April 21, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4260 • 4261

Johnson's Russia List
#4261
21 April 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Interfax: MOST RUSSIANS VIEW WEST'S CRITICISM OF EVENTS IN CHECHNYA AS INTERFERENCE IN RUSSIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
2. Interfax: Poll: Stalin takes first place among outstanding statesmen.
3. Reuters: Chechnya war cost Russia $200 mln so far this year.
4. Business Week: Crunch Time in Russia.
5. Bloomberg: Putin to Meet Foreign Economists to Discuss Reform, Paper Says.
6. Peter Juviler: Re: 4259-Arena/Putin and Legal Reform.
7. Jonathan Mueller: RE: 4259- eXile/Press Review.
8. AP: Russia Resists Boosting Cops' Powers.
9. Christian Science Monitor: Justin Brown, Russia's goodwill pacts come with a bite. Its recent actions to ratify two antinuclear measures back the US into a corner on its national missile-defense 
plan.
10. Moscow Times: Igor Semenenko, President: Economy To Go On Booming.
11. Interfax: RUSSIA GOVT CALLS FOR MORE OPTIMISM IN ECONOMY.
12. gazeta.ru: Centre Shifts To The Right.
13. Michael J. Carley: DIPLO-HIST: A new listserv in Diplomatic, 
Political, and Economic history.
14. Ira Straus: small is ugly (cont'd) - Re JRL 4259.
15. Moscow Times: Robert Coalson, Study Plants Seeds of Hope.
(re media)
16. Boston Globe: Stephen Kurkjian, Russian with alleged mob ties gets visa. (Josef Kobzon at Harvard)
17. Oleg Bogomolov: TROUBLED US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.]

********

#1
MOST RUSSIANS VIEW WEST'S RITICISM OF EVENTS IN CHECHNYA AS
INTERFERENCE IN RUSSIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

MOSCOW. April 20 (Interfax) - Over two thirds of Russians, or 69%,
view western criticism of federal troop activity in Chechnya as
absolutely unreasonable interference in Russia's internal affairs.
This data came from a representative poll of 1,600 respondents
conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Surveys (VTsIOM)
on April 14-17 in 83 populated areas of 31 of Russia's regions. The
statistical margin of error of the poll may come to 3.8%. Interfax
obtained the information on Thursday.
According to the poll, only 14% of the respondents think that
western countries have the right to take such actions as those of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and 17% were undecided.
As many as 33% of Russians are convinced that Russia must be
persistent in explaining to the European parliamentarians its position
on the Chechen conflict, 29% take the view that it is more important to
resolutely reject all provocative attacks against Russia on this issue
and 12% believe that Russia must halt the cooperation with the
organizations attacking its policy and not let the representatives of
PACE and other similar organizations into the North Caucasus.
Another 7% think that Russia should take the criticism into account
and move from military actions to political settlement in Chechnya,
while 19% were undecided.

*******

#2
Poll: Stalin takes first place among outstanding statesmen 

MOSCOW. April 20 (Interfax) - As many as 11% of the Russians polled
by the independent Agency of Regional Political Research believe that
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was the most outstanding Russian statesman
of the 20th century.
The poll was taken in over 90 urban and rural areas of 49 Russian
regions in every economic geographical zone on April 14-16. Its findings
were made available to Interfax on Thursday.
Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, was named by 10%,
today's head of state Vladimir Putin by 6% and Leonid Brezhnev, a Soviet
era leader, by 5%. Pyotr Syolypin, a Russian prime minister early in the
century, did slightly better than Yevgeny Primakov, a recent prime
minister, 4% and 3%, respectively. Fourteen percent named others while
47% were undecided.
The rating of Putin, Brezhnev, Stolypin and Primakov has somewhat
increased and that of Stalin, Lenin and former Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev somewhat decreased since the December poll.

*******

#3
Chechnya war cost Russia $200 mln so far this year

MOSCOW, April 20 (Reuters) - Fighting rebels in the breakaway province of 
Chechnya cost the cash-strapped Russian government 7.5 billion roubles ($262 
million) in the first three months of the year, a senior minister said on 
Thursday. 

Russia's state coffers have been boosted by buoyant oil prices but the 
country faces tightening its belt in the second half of the year as crude 
prices have been dropping. 

``On the day-to-day cost I cannot say...but over the month around 2.5 billion 
roubles is being spent,'' First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov told 
Russia's ORT public television. 

``This is just over the first three months of this year, last year it was 
less,'' he added. 

Russia has been battling the rebels for more than six months and has gained 
control over most of the region. 

But rebel resistance has not been totally stamped and the guerrillas have 
launched several raids which took a heavy toll on Russian forces. 

Russia has also said it would need around seven billion roubles this year to 
rebuild in Chechnya, where the capital city Grozny and many villages have 
been flattened during the fighting. 

