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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

May 26, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4324  4325  4326

Johnson's Russia List
#4326
26 May 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Business Week: Putin's Power Play. Will his cure for balkanized rule be worse than the disease?
2. AP: Albright: Russia Future Unclear.
3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Dmitry Gornostayev, IVANOV, ALBRIGHT AGREE SUMMIT SUBJECTS:  There is no question of amending the ABM treaty in 
the agenda of the Putin-Clinton summit.
4. Garfield Reynolds: Re: 4325-Aris/Putin's Economic Policy.
5. Reuters: Russia freeing 120,000 to mark war anniversary.
6. The Guardian (UK): Amelia Gentleman, RUSSIAN CINEMA FEARS LOSS OF PROP.
7. Financial Times (UK): Moscow's mandate for change: Romano Prodi 
finds much to be optimistic about in Vladimir Putin's Russia - given 
the right programme of reform.
8. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE: RUSSIAN EXODUS FROM KYRGYZSTAN FUELLED BY 
POVERTY, ISLAMIC FEARS
.
9. Reuters: Russian Afghan strikes would stir trouble - general.
10. Carnegie Moscow Center: Alan Rousso, Clinton-Putin I: A False START.
11. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: Anna Kozyreva, DUMA UNANIMOUS ON PROPOSED REFORMS. Never before has the State Duma demonstrated such unanimity: 
already now all the deputy factions and groups expressed certainty 
that the package of draft laws on the reform of the power system 
would be approved.] 


******


#1
Business Week
June 5, 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin's Power Play (int'l edition)
Will his cure for balkanized rule be worse than the disease?
By Paul Starobin and Sabrina Tavernise in Moscow, with Kristina Shevory in 
St. Petersburg 


For four years, Governor Vladimir Yakovlev has ruled St. Petersburg with an 
iron grip. He has signed off on every key decision in Russia's second largest 
city, from business investment projects to the hiring and firing of local 
political officials. And he's done it all with scant regard for the wishes of 
the Kremlin in Moscow.
Now those days are over. With one stroke of the pen, Russian President 
Vladimir V. Putin has altered the power equation. On May 13, Putin issued a 
decree to put his own man in charge of a powerful new federal unit 
responsible for administering Northwestern Russia, St. Petersburg included. 
Putin's choice: Victor V. Cherkesov, deputy director of the Federal Security 
Service, the successor to the KGB. ``Cherkesov will quash Yakovlev,'' says 
Duma Deputy Yuly Rybakov from St. Petersburg. Yakovlev is a longtime rival of 
Putin, from the days when they both worked in St. Petersburg.
ELECTION VOW. Fulfilling an election promise, Putin is moving swiftly to 
assert the Kremlin's political and financial control over Russia's vast 
provinces. The Cherkesov appointment is just one step. He will join six other 
officials as superbosses, responsible for asserting Moscow's will over 
regional governors in a scheme that carves the nation into seven federal 
districts. In an even bolder move, Putin is also calling on the Duma to pass 
laws giving him the right to fire the governors and to dissolve regional 
legislatures. And he wants to be able to strip governors of their legal 
immunity from prosecution. None of the proposals appear to violate the 
Russian constitution, but that is ultimately a matter for the courts to 
determine.
Putin is grappling with a real problem. Since the Soviet Union's collapse, 
many regions have become fiefdoms of their governors, who are popularly 
elected but often exceed their legal authority. Boris Yeltsin, Putin's 
predecessor, failed to discipline lawless governors. In fact, he bestowed 
favors on regional leaders who pledged their support.
The governors have bucked Moscow on almost every front. As many as 40% of 
all regional laws violate federal legislation or the Russian constitution, 
according to Fond Politika, a think tank in Moscow. For example, 
Bashkortostan, a republic just west of the Ural Mountains, has enacted a 
constitution that gives it powers on a par with those of a sovereign state, 
such as the right to participate in international alliances.
Regional administrations collect federal taxes, but some, such as 
Kalmykia, have refused to ship proceeds to Moscow. Governors routinely 
misspend federal funds intended for wages of federal workers, and electricity 
payments for municipal institutions such as hospitals. Some governors, such 
as Yevgeny Nazdratenko in the Primorye region in the Far East, have dictated 
court decisions. To combat that problem, Putin plans to provide full federal 
funding for courts. That will free judges and law-enforcement officials from 
dependence on governors to finance their operations. ``There must be a single 
way of understanding legislation everywhere throughout the Russian 
Federation,'' Putin said in a Kremlin ceremony to unveil his plan to 
governors on May 22.
But the new President's cure may be worse than the disease. Putin seems to 
be erecting an edifice of concentrated political authority emanating from 
Moscow. The danger is that healthy political and economic initiatives 
launched from the grass roots will be trampled by bureaucrats answerable only 
to the Kremlin. At a time when many Western nations are relaxing federal 
strictures over their regions to foster bottom-up development, Russia is 
moving in the opposite direction. ``This is an attempt to control everything 
from Moscow, a return to the doubtful practices of the Communist Party 
Central Committee,'' declared Ruslan Aushev, president of Ingushetiya, a 
Russian republic in the Caucasus, after Putin's decree. Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov has also spoken out publicly against Putin's move.
NERVOUS. The superbosses, in charge of organizing the work of all of the 
federal agencies in their districts, will have extensive powers to demand 
information from the governors. Two of the seven appointees are army 
commanders, a third is a senior police official from the Interior Ministry 
and two, including Cherkesov, are veterans of the KGB, like Putin himself. 
Only one, former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, tapped to supervise the 
Volga district, has well-established liberal credentials. The seventh 
representative, Leonid Drachevsky, was minister for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.
The regional representatives may well play key roles in brokering business 
investment deals. In some regions, investors are nervous. In St. Petersburg, 
for example, Yakovlev is widely viewed as autocratic, but the business 
community has learned to work with him over the years. As a result, the 
volume of investment has grown from $140 million in 1996, when he was 
elected, to $350 million last year. ``I don't think we need any new direction 
here, thank you,'' says Scott Antel, a St. Petersburg-based attorney who 
heads a U.S. Chamber of Commerce group that helps American investors adapt to 
the Russian environment.
But Putin's plan will be difficult to thwart in the face of his high 
public-approval ratings and command of the formidable resources of the 
Kremlin. Fearful of alienating Moscow, many local bosses, including such 
usually outspoken figures as Alexander Lebed, the former Army general who 
presides over the Krasnoyarsk region in Siberia, are declining requests for 
comment. The Duma, which has been broadly backing Putin's initiatives, is 
expected to approve his request for new laws.
So who's on the list of governors likely to be fired? The Kremlin is 
expected to make an example out of someone. Warnings have been delivered to 
relatively small-time bosses--the chiefs of Ingushetiya, Bashkortostan, and 
Amur. Or the Kremlin could train its sights on a big fish such as Yakovlev or 
Nazdratenko.
If Putin can really control Russia's regional governors, it will mark a 
remarkable change from the Yeltsin era. But it's also true that Russia, with 
its 11 time zones, does not easily lend itself to central control. Even 
during Soviet times, local Communist bosses found ways to evade edicts from 
Moscow. Russia has not gained its reputation for Byzantine governance for 
nothing. For now, many analysts are supporting Putin's plan as a way to deal 
with a nation afflicted by balkanized rule. ``Strong federal power is the 
lesser evil,'' says Yury Korgunyuk, a Moscow political analyst. But strong 
centralized power has proven a curse for Russia in the past. The country is 
leaning in a dangerous direction.


