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Johnson's Russia List
 

 

June 1, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4338 4339  4340

Johnson's Russia List
#4339
1 June 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow Times: Gregory Feifer, Berezovsky's Letter Dominates News.
2. Reuters: FACTBOX-Russia's seven new super-regions.
3. gazeta.ru: Putin Announces Yet More Centralization.
4. Ira Straus: Re: Brzezinski (JRL 4337). (re Taliban)
5. Vremya (ORT TV Channel): Interview with Anatoly CHUBAIS by Yekaterina Andreeva.
6. Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Stsenarii: Leonid SEDOV, BETWEEN ELECTION AND INAUGURATION.  Feelings and Expectations in Russian Society. (poll
information and analysis)
7. Moscow Times: Berezovsky Criticizes Putin. (text of Berezovsky's
letter to Putin)] 


*******


#1
Moscow Times
June 1, 2000 
Berezovsky's Letter Dominates News 
By Gregory Feifer
Staff Writer


Moscow political circles were abuzz Wednesday over an open letter by 
controversial tycoon Boris Berezovsky criticizing President Vladimir Putin's 
plan to rein in regional governors. 


Local media and analysts said the letter could signal the beginning of a new 
formation of political opposition to the president on the part of regional 
leaders and the country's financial and industrial "oligarchs." 


In the letter, released Tuesday, Berezovsky, a State Duma deputy, said he 
would be obliged to vote against the president's legislative project, which 
was "directed toward changing the state's structure" and represented a 
"threat to Russia's territorial integrity and democracy." 


The bill, overwhelmingly approved by the Duma 319 votes to 39 in a first 
reading Wednesday, calls for the most fundamental changes yet to the 
country's 1993 Constitution through the strengthening of central power, a 
cornerstone of Putin's policies. It proposes creating seven administrative 
districts to be supervised by presidential appointees, removing governors 
from the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, and making it 
possible for the president to sack governors. 


Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center, said 
Berezovsky's letter constitutes a threat to Putin, the very man whom many say 
Berezovsky in large part helped bring to power. 


"The letter is a pretext to form a new opposition of regional leaders and 
oligarchs," Ryabov said. 


Berezovsky defended his move in a telephone interview Wednesday. 


"I knew from the start that my appeal to the president would be used by all 
kinds of opponents in bad faith," he said. "The only thing governing me when 
I decided to write the letter was the desire for Russia to continue 
developing along a democratic path. 


"But the main goal is to maintain what we have achieved in the last 10 years 
- sometimes with great difficulties - which is a truly democratic state," he 
added. 


Izvestia on Wednesday played on a phrase in Berezovsky's letter - "one cannot 
change the rules of the game after it has started" - saying that Berezovsky, 
who considers himself to be Putin's political "father," was trying to put the 
brakes on the president, who had made his first move independently of "the 
family," a powerful group of insiders including Berezovsky and said to 
control the Kremlin decision-making process. 


Often seen as a paper that follows the family-approved line, Izvestia added 
that the businessman's public move came after a failed attempt to influence 
the president in a private meeting last week. Berezovsky denied that he met 
the president last week. 


The tycoon and his letter made the front page of almost of all the capital's 
major newspapers. 


Vremya Novostei commented on Tuesday night's news coverage on ORT television, 
which featured an item about Berezovsky's letter as its top story. The 
state-owned channel - the country's most-watched - is also widely seen to be 
controlled by Berezovsky. "It's an interesting episode of using a de facto 
state channel to counteract the state's own policies," the paper wrote. 


Kommersant - also controlled by Berezovsky - opined that passage of the 
president's bill in its first reading would signify little, since most 
corrections come afterward. The Duma is set to examine the legislation in a 
second reading on June 30. 


The Carnegie Center's Ryabov said Berezovsky had several motives for issuing 
his letter. 


"The first is that he was acting in the interests of 'the family,'" he said. 
"They are not interested in a strong president, and want to maintain a 
fragmented political stage." 


Another motive involves Berezovsky's personal ambitions and is tied to the 
Kremlin administration's moves to push Berezovsky away from its 
decision-making process, Ryabov said. "While there are no problems posed for 
Berezovsky's businesses, the letter shows he wants to remain an important 
political player." 


Another chief motive involves the desire on the part of the country's 
oligarchs and regional leaders to maintain the profitability of business 
interests they control with a large degree of independence from the center. 


"The president's legislative project taken together with proposed tax reforms 
would most likely end the oligarchs' economic privileges," Ryabov said, 
citing as an example the oil industry, in which Berezovsky is included 
through Sibneft, an oil holding he partly controls. 


Yevgeny Volk of the Heritage Foundation said while Berezovsky in fact remains 
influential - as shown by recent Cabinet appointments of men said to be close 
to him, including Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, Prosecutor General 
Vladimir Ustinov and Kremlin Chief of Staff Alexander Voloshin - he is 
nonetheless interested in protecting the powers of regional leaders. 


"Berezovsky has invested a lot in these people, who include a number of 
governors," Volk said. 


However, Volk said Berezovsky's letter would not constitute significant 
influence on the Kremlin. "It's a warning to Putin that his proposed changes 
might see some opposition in the future." 


Although all of the president's proposals passed in their first reading 
Wednesday, Berezovsky said he was completely satisfied with the discussion in 
parliament, and that he had achieved his goal of generating a "public 
discussion" of the issues. 