($1-28.61 Rouble) 

*******

#4
Business Week
April 24, 2000
[for personal use only}
Crunch Time in Russia

Newly elected President Vladimir V. Putin is moving closer to deciding how to 
tackle Russia's deep-rooted economic problems. A team of 10 liberal 
economists has presented him with two different plans for rolling back 
government interference in the economy and eliminating barter, which accounts 
for up to 50% of all business-to-business transactions in the country.
The most radical approach envisions slashing state social spending by 50% 
within 10 years or less. That could involve privatizing everything from the 
pension system to medical care, which is mostly free in Russia. A second, 
more moderate plan involves slashing social spending by 25%, says a source 
close to the economic team.
Both plans call for major steps to deregulate the economy: a proposed flat 
income-tax rate of 12%, the reduction and elimination of numerous customs 
duties, sweeping bankruptcies of unprofitable enterprises, and a major reform 
of the bureaucracy to reduce corruption.
Putin is expected to decide on his economic program by May 15--a week 
after his inauguration. ``His opinions on the economy are quite liberal,'' 
says German O. Gref, head of the planning team. ``He has a very good sense of 
what can be implemented.'' Leading businesspeople hope Putin opts for fast 
and deep reform. But the big questions are whether he can get backing from 
the parliament--and whether he feels a radical approach could spark social 
tensions. Although many Russians agree that the economy needs to be shaken 
up, they may not be ready to accept the pain.

EDITED BY SHERI PRASSO 

*******

#5
Putin to Meet Foreign Economists to Discuss Reform, Paper Says

Moscow, April 20 (Bloomberg)
-- Russia's President-Elect Vladimir Putin may meet with a group of five 
foreign economists tomorrow, invited by the government, to hear their views 
on economic reform, Russian daily Vedomosti reported, citing sources in the 
Kremlin. The group includes Arnold Harberger, University of California 
professor, James Gwartney, economics professor at Florida State University 
and the chief economist for Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, 
Richard Vedder, economics professor from Ohio University, Carlos Bologna, 
former finance minister of Peru, and U.S. economist James Carter. The 
economists are also expected to meet German Gref, director of a government's 
center developing Putin's economic program to be published in May; their 
visit is financed by the United State's Agency for International Development, 
the paper said. 

Gref said last month, a 300-page program in the works, he aims to bring 
economic growth of 5 percent to 10 percent per year. 

********

#6
Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2000 
From: Peter Juviler <pjuviler@barnard.edu> 
Subject: Re: 4259-Arena/Putin and Legal Reform

Nicholas Arena makes an important point in his letter, "Putin is well
placed to undertake legal reform." Long himself an ardent partisan of
such reforms as the jury system for Russia, Mr. Arena correctly I think
points back to the pre-communist legacy of major legal reform and a bar
association--destroyed by the communists, incidentally. Amnesia conferring
those reforms in Russia is both surprising (given Russian's supposed
turn to pride in their past) and disappointing (given the importance of
the issue). NIcholas Arena's letter fully accords with the idea that
reforms will succeed in Russia only when coming out of the Russian
traditions. Though originally a Europan import, the reforms of 1984 and
1917 (under the provisional government), had growing Russian roots and
should be given high priority for study in classrooms and chanceries
of Russia--and other former parts of the Russian and Soviet empires.
Peter Juviler, Barnard College, Columbia University. 

*******

#7
Date: Thu, 20 Ap 2000 
From: "(RIA) Mueller, Jonathan D" <j.mueller@state.gov> 
Subject: RE: 4259- eXile/Press Review

David, I usually get at least a laugh from Taibi's press reviews, but this
time (JRL 4259) he perhaps misses the point. I say perhaps because I have
not read the NYT article he trashes, only the Patrick Cockburn/Independent
story on IKEA. When I read the latter, though, it was clear to me that the
whole point of this affair is that IKEA chose not to pay off Luzhkov via a
lease on a piece of property, and, although Luzhkov is fighting back, so
far/so far IKEA appears to be winning. At a time when western governments
and the IFIs are searching the tea-leaves for signs of Putin's 'reform'
credentials, IKEA has actually taken a potentially serious whack at one of
the greediest circles of corruption in Russia -- and the thanks they get is
Taibi's factually-correct but gratuitious comment about a rich company
trying to get richer. I don't know anything about IKEA's business practices
or how far they were willing to go to make a deal with the mayor, but the
fact is that they did not.

********

#8
Russia Resists Boosting Cops' Powers
April 20, 2000

MOSCOW (AP) - A proposed code expanding the authority of the traffic police 
met stiff resistance in parliament Thursday, with deputies across the 
political spectrum saying it boosts police powers and trims some civil 
liberties won after the Soviet Union's collapse. 

``If we pass this, we lay the foundation stone of a totalitarian state,'' 
said Andrei Isaev, a deputy in the State Duma, the lower house of parliament. 

A proposal expanding the authority of traffic police met particular criticism 
from lawmakers, who said that this branch of law enforcement is already 
notorious for abusing its powers and bribe-taking. 

Communist legislator Anatoly Lukyanov said the traffic police proposal had 
been advanced by members of several parties, yet faction leaders of all 
parties spoke against the measure that would stiffen punishments for some 
moving violations to include jail stays. 

Oleg Morozov, head of the Russia's Region's group, called the proposal ``a 
tilt toward a police regime,'' the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. 

Deputy Viktor Pokhmelkin, a leader of the liberal Union of Right Forces 
party, said the provisions would give police more chances to demand bribes 
from motorists eager to avoid arrest. 

``This will only lead to a worsening of corruption,'' he said. 

The new administrative code has thousands of provisions covering everyday 
life, such as parking and licensing of street trade. It specifies which 
officials can hand out punishment for which offenses. 

But fines or imprisonment often apply only to those who cannot bribe their 
way out of trouble. 

