The Chamber’s auditor Veniamin Sokolov had prepared
the privatization study. Chubais was fast to accuse the Chamber’s auditor
Veniamin Sokolov of being politically biased and demanded the
Constitutional Court to abolish the bill that discriminates against
foreigners’ rights. Chubais said, the legal grounds for the case was
absolutely laughable, and “if juridical logic prevails,” all charges would
be dismissed “in two minutes.” 

The Chamber convened to review the audit report prepared by Sokolov. Prior
to the sitting, Chubais told reporters the case was an attempted “communist
revenge” and said he hopes that after the Audit Chamber calmly studies all
the documents provided by auditor Sokolov, and that they will come to a
reasonable solution. 

On the other hand the Audit Chamber’s attack upon the RAO UES management
happens to have come at exactly the right time for Chubais. Moreover, that
attack poses no real threat to the company. 

Chubais knows well how to fight off attacks by the opponents of
privatization. It has proved far more difficult for Chubais to reach
agreement with UES’ foreign shareholders who ardently oppose Chubais’ plans
for restructuring the company. A few weeks ago the RAO foreigners accused
Chubais of neglecting their interests and even pressed for his resignation. 

Chubais had to compromise. On Thursday he presented his revised plan for
RAO UES reforms to the shareholders. It was elaborated, “taking into
consideration the shareholders’ wishes.” Thus, Chubais can only benefit
from this latest conflict, which will undoubtedly boost his chances of
winning back the favour of the ROA UES shareholders and having his
restructuring plans approved. 

On Friday Chubais declared: “We will act even more aggressively than
before. We will use all legal means to defend our shareholders’ rights.” It
took him only two days to seize the initiative from Boris Fyodorov, and has
become the shareholders’ advocate overnight. 

Ivan Chelnok 

******

#12
Pro-Moscow Chechens row over who's in charge
By Michael Steen

MOSCOW, July 18 (Reuters) - Two Moscow-appointed Chechen civilian 
administrators, hailed as a ``dream team'' by Russia's top commander in the 
rebel province, got off to a bad start on Tuesday by rowing over who was the 
boss. 

Ten months into the war in Chechnya, Moscow is still battling separatists in 
the region's southern mountains but has appointed ethnic Chechens to govern 
Russian-held areas as part of what it calls a political process to end 
hostilities. 

Russian news agencies reported from the region that Bislan Gantamirov, 
convicted of embezzlement but appointed last week as deputy administrator, 
had ordered 2,000 men from a militia he controls to search the eastern town 
of Gudermes for ``bandits.'' 

Gudermes is the seat of the top administrator, Akhmad Kadyrov, former 
spiritual leader of the largely Moslem region, who quickly responded by 
telling Interfax news agency no ``mopping up'' operations would take place in 
the town. 

``Gantamirov did not agree this announcement with me and received no approval 
to carry out such an operation,'' Kadyrov was quoted as saying. 

The Russian military and the Kremlin said Gantamirov had no authority to 
order the operation, in which soldiers go from house to house to root out 
separatist guerrillas. 

Following talks between the two, Interfax quoted Gantamirov as saying he did 
not agree with a series of dismissals in the local administration ordered by 
Kadyrov. 

'WE WON'T BE BOSSED AROUND' SAYS GANTAMIROV 

``We are people who fought our way from the border of (neighbouring region) 
Ingushetia to Grozny, and we won't be bossed around by Kadyrov and his 
gang,'' he said. ``We have the forces and means (to ensure) this.'' 

During the 1994-96 Chechen war in which Moscow was defeated, Gantamirov was 
made mayor of the regional capital Grozny, but was later imprisoned for 
stealing reconstruction funds. 

He was let out of jail at the start of the current war and put in charge of a 
Chechen militia supporting Russian troops advancing into Chechnya. 

The row between Gantamirov and Kadyrov could embarrass Moscow. Gennady 
Troshev, the top Russian general in Chechnya, hailed Gantamirov's appointment 
last week as the creation of a ``dream team'' for the province's civilian 
administration. 

At the time of his appointment, Russia said he would be in charge of Chechen 
security forces, but did not specify what this meant. 

Elsewhere in Chechnya, rebel and Russian sources reported overnight gunfights 
at checkpoints. Russia's military said its fighter jets had flown nine combat 
missions against rebel targets. 

A Reuters Television reporter went to the southern village of Agishty on 
Sunday, soon after Russian troops bombarded it with shells killing six 
civilians and injuring around 20. 

Shocked residents mourned for lost relatives among the rubble of 
shrapnel-damaged houses. 

