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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

June 2, 2000    
This Date's Issues:   43414342




Johnson's Russia List
#4342
2 June 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russia, U.S. clash in former Soviet empire.
2. Baltimore Sun: Edward Goldberg, U.S.-Russian ties: The silent embargo.
3. St. Petersburg Times: Charles Digges, Moscow Quiet on Gref's Past.
4. Trud: Svetlana Sukhaya, THE NOT SO YOUNG RUSSIA.
5. MSNBC: Putin on his presidential goals. Excerpts from 
Tom Brokaw’s exclusive interview.
6. Interfax: PUTIN INITIATIVE ON ABM COOPERATION WITH USA CONCERNS ONLY NONSTRATEGIC MISSILES.
7. The Guardian (UK): Jonathan Steele, EMPTY ENCOUNTERS: 
CLINTON'S VISIT TO PUTIN WILL ACHIEVE LITTLE. HE HAS FAILED 
WITH MOSCOW AND RUSSIA STILL HAS THE CHECHEN PROBLEM.
8. Itogi: Yuly Fryomin, The Useless Environmental Agency.
New federal authorities let us know that they will neither 
protect the environment, nor allow others to do it.
9. Washington Post: Sharon LaFraniere and Daniel Williams,
Chechnya's Bloodiest Massacre. On a Quiet Day in February, 
Russian Troops Killed at Least 45 Civilians.]


******


#1
Russia, U.S. clash in former Soviet empire
By Mike Collett-White

MOSCOW, June 2 (Reuters) - ``Look West'' the United States has urged former 
Soviet republics, dangling the carrots of political support, defence 
cooperation and trade growth to win allies among newly independent states. 


``Don't bother'' has been Russia's response, a message which has grown in 
conviction since the arrival of President Vladimir Putin at the helm. 


His more aggressive approach to the so-called ``near abroad'' has won him 
some early victories in the battle between old Cold War foes for influence 
over strategic and resource-rich states. 


But it is early days, and a string of high-level U.S. visits, involving 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the heads of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, show that Washington 
is still interested. 


After his visit to Moscow this week, U.S. President Bill Clinton travels to 
Russian neighbour Ukraine, which political analysts say sees itself as much a 
part of an expanding Europe as of the former Communist bloc. 


``There is a clear rivalry between the U.S. and Russia for influence over 
countries of the former Soviet Union,'' said Yevgeny Volk of the Heritage 
Foundation in Moscow. 


CENTRAL ASIA IN SHARP FOCUS 


Nowhere is this rivalry more apparent than in Central Asia, a vast swathe of 
steppe, desert and mountain bridging Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan and 
blessed with huge untapped reserves of oil, gas, gold and industrial metals. 


Washington made much of the early going after independence in 1991, promoting 
its firms' interests and urging governments to develop export routes for 
hydrocarbon riches which would avoid both Russia to the north and ``rogue 
state'' Iran to the south. 


Its success was partly explained by the vacuum in relations with Moscow under 
Boris Yeltsin, a weakness Putin has been quick to address. 


His first trip abroad after the May 7 inauguration was to Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan where he spoke of the security threat to the region and Russia 
posed by extremist Islamic movements said to be supported by the 
Afghanistan's ruling Taleban. 


That concern is shared by Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan which 
borders Afghanistan and has seen a strong Islamic revival amid its population 
of 24 million people. 


``Karimov was one of the most anti-Moscow leaders in the former Soviet Union, 
but that has changed very quickly,'' said Andrei Piontkovsky of the Centre 
for Strategic Studies. 


``It is not because he suddenly fell in love with the Russians or with Putin, 
but because he has a problem with Islamic fundamentalism.'' 


In Turkmenistan Putin turned to the other key pillar of his policy in Central 
Asia, signing a deal to transport rising volumes of Turkmen gas via Russia's 
existing pipeline system. 


The deal had the dual advantage of making Turkmenistan more reliant on Moscow 
at the same time as undermining a U.S.-backed project to build a $2.0 billion 
pipeline across the Caspian seabed, through Azerbaijan and Georgia and on to 
Turkey. 


SIMILAR THEMES DIVIDE SIDES IN CAUCASUS 


Security and energy are also major concerns both for Washington and Moscow in 
the volatile Caucasus, where the leaders of Azerbaijan and Georgia have put 
considerable distance between their small nations and their mighty northern 
neighbour. 


The United States backs a major new oil pipeline running from the Azeri 
capital of Baku to Turkey's Mediterranean coast, a plan which Moscow says is 
uneconomic and inferior to its own proposal to run the new link through its 
territory. 


And the scars from old conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan, in which both 
countries saw clandestine Russian support for their enemies, has encouraged 
them to look West for political, and eventually military support. 


Georgia and Azerbaijan are both seeking closer cooperation with NATO, 
including eventual membership, a proposal which is anathema to Russia. 


Some political analysts play down the significance of such statements, saying 
that they are as much a way of sending signals to Moscow as serious policy 
decisions. 


And a straight-talking Putin could usher in warmer relations with the two 
states if he can win over their leaders, who are seen as political 
pragmatists before they are ideologues. 


UKRAINE ALSO COURTS NATO 


The prospect of NATO spreading to Russia's borders is also a key one in 
Ukraine, which Washington has singled out for close attention because of a 
relatively big population of 50 million. 


``I think Russia is interested in Ukraine's slower movement in the direction 
of NATO as long as there is no clarity about the future of Russia's own 
relations with the alliance,'' said Mykhailo Pohrebinsky of the Kiev Centre 
of Political Studies. 


``On the other hand the U.S. would hail much faster movement (by Ukraine) to 
NATO and other European structures. In this case we have a conflict.'' 


But while Ukraine has consistently cast its eye westward, its economy is 
still linked inextricably to Russia which supplies it with oil and gas. 
Energy arrears are a constant irritant in relations between the Slavic 
neighbours. 