"I think that - not without my participation - it was possible to subject the 
questions to a most serious discussion and analysis already today," he said. 


"Those who voted for [passing the legislation] did not vote for the law, as 
they said, but for the fact that the topic is absolutely important and must 
be discussed." 


In a written statement, Berezovsky put forward his own proposals in eight 
points to "strengthen the federation and power," including doing away with 
the proposed seven districts, instituting direct elections to the Federation 
Council and boosting regional independence within a uniform federal code. 
(See box.) 


Berezovsky said he ultimately wants these issues put to the population in a 
referendum. 

8 SUGGESTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE FEDERATION 
1. Ask the president to cancel his decree establishing seven federal 
districts. 
2. Form the Federation Council via direct popular elections. 
3. Pass legislation guaranteeing that the dismissal of elected regional and 
local leaders can be effected only by the will of the voters. 
4. Delineate and unify the respective rights and obligations of the federal 
center and the regions in a single, standardized federative agreement. 
5. Retain the existing way of forming organs of local self-government, while 
legislatively reinforcing their independence from regional leaders and their 
accountability to voters. 
6. Create special local prosecutor's offices, directly accountable to the 
Prosecutor General's Office, to oversee adherence to the Constitution. 
7. Introduce a legislative norm establishing criminal liability of regional 
executive officials for specific violations of federal law. 
8. Cancel the law stipulating that the dismissal or appointment of heads of 
regional offices of federal agencies must be agreed upon by regional leaders. 


*******


#2
FACTBOX-Russia's seven new super-regions

MOSCOW, May 31 (Reuters) - As part of his drive to tighten control over 
Russia's 89 provinces and semi-autonomous ethnic republics, President 
Vladimir Putin has divided them into seven districts and named a 
representative to each with broad powers. 


The new representatives, chosen mainly from the military, police and ex-KGB 
security services, have been given seats on the influential advisory Security 
Council and their territories roughly coincide with Russia's eight military 
districts. 


Following is a list of the new super-regions and the presidential 
representatives appointed to head them. 


1. Central Region. This region includes Moscow, its suburbs and a handful of 
smaller nearby cities in the heartland of European Russia. Its new chief 
Georgy Poltavchenko, born in 1953, will be based in Moscow. He was previously 
head of the tax police in St Petersburg, where Putin was deputy mayor, and is 
seen as close to the president. His task will be to rein in the most powerful 
of the regional bosses, Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov. 


2. Northwestern Region. This region includes St Petersburg, the Arctic ports 
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, as well as the outlying Baltic enclave Kaliningrad. 
Its boss, Viktor Cherkesov, born 1950, was a deputy head of the FSB, the main 
domestic successor of the KGB secret police. Before that he ran the regional 
FSB in St Petersburg, where he will now be based. 


3. Volga Region. Liberal former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, born 1962, 
returns to his home town, the once closed industrial city of Nizhny Novgorod, 
to run this region surrounding the Volga river and the north coast of the 
Caspian Sea. It includes many of Russia's ethnic semi-autonomous republics, 
including oil-rich Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. 


4. North Caucasus. This restive region includes breakaway Chechnya, where 
Russia has battled separatist rebels since last October after being defeated 
in a previous war in 1994-96. It includes the Caucasus mountains, Europe's 
highest range, and the wide steppes beneath their northern slopes. Ethnic 
tension has also flared into violence in several other areas of the region, 
which is one of Russia's poorest. It will be headed by Viktor Kazantsev, born 
1946, a tough-talking, four star general who commanded the troops in Chechnya 
until April. He will be based in Rostov-on-Don. 


5. Urals Region. The resource-rich region of the Ural mountains will be 
headed from Yekaturinburg by Pyotr Latyshev, born 1948, a former deputy 
interior minister who ran the police in the northwest military district. He 
is also a former police chief for the Krasnodar province in southern Russia. 


6. Siberia Region. Leonid Drachevsky, born 1942, a diplomat who ran the 
ministry in charge of relations with other ex-Soviet republics in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, will run this vast, resource-rich region 
from Novosibirsk. He has also been deputy foreign minister and ambassador to 
Poland. 


7. Far East. This region includes the Pacific coast, Sakhalin island, the 
Kamchatka peninsula, the huge, diamond-rich ethnic republic of Yakutia, the 
port of Vladivostok and the remote Arctic north. Its vast and sparsely 
populated territory sees frequent power and transport crises that often turn 
life-threatening in winter. It will be run by Konstantin Pulkovsky, a general 
who commanded Russian troops during the first Chechen war. He will be based 
in Khabarovsk, a trading and industrial city just north of the border with 
China. 


*******


#3
gazeta.ru
May 31, 2000
Putin Announces Yet More Centralization
By Elena Ogorodnikova 


Vladimir Putin’s reforms will entail radical amendments to the Federal 
Constitution. And the matter concerns not only the new administrative 
division of the state (even the Justice Minister is already referring to the 
newly created seven federal districts as subjects of the Federation). 
President Putin does not approve of the current division of power between the 
federal center and the regions. 

On Tuesday, May 30th, Vladimir Putin introduced the newly appointed 
presidential envoy to the North Caucasian federal district General-Governor 
Viktor Kazantsev to the governors of the thirteen Caucasian regions. During 
the ceremony Vladimir Putin unveiled his latest plans for the restructuring 
of state power structures and inter-federal relations. 


