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May
24, 2000
This Date's Issues: 4321 • 4322
Johnson's Russia List
#4321
24 May 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. APN: No sex in Russia.
2. Itar-Tass: Capital of Russian Banks to Reach Pre-Crisis Levels
in 2000.
3. Reuters: Robertson says Russia could one day join NATO.
4. AFP: Putin pins colours to mast of tax reform.
5. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, Fighting Bureaucracy With Bureaucracy.
6. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Andrei Litvinov, NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
ESTABLISHED. St. Petersburg Liberals Assume Key Positions.
7. History News Service: Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Vladimir Putin: Not the Jefferson of Russia.
8. Reuters: Environmentalists say Putin allows nature theft.
9. gazeta.ru: Unity to Adopt Communist Practices.
10. Interfax: IF US VIOLATES ABM TREATY, RUSSIA MAY PULL OUT OF
START-I - DUMA FIGURE. (Rogozin)
11. Reuters: Russian court to consider Beria rehabilitation.
12. TIME EUROPE: NDREW MEIER and YURI ZARAKHOVICH, Putin Tightens
His Grip.
13. smi.ru: Governor-Generals Will Deprive Governors Of Their
Generals.
14. Moscow Times: Sarah Karush, Tatarstan Shows No Sign of Surrender.
15. Kommersant: The Dollar is the Proletariat's Weapon. Comrade
Zyuganov Said at the Top of his Voice.
16. Interfax: NUCLEAR AGE HAS CLAIMED BILLIONS OF LIVES - RUSSIAN
ECOLOGIST.
17. smi.ru: There Is No Longer Any Need for Inviting IMF. It Will
Come Itself.]
Johnson's Russia List
#4321
24 May 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. APN: No sex in Russia.
2. Itar-Tass: Capital of Russian Banks to Reach Pre-Crisis Levels
in 2000.
3. Reuters: Robertson says Russia could one day join NATO.
4. AFP: Putin pins colours to mast of tax reform.
5. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, Fighting Bureaucracy With
Bureaucracy.
6. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Andrei Litvinov, NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
ESTABLISHED. St. Petersburg Liberals Assume Key Positions.
7. History News Service: Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Vladimir Putin:
Not the Jefferson of Russia.
8. Reuters: Environmentalists say Putin allows nature theft.
9. gazeta.ru: Unity to Adopt Communist Practices.
10. Interfax: IF US VIOLATES ABM TREATY, RUSSIA MAY PULL OUT OF
START-I - DUMA FIGURE. (Rogozin)
11. Reuters: Russian court to consider Beria rehabilitation.
12. TIME EUROPE: NDREW MEIER and YURI ZARAKHOVICH, Putin Tightens
His Grip.
13. smi.ru: Governor-Generals Will Deprive Governors Of Their
Generals.
14. Moscow Times: Sarah Karush, Tatarstan Shows No Sign of Surrender.
15. Kommersant: The Dollar is the Proletariat's Weapon. Comrade
Zyuganov Said at the Top of his Voice.
16. Interfax: NUCLEAR AGE HAS CLAIMED BILLIONS OF LIVES - RUSSIAN
ECOLOGIST.
17. smi.ru: There Is No Longer Any Need for Inviting IMF. It Will
Come Itself.]
******
#1
APN
23 May, 2000
No sex in Russia
The conclusion follows from all-Russian polls conducted in May by independent
research center ROMIR. (The surveys were made on a random basis, N=2000, 41
subjects of the Russian Federation, 203 points of inquiry.)
Sociologists suggested that Russians should dispute whether casual sexual
contacts are justified or not. It proved clear that 42.1% of respondents
consider casual sexual contacts unjustified in any case. 21.3% regard
contacts of this sort as unjustified in most cases.
None of respondents consider casual sex justified in all cases. Some 3% think
it is justified in most cases. 6.5% of Russians found difficulty in answering.
The rest citizens, declined to compromises, believe that in some cases casual
sexual contacts are justified and in some cases are not.
It turns out the Russians are patriarchal people who stick to traditional
moral rules.
True, certain empirical data reveal the fact that not all Russian men and
women are modest, touchy persons. It is well known that prostitution in major
Russian cities is beyond the pale.
Russians` word seems to disagree with their deed in delicate intimate sphere.
It`s not without reason a Russian saying reads: «No sin no repentance, no
repentance no redemption.»
******
#2
Capital of Russian Banks to Reach Pre-Crisis Levels in 2000.
MOSCOW, May 23 (Itar-Tass) - The capitalisation of Russian banks will by late
2000 reach levels it had enjoyed before the August 1998 crisis, president of
the Association of Russian Banks (ARB), Sergei Yegorov, told an ARB
conference on Tuesday.
The capital of all Russian banks rose by 1.5 times to reach 145 billion
roubles (5.12 billion dollars) in 1999, Yegorov said, adding that the capital
of regional ones registered a three-fold increase.
The banks' credit investment had been estimated at 625 billion roubles (22.01
billion dollars) as of the beginning of 2000, according to him.
Russia's banks have adapted to the new conditions, but their aggregate
capital is still insufficient, he aid, adding that it is necessary to pass a
bill providing guarantees for deposits and attracting foreign money to
restructure the country's banking system.
******
#3
Robertson says Russia could one day join NATO
May 23, 2000
MOSCOW (Reuters) - NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson was quoted Tuesday
as saying he backed the idea of Russia joining the Western military alliance
although it was unlikely to happen soon.
``When President Putin was asked if Russia might become a member of NATO one
day, he said: 'Why not?' That's my position. Though it's not on the agenda
today,'' Robertson said in an interview published in Wednesday's edition of
Izvestia daily.
Putin made the comments about joining NATO in March, heralding a thaw in
Russia-NATO relations which had become frozen over Moscow's opposition to the
alliance's bombing campaign in Yugoslavia last year.
``I hope that step-by-step we will continue to improve our relations,'' said
Robertson, who was British defense minister during the Kosovo crisis. ``I
think we are moving toward the normalization of relations.''
Despite improving ties, Russia has kept up its criticism of NATO's actions
during the Kosovo crisis. It earlier this month secretly invited Yugoslav
Defense Minister Drogoljub Ojdanic, an indicted war criminal, to Moscow for
talks.
Russia has close ethnic and religious ties to Serbia, the dominant partner in
the Yugoslav Federation.
Robertson said he had recently spoken to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
about a meeting scheduled for Wednesday when both are due to meet alliance
foreign ministers in the Italian city of Florence.
He said Russia and NATO had some talking to do after both recently formulated
new doctrines regulating nuclear strikes.
``The more we talk about these 'misunderstandings' the more we strengthen our
security. NATO does not view Russia as an opponent,'' he said.
******
#4
Putin pins colours to mast of tax reform
MOSCOW, May 23 (AFP) -
Vladimir Putin urged lawmakers Tuesday to quickly approval radical fiscal
reforms aimed at ending a national pastime -- tax evasion -- a first economic
test for Russia's new president.
Economy chief Alexei Kudrin said Putin had written to deputies requesting a
speedy passage through the State Duma lower house of parliament of an
overhaul of the punitive tax code that is seen as a brake on investment.
The letter aims to "help deputies work out their position," said Kudrin, who
is a deputy prime minister in the new cabinet and holds the key finance
portfolio.
Key changes include a flat rate 13 percent income tax, abolition of a five
percent business turnover tax, and the simplification and reduction of social
security charges.
The State Duma lower house of parliament is due shortly to debate part two of
the revamped tax code, which contains specific taxes, their rates, tax
exemptions and tax breaks.
Amendments to part one, which aims to improve tax compliance and streamline
the Soviet-era tax administration system, will also be laid before the
chamber.
Putin wants the bulk of measures relating to the second part of the tax
reform to be on the statute book by the time lawmakers take their summer
break, which will likely be pushed back three weeks to July 7.
Kudrin said if approved, the new laws would be able to come into force on
January 1, 2001 and be incorporated into budget calculations for that year.
Together, they represent the most far-ranging tax reform in 10 years.
Putin and his Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov currently enjoy good relations
with a so-far co-operative Duma, but the proposed changes will significantly
modify the tax take of Russia's 89 regions.
Importantly, they will also entail the disappearance of a host of subsidies,
making adoption of the package far from a done deal.
"Having chosen the tax systems as the first target of reform, it is crucial
for the credibility of the rest of the programme that it proves successful,"
the Renaissance Capital finance house said in an investment note.
"Given Russia's abysmal record of following through on reform promises, there
remains enormous scepticism over President Putin's promises to implement
reforms.
"Success would go a long way to establishing credibility. Failure would
undermine the rest of the programme," it added.
Chronically poor tax collection has helped cripple the Russian government's
finances for the past decade.
But with taxes too high, too numerous and too complicated, they have been a
standing invitation to both individuals and businesses to doctor their annual
revenue declarations.
The government's calculates, however, that less tax will generate more
revenues for its threadbare coffers by increasing compliance.
Russia's richest citizens -- those who declare income of more than 150,000
rubles (5,280 dollars, 5,802 euros) a year -- are currently taxed at 30
percent.
But in reality, only 0.5 percent of taxpayers declare revenues that high, and
some 90 percent claim to earn less than 50,000 rubles, or less than 145
dollars a month.
Businesses, responsible for declaring their staff's earnings, deliberately
under-report their wage bill in an effort to cut their liability for social
security payments.
"It's ridiculous that in Moscow (a private company) officially declares that
it pays wages of 200 rubles a month," the then tax minister Alexander
Pochinok complained in an article earlier this month.
"Everyone knows that unemployed workers receive at least 2,500 rubles," he
said, adding that real average salaries in the capital were around 4,500
rubles a month.
Kudrin admitted that many of Russia's famous actors, sports stars and
entertainers escaped the country's tax system by registering abroad.
However, Western experts say that the proposed 13 percent tax rate aimed to
curb ruinous capital flight by making the benefits of illicitly sending funds
abroad marginal.
******
#5
Moscow Times
May 24, 2000
INSIDE RUSSIA: Fighting Bureaucracy With Bureaucracy
By Yulia Latynina
Not a week had passed since the inauguration of President Vladimir Putin when
the shot of a presidential decree was aimed at the governors. In a flash, the
authoritarian regional leaders were told they could be recalled - and that
they would have some kind of governors-general looming over them.
In order to understand how effective this new method for treating the
governors' arbitrary rule will be, we should first look at the reasons for
that arbitrary rule.
There is a powerful economic basis for the governors' actions: the system of
payments. Every entrepreneur must pay taxes. In regional budgets, taxes as a
rule are paid through barter. And prices set for goods used in barter can be
inflated.
This creates an opportunity for abuse of the system. An enterprise whose
director is friendly with the governor can lower its taxes to a laughably low
percentage, by paying them with hard goods valued at an inflated price. An
enterprise that is on the outs with the governor will be forced to pay its
taxes with real money.
