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CDI Library > Johnson's
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May 1, 2000
Johnson's Russia List #4278 1 May 2000 davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson: ******
Thousands march in calm, cold Russia May Day By Ron Popeski
MOSCOW, May 1 (Reuters) - Tens of thousands of Russians took part in May Day marches on Monday, but with a new Kremlin leader in place and cold weather gripping cities, protests were smaller and less virulent than previous post-Soviet gatherings.
President-elect Vladimir Putin spent the day relaxing with his family at the Black Sea resort of Sochi and presumably readying himself for his inauguration next Sunday and the subsequent formation of a new government. Russia's pensioners, many barely able to make ends meet after nine years of turmoil, received a small boost to their pensions, now worth the equivalent of less than $30 on average. But were also hit by increased gas and electricity prices.
``We were all free and happy then,'' pensioner Dina Gulicheva told Reuters Television beneath a statue of Soviet state founder Vladimir Lenin in central Moscow. ``These democrats have taken everything away from me.''
Soviet-era celebrations were organised affairs, with workers proceeding in columns through Red Square while Communist leaders watched approvingly from atop Lenin's mausoleum. In recent years, marches focused on demands for the resignation of Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.
Monday's festivities saw two processions pass through Moscow streets, each drawing several thousand marchers braving cold winds to mark a ``holiday of spring and labour.''
Trade unions, joined by popular Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and groups of women carrying plastic flowers and balloons, demanded higher and promptly paid wages plus measures to help domestic producers meet the demands of market economics.
``These people have come here with simple demands -- 'where is our pay?' 'Why is the minimum wage not being raised?','' trade union leader Mikhail Shmakov told reporters on Moscow's main thoroughfare, Tverskaya Street.
A few kilometres (miles) away, the Communist Party and other leftists held their own procession, but with Yeltsin's departure depriving them of their main focus of anger, the tone was largely subdued.
Marchers carried red flags and carnations, danced in a city square to Soviet-era songs and railed against poverty.
One Lenin lookalike carried a placard with Communist slogans. Others staged a mime depicting the evils of capitalist society, including a gagged marcher labelled ``freedom of speech'' and another dressed as a prostitute with the banner ``morality.''
COMMUNIST ZYUGANOV BLASTS DISARMAMENT PACT
Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, defeated by Putin in March's presidential election, used his speech to denounce parliament's ratification of the START-2 disarmament pact.
``We were forced to sign a treaty to liquidate the last nuclear umbrella under which we could have resurrected our state within 10 to 15 years,'' he said.
Viktor Anpilov of the far-left ``Working Russia'' movement acknowledged Yeltsin's departure had altered the tone, but said: ``He is still there, though unseen, through his policies.''
Television showed thousands of marchers in St Petersburg pledging to ``build a positive image'' for Russia's second city, renowned as a centre of organised crime with contract killings an almost weekly occurrence. Leading the rally was governor Vladimir Yakovlev, running for re-election this month.
Reports from throughout Russia spoke of small rallies in other cities, mostly by left-wing groups, without incident.
In the former Soviet republic of Ukraine, about 2,000 communist protesters gathered in the capital Kiev outside the former Lenin museum, now an exhibition hall.
Party leader Petro Symonenko, beaten in last year's presidential election, decried policies he said had turned Ukraine into ``one of the world's 10 fastest dying nations.''
******
The Times (UK) 1 May 2000 [for personal use only] Duma debates capital move to St Petersburg FROM ALICE LAGNADO IN MOSCOW THE Russian parliament this month will debate moving to the former imperial capital of St Petersburg.
Vladimir Yakovlev, the city's Governor, and other prominent figures in St Petersburg for years have pushed for the "crime capital of Russia" to return to its pre-communist position as the most important Russian city and attract more money to its economy.
Gennadi Seleznyov, the Speaker of the Duma, said at the weekend that there may be a vote on the issue by mid-June and that the new buildings could be ready in 36 months.
Moscow and St Petersburg maintain an intense rivalry, with Muscovites deriding St Petersburg as nothing more than a dead "museum" and St Petersburgers sniffing at the "big village" that is Moscow.
In St Petersburg, despite the dirt, potholes, bleak weather and frequent contract killings, there are many who regard the city as more European, more literary and more refined than Moscow, and more suitable as a seat of national government.
Now the Russian Government is headed by a St Petersburg native, Vladimir Putin, who has brought many of his cronies with him, and has inspired those who want to move out of "provincial" Moscow. In reality, the plan is unlikely to be realised. Mr Putin said in February that moving north would be absurd and too costly. But the fact that the issue, which St Petersburg's Governor has talked about for years, is finally being taken seriously in parliament is important for other reasons.
Mr Yakovlev and Mr Putin have been bitter enemies for years. In the past, Mr Putin has called the Governor a Judas and is known to have made rude remarks to the Governor and even ignored him during public appearances. Mr Yakovlev's enemies accuse him of running a corrupt city government infiltrated by the ruling Tambov mafia.
