April 18, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4254 • 4255 • 4256

Johnson's Russia List
#4255
18 April 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

*****

TITLE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH SERGEI KARAGANOV AND OTHER FOREIGN
AND DEFENSE POLICY COUNCIL OFFICIALS
(ARBAT HOTEL, 11:30, APRIL 14, 2000)
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE

Karaganov: It is a pleasure to present to you the fruit of 14
months of work, absolutely voluntary work, by a huge group of
people associated with the Foreign and Defense Policy Council. This
work was planned in 1998. In 1999 it was decided that the country,
our society need a joint study telling us where we should go and
where we are at present. 

In the course of 14 months various working groups numbering
sometimes up to 100 members, on other occasions numbering only a
handful of people held some 65 meetings of various format to work
out these texts that you have now been issued. 

We are very proud not only because these tests have been
published. It is not for us to judge their quality. Of course, we
like them because they are our brainchild and we do not like them
because, naturally, we would want them to be much better. 

It seems to me that another thing that makes this work
interesting is that it disproves the widespread claim that there is
no place for civic society and civic initiative in our country.
This work was carried out entirely by volunteers, by people who
intellectually comprise the pride of our country. You will see that
the co-authors, the people we refer to are those who should have
taken part in the writing of such studies. 

I must tell you that a lot of people, especially in official
structures, who also helped us, who consulted us were not mentioned
by us so as not to put them in a difficult situation.

Now you have this book in your hands, a copy has been sent to
the President, copies have been sent to all government offices in
the Russian Federation, to the Duma, the Federation Council,
libraries. 

The idea of this book is not only to give recommendations to
the state, the President and society but also to determine from the
outset what exactly we want. The Foreign and Defense Policy Council
intends to continue to work on many sections of this book on the
basis of the national discussion of this book that we will
encourage. I expect such a discussion to take place in our society
anyway. In autumn we will return to many sections of this book and
organize a new series of round table discussions so as to be able
next year to publish some of these sections as updated books with
new recommendations.

We will proceed from the experience that Russia will gain in
the period of the new presidency. It is possible that four years
from now, we believe that four years from now the Foreign and
Defense Policy Council will publish a book called Strategy for
Russia, Agenda for the President-2004. This will become a constant
area of our work.

Our initial aim was to help our society and state work out a
strategic concept. We are not in competition with anyone. More than
that, from the very outset we submitted the drafts of the book to
government bodies, including the Strategic Studies Center, so that
government could avail itself of these ideas from the outset. 

I repeat, we are not dictating anything, we are forming an
intellectual political environment around the adoption of
decisions. 

After the presentation we will have a reception in honor of
the authors and journalists. We are doing this with the help of the
National Press Institute. 

It is a pleasure to represent to you some of the authors of
the book. Some of the authors could not come here today, for
instance, Kuzminov has been summoned to make a report on the new
economic concept while Arbatov is now the Duma ratifying a treaty.
After ratification I expect some of the authors to join us.

First of all, I would like to give the floor to the
representatives of our team of authors. I will answer questions
about military and defense policy. True, there is also Pavel
Zolotaryov and there is also Gennady Ivanov who can answer
questions about military policy. I will also answer questions about
foreign policy.

But first I will give the floor to the key authors, to those
who headed teams of authors writing on a particular subject. This
will give you a feeling of the book.

I will give the floor to Alexander Viktorovich Uss. We all
know him now thanks to his publications. He is the chairman of the
legislature in Krasnoyarsk Territory. He has played the key role in
putting together two sections of the book -- on federalism and on
Siberia and the Far East.

Mikhail Gennadiyevich Delyagin headed the team of authors who
wrote about the fight against corruption. He also was most active
in preparing the economic section.

Alexei Mikhailovich Salmin, director of the Russian
Socio-Political Center, a professor and a doctor of sciences, was
the main author of the section on internal policy, one of our most
active authors. 

Vyacheslav Yevgenyevich Nikonov, whom we all know, is another
very active author.

I will give them the floor for statements ranging from 3-4
minutes. As to Alexander Viktorovich, since he has come from
Krasnoyarsk, I will give him 7 minutes. I would want them to
present to you their perception of ideas. After that, the other
members of the team of authors will field your questions. 

We will not be able to respond to your critical remarks
because you simply have not yet had the time to read the book. 

After the questions we will move to the festive part of our
agenda. It is called a reception in honor of the team of authors.