The system is so cleverly constructed that arbitrary rule does not entail
stifling a business; it entails allowing a business to survive. It's clear
that on this level there is no outcry - no one protests loudly when his taxes
are lowered. But when a business is stifled - what can it complain of? That
it is forced to pay its taxes? Any governor so accused will throw up his
hands and say, "The slanderers want to get rid of me because I'm complying
with the law!"
The same kind of "rules" also govern the redistribution of property. Of all
the factories seized during the past year, not one of them was seized without
the approval of the governor.
There are many standard ways to seize an enterprise. You can sue it for
recovery of 3 1/2 kopeks and bankrupt it. You can buy 20 percent of the
shares and freeze the remaining 80 percent, call a shareholders meeting and
name a new director. You can buy off the members of the board of directors,
call a meeting of the board and fire the general director. All of these
methods share two main features. First, they require the governor's
cooperation, otherwise the OMON paramilitary police will not be available to
escort the former owners from the premises of the business in question.
Second, these methods are ostensibly perfectly legal, since each time the
OMON troops act, they do so in accordance with the decision of a judge - a
judge controlled by the governor.
But here's the question: If a governor-general is going to stand over the
regional governor - and those very governors can be recalled - what will this
change in terms of arbitrary rule? Will this change the system of payments?
Will it lessen corruption among judges?
The obvious answer is no. It will only increase the number of instances in
which arbitrary rule can be applied.
There is, however, a mechanism of control over the governors - they're called
elections. I won't argue here about whether that mechanism is working: it
isn't. But it is clear why it's not working: If an opposition candidate is to
win, he's got to be financed. But anyone who finances him will find that
their electricity bills shoot up three times, or their water will be cut off.
These days, elections in the regions have turned into an instrument for
squeezing capital out of large taxpayers.
But if you can't eliminate arbitrary rule even with the help of elections,
who says you can eliminate them with the knout?
There's only one thing you can do with the knout - ensure that any seizure of
property comes with the Kremlin's sanction. It's clear why the Kremlin wants
to do this. But we shouldn't adopt centralized arbitrary rule to strengthen
the rule of law.
Yulia Latynina writes for Segodnya.
******
#6
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
May 23, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED
St. Petersburg Liberals Assume Key Positions
By Andrei LITVINOV
In its May 23 issue, Nezavisimaya Gazeta publishes a list
of ministers now serving with Mikhail Kasyanov's Government.
Despite the fact that everyone already knows quite a few names,
experts have some misgivings about the new Cabinet's structure.
Small wonder, the Russian stock market, which is seen as a
traditional financial indicator of nationwide political life,
has reacted in a rather skeptical manner to the appointment of
Government members, what with stock market prices plunging
somewhat. According to some experts, cheaper shares are linked
with stock jobbers' reaction to the appearance of new Cabinet
members. Quite a few people note that the Russian Cabinet
boasts numerous officials, whose names still say nothing to
market players. As far as more familiar persons, namely
Khristenko, Aksenenko and Adamov, are concerned, they are
highly unlikely to chart the new Government's political line.
Vladimir Putin conferred with the new Cabinet's members
May 22, even voicing hope to the effect that the government in
this format will work fruitfully and for a long time. It is
quite possible that by saying this Vladimir Putin wanted to
stress that he has managed to find an optimal correlation
between various forces that kept vying for government
positions, and that such a correlation will be quite stable.
Indeed, despite the fact that the Government's structure still
arouses some doubts (among other things, various prerogatives
have not yet been completely distributed among Kasyanov's
deputies) one can already sum up specific results. The new
Cabinet comprises some new people, including Tax Minister
Gennady Bukayev, as well as Industry, Science And Technologies
Minister Alexander Dondukov.
It's crystal clear that the so-called team of St.
Petersburg liberals, which is apparently headed by Anatoly
Chubais, now has every reason to rejoice to a greater extent
than anyone else. By all looks, Alexei Kudrin has become an
unofficial first deputy prime minister, even occupying Mikhail
Kasyanov's office at the Government House. For his own part,
Gherman Gref has been placed in charge of the Ministry for
Economic Development and Trade, which is considered to be the
Government's key agency, and which has also obtained the
functions of six federal executive bodies (be it completely, or
in part). By the way, the May 22 session, which was presided
over by Putin, involved only one "ordinary" minister, Gherman
Gref, on a par with deputy prime ministers and top
law-enforcement officers. Mikhail Kasyanov made a statement
later on, stressing that the Ministry for Economic Development
and Trade will play the lead during the elaboration of the
Government's economic policy. Apart from acting as a "strategic
headquarters," Gherman Gref's department will have to tackle a
rather unusual, for a state body, task, that is, organizing the
relevant process for ousting the state from a number of
economic sectors.
However, members of the St. Petersburg team have failed to
divide all economic agencies among themselves. The rather
important State Customs Committee, the Federal Securities
Commission and the Property Relations Ministry, which make it
possible to swell the federal budget, will be directly
supervised by Mikhail Kasyanov. Therefore one can draw the
following conclusion -- that well-known system of checks and
balances will be retained in high places.
******
#7
May 18, 2000
Vladimir Putin: Not the Jefferson of Russia
By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
History News Service
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is associate director of the J. M. Dawson Institute of
Church-State Studies at Baylor University and a writer for the History News
Service.
When Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated as America's third president
in 1801, he noted that the American experiment in democracy had passed a
crucial test. Power had been transferred peacefully from one president to
the next after a bitter electoral campaign. "This being now decided by the
voice of the nation, announced according to the rules of the Constitution,
all will ... unite in common efforts for the common good," he proclaimed.
Two centuries later, another newly-elected president, Vladimir
Putin, echoing Jefferson, paid homage to the democratic process. The
"transfer of power is always a test of the constitutional system, a test of
its strength," he said. For the first time in Russian history, "supreme
power is being transferred in the most democratic and simple way." In the
presence of Mikhail Gorbachev--the last Soviet president, who started the
process of democratization--and Boris Yeltsin--Russia's first elected
president--the new leader promised to "safeguard what has been achieved"
and to "ensure that the authorities elected by the people work in their
interests."
Despite the apparent connection between an 18th-century Virginia
farmer and a 20th-century ex-KGB operative, Putin is not likely to draw on
the Sage of Monticello for inspiration. Jefferson called for a "wise and
frugal government" that would "restrain men from injuring one another" but
"leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and
improvement."
Putin is more spiritually akin to another statesman who also tried
to lead Russia on the path toward economic prosperity and reform and
political liberalization: Peter Stolypin, prime minister (1906-1912) under
Nicholas II. Stolypin's battle-cry against revolutionaries, "You want great
upheavals, but we want a Great Russia!" finds an echo in Putin's
declaration that he seeks to restore "the guiding and regulating role of
the state to a degree which is necessary, proceeding from the traditions
and present state of the country ... Russia needs a strong state power and
must have it."
Indeed, Putin's actions so far are more Stolypinesque than
Jeffersonian. Both Stolypin and Putin rose to prominence as "law-and-order"
men, Stolypin with his suppression of peasant unrest and revolutionary
terrorism (the noose sarcastically referred to as a Stolypin necktie),
Putin with his campaign in Chechnya.
Both manipulated the electoral system to tailor pro-government
majorities in the legislature (Stolypin by changing electoral laws, Putin
through the creation of the "Unity" movement). Both invoked the power of
the state to push through fundamental change.
During his tenure as prime minister, Stolypin unleashed a series of
reforms designed to turn millions of Russian peasants into property owners
with a stake in civil peace and economic development. Putin wants the state
to become "an efficient coordinator of the country's economic
and social forces" in order to "ensure a stable growth of prosperity on the
basis of the growth of real disposable incomes of the people."
Stolypin's model is attractive to Putin because, in the short run,
it was successful. The economy grew at a rapid pace; the Russian military
was modernized, and plans were drafted for a dramatic expansion of
educational and health-care services to the general populace. Stolypin's
reforms paralleled the revival of Russian culture, the "Silver Age"
reflected in the paintings of Malevich or the compositions of Stravinsky.
Stolypin's policies led Vladimir Lenin to conclude that his
generation might not even see the "approaching battles of the revolution."
Unfortunately, time was not on Stolypin's side; his assassination and
Russia's entry into the World War I wrecked his work, and the Russian
Revolution followed.
As if haunted by Stolypin's ghost, Putin pointed out in his
inaugural that the reform process is "still far from completion." In an
earlier speech, he warned, "We are running out of time." To see this
process through, Putin is likely to adopt some very un-Jeffersonian
policies and procedures.
Benjamin Franklin expressed his optimism at the close of the
Constitutional Convention in 1787 that the sun painted on the back of
George Washington's chair was, in his view, rising and not setting. It is
too early to say whether the sunburst on the canopy over the dais where
Putin took his oath of office represents the dawn -- or the sunset -- of
the nascent Russian democracy.
[Nikolas K. Gvosdev, J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor
University, Box 97308, Waco, TX 76798-7308. Telephone: (254) 710-1510;
fax: (254) 710-1571; e-mail: Nikolas_Gvosdev@baylor.edu]
*******
#8
Environmentalists say Putin allows nature theft
May 23, 2000
By Elizabeth Piper
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Environmentalists condemned President Vladimir Putin's bid
to disband Russia's only federal environmental agency Tuesday, saying he had
given the green light to those who want to pillage the country.
The head of the State Committee for Environmental Protection said the
transfer of his group's responsibilities to the Natural Resources Ministry
was ``absurd'' and dangerous for Russia's fragile and polluted environment.
``It is a signal for thieves. The law says, 'Hey guys! there is no one
watching over nature so come and take what you want','' Viktor
Danilov-Danilyan told a news conference.
``Authorizing the Natural Resources Ministry to deal with ecological problems
is like asking an alcoholic what the price of vodka should be,'' he said.
Putin signed a decree to disband the agency last week in order to save money.
The executive director of Greenpeace Russia, Sergei Tsyplenkov, also pledged
to protest against the move.
``The leader of this country has said time and time again that laws should be
adhered to, but now it is difficult to adhere to the law,'' Tsyplenkov said.
``They've made a mistake for this country.''
Greenpeace Russia issued a statement Monday that said the Natural Resources
Ministry has a record of backing ``illegal and environmentally hazardous
projects.''
Environmentalists said the Natural Resources Ministry had helped pollute
Russia by allowing companies to freely exploit its rich resources, notably by
oil and gas extraction, gold mining and logging.
``This law is a step backwards for the country,'' Danilov-Danilyan said. ``In
every other civilized country, there is a department which concentrates on
protecting the environment. The president's decree has violated this
principle.''
He said the committee would continue its work until papers abolishing it were
completed, which could take six months. He said it was unclear how the
committee and its staff would be integrated into the ministry.
******
#9
gazeta.ru
May 23, 2000
Unity to Adopt Communist Practices
Unity intends to make a further move towards becoming a worthy successor of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It is now planning to create
local party organizations in enterprises and factories. The Federal
Coordination Council of Russian Trade Unions will help the ‘bears’(Unity)
around the law that prohibits such political activity.