******
Boston Globe 1 May 2000 [for personal use only] FOREIGN JOURNAL Bank scandal gets a dose of titillation By Brian Whitmore, Globe Correspondent
MSCOW - References to the Bank of New York have been popping up in strange places in Moscow. In the city's chatty tabloid press, for example.
Last week, the scandal-sheet Versiya reported that it knows of a videotape showing a Bank of New York executive frolicking with Moscow prostitutes. The paper reported that it was trying to obtain a copy of the tape to check its validity and promised readers it would stay on top of the story.
Huh? What's that all about? Stories like this usually don't appear in the Russian press by accident - and they usually have goals other than amusing voyeuristic readers. When something like this pops up, it is often some sort of veiled threat.
Granted, the Bank of New York's recent history with Russia hasn't been a happy one. Last fall, US and British law-enforcement officials said they were investigating allegations that as much as $7 billion in Russian cash was illegally laundered through the bank.
When the scandal broke, the news media here were full of stories saying the allegations were fabricated by political forces in the United States to discredit Russia.
The Bank of New York has since fired two Russian-born executives, Lucy Edwards and Natalya Kagalovskaya. Edwards pleaded guilty to arranging illegal transfer of billions of dollars through the bank. Kagalovskaya, who has not been charged, is suing the bank for damaging her reputation.
Last week, Iowa Republican James Leach, who chairs the House Banking Committee, was in Moscow to confer with Russian legislators on how the countries can cooperate to tighten controls on money laundering. A Russian journalist asked Leach about the Versiya article and its allegations of sexual debauchery. While listening to the translation, Leach's face seemed to betray a mixture of confusion, amusement, and dread - but he recovered well.
''We don't know anything about sexual scandals in the United States,'' he said.
Nearly everyone in the room burst out in laughter. The Russian media, with barely concealed delight, had reported extensively on the Monica Lewinsky affair.
The tabloid press isn't the only place the Bank of New York has fallen under attack here. Recently, billboards have appeared along some of Moscow's most heavily traveled streets with the following message: ''Gentlemen from the Bank of New York, we are warning you. Manipulating stocks in Russia is impermissible.''
Nobody can say who was behind the billboards, but the Bank of New York is a major player with Russian stocks. The bank holds a virtual monopoly on American Depositary Receipts, or ADRs, proxy stocks for Russian corporations that are traded on Wall Street.
Under the ADR system, the Bank of New York buys shares in Russian companies and then sells proxy stocks on the US exchange. The bank, not the foreign ADR holder, is allowed to vote at shareholder meetings.
Some politicians here have criticized the ADR system, saying Russian corporate executives use it to manipulate shareholder votes. In exchange for a company's ADR business, the politicians allege, the Bank of New York agrees to vote according to management's wishes.
The Bank of New York's ADR business is also threatened by Kagalovskaya's $270 million lawsuit. If she wins, her lawyers suspect that the Bank of New York will not pay out. If this happens, the lawyers have hinted that they will go after the assets the Bank of New York owns in several Russian companies through ADRs. Meanwhile, Moscow can probably look forward to more tantalizing tabloid stories, and strange billboards.
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Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2000 From: Gordon N Bardos <gnb12@columbia.edu> Subject: AP/Harriman Conference in New York May 5
Dear Colleagues,
Your are cordially invited to:
The Seventh Annual Associated Press/Harriman Institute Conference
"Russia After Yeltsin"
Friday, May 5th, 2000 Kellogg Conference Center International Affairs Building Columbia University
9:00-9:30--Registration and Coffee
9:30--9:45--Welcome and Introductory Remarks: Catherine Nepomnyashchy, Associate Director, Harriman Institute, Amb. William Luers, President and Chairman, United Nation Association of the US, Chairman of the National Advisory Council of the Harriman Institute; Thomas Kent, Deputy Managing Editor, Associated Press
9:45-11:45--Panel I: Russia's Changing Political Scene
Chair: Amb. Jack Matlock, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, NJ, and former US Ambassador to the USSR Panelists: Stephen F. Cohen, New York University Alexander J. Motyl, Rutgers University Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Princeton University
12-1:45--Luncheon and Keynote Address: Thomas Graham, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
2-3:45: Panel II: The Future of Economic Reform: Progress or Stagnation? Chair: Allen Sinai, President and Chief Global Economist, Primark Decision economics Panelists: Rose Brady, Business Week Padma Desai, Harriman Institute Richard Ericson, Harriman Institute
4-5:45--Panel III: Western Media Coverage of Russia Chair: Thomas Kent, Associated Press Panelists: Jim Heintz, Associated Press Moscow Bureau David Johnson, Center for Defense Information, and Editor, Johnson's Russia List Serge Schmemann, Deputy Foreign Editor, The New York Times
6:00-7:00--Reception
The registration fee for the conference is $85. For more information or to register, please contact Gordon N. Bardos at 212-854-8487, or by email at gnb12@columbia.edu
******
Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2000 From: "Keith Bush" <KBush@CSIS.ORG> Subject: the eXile at CSIS in Washington May 4
Center for Strategic and International Studies Russia and Eurasian Program Corporate Briefing Series THE EXPATRIATEÆS RUSSIA Thursday, May 4, 3:305:00 PM, at CSIS
Matt Taibbi and Mark Ames Editors of the eXile
Dear Colleague,
And now for something completely different! Matt Taibbi and Mark Ames have been the editors of the exile, a biweekly Moscow-based satirical and political magazine, since 1997. They have also just published The exile: Sex, Drugs, and Libel in the New Russia. At 3:30 PM on Thursday, May 4, they will be speaking on the record at CSIS about their experiences editing a satirical magazine in Moscow. They will also discuss the failures of the so-called ôreformö movement in the Yeltsin era, the outlook for press freedoms under the Putin regime, and the problems with Western press coverage of Russia.