Vladimir Putin stressed that a complete review of the existing federation 
agreements on the demarcation of federal and regional powers. Vladimir Putin 
made the democratic gesture of instructing the governors to prepare the 
proposals themselves. The governors saluted and right now they are probably 
working hard on their drafts entitled something like “top-priority measures 
aimed at the invigoration of Russian federalism”. In the current climate, 
descent is not the done thing. 


Thus it looks probable that all the powers and autonomy that the majority of 
Russia’s regions managed to acquire through a range of ‘personal’ federation 
treaties in 1995 and 1996 will soon be done away with at the stroke of a pen. 


It is now clear that Vladimir Putin has already made up his mind about the 
new demarcation of jurisdiction. He would not have raised this subject, 
otherwise. And that means that irrespective of the proposals put forward by 
the regional leaders, their independence will be significantly curtailed in 
the near future. For instance, there is no doubt left that the tax collection 
system will be radically revised and inevitably the central authorities will 
collect higher taxes at the expense of the regions. What is more, the 
regional authorities will be deprived of their right to impose local taxes 
and will be even more financially dependent on Moscow as a result. 


In spite of such a grim prospect, the leaders of North Caucasian regions gave 
no indication that Putin’s new ideas, to put it mildly, were not to their 
liking. One gets the impression that the governors have already learnt to 
express delight and full approval at getting whipped. And the way they 
received the presidential envoy leaves no doubts that in a year’s time, the 
federal constitution currently in force, along with the principles proclaimed 
therein, will be totally revised, including the regulations on the 
demarcation of central and regional jurisdiction. 


The governors praised General Kazantsev so emphatically that one got the 
impression that it was a circus manager, not a supervisor of everyone and 
everything who had arrived in the newly formed district. 


Rostov region’s governor Vladimir Chub said Kazantsev was “a competent and 
reserved man”, and added: “The main thing is that the president should be 
happy with him.” That is true, but the regional leaders will have to learn to 
live with the brave general. Chub hurried to please his new boss by informing 
him of the new office premises already prepared for the presidential envoy in 
Rostov-on-Don: “several administrative buildings in the central street, right 
opposite the regional administration.” 


The governor of the Astrakhan region Anatoly Guvzhin thanked the president 
for a good choice, etc, etc and spoke enthusiastically about reducing the 
number of federal structures in the regions. It would not be bad, said 
Guvzhin, if the first steps taken by the general-governor would be a 
reduction of staff. 


Astrakhan must be too far away from Moscow if the local authorities fail to 
understand the essence of the reform of federal structures. The creation of 
the federal districts with their presidential envoys and all their deputies 
and technical staff means enlarging many federal organs such as the Ministry 
of Justice, the Audit Chamber, Prosecutor-General’s office, and thus 
undermines the idea of reducing bureaucracy. 


But how could a unified and centralized state be created otherwise? 


*******


#4
From: IRASTRAUS@aol.com (Ira Straus)
Date: Wed, 31 May 2000
Subject: Re: Brzezinski (JRL 4337)


The Case of the False Assumption


"The summit this weekend, if not handled properly, poses new risks... Mr. 
Putin could seek to enlist the United States in his effort to assume the role 
of protector of the Central Asian regimes against fundamentalist pressures 
emanating from Afghanistan. He would like support for a Russian-sponsored 
anti-Islamic coalition that would regain a dominant role for Russia in that 
region." - Brzezinski, "Indulging Russia Is Risky Business," New York Times, 
May 31, 2000


It is far from clear what is the risk in supporting Russia against the 
Taliban. Russia's role in opposing the Taliban and fundamentalism in the 
region could be bad for us only on the assumption that Russia is our enemy.


The risks in opposing Russia on Afghanistan are more obvious: 1. It would 
give space for Taliban to survive and to continue its terrorist missionary 
efforts abroad. 2. It would make America a de facto ally of fundamentalism. 
3. It would actually cut America out of Central Asia, since if forced to make 
a choice, the Central Asian states would turn to an anti-Islamist Moscow 
instead. 4. It would gratuitously set America against Russia. 5. It would 
show that we are always enemies of Russian power and influence, no matter how 
much Russian interests coincide with our own. 6. It would miss the 
opportunity to show - at long last after ten years - that we are genuine 
friends of Russia.


We all understand that the Cold War created a habit of regarding Russia as an 
adversary. In the course of the long decades of protracted conflict with 
Soviet Russia, this reflex became deeply ingrained -- so deeply, it would 
seem, that it is still making it hard for some people to recognize the 
occasions when Russia's role and influence is something that is in our own 
interest.


Russia is the dominant force in post-Soviet Central Asia and will remain so 
for a long time to come. Its role in this region is inherently one of a 
secular European power, supportive of modernization, secular government, and 
multiethnic tolerance. Its role could be bad for us only if we make it that 
way, by setting ourselves against it and making an enemy again of Russia in 
this region.


No matter how much we set ourselves against Russia's leading role in this 
region, we could not overcome that role; at most we could render it more 
heavy-handed and make the situation more chaotic. If, instead, we work with 
Russia in opposing Islamism, this will not require any endorsement of 
Russia's special role in Central Asia but simply working with the reality. In 
this way, we can benefit from the natural advantages of the reality and avoid 
turning it into something against ourselves.