In stark contrast to Ukraine's good standing in Washington is Belarus, where 
President Alexander Lukashenko has come under frequent Western criticism for 
stifling reforms and democracy. 


He has been the driving force behind a plan to merge his nation of 10 million 
with Russia in a union based on joint institutions and eventually a common 
currency. 


*******


#2
Baltimore Sun
June 2, 2000
U.S.-Russian ties: The silent embargo
By Edward Goldberg
Edward Goldberg is president of F.J. Elsner North America Ltd., which trades 
extensively with Russia and Eastern Europe. He has testified before the 
Senate on trade issues, has lectured on international trade at the Lubin 
Graduate School of Business, Pace University, and is working on a book about 
the history of Russian-U.S. relations. 


NEW YORK -- U.S. relations with Russia during the past century can be 
described in three words: enmity, fear and misunderstanding. 


It is as if a silent psychological embargo has been in place, blocking most 
of the paths to mutual understanding. Even during periods when mitigating 
circumstances could have allowed the formulation of a more enlighten policy, 
animosity prevailed. 


This embargo is so fraught with historical and cultural implications, that 
even the massive changes toward democracy and capitalism that have occurred 
in Russia over the past 10 years have not been able to totally tear down this 
wall. These changes have been what the United States has been longing for 
since Lenin first arrived back in Russia. 


Yet if this is truly the case, why is our Russian policy still politicized? 
What is the historical cause for this? Why are we so deaf to the actual 
reality and needs of the situation? 


America's negative perception of Russia during the last century, partly based 
on the realities of Soviet actions, has been allowed to run unchecked for 
several cultural and historic reasons. 


Primary among these is the lack of a non-ideological Russian- American 
constituency within the United States. Theodore Roosevelt spoke of hyphenated 
Americans -- Irish-Americans, German-Americans, etc. -- having a major 
influence on U.S. foreign policy. There are, however, hardly any 
Russian-Americans. 


>From 1881 to 1914, 3.2 million people immigrated from the Russian Empire to 
the United States, of which only 65,000 were ethnically Russian. Thus, not 
only were the overwhelming majority of these immigrants not Russian, these 
émigrés viewed Russia and Russians with hostility. 


Unlike Polish-Americans or Jewish-Americans, as an example, there was and is 
no domestic constituency to politically support Russia and create a Russian 
cultural identity within the American polyglot. No American presidential 
candidate ever has needed to worry about losing a big state because he did 
not support warmer relations with Russia. 


The mass immigration from the Russian Empire, at a time of great social 
change in America and the beginning of radicalization within Russia, 
unwittingly created the first anti-Russian imprints on the American 
consciousness. 


Although very few of the immigrants were political radicals of any type, the 
fear caused in America by this huge wave of immigrants from Russia 
(regardless of the fact that most of these immigrants were not Russian) 
helped lead to the post-World War I Red scares. 


Stalin's aggression and the possibility of nuclear war during the Cold War 
only reinforced our negative perceptions of Russia to such an extent that it 
is difficult for us to grasp fully -- even today -- that Soviet Russia was 
totally defeated in the Cold War. A fear of Russia has almost become part of 
the American psyche. With no other former major adversary has the United 
States remained so distrustful after it has won the actual conflict. 


Germany, with which we fought two wars, is an example. Even though Germany 
could be a major economic rival today, the United States and Germany are 
close friends. 


Ninety years of rhetoric and misunderstanding has made it very easy and 
politically acceptable for America to turn away from Russia when things 
appear difficult. The problem, however, is that Russia is extremely important 
to our own security, both now and in the future. 


Its geographical position, straddling Europe and Asia, its nuclear arsenal, 
its economy, which has enormous potential, its mineral wealth and its 
membership in the U.N. Security Council make Russia too important for America 
to quasi-isolate. 


We must, therefore, through leadership overcome our historic fears and truly 
tear down the wall that inhibits our relationship with Russia. 


*******


#3
St. Petersburg Times
June 2, 2000
Moscow Quiet on Gref's Past
By Charles Digges
STAFF WRITER
Editor's Note: This is part of an on-going series looking back at the early 
careers of members of the so-called "Petersburg clan" who have graduated to 
Vladimir Putin's government.


Some might say that German Gref, President Vladimir Putin's current cconomic 
strategy and trade minister, has a knack for landing on his feet.


After a financially disastrous stint as chairman of a regional real estate 
committee, he was tapped by Mikhail Manevich to be the head of the real 
estate department of the St. Petersburg City Property Committee, while 
Anatoly Sobchakwas the city's mayor.


When Sobchak was defeated in 1996 in an upset election victory by his old 
lieutenant Vladimir Yakovlev, Gref endured and was named Manevich's first 
deputy the following summer.


And when Manevich was assassinated that year, Gref took up the flag.


During his tenure in charge of the Property Committee, or KUGI, which busied 
itself with a number of privatization schemes, Gref made a number of 
questionable decisions that cost investors millions of dollars. Now, he is 
the head of a think tank called the Center for Strategic Studies, which has 
been charged with redesigning the Russian economy.


Some of Gref's ideas on this count are facing stiff opposition in Moscow, but 
one of the more substantial changes, the idea of dividing Russia into seven 
administrative zones, has already been adopted by Putin.


But earlier this week, financier, Duma deputy and "family" member Boris Be re 
zovsky sent a letter to Putin criticizing the zone division. It was an open 
sign of conflict between the "family" members of Putin's cabinet and the 
members of the St. Petersburg school, said Andrei Ryabov of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace in Moscow.


Despite the conflict, Ryabov said Gref's program would win with Putin.


"Putin will take Gref's plan - in effect he already has," he said.


Georgy Arbatov, of the U.S.A. & Canada Institute, a think-tank based in 
Moscow, was less optimistic.