We look forward to seeing you on May 4.
PLEASE RSVP BY FAX (202)775-3132 OR TELEPHONE (202)775-3240
******
April 26, 2000 Argumenty i fakty Interview with Sergei IVANOV, Secretary of the Security Council [translation for personal use only]
Just recently Sergei Ivanov was widely known only in very narrow circles. Being at the helm of one of structural subdivisions of the Foreign Intelligence Service, and then as deputy director of the FSB, Lieut.Gen. Ivanov did not suffer from excess visibility. But since he became secretary of Security Council, that is, one of the key figures in the presidential administration, Sergei Borisovich Ivanov immediately became accessible to and interesting for the media.
Q: Could you provide an example of any real threat to the nation that was liquidated by the Security Council?
A: It is preferable not to allow threats to emerge, which implies constant adjustments in our policies. But at times, we have to resort to straight action. Thus, last fall, with the beginning of the Chechnya war, our TV channels vied with each other in running interviews with Basayev, Raduev, Udugov, and other bandits. We had to make it clear, that, I'm sorry to say, even in the most democratic Britain, members of the terrorist IRA have no legal right to display their mugs on television screens. If anything ought to be quoted, this is done by an announcer without showing the picture of the "hero". One cannot allow terrorists to propagate their views. After an intervention by Security Council, this practice ended in our country.
Q: Did you make estimates of how much longer will the Chechen war drag on?
A: It may languish for another several years. Even under Stalin's tough policies, which included deporting Chechens to Kazakhstan over one week, and under somewhat softer policies of his successor, the last bandit in Chechnya was slain in the mountains in 1974.
Q: Russian military are often accused of being too rough. How justified are these accusations?
A: Attempts to be soft only led to ever more blood. At present, our military act like this: if there is a gunshot from a certain building, they open fire without delay. And all locals had been warned of this attitude. As a result, we already control even the most difficult mountainous areas. It is also important to take control of all borders and related flows of supplies to the guerillas.
Q: But in the meantime, it looks like we are losing the information war. We fail to demonstrate to the outer world that our actions in Chechnya are just and legal.
A: In our Soviet past, we had APN, foreign broadcasting, which enabled the government to explain its policies to the world. Now we do not have these capabilities. Our task is to set up something new, something like USIA in America. But, as usual, money is the problem.
Q: By the way, do we still define America as our enemy, or do we have no enemies any more?
A: My viewpoint is that the key threats to our security are internal ones. Because no one has damaged us as much as we did ourselves. Economy is the first priority, crime and disorganization of the state that has become unmanageable are second and third. We put the economy front and center, because if it does not improve, then there is no sense to discuss other matters.
Q: Which intelligence services in the world you would rate as the strongest?
A: Ours, the British, and the Israeli.
British intelligence has an excellent school and traditions, they give superb training to their agents. As for the Israeli intelligence, the most important role is played by the ethnic factor, which no other country shares to such an extent. If an Israeli agent asks a Jew for help, at least he can be confident that his contact will not betray him.
Q: What about the CIA?
A: Americans have got too much money. Hence their idea that anything can be bought and that you don't need to exert your brain. I must say that an intelligence agent is typically slowed down by too much money and comfort. Our native operative is accustomed to using his brain rather than money, to keep himself in shape and to do twenty things at once.
Q: Beside Chechnya, there is yet one more threat. This is the creeping takeover of the Far East by China.
A: China is not the only problem, although this process is going on, in the Far East, among other places. In fact, no one knows how many illegal immigrants we have. Clearly, there are several millions of them. Plus, [people from] virtually all the CIS reside in our land. For this reason, we will have to introduce visa regime, sooner or later. Because we have millions of Ukrainians, Azeris, Georgians, who work here and send home billions of dollars in cash that is unaccounted for. From a human point of view, we can understand this. But this does not make our life any easier. Meanwhile, in the "civilized" Europe one has to pay no less than $ 2,000 per person for a half-a-year visa with work permit.
Q: Wouldn't it be better to let these Azeris stay in Russia and settle down here? After all, these are our people, just as the Armenians, the Georgians, and others. As long as they don't bring their families here, let them send money over there, if they earned it honestly.