*******


#5
May 28, 2000
Vremya, ORT TV Channel
Interview with Anatoly CHUBAIS by Yekaterina Andreeva
[translation for personal use only]


Program host: This morning, Anatoly Chubais, the head of RAO UES of Russia
and one of the leaders of the Union of Right-Wing Forces, came back from the
United States. Officially, he traveled overseas in order to discuss RAO UES
problems with foreign shareholders. In reality, however, his visit went far
beyond the limits of Russian energy problems. Chubais was received at the
highest levels - he met with Vice President [Albert] Gore, State Secretary
[Madeleine]Albright, her deputy [Strobe] Talbott and Secretary of Treasury
[Lawrence] Summers. Anatoly Chubais has shared some details of these
conversations in his exclusive interview to the Vremya correspondent.


Q: What was the purpose of your trip to America, whom did you meet there and
what issues were discussed?
A: The main purpose was linked to the plan of restructuring of RAO UES that
has been prepared in our company, and the principal goal of the trip to the
US was to work with our shareholders, to clarify our intentions to them, and
to attract their investments to our national energy sector. One should say
that there is great interest, and the most important observation overall is
that the United States have overcome the psychological consequences of
Russia's financial crisis of August 1998. It's obvious that strategic
investors, as well as portfolio investors demonstrate increasing interest in
our country.


Q: Now let us move to the second part of your visit, to its unofficial part.
You met with many prominent American politicians. What was the subject of
your discussions?
A: Yes, indeed, I visited Washington and, following the request of the
American side, I met the Secretary of State, Mrs. Albright, her first
deputy, the Secretary of Treasury, with [Albert] Gore's chief of staff.
There was only one subject - the forthcoming summit between Putin and
Clinton. In the United States, gigantic importance is being attached to this
meeting. You know, it's just visible that all the highest leadership is kind
of nervous, it's visible that they badly need results. The situation is not
simple, and inevitably it does reflect those concerns that exist among the
American elite, but at the same time they want very much the visit to
produce certain results, some kind of achievement.


Q: Why do you say that American political elite is getting nervous?
A: Because there are certain objective problems in our country, which
reverberate over there, including the problem related to the freedom of the
press. And, on the other hand, there are certain issues that, in my opinion,
are not very serious, that are virtually rooted in emotions and are not up
to such a high government level, but they are matters of real concern for
the American side, and one should simply clarify and resolve these issues,
even in advance of the trip.


Q: For example?
A: Unfortunately, there are issues that are inappropriate for a public
discussion, but I believe I will be able to alert the Russian leadership and
to soften the atmosphere a little bit before the beginning of the visit.


Q: Although all of your contacts with politicians in America were informal,
are you planning to meet with our leadership and report on the results of
your talks?
A: I am not a state official and you are right, I did not conduct any
negotiations on behalf of Putin or on behalf of the Russian government.
Nevertheless, the information that I have obtained and those issues that
were raised, including in unofficial ways, are certainly very important in
terms of assisting our country, assisting president Putin in achieving
important results in the negiotiations between the two presidents.


Q: Anatoly Borisovich, how does American political elite assess a recent
statement by our leadership about the possibility of preventive strikes
against terrorist bases on the territory of Afghanistan?
A: There is great concern about that. It's natural that any coercive actions
by Russia beyond its territory will be very controversial. This is
notwithstanding the fact that the United States themselves do similar
things, and this is well known, but my opinion is that in this area we ought
to think many times before acting. We may face a disproportionate reaction.


Q: For its part, America took the liberty of carrying similar strikes.
A: This is true. There are two sides to this coin. Regrettably, our American
partners follow double standards, which, by the way, transpired in
connection to the Chechnya events - in my view, these events were
misperceived by the American side. But, on the other hand, there are
objective concerns that our actions of this kind might just run out of
control, and that the reaction of other countries might be disproportionate.


Q: Anatoly Borisovich, you mentioned the freedom of the press. Do you mean
that American political elite is anxious about the existence of the freedom
of press in Russia? How does American political elite comment upon the
developments around Media-Most?
A: As for these latter, I wouldn't exaggerate by saying that they are in the
focus of attention in the United States, this is nearly at the center of
discussion. And I have to explain [to Americans] that basic democratic
values in the country will be protected no matter what happens, and that
this does not contradict to the approach of the Russian president. And yet,
it seems to me that these problems can be overcome, so far as there is still
confidence [in the US] in our basic underlying goals. And being convinced
that a long-term alliance with the West on an equal basis is an absolute
necessity for Russia - for political, economic, and cultural reasons, I
think confidence is of paramount importance. As for Chechnya, I have a firm
sense that by now this problem is far less acute. In the past, I had to take
part in many debates on this issue, when there was fierce opposition to our
actions in the West, and, on my part, I was equally fierce and unequivocal
in defending the actions of our authorities, because I saw them as
completely necessary and unavoidable. By now, the situation [in the West]
has calmed down.