A 1998 U.S. State Department human rights report said Russian police 
sometimes keep people in jail for administrative offenses beyond the legal 
period in order to extort bribes. 

The current administrative code dates from 1985, and a revision has been in 
the works for four years, resulting in a four-volume proposal that has 
received more than 3,000 amendments. Deputies gave preliminary approval to 
some sections Thursday but the contentious parts will face more debate in 
coming weeks. 

*******

#9
Christian Science Monitor
April 21, 2000
Russia's goodwill pacts come with a bite
Its recent actions to ratify two antinuclear measures back the US into a 
corner on its national missile-defense plan.
By Justin Brown 
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
WASHINGTON 

On the surface, Russia's recent arms-control initiatives seem to be gestures 
of goodwill from the country's president-elect, Vladimir Putin.

By ratifying START II, and in all likelihood approving the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty today, Moscow has done more on paper in days than it previously 
did in years.

But, as more of the implications become clear, analysts here say the recent 
moves could back the US into an uncomfortable corner where no side can win.

"This is an offensive diplomatic move," says Joseph Cirincione, an 
arms-control expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 
Washington. "It puts the nuclear ball back in the US court."

Last week, the Russian Duma, or lower house, overcame seven years of 
squabbling and voted in favor of START II, which would require the US and 
Russia to lower their number of nuclear weapons from 6,000 to 3,500 by 2007. 
Today, the Duma is set to vote on the test ban treaty, the same measure the 
US Senate rejected last year.

Immediately, the measures will put the pressure on the US. Talks next week in 
New York will review the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the long 
term, the moves are likely to put the US into a bind. All the major 
arms-control treaties will be tied together, yet President Clinton, facing a 
hostile Senate, may be unable to act.

Moreover, analysts say, it appears unlikely the US will be able to amend a 
third agreement, the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The US needs to 
change it to build a national missile-defense system.

"This puts a lot of pressure on Clinton not to take any new actions on arms 
control," says Mr. Cirincione.

Senate's stumbling blocks

The problems stem from protocols that the Russians attached to START II. They 
make the accord difficult for the US Senate to approve. Essentially, the 
Russians say they will not stick to START II unless the US sticks to the ABM 
treaty. And the protocols, which were approved by Mr. Clinton and Boris 
Yeltsin in 1997, make the ABM treaty multilateral, drawing in the Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakstan, along with Russia.

"The idea that the Senate would vote on [all of these protocols] is a 
nonstarter," says Baker Spring, a researcher at the Heritage Foundation in 
Washington.

If Clinton cannot get the Senate to approve START II, as was the case with 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it will make it hard for him to go ahead 
with the controversial national missile-defense plan, say experts.

National missile-defense, a system in which interceptors try to shoot down 
incoming antiballistic missiles, would provide a shield from attack by rogue 
nations, US officials say.

But the Russians, along with the Chinese, oppose the plan because they say it 
would limit the ability of their missile arsenals to act as a deterrent 
against the US. The Europeans oppose the plan, because they say it would 
trigger a new weapons buildup.

Furthermore, national missile-defense technology is still in the development 
stages. It will be tested one more time before Clinton can decide whether to 
deploy it.

For Clinton, much will ride on a June summit he has planned with Mr. Putin. 
It is expected that he will discuss, among other topics, the ABM treaty and 
further nuclear-weapons reductions.

Missile defense: At what price?

For arms-control advocates, the concern is that Putin and Clinton will be 
facing an all-or-nothing scenario, in which the two countries will either 
work together, or suspend crucial arms-control measures.

"This is a very critical point in international security and US nuclear 
policy," says Spurgeon Keeny, the president of the Arms Control Association 
in Washington.

An increasingly likely scenario is that Clinton will have to postpone a 
decision on national missile-defense and leave it up to the next 
administration, analysts say.

Republicans, including Texas Gov. George W. Bush, tend to favor a faster 
deployment, even if it is at the expense of arms-control agreements.

Vice President Al Gore, on the other hand, has taken a wait-and-see approach, 
much like Clinton. "This is an unintended mess," says Daniel Goure of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies here.

*******

#10
Moscow Times
21 April 2000
President: Economy To Go On Booming
By Igor Semenenko 
Staff Writer 

The economy is booming, growing 6 percent in March and 8 percent for the 
first quarter of 2000, President-elect Vladimir Putin said Thursday as he 
opened a government meeting.

Independent economists were skeptical about the figures backing Putin's 
statements, which they said significantly overstated the country's admittedly 
impressive recent economic performance.

"This growth is not simply good and sustainable, this is huge growth," Putin 
told a government meeting discussing the country's 2001-2003 economic program.

"This gives grounds to some specialists to suppose that our economy can be 
classified as booming," Putin said. 

He said that this increased wealth must flow on to improve the lot of 
Russia's many impoverished citizens.

"We will have to index salaries and pensions not below, but above that [GDP 
growth] level," Putin said. 

Putin also said that 2001 consumer inflation would be at 10 percent per annum 
next year.

In other positive news, the ruble rose, as did the stock market, 
hard-currency reserves stood at their highest level for almost two years and 
officials forecast that interest rates would continue to slide. 

Some economists felt the government was overplaying its hand.

"Our estimates show that gross domestic product growth in the first quarter 
stood at close to 4 percent," said Natalya Orlova, economist with Alfa Bank. 
"Six percent is the maximum figure that could sound more or less realistic."

