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CDI Library > Johnson's
Russia List |
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May 2, 2000
Johnson's Russia List #4280 2 May 2000 davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
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20 years after Miracle on Ice, U.S. pulls another stunner May 2, 2000 By STEPHAN NASSTROM
ST. PETERSBURG, Russia (AP) - The banner in the stands read: ``St. Petersburg is not Lake Placid,'' referring to the Americans' stunner over the Soviet Union in the 1980 Winter Olympics.
But the United States pulled off a smaller miracle Monday night, shutting out Russia 3-0 in the preliminary round of the World Hockey Championships.
It was the second biggest shutout loss for a Soviet or Russian team in the championships' history.
``In 1960, we beat the Soviet team (in the Winter Games at Lake Placid, Calif.), 20 years later we beat them and 20 years later again we beat them,'' U.S. head coach Lou Vairo said.
This team had the least preparation of the three. Herb Brooks' squad, for instance, was together for months before the 1980 Olympics.
Before this championship started, the Americans had only three practices together. They played just one exhibition, a win over Finland.
``We played hard and we got good bounces, so we won,'' Vairo said. ``Maybe we'll have aggravation against France in two days. Every game is different.''
Minor league goalie Bob Esche turned in the best game of his career, stopping 44 Russian shots. He had several sparkling saves as the Russians put the pressure on with the game still scoreless.
Esche, who played for the Springfield Indians of the American Hockey League this season, got the starting job after Damian Rhodes of the <A HREF="aol://1722:Thrashers">Atlanta Thrashers</A> gave up three goals in a 3-3 tie against Switzerland.
Jason Blake of the Los Angeles Kings, Phil Housley of the Calgary Flames and Dave Legwand of the Nashville Predators scored for the Americans before a sellout crowd of 12,350 at St. Petersburg's brand new Ice Palace.
``We lost mostly because of lack of hunger and spirit,'' said Russian head coach Alexander Yakushev, a former star of the Soviet team that nearly beat Team Canada in the first Summit Series in 1972. Some disappointed Russian fans pelted the ice with cans, plastic bottles and other items near the end of the game. Two high Russian officials, St. Petersburg vice governor Gennady Tkachkov and Russian Hockey Federation president Alexander Steblin apologized to the U.S. delegation afterward.
``We are very sorry and we'll make sure it won't happen again,'' Steblin said.
But the Americans did not seem to be upset and did not plan to file a protest, organizers said.
``We're not mad,'' Vairo said. ``We're just happy that the puck bounced our way. The coach did not win the game for the U.S. The players won because they played with all their heart, spirit and desire and confidence.''
Russia, which has not won a medal in the six past championships, put together a powerful roster for the tournament that included this season's NHL goal-scoring leader, Pavel Bure of the Florida Panthers.
But Bure, who scored twice in Russia's 8-1 rout of France in Saturday's opener, was a big disappointment against the Americans. In the first period, Bure drew a double-minor that hardly helped Russia's cause.
Ottawa Senators holdout Alexei Yashin, cleared to play in the championships Sunday by an arbitrator in New York, played his first game of the season, but did not make an impact on the Russian team.
``It was a heavy game for us,'' Yashin said. ``We knew we had to win and we felt the pressure. The U.S. team used that very well, I think. They played extremely good defense, and their win was well-deserved.''
Veteran Eric Weinrich of the Montreal Canadiens was one of the top American defensemen.
``This is the most exciting game I've ever played,'' Weinrich said. ``I grew up idolizing Russian hockey and one of my best friends is Alexei Kasatonov. To play in a game like this was one of the most exciting days in my hockey career. I played in the NHL for 12 years. This definitely ranks up there in the top.''
Blake made it 1-0 early in the second period when he knocked a rebound past goalie Ilia Bryzgalov after a slap shot by Mike Peluso.
Housley, a defenseman who is the career American points leader in the NHL, put the Americans ahead 2-0 at 11:13 with a wraparound, his second goal in the tournament.
The Americans took a 3-0 lead early in the third period as Legwand, skating unchecked into the Russian zone, beat Bryzgalov with a wrist shot.
Only 13 NHL players accepted invitations to play for Team USA in these championships. The rest are minor leaguers, collegians and European-based players.
Tore Vikingstad scored a power-play goal midway through the third period as Norway came back from a 3-2 deficit to upset Canada 4-3 in Group C action. Martin Havlat scored the winner to lead reigning Olympic and world champion Czech Republic to a 6-3 victory over Japan in the other Group C game.
Meanwhile, Arnaud Briand scored twice to keep alive French hopes of advancing to the qualifying round. France posted a 4-2 win over Switzerland in the other Group D game
*******
St. Petersburg Times May 2, 2000 May Day Protests Lose Their Sting By Galina Stolyarova STAFF WRITER
Tens of thousands of people took to Nevsky Prospect and Palace Square for May Day marches Monday. But with a new Kremlin leader in place, the sun in the sky, and a spring in the step of foreign visitors in town for the World Ice Hockey Championship, the demonstrations were less virulent than they have been since the collapse of Soviet power.
