May 22, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4315 • 4317 

Johnson's Russia List
#4317
22 May 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Think-tank presents economic plan to Russian govt.
2. Itar-Tass: Putin to Support Russian Academy of Sciences. 
3. The Independent (UK): Patrick Cockburn, REPORTING RUSSIA BECOMES A DANGEROUS TRADE AGAIN.
4. New York Times editorial: Mr. Putin's Missteps.
5. The Russia Journal: Francesca Mereu, 'Dictatorship of the law'
(how Putin is perceived by foreign media). 
6. Novaya gazeta: Roman Shleinov, Our Acting Yeltsin: FSB Officers Comment Upon The Latest Political Moves of the Authorities.
7. Reuters: New Russian energy minister seen taking different path.
8. Bloomberg: Russia's Kudrin on the Budget, Ruble, Economic Program.
9. gazeta.ru: Chubais Assured of Influence in Government.
10. Financial Times (UK): VISUAL ARTS: A Moscow show of photographs emphasises the conflict beyond Russia, says Andrew Jack.
11. Reuters: Mike Collett-White, Hurdles for Russia in former Soviet Union.
12. Krasnaya Zvezda: START II: SECURITY ON PARITY BASIS.
13. Newsday: Michael Slackman, Displaced Peoples Of The Former Soviet Union.  One Family's Trail of Tears. Meskhetian Turks on the run.
14. AFP: Putin Launches Busy Legislative Program.]


******


#1
Think-tank presents economic plan to Russian govt

MOSCOW, May 22 (Reuters) - A think-tank set up by Russian President Vladimir 
Putin presented a 10-year economic programme to the government on Monday, 
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said. 


In televised remarks to officials at the Ministry for Economic Development 
and Trade, Kasyanov said he had ordered ministries to consider the document, 
on the basis of which the government would compile its own programme by 
mid-June. 


Kasyanov had previously said the government could amend the programme, which 
was worked out under German Gref, now economic development and trade 
minister, either slightly or significantly. 


But Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin told RTR television on Sunday the plan 
would not undergo significant changes. 


The plan calls for fair business competition, measures to curb capital 
flight, reforms in the banking and tax systems and a deficit-free budget 
policy. 


Kasyanov said the 2001 budget, a draft of which would be considered by the 
government on June 1, would be the first step in implementing the programme. 


*******


#2
Putin to Support Russian Academy of Sciences. .


MOSCOW, May 22 (Itar-Tass) - President Vladimir Putin is going to support the 
Russian Academy of Sciences in every way. 


"I would like to inform you that the government will support the Russian 
Academy of Sciences in every way," he said, addressing an annual general 
meeting of the Academy, which opened here on Monday. 


Until recently, general meetings of the Academy were held twice a year. 
During the past several years, however, they were held only once a year. The 
presidium of the Academy decided that they would save much money in this way. 


The Russian Academy of Sciences includes several hundred research institutes, 
which are amalgamated into 18 branch and four regional sectors. There are 
some 1,000 academicians and corresponding members in the Academy. 


The Academy, the oldest scientific organisation of the country, observed its 
275th anniversary in 1999. 


******


#3
The Independent (UK)
22 May 2000
[for personal use only]
REPORTING RUSSIA BECOMES A DANGEROUS TRADE AGAIN
By Patrick Cockburn


NOBODY KNOWS who attacked Igor Domnikov, a journalist on the campaigning
bi-weekly Novaya Gazeta - beating him half to death with a hammer at the
entrance to his apartment block in south-east Moscow 10 days ago. 


But his editors have a shrewd idea about the motive for the attack. They
assume that some powerful figure in Moscow was expressing his displeasure
at the coverage of his activities by Novaya Gazeta, one of the few truly
independent journals in Moscow. They also suspect the attacker got the
wrong man. They believe a more likely target was Oleg Sultanov, another
journalist on the same paper, who had been writing about corruption in
LUKoil, Russia's biggest oil company. He lives in the same building as Mr
Domnikov, and the two men also look alike. 


A few months ago an old acquaintance of Mr Sultanov in the FSB security
service politely told him either to give up his investigation - in which
case he would receive money, an apartment and a job - or go on and possibly
become the target of a contract killer. LUKoil strenuously denies being
behind any such threats. 


The police, arguing that the attack does not bear the marks of a
professional hit, are also looking into the possibility that Mr Domnikov
was the victim of a drug addict or petty criminal who was scared off before
he could take any money. 


In the present edgy mood among Moscow journalists few are likely to accept
this theory. Only the day before Mr Domnikov was assaulted, armed police,
their faces concealed by black balaclavas, broke into the headquarters of
Media-Most, the media company which owns NTV, the second most popular
television station in the country, Ekho Moskvy radio station and several
influential newspapers. All have criticised President Vladimir Putin and
the Chechen war that put him in power. 


No wonder journalists in Moscow feel threatened. It is not that
assassination attempts on correspondents are something new in Russia. In
1994 a journalist named Dmitri Kholodov on the Moskovsky Komsomolets
received a tip that, if he picked up a briefcase at a railway station, he
would learn something interesting. When he opened the case, the bomb inside
blew him apart. 


In the face of such intimidation Russian journalists have proved
extraordinarily courageous. But now they see storm clouds gathering on
every side. Ownership of the Russian media has become highly concentrated
with Vladimir Gusinsky, head of Media-Most, in one corner and Boris
Berezovsky, controller of ORT, Russia's most watched television station, in
the other. 


The latest attacks are no doubt primarily Mr Putin's subtle way of pointing
out that he does not much care for critical coverage of his actions by NTV
and other Media-Most organs. 


Like other big Russian companies, Media-Most resembles a mini-version of
the Soviet Union with its own private army of security men, frequently
former employees of the FSB or Interior Ministry. 