The way in which the GDP deflator - the figure used to adjust for 
inflationary effects - is calculated can distort GDP growth figures, 
depending on how much weight is given to consumer price changes and producer 
price changes, she said. 

"We forecast GDP growth of 2.5 [percent] to 3 percent for this year, but even 
small adjustments to the way the deflator is calculated may help the 
government to report growth of 4.5 percent," she said.

In 1999, the Producer Price Index surged 67.3 percent, while the Consumer 
Price Index was up 36.5 percent. If the slower growing CPI is given more 
weighting, that raises the rate of "real" GDP growth - the figure adjusted 
for inflation.

However, there is no doubt that Russia is experiencing a rare surge in 
economic performance. The 75 percent devaluation of the ruble against the 
dollar in 1998 provided a major boost to domestic industry, lifting it 
decisively out of the slump in output that began soon after the Soviet 
Union's collapse. 

With high world prices since March 1999 for crude oil - Russia's most 
important export - also stimulating the economy, GDP grew 3.2 percent last 
year, according to official figures. 

In further evidence of the government's increasing confidence on the economy, 
Economics Minister Andrei Shapovalyants said at the same government meeting 
on Thursday that the ruble should strengthen in real terms over the next few 
years, but not so much as to harm domestic producers. 

The government had focused on a ruble policy to allow domestic producers to 
crowd out exports and sell exports competitively, he said. The official ruble 
rate firmed Thursday to 28.59 per dollar, up from Wednesday's 28.62.

Shapovalyants said that 15 years of strong, stable economic growth were 
possible, provided the government pursued his department's detailed plans to 
create the foundations for growth. Those plans include:

oeliminating the subsidization of private housing by 2008 or earlier;

ogetting the Tax Code through parliament as early as possible so as to 
alleviate the tax burden on industry;

odepreciating the ruble with a 15 percent to 20 percent lag to inflation, 
leading to a rise in real exchange rates and growth in real household incomes 
by 23 percent through 2003, leading to growth in demand;

orestructuring the energy sector to prevent gas extraction from falling below 
600 to 610 billion cubic meters and to raise crude output to 350 million 
metric tons from 308 million metric tons.

"We hope to achieve growth of 4.5 percent every year through to 2003," 
Shapovalyants said.

And the Economics Ministry's optimism does not stop at 2003. For the years 
2004 to 2007, the ministry is predicting the economy will hum along at 6 
percent per year growth, twice the average global rate of growth.

For the next eight years through to 2015, the government will seek to 
engineer a soft landing to reach a situation of general equilibrium in the 
economy, opening way to a period of long-term stable growth.

In the year 2001 GDP is expected to grow 4 percent to 4.5 percent, industrial 
output will expand 5 percent, investments will increase 6 percent and 
households income will go up 5 percent.

Analysts were more cautious than the government.

"Nobody - neither the government itself nor independent economists - know how 
realistic these plans are," said Boris Sinegubko, associate director with 
Moscow investment bank Brunswick Warburg.

The government had taken the right tack in building positive expectations and 
advertising Russia at a time of high uncertainty in most global markets, he 
added.

Shapovalyants was also optimistic that the Central Bank's mostly symbolic 
refinancing rate, its highest profile interest rate, could fall to 20 percent 
by the end of the year from its current 33 percent. The refinancing rate is 
closely watched by the domestic bond markets and President-elect Putin has 
said it should be lowered, nudging commercial banks to make loans more 
affordable to industry. 

However, the rate's chief influence is an indicator of sentiment at the 
Central Bank, which works closely with the government, rather than a rate at 
which many funds are lent. The rate was cut twice in March, to 38 percent 
from 45 percent as of March 7, and to 33 percent as of March 21. 
Shapovalyants said government documents approved at the meeting forecast the 
rate would fall to between 10 percent to 13 percent by 2003. 

Meanwhile, the Central Bank announced Thursday that the country's foreign 
exchange and gold reserves had increased $200 million in the week to April 
14, reaching $16.5 billion, their highest level since before the 1998 
financial crash. 

The flood of good news and official optimism helped local stocks continue 
their recent rally. After U.S. markets plunged late last week, Russian stocks 
opened this week down more than 7 percent. On Thursday, the Moscow Times 
Index of 50 leading shares rose 2.98 percent to 156.05 on moderate volumes of 
$14.59 million. The MT Index is now up 2.15 percent for the week.

******

#11
RUSSIA GOVT CALLS FOR MORE OPTIMISM IN ECONOMY
By Interfax observer Pyotr Antonov