A: Indeed, we are destined to live in a multi-ethnic state. Already now we have about 25-30% of non-citizens in Russia. And they are entitled to export their money, but only on a legal basis. So that the police does not have to rob them in the flea markets, they ought to pay their reasonable legal taxes. We should have become pragmatists long time ago and display our reasonable national egoism. When select leaders of the CIS [countries] declare their wish to join NATO, they don't consult us, and they keep silence while squeezing Russians out of their countries. We cannot act this way, but we can and we must compel our neighbors to respect our legitimate national interests. One cannot get a free ride by stealing Russia's oil and gaz, while at the same time striving to join either Greater Romania, or NATO, or something else... Our response is as follows: please go wherever you like, but take responsibility for all the consequences.
<...> Q: Tell us please how did you meet Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin].
A: Although we both studied in the Leningrad University, we didn't meet each other there, as some people think. After graduating from the language department, I got a degree from the KGB's advanced counter-intelligence courses in Minsk. After that, I was assigned to the Leningrad directorate, where he was already working. We were born in the same year, so it was just natural for us to become friends. Two years later, I was transferred to Moscow and spent another year in the intelligence school. I never returned to St.Pete. But we met each other now and then, when we both had to go to Moscow. <...>
****** Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2000 From: VladPchol@aol.com (Karen Johnson) Subject: EAST EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW--FREE
Free subscriptions to the print version of the East European Constitutional Review are available by writing to ar55@is8.nyu.edu Please send your name, mailing address, and institutional affiliation, if any.
The EECR is a quarterly that has covered law and politics in post-socialist Europe and Eurasia since 1992. Its upcoming issue has a special feature on Russia After Yeltsin. The previous issue looked at the "demand for law" in Russia. (Back issues are available online at http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr)
The EECR is published by NYU Law School and the Central European University; its editor-in-chief is Professor Stephen Holmes.
The EECR also has a Russian-language edition published in Moscow; it is available online at http://www.mpsf.org/cp/r_csc.html#kpvo
Karen Johnson Articles Editor, East European Constitutional Review
******
New York Times May 1, 2000 [for personal use only] U.S.-Russian Talks Revive Old Debates on Nuclear Warnings By WILLIAM J. BROAD
American proposals to change a key arms control agreement have revived some of the more important, if arcane, debates over nuclear strategy that not long ago seemed consigned to the dustbin of the cold war. One of those strategies is called "launch on warning" and is widely viewed as raising the risk of accidental nuclear war.
It was mentioned recently in documents that American negotiators gave Russian officials in an effort to persuade them to amend the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and let the United States build a limited missile defense.
The documents, presented to the Russians in January, were obtained by The New York Times, which published parts of them last week.
Opponents of changes to the ABM treaty are now charging that the Clinton administration is encouraging Russia to engage in a high-risk nuclear strategy. But American officials strongly deny that charge, saying they are simply acknowledging the reality of what Moscow might do in time of war.
The launch on warning strategy is essentially this: if a defender detected a nuclear launch, it would send up its own missiles and warheads even before its enemy's could hit the ground. That way, a country would not be left defenseless by having its missiles destroyed while they were still sitting in their submarines and silos.
Launch on warning was once seen as a way to reinforce the idea that all sides would lose in a nuclear exchange -- and thus deter one -- as modern arms became increasingly accurate.
The problem, most experts on strategy say, is that it also puts nuclear war on a hair trigger. And it increases the risks of an accidental nuclear exchange because early warning systems are notoriously faulty. In 1995, for instance, the Russians misread the launching of an American weather rocket from Norway as a surprise nuclear attack. If not caught by vigilant humans, such false alerts can start an accidental exchange of nuclear missiles.
Despite such dangers, the new American documents mention launch on warning in an approving context. They say it would help guarantee that the United States would not strike first in a disarming attack, even if it had a missile defense, which strategists, as well as the Russians, see as destabilizing because in theory it can give one side a protective advantage.
A Russian policy of launch on warning would thus continue to insure that both sides would lose in any nuclear exchange.
"It is highly unlikely," the documents said, that an enemy with a shield would ever attack Russia because Moscow could launch its missiles on warning of attack, "which would neutralize the effectiveness of the assault."
The documents also say Russia is keeping its nuclear forces on "constant alert and apparently will do so" well into the future. High states of alert are a prerequisite for a policy of launch on warning, but they too can add to the risks of accidental war.
Critics of an missile defense system say statements like those in the American documents, coming in the context of reassuring Russia about its ability to penetrate any American shield, are encouraging risky strategies and undermining nuclear stability. "The U.S. position should seek to reduce, not embrace, Russia's readiness to launch on warning," said Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information, a private Washington group.
John D. Steinbruner, a nuclear expert at the University of Maryland, said the Clinton administration's tacit endorsement of Russian launch on warning was "pretty bizarre" because "we know their warning system is full of holes."
Experts agree that Russia's network of early warning radars, satellites and computers is decaying and increasingly prone to false alerts.