The official line is that the Moscow prosecutor was shocked to learn that
Media-Most security was bugging politicians, businessmen, rivals and its
own employees. But if anybody had any doubts about the Kremlin's real
animosity towards Media-Most they were dispelled on Wednesday when the
Central Bank sent administrators into Most Bank, a vital resource for the
company. It owes a lot of money to the Central Bank, but then so do many
other institutions loyal to the Kremlin - and they have not been bothered
by the banking authorities. 


*******


#4
New York Times
May 22, 2000
Editorial
Mr. Putin's Missteps

As President Clinton prepares to visit Moscow next month, there are 
disquieting signs that Russia's new president, Vladimir Putin, is steering 
the Kremlin toward anti-democratic policies. A government raid on a private 
media company earlier this month and Moscow's recent welcome for Yugoslavia's 
defense minister, who has been indicted for war crimes, suggest a contempt 
for democratic values that Mr. Clinton and his aides must consider as they 
plan for the Moscow summit meeting. 


It is possible that the police raid on the offices of Media-MOST and the 
defense minister's visit were tactical maneuvers designed to placate some of 
Mr. Putin's conservative political allies rather than a signal of new 
policies. Even so, Mr. Putin must have understood that the steps would send a 
chilling message in the first days of his presidency. 


The government defended the crude search of Media-MOST headquarters as 
necessary to gather information for a criminal investigation of suspected 
financial irregularities at the company. Mr. Putin himself echoed that view 
when he endorsed the police action, while affirming his support for a free 
press. But it is difficult to believe that the arrival of masked agents with 
automatic weapons was not an effort to intimidate an enterprise whose 
publications and broadcast outlets have been critical of Mr. Putin and his 
prosecution of the war in Chechnya. 


By hosting Dragoljub Ojdanic, Belgrade's defense minister and a loyal ally of 
Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslav president, Moscow defied the war crimes 
tribunal in The Hague, which was established by the United Nations Security 
Council to deal with atrocities in the recent Balkan ethnic conflicts. Mr. 
Ojdanic was army chief of staff during the war in Kosovo. The tribunal last 
May charged him and other Yugoslav leaders with responsibility for the 
deportation of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians and the murder of 
hundreds of others. 


As a member state of the U.N., Russia had an obligation to detain Mr. Ojdanic 
so he could be brought to trial. Instead, he met with Russian defense 
officials and moved freely through Moscow during a five-day visit that 
coincided with Mr. Putin's inauguration. Last week, after a visit by 
Belgrade's foreign minister, Moscow granted Yugoslavia a $102 million loan. 
Mr. Putin may be playing to nationalist and Slavic sentiment in Russia with 
his embrace of Belgrade, but these steps are a direct slap at Washington. 


Mr. Clinton's advisers talk about the coming summit meeting as an opportunity 
to take the measure of Mr. Putin, and a chance to explore a broad agenda of 
common interests. The Russian leader may turn out to be a pragmatic 
negotiator. Certainly he is more energetic and more familiar with policy 
details than his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. On economic issues, he seems 
inclined to spur reform. But on such critical issues as respect for 
democratic principles, Mr. Putin has not made a promising start. 


******


#5
The Russia Journal
May 22-28, 2000
'Dictatorship of the law'
By Francesca Mereu 
Media Watch columnist Francesca Mereu looks at how Putin is perceived by
foreign media.


In the wake of his victory in the March presidential election, the West
appeared enchanted by Vladimir Putin. The Western media were referring to
him as "Vladimir the decision-maker," they have noted that he spoke "fluent
German and passable English," was "the youngest leader since Stalin," would
"espouse liberal pro-market economic policies," and was "a canny pragmatist."


Most European journalists assured their readers that Putin was a convinced
"Westernizer" who understood that Russia's future lay with Europe. These
same journalists faithfully reported that Putin's popularity stemmed from
his promises to fight corruption and put the oligarchs in their place.


It is almost as though the journalists were writing what they wanted Putin
to be doing ­ filling in the blank slate of Putin's policy platform with
their own ideas. 


‘A strong state’


On the other hand, what Westerners chose to criticize at the time were
Putin's two most famous statements for resurrecting Russia ­ imposing a
"dictatorship of the law" and reconstructing "a strong state." 


Why is it that these two phrases, two of the keys to Putin's high standing
in domestic public opinion, have drawn the most criticism from the Western
press? Probably because to Western ears, the subtext of these messages is
an appeal to the population's instincts toward an authoritarian state, one
where force, not institutions, decides problems.


Most Russians, by contrast, understood the statements differently. I asked
a couple of Russians about their views to try to understand their
interpretation of what Putin said.


To Dima, 28, the "dictatorship of the law" meant having "a law that really
worked. A law that applied to everyone equally, as in the West." To Andrei,
31, "a strong state" meant "to have a state that functioned, including
paying old people's pensions on time and in full, as in Europe."


This difference of interpretation has seen a lot of Russians ­ even those
who did not vote for Putin ­ become confused when they hear criticisms in
the Western press of notions that they consider to be democratic.


Still, confusion aside, the question remained: How did Putin understand his
statements? In the Russian interpretation, or that of the Western press?


A free press is a cornerstone of any successful democratic society.
However, since Putin became prime minister, we have witnessed the
reintroduction of a certain amount of censorship in society ­ and now, as
president, we appear to be seeing a further tightening of controls.


License threat


The first instance came with the detention in January by Russian troops of
Radio Liberty reporter Andrei Babitsky, who disappeared for three weeks
following a puzzling prisoner exchange. Then, this month, the deputy media
minister, Andrei Romanchenko, defined the position of Radio Liberty as
unfriendly to the Russian state. He proposed revoking the licenses of
foreign media outlets if they took a position hostile to the government. 


