May 13, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4297 • 4298

Johnson's Russia List
#4298
13 May 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. AFP: Chechen conflict could spread to neighbouring republics: Russia.
2. Interfax: FORMER RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER BLASTS MEDIA-MOST OFFICE RAIDS. (Primakov)
3. Andrew Gentes: Re: 4297-DJ/Alternatives. 
4. Helena Goscilo: Primakov as an alternative.
5. Itar-Tass: Russia, Foreign Experts Discuss Web-State Relations. 
6. Kennan Institute meeting report: Social Status and Ethnicity in Russian Republics.
7. The Economist (UK): Russian debt.
8. St. Petersburg Times: Andrew McChesney, Privatization Gets Another Chance.
9. Interfax: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA DOWN BY OVER 90% IN 1999.
10. Job posting: SENIOR PROGRAM COORDINATOR, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR EURASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH (NCEEER).
11. AP: Will Putin Move Russian Capital?
12. BBC MONITORING: LEAKED REPORT SHOWS POOR STANDARDS AT RUSSIA'S 
NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS.
13. Moscow Times: Helen Womack, To Russia, With Thanks for the Memories.
14. Beverly Nickles: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN RUSSIA A RENEWED CONCERN.
15. Interfax: PUTIN'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM-MAKER DENIES RELIABILITY OF REPORTS ABOUT PROGRAM.
16. Interfax: Pyotr Antonov, IMF READY TO ADVISE, BUT RUSSIA NOT YET VERY EAGER TO LISTEN.
17. Moscow Times: Catherine Belton, Putin Must Act Fast, Former Minister Says. (Boris Fyodorov)]


******


#1
Chechen conflict could spread to neighbouring republics: Russia


MOSCOW, May 13 (AFP) - 
A Russian minister acknowledged Saturday that the Chechen conflict could
spread to neighbouring republics after rebels killed 19 Russian soldiers in
an ambush in Ingushetia, the Interfax news agency said.


Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Kochman, the government's representative in
Chechnya, said during a visit to Saint Petersburg he was pessimistic about
a political solution to the conflict.


He could not rule out the conflict spreading beyond Chechnya into other
Russian republics, such as Ingushetia and Dagestan, citing Thursday's
attack in Ingushetia, which runs along the western border of Chechnya.


The raid was the deadliest recorded outside the war-torn republic since
Russia launched its ground operation on October 1.


"The terrorists (Chechen fighters) infiltrate Ingushetia and other regions
just because we made it difficult for them to move around in Chechnya,"
Kochman said.


The Russian deputy prime minister said Russian President Vladimir Putin had
foreseen such events when he said that terrorism had to be rooted out at
the source.


The Chechen raid sparked a row between the Russian military and Ingush
President Ruslan Aushev, who blamed each other for the security lapse that
had made the attack possible.


Commander of the Russian forces in Chechnya General Gennady Troshev,
rejecting Ingush criticism, said Friday the republic had become a refuge
for Chechen rebels, a charge angrily denied by Aushev.


The Russian republic of Ingushetia houses some 200,000 Chechen refugees.


Saturday's edition of the Russian daily Izvestia noted that the incident
had provoked a crisis in Ingush-Russian relations.


Citing military sources in the northern Caucasus, the paper noted that
Thursday's attack had come the day after exploratory talks were held in
Ingushetia aimed at ending the conflict.


Pavel Krasheninnikov, who chairs the justice committee in the Duma, the
lower chamber of Russia's parliament, met Chechnya's Deputy Prime Minister
Kazbek Makhashev on Tuesday and Wednesday there.


Even though the Kremlin stressed that the contact was not the start of any
negotiations, the daily paper Segodnya headlined its story on Thursday:
"Chechnya - the negotiations start."


For Russian soldiers cited by Izvestia, the simple fact that such talks
could take place in Ingushetia at all showed that "the criminals could move
freely there."


Some Moscow media have interpreted the strike as a bid by more radical
fighters to interrupt these peace overtures.


"I don't see the forces we could be negotiating with," Kochman said Saturday.


The Russian interior ministry said Saturday that 10 bombs had been found
and defused Saturday: nine near Balansy, in southeast Chechnya near
Dagestan; and the other in Sernovodskoye, near Ingushetia, Russian agencies
reported.


Several thousand Ingush gathered in the republic's capital Nazran on Friday
evening to denounce the Chechen attack, in a demonstration called by Ingush
authorities, Muslim leaders and parliamentary deputies, the Russian media
reported.


******


#2
FORMER RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER BLASTS MEDIA-MOST OFFICE RAIDS


MOSCOW. May 12 (Interfax) - Former Russian Prime Minister and
leader of Fatherland-All Russia coalition Yevgeny Primakov has expressed
his indignation at the methods employed by law enforcement bodies during
searches of the offices of the Media Most holding company.
"The intrusion of masked people armed with attack rifles into the
holding's building aroused general indignation," Primakov said in a
Friday interview with Interfax.
He described as absolutely impermissible such kinds "of so-called
inspections." Primakov said they are regarded as "a show directed
against one of the most influential of the media."
He said the action and form of its implementation are characterized
by at least two important things: one, an action of intimidation was
carried out the fourth day after the inauguration of the president; two,
it was conducted ahead of the Duma debate on the nomination of Mikhail
Kasyanov for prime minister.
"What is behind all this? Is it possible that certain forces are
acting so as to complicate the rise of President Vladimir Putin as an
independent, strong figure? Could these be the intrigues of those who
should leave the Russian political arena in order to let this country
would become a democratic, strong and generally respected nation?"
Primakov asked.