"Everyone drags their shamans to government with them," he said. "But who 
knows what guys like Gref can do? All I know is that he appears to have been 
born a few years back and brought to Moscow. I know nothing of his biography 
at all."


Indeed, said Arbatov, the powers surrounding Gref now can try to make sure 
that history is not an open book.


German Oskarovich Gref was born in 1964 in Kazakstan, the son of German 
deportees who were exiled during World War II. Despite his modest 
circumstances, Gref managed to graduate in 1983 from the law faculty of Omsk 
University, and then go on to Leningrad State University for his graduate 
degree.


There, he fell under the influence of the liberal Sobchak culture in the law 
department. He and Putin be came fast friends, according to press reports.


After Sobchak's victory in 1991, Gref was appointed head of the real estate 
committee in the Petrodvorets District west of St. Petersburg, where he 
planned to build a village in memory of German deportees.


According to a recent article in the newspaper Novaya Gazeta, Gref recruited 
a number of German and Russian partners for the project. The company that was 
to build the village was called Neudorf, and it was to include some 30 
cottages, saunas, pools and other recreational attractions for former German 
and Russian war survivors.


A loan for 50 million Deutsch marks ($20 million) was secured from a German 
bank by Neudorf, Novaya Gazeta reported. The project - begun in 1992 - was to 
be complete by 1999. But so far, the paper said, only eight cottages have 
been constructed. The Russian side appealed to Neudorf for more money but was 
turned down, Novaya Gazeta reported. The original 50 million Deutsch marks 
are still unaccounted for.


After this, Gref was promoted to City Hall to supervise real estate, where he 
earned a reputation as a strict landlord, especially toward human rights 
tenants. In privatizing the Gorchakov Palace, where the Petrograd Region 
administration is housed, he booted out the social service agency Nadezhda, 
which united a number of advocacy groups of for the elderly, according to 
Novaya Gazeta. He also evicted UNESCO from its offices on Ul. Chaikovskogo.


After Manevich's murder in 1997, Gref inherited the Nevsky Prostor fiasco. 
Nevsky Prostor was a real estate company 40 percent owned by City Hall that 
offered to build apartments within a period of a few years, provided clients 
put money down immediately.


Many clients, who said they otherwise would not have participated, said they 
were reassured by the fact City Hall was involved. Collectively, the clients 
put down $80 million. However, when it became more and more clear that 
nothing was materializing, worried clients were told Nevsky Prostor was 
bankrupt.


Angry letters besieged Gref's office, but he just replied that City Hall had 
sold off its initial 40 percent stake in Nevsky Prostor, and shrugged his 
shoulders.


City Prosecutor's Office spokes woman Tatyana Vishnyakova confirmed that a 
case had been opened against Gref over the Nadezhda matter, and that others 
were pending in the Neudorf case. But when Gref was tapped by Anatoly Chubais 
to be deputy minister of property and real estate in 1997, the cases simply 
evaporated.


"We were made to understand that this case just wasn't to be pursued 
anymore," said Vishnyakova.


Ryabov, however, thinks that most of these things will remain quietly buried.


"The only way Gref will suffer is if Berezovsky wants to bring it up," he 
said. "Otherwise, he's safe."


*******


#4
Trud
June 2, 2000
[translation for personal use only from RIA Novosti]
THE NOT SO YOUNG RUSSIA
By Svetlana SUKHAYA

Demographers say that the world's population may nearly 
double by the end of the 21st century. A concerned global 
community ponders ways to keep the population's growth in 
check. 
Russia's concern is different: forecasts say that the 
nation may extinct. Unless the current demographic crisis is 
overcome by urgent and well-considered moves of the authorities 
and society, Russia's population would taper to a mere 50-55 
million people in 2075. Today, i.e. as of January 1, 2000, the 
country's population stands at 145.5 million.
"Russia may simply disappear as an independent state 
before the end of the 21st century," is the opinion of Nikolai 
Gerasimenko, who chairs the Duma's health committee.
The nation is shrinking for the fourth time since the 
start of the 20th century. The first three times coincided with 
the periods of wars, hunger and repression. Experts indicate 
that the current crisis is unprecedented in peacetime. 
Russia's population has been consistently diminishing 
since 1992. In 1999, 27 regions registered a mortality rate 
that exceeded the birth rate two to three times over. A natural 
increment, i.e. the birth rate exceeding the mortality rate, 
was registered only in 11 of the country's regions in the first 
quarter of 2000.
The population's growth is clearly dependent on two 
factors:
the birth rate and that of mortality. Both indices have been 
tragically worsening in the past decade. In 1987, 2.5 million 
children were born in Russia; in 1998, the figure nearly 
halved. 
The worst thing about it is that more and more females 
want to have no children at all. Polls conducted in 1994 
indicate that nearly a quarter of childless females between 18 
and 44 years old had no plans to have one. Is there something 
more unnatural than a woman's refusal to give birth to a human 
being?
In 1999, the mortality rate radically exacerbated: the 
number of the deceased grew 151,600 on the year previously.
Experts discern a novel phenomenon in the country - a 
super-mortality rate explained by rampant poverty, civil 
conflicts and a surge of diseases. 
One can analyze the possible reasons for the mortality 
rate's growth and the evidently negative influence of smoking, 
alcohol and narcotics until one is blue in the face. The 
opinion that Igor Gundarov, MD, has offered to a recent 
parliamentary hearing sounds especially conspicuous. He is 
confident that the main reason behind the super-mortality rate 
in Russia is the catastrophically poor spiritual health of a 
major part of Russia's population in the past few years.