Romachenko's comments came just a few days after police commandos in ski
masks raided the Moscow offices of Vladimir Gusinsky's Media-MOST holding
company. Gusinsky's media have been critical of the war in Chechnya ­
witness NTV television reports ­ and skeptical about Putin's democratic
credentials. Media-MOST's papers, such as the daily Segodnya and biweekly
Novaya Gazeta, are anti-Kremlin and consistently attempt to reveal
corruption in high places.


No explanations


"Does the president know what's going on?" asked Yevgeny Kiselyov, the
anchor of NTV's Sunday night "Itogi" program, in the wake of the MOST raids.


To date, Putin has avoided giving any commentary on, or explanation of, the
raid ­ and many people are feeling confused. It seems improbable that Putin
didn't know anything about it, because a struggle in the Kremlin is now
taking place, as officials vie to become the president's favorite. Hence,
it seems unlikely someone would dare to make a move without Putin's approval. 


This latest event has left much of the Western media shocked. It was
front-page news, and its significance was heavily emphasized. The Western
media now seem to have grasped that this latest attack on press freedom
demonstrated that there is no democratic basis to Putin's "dictatorship of
the law" and "strong state" statements. 


A lot of Russians who voted for Putin in the hope that their country would
become a Western-type society must now realize that they deeply
misunderstood his intentions.


(E-mail Media Watch at media@russiajournal.com)


*******


#6
May 22, 2000
Novaya gazeta
Roman Shleinov
Our Acting Yeltsin:
FSB Officers Comment Upon The Latest Political Moves of the Authorities
[translation for personal use only]


The second incursion of special services into the Media-Most headquarters,
permutations in Russia's administrative system and the installation of three
generals, two FSB operatives and two civilians (or just in civilian dress?)
as heads of districts carved out in a military fashion - isn't that too much
of an activity for a beginning president? Looking in the eyes of his
entourage (that might well have ended up in jail before he ended up in the
presidential seat), one can safely conclude: these are not Mr.Putin's
initiatives.


We addressed two retired special service officers with a request to comment
upon these tumultuous developments: 1. What are the prospective
relationships between special services and the media after FSB and
Prosecutor-General's offensive against Media-Most, and what are the reasons
for such an offensive? 2. What is the point of carving out districts and
appointing generals and operatives to preside over them? Will similar
personnel policies guide all other appointments?


Retired officer X: 1. Even before the inauguration, it was obvious to anyone
that Berezovsky's people will remain in power. Despite the recent attempt to
revoke Berezovsky's Duma membership, initiated by the Semyonov, chief of
administration of the Karachaevo-Circassian Republic, an attempt, in which
Gusinsky participated. This was also the work of special services, but in
this case they failed. Meanwhile, when it became clear that the government
will remain the same, and Berezovsky felt that his rear is secure, he went
for a counterattack. This is a primitive demonstration of power at the
highest level: "Look what I can do!" This has nothing to do with an attack
against the media. If even security services of the country are being used
for private purposes, then the media just count for nothing among these
players.
2. All the three "power ministers" stayed in office, and none of them comes
from St.Pete. All of them are Boris Yeltsin's appointees. The
Prosecutor-General will sign whatever he will be asked to. Voloshin stayed
for a second term. The new president kept the old team. Could one imagine
Yeltsin keeping Gorbachev's team in place after coming to power, or, for
that matter, Clinton retaining the team of George Bush Sr.? If Putin did
this, it means that he is a puppet president.


Retired officer Y: 1. There is a war between Berezovsky and Gusinsky. It is
disappointing to see the FSB involved in this fight. One of them acquired
power and demonstrates it to the other, with the involvement of journalists,
so that everyone knows about his power and influence. This was not an
assault on the freedom of the press, because the press was just a random
casualty. At this stage, the freedom of speech is just not a serious
subject.
2. It seemed that the new territorial structure would lead to the downsizing
of the apparat. But, as we find out, everyone will stay in office. For
example, the presidential representative in Chukotka had 120 subordinates -
more than the governor. All of them remain employed - as assistants to the
new district boss. Add to this the newly created bureaucracy.
Putin will not be able to remove regional authorities. The system took its
shape long before him. To remove people from the old team would mean hurting
Yeltsin or his entourage. So, the new president creates new structures by
inflating bureaucracy to exorbitant levels, without offending Yeltsin,
Berezovsky or Chubais. But he appoints his own people in order to have at
least some control over situation. This resembles the Secretariat of the
Central Committee under comrade Stalin, whose representative was sitting in
every regional party committee and writing encrypted reports to the
center...
At this stage, Putin is a weak president. He can only remove people from
weakened political groups, such as Luzhkov's. Luzhkov lost, so Putin does
not have to be too nice to him.


*******


#7
New Russian energy minister seen taking different path
By Aleksandras Budrys

MOSCOW, May 22 (Reuters) - Russian Energy Minister Alexander Gavrin, 
appointed at the weekend, is a largely unknown quantity but analysts said on 
Monday he may reverse some of his predecessor's policies. 


Gavrin replaced Viktor Kalyuzhny, a controversial figure who advocated tight 
administrative regulation of the sector and creation of a state oil company 
in his year-long period as head of what was previously called the fuel and 
energy ministry. 


``Substitution of Kalyuzhny is itself a positive factor for the industry,'' 
said Dmitry Avdeev, an analyst at Moscow brokerage UFG. 


``But anything may happen, as Gavrin is still a big question mark,'' Valery 
Nesterov, an analyst at Flemings UCB, added. 


Ukrainian-born Gavrin, 47, was mayor of the Western Siberian town of Kogalym, 
the Siberian capital of Russia's largest oil producer LUKOIL LKOH.RTS. Before 
1993, he was trade union boss at Kogalymneftegaz, a LUKOIL subsidiary. 