******


#2
Albright: Russia Future Unclear
May 26, 2000
By IAN PHILLIPS

LONDON (AP) - U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said Friday it is 
too soon to gauge which direction Russia will take under President Vladmir 
Putin, but warned that the depth of U.S. investment will depend on his stand 
on economic reform, democracy and human rights. 


Speaking ahead of a June 4-5 summit in Moscow between Putin and President 
Clinton, Albright welcomed the new Russian administration's ``ambitious 
agenda.'' But she said its capacity to reform is so far unproven and its 
commitment to democratic values and human rights ``still to be measured.'' 


``President Clinton will make clear at the summit: If its new leaders back 
their promises with performance, we will enthusiastically support Russia's 
efforts to integrate itself into the world economy and encourage investments 
on Russian soil,'' Albright said in a speech at the London School of 
Economics. 


Predicting the future of Russia's economy, she said, can be like ``one of 
those traditional English mystery novels.'' 


``There is a sense of anticipation, but also a nagging feeling that you may 
have read the same book - albeit with a different cover - before. Doubts will 
dissipate only after the first chapters have been read,'' she said. 


The White House says the Moscow summit will not be an occasion to resolve 
major differences over nuclear arsenals or U.S. plans to build a national 
missile defense system. However, it has raised the prospect of an agreement 
to destroy 34 tons of military grade plutonium on each side. 


Talks also will focus on Russia's relationship with Europe and the Chechnya 
conflict, which Albright, returning from a NATO foreign ministers' summit in 
Italy, said is endangering Russia's democracy and is ``an obstacle to its 
integration.'' 


******


#3
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
May 26, 2000
[tranlation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
IVANOV, ALBRIGHT AGREE SUMMIT SUBJECTS 
There is no question of amending the ABM treaty in the 
agenda of the Putin-Clinton summit 
By Dmitry GORNOSTAYEV