******


#3
Date: Sat, 13 May 2000 
Subject: Re: 4297-DJ/Alternatives
From: Andrew A Gentes <cheeselovers@juno.com>


Dear David,
Whereas I agree with the premise of your "There is no alternative"
commentary, as well as with most of what you say about Primakov, I have
to disagree with your assertion that he would have taken steps against
corruption had he been allowed to remain in office. Unless I'm seriously
mistaken, Primakov's government was renowned for its corruption. Primakov
is an old-time operator, much in the way Besmertnykh is, both of them
able to work with the powers that be precisely because they refuse to go
against those powers in any significant way. It's true that Putin may be
a Stalin-in-incubation, but I believe it is still too early to determine
whether or not he will tolerate current levels of corruption.


Andrew A. Gentes
PhD Candidate
Department of History
Brown University


******


#4
Date: Sat, 13 May 2000 
From: helena goscilo <goscilo.1@osu.edu>
Subject: Primakov as an alternative


Dear David,


I couldn't agree more with your comment today that Primakov represented a
genuine alternative to Yeltsin, whereas Putin signals continuity. Since
superficiality seems the universal plat du jour, however, it makes
(ridiculous) sense that sheer surface militated against Primakov, while
"favoring" Putin (the question of American financial and political
interests in averting genuine changes in Russia aside): Primakov's age,
build, "presence," "Russianness," and long-standing activities in Soviet
structures emit misleading media messages, as do, contrastively, Putin's
comparative youth and "litheness," abstemiousness, European (German) stint
and associations, as well as his awareness of the influence of media on
everything from voting patterns to purchase of refrigerators, flowers, and
Mother's Day cards. The magical aura of the words "young," "new," and
"different" carry the day, without recognition that they are, as Hamlet
says, merely "words, words, words."


******


#5
Russia, Foreign Experts Discuss Web-State Relations. 


MOSCOW, May 12 (Itar-Tass) - Russian and foreign information officials on 
Friday discussed relations between the state and the Internet. 


High-ranking officials from the Media Ministry, television companies, the 
Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) and the 
Federal Security Service (FSB), as well as foreign experts, took part in an 
on-line round-table meeting titled "State. Information. Internet". 


The State Duma lower house of parliament is planning to hold hearings about 
relations between the Internet and the law in late May, so it is eager to 
know what experts think about this problem. 


"Relations between power and wired society in the 21st century will be 
playing a leading role to keep up Russia's image as a free and democratic 
state," FAPSI director Andrei Korotkov said. 


The session, which was part of an international symposium dedicated to the 
same topic, will help conduct "broad and efficient co-operation between 
up-to-date information structures and bodies of state power," Korotkov said. 


******


#6
Kennan Institute meeting report
Washington DC 
Social Status and Ethnicity in Russian Republics
Vol. XVII No. 16 2000


What divides people in Russia at the moment is not so much ethnic or
cultural differences but deeper issues lying in the sphere of politics,
remarked Leokadia Drobizheva, Chair, Institute of Ethnography and
Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Drobizheva was joined by
Viktoria Koroteyeva, Senior Researcher, Institute of Ethnography and
Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, at a Kennan Institute
lecture on 3 April 2000.


Drobizheva and Koroteyeva conducted surveys in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan,
and Sakha (Yakutia) to analyze the participation of various ethnic groups
in the transformation process; how new social divisions resulting from the
transition period influence inter-ethnic relations; and how new
solidarities appear.


According to Drobizheva, ethnic diversity impacts social diversity and
social differentiation. After the August 1998 financial crisis, Russia's
overall social structure changed. There is now a small upper class, a
decline in the proportion of the middle class, and a dramatic increase in
the number of people placing themselves in the lower class. In the national
republics, however, there is a different situation, Drobizheva commented.
In Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Sakha, a large proportion of people still
identify themselves as part of the middle class. Furthermore, the
proportion of those placing themselves in the lower class is higher among
Russians than among native groups. Drobizheva cited statistics showing that
the real position of ethnic groups did not change as much as their
perceptions. 


There are differences among regions over what it means to be middle class.
This is where, Drobizheva stipulated, ethno-cultural features come into
play and influence the self-perceptions of people. When asked what it meant
to be rich, respondents in Tatarstan answered that it meant to have your
own business. For Russians, to be rich meant to have money and to be free
to spend it as you wish. For the Yakut, in addition to money, it was
important to have a good job.


According to Drobizheva, since the notions of what it means to be
successful vary, people of different ethnic origins cannot always
understand what are the cultural expectations of others. Often, the basis
of ethnic tensions are due more to the subjective perception of one's
position in society than real objective status, Drobizheva stated. 


Viktoria Koroteyeva then described the ethnic and social structures in the
surveyed republics. There isterritorial and occupational segregation among
communities in Sakha, unlike in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The Sakha
people live mainly in rural areas and work predominantly in agriculture and
certain intellectual occupations like teaching. Conversely, Russians in
Sakha are urban dwellers and are employed in industry. In all the republics
surveyed, however, the titular nationalities held a disproportionate number
of positions in both the government and the economic sphere. This marks a
new cultural division of labor, Koroteyeva argued.