Nationwide, some 412,000 people took part in May Day demonstrations, according to official figures - trade union offcicials said it was closer to 2.5 million. In either case, the numbers are dropping year by year and on Monday cold weather in many cities - and perhaps even a leavening of hope - kept people home: On Monday, the government announced a small hike for Russia's cash strapped pensioners, who currently receive the equivalent of about $30.
Pension raises have long been a central demand of past May Day marches, trade union leader and a main organizer of Russia-wide marches, Mikhail Shmakov, told NTV television. He reminded viewers, however, that gas and electricity utilities have just hit the country with a rate hike that may deplete the pensions of those cheered by the slight windfall.
Still, the usually communist-dominated demonstrations were deprived of one of their central scapegoats, former president Boris Yeltsin, for whom the left usually reserved most of its May Day scorn. President-elect Vladimir Putin spent his holiday in Sochi with his family, Reuters reported, relaxing before his inauguration next week.
In St. Petersburg, stolid veterans walked down Nevsky Prospect to Palace Square with medals pinned to their chests, some carrying pictures of Lenin - most of which were remarkably smaller than the traditionally powerful icons of previous years. Also present were posters of Stalin and red hammer and sickle flags, but their presence was less than intimidating.
Gov. Vladimir Yakovlev greeted demonstrators on Palace Square with a promise that "The city's administration can help solve numerous problems facing workers."
Many demonstrators were drawn to the square by the traditional purpose of the day - officially called International Worker's Solidarity Day. Labor Unions cried for stipends and salaries to be increased and for the current Labor Code to be improved. One group sang old Soviet war songs. Another group that harkened back toward the Soviet past was selling a newspaper called "For the USSR." for 1 1/2 rubles.
"I can give you three copies for 3 rubles and you'll distribute them somehow," urged one of the paper's elderly saleswomen, anxious to spread the word, to one passer-by. The Moscow-published paper identified itself as an "organ of unconquered peoples of the Soviet Union" and contained reports of past Soviet glory.
Other groups came to protest against the civil war in Chechnya. Anna Alexandrovna, a pensioner and one of the protesters said: "It is sheer genocide going on in the country. Russia's youngest are dying in Chechnya, and the authorities aren't brave enough to disclose the true figures," she said.
"I am not even talking of people of my age. All of us have no illusions: We know we are totally on our own."
The one group that distinguished itself for vehemence and anger was a group of anti-Semites who blamed the countries problems on a supposed minority of Jews ruling a majority of Slavs. Another intimidating group was the anarchists, who stood around quietly, dressed all in black with dark circles under their eyes.
Despite - or because of - this odd mixture on the square, the foreigners managed to fit right into this traditionally Soviet holiday.
"This is fun," said Sarah, a young American who was "just wandering around."
"This is the first time I've come to Russia," she said, "and didn't expect to see the Soviet flags."
"Eventually," she added, "there will be fewer and fewer meetings like this because the younger generation here is against Communism - I myself observed the younger guys arguing with the elderly ladies holding posters. I have a poor command of Russian, so I only have a vague idea of what exactly is going on, but portraits of Stalin and Soviet flags gave me a guess." Johann, a 23-year old German studying law in St. Petersburg said: "Most people are friendly, and we find this demonstration quite interesting,"
"Frankly, it is quite a small group here, I would expect a lot more people. Young people didn't come to protest."
Hockey fans blended right into the crowd of flag-bearing demonstrators. One group of fans from Lugano, Switzerland, photographed themselves against a red-banner background wrapped in their own red national flag.
"We arrived on Saturday to stay here for the whole week," one of the Lugano fans said. "We are curious what all these flags and singing is all about. It is very exciting, not scary at all."
Another Swiss national who refused to give his name - not with the Lugano fans, but in town for the hockey games - said: "I am not very much into politics, really.The meeting looks pretty normal and quiet to me.
"I understand it is normal democratic process, and it doesn't bother me at all. All parts of society, including those present here now - I don't know who they all are - deserve the right to express themselves and to be heard."
*******
Jamestown Foundation Monitor May 1, 2000
RIGHTS ACTIVISTS PROTEST PATRIARCH'S ROLE IN INAUGURATION. A group of leading Russian human rights activists has sent a letter to President-elect Vladimir Putin asking him not to allow the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Aleksy II, to participate in the May 7 presidential inauguration. When Boris Yeltsin was sworn in for his second term as president in 1996, the patriarch was among those top officials who stood on stage with Yeltsin as he was sworn in. While Aleksy did not administer the oath of office, he was the only religious figure who was on stage with Yeltsin. The leaders of Russia's other major confessions sat in the audience.