*****


#5
MSNBC
Putin on his presidential goals 
Excerpts from Tom Brokaw’s exclusive interview with new
Russian President Vladimir Putin 
A year ago, hardly anyone knew who Vladmir Putin was. A former KGB agent
and son of poor parents, why did Yeltsin select him as his successor? 
NBC NEWS 
MOSCOW, June 1 — Russia’s new president is Vladimir Putin, and no leader
in the world has a greater challenge. He leads a massive country with an
economy in chaos, a bloody war within its borders and a deteriorating
nuclear arsenal. President Clinton is coming to see him this weekend, but
Thursday he gave an exclusive interview to NBC’s Tom Brokaw. 
A YEAR AGO practically no one in Russia knew of Vladimir Putin. He was
just one more apparatchik — a man who had been a KGB agent, a deputy mayor
of St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) and an adviser to Boris Yeltsin.
He grew up as the grandson of Stalin’s cook; his parents were typical
Soviet citizens — poor and hard-working.
Putin was best known as a young man for his judo skills and later for
his devotion to the KGB, Russia’s notorious intelligence agency.
When Yeltsin selected him as his successor, the common question was:
Who is Vladimir Putin?

THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY
Tom Brokaw: When you were in the KGB, you were protecting the ideology
of communism. Once communism went away you made a U-turn. Is there an
ideology at the heart of Vladimir Putin or are you ultimately just a
pragmatic man?
Vladimir Putin: If you mean the communist ideology, we used to live in
a different country — and in a different world. We were brought up with
different ideals. If we speak about my personal views, I believe the
communist idea is a beautiful, but harmful fairy tale. It is clear that the
state cannot exist on this as a foundation. It is also obvious that there
is nothing that can substitute [for] this ideology except democracy.

THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 
Brokaw: There is nothing more important than restoring the Russian
economy ...
Putin: There is no doubt we will have to strengthen our laws, law and
orders and without any doubt guarantee all the property owners the right of
ownership. The state must protect the property owners.

CONTROVERSIAL CORRUPTION
As for Boris Berezovsky, the Russian who has become rich, in part,
through sweetheart deals — Putin says his notoriety is exaggerated.
Brokaw: Are you saying that Boris Berezovsky and the other member of
the families that have so much economic control here, will continue to have
the economic power that they have enjoyed for a number of years?
Putin: I think that you are overestimating if you believe that Boris
Berezovsky holds the most part of the Russian economy in his hands. Russia
is too big for one man, or a handful of people, to run it.

BATTLE OVER CHECHNYA
Putin continued to defend the bloody war in Chechnya, even though
there may be a high price for the Russian government to continue the conflict.
Putin: It is clear to us if we pull out of Chechnya, the territory of
Chechnya will become a beachhead for an attack on Russia. Russia cannot
afford — and will not repeat — such an exercise. Therefore to us it is
better to maintain troops and armed forces, law enforcement forces, and
deal with the terrorist problem there before the problem moves to other
Russian territories.

RUSSIA’S GREATEST THREAT 
Brokaw: What’s the greatest threat to Russia: Islamic terrorism coming
out of Afghanistan? Or NATO now expanded?
Putin: The biggest threat to Russia is ineffective economic policy.
And if one speaks about external threats, I should say that the religious
extremism exists in Russia like in other parts of the world.

POOLING EFFORTS
Putin also made some news during the interview. Instead of each
country building its own defense against so-called “rogue” nuclear powers —
such as North Korea — he suggested a common effort.
Putin: Such mechanisms are possible if we pool our efforts and direct
them towards neutralizing the threats against the United States, Russia,
our allies or Europe in general. We have such proposals and we intend to
discuss them with President Clinton.

RUSSIA’S FUTURE
Brokaw: You have two young daughters. What kind of country will they
be living in 20 years from now?
Putin: I would hate to see my country, Russia, lose its identity, its
face. ... What I would like to see that the cultural roots of Russia, that
we are so proud of and we so love, that form [us] as people, shape us as
people be preserved with all due respect to the common values of our world,
I would like to see my children see themselves as Russians.

Putin’s idea of putting some kind of common defensive umbrella over
the other nuclear states is obviously a big reach, but the Russians are
feeling very vulnerable if the U.S. builds the missile defense system often
referred to as “Star Wars” — and Moscow can’t match it. 


******


#6
PUTIN INITIATIVE ON ABM COOPERATION WITH USA CONCERNS ONLY 
NONSTRATEGIC MISSILES
Interfax 


Moscow, 2nd June: Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal on the possible 
establishment of an antiballistic missile shield jointly with the US concerns 
only nonstrategic ABM systems designed for fighting nonstrategic missiles, 
Russian military-diplomatic sources told Interfax today in commenting on 
Putin's initiative. 


"Washington's response to Russia's initiative will clarify the true plans of 
the USA on deploying an ABM system and at whom this nuclear umbrella will be 
targeted," the sources said. 


Putin's proposals "lie in the context of the protocols signed in September 
1997 in New York on the separation of strategic and nonstrategic ABM systems 
and make it possible to lift certain problems that have accumulated between 
the two countries in the sphere of strategic stability", sources said. 


"A decision to deploy a joint ABM defence will make it possible to alleviate 
Washington's concern over missile programmes worked out by the so-called 
rogue states (North Korea and Iran) and leave unchanged the 1972 ABM treaty, 
the foundation of the whole treaty system in the sphere of strategic 
offensive arms reduction," the sources said. 


Russia, the USA and certain European countries "have some technological 
projects on setting up regional ABM systems", the sources said. 


"If an agreement is achieved on setting up a nonstrategic ABM system, it 
would be of a multilateral rather than bilateral nature with the involvement 
of leading European states," the experts said. 


"The very beginning of joint work on this programme will lift a number of 
threats, prompting the USA to rationalize the need to modernize [modify] the 
ABM treaty," the sources said. "Moscow and Washington have formed different 
relations with the states whose missile programmes cause the Americans to 
worry," one of the experts said. 