``We expect this man (Gavrin) to favour LUKOIL in a certain manner, 
especially because (LUKOIL's head Vagit) Alekperov personally supported him 
during a mayoral election last March,'' Nesterov said. 


``But notwithstanding that, we also expect him, as an oilman, to reflect 
interests of the whole oil sector,'' he added. 


Gennady Krasovsky, an analyst at NIKoil investment and banking group which 
holds a stake of over 10 percent in LUKOIL, said he did not expect any 
special favours for LUKOIL. 


``Putin forms the government as an integrated team, so people working in the 
team can't give any preferences to anybody. If they do, they go,'' he said. 


EXPORT CURBS MAY GO 


Analysts said they expected Gavrin to abandon administrative methods of 
regulating the energy sector defended by Kalyuzhny, who introduced quotas for 
crude oil and oil products exports in order to supply the domestic market. 


``This regulation did not work anyway, as under Kalyuzhny all regulation 
ended with a really primitive redistribution of quotas or bonuses,'' said 
Ivan Mazalov of Troika Dialogue. 


Another project advocated by Kalyuzhny was to create a state oil company on 
the basis of the government's stakes in Rosneft PFGS.RTS, Slavneft MFGS.RTS 
and Onako ORNB.RTS. 


``I believe the project for creation of the state oil company will now be 
buried forever, as Kalyuzhny was practically the only man in the government 
lobbying for it,'' said UFG's Avdeev. 


``Not a single oil company is interested in the project, as everybody wants 
to buy those stakes, especially LUKOIL.'' 


Analysts said they did not expect the powers of the ministry to be cut 
radically, as local media speculated after the former Fuel and Energy 
Ministry lost its fuel component last week. 


``The functions of the ministry have not yet been clearly defined, so it must 
be subject to bargaining,'' Nesterov said. 


``It would be ideal if the new minister defended the interests of Russian 
producers abroad and contributed to setting up a better investment climate,'' 
said UFG's Avdeev. 


*******


#8
Russia's Kudrin on the Budget, Ruble, Economic Program: Comment

Moscow, May 22 (Bloomberg)
-- The following are comments by Russian Finance Minister and Deputy Prime 
Minister Alexei Kudrin, in an interview with Russian daily Vremya. 


``The ruble will remain strong this year, though its slight devaluation is 
possible. 


``According to my estimations, the Russian budget will be balanced. The level 
of budget revenues enables us to do without loans from international 
organizations. However, we hope to receive (International Monetary Fund) 
loans after approval of the government's economic program. The program is to 
be confirmed in the beginning of June, after which we hope to coordinate it 
with the IMF. But if by the end of this year Russia does not get any loans, 
the financial situation in this period of time will not be critical for us. 


``We will fully implement the budget this year. Financing of the Chechen war 
will not change the situation. The money designated for war expenses has 
already been included in the budget under the auspices of the Defense 
Ministry. 


``There will be no reorganization of the Ministry of Finance. The ministry 
has a lot of responsibilities and duties and I don't see any sense in 
widening its authorities.'' 


*******


#9
gazeta.ru
May 22, 2000
Chubais Assured of Influence in Government
By Leonid Sborov 


The day after his appointment as Vice-Premier, Alexei Kudrin announced on 
Friday that he has come to an agreement with Mikhail Kasianov over dividing 
their duties. Practically all the important ministries are now under Kudrin`s 
control. That means that Anatoly Chubais` influence upon the President is 
still strong. 
Alexei Kudrin has always been considered as Chubais` man. They have 
known each other for over ten years, since they lived in Leningrad. When 
Chubais was prime minister, Kudrin held high but secondary posts such as 
deputy Head of the Presidential Administration or deputy Finance Minister or 
deputy chairman of the Russian energy monopoly UES. 


Immediately after Putin`s inauguration there was speculation that 
Alexei Kudrin may even get the post of Finance Minister or even Vice-Prime 
Minister. Our sources in the presidential administration say that he was even 
considered as a candidate for PM. However, this did not suit Boris Berezovsky 
one bit. Berezovsky`s media empire started publishing materials claiming that 
Kudrin`s promotion would undermine Putin`s independence in decision-making. 

Kudrin has not been appointed Prime Minister, but nevertheless he has 
got two key positions in the new government. He is both Vice Premier (PM) and 
Finance Minister at the same time. And on Friday he announced that he and his 
boss Mikhail Kasyanov had agreed on the distribution of their duties. 
Kasyanov is considered as a man from Berezovsky`s team. 


According to Kudrin, he and Kasyanov have agreed to divide management 
of the economy ministries between them. Kudrin gets the Finance, Tax, 
Economic Development and Trade and Anti-Monopoly Ministries as well as 
Federal Bankruptcy Service. The Prime Minister will personally control the 
remainder of the so-called economy ministries. 


Obviously Kudrin has got the most important institutions, thereby 
strengthening Anatoly Chubais` clan's position. Our sources say that prior to 
the appointment Vladimir Putin met both Chubais and Berezovsky several times 
and a compromise was reached; Putin appointed Kasyanov as Prime Minister and 
Kudrin as his deputy, but has given more powers to the latter. 


The balance achieved appears tenacious. Kasyanov himself, not to 
mention his powerful patrons, is not happy with Kudrin. First deputy Finance 
Minister Kudrin even dared to doubt Kasyanov`s negotiation skills in public 
at the time when Kasianov was holding talks with the London Club of 
creditors. Moreover, when the Economic Ministry announced that Russian 
economic growth mounted to 3.2% last year, it was Kudrin who defiantly 
asserted that the figure was "fictitious" and the real figure was no more 
than 2.5% 


Again we have a familiar situation whereby two rivals occupy the 
highest ranks of government. What differentiates the new pair of Kasyanov and 
Kudrin from their predecessors, such as Chubais vs Soskovets is that the 
former only have a "clan" rivalry, whereas the latter were also 
ideologically opposed to each other. 