*******


#6
Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Stsenarii
No. 5
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
BETWEEN ELECTION AND INAUGURATION
Feelings and Expectations in Russian Society 
Leonid SEDOV, master of arts (history), leading associate of the 
All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies, or VTsIOM

Russia and the West

According to the results of opinion polls conducted by 
VTsIOM 56% of respondents answered Yes and 31% No answering the 
question whether they would approve of Vladimir Putin if he 
chose the course of rapprochement with the West and integration 
into European and global organizations (the ratio of these 
answers is 66:20 in Putin's electorate, compared with 83:28 in 
Grigory Yavlinsky's and 36:49 in Gennady Zyuganov's). However, 
Putin has even greater support if he pursues "the line of 
building up the economic might and military potential of the 
country as a challenge to the West: 75% - Yes and 15% - No (the 
ration among his electorate is 83:12 and among Yavlinsky's is 
65:28). The obvious contradiction of these two approved 
positions shows that if it is not the case of collective 
schizophrenia among a considerable part of Russians (40-45 
percent), then it is a insurmountable desire to eat one's cake 
and have it, too. How can the striving to "integrate" with the 
West and "confront" it at the same time can otherwise be 
explained? We are to agree that a society, which is made up of 
15% of people with pro-West sentiments, 30% of 
"West-haters"(the "left electorate, for the most part) and 40% 
to 45% of "schizophrenics" who are ready to follow Putin on any 
of the two mutually excluding courses, guarantees the President 
an enviable freedom of maneuver. (What is more, the State Duma 
has about the same line-up of sentiments.)
Such a frame of mind explains the reaction of Russian 
public opinion to the decision of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, or PACE, to exclude Russia from the 
Council and to the criticism of the actions of Russian troops 
in Chechnya by European parliamentarians. As many as 69% of 
respondents consider PACE's resolutions as "an unjustified 
interference in Russia's internal affairs" and only 16% 
(pro-Westerners") regard the West's anxiety and criticism of 
Russia as quite legitimate.
It is worth noting that the "left" and "schizophrenics" are 
unanimous on this issue. The answers to a slightly re-worded 
question, in which the suffering of civilian population is 
mentioned ("the suffering of the peaceful population in 
Chechnya is truly too high, and we need to heed the West's 
opinion), reveal that slightly more Russians are prepared to 
assume a critical position (20% agree "to heed"). Nonetheless, 
the overwhelming majority either think that "Western propaganda 
exaggerates the suffering of peaceful civilians in order to 
accuse and humiliate Russia" (32%; such is the opinion 
characteristic of the "right" from among Russians supporting 
Viktor Chernomyrdin and Konstantin Titov, the majority of whom 
are precisely what is called "the swamp") or are inclined to 
presume that Chechens themselves are to be blamed for all their 
troubles and are getting what they deserve (36%, the opinion of 
the "left").

The following Table illustrates the practical reaction of 
Russians to the PACE decisions.

Table 1
----------------------------------------------------------------
What should Russia do in response to the PACE decisions?
----------------------------------------------------------------
To take the criticisms into consideration and change over
from military actions to a political settlement in Chechnya.. 
7%


To persistently explain to European MPs the position of Russia
in the Chechen conflict ..................................... 
33%


To resolutely reject provocative attacks on our country
and army .................................................... 
29%


To discontinue any cooperation with organizations which attack
Russia's policy and not to allow representatives of PACE and
similar organizations to visit Chechnya ..................... 
12%


Russian society has split into two equal parts "the 
irreconcilable" (mostly the "left") and those who offer to 
continue a dialogue with the West to persuade it that we are 
right (a considerable part of the "swamp" has joined this 
group).
All these sentiments also manifested themselves in the 
appraisal by the public of the behavior of Sergey Kovalev who 
supported at the PACE session the decision to take sanctions 
against Russia. Though one-third of respondents had difficulty 
to express their opinion on this matter out of the lack of 
knowledge or for other reasons, 23% (mostly the "left") 
qualified Kovalev's behavior as "outrageous" and "treacherous" 
and 13% of respondents with more "lenient" views as "emotional" 
and "ill-thought." Part of the "swamp" joined with a part of 
"pro-Westerners," forming 24% of those who disagree with 
Kovalev but think that he had the right to express his point of 
view. And only 5% (extreme "pro-Westerners" plus Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky's followers who love to stage controversial public 
shows and attract attention to themselves) called Kovalev's 
behavior "correct" and "courageous." The above mentioned 
positions of Russian public opinion with regard to the West are 
influenced, albeit quite differently, by the general idea about 
the place of our country in the world today. Is Russia a great 
power or not? As many as 53% of respondents are prepared to 
insist that it remains a great power and 43% disagree with 
them. It is interesting that the feeling of grandeur is more 
characteristic of the "pro-Westerners: and a greater part of 
the "swamp" (the ratio between those who think Russia is a 
great power and those who disagree with this is 61:35 among 
Putin's electorate, 58:40 among Yavlinsky's and 67:32 among the 
young supporters of the Union of Right Forces with their 
"teenager complex" of the superiority of "ours"). The "left," 
on the contrary, are nostalgic for the lost grandeur and suffer 
from the inferiority complex (48:49 in Zyuganov's electorate). 
Those who voted for Our Home Is Russia, or NDR, at the Duma 
elections (21:79) and Titov's supporters (44:55) seem to be 
more sceptical (and probably more realistic) than others. It is 
indicative that these two groups of respondents are also more 
sure that we need Western (International Monetary Fund) 
credits. In the NDR electorate 54% think that complete economic 
decay will begin in Russia without financial injections from 
the West. This opinion is shared by only 18% of respondents for 
the whole of the country, while 60% believe that we can make do 
without credits (the corresponding percentage is 76 in the 
Yabloko electorate, which combines "great power conceit" with a 
certain affinity with the West when it comes to the protection 
of human rights).
Russians are very much for economic cooperation with the West 
when they are to answer whether Putin should continue 
attracting Western companies to work in Russia. 48% would 
support him on this matter and 37% would be against such a 
line. The "swamp" (NDR and Fatherland-All Russia followers) 
shift to the right on this matter, closer to Yavlinsky's 
Yabloko 71% of whose followers are for the participation of 
Western business.
It must be emphasized, however, that the "line in support 
of domestic producers" received the greatest number of positive 
answers - 91% and 4% against it (such a course scares only a 
very small number of Yabloko and NDR followers).