Following from these ideas, Koroteyeva continued, access to power and the
status of culture and language are further indicators of the status of
ethnic groups. In the case of Tatarstan during the Soviet period, the
inferior status of Tatar culture and language among urban Tatars
contributed to the push for political changes and the reversal of the
status of Tatar and Russian cultures. According to Koroteyeva, now, in the
post-Soviet era, political status is a crucial dimension to overall social
status. For many Russian respondents, there was a belief that titular
groups had a better chance for promotion in the government and better
access to jobs—so their political status declined in their eyes. This
decline has influenced their perception of overall social status and led
many Russians in the republics to place themselves at the bottom of the
social ladder, Koroteyeva remarked.


Drobizheva discussed how new identities and solidarities are formed.
According to Drobizheva, the major identities of survey respondents in the
republics and other regions are social and professional. Two other
identities—ethnic and state—are seen by some as competing. Drobizheva
argued, however, that these identities are complementary. People can
identify themselves as belonging to a particular ethnic group as well as
being a citizen of the Russian Federation. Often, loyalty to the republic
is higher than loyalty to the Russian state, which may cause some conflict.


Drobizheva offered two conclusions. First, in reality, ethnicity does not
have much influence on the transformation process and the proportion of the
middle class among native ethnic groups in the republics is rather strong.
Second, Russians are resentful of this fact and have responded with
increased ethnic awareness. This sentiment contributed to massive support
of the pro-government party "Unity" and Vladimir Putin in the most recent
elections.
—by Jodi Koehn


******


#7
The Economist (UK)
May 13-19, 2000
[for personal use only]
Russian debt
Orient express 
M O S C O W 
“WE do not feel like paying our old debts, but we need to borrow some more 
money. Please can we restructure?” Put as baldly as this, Russia’s approach 
to the western countries that lent to the Soviet Union sounds less than 
persuasive. But it has worked in the past and will probably do so again. In 
February, the London Club of commercial banks agreed to write down more than 
a third of Russia’s Soviet-era debt to them, swapping the rest for 
long-dated, low-interest bonds. 


Now Russia wants to pull off a similar trick with the Paris Club, a grouping 
of 19 rich countries that handles state-to-state debts—in Russia’s case $42 
billion. This would clear the way for a return to the international capital 
markets. That seemed almost inconceivable after Russia’s default of August 
1998, when bankers stormed out of Moscow; some of the same pinstriped furies 
are now drooling at the prospect of lead-managing Russia’s forthcoming 
Eurobond. 


Russia pleads both poverty and history: the borrower was the Soviet Union, 
which no longer exists. (Oddly, there is no suggestion that Russia should 
give up the Soviet assets it inherited, such as embassies and nuclear 
weapons.) Some Russian politicians want the debt written off completely. The 
official position is that the western governments should write off half the 
loans. 


That causes consternation in Germany, which is owed about $30 billion. The 
German government is prepared to agree a longer repayment schedule at a lower 
interest rate, but does not want the net present value of the debt payments 
to fall. It cites new advice from the IMF that Russia, currently flush with 
money thanks to the high price of oil and a post-devaluation boomlet, can 
afford to pay. German officials do not see the London Club deal as a 
precedent. On the contrary, one fumes that the European taxpayer has already 
lost out because banks were allowed to write off their Russian losses against 
taxable profits, and asks, “why should the taxpayer now suffer again?” 


The same official also appeals to Russian national pride: “surely they don’t 
want to be compared with Nigeria and Ethiopia?” And he points out that Russia 
itself is a member of the Paris Club through which it is trying to collect 
Soviet-era debts from former satellite countries such as Vietnam. Refusing to 
pay in one hemisphere is hardly likely to help it collect in another. 
Finally, Germany argues that although the Soviet Union signed the deals, most 
of the money was actually paid out to Russia. 


The negotiations will probably start in September, but western governments 
are already squabbling about what line to take. Other European countries and 
America are owed mainly symbolic sums, and would like to make friends with 
Russia’s new president, Vladimir Putin. Germany wants to be friends too. In 
the past decade it has furnished Russia with loans and grants worth DM131 
billion ($60 billion at current euro exchange rates, but much more in the 
harder currency in which it was dished out), partly as a geo-political bribe 
to gain Russian consent for German reunification. 


On past form, Russia will gain a headline-catching write-off, while the real 
problem is postponed for a few years hence. One catch may be the remaining 
foreign-currency debt, bonds issued by the finance ministry. These have not 
yet been restructured, partly because of the murky but lucrative role they 
play in Russia’s own financial system. Well-connected companies can buy them 
at market value and then use them at face value to pay taxes. Western hedge 
funds that did well by speculating in London Club debt have been snapping up 
the MinFin 4 bond (see chart above) in the hope that the government will 
honour these obligations. That may be a long shot: the Paris Club, in the 
interest of fairness, is likely to insist MinFins are restructured too. The 
Russian government may agree. Since MinFins count as domestic debt, 
disgruntled holders would have to sue in a Russian court—an even less 
frightening prospect than the feeble sanctions its financial misbehaviour 
usually provokes. 


*****


#8
St. Petersburg Times
May 12, 2000
Privatization Gets Another Chance
By Andrew McChesney
STAFF WRITER


MOSCOW - Armed with ambitious plans that hark back to the heady privatization 
days of the mid-1990s, the government is preparing to sell off huge stakes in 
four oil giants for about $1 billion this year.


This time around, the government says it is determined to do it right. In a 
bid to prevent a repeat of the disastrous privatizations that saw lucrative 
stakes sold for a fraction of their value, the government is calling for more 
transparency in sell-offs and is planning to amend the law on privatizations.


The government decided late last week to place on the auction block a 19.68 
percent stake in Slavneft, a 25 percent plus one share stake in Rosneft and 
possibly an 85 percent stake in Onako. Also, a 4 percent to 4.5 percent stake 
in LUKoil will be floated as American Depository Receipts on the New York 
Stock Exchange.