*******


#10
Financial Times (UK)
22 May 2000
[for personal use only]
THE ARTS: Viewpoints from a global war: VISUAL ARTS: A Moscow show of 
photographs emphasises the conflict beyond Russia, says Andrew Jack


There was more than a touch of the Soviet past about the festivities in
Moscow earlier this month to mark the 55th anniversary of the end of what
Russians call the Great Patriotic War. 


Under the stern eye of the new president, Vladimir Putin, there was a
military parade in Red Square, the clinking of heavy rows of medals on
octogenarians' chests around Gorky Park, and billowing banners all across
the city to proclaim Victory Day. But just a few hundred yards away, there
was a rather more nuanced, personal approach to dealing with the legacy of
the past. 


The Novy Manezh, an old brick building converted into an exhibition hall,
is hosting a pioneering photographic exhibition. The show, called
Dedication: Second World War photo-project, gives a far broader perspective
to the conflict. 


As the dates on several of the photographs on display discreetly remind
viewers, the second world war - as opposed to the Russian Great Patriotic
War, which began in 1941 when Stalin's secret pact with Hitler collapsed -
started in 1939. 


As the fine moustachioed faces of grinning partisans in the shots of Boris
Ignatovitch recall, the Russian contribution was won with the blood of the
diverse ethnicities that made up the Soviet empire, and was not just the
victory of Slavic people, as Putin claimed during a meeting with his
Ukrainian and Belarussian counterparts earlier this month. 


And as the Black American GIs in Czechoslovakia perched on a jeep bearing a
Red Star illustrate, it was also not simply a war won by Russia, as Soviet
propagandists so long emphasised. Nor was it one only fought within Europe,
as a chilling shot of a napalmed Japanese soldier's head, or the bombing of
Tunis, demonstrate. 


Olga Sviblova, the energetic head of the Moscow House of Photography and
organiser of the exhibition, says that the images on display are not just
pioneering for Russia, but also for all other nations which took part in
the second world war. Through research in archives in different countries,
she concluded that most nations only showed photographs of war from their
own viewpoint. "After the war, people tried to go back to civil life. As a
form of defence, it was necessary to forget. People wanted to remember
heroic things. Everyone lived in catastrophe. What was the point of showing
ruins when everyone lived among them?" 


By contrast, she has tried to pull together a broad international
cross-section of work, including pictures by American, French and German as
well as Russian photographers. For her, that helps to prove that Russians
were just as talented as their counterparts from other countries. 


The show also demonstrates some powerful common themes across the cultures.
The shots of women welding tank-parts taken by Margaret Bourke-White were
from in a factory in Indiana, but bear a striking resemblance to Vsyevolod
Tarasevitch's images of Socialist heroines at work making shells in
Leningrad. 


Partly limited by constraints of time and money, the structure of the
exhibition overall is a bit confused, and the selection of foreign photos
is nonetheless relatively limited. A number of the German photos, perhaps
reflecting the fact that they were seized by the Red Army from official
Nazi archives, focus on ritual, including an extraordinary image of Hitler,
his hand clenched in emphasis, in mid-speech. 


There are splashes of emotion, of laughing soldiers and smiling nurses
during moments of relaxation, and of humour, such as the cyclists
overtaking a bemused military patrol in the streets of Paris. There is also
the powerful ambiguity of war, with a delicate young Frenchman, branded a
collaborator, being trussed up in a callously matter-of-fact way by a
rough-hewn worker to prepare him for shooting. And there is the futility of
death, shown powerfully by Carl Mydans' shot of a young German soldier -
who could just as easily have been Russian or Japanese - his face in the
dirt, his forearm raised. 


There are insights into the devotion to Stalin, or more likely, the degree
of propaganda surrounding him, with a shot of a pilot flying his plane with
a photo of Stalin balanced on the cockpit controls so that it even obscures
several of his dashboard instruments. 


But the most striking pieces are Russian in origin and concern death, long
a taboo during the Soviet Union. Many have been extracted from the archives
of the FSB, the successor to the KGB, during the openness permitted over
the past decade. One shows faces, frozen and sculpture-like, sticking out
from deep snow; another, grieving mothers surveying a frozen field of
corpses. 


It is to the credit of the FSB that such pictures are now accessible, and
to the City of Moscow that it so significantly funded the show. But it is
striking that while the exhibition includes some postwar images - notably
shots of the Nuremberg trials against leading Nazis - it does little to
remind its viewers of the fate of those Russians (not to mention German
prisoners of war) shunted off to Siberia. 


That merits a permanent exhibition of its own. It would be a true test of
whether Russia can finally address not only the more positive achievements
of its past - as Putin urged in his inauguration address earlier this month
- but the darker side too. 


*******


#11
ANALYSIS-Hurdles for Russia in former Soviet Union
By Mike Collett-White

ASHGABAT, May 22 (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin wants to entrench
Russian influence in former Soviet territory but the his first visit to
Central Asia shows his mission will not be easy. 


Putin's choice of Central Asia as his first destination after his May 7
inauguration may have reflected concerns about a string of U.S. visitors
touring the region. 


He secured more or less what he wanted from President Islam Karimov of
Uzbekistan -- closer ties forged through common concerns over terrorism and
religious extremism in nearby Afghanistan. 


But he came away with little from Turkmenistan, where plans to sign a
long-term gas supply agreement appeared to go awry. 


His next meeting will be in Minsk on Tuesday, where leaders from Slav
nations Russia and Belarus meet other Central Asian members of a customs
accord -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Officials said the main
issues at that meeting would be removing trade barriers and improving
economic cooperation. 