Among the signatories of the letter to Putin expressing misgivings over the Patriarch's role in the inauguration were Ludmilla Alexeeva, Sergei Kovalev, Marina Salye and Lev Ponomarev. Ponomarev, who is a founder and leader of the Democratic Russia movement and also heads a human rights group called "For Human Rights," argued that the Russian constitution makes no mention of religious leaders or representatives participating in the inauguration or swearing-in of a president. In addition, the ceremony is secular, involving no religious oaths or rituals, he said. Ponomarev also said that "the country is multiconfessional, and a demonstration of the Patriarch's special proximity to the government can be seen by other religious confessions as an insult." The signatories to the letter noted that in such countries as the United States, France, Switzerland and Germany, religious leaders and representatives participate in the inauguration of the head of state only as guests. They also noted that even countries in which the Catholic church is powerful, such as Poland, Italy and Spain, would not allow such an open expression of the links between the church and state.
However, despite Ponomarev's fears that the Orthodox patriarch's high-profile role in the inauguration will be an insult to other religions, representatives of other religious faiths are apparently not particularly bothered by this prospect. "All of this is politics, which we regard with indifference," an anonymous official from the office of Russia's chief rabbi told a newspaper. "If only the Patriarch will be next to the president again, this does not particularly bother us." Sheik Farid Asadullin, a member of the Council of Muftis of Russia, said that the council's chairman, Ravil Gainutdin, had been invited to the inauguration, but that it was not clear yet how he would participate (Segodnya, April 29).
The Kremlin announced last week that foreign leaders would not be invited to Putin's inauguration because it is a "domestic event." Foreign ambassadors based in Moscow will, however, be invited (Moscow Times, April 28).
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The Globe and Mail (Canada) 1 May 2000 Adoption in Russia rife with corruption Wheel-greasing common as wealthy Westerners often given top priority GEOFFREY YORK Moscow Bureau
Moscow -- When Karen Smith travelled to Russia to try to adopt a 15-month-old girl, her adoption agency told her to bring gifts for every official she would meet -- including the judge who would rule on her application.
Ms. Smith, a childless, middle-aged U.S. social worker, bought cans of coffee and boxes of chocolates to distribute to the judge and other bureaucrats. When she saw the disappointment on their faces, she realized her largesse was not as generous as expected.
Gifts by affluent foreigners to supposedly neutral judges are just one of the wheel-greasing routines in Russia's adoption game. Foreign adoptions have soared to record levels in Russia in recent years, and there are growing concerns that the system is riddled with corruption and favouritism.
The adoption process in Russia is officially free. But foreigners often spend more than $30,000 per child in fees and payments to agencies, intermediaries, officials and orphanages.
Even a fraction of this amount is a fortune in Russia's impoverished regions. Critics say the lure of money is distorting the adoption system, favouring the big-spending foreigners at the expense of Russian families.
The dramatic rise in foreign adoptions has become an emotionally charged issue in Russia, where a new mood of nationalism is fuelling resentment at the exodus of children to foreign parents. Many politicians are complaining of "baby-selling" and a humiliating loss of Russia's future generation.
"Russia is rich in caviar and vodka . . . but now it has a new product for sale, in crazy demand in the West," the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda commented recently. "We export our children to 30 countries!"
Ms. Smith -- that is not her real name, she spoke on condition of anonymity -- argues that the adoption system is a way for Westerners to "share the wealth" with citizens of a poorer country. "These people cannot take care of their children."
But when local officials make a serious effort to look for Russian parents, they sometimes discover that foreign adoptions are unnecessary. The Volga River region of Samara, for example, launched a search for foster parents in 1998. It found more than 500 foster families in a year.
After a series of scandals over criminal baby-trading rings in Russian provincial cities, the Kremlin has announced a crackdown on foreign adoptions, restricting the use of middlemen and requiring adoption agencies to be legally registered. But these steps are unlikely to end the corruption or the rising flow of Russian children to the West.
Russia has announced similar steps in the past, including a 1995 moratorium on foreign adoptions while new laws were being drafted. Yet after the moratorium, the number of adoptions was bigger than ever.
Foreigners adopted 6,200 Russian children last year, almost as many as the 7,000 children adopted by Russians.
There were virtually no foreign adoptions from Russia before 1992. Yet within a few years, Russia has become the biggest single source of foreign children for U.S. parents. Americans adopted 4,348 Russian children last year, almost double the figure for 1996.
More than 80 U.S. adoption agencies now are searching for Russian children. Some flights from Moscow to New York have so many adopted children on board that they are known as "orphan flights."
Canadian adoptions of Russian children are also increasing rapidly. Canadians adopted 209 Russian children last year, up from 160 in 1998.
With the spread of poverty since the post-Soviet economic collapse, more than 620,000 children are in orphanages or other Russian institutions today -- the highest number since the Second World War. Of these, about 80,000 have been placed on a national registry of children available for adoption. After five months on the registry, if the children are not adopted, they can be adopted by foreigners. But few Russians are aware of the registry. According to one report, only 19 children have been adopted through the registry in the past four years. The number of adoptions by Russian families has declined sharply from about 13,500 in 1992 to barely half that last year.
Russian officials insist most ordinary Russians are too poor to consider adopting children. They also say Russians have no interest in adopting unhealthy children.