I will begin with giving the floor to the people who are to
the right of me. I have no other way of making a choice of speakers
among such a brilliant company of equals.

Salmin: Before speaking about the fight against corruption I
want to say that the economic section in the book, I will not speak
in detail about it because I was not the coordinator, I believe
that in that section we have succeeded in solving a fundamental
problem confronting the entire economic thought in Russia, we
succeeded in putting together all that is positive in people who
regard themselves as liberals with all that is positive in people
who consider themselves advocates of a strong state. As a result,
we have some sort of a liberal-neoconservative combination which
proved to be quite fruitful. Practically all the positive ideas
that exist in the economic thought have been combined into a rather
rigid and streamlined system. Roughly speaking, a hedgehog has been
crossed with a grass-snake and get not barbed wire but something
workable. 

Although I have to admit that corruption has become a
system-forming phenomenon, not an exclusion but a norm of life, we
all understand this, but one of the merits of this book is I think
that it talks about it without hysterics and offers an in-depth
analysis of the problem.

Unfortunately, corruption is found not only in business but in
the every-day lives of tens of millions of Russians and basically
it is not separable from government. Let me give you three
examples. First, the law on bankruptcy which is good in principle,
but its flaws make it a hideous corrupting act which destabilizes
the entire economic life in the country. Second, the procedure for
distributing transfers among regions. In principle, this is a very
good measure and it constitutes considerable progress from previous
years, but it cannot be used in practice because it has all kinds
of flaws, even arithmetical mistakes. As a result, the margin of
error in the calculation of transfers exceeds 100 percent for many
regions. It creates chaos in which bureaucratic arbitrariness which
provides feeding ground for corruption is the only way for the
state to exist. 

Finally, it's the stock market. We have used to thinking of it
as the most civilized market. But there is still no law that would
prohibit the use of insider information. What the whole world
considers a crime and a fact of corruption, is believed to be a
normal way of doing business in this country.

Therefore, corruption is a terrible enemy and at stake is our
very existence, because Russia burdened with corruption will be
able to make only several wrong steps in the 21st century.

There are three main avenues to pursue. First of all, it's the
revitalization of government because the state is the only tool for
society to determine its interests and to realize them. So, first
of all, it is necessary to determine the functions that the state
is ready to perform and for which taxpayers are prepared to pay it.
Second, it is necessary to determine a narrow circle of manageable
agencies to perform these functions. We have 68 ministries and
agencies in the country. This is an unmanageable system in
principle. Their number must be reduced at least to 28-25, but this
reduction must be functional rather than mechanical. It is
necessary to clearly define the powers of each agency in order to
avoid a vacuum and overlapping powers and realize the principle of
exclusive competence. Finally, it is necessary to devise a clear
mechanism for making and harmonizing decisions. This is the only
way to make our state a) civilized and b) efficient. And in so
doing we will not lose our democratic gains.

Next stage. It is necessary to eliminate conditions for state
racketeering, that is, it is necessary to dramatically reduce the
state's licensing functions. The simplest way to do this would be
to transfer to registration of small businesses not on the basis of
licenses, but on the basis of applications. Without an exaggeration
this will make a revolution not only in law enforcement but also in
economic life of the country. 

And tax reform. It is necessary to make Russia's tax system
as simple, not to say primitive, as possible. In order to survive,
economic growth in the years to come will not be enough. With an
economic growth rate of 5 percent a year, we will have fallen even
farther behind the developed world and China by the year 2015.
Therefore, we need not economic growth, but unfortunately an
economic explosion. But this cannot be done without a dramatic
simplification of the tax system. Only by simplifying the tax
system will we be able to reduce the tax burden for scrupulous
taxpayers and expand the taxable base to the shadow economy. This
is a fundamental requirement. Much will depend on the state's
ability to meet it. In brief,I have described the content of these
sections.

Karaganov: Alexei Mikhailovich Salmin.

Salmin: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, you understand that
having got three or four minutes from our generous Sergei
Alexandrovich Karaganov, I will not be able to describe you what
the rather big section devoted to domestic policy is about. 

I am convinced that miracles may occur, but not this kind of
miracles. Of course, this big section did not come out of the blue.
It draws on the reports made by the Council for Foreign and Defense
Policy since 1992. These include three strategies, that is
documents called Strategy 1, Strategy 2 and Strategy 3, and other
reports. I advise you to read this section and perhaps these CFDP
reports which overlap with it, further some provisions or serve as
the basis for this introductory section devoted to foreign policy.