Chechen Knot

The war in Chechnya is a test for Putin in a certain sense 
during which he has to display firmness and completely restore 
order (the way Russians understand this term) in one of the 
regions of the Russian Federation. As a matter of fact. Putin's 
popularity and election to the post of President are directly 
connected with this war. Active hostilities in Chechnya had a 
very high approval level (68% to 72%) among the population 
right from their beginning. This approval did not lower even 
after the substantial losses of Russian forces became obvious. 
But the "Chechen" component of Putin's mandate is not as firm 
as numbers might show. The matter is that the authorities and 
the population differently see the tasks that are being handled 
in Chechnya.
Regardless of what might be said, to prevent Chechnya's 
secession from the Russian Federation is the main task for the 
authorities, while ordinary Russians by far not always share 
this aspiration.
Only 28% of respondents think that Chechnya should be kept by 
any means, including the use of arms (it is indicative that 
precisely as many Russians came out in the past for keeping the 
Baltics by military means. It should also be said that Putin's 
electorate (26% for the use of any means to keep Chechnya) is 
less aggressive than Titov's (41%) and Zyuganov's (34%). As 
many as 29% of respondents are in principle against the 
separation of Chechnya but they are ready to reconcile 
themselves to this; 17% are indifferent, 19% would welcome 
Chechnya's separation (the corresponding percentage among Aman 
Tuleyev's electorate is 24%), and 7% think that Chechnya has 
actually broken away from Russia already (11% of Tuleyev's 
electorate).
Despite the rather tolerable attitude of the majority of 
Russians to the question of Chechnya's independence, they, 
nonetheless, not only approve of the government's actions with 
regard to that republic on a broad scale (only one in five 
respondents does not approve of the Chechen campaign) but also 
demand their toughening. Last December, before the storming of 
Grozny began, 29% of respondents regarded the actions of the 
military insufficiently tough and resolute. In April 2000 the 
corresponding number was 40%. In December, 18% of Russians 
thought that these actions were too cruel, compared with 8% at 
present. Judging by many things, the majority of Russians are 
not so much for keeping Chechnya within the Russian Federation 
as for punishing Chechens, take revenge for the defeat in the 
first war, prove who is the strongest and let them go their own 
way.
It is indicative in this connection that anxiety over the 
progress of the Chechen war and the number of people who are 
sceptical about its eventual end began growing shortly after 
the elections. Whereas 11% put the Chechen war on the list of 
events and circumstances which gladdened them on the eve of the 
election, their number is now only 4%. At the same time, the 
number of Russians who are sorry about the state of affairs in 
Chechnya grew by eight points - from 43% to 51%. It is the 
first time that Chechnya tops the list of people's grievances. 
As many as 39% think that the government should regard the 
solution of the Chechen problem as one of its top priority. For 
only 1% more respondents - 40% - price growth is Problem No. 
One. A growing number of people doubt that the government will 
be able to successfully complete the war. South doubts were 
voiced by 26% of respondents on the eve of the election and by 
33% in April. The number of those who have doubts about the 
possibility to reach a political settlement of the conflict 
grew from 31% to 36%. The proportion of positive and negative 
judgements about the actions of federal troops in Chechnya 
changed from 71:19 in December to 60:31 in April. The number of 
Russians who predict a protracted character of the war and its 
possible spread to other regions of the Northern Caucasus (36% 
in April, compared with 24% in January) has grown and is almost 
as many as the number of those who believe in the victorious 
completion of the war and the return of Chechnya to Russia 
(40%). The number of respondents in favor of negotiations with 
the leadership of Chechnya also gradually increased from about 
17% in February to 23% (and 32%, if Russian troops sustain too 
heavy losses) in April.

*******


#7
Moscow Times
June 1, 2000 
Berezovsky Criticizes Putin 


Individual Liberties Are the Main Law of a Democratic Society 


An open letter to Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation 


Respected Vladimir Vladimirovich, 


The aim of this letter is to start an open, reasoned public debate on the 
recent decree on forming seven federal districts and on the package of 
federal bills that, as you said in your televised address to the nation, are 
mechanisms of "our democratic state structure" and have as their goal the 
implementation of a number of measures "on strengthening the unity of state 
power, ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution" and "federal laws" and 
developing "truly constitutional principles of federalism." 


I, like many people in our country, am convinced of the sincerity of your 
intentions and in your will to make Russia powerful and flourishing, to make 
its citizens live in prosperity and well-being. The problem you raise is a 
key one for our future: how to combine the principles of liberty and 
democracy with the necessity of effectively managing an enormous country. 