In some cases, however, bureaucrats seem to exaggerate the illnesses of Russian children to ensure they are adopted by foreigners. Russian officials told Ms. Smith that the mother of her adoptive child had syphilis. As a result, she was told, no Russians would want to adopt the child.
She believes the Russians exaggerated the child's health problems. They reported she had an "acute respiratory infection" when it was just a minor cold. In the central Russian city of Ryazan, police detained several people in a criminal investigation into foreign adoptions. Medical records in Ryazan had been falsified to make it easier for foreigners to adopt children, according to Russian media.
*******
St. Petersburg Times May 2, 2000 EDITORIAL Duma moving to St. Petersburg? No Thanks!
IF Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov and St. Petersburg Gov. Vladimir Yakovlev have it their way, the city's population could be increasing its representation to the tune of 250 Duma deputies.
And since last Friday, when Seleznyov began floating the idea at a federal level, there are plenty of people who think the paint job, the road works and the supposed cash infusion the city would get justify the scheme of dropping a super-modern "parliamentary center" next to the Tavrichesky Gardens - incidentally, the site of the original Duma. The idea of moving the government back from Moscow to St. Petersburg has come up several times since the fall of Soviet power. If nothing else, we have Vladimir Lenin to thank for that. And both he and generations of architecturally challenged general secretaries had the good sense not to raze the place like they did in Moscow, filling it with some of the ugliest buildings to be found on earth.
For nearly 300 years, St. Petersburg has been the only refuge that Russia has had against itself and its short-sightedness. This is because St. Petersburg looks little - in physique and spirit - like the rest of the provincial empire it once ruled. Conceived by Peter the Great as a foreign port, it had a "foreignness" that allowed Russia to gain a bit of reflective distance on itself.
That distance allowed it to become the birthplace of Russian literature, and the poetry that flowed out of the city is the single thing that still unites the Russian people and still provides its greatest contribution to world art.
It was also the home of Russian democracy in the Zemstvo experiments in 1905.
Since Lenin gunned that democracy down in 1917, the new and improved government has done little in the way over earning the reception of a prodigal son - 70 years of communist despotism aside, it has, simply put, picked up some foul manners along the way.
No Duma deputy in Moscow can go anywhere in fewer than three cars that have blue sirens on top allowing them to blow red lights and cause traffic snarls at will. The government's paranoia - or is it pomposity? - allow Moscow to keep alive the Soviet-era living restrictions on residents that lead to the literal deportation of thousands of people a year from the city, and make fugitives out of thousands more.
Moscow is a city that has been rebuilt for the convenience of its government and the cell phone-bearing courtiers that can afford the door-charge.
It's not that simple Muscovites don't benefit from these amenities. There are clean roads to accommodate more traffic jams for the next motorcade to whizz past, and clean sidewalks that would accommodate the thousands made homeless in this boomtown - had they not been chuffed out of town by Moscow's notoriously brutal cops and put on trains that run precisely on schedule.
The Duma is fulfilling its purposes of real-estate graft and shammed allegiances just fine where it is. If it needs more room, it could surely clear out some of Russia's jails.
And besides, would Vladimir Putin, a native of St. Petersburg, really want his mother to see how the country runs?
*******
Freedom of religion in danger in Russia: report
WASHINGTON, May 1 (AFP) - Religious freedom in Russia is in danger of deteriorating significantly in the near future and the United States should monitor developments, an independent panel set up by the US Congress said Monday.
In its first annual report, the Commission on International Religious Freedom said that Russia's 1997 Religion Law was a "significant step backward."
The law makes it harder for new, often aggressively active religious organizations to operate in Russia, forcing them to register with the government while traditional religions do not have to do so.
The law "creates a hierarchy of religious organizations and effectively restricts smaller, newer, and foreign religious communities," the commission, created in 1998 to monitor religious freedom around the world, said in its first annual report.
"It also establishes an onerous and intrusive registration process and other means of state interference with religious organizations' activities."
Most alarming, the report said, was a decree by Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin which extends the deadline for registration to the end of the year, but stipulates that from then, non-registered churches would be banned.
Regional officials have denied unpopular religious groups registration as a way to have them banned, the report said.
It said that the threat to religious freedom in Russia often came at the regional level where religious believers have been victimized and foreign clerics expelled from the country.
One third of the regions have enacted religious laws more stringent that the 1997 federal law, said the commission, which makes recommendations to the president, the secretary of state and Congress.
The report also accused the Russian government of using anti-Muslim propaganda in its civil war against the separatist republic of Chechnya.
"While the conflict in Chechnya is based on political and geographic factors, the severity of the documented human rights abuses against the majority Muslim population requires the attention of the commission and the US government," the report said.
The commission members, including Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Bahai religious leaders as well as experts on human rights and international law, recommended continued US government monitoring. It also said Washington should pressure Moscow to keep an eye on regional and local officials.
"The United States should urge the Russian federal government to monitor more closely and respond to more effectively the actions of regional and local officials who interfere with religious freedom," it said.
The State Department said it welcomed the recommendations of the report for increased monitoring of religious freedom.