There is no item containing the United States' proposal to 
amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty in the agenda of the 
fast-approaching Russian-US summit, Russian Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov told the Nezavisimaya Gazeta correspondent after 
the end of the meeting with US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright in Florence, where he took part in a session of the 
Russia-NATO Joint Permanent Council. "The USA may raise this 
question, of course, but only in the general context. In the 
specific context, this question is not included in the agenda," 
said Ivanov.
In this way, it is safe to say even now that no documents 
which would allow the USA to create a national ABM system 
without breaking the 1972 treaty will be signed during the 
Putin-Clinton meeting. This is of principled importance for 
understanding the sides' further potential steps in the sphere 
of strategic stability, since the USA has actually got down to 
creating individual elements of a national ABM system. The 
decision to be taken by President Clinton before the autumn of 
this year is quite predictable: the green light has already 
been given to the system's deployment. Consequently, there is a 
real prospect of abrogating the ABM treaty and the whole system 
of agreements in the disarmament sphere (START-1 and START-2 
treaties, the treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles 
etc.) since the whole of the system is only effective on the 
condition of preserving the ABM treaty. (Incidentally, this is 
specified in the law on the ratification of the START-2 treaty 
by the State Duma and President Putin, too, said the same 
thing).
Indicatively, the ABM issue has already exceeded the 
framework of Russian-US discussions. Here, in Florence where a 
session of the NATO Council met at the ministerial level the 
day before, the alliance's European members expressed serious 
concern over the US plans. Expressing the common European 
position, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said that 
the allies would give their consent to the idea of creating a 
national ABM system only on three conditions: a national ABM is 
created only within the framework of agreements with Russia on 
amending the ABM treaty (that is, what we object to after a 
year of US persuasion and what we will not agree to during the 
Putin-Clinton meeting); the ABM treaty is linked to talks on 
the START-3 treaty; and still more radical reductions are made 
in the nuclear arsenals of the USA and Russia. Apart from that, 
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine hinted that the US 
national ABM system may pose a threat not only to Russian and 
Chinese but also to French nuclear missiles. So, this subject 
proved very acute during practically all the discussions in 
Florence. 
However, the main aim of the Russian delegation's arrival 
in Florence was participation in the session of the 
Russia-NATO Joint Permanent Council, which had not met for more 
than a year due to the alliance's aggression against 
Yugoslavia. Summing up the results of the meeting, Igor Ivanov 
stated that it was inopportune to talk of positive or negative 
results of the discussion. In his words, what is most important 
is that the meeting did take place and the sides demonstrated 
their desire to take relations out of the crisis. Although this 
will be an uphill road, believes Ivanov, since confidence was 
undermined as a result of NATO's action in the Balkans. 
Another acute subject was the situation in Kosovo. At the 
final press conference Ivanov again expressed concern over 
failure to fulfil UN Security Council resolution No 1244.
However, in his words, it is good that the West has stopped 
linking its implementation to the situation in Yugoslavia. The 
statement on the results of the meeting of the Joint Permanent 
Council says that sides "are full of resolve to work together 
to ensure Kosovo's multiethnicity, put an end to violence 
against ethnic minorities and enable refugees and internal 
displaced persons regardless of ethnic origin to return 
home..." Ivanov also said that now that less than 100,000 Serbs 
remain in Kosovo, Moscow deems holding local elections 
inexpedient. The recent visit of Yugoslav Defense Minister 
Dragoljub Ojdanic, who is wanted by the International Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, caused a scandal during the 
discussion. Ivanov was actually the first top-ranking official 
to admit that "the recent visit of the Yugoslav defense 
minister to Moscow was due to internal malfunction between 
individual services." The explanations offered by Moscow to the 
chairman of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia have been accepted and he (the chairman) considers 
the question closed, he noted. At the same time, Ivanov said 
that the Tribunal's work was far from perfect. It has turned 
from "a court of law into a political body," due to which 
Moscow may raise in the UN Security Council the question of 
bringing this fact in line with the provision of the Security 
Council resolution under which its was created, he noted. 
The session of the Russia-NATO Joint Permanent Council 
practically did not discuss the Chechen subject, with the sides 
just exchanging information. Ivanov recalled that under the 
Founding Act, the internal issues of the alliance and Russia 
are not broached at such meetings. However, he himself could 
not but react to the final communique of the NATO Council held 
the day before. It has an item calling to hold talks with 
representatives of Ichkeria and assessments that are clearly at 
variance with the state of affairs in the republic.
"One has a feeling that they were made on the basis of 
information of five months ago," said the head of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry. To prove his point, he demonstrated to his 
colleagues Aslan Maskhadov's order to eliminate the Chechens 
who collaborate with the federal bodies of power.
Florence 

******


#4
Date: Fri, 26 May 2000
From: Garfield Reynolds <garfield@imedia.ru>
Subject: Re: 4325-Aris/Putin's Economic Policy


Ben writes: From a purely pragmatic point of view donąt most Russians want
bread,
work and dignity, more than civil liberties at this point?


I respond: Why is it that bread, work and dignity somehow exclude civil
liberties? In fact, civil liberties are vital for the creation of a system
that
would deliver the maximum amount of these to the maxi mum amount of people.
Economic and political power go hand in hand, and Putin is doing his best
to make
sure that such power remains in the hands of an oligopolistic elite.


Yours sincerely,
Garfield Reynolds,
Managing Editor,
The Moscow Times.


******


#5
Russia freeing 120,000 to mark war anniversary

MOSCOW, May 26 (Reuters) - Russia's parliament declared an amnesty on Friday 
in which it will free about 120,000 prison inmates in a goodwill gesture to 
mark the 55th anniversary of the end of World War Two in Europe. 


The State Duma lower house overwhelmingly adopted a resolution pardoning 
people sentenced or facing trial for minor crimes. 


A senior Duma deputy, Pavel Krasheninnikov, told Reuters that it was 
impossible to say how many people who have not served full sentences would be 
affected by the amnesty. 


Russia traditionally announces amnesties on major national holidays. The 
government also views amnesties as a way to free space in the country's 
overcrowded prisons. 


Russia has one of the biggest prison populations in the world. International 
human rights campaigners have condemned the squalid, disease-ridden 
conditions in which most prisoners live. 


Many respected politicians and other public figures have urged parliament to 
change legislation so that minor crimes would not be punished by prison 
terms. 


******


#6
The Guardian (UK)
26 May 2000
[for personal use only]
RUSSIAN CINEMA FEARS LOSS OF PROP
By Amelia Gentleman


Russia's film-making community is in uproar over President Vladimir Putin's
decision to abolish the film ministry - a move they claim will cripple the
struggling industry. 


Leading film directors this week held an emergency meeting to protest that
Russia's cinema tradition would not survive without the support of the
powerful state committee for cinematography (Goskino) to lobby for it. 


As part of a government streamlining drive ordered by Mr Putin this week,
Goskino is to be swallowed up by the ministry of culture. 'Everything will
go to pieces, there will be a total collapse,' Sergei Lazaruk, Goskino's
deputy chairman, warned yesterday. 