A 25 minus two shares stake in telecom mammoth Svyazinvest also could be 
offered later this year, while shares in gas monopoly Gazprom probably will 
be sold next year, ministers said after a Cabinet meeting Thursday.


The planned oil auctions, slated for the last half of this year, should 
generate 27 billion to 30 billion rubles ($954 million to $1.06 billion), 
while the LUKoil float should bring in $400 million, they said.


The privatization target under the 2000 budget had called for revenues of 18 
billion rubles ($636 million).


"We intend to send not less than 30 billion rubles to the state budget," Igor 
Shuvalov, head of the Federal Property Fund, the state's privatization agent, 
said in televised remarks.


"In 2000 the [economic] situation has improved and in the second half of the 
year we will be able to privatize a number of properties," acting Prime 
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov was quoted by Interfax as saying.


Kasyanov said the government was forced to curtail sell-offs last year due to 
poor economic conditions and a lack of interest from potential buyers.


Privatizations in 1999 netted the state 8.5 billion rubles, the bulk of which 
came from sales of a 48 percent state in the Tyumen Oil Co. and a 9 percent 
stake in LUKoil, State Property Minister Farit Gazizullin said at the 
government meeting.


Sell-offs in the first quarter of this year - mainly a 0.9 percent stake in 
LUKoil - brought in over 2 billion rubles, he said. Bidding started May 5 on 
another 1 percent stake in LUKoil.


Details on how the government intends to clean up privatizations are unclear. 
The government's press office said simply that it plans to make wider use of 
auctions for the sale of highly liquid assets, and unspecified amendments to 
the privatization law would be submitted to parliament by Aug. 15.


The Kremlin has long been red-faced about how it carried out the 
privatizations of hundreds of companies in the mid-1990s. That scheme, cooked 
up by then-Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais and applauded by 
international observers like the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, saw the government doling out stakes in the nation's biggest industrial 
companies through loans-for-shares auctions.


Under the auctions, now widely regarded as amateurish and rigged, the stakes 
were transferred in trust and then sold to insider banks for a fraction of 
their market value.


But the property fund's Shuvalov insisted that despite the huge, planned oil 
sales, the days of mass privatizations are over.


"Shares in over 30,000 state-run enterprises could be offered for sale ... 
[but] an all-out privatization is not on the agenda any more and is not 
likely to be," he said. "We propose selling small packages of shares in those 
companies while keeping control in the state's hands for the benefit of both 
the state and the companies."
*******


#9
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA DOWN BY OVER 90% IN 1999


MOSCOW. May 12 (Interfax) - Foreign investment flows into Russia
plunged to $1.3 billion last year from $20.8 billion in 1998, the
Central Bank of Russia reported.
Foreign direct investment rose to $2.9 billion in 1999 from $2.8
billion in the previous year, balance of payments data in the Central
Bank's newsletter show.
But the outflow of portfolio investment reached $900 million,
compared to an increase of $8.3 billion in such foreign investment in
1998.
Foreign loans and credits to the government sector totaled $2.7
billion last year, down from $6.7 billion in 1998. This included $1.3
billion in untied financing: about $1.0 billion in loans from
international financial organizations and a loan of $0.3 billion from
the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation.
Actual government payments on foreign loans and credits totaled
$7.2 billion ($5.6 billion on the principle and $1.6 billion in
interest), out of the $12.2 billion due; about $3.0 billion in payments
were overdue.
The proportion of foreign equity ownership in the Russian
commercial banking system increased by 70% to 10.7% as of January 1,
2000. Foreign direct investment into this sector rose to $0.5 billion
(including subordinated credits) from an estimated $0.3 billion in 1999.
Last year $11.7 billion in cash foreign currency was brought into
Russia (down from $20.7 billion in 1998), including $8.3 billion by the
banking system. At the same time, $12.6 billion was taken out of the
country ($21.6 billion in 1998), including $5.4 billion through
unregistered trade (shuttle traders) and $5.3 billion by tourists.
The official foreign currency reserves increased by $1.8 billion in
1999 as a result of operations reflected in the balance of payments


******


#10
Date: Fri, 12 May 2000 
From: Bthnceeer@aol.com (Robert T. Huber)
Subject: Job Posting


SENIOR PROGRAM COORDINATOR, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR EURASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN
RESEARCH (NCEEER)


NCEEER seeks a Senior Program Coordinator to assist in the administration
and development of research, exchange, and curriculum development programs
involving American scholars and their counterparts in the New Independent
States (NIS) and Central and Eastern Europe.


The successful candidate will be required to:


- administer and monitor academic research programs administered by NCEEER;


- demonstrate experience in working with members of the scholarly and
policy community concerning the administration of fellowships;


- demonstrate experience in working with U.S. government and private
funding agencies in program formulation, development, and implementation; 


- Candidates should preferably have an M.A., and have at least one year
experience in administering research, training, and exchange programs with
the NIS and CEE, and have intermediate language skills in at least one
language of the region. Candidates should send resumes and reference
information to:


Robert T. Huber, President
NCEEER
910 17th Street, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 822-6950 (Phone)
(202) 822-6955 (FAX)


*******


#11
Will Putin Move Russian Capital?
May 12, 2000
By ANNA DOLGOV


MOSCOW (AP) - When Russian rulers from Ivan the Terrible to the Bolsheviks 
wanted to make major changes, they moved to a new capital - a tradition that 
has some Russians asking if President Vladimir Putin wants to leave Moscow.