"The administration has already enhanced our efforts on each of these issues and we will look for more opportunities to do even more in the future," it said. *******
US Puts Basayev, Khattab among Notorious Intl Terrorists.
WASHINGTON, May 1 (Itar-Tass) - The U.S. Department of State on Monday put Chechen warlords Shamil Basayev and Khattab among the most notorious international terrorists.
Its annual report, titled Patterns of Global Terrorism - 1999, says Russia's armed forces gad to begin a counter-terrorism operation in North Caucasus after armed rebels led by Basayev and Khattab had invaded Dagestan from neighbouring Chechnya.
The document says Chechen rebels and mercenaries fighting on their side get support from foreign Mujahideen who have close connections with Islamic extremists in the Middle East, and South and Central Asia, including Osama bin Laden.
The report mentions apartment house blasts in Moscow and Volgodonsk that killed about 300 people and injured over 800 last autumn. It says Russian authorities suspect Chechen groups connected with Basayev and Khattab of organising these explosions.
*******
From: "Nick Holdsworth" <nickh007@online.ru> Subject: Moscow launch of new book on Russia Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2000
Readers of JRL who are in Moscow on May 4th are cordially invited to join me at the ANGLIA BOOKSHOP, KHLEBNY PEREULOK (parallel to Novy Arbat behind large book shop Dom Kinigi) MOSCOW on THURSDAY MAY 4TH AT 1800 HOURS.......where I shall be signing copies of my new book "Moscow: The Beautiful and the Damned -- Life in Russia in Transition" published by Andre Deutsch (London) earlier this year.
Nick Holdsworth Times Higher Education Supplement Moscow & Prague
*******
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM A MONTHLY ON THE POST-SOVIET STATES April 2000 No. 4 Part 2
A PRE-DECLARED VICTORY By A.V. Buzgalin Aleksandr Buzgalin is a doctor of economics and a professor at Moscow State University. He is a leader of Russia's Democratic Socialist Movement.
HOW PUTIN ACHIEVED HIS POPULARITY
A victory for Vladimir Putin in the presidential election seemed to be on the cards back in November 1999, before Boris Yeltsin resigned, when the elections were still planned for June 2000. A young, energetic and decisive prime minister had made an appearance in the Kremlin--a man who was able to make himself popular among the Russians by his consistent use of force against the bandit groups which had invaded Dagestan, and who was not afraid to take the military campaign against these groups onto the territory of the breakaway republic of Chechnya. Remembering the grim results of the 1994-96 Chechen war, this was indeed a brave move for a Russian politician to make, especially one who was not a president and who therefore did not enjoy the full might of state power.
This move was as calculated as it was brave. And it cannot be said with any certainty that it was Putin himself who did the calculating. The course of the military operations in Dagestan and Chechnya and the curious timing whereby the military actions coincided with political events in Moscow clearly suggest that the second Chechen war was used as a pre-election political show. In fact, the Chechens' preparations for their incursion into Dagestan, and the erection of long-term fortifications in those border regions where the Chechen population was predominant and where there was a strong fundamentalist Wahhabi presence, were no secret for Moscow, nor of course for Putin's office. The incursion was expected. What was the first thing Moscow did in reaction to the Chechen aggression in Dagestan? They replaced prime minister Stepashin with Prime Minister Putin. Why was this?
The answer is that the Chechen invasion of Dagestan provided the perfect opportunity to attack the criminal armed groups (or, to put it bluntly, the bandits) which had dug themselves in Chechnya and which threatened the peace and stability of the entire southern part of European Russia. And it was Putin who had to take advantage of this opportunity. He had to take over as prime minister and make himself popular with the Russians by routing the Chechen gangs at any price. This was the last chance for Yeltsin's "family" to put up a new political figure for the presidential elections--one untainted by being connected to the bankrupt policies of Yeltsin's administration--and to ensure this figure became popular enough to win the election.
I do not propose to offer any pointed hints or theories as to who was behind the bombing of apartment blocks in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. Let us assume that the official version is correct. One way or another, these bombs helped to justify Putin's subsequent actions in the eyes of Russian public opinion. The terrorists needed finishing off! (Putin himself publicly used criminal slang to express this idea). Russian troops thus blockaded Chechnya's borders and began moving into its northern regions. At first these actions met with very little resistance and proceeded with almost no losses. This is understandable--a section of the Russian population had survived in these northern areas. And apart from this, the blockade of the Chechen border was carried out in a rather curious manner: The borders were closed off everywhere except to the south, which was where the Chechens could receive aid, in the form of money, reinforcements and weapons, through Georgia and Azerbaijan. Why was this?
The parliamentary elections were drawing close, and the forces which Putin hoped to rely on in parliament did not need the bitter fighting and the risk of huge losses that would surround attempts to close off the mountain passes. For the same reasons, the storming of Grozny was delayed, and the street fighting that began very inauspiciously was deliberately kept secret from public opinion for quite some time. It was only two days before the election that paratroopers landed in the Argun pass, Chechnya's main link to the outside world.