The head of Russia's independent film studio, Mosfilm, was also adamant
that the decision would have dire consequences. 'The abolition of this
ministry just when Russia's film industry is beginning to come back to life
can only be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to destroy the country's
cinema,' he said. 


Russia's most famous and politically influential director, Nikita Mikhalkov
- who made the Oscar-winning Burnt by the Sun - is to lead a group of
prominent film industry figures to appeal to Mr Putin next week, in an
attempt to get him to rethink. 


Protesters are worried that without the expertise concentrated in the walls
of Goskino, bureaucracy will intensify and the quality of Russia's films
will drop. There is also concern that the modest profits the industry has
recently begun to make will be siphoned off to subsidise other cultural
projects. 


'Five years ago when Russian film was destitute and half dead, no one paid
any attention to Goskino,' Mr Mikhalkov said. The government had noticed it
only because 'the industry has started to be profitable,' he said. 


No independent-minded film makers would have campaigned for the
preservation of Goskino 20 years ago. The organisation has its roots in a
1919 decree by Lenin, ordering the film industry to be harnessed to the
state's crusade for ideological enlightenment. 


In the Soviet era, Goskino's remit was to 'strengthen the role of cinema in
the building of communism' and to 'help in the active promotion of
Marxist-Leninist views among the Soviet people'. Censors in the
script-reading room of Goskino's Moscow headquarters spent all day scanning
new texts for ideological suitability. 


The organisation was disbanded in 1991, but after several months of chaos
film-makers decided they needed a central coordinating body and Goskino was
resurrected to allocate government subsidies and to organise film
distribution. It has worked since then in an administrative support
capacity, championing the interests of film-makers. 


After a barren stretch, the film industry is beginning to see a revival.
Domestic enthusiasm for cinema is growing; in the mid-1990s, 97% of
Russians did not visit the cinema even once a year. Last year, 35% ventured
out to the cinema at least once. 


In last year's budget, the government allocated pounds 10.5m to the film
business. 


*******
#7
Financial Times (UK)
26 May 2000
[for personal use only]
Moscow's mandate for change: Romano Prodi finds much to be optimistic about
in Vladimir Putin's Russia - given the right programme of reform.
The writer is president of the European Commission 


Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, will shortly announce his new
economic policy strategy and make clear his foreign policy priorities. Next
week's EU-Russia summit in the Kremlin, which will preceed the visit of
President Bill Clinton to Moscow, therefore comes at an important moment in
Europe's relationship with its largest and most influential neighbour.
Europe must seize with both hands the extraordinary opportunity offered to
open a comprehensive dialogue between the EU and Russia. 


The economic programme will be crucial to Russia's future relations with
the rest of the world. It will determine the attitude of international
investors whose confidence is vital to the economic future of the country.
Hubert Vedrine, French foreign minister, and Laurent Fabius, French finance
minister, are right to suggest that it is a good moment to take stock of
Europe's relations with Russia and their prospects (Financial Times, April
25). 


Europe sees reasons for optimism. Mr Putin's strong performance in the
presidential elections gives him a solid mandate for change. He has said he
is committed to reform and open to European ideals. Russia faces huge
challenges, such as that in Chechnya. This is why he needs to show strong
and visionary leadership. 


Europe has high expectations. The priority is to ensure strong and
effective institutions to underpin the rule of law. No amount of liberal
and constructive legislation on the statute book will make any difference
if the courts are too weak to ensure it is applied. Bankruptcy legislation
will have an impact on investors' confidence only if they see it preventing
the discrimination and abuse that have done so much to undermine Russia's
image in the past. 


A more modern tax system will only have the desired benefits, including
boosting government revenues, if its enforcement is improved. Better
relations with the international financial institutions and progress on
debt relief will require more decisive action against corruption, fraud and
money laundering. 


Russia also needs to press ahead with the unfinished business of structural
reform. In particular, this means action on tax reform, bank restructuring,
industrial modernisation and new rules on land ownership. Improved
prudential supervision and a fairer, more open legal environment for
business are vital if Russia wants to attract more international capital
flows, tackle crippling capital flight and create an appealing climate for
investors. By promoting initiatives such as the EU-Russia industrialists'
Round Table, Europe can help to foster the necessary mutual trust and
understanding. 


In addition, Europe is naturally keen to acknowledge Mr Putin's electoral
success in the early days of his presidency. But the Chechnya conflict is
still not over and concerns over the treatment of civilians and the
difficulties faced by international humanitarian and human rights
organisations in the region have not disappeared. 


Public opinion in the EU has been deeply touched by reports coming from
Chechnya. Against this background, Europe expects from Mr Putin a new and
more constructive approach to individual rights and personal freedom. 


Finally, Europe needs to work for improved EU-Russia trade relations. This
is a key theme of the EU's Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with
Russia and the recently adopted common strategy. The EU accounts for almost
40 per cent of all Russian external trade and Russia has a Euros 10bn
annual trade surplus with Europe. Both the EU and Russia have everything to
gain from more open trade relations. Most important, Russia needs to
accelerate its process of WTO accession. In that, of course, it continues
to have the EU's full support. 


There are too many crucial political issues that demand Russian
involvement. Three in particular are likely to bear heavily on EU-Russia
relations in the coming years. First, and perhaps most obviously, the
Balkans, where it is difficult to imagine lasting stability without Russian
support. Second, EU enlargement, where although Russia is not directly
involved in the negotiations with the candidate countries, the EU
acknowledges its deep interest and wants to keep channels of communication
open. Third, nuclear safety, which has perhaps not received the attention
it deserves, but that could become the biggest challenge Europe faces in
the coming years as Russia's ageing and obsolete stock of power stations,
reactors and military equipment needs to be decommissioned. 