MOSCOW. April 20 (Interfax) - The government made public an
official prognosis on Thursday, which forecasts 4-4.5% growth in GDP and
10% inflation rise in 2001.
Government officials said that that was an optimistic prediction.
However, they did not give any details of a pessimistic course of
events.
A report by Economy Minister Andrei Shapovalyants, placed on the
government's website, said: "According to the second version of the
prognosis, when the influence of unfavorable factors and the
accomplishment of existing threats are possible, higher inflation
figures and lower GDP growth may happen."
However, President-elect Vladimir Putin told a government session
that "we have better figures now than ones forecasted for 2001."
GDP rose by 8% in the first three months of the year, Putin said,
adding "it is not just steady growth, it is huge growth."
"This makes some experts believe that the Russian economy can be
referred to as energetic," according to him.
In the wake of the government statements, Russian shares, whose
reaction to economic news is usually flabby, rose by 2-4%.
Russia's industry has been doubtlessly developing according to the
optimistic scenario since the beginning of the year. However, everyone
admits that it has not recovered so far.
The doping that it has received since the ruble devaluated is still
in force. But any growth resulting from it will have been impossible by
2001 if the economy fails to receive more investments, government
experts said.
The economy needs to meet important conditions to make a steady
step into the future. These include an inflow of investments, growth of
domestic effective demand, structural reform, improved economic
legislation and a better tax system.
It so happens that the economy is now at a crossroads, at a time
when the government is making plans for next year.
Government experts are reported to have split into optimists and
pessimists while making their informal economic forecasts for 2000 and
2001. Outsider experts issue different estimates, too.
"The acceleration of economic development is drawing to an end,"
the director of the Globalization Institute, Mikhail Delyagin, told
Interfax.
"If we squander this time as uselessly as we did 1999, then we are
in for big problems," Delyagin said.
The fact that Russia's economy has become "energetic" now gives the
government a chance to focus on middle-term problems instead of short-
term ones.
"To make Russia reach positions in the world economy, equaling its
potential, it should achieve economic development figures which at least
double the average world ones," he said.
Against this background, even the optimistic scenario for next
year, which the government seems to regard as the only possible one,
does not look like optimistic enough.
According to a forecast made by the International Monetary Fund,
the global economy will grow by 4.25% next year.
The pessimistic prognosis, worked out in the Economy Ministry,
provides for 3% growth in GDP.

******

#12
gazeta.ru
April 20, 2000
Centre Shifts To The Right
By Elena Shishkunova

The Union of Right Forces and Yabloko have not yet managed to come up with a 
single candidate for the St. Petersburg governor’s elections. The only thing 
they agreed upon after their Wednesday meeting – there will definitely be a 
single candidate. Factions also announced that they are creating the United 
Coordination Council of Legislation. 

On Wednesday during a meeting of the political councils of both 
movements – Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko – a long-awaited decision 
to name a single democratic candidate for the St. Petersburg elections was 
expected to be made. But it never happened. After the meeting Sergei 
Kiriyenko announced that the candidate would definitely be named in the next 
couple of days. So it can be supposed that talks on who in particular is 
going to head the new block are meeting with great difficulties. 

After Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matvienko on Vladimir Putin’s 
request suddenly refused to run for the governor’s post, the Right Forces, 
which earlier expressed their support for her, found themselves at a loss 
what to do. Thinking it necessary to have their own candidate, the SPS 
started frantically searching for an appropriate figure. Only several days 
before the end of the registration, Kiriyenko’s movement decided to back Yuli 
Rybakov, chairman of the Democratic Russia movement. It is clear that 
Rybakov’s chances are not high. So there was only one way out for the SPS – 
to unite its forces with some other movement that opposes Vladimir Yakovlev. 
Yabloko, who elected its top St. Petersburg representative Igor Artemiyev as 
candidate, became the obvious solution. Such is the basis of the new 
anti-Yakovlev coalition. The Wednesday meeting was supposed to resolve the 
question of whether Rybakov or Artemiyev will represent it. But it turned out 
to be a difficult choice, the argument on who might become the leader drags 
on, thus threatening the very existence of the coalition itself. 

Meanwhile SPS and Yabloko have made another emphatic move to 
demonstrate their unity – their leaders signed a resolution creating the 
United Coordination Council that is expected to deal with legislation issues. 
Victor Pokhmelkin (SPS) and Sergei Ivanenko (Yabloko) are elected as its 
co-chairmen. SPS leader Sergei Kiriyenko asserted that for both factions the 
decisions of the new body are obligatory, not just a recommendation. The 
first joined step is to boycott the Code on Administrative Infringement, 
which the council also discussed on Wednesday. The only puzzling thing is 
that Yabloko representatives did not confirm the statement that the new 
Council’s decisions are obligatory for their faction. So one can only test 
the efficiency of the new Duma coalition (the Council’s decision are 
obligatory only for SPS and Yabloko) by looking at whether they will vote 
similarly on principle issues. 

******

#13
Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2000 
From: "Michael J. Carley" <mjcarley@uakron.edu> 
Subject: [for JRL] DIPLO-HIST: A new listserv in Diplomatic, Political,
and Economic history

Dear friends and colleagues, We are pleased to announce the creation of 
DIPLO-HIST, a new discussion listserv in diplomatic, political, and 
economic history and current affairs. We would welcome subscriptions and 
contributions from historians and political scientists, or other interested 
and informed persons. Please feel free to pass along this message to 
friends and colleagues who might like to join our list.

If you are interested in subscribing, please contact either one of us, or 
send the following message to listserv@lists.uakron.edu: subscribe 
DIPLO-HIST Firstname Lastname.

Sincerely,
Michael J. Carley
mjcarley@uakron.edu
http://gozips.uakron.edu/~mcarley/

Robert Buzzanco
buzz@uh.edu
http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/buzzanco.htm 

******

#14
From: IRASTRAUS@aol.com (Ira Straus)
Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2000
Subject: small is ugly (cont'd) - Re JRL 4259

Vladimir Kovalyev wrote a clear, competent article in the St. Petersburg 
Times, 18 April 2000, about how "President-elect Vladimir Putin has teamed up 
with the Constitutional Court in an effort to limit the power of regional 
administrations over local legal systems." The article shows how regional 
governors tended to use the power of the purse to free themselves from the 
rule of law, and how Putin is finally beginning to implement the 
constitutional provision that the financing of courts is supposed to come 
from the Federal government.