Lisbeth Gronlund, a scientist at the Security Studies Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said the documents show that the United States, in exchange for what she characterized as an unworkable antimissile dream, was willing to pay an absurd price: "the continued threat of Russian unauthorized, accidental and erroneous launches."
Instead, the critics say, Moscow should be encouraged to take its nuclear forces off alert and to disavow launch on warning, and Washington should do likewise.
Federal officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, denied that the arms negotiators were blessing dangerous practices and said the critics were being na1ve. The references in the documents, they said, simply conceded military realities and what Russia might do in war.
"It's not our job to say it's a bad thing," a senior official who works intimately with the Russians on military matters said of launch on warning. He said that Washington, eager to lessen the odds of accidental war, is actively working with Moscow to help Russia improve its early-warning systems.
"We're into lowering the risk" of war, the official said, "not raising it." He added that in some cases that meant a nation would adopt arguments and strategies that might look risky, but over time would prove beneficial.
******
Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2000 From: Albert Weeks <AWeeks1@compuserve.com> Subject: Holum and Blair dialog
The Holum/Blair dialog prompts a number of additional comments:
1. Mr. Blair deplores Russia's LOW (launch on warning) posture and calls it infeasible. But the Russians still stick by it. As proved by their dangerous reaction to the stray Norwegian test rocket several years ago. Their hair-trigger posture, in fact, is simply one more argument in favor of some form of American anti-missile protection. So is the danger of accidental launch, which is generally ignored in such discussions.
2. If the Russians are so opposed to anti-missile defense, why do they continue to invest so much in their constantly-upgraded ABM around Moscow, the world's most impressive, functional ABM?? Why is this installation praised so lavishly in a new military book published in Moscow? For our part, we declined to deploy even one such permitted battery. We have thus lost some technological time and ground in the ABM field. Moreover, how much technological know-how backed up the Krasnoyarsk NMD installation erected in violation of the ABM treaty of '72? Based on its overall ABM testing and accumulated knowledge, how easily could Russia expand its existent ABM into a NMD?
3. In a hypothetical argument, Mr. Blair imagines a surprise American nuclear attack against Russia. But hypothetical arguments of a fantastic sort are simply unconvincing. (Let's, say, imagine a dictator taking over the White House in Washington!) Everyone knows, or should know, that U.S. diplomatic and military history shows that this country has responded to, not initiated large-scale military actions in the 20th century. Even new, post-'91 Russian history texts acknowledge this truism about the U.S. that is known to every schoolboy as the defencist "Pearl Harbor syndrome." By contrast, Russian, Soviet, and to some degree post-Soviet Russian military history shows an intertwining of both offensive and defensive strategic postures and actions. The last phase of the Soviet period showed a distinct Russian preference for offensive strategies (as documented by such military thinkers as Yeltsin's former military adviser, Andrei Kokoshin, who recenly wrote that Soviet military strategy was deeply offencist in nature).
4. If Russia is so "unanimously" opposed to NMD, why is it that certain Russian military writers themselves, published in the pages of the General Staff journal, Voyennaya Mysl' (Military Thought), propose NMD for Russia?? Evidently some Russian military men DO favor it. On what grounds? Maybe others on both sides, Russian and American, should examine their arguments.
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THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN/DAILY YOMIURI April 30, 2000 LOCAL GOVERNORS BOW TO PUTIN Alexander Tsypko, Special To The Daily Yomiuri (Tsypko is Director of the Political Research Center in Moscow.)
Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin inherited from Boris Yeltsin three big problems: oligarchs, natural monopolies and the high-handedness of elected governors. Of these, Putin has succeeded first in solving the latter problem by reestablishing centralized power and traditional Russian one-man management. The most significant indication that he had achieved this came with our senators' almost unanimous support of Putin's request to dismiss Prosecutor General Yuri Skuratov.
It illustrates the unprecedented force of the new executive. Perhaps for the first time in its six years of existence, the upper house--consisting of elected heads of the federation and heads of regional legislative bodies--demonstrated a strong and open desire to please the president.
Obviously, our senators are much more afraid of Putin than they were of Yeltsin. During the course of 1999, Yeltsin asked senators three times to agree with his decision to dismiss Skuratov. And three times governors who controlled the upper house refused to take Yeltsin's side despite all the accompanying demands and threats.
When Putin asked them to fire Skuratov, they eagerly took the chance to demonstrate their servility. Governors even sent hints to Putin that they would cooperate with his wish to get rid of the prosecutor who had tried to uncover the Kremlin's corruption.
The almost unanimous support Putin received from governors has destroyed the myth that governors and heads of national republics enjoy political independence from the Kremlin.
Now not only governors of Russian provinces but also presidents of Islamic republics are rushing to give the loyalty oath to Putin. It is becoming clear that our "regional barons" were able to walk as they pleased only because of Yeltsin's weakness. Yeltsin allowed them to do anything they wanted, which included nonpayment of taxes, the promulgation of local laws and cooperation with the local mafia.