The EU is Russia's first partner by far in all fields. This is why I look
forward to meeting President Putin in the Kremlin and initiating strong
co-operation that will be of strategic importance in the years to come,
both for the Russian Federation and for the European Commission. 


*******
#8
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
RUSSIAN EXODUS FROM KYRGYZSTAN FUELLED BY POVERTY, ISLAMIC FEARS
25-May-2000


Skilled Russian workers are flooding out of the Central Asian republic of
Kyrgyzstan, a migration sparked by economic hardship and accentuated by
fears of Islamic extremism, officials say. 


Official concern about the scale of the exodus this week prompted Kyrgyz
President Askar Akayev to issue a decree bolstering the rights of the
800,000 ethnic Russians who live in the former Soviet republic. 


Experts blame the brain-drain largely on Kyrgyzstan's struggling economy,
which was hit hard by the financial meltdown in Russia in 1998. 


However, the experts say the threat of unrest linked to Muslim
fundamentalists has intensified the Russian migration. 


Presidential spokesman Osmonakun Ibraimov said "fears of a repeat of the
incursion of international terrorists in the south of the republic" was
behind the outflow. 


Kyrgyzstan had enjoyed relative political stability until last August when
around 1,000 Islamic rebels invaded the south of the republic and took four
Japanese geologists and about a dozen Kyrgyz citizens hostage. 


Although the scientists were released two months later, the saga rattled
the authorities, who fear the Islamic rebels could return from Tajikistan,
where they fled after releasing their hostages. 


Since then, Askar has crackdown on political rivals and banned leading
opposition parties from March legislative elections that were marred by
widespread violations. Thousands took to the streets in protest. 


In the wake of the hostage crisis the number of Russians leaving Kyrgyzstan
rocketed from 5,000 a year to 5,000 a month, said Vasily Ostapchuk,
director of the migration service at the Russian embassy here. 


Some 30,000 ethnic Russians left Kyrgyzstan during the first four months of
this year, he said. 


Despite official sensitivities surrounding the perceived Islamic threat,
Ibraimov admitted, however, that "economic factors and unemployment" were
also a major reason for ethnic Russians to leave. 


Kyrgyzstan's currency slumped sharply from 29.4 som to the dollar at the
end of 1998 to 45.5 som to the dollar at the end of last year as the
fallout from Russia's financial meltdown hit its neighbours. 


Economic growth slowed abruptly, increasing by just 2.1 percent in 1998 and
3.6 percent last year, compared to the 9.9 percent recorded in 1997. 


The average monthly wage is just 20 dollars (22 euros) in Kyrgyzstan, which
lacks the lucrative oil and gas wealth that has attracted heavy foreign
investment to its Central Asian neighbours. 


"Those that leave say that if they received the same wage in Kyrgyzstan
that they do in Russia, then the Batken (hostage-taking crisis) would not
frighten them," said Bulat Sarygulov, deputy director of the agency of
migration and demography. 


Valery Vishnevsky, head of the Kyrgyz Slavonic Fund, cited unemployment,
lack of prospects and discrimination as the main factors forcing Russians
to leave. 


"If Russians felt that they were complete and legal citizens, then events
(like the hostage incident) would not frighten them," he said. 


Many of those decamping are skilled and highly qualified specialists who
worked in the military industrial complexes that now stand idle, he said. 


"The factories have stopped working and people are worried about what sort
of education their children are going to receive. It bodes ill for the
future of the country," he added. 


"If our plants start working again I fear that there will be no one left to
work in them," said Sarygulov. 


President Akayev, who faces a presidential election later this year, on
Monday issued an order aimed at shoring up the rights of ethnic Russians in
the country. 


The order promises to give Russians a greater role in the running of the
country and urged parliament to give Russian the status of an official
language. 


It further pledges to take tough measures against those found guilty of
discrimination and would allow Russians to enjoy dual citizenship. 


But Vishnevsky said that while the president's order was a sign he wanted
to take steps to stop the brain drain, he doubted that parliament was
interested in improving the plight of Russians. 


******


#9
Russian Afghan strikes would stir trouble - general
May 26, 2000
By Andrei Shukshin
MOSCOW (Reuters) - A top Russian general said Friday that Moscow risked 
sparking violence in parts of ex-Soviet Central Asia if it went ahead with 
attacks on Taliban bases in Afghanistan. 


Col. Gen. Konstantin Totsky, commander of Russia's Border Guards, said Moscow 
was within its rights to launch such strikes, but warned that the price would 
be inevitable destabilization in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 


Moscow has vowed to defend the two former Soviet republics bordering 
Afghanistan, where it says Chechen rebels receive military training in camps 
sponsored by the ruling Afghan Taliban, an ultraconservative Islamic 
religious movement. 


Russia has said it would launch strikes against the bases if Kabul did not 
stop providing military aid to the rebels. 


``I would hate to see further Taliban action prompting these preemptive 
strikes,'' Totsky said. ``And I am absolutely certain that they would sharply 
aggravate the situation on the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.'' 


Echoing Totsky's concern, the Kremlin's main Chechnya spokesman, Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky, said Moscow had ruled out any serious military involvement in 
Afghanistan. 


``Relaunching anything like the (Soviet Union's) Afghan adventure is 
absolutely out of the question,'' Interfax news agency quoted him as saying. 