The title that the St. Petersburg Times gave to this article? 
"Kremlin Tightens Grip on Courts". 

This headline makes it sound like the article is about another step toward a 
centralized lawless Putin dictatorship.

Actually there is nothing at all in the article about central control of the 
courts. There are serious abuses of the courts discussed in the article, but 
they are regional abuses. 

It looks like the Western editors of the St. Petersburg Times superimposed a 
misleading headline onto the article. The headline puts a negative spin on 
what is a step, albeit a small one, toward a normal Federal rule of law, and 
serves to confound this with gross centralization, arbitrariness and 
dictatorship. 

This is unfortunate not only from a journalistic standpoint. The Times 
represents the Western expatriate community in St. Petersburg. 

The Western community in Russia has an interest in making clear distinctions 
between federalism and gross decentralization or disintegration; between rule 
of law and dictatorship; between strong authority and arbitrary 
authoritarianism. Yet the habit of too many Western writers in Russia, 
including evidently the headline writer for said article, has been to 
confound these things. 

This can only reinforce the traditional failure of Russians to make the same 
distinctions. It can only encourage Russians to believe that they cannot have 
an effective law or a coherent country without arbitrary centralization or 
authoritarianism, but must swallow all these things at the same time.

*******

#15
Moscow Times
21 April 2000
Study Plants Seeds of Hope
By Robert Coalson 

There are precious few opportunities to write something hopeful in a column 
about the media in Russia. That is why I was excited this week when a 
colleague handed me a packet of quotations from regional officials responding 
to a recent study of the condition of freedom of speech across the country.

Some readers may recall that last November I wrote about a study called 
"Public Expertise," which was conducted by the Russian Union of Journalists, 
the Glasnost Defense Foundation, the noncommercial organization Internews and 
other. That study examined media-related legislation and access to 
information in 81 of Russia's subject territories and, not surprisingly, 
reached the overall conclusion that "there is no freedom of speech in 
Russia." In a nutshell, the study found that local legislation regularly 
contradicts national media laws and government officials routinely refuse to 
provide public information that they are legally obligated to disclose.

After the study came out, it was widely distributed to officials throughout 
the country in hopes that the damning picture it contained might stimulate 
momentum for change. One would expect that the easiest thing for these 
officials to do, as they did with the requests for information in the 
original study, would be to just ignore the report. Surprisingly, though, 
many seem to have actually read it and a few even declared that they agreed 
that the study had uncovered real problems in their regions.

The official representative of the Russian president in the Yaroslavl region, 
G. Bykov, wrote: "Your letter has been considered and I can report that the 
draft regional law 'On the Presentation of Information on Income and Property 
by Municipal and Regional Officials' is being reconsidered by the regional 
legislature during the first quarter of 2000. We agree with you that certain 
provisions of the 'Procedures for Accrediting Journalists to Cover the 
Administration of the Rybinsk Municipal District' are in contradiction with 
federal legislation."

Likewise, officials in St. Petersburg, Tyumen, Kemerovo and other regions 
asserted that they would use the study in drafting changes to existing local 
legislation. The governor of Sakhalin claimed that his administration has 
created a new procedure that "enables officials to promptly respond to 
requests for information from the mass media and has made improvements in the 
procedure for accrediting journalists."

However, many of the comments — even those that ostensibly seem to support 
the need for reform — reveal how difficult the struggle for such reform will 
be. Many officials cling doggedly to Soviet notions of media-power relations. 
Their immediate response to the ignored requests for information in their 
regions was to "punish" those responsible. The response of the prosecutor of 
Krasnoyarsk typifies this mentality and the final sentence is particularly 
alarming in the Russian context:

"We have confirmed your report that the request of the local television 
station Afontovo for statistical information regarding emergency situations 
was not fulfilled. According to the deputy director of the emergency 
situations department an administrative investigation has been carried out 
and the guilty have been punished. An apology has been issued to the 
station's director, A. L. Karpov. An agreement has been reached with the 
television company concerning propagandizing the work of the Krasnoyarsk 
Emergency Rescue Service."

Further, some of the officials have responded with increased subsidies for 
the press that merely increase the local media's dependence on the state. The 
governor of Sakhalin, who is generally regarded as one of the most 
progressive regional leaders in Russia, wrote that his legislature would soon 
pass a new media-subsidies law that would give local (state-controlled) 
newspapers discounts for "renting state property, renting land, paying for 
utilities and the like." It is worrisome that even democratically minded 
officials are so far from understanding what the media really need.

The recent upsurge of repressive measures against the regional press makes it 
hard to take too much encouragement from the responses to Public Expertise. 
In many cases, no doubt, the support expressed will turn out to be mere lip 
service. However, Russia is still a country where official lip service in 
support of the media is actually a step forward. Public Expertise has already 
achieved more results than I expected. Perhaps there is reason to hope for 
more.

Robert Coalson is a program director for the National Press Institute. The 
views expressed here are not necessarily those of NPI.