It is an ingenious solution: Just pretend that a party organization is
a trade union and the law is taken care of. Sergei Khramov, leader of the
Trade Unions’ Council, wrote to the Duma Unity leader Boris Gryzlov, staying
that it is high time to recruit new members for the movement amongst
conscientious workers in medium and large Russian enterprises, who form the
majority of the electorate”.
Khramov writes that trade unions fully support Unity’s efforts to
transform itself from a bloc into a political party that “would reflect the
interests of the majority of the population who expressed their will by
electing Vladimir Putin President of the Russian Federation”.
Now the next step will be to carefully consider the Council’s proposal
at the coming conference dedicated to the foundation of this future party,
scheduled for May 27th, and to include the trade union leader Khramov in the
permanently functioning Unity organ. Such is the basic idea behind the whole
plan.
In its 11 years of existence the Council of Russian Trade Unions has
not managed to beat its main competitor the Federation of Independent Trade
Unions. But now it may try to get the upper hand by using the mighty
potential of the pro-government Unity.
There is nothing new about creating party controlled trade unions in
factories. At one time it was widespread practice in the West but the
consequences of such activity in Russia could be very different. An
institution resembling the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with familiar
attributes such as obligatory membership regardless of age, essential for
one’s career, business trips abroad, etc., could easily materialize in Russia
but would be impossible in democratic Europe.
Unity already has two components necessary for creating a new type of
CPSU a large number of members and sympathizers and a youth movement, which
some have already labeled ‘Putinmol’ (like Comsomol). In order to revive the
practices of the CPSU, Unity now has only to create party organizations in
enterprises and factories which is exactly what the trade unions are propose,
and proclaim president Vladimir Putin leader of the new ‘directing social
force’.
Both proposals could well be endorsed at the forthcoming ‘bear’
congress on May 27th. Any possible obstacles could easily be overcome. The
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which also claims to defend the
interests of ordinary workers, will be unable to oppose the might of the
president’s party and particularly the organizational potential of the
presidential administration.
Also there cannot be any doubt that in legal terms everything will be
perfect. The head of the trade union is one of the leaders of the Unity bloc.
This is totally in accordance with the law on parties and public
organizations. As for Putin himself, he has never actually stated that he
does not want to become General Secretary (such proposals do already exist).
Unlike Boris Yeltsin, who, it might be remembered, publicly announced that he
will not be a member of any party and kept his word, Vladimir Putin, hoping
to introduce more discipline into society, might well approve of such a
party. It is just that he has not yet chosen the time to declare his love for
Unity. But this will certainly happen.
Elena Ogorodnikova
******
#10
IF US VIOLATES ABM TREATY, RUSSIA MAY PULL OUT OF START-I - DUMA FIGURE
MOSCOW. May 23 (Interfax) - Duma International Affairs' Committee
chairman Dmitri Rogozin has said he believes that if the United States
violates the ABM treaty, Russia may leave the START-I and START-II
treaties and undertake "certain flank restrictions" to guarantee its
security.
In an interview with Novye Izvestia published on Tuesday, Rogozin
called for taking into account that "an election campaign is under way
in the United States and the ABM question is being inflated for purely
party interests." By deploying a missile defense system the United
States "is driving itself into a corner not only with regard to Russia,
but many other countries as well," he said.
Rogozin said in his opinion, the United States has not forecast
China's reaction. China's "entire nuclear potential will then be
neutralized by the new American missile defense system and as a result
Beijing will be buying new means to overcome the system," he said,
adding that the new system may arouse "great dissatisfaction among
America's NATO partners in Europe."
The entire spectrum of bilateral relations was discussed during the
recent visit of a Duma delegation to Washington, namely U.S. sanctions
against Russian companies cooperating with Iran, anti-dumping studies
against Russian companies and other problems "casting a shadow on
American-Russian relations," he said.
On U.S. President Bill Clinton's upcoming visit to Moscow, he said
it would be better "to discuss opportunities for American investments
and the expansion of trade in Moscow instead of ABM."
"We do not understand the reason for such haste in deploying the
missile defense system and placing the internal interests of the United
States above the national interests of America in the world arena,"
Rogozin said.
*****
#11
Russian court to consider Beria rehabilitation
MOSCOW, May 23 (Reuters) - Russia's Supreme Court said on Tuesday it would
consider later this month a request to pardon Lavrenty Beria, the feared
police chief of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin who sent millions to their
death.
Rights groups were angry over the idea of clearing Beria's name and said it
would be an insult to people who were persecuted.
``The court's military board will sit to consider this case on May 29 but we
cannot say how it will decide,'' a spokesman told Reuters.
Relatives of Beria, who was executed after Stalin's death in 1953, have been
pushing for his rehabilitation under a law which pardons victims of
Soviet-era political repression.
The court's military board has already rejected the relatives' request once,
but they have decided to try again.
Beria was a close associate of Stalin, first as chief of the Communist Party
in Soviet Georgia from where both men came, and then from 1938 until the
dictator's death in 1953 as head of the NKVD domestic security organ, which
later became the KGB.
After Stalin's death, Beria was arrested on charges of foreign espionage,
carrying out acts of terror and of rape. He was subsequently shot.
``Even a hint of justifying Beria is blasphemy against the relatives of those
40 million citizens who were victims of the abitrary actions of the NKVD,''
Interfax news agency quoted Boris Pustyntsev of rights group Citizens Watch
as saying.
Parliament member Yuly Rybakov said the question of clearing Beria would be a
key indicator of Russia's moral health.
Interfax quoted chief military prosecutor Yuri Dyomin as saying last year
that the espionage charges were clearly dreamed up by the regime to help
justify Beria's removal. But he said Beria remained guilty of the other
charges.
Many Russians are ambiguous about their totalitarian past and some Communist
MPs have demanded that a statue of Soviet secret police founder Felix
Dzerzhinsky be restored.
President Vladimir Putin is a former KGB officer who worked in East Germany
during the 1980s. He later headed the FSB, one of the successor bodies of the
KGB.
******
#12
TIME EUROPE
May 29, 2000 VOL. 155 NO. 21
Putin Tightens His Grip
Russia's newly elected President unveils his plans to concentrate even more
power in the Kremlin
By ANDREW MEIER and YURI ZARAKHOVICH Moscow
During his rapid march to the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin vowed to raise Russia
from her knees by building a "dictatorship of the law." Last week, Putin took
a sudden step that shows he really meant to add after the word law ... "as I
choose to rewrite it." In a surprise, late-night television address he
declared: "We are talking about laws that will strengthen and cement Russian
statehood. The period of forced compromises leading to instability is over."
This was no fireside chat. Seated squarely at his Kremlin desk, Putin faced
the camera straight-on to lay out his plans to radically reform how Russia is
ruled. Earlier in the week, he had dropped his first bombshell, signing a
decree to group Russia's 89 regions into seven federal districts, each run by
a presidential envoy. All federal services would come under the purview of
these Kremlin proxies, rather than under the governors.
And so Putin enjoined the often unruly regional leaders in a fight for power
and federal largesse. Although the draft laws have yet to be published,
Putin's blueprint calls for replacing, by next January, the current members
of the Federation Council (the parliament's upper house), 178 elected
governors and regional leaders, with political appointees from the regions.
He also wants the right to dismiss elected governors, and disband regional
governments, should courts find their policies to be in contravention of
federal law.
Putin's seven new federal districts would follow the same lines as Russia's
military districts. This is no coincidence. His intention is to remove the
internal troops, responsible for domestic security, from the Interior
Ministry, reform them as a National Guard and keep them stationed in the
regions — but under the President's direct command. By week's end, he had
named the men who will enforce his writ in the seven districts. Five are
generals: two are veterans of the war in Chechnya, and three come from the
security services. One of the two civilian apparatchiks is a token liberal,
former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko.
In all, the new laws would grant Putin greater presidential powers than
Yeltsin enjoyed under his hand-tailored 1993 constitution. Although many of
his wishes require the Duma's approval, few doubt he will get his way. Many
in Moscow's political élite greeted the steps to clean up Russia's feudal
bedlam warmly. After all, ever since Yeltsin encouraged regional bosses "to
take as much sovereignty as you can swallow" in order to buy their loyalty,
Russia has become a loose confederation of feudal barons, nominally presided
over by a weak king. But, says Lilia Shevtsova, senior analyst with the
Moscow center of the Carnegie Endowment, "There are two ways out of this
predicament: the first is the painstaking process of drafting legislation,
firmly dividing federal and regional responsibilities, strengthening the
courts and resolving issues among federal, regional and local authorities
through the courts." The second, quips Shevtsova, "is the traditional Russian
way to build an administrative hierarchy: you construct a transmission belt
of power and connect it to a single engine."
Putin clearly has chosen the second approach. Before making his TV address,
Putin held a three-hour, closed-door session with 26 key regional leaders. He
drew the party line for them sharply: Either you are with me or you are
against the state. Although many governors last week bowed obediently to his
wishes, some promised defiance. "No matter what they write in decrees, we
will rule in the regions," fumed Mintimer Shaimiyev, the powerful president
of Tatarstan, a mostly Muslim, oil-rich and virtually autonomous, ethnic
republic in central Russia.
Russia's parliament, however, seems positively supine. On Wednesday, in a
record majority vote, the Duma rubber-stamped Putin's choice for Prime
Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov. The 42-year-old technocrat, who won the approval
of 325 of the 450 deputies, was Putin's first choice. While Putin's
long-awaited economic recovery plan has yet to materialize, Kasyanov did
outline to the Duma his priorities: tax reform and a balanced budget. Like an
old Soviet era leader, Putin has commanded that the economy grow. "He made
his instructions clear," says one adviser working on the economic plan. "Make
sure that GDP doubles in 10 years."
In last week's flurry of decrees and declarations, Putin, once considered an
opaque man of mystery, made the direction of his nascent presidency
abundantly clear. Authority, and loyalty to the man who holds it, are fast
becoming the leitmotiv of the new regime. By now it is clear that Putin
wishes to do more than take spins in fighter jets and submarines. Embarking
on a path toward a more muscular presidency, he aims to regain the power that
seeped out of the Kremlin and into the fractious fiefdoms during Yeltsin's
paralytic reign. His predecessor may have tolerated disobedience and
disorder; Putin has a fondness for discipline and order. Particularly when he
gets to run the show.
******
#13
smi.ru
May 23, 2000
Governor-Generals Will Deprive Governors Of Their Generals
RIA "Novosti", quoting sources in the Kremlin administration, reported that
force agencies will have to change territorial structure in accordance with
the newly created federal counties. The headquarters of force agencies'
territorial departments will be relocated to the federal counties'
administrative centers: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod,
Rostov-on-Don, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk and Khabarovsk.
Comment: There are reasons to believe that the whole scheme was devised with
this aim in mind. Control over local force bodies and financial flows are
governors' key instruments of power. Dividing the country into seven counties
does not allow directly to check the regions' financial liberty, but at the
same time it is a sine qua non for implementing the plan of creating a
unified market space, because without the local force bodies' support
governoral decrees on, say, banning the wheat exports or vodka imports, etc.
will be impossible to implement. Besides, special police units (OMON) will
not be used by governors as an effective instrument of "property
restructuring". So, after governors lose their control over force bodies it
will be just a matter of time when they lose their financial independence.