On the technical capacities of the nonstrategic ABM system, the Russian 
expert noted that "projects of systems capable of efficiently fighting 
nonstrategic ballistic missiles exist". 


*******


#7
The Guardian (UK)
2 June 2000
[for personal use only] 
EMPTY ENCOUNTERS: CLINTON'S VISIT TO PUTIN WILL ACHIEVE LITTLE. 
HE HAS FAILED WITH MOSCOW AND RUSSIA STILL HAS THE CHECHEN PROBLEM
By Jonathan Steele (jonathan.steele@guardian.co.uk) 


It would be easy to dismiss Bill Clinton's visit to Vladimir Putin in Moscow 
this weekend as the powerless in pursuit of the faceless. Lameduck American 
president with dwindling influence meets new-boy Russian counterpart who has 
no programme. So no agreements of any significance can be expected. 


Yet this policy vacuum is not just dictated by the electoral calendar. It 
highlights a much deeper crisis and a need for radical choices. On the 
western side, the empty encounter in Moscow epitomises the failure of 
Clinton's Russian project in every field - political, economic and strategic. 
Back in 1993 when Clinton held his first summit with a Russian president, he 
and his advisers hoped gradually to transform their defeated cold war enemy 
into a democratic market economy and a partner in for eign affairs. But every 
step they took worked against their stated goals. 


In the fierce arguments between the Kremlin and the Russian parliament over 
the distribution of power, which was the big theme of 1993, the US president 
repeatedly urged Boris Yeltsin to impose executive supremacy by closing 
parliament down and changing the constitution. Instead of a democracy with 
checks and balances, Russia became what Lilya Shevtsova, one of its best 
independent analysts calls, 'an elective autocracy'. This was confirmed in 
1996, when with full Clinton support Yeltsin combined American advertising 
techniques with ruthless editorial control of TV, partly still under state 
ownership and partly in the hands of friendly oligarchs, to demonise the 
opposition and win re-election. 


Russia's economic reforms were as badly distorted as its path to pluralism. 
The corruption-prone privatisation which the west encouraged, the failure to 
regulate the new private banks, and the transfer of the country's energy 
resources to Kremlin cronies led to a haemorrhage of national capital into 
off-shore accounts. In response, western financial institutions merely 
stepped up pressure for cuts in government spending to stem the budget 
deficit. The result was a massive drop in industrial output and the 
pauperisation of millions. 


In foreign affairs Clinton's campaign to expand Nato eastwards alienated 
Russians of all political persuasions and is still at the core of the 
country's suspicions of the west. It has been compounded by Washington's 
continuing efforts to woo the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, and 
divert their oil and gas reserves as well as those of the Caspian, from 
flowing through Russia. 


So the fact that an unknown ex-KGB man with illiberal instincts was nominated 
by the financial oligarchy to exploit another flawed electoral process and 
become Russia's new leader is in part a measure of Clinton's mistakes. 
Russian factors, of course, also play a role. The country's long history of 
authoritarianism, its power-holders' inability to accept a legitimate role 
for opposition, and the intelligentsia's habits of swinging wildly from 
servility to alienation, meant that the transition to democracy should have 
been handled more gradually and with greater sensitivity. 


Now Russia stands at a new crossroads. Its internal policies are moving away 
from western control since rising oil prices have given it the first chance 
of growth for a decade, as well as less need for foreign loans. 


But it faces a key strategic choice in foreign affairs. During the Yeltsin 
period it veered from subservient pro-westernism under Andrei Kozyrev as 
foreign minister to an emphasis on 'multi- polarity' under Yevgeni Primakov. 
Some Moscow think-tanks are now counselling 'selective engagement' with the 
west and a pronounced orientation towards Europe. 


This makes sense for several reasons. The switch towards close relations with 
China, which Primakov encouraged, was largely a reaction to Nato's expansion 
and a way of cocking a snook at the west. Russia needs good relations with 
its largest Asian neighbour, but to make them a lever for solving problems in 
other regions is dangerous. 


The external changes which will affect Russia most in the next half-decade 
are not in Asia, but Europe. They are the gradual enlargement of the European 
Union, the slow build-up of a European defence identity, and the future shape 
of Nato. Putin was right recently to stress that Russia is a European state, 
and to affirm this by inviting EU leaders to Moscow this week before Clinton 
comes. Russia can no longer pretend to a global role, no more than European 
powers can, whether individually or as the European Union. But Russia needs 
to engage closely with Europe for economic and well as political reasons. If 
it is to have any hope of delaying the further expansion of Nato - which 
would be good for most Europeans, and not just Russia - it must work hard in 
Europe to show it can be a genuine long-term partner. 


For that to happen Russia must end its Chechen folly. Having secured his 
election with the Chechen war, Putin has a chance to enhance his foreign 
policy by ending it through dialogue with Chechen leaders and an acceptance 
that atrocities against civilians only provide new grounds for Chechen 
resentment. The values which the Chechen operation have so far embodied 
cannot help Russia's cause in Europe. 