Your address included all the key words: "democracy," "federalism," "strong 
leadership," "loyalty to the Constitution." It is precisely from these 
positions - these basic categories for Russia's state structure - that I have 
tried to evaluate the aforementioned documents and, unfortunately, I have 
come to the conclusion that they do not correspond with the goals outlined 
and will bring more harm than good. 


Let me start with an overview. 


Overview 


The decree issued and the prepared package of federal legislation aim to 
strengthen the power vertical. However, they are an attempt to solve a real 
problem with inadequate methods. The proposed changes are anti-democratic 
because, if adopted, they will destroy the system of the balance of power, 
which is necessary for the normal functioning of any democratic government 
and market economy, significantly increase the authority of the executive 
branch of power at the expense of the legislative and limit citizens' 
participation in the representative management of government. They make the 
federation's foundations even more shaky inasmuch as they complicate the 
relationship between the center and the regions, weaken and complicate the 
existing system of vertical management and will lead to a consolidation of 
regional elites as their isolation increases. As a result, the new 
legislation will have the opposite effect of the desired intention. Many 
aspects of the legislation will introduce insoluble contradictions and chaos 
into the judicial foundations of constitutional order and the government's 
federal structure. 


Now, I will try to provide the basis for this conclusion, dealing with the 
form and substance of the issue at hand. 


1. Violation of democracy 


The vertical division of power is the basic element of a democratic society, 
along with a horizontal division into legislative, executive and judicial 
branches. The principle elements of both horizontal and vertical division of 
power are the independence of the various power structures from each other, 
the clear limitation of authority within separate institutions of power and 
the fact that representatives of power are elected by, representative of, and 
answerable to the people. On the whole, the horizontal and vertical division 
of power is a guarantee against arbitrary rule and the usurping of power. The 
observation of the main principles of the vertical division of power is one 
of the cardinal foundations of democracy. In other words, a "bad" elected 
leader is better than a "good" leader appointed from above because the system 
of appointing leaders is defective in principle. 


.. On the whole, the proposals significantly limit the powers of local 
government, violate the balance of a democratic division of power and create 
a precedent for establishing unitary and authoritarian regimes, both on the 
level of federation subjects and on the national level. 


In the context of the world's experience with federalism, the present Russian 
government structure corresponds more closely to that of North American and 
European models based on decentralization of power, which recommend 
themselves as guarantors of political stability. The proposed legislation 
will place Russia in the category of Latin American models of federalism, 
characterized by extreme centralization that leads to instability and a high 
probability of undemocratic forms of government. 


2. Weakening federalism and the power vertical 


The point of a federal organization of government lies in the rational 
balancing of real, objective contradictions between central and local 
interests. The stability of the federal structure to a much lesser degree 
depends on control from above than on the feedback and self-regulating 
impulses from below. The measures proposed increase control from the top 
down, but they weaken the feedback from the bottom up at the expense of 
lessening the independence of local authority and its representatives in the 
center. As a result, this increased control will be accompanied by a 
lessening of the effectiveness of government. 


Logically, the following negative tendencies can be foreseen: 


- The heads of the regions will compensate for the weakening of their power 
in the federal arena by increasing their influence within their regions - 
using their newly created right to dismiss leaders of local administrations. 
In addition to a weakening of democracy locally, such a consolidation of 
local elites will lead to the appearance of closed, corrupt, monolithic local 
bureaucracies, similar to the administrative party elites of the republics of 
the former Soviet Union. ... 


- The concentration of federal functions in six centers, plus the one in 
Moscow, will lead to the appearance of de facto "interregional capitals," 
which violates the principle of equality of subjects of the federation, will 
inevitably lead to unfairness in the distribution of federal resources, will 
lead to the appearance of regional leaders divided into "first" and "second" 
classes and, over the long term, may promote the disintegration of Russia as 
the result of the appearance of powerful, economically and politically 
integrated interregional associations. 


- The dependence of local leaders on personnel decisions by a higher level of 
power will lead to the hesitance of the power vertical to deal with real 
problems locally. The fear of sanctions from above paralyzes the defense of 
local interests from below, a defense that is now the main mechanism for 
involving federal authority in the resolution of local problems. 


- For the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, the proposed 
legislation poses the task of practically following all events at the local 
level and, if the situation requires, of instituting punitive measures; it 
also poses the task of significant involvement in personnel issues, similar 
to the previous [Communist] party system. The implementation of functions and 
powers not now handled by the presidential administration will require the 
creation of a corresponding apparatus, provision of resources and so forth. 
In essence, a new vertical power structure will arise, functioning in 
parallel with existing vertical federal structures - the Interior Ministry, 
Federal Security Service, Justice Ministry, Health Ministry, Education 
Ministry and so forth. Thus, significant issues will be decided in a 
triangular configuration: governor-presidential representative-minister. ... 


On the whole, the proposed reform of the federal organization of the Russian 
Federation includes many characteristics of the Soviet system's relationships 
between the center and regions. As we know, this system proved to be 
incapable of dealing effectively with conflicts between the center and the 
periphery, which in the end served as one of the main reasons for the demise 
of the Soviet Union. 


3. Mentality and freedom 


But, Mr. President, there is still one very important achievement of the past 
decade the destruction of which is more dangerous than all the other 
consequences of adopting the proposed package of laws. 