Putin's decision to receive foreign leaders in his native St. Petersburg 
coincides with calls to move key government agencies from Moscow to its 
longtime rival in the north. Now some Russians are wondering if Putin wants 
to move the capital back to St. Petersburg as part of his plans to revive 
Russia as a great power.


For centuries, St. Petersburg was the capital. Its palaces, cathedrals and 
fortresses recall the days of imperial power and glory, and its residents 
still regard Muscovites as uncultured upstarts.


Other developments have added to the speculation. The speaker of the lower 
house of Russia's parliament, Gennady Seleznyov, said last month he would 
submit a proposal to move the chamber from Moscow to St. Petersburg.


Banks and oil companies have quietly been moving assets to St. Petersburg. 
The share of Russia's financial assets concentrated in St. Petersburg has 
gone up from 5 percent two years ago to about 10 percent, according to Alexei 
Chaplygin, an analyst with the Center for Civil Society Studies, a political 
think tank in Moscow.


Lev Lurie, a historian and political analyst in St. Petersburg, says he has 
heard ``serious talk'' among high-ranking officials about moving the Academy 
of Sciences, the Culture Ministry, and the Constitutional Court to St. 
Petersburg.


Putin makes little secret of his affection for his hometown, and many of his 
top officials are from St. Petersburg.


``The Petersburg group love their city a lot and they are trying to help 
it,'' Chaplygin said. ``Nobody used to talk seriously about the issue (moving 
the capital) - but now there is a chance to do something about it.''


In his characteristically cryptic manner, Putin is saying nothing. But most 
analysts agree that he is trying to send a message by putting St. Petersburg 
at center stage again after years of official disdain - although they don't 
agree on what it is.


Putin turned tradition on its head by receiving in St. Petersburg the two 
foreign leaders who have visited Russia since he took power. British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori did not set foot 
in Moscow.


``This is some sort of a demonstrative act, a PR action,'' Lurie said. ``But 
what it might mean is open to various interpretations.''


Still, moving the capital from Moscow is a far-fetched idea, officials say. 
The project would cost a staggering amount of money, and Russia is broke.


While a government department or a federal court or two might be moved from 
Moscow, some analysts insist the talk of moving capitals is just hot air.


``There won't be enough money to move even one department of one ministry,'' 
said Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director of the Institute for USA and Canada 
studies.


And when Putin receives President Clinton in June for their first meeting, it 
will be in Moscow.


Putin's elevation of St. Petersburg may be part of his call for close ties 
with Europe, some analysts say. St. Petersburg traditionally has been 
Russia's most westward-looking city.


``Every time talk about friendship with the West begins, St. Petersburg comes 
into the limelight,'' said Kremenyuk.


Or Putin may want a symbolic break with the Moscow-based, scandal-ridden 
administration of Boris Yeltsin, others say.


Ivan the Terrible moved the capital from Moscow to the provincial town of 
Alexandrovskaya Sloboda in 1564 and plunged the country into a reign of 
terror.


Peter the Great moved the capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg in 1712 to 
underline his drive to Westernize the country. The Bolsheviks made Moscow the 
capital again as one of their first acts after the 1917 revolution.


*******


#12
BBC MONITORING
LEAKED REPORT SHOWS POOR STANDARDS AT RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS
Source: 'Izvestiya', Moscow, in Russian 11 May 00 


Specialists of the International Social Ecological Union have given 
'Izvestiya' some previously unpublished documents - a Russian Federation 
Ministry of Atomic Energy Report on the results of this department's enlarged 
collegium in March 2000 in which Vladimir Putin took part and a Report on the 
State of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Russia in 1999 by the Russian 
Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety [Gosatomnadzor]. These 
documents, as we have learned, were not due to be published until autumn this 
year. 


The documents that we have managed to obtain contain some sensational 
figures: last year 840 violations of regulations and standards in the use of 
nuclear energy were recorded in Russia. The Gosatomnadzor experts express the 
belief in their report that the lamentable situation is aggravated by the 
considerable deterioration in the condition of equipment and its inadequate 
reliability and by the obsolete design solutions which were used to develop 
nuclear facilities which pose a radiation hazard. Out of Russia's 29 nuclear 
power station generating sets, 10 are so-called "first generation," which do 
not correspond to present-day safety requirements. 


Construction is continuing according to obsolete and potentially hazardous 
designs (Kursk generating set No 5 using RBMK [high-power pressure-tube 
reactor] reactors, Kalinin set No 3, and Rostov set No 1). 


"In 1999 there were 90 operating violations at Russian nuclear electric power 
stations which had to be investigated and logged," the Gosatomnadzor Report 
says. "A significant number of pipeline metal defects came to light during 
operational monitoring. The defects are dangerous because the development of 
cracks in pipe weld joints is a signal that the integrity of the third 
physical barrier to the release of radioactive materials into the environment 
could have been compromised." These complex terms conceal a very simple 
warning: If something happens, nothing will prevent a radiation emission. 


According to the Report, the highest number of operating violations occurred 
at the Kursk nuclear power station (which had 21 violations), Smolensk (16), 
Novovoronezh (15), and Kola (10). Gosatomnadzor agencies have conducted 411 
inspections and issued instructions that 501 violations of standards and 
regulations at nuclear research installations be eliminated. The highest 
percentage of comments relates to violations of the requirements of the 
design, technological, and operational documentation and also in training and 
work clearance for personnel... 