*****


#8
May 30, 2000
Itogi
Yuly Fryomin
The Useless Environmental Agency
New federal authorities let us know that they will neither protect the
environment, nor allow others to do it
[translation for personal use only]


A new stage of a large-scale operation liquidating the residuals of Russia's
democratic revolution has been successfully completed. Starting on May 20,
the country lives without an agency whose primary function would be to
protect and monitor the environment. Out of a random sample of forty
countries, we found a similar peculiarity of governmental structure only in
Honduras.
The president's decree on the liquidation of the State Committee on the
Ecology (GKE), as well as the Federal Forestry Service, and the transfer of
their functions to the Ministry of Natural Resources (MPR) is only a
concluding step in the gradual destruction of the federal environmental
agency: first, it was deprived of some of its functions, then, its authority
was reduced, then (in 1996) its status declined from that of a ministry to a
committee level. Its financial resources were so meager that, for example,
last March it had to resort to financial assistance from Greenpeace in order
to verify reports about severe violations in the Central Siberian Preserve.
It has become a rule that large-scale economic projects are launched without
waiting for the results of environmental examination, and often even before
it is conducted. <Examples follow>
When all this comes to mind, it becomes clear that the latest demise of GKE
is not a result of some illiteracy or near-sightedness of a specific
individual or a group of people, but rather an expression of the mood that
has dominated Russia's political elite for quite some time. Of course, the
name of Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, the longstanding chief of the agency, was
always a synonym of resignation in the face of humiliating treatment. But
this peculiar feature of his personality should rather be considered a cause
of his personal administrative longevity (he served in his office since
November 1991), than an explanation of the dismal fate of his agency. The
reason is that the Inter-Agency Commission on Environmental Security, that
was set up by Aleksei Yablokov, a temperamental and unyielding individual,
was liquidated back in 1996, together with the Council of Ministers'
Commission on Radioactive Waste and Department on Environmental Legislation
of the Ministry of Justice. The same year saw the loss of independence by
the sanitary-epidemiological inspection agency and several other
administrative permutations that demonstrated complete unwillingness on the
part of the government to deal with environmental problems. By the way, it
was about same time that special services began their offensive against
environmental NGOs, an offensive that continues until this very day, in
spite of the utter collapse of all criminal cases initiated in courts. Thus,
the authorities are not just unwilling to protect the environment on their
own, but are fully resolved not to let anyone else to do it.
These manifestations are damaging to the environment in and of themselves,
because they serve as a signal for others: if government is not interested
in having a control agency that would monitor compliance with environmental
laws, then economic agents are free to disregard them. But the consequences
of this yet another "reform" will not be limited to moral damage. The
"reform" puts an effective end to any control over the use of natural
resources by the Natural Resources Ministry, including geologic
explorations, hydraulic projects, and intermediary felling of forests.
Besides, the ministry's top bureaucrats are renowned for their environmental
and legal nihilism. It became clear a couple of years ago, during the
controversy over gold mining in the Yugyd-Va National Park of Komi, that had
been included in the UNESCO list of world heritage. At that time, current
Natural Resources Minister Boris Yatskevich (who served then as first deputy
minister) disingenuously explained to Greenpeace activists that
opportunities for gold mining outweighed the power of regulations about
natural preserves.
In theory, there are still two or three months when something could be
changed. The agency to be shut down continues to operate until the end of
the work of the liquidation commission, and the latter has not been formed
yet. During Putin's visit to the yearly gathering of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, two collective appeals in defense of the committee, signed by
prominent scholars, were submitted to the president. Environmental NGOs
(that, as a rule, were fiercely critical of the committee because of its
inconsistency and proclivity to compromise) are planning public actions and
petitions of protest against its abolition. Yet observers believe that
internal protests will have no effect: people who launched this "reform"
were well aware of every argument against it, and Russia's authorities have
completely recovered from any fear of public opinion. If there is anybody
able to influence the situation, this would be the G-7 governments and
international financial institutions, starting with the IMF and the World
Bank. In recent years, they have been fairly sensitive to the environmental
behavior of their clients.


*******


#9
Washington Post
June 2, 2000
[for personal use only]
Chechnya's Bloodiest Massacre
On a Quiet Day in February, Russian Troops Killed at Least 45 Civilians
By Sharon LaFraniere and Daniel Williams


NAZRAN, Russia, June 1--Maliko Labazanova walked up from her cellar on the 
morning of Feb. 5 feeling more hopeful than she had in many weeks. Russian 
soldiers had driven the rebels out of Grozny, the Chechen capital. Her 
neighborhood of Aldi, on Grozny's southwestern outskirts, was blessedly 
quiet. The bombing had stopped. 


Labazanova, 49, headed across the street to fry some meat for an elderly 
neighbor, she recalled recently in an interview. All around her, residents 
fell into their prewar morning routines. Two men filled a wheelbarrow with 
flasks and went to fetch water from a spring. Four friends worked to fix a 
damaged roof. A nurse peeled potatoes. If the war wasn't over, it had at 
least taken a breather.


Six hours later, Labazanova returned to the cellar, dragging the bodies of 
three relatives killed by uniformed Russian officers. Spared herself by a 
sympathetic soldier who ordered her to play dead so he wouldn't get in 
trouble for failing to shoot her, Labazanova hid in the cellar for the next 
week, separated from the bloody corpses by only a curtain.


The rampage by Russian soldiers in Aldi claimed the lives of more than 45 
civilians in a single day in what was apparently the biggest massacre of the 
nine-month-old war, according to witnesses and human rights investigators. By 
afternoon, corpses were scattered throughout Aldi's streets and the air was 
crackling with the sound of roof tiles splitting atop burning houses, 
witnesses said.


Some people were killed before they could say a word, others after they had 
handed over their last rubles and begged the uniformed marauders for their 
lives. Residents heard some soldiers joke about whether to use a green 
antiseptic to mark targets on people's foreheads.


Even some colleagues of the Interior Ministry riot police known as OMON, 
suspected of carrying out the killings, seemed appalled at the bloodshed. 
"Have you gone mad?" one OMON commander was heard yelling into his handset.


The Aldi massacre was the latest and bloodiest example of the mass shooting 
of civilians, part of a pattern of human rights abuses by Russian forces in 
the war against Chechnya's separatist militants. Other Russian tactics 
include artillery and aerial bombardment of towns and cities to drive rebels 
into the wilderness and the mass detention of hundreds of Chechens, mostly 
men, in camps where some were tortured and raped.