Analysts agree that relations between Russia and most of the
newly-independent states once under its tutelage can only get better after
the blunders of Putin's predecessor Boris Yeltsin -- seen by many regional
heads as a colonialist bully. 


RUSSIAN CONCERNS COULD LIMIT PUTIN INITIATIVES 


Yet Russia's own economic, military and political limitations and the
conflicting concerns of the 12 ex-Soviet states loosely grouped under the
Commonwealth of Independent States, could limit the impact of Putin's policy. 


Putin's stay in Uzbekistan represented a further improvement in relations
with Karimov, who was remarkably candid, given how far removed from the
Kremlin he became under Yeltsin. 


``In this world, a country like Uzbekistan cannot defend itself,'' Karimov
said. ``So naturally we seek help from Russia.'' 


Analysts said it was indisputable that ties had warmed between Russia and
Uzbekistan, a key player in the oil-rich Central Asian region with the
biggest population of 24 million. 


``Russia is stating its willingness to protect the sovereignty and
independence of Uzbekistan...and is pursuing its own geopolitical aims by
protecting itself from the spread of instability,'' said Andrei Grozin of
the Moscow-based Institute for Diaspora and Integration. 


But they also questioned what practical form future security cooperation
could take, given Moscow's own concerns with its eight-month-old drive
against separatists in Chechnya. 


``Russia has little to offer economically and its military is tied up in
the Chechen campaign,'' said Olivier Roy of France's National Centre of
Scientific Research, author of ``The New Central Asia: The Creation of
Nations.'' 


Russian media had suggested Putin might agree with Karimov to support Ahmad
Shah Masood, leader of the Afghan opposition fighting the conservative
Moslem Taleban movement which controls most of the country. But Putin
denied any such plan. 


``No form of cooperation with either side fighting in Afghanistan was
discussed either here or in Uzbekistan,'' he told reporters in the Turkmen
capital Ashgabat. 


In Tashkent, Putin and Karimov said only that 28 agreements in the defence
and military spheres would be signed shortly. 


DIFFERENCES REMAIN OVER KEY TURKMEN GAS DEAL 


When Putin met Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov on Friday, the focus
moved from security and military cooperation to economic relations centred
on natural gas. 


Turkmenistan boasts some of the world's largest gas resources, but has yet
to find a way of bypassing Russia while exporting significant volumes to
cash-paying markets. 


The touted deal would have involved Turkmenistan delivering up to 50
billion cubic metres (bcm) a year via Russia's sprawling pipeline system
for a period of thirty years. 


It would have served more than one purpose. 


Putin would win key leverage over the desert nation of five million and
strengthen Russia's hand in the new Great Game being played out by major
powers for control of production and transportation of the Caspian's huge
oil and gas reserves. 


It would also undermine a United States-backed plan for a new gas pipeline
that would run west across the Caspian to Turkey, avoiding Russia and
``rogue state'' Iran. 


Putin announced that the leaders had agreed to increase the volumes of
Turkmen gas passing through Russia by 10 bcm annually until they reached 50
or 60 bcm, but made clear that the key issue of price remained unresolved. 


``We agreed on an increase of 10 bcm and we decided that the price would be
one on which we can agree,'' Putin said. 


******


#12
Krasnaya Zvezda
May 16, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
START II: SECURITY ON PARITY BASIS
Vyacheslav SHPORT, deputy chairman of the State Duma 
committee on industry, construction and science intensive 
technologies is interviewed by Krasnaya Zvezda's correspondent 
Colonel Anatoly ANTIPOV.

Question: You and the majority of your colleagues in the 
lower house of the Federal Assembly voted for the ratification 
of the START II Treaty. By what considerations were you guided?
Answer: START II ratification is necessary because under 
this treaty both Russia and the US trim their strategic nuclear 
forces, or SNF, down to the same level. This helps Russia to 
optimize expenditures for the upkeep of its SNF grouping. It is 
a unique opportunity to maintain the comparability of Russian 
and US strategic nuclear forces in the light of the inevitable 
prospect that they grow naturally obsolete very fast and, at 
the same time, to preserve the efficiency of our nuclear 
deterrence potential.
Had Russia refused to ratify START II, it would be 
economically impossible for it to keep its SNF at the level of 
6,000 warheads, as it is stipulated by START I.
Second, START II ratification clears the way for beginning 
full-scale negotiations on the START III Treaty, which will 
lower Russian and US strategic offensive armaments to a still 
lower level not only without any detriment to Russia's security 
but sooner in its favor. Besides, putting START II into effect 
strengthens Russia's equal status with the US as a world 
nuclear power.

Question: Washington does not conceal its intention to 
deploy anti-ballistic missile defense systems, including the 
national ABM system. Are such plans compatible with the 
ratification of the START II treaty?
Answer: Like Russia, the US has a stake in the reduction 
of its nuclear arsenal, given the preservation of strategic 
stability, because this accords with its national security 
interests. Such an objective coincidence of the strategic 
interests of the two great nuclear powers became the basis for 
the principled agreement between their presidents that the 
conclusion of the START II Treaty should be followed by signing 
the START III Treaty. The latter is to stipulate even greater 
cuts and deeper restrictions of strategic offensive armaments. 
In order to maintain the deterrence potential the US does not 
need to have many-fold superiority over Russia in the nuclear 
sphere.
What is more, this would require considerable military spending.
It goes without saying that the ABM Treaty is of 
exceptional importance for the entire disarmament process. It 
is the key element for ensuring strategic stability and a major 
condition for strategic offensive armaments cuts. When making 
such cuts, we should proceed from the prospect of the 
preservation of the ABM Treaty. If this treaty is violated and 
the US begins creating its national ABM system, this would 
signify a breach of the entire system of START agreements, and 
the continuation of START negotiations will become meaningless.
Possible measures of our response to the US violation of 
the 1972 ABM Treaty are laid down in the federal law on the 
ratification of the START II Treaty.