The last Soviet troops withdrew in humiliation from Afghanistan in 1989 after 
10 years of fighting guerrillas opposed to the Moscow-backed regime in Kabul. 


Last Monday, Yastrzhembsky accused the Taliban of harboring the Chechen 
rebels. The Taliban, which controls much of Afghanistan, infuriated Moscow 
several months ago by officially recognizing Chechnya as an independent 
state. 


The Taliban, which itself is only recognized by a handful of governments, has 
denied providing training to the Muslim rebels fighting Russian forces in its 
separatist province of Chechnya. 


The Taliban has warned Moscow that it will hold Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
responsible for any Russian military action against the territory it 
controls. 


Despite pledges of help from Moscow, both countries remain potentially 
vulnerable to extremist groups, which command some following among their 
overwhelmingly Muslim population and are believed to cooperate with the 
Taliban. 


******


#10
From: Alan@CARNEGIE.RU (Alan Rousso)
Subject: US-Russia
Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 


David,
Attached is a piece I just wrote on the upcoming US-Russia summit which will
serve as my "talking points" for a press conference in Moscow next week and
will later appear (in revised form) as a Carnegie Moscow Center "Briefing."
Feel free to post it on the list if you think your readers would be
interested.


Best regards,
Alan
Alan Rousso
Director
Carnegie Moscow Center
Tel: 7 095 935-8904
Fax: 7 095 935-8906
email: alan@carnegie.ru
http://www.carnegie.ru



Clinton-Putin I: A False START
Alan Rousso
Carnegie Moscow Center


When Bill Clinton last visited the Russian federation, he found a country
badly wounded by the August 1998 financial crash and working its way
through a profound political, social, and economic crisis. To critics at
home and jaded Russians here in Moscow, the president was surveying the
ruins of a well-intentioned Russia policy gone bad. Curiously, Mr. Clinton
chose to use this opportunity not to reassure the Kremlin and the Russian
people but to admonish the newly installed Russian government and his old
friend Boris Yeltsin that they must stay on the economic straight and
narrow, striking a discordant note and expanding the already deep reservoir
of anti-American opinion. This off-key performance was followed by a
series of events in the ensuing year which did a lot to put the foundering
US-Russian relationship at risk of complete collapse.


First, NATO marked its 50th anniversary with the formal inclusion of three
former Soviet-bloc states - Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic - a
reality which, despite the so-called "soft landing" made possible by the
creation of the Permanent Joint Council, still rankled the defense
establishment and foreign policy elites in Moscow. To make matters worse,
the Atlantic Alliance's new strategic concept, urging more out-of-area
peacekeeping missions, was tested almost immediately in the bombing
campaign against Serbia. Russia's ultimate cooperation in resolving the
dispute over Kosovo diplomatically did not blunt the sense of resentment
here that the United States had acted contrary to international law and to
Russia's interests in a region to which it has both ethnic and historical
links as well as geopolitical concerns. When tensions over Yugoslavia had
barely died down, the massive money laundering scandal broke in the summer
of 1999, claiming that over $10 billion had been illegally funneled through
the Bank of New York by dummy corporations linked to known Russian criminal
figures. Three Congressional hearings ensued, during which a lot of name
calling and unfounded accusations were hurled at Russia against the
background of a sterile and highly-politicized "Who Lost Russia" debate in
Washington. Finally, by the fall of 1999 Russia launched a second campaign
in the separatist region of Chechnya which had the strong backing of the
Russian people but turned the country into an international pariah thanks
to the use of indiscriminate and highly deadly means of prosecuting the
war, high rates of civilian casualties, a tragic refugee crisis which the
conflict threw off in neighboring Ingushetia, and accusations of war crimes
by the world's leading human rights organizations.


It has been an eventful year to say the least, and these and other recent
contretemps have caste a shadow over the coming summit. Moreover, the
timing is awkward. Russia has elected a new president who in these first
few months following his inauguration may have the authority and
credibility to pull off a breakthrough agreement with the United States.
Certainly the effortless ratification of the long-stalled START II treaty
by the Russian Duma demonstrated that this new president, who strongly
favored passage, could have his way with the new and improved lower house.
But Bill Clinton is in the final year of his presidency and therefore comes
to Russia as a lame (and, after Monicagate, wounded) duck.


So, what is the agenda for the summit and what can realistically be
accomplished in the sphere of US-Russian relations this year?


As is customary when the leaders of the world's two leading nuclear powers
get together, this summit was being planned around strategic arms control.
President Clinton has waited more than seven years for the opportunity to
sign a major arms control accord with Russia, having been barred from any
new negotiations while the Russian Duma held up ratification of the START
II treaty signed by presidents Bush and Yeltsin. He would very much like
to cap his presidency with such an achievement, if only to secure his name
in the history books as a peacemaker. Thus, the early word from both
capitals was that the summit would be dominated by discussions of START III
and modification of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. The two
issues are linked, for both real strategic and diplomatic tactical reasons.
Despite protestations to the contrary, the Russians seem open to the
possibility of modification of ABM - which they consider the cornerstone of
effective deterrence - as long as they can convince US negotiators to set
START III targets at somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500 warheads per side.
In that case, the potentially destabilizing effects of national missile
defense will be compensated by the reduction in nuclear arsenals which
would diminish a credible US first strike threat. Moreover, such an
arrangement would make a virtue out of a necessity, since the overstretched
Russian military can hardly afford to stay at START II levels for long
without busting the defense budget. Clinton administration officials
seemed to warm to this "grand bargain" when they saw some daylight in
Moscow for securing a deal on ABM.