******
#14
Moscow Times
May 24, 2000
Tatarstan Shows No Sign of Surrender
By Sarah Karush
Staff Writer
KAZAN, Central Russia -- The day after President Vladimir Putin announced his
plans to tighten the Kremlin's grip on the regions, Tatarstan President
Mintimer Shaimiyev gathered reporters at his residence under the green, white
and red flag of sovereign Tatarstan to respond.
The leadership of Tatarstan, said Shaimiyev - one of the nation's most
powerful regional potentates - fully supports the plans that Putin first
floated a week ago.
If Putin follows through on his pledge to make all Russians live under one
set of laws, Shaimiyev's reign as unchallenged ruler over this republic of 4
million could be brought to an end. But far from rushing to the defense of
his autonomy, Shaimiyev is avoiding confrontation. Despite his awesome power
within Tatarstan's borders, Shaimiyev may have little choice, observers say.
"Tatarstan has gone quiet," said Rashit Akhmetov, editor of the opposition
newspaper Zvezda Povolzhya. "Everyone is sitting and waiting."
Tatarstan led the regions in wresting away from Moscow many of the political
and economic powers associated with sovereignty. Most importantly, control
over the region's vast oil deposits - Tatarstan's oil industry generates more
than $1 billion a year in revenues - passed into the regional government's
hands. Many of Tatarstan's laws - from additional tax legislation to the lack
of term limits for presidents - contradict federal legislation.
Shaimiyev, a former Soviet party boss well known for his ability to
painlessly switch ideologies, has coyly avoided addressing the central
question: Is he ready to give up his independence?
"I wouldn't say that this [Putin's proposals] will threaten independence. I
don't think anybody ... wants lawlessness," he said in an interview with
ORT's Sergei Dorenko broadcast last Saturday. "There should be one set of
rules in the state."
But for all the Tatarstan leader's outward acquiescence, the mood in Kazan is
far from one of surrender. Officials close to Shaimiyev say they don't want
to give anything up and are counting on success at the negotiating table to
allow them to retain most, if not all, of their current powers.
"Our powers will stay with us. ... We don't plan to give them up," said
Rafail Khakimov, a close adviser to Shaimiyev.
"They may try to scare us in Moscow, and some regions will give up right
away," Khakimov said in an interview Monday. "We aren't afraid, that's the
difference. We'll sit down at the negotiating table and find a common
language."
Tatarstan has done well at the negotiating table in the past. A 1994 treaty
broadly outlined areas of regional control - such as land distribution and
natural resources - and areas of federal control - nuclear energy and
defense, for example. But the nuts and bolts of the relationship are set
forth in specific agreements that must be renewed every few years.
This time, they will struggle to hold on to more than a fraction of their
current powers, analysts said.
"Tatarstan on its own won't be able to resist these changes," said Nikolai
Petrov, a regional politics analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center.
Indeed, the republic already has been forced to make concessions. When Putin
visited Kazan in March, he forced the republic to direct the same amount of
tax revenue to the federal budget as other regions, Khakimov said. In return,
that money will stay in Kazan at the regional branch of the federal treasury
and will be directed toward federal projects in Tatarstan, he added.
Meanwhile, members of Tatarstan's weak opposition forces say they welcome any
measures that would bring Shaimiyev into line.
"You can't talk about human rights until you have state power," said
Alexander Shtanin, the only Shaimiyev opponent in the Tatarstan parliament.
Shtanin had to sue the regional election commission eight times for election
fraud before being allowed to take up his seat earlier this month.
Shtanin and other Shaimiyev opponents say Moscow's crackdown means the
63-year-old leader will probably not run for a third term next year.
Tatarstan amended its constitution to allow presidents to run repeatedly, but
federal law limits regional leaders to two terms.
With Putin leading the charge to tighten federal control - and placing an
especially strong emphasis on the need for regional laws to conform to
federal legislation - the wily Shaimiyev is unlikely to disobey Moscow so
blatantly, they said.
Some observers said they foresee a deal where Shaimiyev would get a seat in
the Federation Council as compensation for not running for president in
elections due the first half of next year.
One of the three bills Putin has sent to the State Duma would restructure the
upper house so that it is no longer made up of governors and the heads of
regional parliaments. Instead, the regional parliaments will elect full-time
senators - a position that comes with immunity from prosecution.
State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov said Tuesday that lawmakers plan to
debate the three bills on May 31 in a first reading and would pass them by
early July.
Tatarstan officials are quick to point out that Putin's proposals to
strengthen the so-called vertical power structure is something they have
firsthand experience in. In fact, Tatarstan takes it a step further.
While Putin's bills would give Moscow the right to dismiss governors and
governors the right to dismiss mayors if a court establishes that they have
broken federal law, Shaimiyev appoints and dismisses mayors and district
administration heads unilaterally.
"It [the vertical power structure] is necessary, first and foremost in the
transitional period," Shaimiyev told ORT. "I am for elections - that really
should be the end goal because power belongs to the people. But at this stage
in the development of society, a certain mechanism of cooperation between
various levels of government is needed."
Some Shaimiyev critics said they feared that in strengthening federal power,
Putin is simply aiming to replace the regional authoritarian regimes with a
nationwide dictatorship.
"On the whole, all these initiatives are part of Putin's overall strategy of
strengthening his personal power," said local Communist leader Robert
Sadykov.
Damir Iskhakov, a former leader of the Tatar nationalist movement, said he is
concerned that Putin will crack down on the cultural autonomy of the regions
as well as the political and economic independence of the governors. Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tatarstan has seen a revival of the Tatar
language and culture.
"Putin doesn't understand the difference [between Tatarstan and other
regions]. He thinks they should all be uniform," Iskhakov said.
******
#15
Russia Today press summaries
Kommersant
May 23, 2000
The Dollar is the Proletariat's Weapon
Comrade Zyuganov Said at the Top of his Voice
Summary
It was expected that Saturday's plenum of the KPRF would be sensational: the
defeat of the Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov at the presidential election
and loss of majority at the Duma gave grounds for tough criticism of the
party leader Gennady Zyuganov. Instead, the Communist chief prevented attacks
of his party companions-in-arms, having fronted a revolutionary program
implementing a new party course.
Some of Zyuganov's provisions were:
-to initiate overall pressure on the power, not limited to parliamentary
forms of fight; - to use the administrative resource of the "red belt " of
Russia. To turn it into "the state of patriots" surrounded by "the state of
traitors"; - to establish an inter-regional authorized bank for workers with
the help of fifteen to twenty "red" regional administrations; - to secure
payments of wages and pensions from this bank, as well as payment of "red
supplementary pensions"; - to provide investments into the real sector of the
economy from this bank; - to establish an inter-regional television and radio
company; - to buy an oil company and equity in Gazprom and RAO UES; - to use
the Internet as a weapon to fight against exploitation of workers.
The last provision was probably cast by the information about "ILOVEYOU"
virus.
It seems that the Communist leader wants to establish his own financial
empire that would control money flows of dozens of billions of dollars.
******
#16
NUCLEAR AGE HAS CLAIMED BILLIONS OF LIVES - RUSSIAN ECOLOGIST
MOSCOW. May 22 (Interfax) - The nuclear age has claimed more than
2.33 billion lives, Russian ecologist Alexei Yablokov, a corresponding
member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has said.
Addressing an international conference on nuclear disarmament in
Moscow on Monday, Yablokov explained that the figure is the result of
the following statistics: 1.13 billion have been the victims of nuclear
testing, 248 million of these dying of cancerous, fatal diseases and 117
million suffering other, non-fatal ailments. Yablokov added that there
223 million people with genetic defects and 558 million born with
congenital deformities attributable to the development of the nuclear
industry.
Yablokov went on to say that 3.2 million had become ill and died
because of the nuclear arms industry, 1.15 billion fell victim to
radiation accidents, 21 million to nuclear power engineering, 15 million
to accidents at nuclear reactors, and 4 million to related medical
technologies and treatments.
Asked why the statistics have never been seen in the open press,
the ecologist cited a 1959 agreement between the International Atomic
Energy Agency and World Health Organization that prohibited the WHO from
publishing such statistics without IAEA consent.
*****
#17
smi.ru
May 23, 2000
There Is No Longer Any Need for Inviting IMF. It Will Come Itself
Gerard Belanger, Deputy Director of the IMF European II Department is
arriving in Moscow to conduct "technical consultations" with the Russian
side, the RIA "Novosti" news agency reports quoting a "source in the Fund".
The consultations of the Fund experts with representatives of the Russian
government bodies responsible for the economy, as well as with experts from
the Center for Strategic Studies headed by German Gref, will "not be in the
nature of a mission", they will be closer to a discussion and, as the IMF
points out, the main purpose of these talks is an exchange of opinions on a
number of macroeconomic issues. The principal task set before the Fund
experts, the IMF remarked, is discussing some issues connected with preparing
the Russian government's new economic program and those of preparing the
draft federal budget for 2001, plus a series of problems related to Russian
budget and taxation policies. This is the second "tranche" of IMF experts
coming to Russia. The first "installment" arrived in Moscow on May 15.
Comment: It is a comforting fact that IMF consultations are no longer in the
nature of missions . Could the IMF have finally understood that Russia
swallows such "missionary" efforts whole, without even choking over its own
promises, and decided to act in a more discreet manner this time? Until now,
the scheme has been the following: Russia agrees on a program of structural
changes with the Fund, gets money for it and afterwards explains in great
detail why it failed to fulfil its promises. It should be pointed out,
though, that of all the Russian governments, the Sergei Kirienko cabinet
alone actually managed to reach an agreement with the IMF on a program of
measures to be implemented - not that the end result wasn't even more
disastrous than usual for the Fund. Now the IMF has got an entirely different
interest in the Land of Disappearing Tranches. A political one. In late 1999,
under pressure from its principal "shareholder" - the US - the IMF refused to
extend further loans to Russia. At the moment, it is the very same States
that are pressuring the very same Fund to resume crediting. The crux of the
matter is that the Clinton administration, vigorously upholding Albert Gore
in the forthcoming US presidential election, has come under fire from its
opponents precisely for having failed the Russian foreign political strategy.
The American administration, in turn, is trying to shift the blame on the
IMF, accusing it of having let the crediting of Russian reforms take its own
course and thus encouraging the Russians to use the tens of billions of
dollars of its loans off purpose. Accordingly, there remains nothing for the
IMF but to try and drastically change the situation and to start funding the
Bears' Country (now Russia is one both geographically and politically) THE
RIGHT WAY. Otherwise, the question might be raised about the expediency of
having an International Monetary Fund at all (especially as Russia is far
from being its only failure).