Question: What steps should the START III Treaty 
stipulate, in your opinion?
Answer: Its fundamental principles were determined by the 
Helsinki agreement between the Russian and US Presidents.
We proceed from the premise that the conclusion of START 
III, just like that of START I and START II before it, is 
possible only if the ABM Treaty is firmly observed in its 
present form, in particular, its cardinal provision which bans 
the creation of a national anti-missile defense system. Should 
either of the sides deploy such a system, this will call in 
question the possibility to maintain strategic stability in the 
world. The result of such actions will be the build-up of 
nuclear arsenals by a number of countries and a complete freeze 
on a dialogue about the limitation and reduction of strategic 
offensive armaments. It is proceeding from the preservation of 
the 1972 ABM Treaty that the Russian and US Presidents agreed 
upon the idea to conclude START III and its basic provisions 
during their meeting in Helsinki in March 1997.
I would also like to recall that the consistency of 
Russia's actions in the sphere of arms control is also borne 
out by the fact that Moscow proposed Washington to agree on 
lower summary levels for warheads on their already deployed 
delivery vehicles - 1,500 warheads instead of 2,000 to 2,500.
The events in Iraq and Yugoslavia laid bare the serious 
danger presented by sea-launched long-range cruise missiles.
Russia (like the Soviet Union before it) has always qualified 
these missiles as strategic offensive armaments. Being a highly 
effective means of warfare, such cruise missiles present a 
special danger to strategic stability, connected with the first 
strike threat. We think that if sea-launched long-range cruise 
missiles are equipped with nuclear or non-nuclear warheads, 
only their complete elimination can facilitate the weakening of 
the threat of a war and the strengthening of international 
peace and security.
The adoption of mutual obligations in the sphere of 
trimming anti-submarine activity in the agreed-upon regions 
which are patrolled by submarine missile-carriers would also 
contribute to strengthening strategic stability and trust in 
relations between Russia and the US. This factor must not be 
ignored in situation when strategic offensive armaments are 
radically restricted. The reduction of the possibility of the 
sides to create a threat to each other's atomic submarines is 
no less important than the restriction of anti-missile defense.
Deployment by nuclear powers of their nuclear weapons 
within the limits of their national territories should also be 
taken into consideration. The Russian President was the first 
to voice this idea at the summit of the world's eight most 
industrialized nations on nuclear security, which took place in 
Moscow on April 19 and 20, 1996.
All of Russia's nuclear weapons are deployed within its 
own territory, and it has no infrastructure for the use of this 
kind of armaments outside its territory.
The US has not deployed tactical nuclear weapons on its 
territory. A considerable part of its nuclear arsenal is still 
within Russia's reach. What is more, the US keeps an 
infrastructure for its tactical nuclear armaments near the 
borders of Russia. Now that the levels of strategic nuclear 
armaments are to be lowered under the START III Treaty, we 
cannot ignore this fact. So, US tactical nuclear weapons 
deployed near Russian borders play the role of the strategic 
component.

Question: Does the federal law on START II ratification 
ensure ground for a sufficient maneuver for making and 
implementing decisions to meet possible challenges on the part 
of the US?
Answer: By and large, this law does ensure ground for 
maneuver in order to adopt and implement necessary decisions to 
meet possible US challenges. In keeping with Article 2, for 
instance, the fulfilment of the START II Treaty is rigidly 
linked to the strict observance of the ABM Treaty and a number 
of other strategically important factors.
Article 4 fixes the deadline - December 31, 2003 - for the 
preparation of a new treaty for further reduction of strategic 
offensive armaments. After that the Russian President holds 
consultations with both houses of the Federal Assembly or 
begins applying to START II the procedures stipulated by 
Article 37 of the federal law "On International Treaties of the 
Russian Federation" (on the termination and suspension of the 
international agreements of the Russian Federation).
The federal law on START II ratification also fixes the 
time-frame during which the Government of the Russian 
Federation is to present its report to the Federal Assembly on 
the state of the country's strategic nuclear forces and 
progress in the fulfilment of the START I, START II and ABM 
treaties. The law also determines the contents of this report.
Article 9 links the putting of this federal law into 
effect to the completion of the procedure of the US 
ratification of START II and the 1997 Protocol to this treaty, 
as well as the package of New York agreements, which were 
signed on September 26, 1997, concerning such ABM questions as 
legal inheritance with regard to the ABM Treaty and 
impermissibility to circumvent it in the process of creating 
non-strategic ABM systems.

*****


#13
Newsday
May 22, 2000
[for personal use only]
BITTER LANDS
Displaced Peoples Of The Former Soviet Union
One Family's Trail of Tears
Meskhetian Turks on the run
By Michael Slackman RUSSIA CORRESPONDENT


Krymsk, Russia-As soon as Bakhtiyar Radzhapov heard the sound of car tires 
rumbling over the dirt road and the heavy steps of men approaching his 
concrete home, he sent his children out the back door running to safety. He 
peered through the window and saw about 50 Cossacks, all in military uniform, 
all carrying clubs. They shouted his name over and over, "Radzhapov, 
Radzhapov." They had come for him. 


Radzhapov stepped from the door, but before he could utter a word, one of the 
men lunged and hit him with the stick. While he was writhing on the ground, 
the group closed in and beat him until he collap- sed to the dirt. His mother 
and wife sobbed; his father recalled later how he screamed for help. 