Vladimir Slivyak, coordinator of the Social Ecological Union's antinuclear 
campaign and the Ekozashchita group, says: "As of today none of Russia's 
existing nuclear power stations has a procedurally complete safety 
certificate, as is customary throughout the world - in other words, none of 
our nuclear stations can be considered safe."... 


******


#13
Moscow Times
May 13, 2000 
FACES & VOICES: To Russia, With Thanks for the Memories 
By Helen Womack 


Dear Readers, I am writing to say good-bye. The faces and voices of Russia 
are limitless, but my time is up. 


It is hard to believe I have occupied this space for five years. I dedicated 
the column to a Russian I love, and, if I was inspired, it was thanks to him. 
When I was absurd, I could always count on the eXile to point it out, for 
which also, many thanks. 


My great hero in journalism was Hedrick Smith of The New York Times who, in 
the depths of the Cold War, broke new ground by going out to meet "ordinary" 
Russians. I have always found the people of this country far more interesting 
than anything that goes on behind the Kremlin walls. 


When I suggested the idea of a portrait gallery in prose, however, the 
initial reaction of editors was: "Isn't there a danger that you will just 
collect a lot of complaining people?" Many Russians lead difficult lives, it 
is true, but I have rarely met a Russian without a sense of humor and, in the 
bleakest situations, the human spirit triumphs. 


As I journalist, I am constantly learning myself in order to communicate. I 
think many of my readers have been expatriates, grappling with the mysteries 
of Russia. One foreign gentleman wrote to me saying he was grateful that I 
met so many Russians because it saved him the trouble of doing so. 


What I did not expect was that many Russians would also become loyal readers. 
To my horror, I discovered that in some Russian schools, Womack was the set 
text used by teachers of English. I can only assume that Russians enjoyed a 
good laugh over the misconceptions of this stupid foreigner. 


Looking back, I remember many of the wonderful characters whom I interviewed 
or, rather, with whom I hung out and had adventures. 


Recently, I met Valentina Mikhailina, the owner of Russia's first ostrich 
farm, who made me an omelet from a giant egg, and Vladimir Petrushin, chief 
trainer at Moscow's dolphin aquarium, who let me go swimming with his Arctic 
whale. 


Over the years, there were scores of others: the late Mikhail Matveyev, at 
whose dacha I spent idyllic times and learned much about Russian rural life; 
Aunt Dusya, who had a cherry orchard worthy of Chekhov; Dr. Mitko Kr'stev, 
the Bulgarian-born keeper of Russia's national lilac collection. There was 
Lydia Ivanovna, a former physiotherapist who was tricked out of her apartment 
in a scam, only to be turned out of a makeshift hut when Moscow Mayor Yury 
Luzhkov ordered a cleanup of the city before the World Youth Games. 


Russian scientists and artists, working from enthusiasm despite poor wages, 
never ceased to inspire me. My friend Mikhail Butov remained loyal to 
literature; he eventually was rewarded for this loyalty, winning the 
Smirnoff-Booker Prize in 1999 for his novel "Freedom." 


But I was also impressed by those who tried to carve out new lives for 
themselves in commerce, people like Andrei Zaborsky, who made a fortune from 
selling small but necessary items such as batteries and light bulbs. 


There were sad stories, too, of beggars, invalids, bankrupts and even a man 
on death row. Generous readers wrote in offering to help. 


The greatest character, however, was Mother Russia herself. Her vast 
landscapes and uncompromising seasons formed the backdrop against which the 
human dramas unfolded. For now, I am giving up this column, but I sense that 
soon I shall also leave Russia, my adopted home for more than 12 years. 


I have a request to make of Mother Russia and a wish for her. I ask her to 
free me so that I shall not be drawn back like a tortured soul after I have 
gone. And I wish her self-confidence. For when Russia is at ease with 
herself, the outside world will automatically respect her. 


*******


#14
Date: Sat, 13 May 2000 
Subject: "Religious Liberty a Renewed Concern in Russia"
From: Beverly Nickles <jesusname1@glasnet.ru>


COMPASS DIRECT
Global News from the Frontlines


May 19, 2000
E-Mail Version


Compass Direct is distributed monthly to raise awareness of Christians
worldwide who are persecuted for their faith. 


Copyright 2000 Compass Direct


RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN RUSSIA A RENEWED CONCERN
The Future for Religious Rights Under President Putin Remains Unpredictable
by Beverly Nickles


MOSCOW (Compass) -- After letting Russia simmer on the back burner for the
past two years, religious freedom defenders have pulled it back into the
center of flame of international concern.


The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued its first
report on May 1 listing Russia, China and Sudan as their three principal
countries of focus for this year. The report stated that although Russia's
human rights' situation didn't compare to the other two countries, it is at
a crossroads at which religious freedom could deteriorate rapidly. 


The Commission selected Russia because of its influence on other nations in
the region and the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy on promoting
religious freedom there.


While some watchers believe the situation in Russia has stabilized, the
future for religious freedom under the administration of newly-elected
President Vladimir Putin remains unpredictable.


One recent decision causing concern was the amendment Putin signed in March
extending the deadline for reregistration of churches and religious
organizations until December 31, 2000. The amendment included language
requiring the liquidation (closure by court order) of all groups that failed
to meet the extended reregistration deadline.


Russia took a step backward in 1997 by enacting a federal law that replaced
legislation adopted in 1990. The 1990 law provided freedom of religion and
equality of all confessions and broad protections for the exercise of
religious rights.