When we were working on this section, we asked ourselves one
question to which no answer existed, or so I think, at least before
our book appeared. "What kind of state and society do we live in?"
We often say what we need and what we want. But what have we
achieved during these 10 years? How could we qualify the political
regime and the public system in which we have the pleasure of
existing?

We have come to the conclusion that in principle the present
regime we see and feel every day can be described as an
underdeveloped democracy, if you wish. In principle, in 1991 we
proclaimed the idea of transferring the state that existed at that
time into a democratic state, similar to most of the developed or
democratic, as we call them, states. Partly this goal has been
achieved. And it would be a sin to underestimate what has been
done. The report names all the institutions, structures and
phenomena that can be described as democratic and as elements of
liberal democracy as political scientists and politicians
understand it. This includes the freedom of the press, the freedom
of faith, free elections with all the reservations which are also
there.

But if we described our system this way, we would not
understand how it works. The problem is that in addition to these
elements of developed democracies, it also contains elements of the
under-reformed, unreformed and unfortunately these include most of
the vital functions and structures of the state, including
structures dealing with security, innovations, science and partly
foreign policy. 

In addition, there is a number of niches or voids, if you
wish, vacuum zones where the state or society is not present. For
example, there is no modern system of local government. We cannot
say that the work to create the judiciary is finished. And I think
this book answers the question what we lack. 

What is even more regrettable is that there is a number of
structures, perverted structures connected with the painful
transformation of the state's functions into something else, with
the privatization of the state's functions by some groups of
people, oligarchates, clans and client structures which are very
dangerous for the state. We know the experience of some countries
in Asia, Latin America, Africa and even in Europe where such
structures, if their development is not stopped in time, place the
state on the brink of collapse. It is very important to understand
how such structures develop. We did make such an attempt. 

Finally, the development scenario. We see three main scenarios
of development and it cannot be said that we favor them similarly.
But as researchers, as objective researchers, we must objectively
outline these three possibilities of development, some of which are
quite dangerous ones. Sub-variants are possible as well. 

The first scenario is the inertial one. That is if the present
leadership of the country does not take some quick and resolute
actions and continues roughly the same what it is doing now. As a
result, we will see a strengthening of negative aspects in our
state structure and we will see these malignant structures as well.
Sooner or later this will produce big or lesser troubles, depending
on when this is going to happen. 

We described the second scenario as the authoritarian one.This
will happen if the state starts playing an active role in
strengthening the state, something that is demanded by the majority
of society today. Here we will face a choice. There are different
ways of strengthening the state. One can strengthen the state with
due account for the potential of arbitrariness and use this
arbitrariness. And it is also possible to strengthen the state
while clearly understanding its possibilities and limitations. This
means making the state more rational, manageable and transparent. 

It is from here that we get two scenarios, one of which is of
decisive importance for us. Our book describes the consequences of
the first, second and third scenarios. It says what we definitely
must not do. In fact, the book is like a map for the new
leadership, a navigation chart to sail in the ocean of economics.

The book says what should be cone in the economy, in the field
of state development, in the field of security and foreign policy.
Thank you.

Karaganov: Thank you very much. I will only add that one of
the substantial ideas of this chapter is that today society and the
country will prompt the new leadership to resort to authoritarian
models of development. At the same time there is no resistance in
society to this, the main institutes are in poor shape, a part of
the elite is demoralized. In this situation, strange though it may
seem, the new president must resist this tendency. Everybody will
now demand of Putin that he introduce order, strengthen the state,
the force structures, fight corruption and so on. 

At the same time he will have to facilitate the creation of
real parties which we do not have at present and which we will not
have if the state does not give a helping hand. The President will
have to start at long last the judicial reform. He will have to
bolster the freedom of the press. In short, a fantastically
difficult road lies ahead of him. His future is a much more
difficult one as compared with Yeltsin, who acted in a
revolutionary way but was constrained on all sides, or Gorbachev.

Now the floor goes to Alexander Viktorovich Uss. 

Uss: Thank you. As Sergei Alexandrovich has already noted, I
was directly involved with two sections -- federalism and the
scenario of Siberia's development in the 21st century. 

True, I am not the author of the final text. But I hope that
my views are reflected in it. 