Chechen refugees have provided compelling accounts to journalists and human 
rights groups of two other cases of large-scale wanton shootings, in which 
Russian forces entered neighborhoods and killed civilians after hostilities 
had ceased. One occurred in the town of Alkhan-Yurt, where 16 people were 
killed from Dec. 1 to Dec. 18, according to the New York-based group Human 
Rights Watch. The other, in the Grozny district of Staropromyslovsky, 
stretched from Dec. 22 to Jan. 21, and left 38 civilians dead and seven 
missing, the group said.


Human Rights Watch, the only foreign organization to conduct exhaustive 
probes of human rights abuses in Chechnya, is scheduled to release a report 
on the Aldi massacre on Friday. The Russian human rights group Memorial is 
also working on a reconstruction of the incident. Memorial says 46 people 
were killed in Aldi; Human Rights Watch reached a higher number, which 
included civilians killed on streets nearby but outside Aldi.


Documentation of the Aldi massacre has taken more time than probes into 
previous mass killings, in part because it has been difficult to contact 
witnesses. The Russian government has refused to allow human rights workers 
or journalists to visit the region, and refugee traffic slowed earlier this 
year because of travel restrictions and barriers. The Washington Post 
interviewed eight witnesses who were at home in Aldi on Feb. 5. The 
interviews took place over a two-week period, mostly here in Nazran, the 
capital of Ingushetia, the Russian region to the west of Chechnya, where 
several witnesses traveled to tell their stories.


Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have called for an 
international investigation of Russia's actions in Chechnya. The United 
Nations, the Clinton administration and other Western governments have not 
pressed the issue.


President Clinton, who will hold his first summit with Russian President 
Vladimir Putin this weekend, plans to focus on the state of Russian 
democracy, economic reform and missile defense, U.S. officials said.


The Russian government insists that it can investigate human rights 
violations on its own. It has refused to grant Mary Robinson, the U.N. high 
commissioner for human rights, access to Aldi and similar sites.


Vladimir Kalamanov, Russia's human rights commissioner for Chechnya, said 
some crimes against Chechen civilians have been committed, but "not many," 
and investigations are underway. At his insistence, he said, more prosecutors 
have been assigned to such cases, including three working on Aldi. "We will 
investigate this in detail," Kalamanov said.


A civilian prosecutor has handed witnesses and relatives pieces of paper 
acknowledging that something ugly happened in Aldi. "On Feb. 5, 2000, in the 
first half of the day . . . employees of the Defense Ministry and Interior 
Ministry in the course of checking passports commited mass killing of 
civilians," the paper said. Then the name of a victim is written.


Aldi survivors are skeptical, and too afraid, in some cases, to cooperate 
with a Russian-led inquiry. "It seems to me it was just a way to calm people 
down, by pretending something will be done," said Uzbek Haji-Muradov, whose 
brother Alvi was shot near his home on Matasha-Muzayeva Street.


It is unclear which Russian units carried out the Aldi killings. Memorial, 
the Russian group, believes two Interior Ministry units, from St. Petersburg 
and Ryazan, were the culprits.


Home to an estimated 4,600 people in peacetime, Aldi largely emptied during 
the winter months of bombing. The mostly single-story brick and clay houses 
sat empty. Of the few hundred people who remained, most were middle-aged or 
elderly. They cut down neighborhood trees for wood and braved 24-hour 
bombardments to fetch water.


By Feb. 5, a cold, sunny morning, it seemed they had survived. Russian forces 
had announced they had captured Grozny, and only a "cleansing" operation 
remained. Army conscripts who had swept through Aldi the day before were 
polite, even friendly, witnesses recalled. They had told residents to have 
their passports ready the next day, because the Interior Ministry OMON forces 
would be checking.


A few of the young conscripts spoke of the OMON in ominous terms. If a 
certain unit came, one soldier told resident Galina Umaeva, "you will be 
unlucky." Koka Demilhanova said a conscript warned her: "Don't be afraid of 
us. Be afraid of those who come after us."


Maliko Labazanova, a former shop clerk, was across the street from her home, 
frying meat for her elderly neighbor Vaha Tasuyev, when she saw the first 
soldier clad in gray camouflage. He led Tasuyev's son, Abdurahman, 51, into 
the yard at gunpoint, she said. Abdurahman had been helping his friend Sultan 
patch a roof.


Abdurahman's head was down and his face was pale, Labazanova said. "He 
demands money," he told his father. "They killed Sultan."


With trembling hands, the old man emptied his black leather purse of its 
contents – 75 rubles, a little more than three dollars. The soldier refused 
to let Abdurahman go, so Tasuyev's other son ran to a neighbor and came back 
with 150 more rubles. Still, the soldier led Abdurahman away, shouting at the 
old man, his other son and Labazanova not to follow. The Tasuyevs found 
Abdurahman's body that night.


Ahiyadi, a welder who helped Tasuyev with the roof, was also led home by a 
soldier who pointed a gun at him. He said he gave jewelry to the soldier, who 
let him go, saying: "Pray for me, because, you see, I didn't kill you."


Soldiers came to Labazanova's house in Tsimlyansky Alley an hour or so after 
she left the Tasuyevs, but they were peaceful. She walked next door to tell 
neighbor Ahmed Abdulhanov the document check was over. A former warehouse 
manager and distant relative of Labazanova's, the 76-year-old bald man sat 
dejectedly in the corridor. His daughter-in-law whispered: "There are corpses 
in the street."


Back home, Labazanova urged her sister-in-law Zena Abulmejidova and 
brother-in-law Hussain Abulmejidov to hide in the cellar. But Zena, her hands 
plunged in bread dough, told her: "It's all over on our street. Nothing will 
happen to us."


Hussain, described as mildly retarded, refused to go to the cellar without 
Zena. About an hour later, Labazanova said, she heard shouts of abuse in her 
yard. Two soldiers pointed their weapons at Zena, Hussain and the old man, 
Abdulhanov. "Maliko, bring money," Abdulhanov told her.