But coming away with an agreement, it now appears, will be difficult if not
impossible. The American defense establishment is uncomfortable with the
START III targets preferred by the Russian side and wants to keep them
somewhere above 2500 warheads per side. They are not willing to bargain
for national missile defense which was not their idea in the first place
and which most realize would be either ineffective or unnecessary and in
any case destabilizing. But beyond questions of affordability and
feasibility of such a system (which are serious), some of the biggest
concerns relate to the message deployment of even a limited NMD system
would send to America's allies in Europe (who fear this would eventually
erode the US extended deterrent on the continent) and to China (which will
certainly view this as a means to degrade their nuclear second strike
capability).


The urgency behind NMD comes from Republicans in the US Congress who have
outmaneuvered Clinton on the issue and forced him to advocate and defend an
initiative one senses he does not fully believe in. And the Congress is
giving him very little room to negotiate. Advocates of NMD want a system
in place immediately with or without Russian compliance, and they're not
willing to compromise a whole lot on START or anything else to get their
way. Whatever deal Mr. Clinton comes back with - even one where the
Russians accede grudgingly to modification of ABM allowing an additional
defensive site in Alaska - will be scuttled by the Republicans who are hell
bent for leather to turn this summit into a foreign policy disaster for the
outgoing administration. Any agreement, even one clearly in US security
interests, will be seen as a victory for Clinton/Gore which Republicans
feel they can ill afford so close to a presidential election in which their
man, George Bush Jr., is in a tight race with Vice President Gore. In
short, the Congress would rather wait till a new president is elected
before agreeing to go along with any breakthrough accords on the key
nuclear arms control issues that would otherwise surely have been at the
center of this summit.


Thus, what was shaping up as a compelling chess game has quickly turned
into a stalemate before the first pawn was moved. The most than can be
hoped for in terms of the strategic arms control agenda for this summit is
the vaguest sort of announcement on how negotiations on START III and ABM
may proceed in the future. As a result, an effort is currently under way
in Washington to downplay the summit agenda and to look upon the visit as
more of a get-to-know-you opportunity with the new Russian president. But
that is not what presidential summitry is for. There will be plenty of
other opportunities this year for Clinton to get the measure of Vladimir
Putin - there are three occasions already on both presidents' schedules for
July, September, and November - and any attempt to spin this as simply a
"friendly exchange of views" will be criticized back home (rightly) as a
dodge and a waste of the tax payers' money.


To give the talks a patina of seriousness, other strategic and
non-proliferation issues will surely come up, most importantly Russia's
relationship with Iran which gives Washington the shivers. Since Putin
arrived in the Kremlin there has been no progress on this matter, with the
Russians stating unequivocally that they intend to continue supplying Iran
with assistance in their building of peaceful nuclear facilities and the US
continuing to sanction extraterritorially Russian scientific institutes
found guilty of transferring missile-related technology. The only area
where there is likely to be some agreement is on plutonium disposal - where
a final deal is near - and better policing and enforcement of the export
control regime. Similarly, much will be made of the American commitment to
de-nuclearization and leakage of fissile materials. The US Congress just
recently agreed to finance in full the administration's request for
increased assistance to Russia under the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program (also known as Nunn-Lugar for the program's sponsors in the US
Senate), and progress on this front will give the two presidents something
to crow about.


Recently, the president's spokesman remarked that Mr. Clinton would use
this visit to "speak to a broad spectrum of leaders who are building new
democratic institutions, civil society, and a market economy." But this is
hardly likely to become the focal point of the summit. Were it to become
so, it would surely come into conflict with the administration's clearly
marked intention to set differences aside and accentuate the positive in
US-Russian relations. To put it more concretely, any substantial effort to
reach out on this front would have to include a reaction to some of the
more worrying signals Moscow has been sending on freedom of the press and
preservation of an open society. The relative silence from the White House
on the controversial Andrei Babitsky case earlier in the year and the more
recent storming of the Media-Most headquarters - the latter an obvious
attempt by the Kremlin to intimidate the heads of the most independent and,
at times, critical media conglomerate in Russia - indicates that they are
not looking to ruffle any feathers. A vague presidential sermon is the
most we can hope for on this set of issues.


That leaves the economy, Chechnya, and few assorted less central issues for
the two heads of state to chew on. Mr. Clinton is likely to find a
receptive audience this time around where American economic priorities are
concerned. At least in terms of his declaratory stand on key economic
questions, Putin's views are compatible with those of the West in general -
he has stated his overall intention to push reforms forward, to crack down
on corruption and money laundering, to create a level playing field for
local and foreign businesses, to encourage foreign investment and to spur
entrepreneurial activity. The government now in place is headed by Mikhail
Kasyanov who has good reputation in the West as a liberal technocrat and
the cabinet has many well-known reformers in key ministerial positions,
including finance and economy development and trade. Historically, that
has been enough to guarantee US support, notwithstanding the government's
actual performance on implementing structural reforms which has been poor.
On international questions, Russia's bid to join the WTO, its efforts to
restructure Paris Club debt, and the chances for further loans from the
major international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD) will
undoubtedly come up for discussion, but little of consequence will come out
of these meetings. Indeed, most of the main questions have already been
answered, as the major institutional donors have already made clear their
intention to resume lending now that the political underbrush has been
cleared away. The goal is to establish a common language and common goals
and then conclude this session with non-committal promises.