It is very correct and timely that the Foreign and Defense
Policy Council arranged numerous round table discussions on
problems of federalism. I will not be wrong if I say that a new
specter is roaming Russia now, not the specter of communism that
roamed Europe in its time but the specter of strengthening state
power.

It is possible that this trend is justified. But it is
possible that we will overdo things and erroneously recreate a
unitary state in place of the quilt work federalism that we have at
present. 

Demands are being made during the past year and a half to
create a unitary state, to appoint governors, to take a whole
number of other steps to strengthen the central authorities. If we
do take all these steps, if we start appointing governors, we will
actually absolve the population in the regions of any
responsibility for their future. And appointed regional leaders
will not try to improve by their own efforts the life of their
population but will form queues to the Finance Ministry and blame
the center for all mishaps. 

That is why the book suggests sufficiently restraining
mechanisms for reforming federative relations. They must preserve
all the positive that we have worked out in the past ten years and
at the same time strengthen the federation and thus strengthen the
state.

For instance, we suggest the creation of the institute of
so-called federal intervention which will give the president more
rights to abrogate unconstitutional regional legal acts, which will
give government bodies in the subjects of the Federation to appeal
to the Constitutional Court, and so on. The institute of federal
intervention will allow for the possibility to use force, including
military force, on the President's initiative. 

Most important, I believe, will be the right of the President
to bring regional leaders to political accountability. Yes, leaders
of the subjects of the Federation must be elected but it is
fundamentally important to give the President a possibility on his
own initiative to call regional referendums on confidence in
regional leaders. We know that on having excessive powers, on
creating authoritarian regimes on their territories regional
leaders often have all the possibilities to block any initiative of
the population to dismiss those who are incompetent or pursue only
their personal private interests. 

The publication contains also numerous other proposals
concerning the institute of federative relations, relations between
the government and parliament and so on. I would describe all these
proposals not as radical but as realistic and reasonable ones.
Their implementation will not require the adoption of any new
Constitution, the dismantling of the existing one. I think we don't
need that because we have not lived enough under this Constitution
to change it.

The second section is devoted, as it has already been said
here, to the various scenarios of Siberia's development in the 21st
century. I am a Siberian myself. But as a Siberian and as a citizen
of Russia I think that this attention to this region of our Russia
is more than justified, because Lomonosov's well-known words that
Russia's might will grow with Siberia will not be a motto but a
reality. Siberia has a great economic potential and most currency
revenues we live on today are there.

Attention to this region is explained by the fact that there
is a very disturbing trend in Siberia, a destructive trend which
endangers the economic and territorial integrity of our country.
Greater Russia, so to speak, used to be linked to Siberia with
unbreakable bonds, there used to be a single system of planning and
financing of major building projects in Siberia which secured the
country its future, there used to be technological interaction
between enterprises in Siberia and in other parts of the country.
But we have not seen any of this lately. Greater Russia is leaving
Siberia. There are neither investments nor technological
connections nor attempts to develop Siberia's wealth in a
comprehensive way.

Greater Russia is being replaced in Siberia by major
international financial and industrial groups which seek to extract
and take mineral resources out of there and they are not interested
in what is around these extracting enterprises. As a result, large
areas in Siberia are turning into social deserts and places of
environmental and social disaster.

These processes have been accompanied by alarming demographic
trends such as uncontrolled migration from Central Asia, China and
some other countries. As a result, Siberia is basically beginning
to separate itself from the rest of Russia. If things go like this,
Russia may lose its vital territory in the foreseeable future, not
so distant one. And Russia without Siberia will not be Russia.

In addition to stating this fact, perhaps slightly
overdramatizing it, but I think it is somewhat justified, it puts
forth certain proposals on how to neutralize these tendencies in
the current economic situation, how to reserve them if necessary
and ensure the progressive development of Siberia for the benefit
of the entire country.

Karaganov: Thank you. We will continue to explore this issue
and recommend you this section written by Professor Lexin and
Professor Shvetsov who are here with us today. We will continue
this work because -- it addresses many problems facing Siberia and
the Far East in a new way, but there is still no finished concepts
of action, because we had to work in the conditions that were
available. Nevertheless, I think it is necessary to raise this
question, for it has been a long time since it was last raised.

Since Vyacheslav Alexeyevich has contributed to practically
all chapters, I think he has two or three favorite ideas to talk
about today.