Regional feudalism as well as the concentration of power in the hands of "the Family" were possible due to a feeble Yeltsin. At the end of summer 1999, there was an impression that Yeltsin had let all centralized power dissipate. But as soon as an energetic and tough president appeared in the Kremlin, everything was put in order and refractory barons became obedient. So the present fountain-like loyalty of governors to the new president shows that their former high-handedness had no serious political foundation. Yeltsin just did not want to rule the country and passed a big part of his power to the regions. But the traditional potential of Russian centralism was strong even in the time of Yeltsin's weakness. As soon as a real master appeared, regional barons immediately turned out to be loyal vassals.
They even started to undermine their own authority by asking Putin to abolish direct public elections of heads of regional administration and to return to the practice of appointing them, thereby restoring a vertical power line.
In that "self-torture" of our governors one can see some logic and motives. People always feel less regret for what they have got for free than for what they have earned with hard work. Governors did nothing themselves as politicians to get their present huge powers. It was Yeltsin and his team who introduced a new clause into the 1993 Constitution that allowed governors to establish a mandate for their authority through direct elections.
Yeltsin himself, in accordance with democratic fashion, introduced the clause stipulating that regional police heads be appointed with the agreement of the relevant governor. Though it was clear that the de-facto dependence of police chiefs on regional governors would harshly weaken discipline in the country.
When governors enjoy a decisive word in the nomination of local police heads, the Interior Ministry has no chance of conducting its own personnel policy and maintaining the one-man management naturally suited to such a force. The present system gives governors the opportunity to cover up the real criminal situation in their regions and to feel safe in the face of the law.
Now governors understand that their liberties will be eliminated anyway, so they are hurrying to express their loyalty to the new president as well as their interest in strong discipline.
In fact, Putin needs to deprive regional separatism of its legal basis. To strengthen law, it is necessary that the chief local prosecutor and the heads of the police, tax and custom departments are appointed by the central government only. They should also be subordinate exclusively to the center. Only in that case would a governor, and those financial structures that back him up, be afraid of punishment if they violated the law.
To strengthen the vertical power line, Putin will also have to forbid regional supplements to the salaries of judges, prosecutors and policemen. As soon as provincial law custodians lose the possibility of feeding themselves from the governor's table, they will recall their sense of duty. The Supreme Court has already stipulated that additional payments to those who maintain the law are illegal.
However, many experts think Putin may restore a vertical line of power without abolishing the elections for governors and national republic presidents. This measure has neither political nor social necessity. Public support for an elected governor would not contradict the goal of state discipline if the president had the right to appeal to the courts in the case of a legal transgression and fire a governor upon a court's decision. It is meaningful that the president's administration is now creating a legal mechanism to allow a governors' dismissal. In Russia, fear of dismissal makes one observe the law.
The present situation in which governors are completely obedient creates no need for Putin to abolish the practice of elections in the regions. If he did so, it would be a demonstration of weakness rather than power.
In fact, the direct election of governors and national presidents is one of the pillars of our young democracy. Through such elections the public has the chance once every four years to express its attitude toward local authorities and to support the most popular local leaders. Direct gubernatorial elections are a form of public opinion poll the Kremlin cannot ignore. Although Yeltsin and his men were against the reelection of Luzhkov for the post of Moscow mayor, they had to agree with Muscovites who respected Luzhkov as a tough and effective manager.
Of course, in a situation of depleted central power and a lack of financial support for local legal authorities, separatism in the regions was bound to grow. But at the same time, the election of governors has positively influenced our political life. The legitimacy of elected heads has helped to strengthen the legitimacy of Russian executive power as a whole. Until 1996 that legitimacy had been weak because Yeltsin ruled the country from December 1991 to July 1996 without being reelected to the president's post.
Free direct elections of governors have helped to unite people in Russian regions and to strengthen a traditionally weak system of local self-government. A legitimate governor could resist radical forms of landslide privatization. Luzhkov could protect Moscow from Chubais' checkbook privatization, which was ineffective in the capital both politically and economically.
If Putin tries to abolish elections, it would be treated in Russian provinces as a blow to rights and freedoms. In Islamic republics like Tataria, Bashkiria or Kabardino-Balkaria that would mean an affront to the national dignity of minorities. Psychological factors are very important. Minor nations want to elect their leaders in the same way as elsewhere in the country.
Now we have everything necessary to restore a vertical power line in Russia without administrative revolutions or the use of force. Now when governors are rushing to show their fidelity to the new president, it is easy to make amendments to the Constitution that could limit governors' high-handedness. That would be a way to restore centralized power constitutionally, thereby helping to save the system of self-government and to strengthen democracy.
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From: "Matthew Taibbi" <matt_taibbi@hotmail.com> Subject: eXile press review Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2000 Dear David,
CHECHENZ WITH ATTITUDES ONLINE! Listen in to the most tasteless gangsta rap recording of all time through the miracle of the internet. Click on to the eXile website (www.exile.ru) to hear the hit single "Straight Outta Grozny", the first release of the eXile-produced jihad-rap band, "Chechenz With Attitudes." The studio-produced song, in both Russian and English, is up on our site in MP3 format. If you have no life, look on the site's front page and hear MC Shamil Basayev, Mc Khattab, and Easy Aslan Maskhadov kick it old school. You'll never listen to the sucker MCs at the New York Times again... WWW.EXILE.RU
Anyway, here's the press review....