******

#16
Boston Globe
20 April 2000
[for personal use only]
Russian with alleged mob ties gets visa 
By Stephen Kurkjian, Globe Staff
(S_Kurkjian@Globe.Com)

A member of the Russian Parliament who had been repeatedly denied visas to 
enter the United States because of alleged ties to organized crime was 
granted approval by the State Department last week to attend a program at 
Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Josef Kobzon is one of 24 Parliament members who arrived in Cambridge to 
attend a two-week program run by the Kennedy School to instruct them on 
American government and politics.

Kobzon could not be reached for comment but, according to the faculty 
director of the program, Kobzon intends to drop out of the program today and 
return to Moscow. Kobzon gave no reason for leaving early, said David C. 
King, a professor at the Kennedy School and the program's faculty director.

King said he was unaware of Kobzon's background until questioned by the Globe 
about Kobzon's participation in the program. King said Harvard played no role 
in seeking the visas for Kobzon and other Parliament members, and that the 
request had been made by the Russian government to the US Embassy in Moscow.

A State Department official, who asked not to be identified, said late 
yesterday that as a member of the Duma, or lower house of Parliament, Kobzon 
would have been afforded special consideration for a visa this time since he 
was requesting it as an official member of the Russian government and it was 
to allow him to participate in a formal educational program.

A popular singer by profession and known as the Frank Sinatra of Russia, 
Kobzon is a close political ally of Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov. A ''60 
Minutes'' program on Luzhkov in October 1998 reported that the CIA identified 
Kobzon as the czar of the Russian mafia and said that members of the Yeltsin 
government had urged Luzhkov to distance himself from Kobzon.

The report also said the State Department had denied a visa for at least the 
prior three years on grounds he might engage in criminal activity in the 
United States. US law enforcement sources called Kobzon an ''intermediary'' 
for organized crime groups in Russia, according to ''60 Minutes.''

Kobzon denied any such links to organized crime.

While King called Kobzon an ''exemplary'' participant in the Kennedy School 
program, Marshall Goldman of Harvard's Davis Center for Russian Studies said 
it was ''embarrassing'' to have Kobzon involved.

'' It is well-known in Russia that he has been denied visas because of his 
background,'' Goldman said. ''He shouldn't be here just because he is a Duma 
member.''

*******

#17
Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2000 
From: "stanislav menshikov" <menschivok@globalxs.nl> 
Subject: OLEG BOGOMOLOV ON US-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Dear David,

Academician Oleg Bogomolov, a leading Russian economist, former Duma
deputy, adviser to the Russian president
and currently member of ECAAR-Russia Board of Directors recentlly adressed
a sminar in Boston on US-Russia 
relations sponsored by the Gorbachev Foundation of North America. I find
his comments provocative, but balanced 
and worth posting on the JRL 

The full text is available on http://www.ecaar-russia.org. An abridged
version follows.

Stanislav Menshikov,
Co-Chair, Ecaar-Russia

http://www.fast.ane.ru/smenshikov 
http://www.ecaar-russia.org


Oleg Bogomolov
TROUBLED US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

The deterioration of US-Russian relations is a very worrying fact It is
true that this relationship has become asymmetric and now plays a less 
important role in U.S. policy than in Russian policy. Nevertheless the
improvement of U.S.-Russian relations is in our mutual interest. What is
more, the whole system of international relations could benefit from
getting these relations right.

What are, in my view, the real causes of the deepening tensions between
both countries? Who is primarily to blame? Both sides are responsible, but
the U.S. as a dominant economic, military and political power in the
contemporary world possessing immense international influence could do
much more than Russia to prevent possible harm to our relations. American
analysts admit that the capacity of the U.S. to influence developments in
Russia was great enough to do both harm and good although it wasn't
decisive. 

The preponderance of one power in the world and the attempts to establish a
unipolar world in contradiction to the natural multipolar architecture of
the international order conceal a potential threat to Russia's national
interests and security, as well as to the interests and security of many
other countries. The concept of unipolarity accords the U.S. the role of
supreme judge and peacekeeper in international affairs and justifies its
unilateral actions rather than multilateral procedures that recognize
multiple powers in the international system. Globalization gives the U.S.
an opportunity to spread its values and build an international system in
its own image. 

This unipolar vision of the international order is unacceptable to Russia, 
China and many others. The president of France, Jacques Chirac states: «To
organize better the international system in the XXI century means first of
all to progress towards a multipolar world… We shall not avoid serious
risks unless an balanced dialog between regional poles is established».

The emerging international security architecture based on the
preponderance of only one power is at the core of Russia's preoccupation 
with its security. If the American experts' conclusion ( see U.S. Working
group's report presented to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) is
correct, that «The U.S. tends to see Russia in strategic perspective as the
only country that can threaten its survival as a nation», then a question
arises. Now the American Administration should react on such a threat. The
most logical answer would be to deploy the national missile defense and to
do its best to keep Russia military and economically down. No wonder Russia
becomes especially suspicious about American intentions and goodwill. 
Recently US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made an effort to tone
down the undesirable reaction to the U.S.' pretensions to hegemony.
Speaking in Moscow she pointed out the necessity of having a multipolar
world with its diversity of countries, cultures and economies. But these
words are in obvious contradiction to real American foreign policy.