So the elections were held, Unity enjoyed a convincing success and Putin's main potential rival in the presidential elections--Yevgeny Primakov--was pushed out of the race. Then came Yeltsin's resignation, and the transfer of his powers to Putin. This move was clearly designed to boost Putin's popularity further by concentrating all the resources of state power in his hands. Now the elections were two months away, and it was unlikely that anyone would be able to stand up to Putin, who had so quickly won the sympathy of the Russian people. And then the war in Chechnya really got going.
AN ELECTION, BUT NO SELECTION--A VOICE, BUT NO CHOICE
The fact that the full might of the government and pro-government mass media was mobilized to support Putin and to discredit his opponents is not unusual for Russian politics. What was somewhat unusual was the almost complete absence of an anticommunist campaign, the extremely harsh attacks on Grigory Yavlinsky and the quite indecent persecution of those who called for a boycott of the elections or encouraged people to vote against all the candidates. However, these features are quite understandable from the point of view of the tasks facing the Putin's election organizers.
The consideration that Gennady Zyuganov was very unlikely to win was put to good use. In any case, the communist candidate had a fairly solid core of voters which it would have been practically impossible to sway. To ensure victory for Putin in the first round, other priorities were set: First, to achieve a fairly high turn-out, and, second, to take votes away from the candidate for third place (that is, Yavlinsky). Both tasks were successfully carried out. A comparison of the half-empty Moscow polling stations for the presidential elections and the crowded ones at the parliamentary elections may tell us something about how these tasks were carried out. The official figures for the turn-out were similar in both cases. There were other factors working in Putin's favor which had little to do with the candidate himself or his electoral team. Favorable economic conditions, a concomitant improvement in tax collection, and a reduction in the wages and pension arrears all served to weaken opposition to the Kremlin authorities.
But even in such favorable conditions, Putin's final result--some 52 percent--was markedly lower than the 63-66 percent predicted, or even the 57 percent accorded him on the eve of the election (they were evidently apprehensive about blatantly exaggerating the results of this poll). In exactly the same way, Gennady Zyuganov's result--almost 30 percent--was much higher than the 22-23 percent given as the results of opinion polls. Clearly all the major polling agencies were simply acting as instruments for influencing public opinion.
In any event, Putin won--and much more convincingly than Boris Yeltsin had in 1996.
THE DECLINE IN POPULARITY OF TRADITIONAL POLITICIANS
Support for KPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov was noticeably down. Moreover, Zyuganov suffered marked losses in a number of regions (in southern Russia) where he usually achieved better results than his opponents. These losses were a consequence of the political and ideological strategy chosen by the KPRF when the party was founded back in 1993. The attempt to use predominantly nationalist rhetoric in seeking to expand its supporter base was a tactical victory but a strategic loss.
All it took was a politician to emerge in the Kremlin who was prepared not only to use the same nationalist slogans but also to take action establishing him as a nationalist head of state in the eyes of the electorate, and many of the opposition's trump cards were rendered worthless. And the leader of the KPRF did not manage to come up with an attractive alternative socioeconomic policy and persuade the majority of voters that he was capable of reviving the Russian economy.
The other loser--Grigory Yavlinsky--suffered even more palpable losses. Speaking against the continuation of military action in Chechnya when the bulk of Russian society was still in favor of a radical solution to the Chechen problem cost him a lot of votes. Another factor in Yavlinsky's defeat was the gradual but steady decline in popularity of a politician who supports the strategy of market reforms yet has never assisted in bringing them about, preferring to concentrate on constant criticism of any specific measures the government takes.
The general decline in popularity of liberal ideas also contributed to Yavlinsky's loss of popularity. It is no coincidence that the Union of Right Forces was unable to put up a joint candidate for the presidency despite its relative success at the parliamentary elections. Of course, the desire of many right-wingers to demonstrate their loyalty to the clear favorite--Putin--also contributed to this. None of the influential right-wing politicians ventured to declare their candidacy. But even if they had, it is unlikely that they could have done better than 5th or 6th place.
The peak of popularity for the Right came at a time when they could claim that they spoke for all the democratic forces. Back then, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Right managed to lead the movement for the democratization of Russia, which brought together people with very different convictions. But this united movement soon broke up, and many people with democratic views, unhappy with the practical politics of the Right, stopped supporting them.
Today the Right's claims that they personify the democratic forces in Russia are simply laughable. Their support for one of the most corrupt administrations in the world (and their own direct involvement in corruption), and their support for the anticonstitutional and antidemocratic measures of the authorities if they felt this was expedient in order to preserve their political influence, did not gain the right-wing politicians any popularity even among those who shared their right-wing views.
WHAT NEXT?
The Russian press today is full of speculation about who will head the government under president Putin and who will be in that government. There is much less discussion of a far more important question: What are the social and political forces that Putin's administration will rely on? For it is this that will shape the decisions on who will be appointed to the government and what policies that government will pursue. If this question is raised at all, it is only from the perspective of debates about the degree of Putin's dependence on this or that oligarch and his chances of freeing himself from that dependence.