In this, the IMF has gotten itself into a really ticklish situation. It is
impossible for it not to extend loans, but it is also impossible for it to
extend them without the traditional procedure of agreeing on a program of
measures with the Russian government - one that will have to be really
fulfilled this time (otherwise, in case of another failure, the IMF might be
deprived of funding itself). On May 15, the Fund's Moscow representative,
Martin Gilman, declared that the IMF is expecting Russia to send in an
official letter on annulling the old bilateral agreement and the commencement
of a new program of crediting. Which means that, mission or no mission, this
time the IMF is going to dictate a really rigorous set of terms to Russia.
In all probability, it is going to demand:
- an increase of the share of payments in "ready money" to 40 per cent in the
power engineering sector, in heat and gas deliveries, and to 65 per cent in
the railroad transport sector (the latter is a legacy of the old program of
the Yevgeny Primakov era),
- reforms in the public utilities sector: raising the prices of these
services for the citizens up to the level of their actual value (this demand
is unrealistic, as this cannot be achieved in practice even in the course of
the next year - SMI.RU),
- finally, adopting a federal law providing for the free sale and purchasing
of land (this is realistic, given political will on the part of the Kremlin).
Plus a number of other strategic financial and economic measures, such as
toughening the law on bankruptcy, etc.
It is self-evident that the Fund will now be looking for methods of control
the way its loans are used - if the agreement is signed after all. As to
Russia, it will have to seriously weigh up whether it will be really able to
meet any specific condition set before it (it will obviously be unable to
fulfil all the IMF conditions - SMI.RU), - if it proves unable to cheat this
time.
******
-------
David Johnson
home phone: 301-942-9281
work phone: 202-332-0600 ext. 107
email: davidjohnson@erols.com
fax: 1-202-478-1701 (Jfax; comes direct to email)
home address:
1647 Winding Waye Lane
Silver Spring MD 20902
USA
Web page for CDI Russia Weekly:
http://www.cdi.org/russia
******
#1
APN
23 May, 2000
No sex in Russia
The conclusion follows from all-Russian polls conducted in May by independent
research center ROMIR. (The surveys were made on a random basis, N=2000, 41
subjects of the Russian Federation, 203 points of inquiry.)
Sociologists suggested that Russians should dispute whether casual sexual
contacts are justified or not. It proved clear that 42.1% of respondents
consider casual sexual contacts unjustified in any case. 21.3% regard
contacts of this sort as unjustified in most cases.
None of respondents consider casual sex justified in all cases. Some 3% think
it is justified in most cases. 6.5% of Russians found difficulty in answering.
The rest citizens, declined to compromises, believe that in some cases casual
sexual contacts are justified and in some cases are not.
It turns out the Russians are patriarchal people who stick to traditional
moral rules.
True, certain empirical data reveal the fact that not all Russian men and
women are modest, touchy persons. It is well known that prostitution in major
Russian cities is beyond the pale.
Russians` word seems to disagree with their deed in delicate intimate sphere.
It`s not without reason a Russian saying reads: «No sin no repentance, no
repentance no redemption.»
******
#2
Capital of Russian Banks to Reach Pre-Crisis Levels in 2000.
MOSCOW, May 23 (Itar-Tass) - The capitalisation of Russian banks will by late
2000 reach levels it had enjoyed before the August 1998 crisis, president of
the Association of Russian Banks (ARB), Sergei Yegorov, told an ARB
conference on Tuesday.
The capital of all Russian banks rose by 1.5 times to reach 145 billion
roubles (5.12 billion dollars) in 1999, Yegorov said, adding that the capital
of regional ones registered a three-fold increase.
The banks' credit investment had been estimated at 625 billion roubles (22.01
billion dollars) as of the beginning of 2000, according to him.
Russia's banks have adapted to the new conditions, but their aggregate
capital is still insufficient, he aid, adding that it is necessary to pass a
bill providing guarantees for deposits and attracting foreign money to
restructure the country's banking system.
******
#3
Robertson says Russia could one day join NATO
May 23, 2000
MOSCOW (Reuters) - NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson was quoted Tuesday
as saying he backed the idea of Russia joining the Western military alliance
although it was unlikely to happen soon.
``When President Putin was asked if Russia might become a member of NATO one
day, he said: 'Why not?' That's my position. Though it's not on the agenda
today,'' Robertson said in an interview published in Wednesday's edition of
Izvestia daily.
Putin made the comments about joining NATO in March, heralding a thaw in
Russia-NATO relations which had become frozen over Moscow's opposition to the
alliance's bombing campaign in Yugoslavia last year.
``I hope that step-by-step we will continue to improve our relations,'' said
Robertson, who was British defense minister during the Kosovo crisis. ``I
think we are moving toward the normalization of relations.''
Despite improving ties, Russia has kept up its criticism of NATO's actions
during the Kosovo crisis. It earlier this month secretly invited Yugoslav
Defense Minister Drogoljub Ojdanic, an indicted war criminal, to Moscow for
talks.
Russia has close ethnic and religious ties to Serbia, the dominant partner in
the Yugoslav Federation.
Robertson said he had recently spoken to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
about a meeting scheduled for Wednesday when both are due to meet alliance
foreign ministers in the Italian city of Florence.
He said Russia and NATO had some talking to do after both recently formulated
new doctrines regulating nuclear strikes.
``The more we talk about these 'misunderstandings' the more we strengthen our
security. NATO does not view Russia as an opponent,'' he said.
******
#4
Putin pins colours to mast of tax reform
MOSCOW, May 23 (AFP) -
Vladimir Putin urged lawmakers Tuesday to quickly approval radical fiscal
reforms aimed at ending a national pastime -- tax evasion -- a first economic
test for Russia's new president.
Economy chief Alexei Kudrin said Putin had written to deputies requesting a
speedy passage through the State Duma lower house of parliament of an
overhaul of the punitive tax code that is seen as a brake on investment.
The letter aims to "help deputies work out their position," said Kudrin, who
is a deputy prime minister in the new cabinet and holds the key finance
portfolio.
Key changes include a flat rate 13 percent income tax, abolition of a five
percent business turnover tax, and the simplification and reduction of social
security charges.
The State Duma lower house of parliament is due shortly to debate part two of
the revamped tax code, which contains specific taxes, their rates, tax
exemptions and tax breaks.
Amendments to part one, which aims to improve tax compliance and streamline
the Soviet-era tax administration system, will also be laid before the
chamber.
Putin wants the bulk of measures relating to the second part of the tax
reform to be on the statute book by the time lawmakers take their summer
break, which will likely be pushed back three weeks to July 7.
Kudrin said if approved, the new laws would be able to come into force on
January 1, 2001 and be incorporated into budget calculations for that year.
Together, they represent the most far-ranging tax reform in 10 years.
Putin and his Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov currently enjoy good relations
with a so-far co-operative Duma, but the proposed changes will significantly
modify the tax take of Russia's 89 regions.
Importantly, they will also entail the disappearance of a host of subsidies,
making adoption of the package far from a done deal.
"Having chosen the tax systems as the first target of reform, it is crucial
for the credibility of the rest of the programme that it proves successful,"
the Renaissance Capital finance house said in an investment note.
"Given Russia's abysmal record of following through on reform promises, there
remains enormous scepticism over President Putin's promises to implement
reforms.
"Success would go a long way to establishing credibility. Failure would
undermine the rest of the programme," it added.
Chronically poor tax collection has helped cripple the Russian government's
finances for the past decade.
But with taxes too high, too numerous and too complicated, they have been a
standing invitation to both individuals and businesses to doctor their annual
revenue declarations.
The government's calculates, however, that less tax will generate more
revenues for its threadbare coffers by increasing compliance.
Russia's richest citizens -- those who declare income of more than 150,000
rubles (5,280 dollars, 5,802 euros) a year -- are currently taxed at 30
percent.
But in reality, only 0.5 percent of taxpayers declare revenues that high, and
some 90 percent claim to earn less than 50,000 rubles, or less than 145
dollars a month.
Businesses, responsible for declaring their staff's earnings, deliberately
under-report their wage bill in an effort to cut their liability for social
security payments.
"It's ridiculous that in Moscow (a private company) officially declares that
it pays wages of 200 rubles a month," the then tax minister Alexander
Pochinok complained in an article earlier this month.
"Everyone knows that unemployed workers receive at least 2,500 rubles," he
said, adding that real average salaries in the capital were around 4,500
rubles a month.
Kudrin admitted that many of Russia's famous actors, sports stars and
entertainers escaped the country's tax system by registering abroad.
However, Western experts say that the proposed 13 percent tax rate aimed to
curb ruinous capital flight by making the benefits of illicitly sending funds
abroad marginal.
******
#5
Moscow Times
May 24, 2000
INSIDE RUSSIA: Fighting Bureaucracy With Bureaucracy
By Yulia Latynina
Not a week had passed since the inauguration of President Vladimir Putin when
the shot of a presidential decree was aimed at the governors. In a flash, the
authoritarian regional leaders were told they could be recalled - and that
they would have some kind of governors-general looming over them.
In order to understand how effective this new method for treating the
governors' arbitrary rule will be, we should first look at the reasons for
that arbitrary rule.
There is a powerful economic basis for the governors' actions: the system of
payments. Every entrepreneur must pay taxes. In regional budgets, taxes as a
rule are paid through barter. And prices set for goods used in barter can be
inflated.
This creates an opportunity for abuse of the system. An enterprise whose
director is friendly with the governor can lower its taxes to a laughably low
percentage, by paying them with hard goods valued at an inflated price. An
enterprise that is on the outs with the governor will be forced to pay its
taxes with real money.
The system is so cleverly constructed that arbitrary rule does not entail
stifling a business; it entails allowing a business to survive. It's clear
that on this level there is no outcry - no one protests loudly when his taxes
are lowered. But when a business is stifled - what can it complain of? That
it is forced to pay its taxes? Any governor so accused will throw up his
hands and say, "The slanderers want to get rid of me because I'm complying
with the law!"
The same kind of "rules" also govern the redistribution of property. Of all
the factories seized during the past year, not one of them was seized without
the approval of the governor.
There are many standard ways to seize an enterprise. You can sue it for
recovery of 3 1/2 kopeks and bankrupt it. You can buy 20 percent of the
shares and freeze the remaining 80 percent, call a shareholders meeting and
name a new director. You can buy off the members of the board of directors,
call a meeting of the board and fire the general director. All of these
methods share two main features. First, they require the governor's
cooperation, otherwise the OMON paramilitary police will not be available to
escort the former owners from the premises of the business in question.
Second, these methods are ostensibly perfectly legal, since each time the
OMON troops act, they do so in accordance with the decision of a judge - a
judge controlled by the governor.
But here's the question: If a governor-general is going to stand over the
regional governor - and those very governors can be recalled - what will this
change in terms of arbitrary rule? Will this change the system of payments?
Will it lessen corruption among judges?
The obvious answer is no. It will only increase the number of instances in
which arbitrary rule can be applied.
There is, however, a mechanism of control over the governors - they're called
elections. I won't argue here about whether that mechanism is working: it
isn't. But it is clear why it's not working: If an opposition candidate is to
win, he's got to be financed. But anyone who finances him will find that
their electricity bills shoot up three times, or their water will be cut off.