Meet Dr. Obvious Press Review By Matt Taibbi the eXile
Question: What do you get when you cross the worldÆs easiest job with the worldÆs ugliest moustache?
Answer: Thomas Friedman, columnist for the New York Times.
Welcome to part 1 of ôHurrumphing Columnistsö, the eXileÆs newest and most ill-advised made-for-TV drama. Desperate for marketing ideas, we here at the eXile in this issue have decided to go old-school and bring back the mini-series. Remember The Winds of War? V? They were movies you wouldnÆt have watched in one part, but couldnÆt miss in three. This new feature will captivate you the same way, profiling in big bunches a group of newspaper columnists so boring and obnoxious that we probably couldnÆt pay you to read them without the sales gimmick.
Our first such subject, Friedman, is someone Russia watchers should know well. As the guardian of the TimesÆs prestigious Foreign Affairs column, his blundering, irritating columns show up in the Russia debate with more or less regular frequency, unwanted but inevitable, like tests of the Emergency Broadcast System. A native of Minnesota and a veteran of the TimesÆs Israel bureau, Friedman has no special expertise as far as Russia or most other countries are concerned. Nonetheless, like all columnists, he has more freedom to pontificate about Russia or about anything else than the Times reporters based in Moscow. This is a luxury Friedman shares with all full-time columnists; like his peers, heÆs given license to broadcast his opinions on the TimesÆs editorial page precisely because opinions, as opposed to actual knowledge, are his expertise.
Columnists can use this freedom in a variety of ways. Dave Barry works tirelessly to convince you of his wackiness. William F. Buckley tries to make reactionary snobbery an art form. What makes Friedman remarkable is that he has no schtick at allù- his whole style is centered around a thoroughly deadpan commitment to a literary legacy of naked, obvious opinion.
FriedmanÆs specialty is the urgent news flash filed ten years after the story broke under everyone elseÆs bylines. Consider, for instance, these insights from his column last week-ù the April 18 piece on Russia, ôBizCzarismö:
æAt every level, different ministries, department heads, agencies, governates and mayoralties have gone into partnership with private businesses, local oligarchs or criminal elements, creating a kind of 21st-century Russian feudalism -- I'd call it "BizCzarism." Last week one newspaper ran a graphic of deputy ministers at the Ministry of Energy, with lines tracing which oil company each of them works for -- in tandem with their government jobs.
æThe different K.G.B. clans, intelligence services and police forces have driven the mobsters out of business -- not by putting them in jail, but by taking over their protection rackets. Now your bank might pay the K.G.B. for what Russians call "roof," a k a protection, and the bank next door might pay the Interior Ministry for the same protection.Æ
This is classic Friedmanù- swooping in on a phenomenon every reporter in Russia wrote about years ago, slapping a grotesquely maladroit catchword on it (what kind of mind thinks up ôBizCzarismö and expects anyone to remember it?), and then quickly leaving town, apparently satisfied that heÆs placed his stamp for good on the matter.
The fun part about following Friedman, as he passes in and out of the world of Russian commentary, is that you never know where heÆll go from here. The job he has allows him to be an expert on anything at anytime, a situation which must make his world forever filled to the brim with narcissistic temptations. The internet may frighten me because I have no hands-on knowledge of the technology, but Friedman doesnÆt have that problem; who needs to worry about understanding something, when you can just cut straight to the chase and start writing about it right off the bat?
The result, inevitably, are pieces like his February 16 column ôLessons in Cybercivicsö. From the headline alone you can see where this is goingù- New York Times columnist goes from 0 to lesson-giving in no time flat. The sum of FriedmanÆs observations in this piece basically amount to such trenchant insights as the revelation that the internet is changing the world forever:
æWhen the walls between nations start to get blown away, and the world gets increasingly wired into networks, everyone becomes potentially super-empowered, including individuals and vandals. What makes an Amazon.com so potentially powerful and possibly lucrative? It's the fact that in a wired world a single bookstore can now reach into 180 different countries, and be reached into from 180 different countries. Amazon is a super-empowered library.Æ
Friedman may be obvious, but heÆs no genius, either. As uninteresting and unoriginal as he is, he still almost always manages to be a wrong-headed reactionary on any issue he writes about. You always know what stance Friedman is going to take on an issue, and usually you donÆt need to read past the headline to catch his drift. After the WTO riots, for instance, there were few sights less surprising than FriedmanÆs ôSenseless in Seattleö headline blasting the protesters. (He liked that one so much, he wrote it twice-- Senseless in Seattle II ran a few weeks later). Before the recent IMF protests, Friedman wrote not one but two columns blasting the protests (ôSaving the Lost Worldö and ôParsing the Protestsö). In the latter piece, he pulled out his trademark wit to suggest that the protesters be renamed "The Coalition to Keep the World's Poor People Poor." For good measure, he gave a lift to the D.C. police by saying the demonstrators should get "the back of your hand."