I assert that the main result of Boris Yeltsin presidency was the changed 
mentality of millions of people from a slavish mentality dependent on the 
will of the boss or government - and therefore irresponsible - to a free 
mentality, dependent only on one's own abilities. The leaders of this change 
- so fundamental in the building of a democratic government - are 
entrepreneurs who have founded medium and large businesses, and politicians 
empowered by the people and responsible to them. 


Vladimir Vladimirovich, at the beginning of your ascent you spoke of "the 
dictatorship of law." Why is dictatorship of law necessary? That is the 
question. The answer is obvious: to give each person the opportunity to 
realize his potential to the greatest degree, so long as he does not cause 
harm to others in doing so. Osip Mandelshtam puts it precisely: "I am 
betrothed to freedom as to the law " ... to freedom as to the law. 


Maintaining maximum individual liberty - that is the point of laws in a 
democratic society. I do not want to philosophize in this letter, but I find 
it absolutely necessary to formulate the main issue clearly. 


Personal liberty is a system of inner (voluntary) restrictions. For an 
Orthodox believer, the 10 commandments are enough in principle. But the 
liberty of a citizen entails external, additional restrictions - laws - 
written for him by society and government. 


The founders of the United States - Jefferson, Washington, Madison and others 
- first understood that external restrictions ... should be minimal, and they 
reflected this fundamental concept in the U.S. Constitution. 


The U.S. experience of over 200 years has demonstrated that the basic 
principles assumed by these men for building a democratic, federal, strong 
government were very effective. Later, the majority of European and other 
governments confirmed by their own example the efficacy of these ideas. 


Not anarchy, not free will, but individual liberty, civil liberty as the 
mentality of a nation - this is the sole key to building a flourishing 
democratic government. 


The package of laws proposed by you significantly restricts the independence 
and civil liberty of tens of thousands of Russian politicians at the highest 
level, forcing them to be oriented toward one person and follow his will. But 
we've already gone through that! 


4. Preliminary legal analysis 


.. From my point of view, both the decree and the legislation change the 
government structure of Russia in a fundamental way. Such a decision in a 
democratic state cannot be adopted without widespread, open discussion by 
society and a subsequent referendum. 


Finally, I want to draw your attention to the egregious, glaring rights 
violations contained in the legislation. 


The proposal on the possible removal of governors during the conducting of an 
investigation violates a key principle of rights - the presumption of 
innocence. And the proposal to use this as a norm to remove elected governors 
and members of legislative bodies of subjects of the federation violates the 
principle that laws should not be retroactive. No changes in the functions 
and status of those already elected should be permissible until that 
individual's term expires; the rules of the game should not be changed after 
the game has started. I personally would not have run for governor if I knew 
a governor could thus be removed. 


5. How to strengthen the federation and the government 


.. Traditionally, the supremacy of central power in Russia was based on 
strength and force. However, we have set off on a path toward democracy, 
toward observing rights and liberties. Other countries' experiences give 
myriad examples of the successful solution to this task by democratic means 
without limiting the inalienable rights of the federation's subjects and 
local government. 


First, it is important to acknowledge that the possibility of strengthening 
the power vertical lies not through destroying liberties and the balance of 
power, but in strengthening the responsibility of those who are obligated to 
fulfill the law. ... Russian legislation severely punishes the violation of 
the nation's Constitution. It is simply necessary to put this mechanism to 
work. 


.. Second, to fulfill judicial decisions on observing the Constitution and 
federal laws, it is reasonable to introduce a legislative norm of federal 
force, but this force should be conducted only when concrete violations 
occur. Here we can remember the United States' experience: In the 1960s, when 
the laws of southern states on racial segregation in schools contradicted 
federal civil rights laws, President John Kennedy used force in ensuring the 
observance of federal law in specific schools, but he did not try to oust 
legally elected governors. In terms of Russia's use of a similar norm, we 
could introduce the idea that members of the executive branch in federation 
subjects can be held criminally liable for a specific violation of federal 
laws. 


Third, it is necessary to change the current situation in which the heads of 
regional branches of federal authorities can only be appointed and removed 
with the approval of regional leaders. 


Fourth, it is obvious there is a need for the division of the branches of 
power as declared in the Constitution; thus, representatives of executive 
power - governors and presidents of republics -should not sit on the 
Federation Council. That should be comprised of representatives - senators 
chosen by the people via direct elections. Senators' parliamentary immunity 
and their independence from the heads of the regions will guarantee an extra 
counterweight to possible abuses in the regions. 


Fifth, it is necessary to preserve the existing means of forming the organs 
of local self-government. And the independence of the heads of local 
self-government from regional leaders should be not weakened but 
strengthened. 


.. This in no way exhausts the list of necessary decisions, but it is 
precisely decisions of this nature that will allow us to achieve absolutely 
correctly formulated goals, to move forward without destroying what has been 
achieved. 


I realize this analysis and my proposals are not exhaustive and, no doubt, 
require discussion and criticism. 


Vladimir Vladimirovich, your personal experience in both St. Petersburg and 
in Moscow showed, I am sure, that democracy in and of itself is imperfect and 
that each step in the direction of society's democratic development requires 
colossal efforts precisely because, in the absence of dictates, you must 
convince - not command - millions of citizens that you are right. 


I ask you not to hurry in deciding a question of historic importance in an 
enormous, seriously ill country. 


As ever, with respect, 
Boris Berezovsky 
State Duma deputy 


*******

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