These days, elections in the regions have turned into an instrument for
squeezing capital out of large taxpayers.
But if you can't eliminate arbitrary rule even with the help of elections,
who says you can eliminate them with the knout?
There's only one thing you can do with the knout - ensure that any seizure of
property comes with the Kremlin's sanction. It's clear why the Kremlin wants
to do this. But we shouldn't adopt centralized arbitrary rule to strengthen
the rule of law.
Yulia Latynina writes for Segodnya.
******
#6
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
May 23, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED
St. Petersburg Liberals Assume Key Positions
By Andrei LITVINOV
In its May 23 issue, Nezavisimaya Gazeta publishes a list
of ministers now serving with Mikhail Kasyanov's Government.
Despite the fact that everyone already knows quite a few names,
experts have some misgivings about the new Cabinet's structure.
Small wonder, the Russian stock market, which is seen as a
traditional financial indicator of nationwide political life,
has reacted in a rather skeptical manner to the appointment of
Government members, what with stock market prices plunging
somewhat. According to some experts, cheaper shares are linked
with stock jobbers' reaction to the appearance of new Cabinet
members. Quite a few people note that the Russian Cabinet
boasts numerous officials, whose names still say nothing to
market players. As far as more familiar persons, namely
Khristenko, Aksenenko and Adamov, are concerned, they are
highly unlikely to chart the new Government's political line.
Vladimir Putin conferred with the new Cabinet's members
May 22, even voicing hope to the effect that the government in
this format will work fruitfully and for a long time. It is
quite possible that by saying this Vladimir Putin wanted to
stress that he has managed to find an optimal correlation
between various forces that kept vying for government
positions, and that such a correlation will be quite stable.
Indeed, despite the fact that the Government's structure still
arouses some doubts (among other things, various prerogatives
have not yet been completely distributed among Kasyanov's
deputies) one can already sum up specific results. The new
Cabinet comprises some new people, including Tax Minister
Gennady Bukayev, as well as Industry, Science And Technologies
Minister Alexander Dondukov.
It's crystal clear that the so-called team of St.
Petersburg liberals, which is apparently headed by Anatoly
Chubais, now has every reason to rejoice to a greater extent
than anyone else. By all looks, Alexei Kudrin has become an
unofficial first deputy prime minister, even occupying Mikhail
Kasyanov's office at the Government House. For his own part,
Gherman Gref has been placed in charge of the Ministry for
Economic Development and Trade, which is considered to be the
Government's key agency, and which has also obtained the
functions of six federal executive bodies (be it completely, or
in part). By the way, the May 22 session, which was presided
over by Putin, involved only one "ordinary" minister, Gherman
Gref, on a par with deputy prime ministers and top
law-enforcement officers. Mikhail Kasyanov made a statement
later on, stressing that the Ministry for Economic Development
and Trade will play the lead during the elaboration of the
Government's economic policy. Apart from acting as a "strategic
headquarters," Gherman Gref's department will have to tackle a
rather unusual, for a state body, task, that is, organizing the
relevant process for ousting the state from a number of
economic sectors.
However, members of the St. Petersburg team have failed to
divide all economic agencies among themselves. The rather
important State Customs Committee, the Federal Securities
Commission and the Property Relations Ministry, which make it
possible to swell the federal budget, will be directly
supervised by Mikhail Kasyanov. Therefore one can draw the
following conclusion -- that well-known system of checks and
balances will be retained in high places.
******
#7
May 18, 2000
Vladimir Putin: Not the Jefferson of Russia
By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
History News Service
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is associate director of the J. M. Dawson Institute of
Church-State Studies at Baylor University and a writer for the History News
Service.
When Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated as America's third president
in 1801, he noted that the American experiment in democracy had passed a
crucial test. Power had been transferred peacefully from one president to
the next after a bitter electoral campaign. "This being now decided by the
voice of the nation, announced according to the rules of the Constitution,
all will ... unite in common efforts for the common good," he proclaimed.
Two centuries later, another newly-elected president, Vladimir
Putin, echoing Jefferson, paid homage to the democratic process. The
"transfer of power is always a test of the constitutional system, a test of
its strength," he said. For the first time in Russian history, "supreme
power is being transferred in the most democratic and simple way." In the
presence of Mikhail Gorbachev--the last Soviet president, who started the
process of democratization--and Boris Yeltsin--Russia's first elected
president--the new leader promised to "safeguard what has been achieved"
and to "ensure that the authorities elected by the people work in their
interests."
Despite the apparent connection between an 18th-century Virginia
farmer and a 20th-century ex-KGB operative, Putin is not likely to draw on
the Sage of Monticello for inspiration. Jefferson called for a "wise and
frugal government" that would "restrain men from injuring one another" but
"leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and
improvement."
Putin is more spiritually akin to another statesman who also tried
to lead Russia on the path toward economic prosperity and reform and
political liberalization: Peter Stolypin, prime minister (1906-1912) under
Nicholas II. Stolypin's battle-cry against revolutionaries, "You want great
upheavals, but we want a Great Russia!" finds an echo in Putin's
declaration that he seeks to restore "the guiding and regulating role of
the state to a degree which is necessary, proceeding from the traditions
and present state of the country ... Russia needs a strong state power and
must have it."
Indeed, Putin's actions so far are more Stolypinesque than
Jeffersonian. Both Stolypin and Putin rose to prominence as "law-and-order"
men, Stolypin with his suppression of peasant unrest and revolutionary
terrorism (the noose sarcastically referred to as a Stolypin necktie),
Putin with his campaign in Chechnya.
Both manipulated the electoral system to tailor pro-government
majorities in the legislature (Stolypin by changing electoral laws, Putin
through the creation of the "Unity" movement). Both invoked the power of
the state to push through fundamental change.
During his tenure as prime minister, Stolypin unleashed a series of
reforms designed to turn millions of Russian peasants into property owners
with a stake in civil peace and economic development. Putin wants the state
to become "an efficient coordinator of the country's economic
and social forces" in order to "ensure a stable growth of prosperity on the
basis of the growth of real disposable incomes of the people."
Stolypin's model is attractive to Putin because, in the short run,
it was successful. The economy grew at a rapid pace; the Russian military
was modernized, and plans were drafted for a dramatic expansion of
educational and health-care services to the general populace. Stolypin's
reforms paralleled the revival of Russian culture, the "Silver Age"
reflected in the paintings of Malevich or the compositions of Stravinsky.
Stolypin's policies led Vladimir Lenin to conclude that his
generation might not even see the "approaching battles of the revolution."
Unfortunately, time was not on Stolypin's side; his assassination and
Russia's entry into the World War I wrecked his work, and the Russian
Revolution followed.
As if haunted by Stolypin's ghost, Putin pointed out in his
inaugural that the reform process is "still far from completion." In an
earlier speech, he warned, "We are running out of time." To see this
process through, Putin is likely to adopt some very un-Jeffersonian
policies and procedures.
Benjamin Franklin expressed his optimism at the close of the
Constitutional Convention in 1787 that the sun painted on the back of
George Washington's chair was, in his view, rising and not setting. It is
too early to say whether the sunburst on the canopy over the dais where
Putin took his oath of office represents the dawn -- or the sunset -- of
the nascent Russian democracy.
[Nikolas K. Gvosdev, J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor
University, Box 97308, Waco, TX 76798-7308. Telephone: (254) 710-1510;
fax: (254) 710-1571; e-mail: Nikolas_Gvosdev@baylor.edu]
*******
#8
Environmentalists say Putin allows nature theft
May 23, 2000
By Elizabeth Piper
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Environmentalists condemned President Vladimir Putin's bid
to disband Russia's only federal environmental agency Tuesday, saying he had
given the green light to those who want to pillage the country.
The head of the State Committee for Environmental Protection said the
transfer of his group's responsibilities to the Natural Resources Ministry
was ``absurd'' and dangerous for Russia's fragile and polluted environment.
``It is a signal for thieves. The law says, 'Hey guys! there is no one
watching over nature so come and take what you want','' Viktor
Danilov-Danilyan told a news conference.
``Authorizing the Natural Resources Ministry to deal with ecological problems
is like asking an alcoholic what the price of vodka should be,'' he said.
Putin signed a decree to disband the agency last week in order to save money.
The executive director of Greenpeace Russia, Sergei Tsyplenkov, also pledged
to protest against the move.
``The leader of this country has said time and time again that laws should be
adhered to, but now it is difficult to adhere to the law,'' Tsyplenkov said.
``They've made a mistake for this country.''
Greenpeace Russia issued a statement Monday that said the Natural Resources
Ministry has a record of backing ``illegal and environmentally hazardous
projects.''
Environmentalists said the Natural Resources Ministry had helped pollute
Russia by allowing companies to freely exploit its rich resources, notably by
oil and gas extraction, gold mining and logging.
``This law is a step backwards for the country,'' Danilov-Danilyan said. ``In
every other civilized country, there is a department which concentrates on
protecting the environment. The president's decree has violated this
principle.''
He said the committee would continue its work until papers abolishing it were
completed, which could take six months. He said it was unclear how the
committee and its staff would be integrated into the ministry.
******
#9
gazeta.ru
May 23, 2000
Unity to Adopt Communist Practices
Unity intends to make a further move towards becoming a worthy successor of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It is now planning to create
local party organizations in enterprises and factories. The Federal
Coordination Council of Russian Trade Unions will help the ‘bears’(Unity)
around the law that prohibits such political activity.
It is an ingenious solution: Just pretend that a party organization is
a trade union and the law is taken care of. Sergei Khramov, leader of the
Trade Unions’ Council, wrote to the Duma Unity leader Boris Gryzlov, staying
that it is high time to recruit new members for the movement amongst
conscientious workers in medium and large Russian enterprises, who form the
majority of the electorate”.
Khramov writes that trade unions fully support Unity’s efforts to
transform itself from a bloc into a political party that “would reflect the
interests of the majority of the population who expressed their will by
electing Vladimir Putin President of the Russian Federation”.
Now the next step will be to carefully consider the Council’s proposal
at the coming conference dedicated to the foundation of this future party,
scheduled for May 27th, and to include the trade union leader Khramov in the
permanently functioning Unity organ. Such is the basic idea behind the whole
plan.
In its 11 years of existence the Council of Russian Trade Unions has
not managed to beat its main competitor the Federation of Independent Trade
Unions. But now it may try to get the upper hand by using the mighty
potential of the pro-government Unity.
There is nothing new about creating party controlled trade unions in
factories. At one time it was widespread practice in the West but the
consequences of such activity in Russia could be very different. An
institution resembling the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with familiar
attributes such as obligatory membership regardless of age, essential for
one’s career, business trips abroad, etc., could easily materialize in Russia
but would be impossible in democratic Europe.