"They were cursing us, 'Why did you come here? We will kill you. We will 
break your house,'" said the 75-year-old father, Isratil, his eyes red and 
swollen, his hands shaking as he sat in the hospital waiting room awaiting 
word of his son's condition. His son had been in surgery for an hour before 
the doctor entered and said the young man would recover. Not even the good 
news allowed Isratil to calm down. 


The physical injury to his son was one matter, but the attack itself was what 
rattled him; the idea that still, after more than half a century, his family 
was being persecuted for one reason and one reason only, because they were 
Meskhetian Turks. 


"We want to have a calm life," said Isratil's other son, Batiyr, 32, as he 
sat consoling his father in the hospital. "Somewhere to be treated like a 
human being." The Radzhapov story is not just their family history, but the 
shared misery of Meskhetian Turks here; an experience that differs from one 
family to the other only in detail, not substance. All over Krasnodar, this 
farming region in southern Russia dotted by small villages with squat stone 
homes hidden behind gates and fences, Mes- khetian Turk families told similar 
stories of abuse: run out of their homeland; born in exile; run out of their 
adopted land. They told of their feelings not just of victimization, but of 
betrayal. 


Isratil was a young officer in the Soviet army, proudly fighting in what is 
called here the Great Patriotic War and known in the West as World War II. He 
was injured four times and helped capture Berlin before he was allowed to 
head home, to a small village called Guladzhuri in the southern part of 
Georgia, near the border with Turkey. He arrived with a chest full of medals 
and a folder full of commendations to find everyone gone. 


While he was fighting, soldiers wearing the same uniform as his had packed 
about 100,000 Meskhetian Turks into railway cars and sent them to exile in 
Uzbekistan. Isratil made his way to Central Asia, only to learn that his 
parents and brother died in the cold, crowded cattle cars. 


Still, the loyal Soviet citizen married, settled down and had a family in his 
adopted homeland of Uzbekistan. He worked as a driver and put out of his head 
dreams of returning to Georgia. 


His second son, Batiyr, was serving in the Soviet military when history 
seemed to repeat itself. 


Batiyr was a sergeant in 1989, the heady days when perestroika and glasnost 
were promising a more open Soviet society. But those same policies unleashed 
nationalist feelings in many republics, including Uzbekistan. Batiyr flipped 
on the news one day to learn that pogroms had broken out and that his people 
were on the run, protected by the Soviet army. He rushed home, but it was too 
late, his family already had fled. 


"I couldn't find them," he said. "Finally, I got a letter from them saying 
they were here." The Radzhapov family pooled their resources and bought a 
small house on a dirt road on the outskirts of the regional center, a small, 
nondescript Soviet city with the ubiquitous run-down blocky buildings and 
broad main boulevard. 


But from the beginning, the authorities had not welcomed them and would not 
let them register. Salim, the oldest of Isratil's children, went to Rostov, a 
neighboring region, and managed to get residency status there-a tactic that 
officials have effectively shut down. Then with legal status, Salim returned 
and opened a garage, hiring his brother Bakhtiyar as a mechanic. 


Compared with many of their neighbors, they were doing well. "I needed to 
feed my children," Salim said. "I needed to be able to work." Then one night, 
Bakhtiyar heard two men trying to break into his house. The police said the 
two men were drug addicts and that one was on probation. While Bakhtiyar 
fought the men, his brother rushed to get help, according to an account 
verified by the police. 


But the two would-be intruders went to the local Cossack office and 
complained that they had been victimized by the Turks, a charge that incited 
the crowd of Cossacks who beat Bakhtiyar. 


The Cossack leader of all Krasnodar, Vladimir Gromov, who also serves as 
deputy governor, met with local leaders after Bakhtiyar was beaten. He 
insisted that despite what the police said, the victims were the two original 
assailants. He also defended the gang of Cossacks, saying they were only 
trying to protect their community. "The victim of the crime was a Russian and 
a Greek-not a Turk," he said. "You must understand they are really worried. 
You must understand, from one crime to another our patience is running out." 
The day after the attack by the Cossacks, the local paper ran a story under 
the headline "Scandal." It repeated the Cossack version of events, then 
called on local authorities to evict the Radzhapov family from the region. A 
few days later, a national newspaper, Tribune, ran the same version of events 
in a front-page story under the headline "Cossacks Are Being Bothered." "The 
Cossacks here are kind of like a local Mafia," said Senior Police Lt. 


Nikolai Demitrenko, who has worked in the area for 16 years. "They just used 
this as a pretext, any pretext. They just wanted to demonstrate their force." 
****** 


#14
Putin Launches Busy Legislative Program


MOSCOW, May 22, 2000 -- (Agence France Presse) President Vladimir Putin 
summoned senior ministers and officials to the Kremlin on Monday as he sought 
to rush a bundle of important bills through parliament before the summer.


State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov said the lower house of parliament could 
extend its session from June 15 to July 8 to accommodate Putin's heavy 
legislative program.


The new president wants deputies to consider three major bills which would 
give him unprecedented control over the 89 sometimes wayward regions that 
make up the Russian Federation.


Under his proposals Putin would have the right to sack regional governors and 
oust them from the upper house of parliament, the Federation Council.


Seleznyov on Friday said the legislation may be taken up for debate in the 
chamber for the first time on Tuesday.


Other key legislation includes the second installment of a key tax bill that 
aims to overhaul the country's Soviet-era taxation system, seen as vital if 
Russia is to attract foreign investment and end ruinous capital flight.


Speaking at the start of the Kremlin gathering Putin said the swift and 
professional formation of the cabinet was "a good sign for society."


"With such a composition, we can work for a long time and fruitfully," 
Interfax quoted him as saying.


Since his inauguration on May 7, Putin has forged ahead with bold plans to 
revamp Russia's institutions and extend the already-impressive array of 
powers granted to him under the constitution. 


*****

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