``Who will deal with this? Who will be punished for this?'' said Khasan 
Umalatov, sitting next to the corpses of his two cousins. ``By doing this 
they make us take up arms and go and kill them the same way.'' 

*******

#13
Moscow Times
July 18, 2000 
LETTER FROM VLADIVOSTOK: A Maverick of the Far East 
By Russell Working

PETROPAVLOVSK-KAMCHATSKY, Far East -- Vladimir Yefimov is a bear of a man 
with a grizzled beard, a ponytail, a bald spot the size of a sand dollar and 
sunglasses that he wears even when paddling about in a swimming pool fed by 
hot mineral water. He is a television executive whose cell phone chirps 
constantly, and he is best friends with everyone in Kamchatka f except for 
those who hate his guts. 

Yefimov, the director of Kamchatka Television, has succeeded in defying 
regional authorities who apparently tried to snuff out his broadcasts. He is 
thus an unusual figure in provincial Russia. If anything, the Kamchatka 
newsman has something in common with national media baron Vladimir Gusinsky, 
who enrages the Kremlin but wriggles free from its grasp through public 
pressure. 

Yefimov is a contradictory character. He presents himself as a champion of 
the free press, yet cheerfully recounts how he stirred up a hornet's nest by 
running in the State Duma elections against Governor Vladimir Biryukov's 
handpicked candidate. (Yefimov withdrew his candidacy a week before the vote; 
the governor's man placed fifth.) 

That he has taken on a political leader in another battle, however, makes him 
especially interesting to a visitor from Vladivostok, where the Primorye 
administration gobbles up its enemies for far lesser offenses than 
challenging the governor's cronies in an election. In Primorye, there are a 
few brave journalists who produce opposition papers and live with lawsuits 
and threats. There are scores of reporters who detest Governor Yevgeny 
Nazdratenko but accept money in exchange for smearing his foes. But there is 
no one quite like Yefimov. 

Yefimov has been making waves since 1996, when he showed up in Vladivostok 
for an Internet conference armed with a pistol. "I cannot go unarmed in your 
bandit city," he told the surprised organizers. 

Once, Yefimov was friendly with Kamchatka's governor, he said. "But I started 
telling viewers there were swindlers among the oblast [regional government] 
administration, and they stopped liking me," he said. "Of course, I also 
poured some oil on the fire by proposing my own candidacy." 

Last March, Yefimov said, the Kamchatka region administration decided it had 
had enough of Kamchatka Television. It was unhappy about the regional Duma 
race and the content of his broadcasts. Perhaps it didn't help that Yefimov 
is chums with Grigory Greshnykh, a businessman and regional deputy who claims 
the governor reneged on millions of dollars in debts to those who sold 
Kamchatka heating oil during the bitter winter of 1998-99. 

Yefimov says Biryukov first tried to get Moscow to cancel KTV's broadcast 
license, but that effort failed. So he pressured the State Property Committee 
into evicting KTV for failing to pay the rent at his state-owned studio f 
Yefimov argued that a 1995 federal law presented KTV and other media with 
their premises. 

Vadim Krainikov, spokesman for Biryukov, scoffed at suggestions that Yefimov 
was a victim. It was the federal government that evicted KTV, he notes. 
"'Strangling freedom of the press' f we laugh at this statement," Krainikov 
said. 

What he didn't say is that in the provinces, most federal offices, including 
the Federal Security Service, are loyal first to the regional governors and 
second to Moscow. If federal officials in Kamchatka operate independent of 
local pressure, the region has made an evolutionary leap beyond the rest of 
Russia. 

In any case, Yefimov fought back. He distributed leaflets and brought 
protesters into the streets. Newspapers and radio stations howled about the 
closure of KTV. This in itself is amazing to a resident of Primorye, where 
most local media simply shrugged when the Vladivostok mayor, a Nazdratenko 
appointee, closed the independent Radio Lemma just before last December's 
gubernatorial elections. What is more surprising, Yefimov faced down the 
bureaucrats and got his broadcast studio back. 

Yefimov is praised by some, disparaged by others. One Kamchatka journalist 
laughed that KTV inflated a rent dispute into a fight for the freedom of the 
press. Still, even if she is right, she is missing the point. KTV used public 
pressure to reverse a government decision f be it the governor's or a federal 
committee's. That suggests a strength unknown in many regions. On the day 
that a Vladivostok broadcaster uses leaflets and protests to check the local 
powers, we will know that freedom of the press is on its way in Primorye. 
Even if the guy carries a gun when he travels. 

*******