The unipolar model of a world order in which the Unites States seeks to
assume the role of hegemonic power, supreme judge and gendarme is bound to
meet with resistance on the part of states refusing to play the role of
vassals. The experience of two world wars in the 20th century shows that
the emergence of a coalition of states striving for a preponderance of
forces in their favour and for economic, political and military domination
in international affairs inevitably leads to the formation of an
anti-coalition, which seeks to build up its strength and power in order to
thwart the hegemonistic plans of the states joined in the coalition or
alliance. The ultimate result has always been an armed confrontation. 
Such could be the price of trampling on the standards of international
relations that have taken shape within the framework of the United Nations
and other international organizations. 

The second cause for a lack of trust and confidence in U.S.-Russian 
relations was the very active American involvement in the process of
social transformation in Russia. In its attempt to help Russia to integrate
its economy into the Western-based international system the U.S. focused on
the issue of debt repayment, primarily on IMF programs, rather than on 
Russian access to Western markets and investments, in particular to
European markets, which was more helpful to economic revival. In supporting
Russian reforms the American administration focused on a narrow elite group
within the Russian government that did not enjoy broad societal support.
Western support helped Yeltsin to triumph over his political opponents, to
impose on nation a constitution tailored for him and to remain in power,
where his inability to rule the country became obvious to the majority of
Russians. Pressing ahead with liberal market reform based on the primitive
principals of the «Washington Consensus», overlooking the rising tide of
crime and corruption, reacting tolerantly to Yeltsin's belligerent policy
in Chechnya, the Clinton administration and the IMF cast into doubt 
Western adherence to genuine democracy and compromised the values of a
modern market economy.

One more sensitive point for Russia should be mentioned. The dissolution
of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a disruption of economic ties
between former Soviet republics which severely harmed their economies.
However Russian initiatives and efforts to politically and economically
invigorate the Commonwealth of Independent States were seen by the West as
a «new Russian imperialism». After the Second World War the U.S. did a
great deal to promote European integration which secured the rapid
economic recovery of Western Europe. Russia expected American support in
this regard in vain. On the contrary, it was confronted with
counteractions. U.S. policy is aimed at preventing the restoration of 
Russia's traditional spheres of influence on the territory of the former
USSR and elsewhere.

I would not say that Russia itself can avoid blame for the deterioration
of U.S.-Russian relations. The Russians themselves are primarily
responsible for Russia's internal failings and its decreased international
influence. Our inconsistent foreign policy during the years of radical
changes badly affected U.S.-Russian relations. Russian weakness,
instability, criminalization, the moral degradation of the authorities and
the population arouse apprehension in the West and lead it to take
precautions, to pursue a containment policy.

During both Chechen wars there have been cases of human rights violations, 
of atrocities and brutalities against civilians, that aroused indignation
in the West and negatively affected U.S.-Russian relations. One could also
list other points of contradiction, as for instance Russian observation
of non-proliferation of WMD.

The Russian authorities attempted to structure their relations with the
United States without learning the lessons of the Cold War, without
properly evaluating the Soviet legacy, and without understanding the
dynamics of global change, including those of Russia's new political and
economic status in the world. The new leadership in both countries could
open the door to a redesign of U.S.-Russian relations. Recent trends in
public and elite opinion in both countries concerned about downgrading the
importance of each country in the foreign and security policy calculus of
the other speaks in favour of such a possibility. Calmly analytical 
Russian experts are convinced that U.S. global political influence,
military power, and its dominant role in the world economy inevitably make
relations with America a high priority for Russia, but assert that there is
a growing asymmetry in the priorities that each country assigns to the
other, with the U.S. increasingly viewing Russia as a second-rate power in
all spheres of international life, other than the strategic nuclear sphere.

Many U.S. experts argue that Russia must remain a key concern for the
United States, even if it can no longer occupy center stage in its foreign
policy. This is not only because of its still vast nuclear arsenal and
possession of large quantities of fissile material and WMD-related
technologies, but also because of its geographic position astride regions
of vital interest to the United States and because of the major U.S.
interest in the outcome of Russia's domestic transformation, upon which
stability in Eurasia directly depends, as well as Russia's capacity to
realize its enormous potential and act abroad for good or ill.
I am not optimistic about the prospects for a substantial breakthrough in
Russian-American relations in the near future. In the first place, there is
an almost inevitable momentum to the current foreign policy on both sides.
Thus far, there has not been a conceptual reformulation of U.S. policy
toward Russia. On the other hand, there are no signs of a clearly defined
independent Russian foreign policy, based on Russian national interests,
instead of blindly following in the wake of U.S. policy. Until new 
leaders begin to act the primary motto for both sides should be: "Do no
harm". 

The new leaders must explore how to remove the obstacles to bilateral
relations. Russia needs American economic assistance. Of course, we
appreciate real assistance, which includes a lightening of the external
debt burden, Western investment in viable sectors of the economy, and
abandonment by the U.S. and the EU of unjustified discrimination against
Russia in world markets. If the U.S. is willing to move in this direction,
it could substantially improve our relations.

It is necessary to continue a dialog in order to find compromises where
the interests of both country do not coincide. Spheres of common interest
correctly understood are quite large which creates opportunities for coming
to an agreement. However, it is absolutely counterproductive to force
Russia in to making concessions in areas where its sovereignty, security or
vital economic interests could be jeopardized. 

********
Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: 
http://www.cdi.org/russia