But through the miracle of the internet-ù Cybercivics, if you willù- U the eXile reader can now experience the Friedman phenomenon in three dimensions. ThatÆs because Friedman has a homepage for his new book, a dense piece of Friedmanesque Obvious Wisdom on the globalization phenomenon. The book has the kind of heavyhanded title that would make any Hurrumphing columnist proud: ôThe Lexus and the Olive Treeö. And the site that goes along with the book offers, hilariously, audio recordings of Friedman thinking out loud. If youÆre anywhere near a computer, get online right now and log on to www.lexusandtheolivetree.com. You should see in the middle of the page a real gem: FriedmanÆs ôgas stationö analogy. In it, Friedman says that the whole globalization phenomenon can be broken down into four basic models, which he says are like four types of gas stations. The first gas station is Japanese and has great service, four attendants in white suits who wash the windows, free air fresheners, etc., but the gas costs five dollars a gallon. Then, proceeds Friedman, thereÆs the American gas station, in which gas costs a dollar a gallon, but you pump it yourself. Then thereÆs the European gas station, where gas also costs five dollars a gallon, but now thereÆs only one worker who only works 36 hours a week and leaves the station closed for lunch (in the audio version one can hear at this point a single faint, halting laugh come from an elderly member of FriedmanÆs audience).
Then, lastly, Friedman cites the communist gas station, where gas costs fifty cents, but there isnÆt any. ThatÆs his laugh line, the last one. Communist gas-- there isn't any! This is followed by his point, which is that the whole world now desperately wants our American kind of gas station. And thatÆs it, thatÆs the point. If you didnÆt know any better, youÆd think youÆd missed something. But you didn't.
Welcome to the world of commentary!
Next week: another colunist!
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Gore Raps Bush on Foreign Policy 1 May 2000 By SANDRA SOBIERAJ
BOSTON (AP) - With a heightened focus on foreign policy, Vice President Al Gore is taking aim at what he sees as a vulnerability of George W. Bush, whose thinking on national security he charges is ``noticeably blank.''
In an address Sunday to the International Press Institute's congress of foreign journalists, Gore cast his Republican rival for the presidency as a puppet of ``right-wing'' ideologues such as Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., and dangerously fixated on the Cold War past.
After seven years of hands-on diplomacy at the White House, Gore believes he outshines Texas Gov. Bush in foreign policy expertise. He recently added elements of foreign policy, particularly Bush's opposition to a nuclear testing ban, to his campaign stump speech and will address international affairs again at the West Point military academy's commencement May 27. In his Boston speech, Gore dismissed Bush as ``noticeably blank'' on 21st century national security challenges such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the global environment and international family planning, for which Gore supports additional U.S. aid.
``One has to assume that these gaps in Governor Bush's foreign policy views and experience will be filled by the ideologies and inveterate antipathies of his party - the right-wing, partisan isolationism of the Republican congressional leadership,'' Gore said.
Condoleezza Rice, Bush's top foreign policy adviser, shot back that the speech lacked credibility, ``somewhat typical of the vice president.''
``He has this tendency to say that he's going to do one thing and in fact he's ... done another for seven years,'' Rice said, calling the Clinton-Gore record haphazard and incoherent.
Gore, who has pledged to make the rejected Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty the first measure he submits to the Senate if elected, attacked Helms' declaration last week that he will block any new arms control pacts until a new president is inaugurated.
The administration is negotiating a START III weapons pact with Russia and hopes to adjust the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow for a limited U.S. missile defense system to protect against attacks from rogue nations.
``If Governor Bush were to inherit from us an arms control agreement so clearly in the best interests of the American people, is Senator Helms the last word?'' Gore asked.
He criticized Bush for promising to heighten the threshold for American intervention in overseas crises and get involved only where there is a direct U.S. interest.
``Governor Bush dangerously fixates on the Cold War past when speaking of the use of force. He suggests that he would not intervene to relieve even the brutal repression of ethnic cleansing and genocide,'' Gore said. ``We must reject the new isolationism that says, don't help anywhere because we cannot help everywhere.''
Rice countered, ``If what the vice president is saying is that the post-Cold War mission of American armed forces is to just intervene in other people's civil wars because we might be able to help, I think that's a headline.''
Gore defended his work with the Russians, which Bush has criticized as solicitous and negligent of increased corruption in Moscow, and said Bush wrongly viewed Russia and China as America's enemies instead of as ``vital partners.''
Rice said Gore had mischaracterized Bush's views. ``The governor has not said that Russia and China should be enemies; in fact, he has said that China is a competitor and we should reach out to Russia,'' she said. ``It is very much like the vice president to distort (Bush's) record.''
Gore lashed out at supporters of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, legislation backed by Bush to establish closer military ties with Taiwan. He said they were ``blind to its consequences: A sharp deterioration in the security of the region.''
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