The 1997 Religion Law required that all religious groups reregister with the
government by December 31, 1999. The majority of religious entities found
this required deadline impossible to meet, resulting in a Ministry of
Justice instruction to waive the deadline until a formal extension could be
approved. About 70 percent of all religious groups failed to complete
reregistration by the deadline, including many Russian Orthodox and other
so-called "traditional" religious groups. No monastery succeeded in
registering.


Currently, an estimated 7,000 religious groups need to register by the end
of the year. Religious rights experts question whether it's physically
possible to complete such a daunting task in the remaining seven months of
this year, especially since resistance in some local areas against
"nontraditional" religions illegally bogs down or blocks registration of
minority groups.


The commission report sited State Department information that 30 of the 89
constituent regions of the Russian Federation adopted legal regulations in
violation of the Russian Constitution that further restrict the activities
of religious institutions. "Many of these regulations specifically target
members of foreign religious groups for restrictions on their activities,"
the report said.


Vladimir Rykhovsky, president of the Christian Legal Center, said his office
currently has about 50 cases pending. Most involve attempts to liquidate
Pentecostal or Charismatic churches.


Still, Rykhovsky chooses to remain optimistic about the future and that
Putin will continue to take the country along a democratic course and
protect religious rights.


As in most every other area of governance, Putin gives mixed signals about
the direction freedom of religion may go during his administration. Putin's
profession as a practicing Russian Orthodox believer contributed to concerns
early on that the Russian Orthodox Church would enjoy a favored position
during his presidency.


However, the Russian Orthodox patriarch's absence on the platform during
Putin's inauguration on May 7 was considered a positive sign. Patriarch
Alexy II held an official role in the 1996 inauguration of Russia's first
president, Boris Yeltsin. Days before the inauguration, Putin's office
received a letter signed by 21 human rights activists asking Putin to keep
the ceremony secular. During the inaugural ceremony, the patriarch stood in
the front row among the other invited quests.


Anatoly Krasikov, president of the Russian chapter of the International
Religious Liberty Association, takes a more pessimistic view. Krasikov sees
"a 50-50 chance" for Russia to return to something resembling its Stalinist
past.


If the government continues to preserve human rights overall, then religious
liberty will be protected, too. It's a step of progress that religious
liberty occupies an integral place in human rights in general in Russia --
more than even a year ago, Krasikov said.


"We must wait to see the first steps of the new government and then make our
decision," he said.


******


#15
PUTIN'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM-MAKER DENIES RELIABILITY OF REPORTS ABOUT
PROGRAM


MOSCOW. May 12 (Interfax) - Head of the Russian Strategic
Development Center German Gref has denied the reliability of the
versions of the presidential economic program allegedly emanating from
his center and published in the media.
In an interview published Friday in the Kommersant daily, Gref said
that the media have published "either our early versions or some that
were not written by our center at all."
"I understand the interest the media has in our program, but it is
not quite fair to hunt for any versions of the text today," Gref said.
"The closer we approach the final version of the program, the more
changes we make to it, because an increasing number of people are
invited to the debate and all this is done at a higher level," he said.
Gref went on to say that as soon as the program is ready, it will
be submitted to the government and presidential administration and "will
become known to everyone." Gref said that the materials published in
several newspapers on Thursday belong "to the very first version, which
has been greatly changed."
Gref said it is normal that the program may be criticized. "I don't
think Cabinet members will act as critics. We are working in very
closely with them," he said. "Yesterday we spent over two hours with
[acting Deputy Prime Minister] Valentina Matviyenko, discussing the
social section. On May 8, we sat with [Prime Minister-designate] Mikhail
Kasyanov for over five hours, after which we significantly amended the
budget and social sections of the program," he said.
Gref admitted that the Finance Ministry had convinced the program-
makers to change the budget policy section in consideration of the
opinions of ministry experts.
For instance, changes were made in the 2001 budget indicators,
budget forecasts until 2004, several budget spending items, the dynamics
of the country's GDP and the dynamics of personal incomes. The ministry
figures had been less programmed, but mean figures were reached, Gref
said.
"For instance, we are now predicting 4% GDP growth in 2001, and
4.5% in 2004," he said.
He rejected speculations that the Finance Ministry and Kasyanov
have opposite plans from those of his center.
"That is absolutely wrong. It is true that Kasyanov makes many
remarks. [Still] the most constructive work is being done with Kasyanov.
He gives a lot of time to the discussion of different sections of our
program," Gref said.
"As for the budget message, we are most directly involved in
drafting it. All our people are now working on the document," he said.
"There is the Finance Ministry version, and we are working on our
proposals to adjust the message that are in tune with what the
presidential administration has worked out," Gref said.
"I want to repeat that this a work in common. There is no disparity
of versions or approaches," he said.