A totally independent president is an unrealistic proposition in any case. Putin will be catering for somebody's interests; he will rely on somebody's support. But whose? As yet all of Putin's public pronouncements have demonstrated his adherence to the socioeconomic strategy of the Yeltsin administration. His team of analysts from St. Petersburg, which Putin has used up to now to develop his future economic policy, adheres to right-wing liberal ideas. So it is unrealistic to expect that Putin will offer us anything fundamentally new, unless... Unless the ephemeral nature of the current favorable economic climate is revealed in the near future. Then the new president will have a tough choice to make.
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From: The Nixon Center <NixonCenter@lists.postmastergeneral.com> Subject: Reality Check: Russia's Unfree Press Date: Mon, 01 May 2000
Reality Check: Russia's Unfree Press by Paul J. Saunders April 29, 2000 (Paul J. Saunders is Director of The Nixon Center. His e-mail address is psaunders@nixoncenter.org.)
Despite Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin's repeated assurances that he is committed to democracy and a free press in his country, the actions of his government both before and after his election suggest otherwise.
It is already well known that Putin's government sharply restricted both Russian and foreign media access to Chechnya almost immediately after the sending the Russian military into the rebellious province. More recently, as the Russian campaign has stalled and Chechen guerilla attacks increase, the Kremlin has begun to crack down on newspapers that suggest a political settlement may be possible. Within the last week, the new Russian Ministry of Press, TV and Radio Broadcasting, and Mass Communications has formally warned two prominent newspapers, Kommersant and Novaya Gazeta, for publishing interviews with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. A second such warning would allow the government to shut them down. According to a source at Novaya Gazeta, the government has also intimidated key Russian broadcast media to prevent the airing of their interview with Maskhadov.
The warnings follow a declaration last month by Press Minister Mikhail Lesin that Russia's law on terrorism "prohibits mass media from giving propaganda opportunities both to terrorists and people suspected of involvement in activities which fall under the category of terrorist acts." Using almost Soviet double-talk, another ministry official said that Russian journalists could meet and interview Chechen rebels so long as they do not disseminate materials which "justify" terrorist activities. By this logic, interviews with the Chechen leaders may be published or broadcast only if they do not attempt to explain the Chechens' views.
The government's sharp reaction to the publication of the Maskhadov interviews is particularly striking given their content, which is not particularly new. In the Novaya Gazeta interview, for example, the Chechen president blames an alliance of the notorious oligarch Boris Berezovsky, unnamed Russian officials, and "rogue" Chechen commanders for the apartment bombings and attacks in Dagestan that provoked the Russian intervention--a suggestion he and others have already made several times, including in the Russian media. Maskhadov also asserts that he is in full control of the Chechen forces and calls for talks with Putin to end the war. None of this is new.
Although proposing a negotiated settlement to the conflict may be inconvenient for the "war faction" in the Russian government, it hardly seems sufficiently threatening to justify warning the two papers. In fact, it should be quite easy for the government to dismiss Maskhadov's plea for peace; after all, the interview included no specific proposals and his claim to control the Chechen forces is questionable.
Looking back at recent reporting in Novaya Gazeta, however, it is easy to understand why Putin or his associates could want to close its doors. For example, earlier this year, the paper ran several stories about suspicious events in Ryazan, a provincial Russian city, at the time of last year's apartment bombings that contributed to initial public support for the Chechnya intervention. In brief, the reporting alleged that Russian security services might have attempted to stage a bombing in the city to further rally public opinion for the war. While most dismiss the story as an unsupported conspiracy theory, it has received widespread attention. Putin himself said "to even speculate about this is immoral and in essence none other than an element of the information war against Russia."
Novaya Gazeta has also recently carried several reports on alleged massive campaign finance violations by Boris Yeltsin in 1996 and Vladimir Putin in 2000. Curiously, the March issue that was to include these stories was delayed by several days after unidentified hackers broke into the paper's computer system and destroyed the entire issue. Some at Novaya Gazeta argue that the Federal Security Service, which Putin previously led, was responsible for the cyber-attack. The paper has also questioned aspects of Vladimir Putin's background in St. Petersburg and investigated corruption allegations against Mikhail Kasyanov, the first deputy prime minister who many speculate will head the Russian government after Putin is inaugurated May 7. Its deputy editor, Yuri Shchekochikhin, is a prominent Russian parliamentarian with strong democratic credentials. Formerly a muckraking journalist himself, Shchekochikhin now chairs a Duma subcommittee that oversees corruption investigations.
President-elect Putin's KGB background and his ruthlessness in defending the Yeltsin regime and prosecuting the war in Chechnya raise serious questions about Russia's future under his leadership. Moreover, the government's treatment of the media since Putin became prime minister has been unprecedented in post-independence Russia.
Nevertheless, Putin is also a relatively inexperienced leader who holds responsibilities far more significant than any that he has previously carried. Once he formally takes office and appoints a government, the Kremlin is likely to launch a number of new initiatives to demonstrate that Russia has, in fact, turned the corner and merits new political and economic support as well as significant foreign investment. While there may be much promise in many of these new developments--and Putin still deserves to be given the opportunity to prove himself--it is essential that the U.S. not be blinded to events within Russia that may be considerably less attractive. The new Russian president should be neither demonized nor lionized, but watched.