Chechnya cannot be avoided, much as the Russian side would like to see the
whole matter confined to the back burner. But Western governments have
decided that the time for tough talk is over - Mr. Clinton will not berate
his Russian counterpart and threaten to isolate Russia over this matter -
with the United States now prepared to accept that as long as Mr. Putin
deals directly with human rights issues (if not to the satisfaction of
independent watchdog groups then at least to the standards of international
organizations like the Council of Europe) they will not allow this problem
to become the skunk at their garden party. However, a stern reminder of
America's belief in the protection of innocents and civilized treatment of
refugees will have to be mixed in with the more anodyne comments on
"fighting a common battle against global terrorism" if only to satisfy
those paying attention at home. In this connection, one can expect the
American president to support Russia's efforts to cooperate with Central
Asian states in managing problems of Islamic extremism stemming from the
Taliban in Afghanistan, but to urge caution in carrying out the threatened
air strikes against terrorist bases there lest the Chechen war spread
throughout this tinderbox region.


Finally, there are a number of issues - some of which are potential
irritants to the relationship - on which Mr. Clinton may use this
opportunity to reiterate the official US position. Russia's enduring and
strengthening ties to Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia is one such issue. The
flap over Russia's failure to arrest the Yugoslav defense minister
Dragoljub Ojdanic during his official visit to Moscow - Ojdanic is an
indicted war criminal wanted by the Hague's War Crimes Tribunal - and its
recent announcement that $102 million will be sent to Belgrade for postwar
reconstruction, puts the United States and Russia on completely opposite
sides of the fence on this matter. Not all the fires have been put out in
the still smoldering Balkans, and while these differences have been papered
over in recent visits by the president's key advisors it would be natural
to expect Mr. Clinton himself to seek some assurances from Moscow on
handling future eruptions of ethnic violence in Southeastern Europe.
Similarly, US-Russian competition in the Caucusus and Central Asia may come
to the fore in the course of this summit, though they will by no means
preoccupy the two sides. Mr. Putin can be expected to make clear the
priority he places on this region - his first official trip abroad after
his inauguration was to the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan - while the US will seek to lay down some policy markers.
With Chechen rebels gathering forces in Georgia, the US will make clear its
position that it would not like to see the war spread southward and
complicate its relations with the independent states on Russia's southern
border. And longstanding disputes on the economic and geostrategic
implications of energy extraction and transportation from the Caspian have
not gotten any easier after the discovery of large petroleum reserves in
the northern Caspian sea off of Kazakhstan earlier this month - the US sees
this as a spur for development of the proposed Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline
which bypasses Russia and Iran, while the Russians are keen to preserve
their role in the region and will insist on "fair oil competition" in their
strategic backyard. No real confrontation is in the offing, but tensions
over this issue tend to run high.


This summit has already been sacrificed. The Clinton administration's
early hopes that it could provide an opportunity for a breakthrough on
US-Russian relations in the arms control sphere have been dashed, thanks to
a combination of Russia's obstreperousness, the US military's cold feet on
deep cuts in strategic arsenals, and the Republican party's unwillingness
to permit the outgoing president an eleventh hour victory. The consolation
prize for Clinton will be an opportunity to re-caste his administration's
Russia policy as at least a partial success in light of the country's first
peaceful, democratic transition of power in its thousand year history, an
uptick in economic performance and a return to the reform path after the
August 1998 financial crisis, and some progress on non-proliferation and
de-nuclearization which will be heralded as a major boon to global
security. It will up to the cynics and the Republicans to find the many
holes in that argument.


*******


#11
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
May 26, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
DUMA UNANIMOUS ON PROPOSED REFORMS
Never before has the State Duma demonstrated such 
unanimity: already now all the deputy factions and groups 
expressed certainty that the package of draft laws on the 
reform of the power system would be approved. 
By Anna KOZYREVA

The first reading of the three draft laws submitted by the 
Russian President to the State Duma (parliament's lower 
chamber) will be held next Wednesday, on May 31. As Alexander 
Kotenkov, the president's representative in the State Duma 
stressed, he did not notice active opponents of the draft law 
among the deputies. Even the Yabloko faction known for 
demonstrations of "its special opinion" every now and then, is 
not going to impose a veto on the package of new draft laws.
However, Yabloko members, not wishing to "betray their 
principles," mentioned that they had an alternative draft law 
on the formation of the Federation Council.
Realizing the importance of the events occurring in the 
country, the State Duma Council adopted the decision to prolong 
the chamber's spring session till July 7. The Duma members even 
expressed the wish to gather in their office in Okhotny Ryad 
Street during the holidays, if such a need arises. This may 
happen if the Federation Council imposes a veto on the adoption 
of the three draft laws after July 7.
The deputies are unanimous that the president's draft laws 
should be approved without delay and translated into life. Oleg 
Morozov, head of the deputy group Russia's regions, called 
measures proposed by Vladimir Putin in order to strengthen 
control over compliance with federal legislation and activities 
of the heads of administrations of the constituent members of 
the Federation "timely and necessary." Chairman of the defence 
committee Andrei Nikolayev believes that by his legislative 
initiatives the Russian President pursues the task to restore 
the system of power in the country. In the opinion of Vladimir 
Platonov, chairman of the Moscow City Duma, "this does not 
concern the governors personally; it concerns state structure." 
Meanwhile, parliamentary hearings (with the participation of 
both chambers of parliament and representatives of the head of 
state and the government) were proposed to be held prior to 
consideration by the State Duma of the president's draft laws 
in the first reading. Yegor Stroyev has already instructed the 
relevant services to send the necessary documents to his 
deputies and heads of the Federation Council's committees.

******


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