Unity already has two components necessary for creating a new type of
CPSU a large number of members and sympathizers and a youth movement, which
some have already labeled ‘Putinmol’ (like Comsomol). In order to revive the
practices of the CPSU, Unity now has only to create party organizations in
enterprises and factories which is exactly what the trade unions are propose,
and proclaim president Vladimir Putin leader of the new ‘directing social
force’.
Both proposals could well be endorsed at the forthcoming ‘bear’
congress on May 27th. Any possible obstacles could easily be overcome. The
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which also claims to defend the
interests of ordinary workers, will be unable to oppose the might of the
president’s party and particularly the organizational potential of the
presidential administration.
Also there cannot be any doubt that in legal terms everything will be
perfect. The head of the trade union is one of the leaders of the Unity bloc.
This is totally in accordance with the law on parties and public
organizations. As for Putin himself, he has never actually stated that he
does not want to become General Secretary (such proposals do already exist).
Unlike Boris Yeltsin, who, it might be remembered, publicly announced that he
will not be a member of any party and kept his word, Vladimir Putin, hoping
to introduce more discipline into society, might well approve of such a
party. It is just that he has not yet chosen the time to declare his love for
Unity. But this will certainly happen.
Elena Ogorodnikova
******
#10
IF US VIOLATES ABM TREATY, RUSSIA MAY PULL OUT OF START-I - DUMA FIGURE
MOSCOW. May 23 (Interfax) - Duma International Affairs' Committee
chairman Dmitri Rogozin has said he believes that if the United States
violates the ABM treaty, Russia may leave the START-I and START-II
treaties and undertake "certain flank restrictions" to guarantee its
security.
In an interview with Novye Izvestia published on Tuesday, Rogozin
called for taking into account that "an election campaign is under way
in the United States and the ABM question is being inflated for purely
party interests." By deploying a missile defense system the United
States "is driving itself into a corner not only with regard to Russia,
but many other countries as well," he said.
Rogozin said in his opinion, the United States has not forecast
China's reaction. China's "entire nuclear potential will then be
neutralized by the new American missile defense system and as a result
Beijing will be buying new means to overcome the system," he said,
adding that the new system may arouse "great dissatisfaction among
America's NATO partners in Europe."
The entire spectrum of bilateral relations was discussed during the
recent visit of a Duma delegation to Washington, namely U.S. sanctions
against Russian companies cooperating with Iran, anti-dumping studies
against Russian companies and other problems "casting a shadow on
American-Russian relations," he said.
On U.S. President Bill Clinton's upcoming visit to Moscow, he said
it would be better "to discuss opportunities for American investments
and the expansion of trade in Moscow instead of ABM."
"We do not understand the reason for such haste in deploying the
missile defense system and placing the internal interests of the United
States above the national interests of America in the world arena,"
Rogozin said.
*****
#11
Russian court to consider Beria rehabilitation
MOSCOW, May 23 (Reuters) - Russia's Supreme Court said on Tuesday it would
consider later this month a request to pardon Lavrenty Beria, the feared
police chief of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin who sent millions to their
death.
Rights groups were angry over the idea of clearing Beria's name and said it
would be an insult to people who were persecuted.
``The court's military board will sit to consider this case on May 29 but we
cannot say how it will decide,'' a spokesman told Reuters.
Relatives of Beria, who was executed after Stalin's death in 1953, have been
pushing for his rehabilitation under a law which pardons victims of
Soviet-era political repression.
The court's military board has already rejected the relatives' request once,
but they have decided to try again.
Beria was a close associate of Stalin, first as chief of the Communist Party
in Soviet Georgia from where both men came, and then from 1938 until the
dictator's death in 1953 as head of the NKVD domestic security organ, which
later became the KGB.
After Stalin's death, Beria was arrested on charges of foreign espionage,
carrying out acts of terror and of rape. He was subsequently shot.
``Even a hint of justifying Beria is blasphemy against the relatives of those
40 million citizens who were victims of the abitrary actions of the NKVD,''
Interfax news agency quoted Boris Pustyntsev of rights group Citizens Watch
as saying.
Parliament member Yuly Rybakov said the question of clearing Beria would be a
key indicator of Russia's moral health.
Interfax quoted chief military prosecutor Yuri Dyomin as saying last year
that the espionage charges were clearly dreamed up by the regime to help
justify Beria's removal. But he said Beria remained guilty of the other
charges.
Many Russians are ambiguous about their totalitarian past and some Communist
MPs have demanded that a statue of Soviet secret police founder Felix
Dzerzhinsky be restored.
President Vladimir Putin is a former KGB officer who worked in East Germany
during the 1980s. He later headed the FSB, one of the successor bodies of the
KGB.
******
#12
TIME EUROPE
May 29, 2000 VOL. 155 NO. 21
Putin Tightens His Grip
Russia's newly elected President unveils his plans to concentrate even more
power in the Kremlin
By ANDREW MEIER and YURI ZARAKHOVICH Moscow
During his rapid march to the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin vowed to raise Russia
from her knees by building a "dictatorship of the law." Last week, Putin took
a sudden step that shows he really meant to add after the word law ... "as I
choose to rewrite it." In a surprise, late-night television address he
declared: "We are talking about laws that will strengthen and cement Russian
statehood. The period of forced compromises leading to instability is over."
This was no fireside chat. Seated squarely at his Kremlin desk, Putin faced
the camera straight-on to lay out his plans to radically reform how Russia is
ruled. Earlier in the week, he had dropped his first bombshell, signing a
decree to group Russia's 89 regions into seven federal districts, each run by
a presidential envoy. All federal services would come under the purview of
these Kremlin proxies, rather than under the governors.
And so Putin enjoined the often unruly regional leaders in a fight for power
and federal largesse. Although the draft laws have yet to be published,
Putin's blueprint calls for replacing, by next January, the current members
of the Federation Council (the parliament's upper house), 178 elected
governors and regional leaders, with political appointees from the regions.
He also wants the right to dismiss elected governors, and disband regional
governments, should courts find their policies to be in contravention of
federal law.
Putin's seven new federal districts would follow the same lines as Russia's
military districts. This is no coincidence. His intention is to remove the
internal troops, responsible for domestic security, from the Interior
Ministry, reform them as a National Guard and keep them stationed in the
regions — but under the President's direct command. By week's end, he had
named the men who will enforce his writ in the seven districts. Five are
generals: two are veterans of the war in Chechnya, and three come from the
security services. One of the two civilian apparatchiks is a token liberal,
former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko.
In all, the new laws would grant Putin greater presidential powers than
Yeltsin enjoyed under his hand-tailored 1993 constitution. Although many of
his wishes require the Duma's approval, few doubt he will get his way. Many
in Moscow's political élite greeted the steps to clean up Russia's feudal
bedlam warmly. After all, ever since Yeltsin encouraged regional bosses "to
take as much sovereignty as you can swallow" in order to buy their loyalty,
Russia has become a loose confederation of feudal barons, nominally presided
over by a weak king. But, says Lilia Shevtsova, senior analyst with the
Moscow center of the Carnegie Endowment, "There are two ways out of this
predicament: the first is the painstaking process of drafting legislation,
firmly dividing federal and regional responsibilities, strengthening the
courts and resolving issues among federal, regional and local authorities
through the courts." The second, quips Shevtsova, "is the traditional Russian
way to build an administrative hierarchy: you construct a transmission belt
of power and connect it to a single engine."
Putin clearly has chosen the second approach. Before making his TV address,
Putin held a three-hour, closed-door session with 26 key regional leaders. He
drew the party line for them sharply: Either you are with me or you are
against the state. Although many governors last week bowed obediently to his
wishes, some promised defiance. "No matter what they write in decrees, we
will rule in the regions," fumed Mintimer Shaimiyev, the powerful president
of Tatarstan, a mostly Muslim, oil-rich and virtually autonomous, ethnic
republic in central Russia.
Russia's parliament, however, seems positively supine. On Wednesday, in a
record majority vote, the Duma rubber-stamped Putin's choice for Prime
Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov. The 42-year-old technocrat, who won the approval
of 325 of the 450 deputies, was Putin's first choice. While Putin's
long-awaited economic recovery plan has yet to materialize, Kasyanov did
outline to the Duma his priorities: tax reform and a balanced budget. Like an
old Soviet era leader, Putin has commanded that the economy grow. "He made
his instructions clear," says one adviser working on the economic plan. "Make
sure that GDP doubles in 10 years."
In last week's flurry of decrees and declarations, Putin, once considered an
opaque man of mystery, made the direction of his nascent presidency
abundantly clear. Authority, and loyalty to the man who holds it, are fast
becoming the leitmotiv of the new regime. By now it is clear that Putin
wishes to do more than take spins in fighter jets and submarines. Embarking
on a path toward a more muscular presidency, he aims to regain the power that
seeped out of the Kremlin and into the fractious fiefdoms during Yeltsin's
paralytic reign. His predecessor may have tolerated disobedience and
disorder; Putin has a fondness for discipline and order. Particularly when he
gets to run the show.
******
#13
smi.ru
May 23, 2000
Governor-Generals Will Deprive Governors Of Their Generals
RIA "Novosti", quoting sources in the Kremlin administration, reported that
force agencies will have to change territorial structure in accordance with
the newly created federal counties. The headquarters of force agencies'
territorial departments will be relocated to the federal counties'
administrative centers: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod,
Rostov-on-Don, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk and Khabarovsk.
Comment: There are reasons to believe that the whole scheme was devised with
this aim in mind. Control over local force bodies and financial flows are
governors' key instruments of power. Dividing the country into seven counties
does not allow directly to check the regions' financial liberty, but at the
same time it is a sine qua non for implementing the plan of creating a
unified market space, because without the local force bodies' support
governoral decrees on, say, banning the wheat exports or vodka imports, etc.
will be impossible to implement. Besides, special police units (OMON) will
not be used by governors as an effective instrument of "property
restructuring". So, after governors lose their control over force bodies it
will be just a matter of time when they lose their financial independence.
******
#14
Moscow Times
May 24, 2000
Tatarstan Shows No Sign of Surrender
By Sarah Karush
Staff Writer
KAZAN, Central Russia -- The day after President Vladimir Putin announced his
plans to tighten the Kremlin's grip on the regions, Tatarstan President
Mintimer Shaimiyev gathered reporters at his residence under the green, white
and red flag of sovereign Tatarstan to respond.
The leadership of Tatarstan, said Shaimiyev - one of the nation's most
powerful regional potentates - fully supports the plans that Putin first
floated a week ago.
If Putin follows through on his pledge to make all Russians live under one
set of laws, Shaimiyev's reign as unchallenged ruler over this republic of 4
million could be brought to an end. But far from rushing to the defense of
his autonomy, Shaimiyev is avoiding confrontation. Despite his awesome power
within Tatarstan's borders, Shaimiyev may have little choice, observers say.
"Tatarstan has gone quiet," said Rashit Akhmetov, editor of the opposition
newspaper Zvezda Povolzhya. "Everyone is sitting and waiting."