*******
#16
IMF READY TO ADVISE, BUT RUSSIA NOT YET VERY EAGER TO LISTEN
By Pyotr Antonov, Interfax analyst


MOSCOW. May 12 (Interfax) - The International Monetary Fund has
been generous lately in advising Russia.
The only parallel this brings to mind is the earlier period of
Russian reforms at the beginning of the 1990s, when Western experts were
lining up to take part in drawing up an economic reform policy for
Russia.
It seems, however, that today advice is being given to Russia not
because the country may be a good ground for experimentation, but
because independent players have come onto this ground.
"The IMF does not want to be left aloof. It is afraid that a
program of action will be adopted at the official level that is very
different from the viewpoint of the Fund," said Oleg Vyugin, chief
>economist at the Troika Dialog investment company.
"They want to take part in this work but they are not being let in
very much. The active participation of the Fund in drawing up guidelines
for the economic development of Russia is a semblance."
Words by a source in the Strategic Projects Center suggest that
Vyugin is right. The source said next week's schedule of the Center top
staff did not yet include any meetings with Fund experts who are
arriving in Moscow on Tuesday.
But there may be such meetings in view of the IMF's former firm
intention to resume consultations with the Center on a future program.
The team coming to Moscow next week will include officials of
several IMF departments who are to spend three weeks helping the Russian
government put together economic development guidelines. The Fund has
stressed more than once that it will be ready to back a government
program - that is, allocate money for it - only if IMF recommendations
come into account.
According to head of the IMF Moscow office Martin Gilman, next week
the Fund team will hold technical consultations on proposed changes to
the first and second parts of the tax code and on the 2001 draft budget,
discussing suggested spending on structural and various other reforms.
Gilman said the points would take a long time to agree on and
needed approval before negotiations on the program as such.
But so far Moscow has shown no sign of need for Fund advice.
Vyugin said the opinion of the IMF experts would be taken into
account in practical terms only during official talks to work out an
economic policy statement that are due to start very soon. "It is
desirable that the program and statement should not contradict each
other, but this is largely the problem of the Russian side. To be more
exact, it is a matter of what tactics the Russian side will choose," he
said.
An official involved in the work on the economic development
strategy for Russia has said two alternative scenarios are under
consideration: either providing the IMF with every proposal and
expecting the Fund to make its own suggestions in response or denying
the IMF any information, waiting for their proposals and trying to
negotiate agreements.
"In practice," said Vyugin, "mixed tactics are being used: the IMF
is aware of the most important ideas but does not know everything. I
think that is reasonable."
The finalized draft for a 10-year strategy is due to be submitted
for government approval by the end of this month. The new government is
to be formed by then.
When negotiations with the IMF on the new program will start also
depends on when the new Cabinet will be formed.
In other words, talks with the IMF cannot start before early June.
Hence, all being well, Russia may receive the IMF go-ahead before
the Okinawa meeting of the Group of Eight industrialized countries.
An IMF approval of the economic program will give a green light to
a restructuring deal on the former Soviet debt between Russia and the
Paris Club of creditors. The Russian government would receive an extra
source of money for foreign debt servicing in the second half of 2000,
although it will most likely never see the $2.6 billion it plans to
borrow from the IMF in 2000.
There is a serious chance that developments will follow this
pattern, though it can be maintained that Russia takes an independent
position and does not hang on the Fund's words, as has often been the
case in the past.
This may be the way to realistic development guidelines, which
simultaneously reflect the situation in Russia and take account of the
IMF's opinion.


******


#17
Moscow Times
May 12, 2000 
Putin Must Act Fast, Former Minister Says 
By Catherine Belton
Staff Writer


President Vladimir Putin must take concrete steps on reform soon, or the 
unique window of opportunity for improving the economy will slam shut, former 
Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov warned Thursday. 


Fyodorov said he couldn't name a single action Putin had taken on the economy 
apart from appointing well-known liberal Andrei Illarionov as his economics 
adviser, even though Putin has been acting president since January. 


Fyodorov was speaking Thursday at a news conference, where he launched his 
new book, "Trying to Understand Russia." 


"Those who are waiting for Putin's economic program are going to be waiting a 
long time," he said. "During my time in government there have been 10 
different economic programs and not one of them had anything to do with 
reality. Power is action, not programs." 


Putin has charged economists working at his think tank, the Center for 
Strategic Research, to come up with an economic blueprint for reforming the 
economy over the next 10 years. 


Would-be foreign investors have said they are waiting for details of the 
program before they decide whether it's safe to re-enter the market. Work 
began on the plan in January, but the first shortened version of the program 
is not to due to be completed until later this month, said Arkady Dvorkovich, 
who is in charge of mapping out fiscal and budget policy for the center, in a 
recent telephone interview. 


Fyodorov said Thursday that if Putin does not take steps on pushing reforms 
through the State Duma in the next 60 days before it breaks up for the summer 
holidays, then by September his influence may have waned. He said it is 
imperative for Putin to prove himself on the economy before the Okinawa 
summit of the Group of Seven leading industrial nations in July, otherwise 
Western support for the local economy is likely to remain no more than empty 
wishes. 


"At the moment Putin has a unique possibility. He can push anything he wants 
through parliament. There is no real opposition. The governors are worried 
and waiting for orders. This only happens once in every 20 or 30 years," he 
said. "But by September the situation could be very different." 


"It might not have been politically correct, but when Putin said he would 
'waste everybody in the outhouse,' he was taken seriously. Politicians are 
waiting for Putin to attack. But by September when it becomes clear that 
Putin is not going to begin a wave of repression and throw people in jail, 
then everyone will become a lot braver," he said. 


Fyodorov was referring to Putin's declaration last year that so-called 
Chechen bandits would be destroyed wherever they were, even "in the 
outhouse." 


Fyodorov said the economic picture is not quite as rosy as the government is 
painting it: Tax collection is dismally low, the boon to the economy wrought 
by devaluation is petering out and the level of dollarization of the economy 
is so high at 70 percent that an economic crisis could be around the corner. 


He also slammed current Central Bank chief Viktor Gerashchenko for failing to 
make any progress on banking reform since the 1998 ruble collapse. 


"As long as Gerashchenko retains his post we will not have a normal 
functioning banking system," he said. "Gerashchenko has been restructuring 
the banking system for almost two years, but not one bank has really been 
closed down in that time." 


******


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