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the eXile March 30 - April 13, 2000 Business and Finance Economic Plan Unveiled Newly-elected Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-awaited economic plan was leaked to the eXile yesterday. Entitled "Steal Lots of Stuff," the economic program, formulated under the stewardship of young economist German Gref, lives up to its near-impossible goal of combining dynamic new ideas with old, promising change without revolution, and a mixture of state and market stimuli. "Russia has seen enough revolution and change already," commented a Putin advisor who asked not to be named and threatened to beat us with a wet rubber hose if we did. "The people are weary."
The program calls for greater vigor in the area of theft, including an increase in the use of state intervention to steal "as much as possible."
"A weak state limits our ability to steal," says the preamble to Gref's economic program. "We need a stronger state, in order to steal lots more stuff."
One area of the Russian economy which needs to be exploited is the free-floating cash. Most economists estimate that some $40 billion in cash is "stuffed under mattresses" due to the average Russian's distrust of the banking system and business practices.
"We need to steal this money," the program declares plainly. "We need to convince our citizens that our banks have finally changed, and that it is safe and even advantageous to deposit their money in our banks instead of under their proverbial mattresses. That way, we can then wire their money to a tropical offshore paradise, close the bank, and then raise our hands in frustration and declare, 'What? Whaddaya mean?'"
In keeping with the program's stated aims of combining both free market and state-interventionist policies, the authors admit that trying to gain the citizenry's confidence again, after having been fleeced twice in the past decade in banking collapses and devaluations, will be difficult. They estimate that perhaps twenty percent of the savings could be enticed into the banking system. For this reason, the authors are calling for state intervention to stimulate theft.
"Police units must be sent to surround entire communities. Doors must be kicked down, citizens must be tied up or forced onto the floor, and their living quarters should be entirely ransacked in the search for their savings. Mattresses must not be spared." The cash will then be sent to Moscow and wired out of the country and into a tropical offshore paradise.
Because endemic corruption could result in stifling centralized theft (the plan foresees that between 90 and 99 percent of the requisitioned savings could wind up in the hands of corrupt officials and officers before reaching Moscow), the authors call for a "rigorous fight against corruption [...] so that we can steal more for ourselves."
Foreign investors are also named as a cornerstone to the economic plan. "We must steal their money again," the report demands in no uncertain terms. Referring to the financial crisis that gripped Russia almost two years ago, the authors believe that foreigners have "already pretty much forgotten about that thing that happened," and optimistically forecast that "they are ready to come back."
"The first thing is, don't even talk about it. Just pretend it never happened."
In order to induce foreign investment, the new regime must "convince foreigners that this time, things will be different-and we swear." They estimate that "several billion dollars can be stolen from foreigners over the course of the next two years," and that after a brief lull, "we can start stealing in the tens of billions. [...] They have so many hundreds of billions of dollars, what's a few billion here or there to those foreigners?"
The report also calls for the government to continue and buttress those parts of the Russian economy that are working, and to increase its efficiency. The report calls for "a few well-placed people" connected to Putin to "continue stealing everything from the state export capacity, the budget, and industry," citing several sectors where "not everything has been stolen."
Commenting on the report, economic analyst Eric Krause said that he is "cautiously optimistic" and "on the phone with foreign investors right now."
"I tell them that it's better to get in now, because that way, you won't look so stupid when they've stolen everything later," he said.
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BBC MONITORING COMMUNIST LEADER SAYS "SWINDLERS" MANAGE RUSSIA'S ASSETS Source: Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 0900 gmt 1 May 00
[Presenter] The left-wing forces gathered some 7,000 people for a rally on Manezhnaya Ploshchad [English: Square]...
[Correspondent] [Communist Party leader, CPRF] Gennadiy Zyuganov was highly critical of the situation in Russia... Now we will show you the footage filmed at the rally.
[Zyuganov] The treaty, which envisages the elimination of the last nuclear and missile shield under which protection we could have restored our fatherland and our sovereignty and independence within the next 10-20 years, has been thrusted on us.
We are being told to build new aircraft and submarines now that the country has neither money, nor resources. Five to seven swindlers are still managing the main assets having seized them in line with [Boris] Yeltsin's decree.
[Presenter] Vladimir, unlike before representatives of the CPRF and the Working Russia [WR], who as we know have serious differences, were walking in the same column today. Who was setting the mood at today's events?
[Correspondent] You know the rally began with an address by [the WR leader Viktor] Anpilov which meant that he was the one to set the mood... Now we can show you Viktor Anpilov's footage.
[Anpilov] I would like to deliver greetings of solidarity to the working people from the socialist countries who are holding the Red Banner at the level it should be.
Greetings of solidarity to the socialist Cuba, socialist Korea and socialist China.
Brotherly greetings to Columbia's youth who with weapons in their hands are fighting against the civilized plunderer, the world imperialism led by the United States... ******
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