Tatarstan led the regions in wresting away from Moscow many of the political
and economic powers associated with sovereignty. Most importantly, control
over the region's vast oil deposits - Tatarstan's oil industry generates more
than $1 billion a year in revenues - passed into the regional government's
hands. Many of Tatarstan's laws - from additional tax legislation to the lack
of term limits for presidents - contradict federal legislation.
Shaimiyev, a former Soviet party boss well known for his ability to
painlessly switch ideologies, has coyly avoided addressing the central
question: Is he ready to give up his independence?
"I wouldn't say that this [Putin's proposals] will threaten independence. I
don't think anybody ... wants lawlessness," he said in an interview with
ORT's Sergei Dorenko broadcast last Saturday. "There should be one set of
rules in the state."
But for all the Tatarstan leader's outward acquiescence, the mood in Kazan is
far from one of surrender. Officials close to Shaimiyev say they don't want
to give anything up and are counting on success at the negotiating table to
allow them to retain most, if not all, of their current powers.
"Our powers will stay with us. ... We don't plan to give them up," said
Rafail Khakimov, a close adviser to Shaimiyev.
"They may try to scare us in Moscow, and some regions will give up right
away," Khakimov said in an interview Monday. "We aren't afraid, that's the
difference. We'll sit down at the negotiating table and find a common
language."
Tatarstan has done well at the negotiating table in the past. A 1994 treaty
broadly outlined areas of regional control - such as land distribution and
natural resources - and areas of federal control - nuclear energy and
defense, for example. But the nuts and bolts of the relationship are set
forth in specific agreements that must be renewed every few years.
This time, they will struggle to hold on to more than a fraction of their
current powers, analysts said.
"Tatarstan on its own won't be able to resist these changes," said Nikolai
Petrov, a regional politics analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center.
Indeed, the republic already has been forced to make concessions. When Putin
visited Kazan in March, he forced the republic to direct the same amount of
tax revenue to the federal budget as other regions, Khakimov said. In return,
that money will stay in Kazan at the regional branch of the federal treasury
and will be directed toward federal projects in Tatarstan, he added.
Meanwhile, members of Tatarstan's weak opposition forces say they welcome any
measures that would bring Shaimiyev into line.
"You can't talk about human rights until you have state power," said
Alexander Shtanin, the only Shaimiyev opponent in the Tatarstan parliament.
Shtanin had to sue the regional election commission eight times for election
fraud before being allowed to take up his seat earlier this month.
Shtanin and other Shaimiyev opponents say Moscow's crackdown means the
63-year-old leader will probably not run for a third term next year.
Tatarstan amended its constitution to allow presidents to run repeatedly, but
federal law limits regional leaders to two terms.
With Putin leading the charge to tighten federal control - and placing an
especially strong emphasis on the need for regional laws to conform to
federal legislation - the wily Shaimiyev is unlikely to disobey Moscow so
blatantly, they said.
Some observers said they foresee a deal where Shaimiyev would get a seat in
the Federation Council as compensation for not running for president in
elections due the first half of next year.
One of the three bills Putin has sent to the State Duma would restructure the
upper house so that it is no longer made up of governors and the heads of
regional parliaments. Instead, the regional parliaments will elect full-time
senators - a position that comes with immunity from prosecution.
State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov said Tuesday that lawmakers plan to
debate the three bills on May 31 in a first reading and would pass them by
early July.
Tatarstan officials are quick to point out that Putin's proposals to
strengthen the so-called vertical power structure is something they have
firsthand experience in. In fact, Tatarstan takes it a step further.
While Putin's bills would give Moscow the right to dismiss governors and
governors the right to dismiss mayors if a court establishes that they have
broken federal law, Shaimiyev appoints and dismisses mayors and district
administration heads unilaterally.
"It [the vertical power structure] is necessary, first and foremost in the
transitional period," Shaimiyev told ORT. "I am for elections - that really
should be the end goal because power belongs to the people. But at this stage
in the development of society, a certain mechanism of cooperation between
various levels of government is needed."
Some Shaimiyev critics said they feared that in strengthening federal power,
Putin is simply aiming to replace the regional authoritarian regimes with a
nationwide dictatorship.
"On the whole, all these initiatives are part of Putin's overall strategy of
strengthening his personal power," said local Communist leader Robert
Sadykov.
Damir Iskhakov, a former leader of the Tatar nationalist movement, said he is
concerned that Putin will crack down on the cultural autonomy of the regions
as well as the political and economic independence of the governors. Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tatarstan has seen a revival of the Tatar
language and culture.
"Putin doesn't understand the difference [between Tatarstan and other
regions]. He thinks they should all be uniform," Iskhakov said.
******
#15
Russia Today press summaries
Kommersant
May 23, 2000
The Dollar is the Proletariat's Weapon
Comrade Zyuganov Said at the Top of his Voice
Summary
It was expected that Saturday's plenum of the KPRF would be sensational: the
defeat of the Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov at the presidential election
and loss of majority at the Duma gave grounds for tough criticism of the
party leader Gennady Zyuganov. Instead, the Communist chief prevented attacks
of his party companions-in-arms, having fronted a revolutionary program
implementing a new party course.
Some of Zyuganov's provisions were:
-to initiate overall pressure on the power, not limited to parliamentary
forms of fight; - to use the administrative resource of the "red belt " of
Russia. To turn it into "the state of patriots" surrounded by "the state of
traitors"; - to establish an inter-regional authorized bank for workers with
the help of fifteen to twenty "red" regional administrations; - to secure
payments of wages and pensions from this bank, as well as payment of "red
supplementary pensions"; - to provide investments into the real sector of the
economy from this bank; - to establish an inter-regional television and radio
company; - to buy an oil company and equity in Gazprom and RAO UES; - to use
the Internet as a weapon to fight against exploitation of workers.
The last provision was probably cast by the information about "ILOVEYOU"
virus.
It seems that the Communist leader wants to establish his own financial
empire that would control money flows of dozens of billions of dollars.
******
#16
NUCLEAR AGE HAS CLAIMED BILLIONS OF LIVES - RUSSIAN ECOLOGIST
MOSCOW. May 22 (Interfax) - The nuclear age has claimed more than
2.33 billion lives, Russian ecologist Alexei Yablokov, a corresponding
member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has said.
Addressing an international conference on nuclear disarmament in
Moscow on Monday, Yablokov explained that the figure is the result of
the following statistics: 1.13 billion have been the victims of nuclear
testing, 248 million of these dying of cancerous, fatal diseases and 117
million suffering other, non-fatal ailments. Yablokov added that there
223 million people with genetic defects and 558 million born with
congenital deformities attributable to the development of the nuclear
industry.
Yablokov went on to say that 3.2 million had become ill and died
because of the nuclear arms industry, 1.15 billion fell victim to
radiation accidents, 21 million to nuclear power engineering, 15 million
to accidents at nuclear reactors, and 4 million to related medical
technologies and treatments.
Asked why the statistics have never been seen in the open press,
the ecologist cited a 1959 agreement between the International Atomic
Energy Agency and World Health Organization that prohibited the WHO from
publishing such statistics without IAEA consent.
*****
#17
smi.ru
May 23, 2000
There Is No Longer Any Need for Inviting IMF. It Will Come Itself
Gerard Belanger, Deputy Director of the IMF European II Department is
arriving in Moscow to conduct "technical consultations" with the Russian
side, the RIA "Novosti" news agency reports quoting a "source in the Fund".
The consultations of the Fund experts with representatives of the Russian
government bodies responsible for the economy, as well as with experts from
the Center for Strategic Studies headed by German Gref, will "not be in the
nature of a mission", they will be closer to a discussion and, as the IMF
points out, the main purpose of these talks is an exchange of opinions on a
number of macroeconomic issues. The principal task set before the Fund
experts, the IMF remarked, is discussing some issues connected with preparing
the Russian government's new economic program and those of preparing the
draft federal budget for 2001, plus a series of problems related to Russian
budget and taxation policies. This is the second "tranche" of IMF experts
coming to Russia. The first "installment" arrived in Moscow on May 15.
Comment: It is a comforting fact that IMF consultations are no longer in the
nature of missions . Could the IMF have finally understood that Russia
swallows such "missionary" efforts whole, without even choking over its own
promises, and decided to act in a more discreet manner this time? Until now,
the scheme has been the following: Russia agrees on a program of structural
changes with the Fund, gets money for it and afterwards explains in great
detail why it failed to fulfil its promises. It should be pointed out,
though, that of all the Russian governments, the Sergei Kirienko cabinet
alone actually managed to reach an agreement with the IMF on a program of
measures to be implemented - not that the end result wasn't even more
disastrous than usual for the Fund. Now the IMF has got an entirely different
interest in the Land of Disappearing Tranches. A political one. In late 1999,
under pressure from its principal "shareholder" - the US - the IMF refused to
extend further loans to Russia. At the moment, it is the very same States
that are pressuring the very same Fund to resume crediting. The crux of the
matter is that the Clinton administration, vigorously upholding Albert Gore
in the forthcoming US presidential election, has come under fire from its
opponents precisely for having failed the Russian foreign political strategy.
The American administration, in turn, is trying to shift the blame on the
IMF, accusing it of having let the crediting of Russian reforms take its own
course and thus encouraging the Russians to use the tens of billions of
dollars of its loans off purpose. Accordingly, there remains nothing for the
IMF but to try and drastically change the situation and to start funding the
Bears' Country (now Russia is one both geographically and politically) THE
RIGHT WAY. Otherwise, the question might be raised about the expediency of
having an International Monetary Fund at all (especially as Russia is far
from being its only failure).
In this, the IMF has gotten itself into a really ticklish situation. It is
impossible for it not to extend loans, but it is also impossible for it to
extend them without the traditional procedure of agreeing on a program of
measures with the Russian government - one that will have to be really
fulfilled this time (otherwise, in case of another failure, the IMF might be
deprived of funding itself). On May 15, the Fund's Moscow representative,
Martin Gilman, declared that the IMF is expecting Russia to send in an
official letter on annulling the old bilateral agreement and the commencement
of a new program of crediting. Which means that, mission or no mission, this
time the IMF is going to dictate a really rigorous set of terms to Russia.
In all probability, it is going to demand:
- an increase of the share of payments in "ready money" to 40 per cent in the
power engineering sector, in heat and gas deliveries, and to 65 per cent in
the railroad transport sector (the latter is a legacy of the old program of
the Yevgeny Primakov era),
- reforms in the public utilities sector: raising the prices of these
services for the citizens up to the level of their actual value (this demand
is unrealistic, as this cannot be achieved in practice even in the course of
the next year - SMI.RU),
- finally, adopting a federal law providing for the free sale and purchasing
of land (this is realistic, given political will on the part of the Kremlin).
Plus a number of other strategic financial and economic measures, such as
toughening the law on bankruptcy, etc.
It is self-evident that the Fund will now be looking for methods of control
the way its loans are used - if the agreement is signed after all. As to
Russia, it will have to seriously weigh up whether it will be really able to
meet any specific condition set before it (it will obviously be unable to
fulfil all the IMF conditions - SMI.RU), - if it proves unable to cheat this
time.
******
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