Nikonov: I didn't bear responsibility for any of these
chapters, but I am ready to answer for everything.

I think one can hardly envy the President 2000. He is like
that millionaire's heir who found out that he has inherited a
million of debts. If we look at Russia's economic development
statistics, we'll see that we ranked 21st in terms of GDP last
year, falling behind the US by 45 times, Japan by 19 times, Germany
by 11 times and even Taiwan by 1.5 times.

In terms of per capita indicators, Russia happened to be in
the second hundred, falling behind the US by 25 times, major
European countries by 20 times and such a country as the Czech
Republic by four times.

The 50 percent by which Russia's military acquisitions have
been increased this year, in such a pompous manner, account for
only 0.5 percent of the US annual military acquisitions.

Russia is in a very dire economic situation and it is
absolutely obvious that economic problems are a priority, and this
is stated in the internal policy, foreign policy and economic
sections of the report. The resolution of these problems is inside
the country and depends to a large extent on the nature of the
regime and the steps to be taken by authorities because, as the
report points out quite rightfully, the crisis is largely a crisis
without power.

I think the most provocative thought in this report, which
will undoubtedly sparkle heated debates today, is the commitment to
the authoritarian-democratic regime or model which is characterized
as an attempt to consolidate power through consistent
reorganization of the regime into a developed democracy by
increasing the effectiveness of government institutions.

Does this constitute a deviation from the democratic gains of
the Yeltsin era? This may be so if we recognize that we had a
democratic era under Yeltsin. But in reality the Yeltsin regime was
a combination of everything that one can imagine and even of what
one cannot. If we take the former, it was a combination of anarchy,
oligarchy, democracy, authoritarianism and Oriental despotism.

If the next president manages to at least rid Russia of
elements of anarchy, Oligarchy and Oriental despotism, this will be
a great progress and a huge step forward.

The report is based on the premise of a strong state. But when
you hear "a strong state", you should always ask what is meant by
the word "state". If it is a bureaucratic apparatus, then we will
have strong corruption. If it is a power, government as such, this
is different.

The authors of the report want the state to be weak as a
bureaucratic machine and strong as a power, as a strong executive
branch in the country where law and order are ensured, and which is
capable of doing at least part of what is written in this book.

The great leader Mao Tsetung used to say, "Don't read many
books". The book we are presenting today is one of those few books
that should and must be read. Thank you.

Karaganov: Thank you, Vyacheslav Alexeyevich. Modest as you
are, you have finished out introductory part. Now we are ready to
take your questions. All the authors present in this hall, not only
those on the panel, will take part in answering them. Our main
specialist on the idea of federal intervention is Sergei Tsiplyayev
from St. Petersburg. I have already mentioned professors Lexin and
Shvetsov.

We have here also a number of people who worked on the chapter
on military policy. Incidentally, already ten or nine years ago we
argued that we need a professional army, that we need a highly
professional General Staff freed of the function to administer the
military economy, that we need a civilian Defense Ministry. Now
this is even more obvious than 8-9 years ago.

Now we will take your questions.

Q: Counselor at the Ukrainian embassy Vasilyev; I would like
to hear about Russia's strategy in respect of Ukraine and the main
steps to be taken to implement this strategy.

Karaganov: Thank you. In our book you will not find anything
on Russia's strategy in respect of Ukraine. But our Council, as you
know, works actively on this theme. We will soon produce a special
report on Russian-Ukrainian relations. We will step up public and
political ties with Ukraine which have withered a bit during the
past two years probably because of the various elections.

As you know, for many years our Council has maintained very
active ties with the Ukrainian political elite. But the book
contains nothing on the concept of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Q: Sergei Alexandrovich, the embassy would be happy to take
part in this and make every contribution possible.

Karaganov: You are welcome. We will invite you but only if
this is going to be an open participation. We invite diplomats and
journalists. We always invite representatives of the embassy to
Russian-Ukrainian activities. Next question?

Q: Romanian radio. You have lived without a foreign policy
concept for quite some time and managed. Is it really necessary?
What do you think about the draft that was discussed by the
Security Council?

Karaganov: Thank you for your question. One can live without
a foreign policy doctrine, but that is bad. We have lived thus for
ten years, or eight years to be exact. We had a paper called
Foreign Policy Concept which was an extremely unrealistic one. Now
a new foreign policy is being worked out. I do not think that this
solved the problem. I will not comment on it because it is a
classified document.