She raced down the empty street to her neighbors', pounding and shouting at 
the gate. Then she ran back with three 100-ruble notes in her hand. A wounded 
gray cat stumbled toward her, trailing its intestines. "Then my feet refused 
to move," she said.


In her courtyard, one soldier laughed at her offering. "Is this money?" he 
demanded. He told another soldier to "shake her down" inside the house.


Labazanova said she tried to hide between the stove and the wall. When the 
soldier pointed his gun at her, she grabbed his boots, begging to be spared. 
"Please. I have sons like you," she told him.


"If I don't kill you, they'll kill me," he answered. Then he shot at the 
ceiling and ordered her to play dead. Outside, she heard shots and the cries 
of Abdulhanov's cows and sheep as his shed went up in flames. When she left 
the house, she found the old man's body, the top of his head blown off and 
his gold teeth bashed out. Nearby were the bodies of Zena and Hussain.


Her neighbors were panicked and stricken. One woman told Labazanova she had 
been raped in front of her young son.


"If I had had a gun at that point, I would have killed, too," Labazanova 
said, tears streaming down her face as she sat on a stool in a refugee camp 
in Ingushetia. "I would not have cared if they killed me. What they have done 
is incomprehensible."


Around the corner, at 38 Hoperskaya St., Zina Shidayeva met her tormentors at 
9:30 a.m.


She had already heard shooting, she recalled. Women ran down the street 
screaming, "They are killing us." Shidayeva, her husband, a neighbor and 
Luisa, an 18-year-old girl who had just arrived from a neighboring district, 
cowered in the kitchen, where they were cutting onions.


A soldier told them to leave the house because he and his men were going to 
set it aflame. But the occupants demurred, fearful of going into the street.


The soldier raised the stakes. "If you want, I will let you live, but give me 
something," he said.


Shidayeva told him she had nothing, and he left – only to return later. In 
the meantime, Shidayeva ventured to the corner and saw corpses on the street. 
The first one she saw was Alvi Haji-Muradov, who had been shot through the 
mouth, the back of his head blown away by the exiting bullet. "I cried to 
Allah and ran home," Shidayeva recalled.


Shots rang out behind her, but she returned unhurt. Soon, the soldier in gray 
returned and asked again for money and jewelry. She had hidden earrings and a 
watch, but had trouble finding them.


She finally found the booty and turned it over, but the soldier wanted more. 
"You have a husband and a neighbor," he said threateningly.


"But I have no money," she pleaded.


"All right. I will let you live. You remind me of my mother," the soldier 
said.


Other soldiers entered the house. Shidayeva wanted to investigate what had 
happened around the corner. She offered cigarettes to the soldier in charge 
in exchange for a tour, saying she wanted to see whether some particular 
neighbors were alive.


Shidayeva and her escort walked past Alvi Haji-Muradov's body, then another, 
that of an old man, Aindi Azuyev. Further on was Koka Bisultanova, a blond 
woman who sold pharmaceutical goods out of her house. Then a couple in a 
yard, then a 71-year-old woman named Rekat Akhmadova. Dogs and cats were also 
victims.


After Shidayeva returned home, she asked her escort why they had shot 
harmless residents, even women. "We were told to kill everybody," the man 
said matter-of-factly. At 4 p.m., the guests left, after firing off a few 
rounds – "so that our comrades will think we killed you," the soldier 
explained. As he left, he said, "We should send in a big rocket here to erase 
all this."


When Luisa came out of hiding, she asked about her mother, Aimani Gudayeva. 
Shidayeva didn't have the heart to tell her she had seen Gudayeva's corpse. 
"She must be in some basement," she told the girl.


"I still don't sleep well at night," Shidayeva said in an interview the other 
day. "I close my eyes, and I see the corpses lying in the street. I feel that 
at any moment what happened then could happen again."


At the other end of the neighborhood, Asiat Chadaeva, a 32-year-old nurse, 
learned from a commander that people had died. She heard him shout into his 
handset: "Have you gone mad?" Then he pulled her aside.


"Our men have killed some old people by mistake," he told her. "Bury them 
quickly."


He had just hurried off in an armored personnel carrier when a neighbor 
walked up with a sobbing 9-year-old girl, Laila. The girl told Chadaeva that 
she, her mother and two other men had been staying in the house of Avalu 
Sugaipov, around the corner.


Her mother walked out of the house to greet the soldiers because she thought 
they would not shoot a woman, Laila said. She was immediately cut down by 
machine gun fire, as were the others. Sugaipov managed to push Laila back 
inside the house before he fell.


Laila told Chadaeva she hid there under the bed, behind a sack of onions. 
Then she heard a soldier say, "Pour it."


"Wait, where is the child?" another soldier asked. "Come out!"


He pulled her scarf over her eyes as he carried her through the yard, but she 
still saw her mother's bloody body. In the street, he gave her a can of pork.


After eight days, a relative came to pick the girl up. A 10-year-old boy came 
along. "They killed my mother," Laila told him. "Don't cry," the boy told 
her. "They killed my father and pulled out his teeth."


Soldiers looted Aldi's houses for ten days after the massacre, residents 
said. "They told each other to be careful not to scratch the furniture," said 
Waha Zakryeva, a resident.


When they parked an army truck in front of the Musaevs' house, Yusup Musaev 
told neighbors: "I could not utter a word." Four members of the Musaev family 
were killed on Feb. 5. Asked what the soldiers took, Yusup told a neighbor: 
"Everything."


While the soldiers stole, some residents prepared a videotape. On it, Maliko 
Ganaeva, an elderly woman, describes how her husband and two sons were shot 
as they returned home from fixing her nephew's roof. A neighbor who tried to 
help her drag off her son's body was shot, too, she said. "Are there people 
left in the world?" she asked, before dissolving into wails of grief. "Please 
help."


*******

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