We are suggesting our own variant. I think that it differs
from the variant that was submitted by the government agencies. The
Council is an organization that tries to inform the state about the
interests of society and the elite. Well, we are saying that it is
necessary to change the concept, that we must understand the we,
the elite lost the Cold War. After the Cold War it was claimed that
we are not a vanquished power but that we must abandon all our
ambitions and work only for the country's economic recovery. It was
claimed that for this purpose we must scale down our ambitions and
commitments along a number of directions and concentrate on those
directions that are really important and the most important of
which is Russia's integration in the world information,
intellectual and other revolutions. This is something that the
state did not engage in, in any case organizationally.

I will not go any further. As to the future development of our
foreign policy, it will develop under the influence of the struggle
of ideas. If we take what has been suggested... true, despite its
somewhat nationalistic tonality it differs slightly from the past
philosophy... in other words, we understand that whereas in the
past we could toughly uphold our traditionalist policy, now,
considering our failures in the economy and other fields, we should
somewhat modernize our policy, conduct it much more carefully and
reasonably that we could afford ourselves some 3-5 years ago.

Another important suggestion is that we should again create a
new mechanism for the administration, coordination of foreign
policy. It is my view, and it has some support, that we must return
the planning of foreign policy and coordination of foreign policy,
especially the strategic directions, to the Security Council while
the Foreign Ministry should be responsible for its day-to-day
pursuance.

The matter is that in recent years the Foreign Ministry again
got the possibility of both strategic planning and current
supervision. This is something that is hard to cope with and
Foreign Ministry officials, as a result, tend to find themselves in
difficult situations.

I want to stress again that although we do criticize Russian
foreign policy and admit is partial failures we are not saying a
single critical word about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We are
saying that Foreign Ministry officials are not responsible for this
for the simple reason that they have been placed in most difficult
internal political conditions.

Q: Promyshlennaya Gazeta: If we cast aside the criminal
aspect, how do you see Chechnya within the system of federal
relations, what do you think about present efforts there? How do
they correlate with your coalition?

Salmin: Our report does not deal with Chechnya as a special
subject although it is mentioned a number of times in the section
dealing with internal politics. You see, the situation in Chechnya
is really a special one, whereas our report is of a strategic
nature, so to say.

The report says that actually two problems exist, very
different problems. For some reasons they are regarded as two
aspects of one at the same problem. These are the problem of
federative relations as such, the problem of territorial federation
and the decentralization of the state and the problem of regulating
inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations which are partly
regulated with the help of federative mechanisms, though not only
and even no so much with their help.

It was already in Soviet times that these problems were
treated as inter-connected ones. This also explains the constant
zigzags we are making in our internal policy. First we have a
ministry dealing with ethnic affairs, then we have a ministry
dealing with regionalism, still later we have a minister who is
specifically responsible for regions and then we get another one
who deals predominantly with inter-ethnic relations.

The stand taken by the authors of the book is that we must
solve these problems both jointly and separately. In other words,
we need a special strategy of inter-ethnic relations and we also
need a special strategy of federalism, that is decentralization.
This deals with one group of problems. The strategy and regulation
of inter-ethnic conflicts and the creation of mechanisms ensuring
the co-existence of one ethnos with another -- deal with another
problem which requires very specific means of resolution.

I will just give you one example. It does not deal with
Chechnya, I deliberately will not speak about Chechnya because it
is a too controversial issue for a strategic analysis. For
instance, in Russia, we do not have a special radio or television
that would broadcast from Moscow in the Tatar language. You see,
Tatars who live in Tatarstan and Tatars who live in other parts of
Russia, many of them get their information either from broadcasters
in Kazan or from the Voice of America. And yet Tatars are the
second biggest ethnos in Russia. This is a problem that Russia must
face and resolve strategically, the problem of inter-ethnic
relations. 

Q: Rossia. You work resembles the one performed by Gherman
Gref's Strategic Studies Center. Are there any contradictions with
his program, his views, for instance in the sphere of taxation? 

Karaganov: As you know, we have submitted our reports to the
Strategic Studies Center. Second, we began this work even before
the Center for Strategic Studies became operational. Third, we have
presented our report, but we have not yet seen any reports by the
Center for Strategic Studies. This is why we cannot make
comparisons. I cannot comment on rumors, because I know that, as it
always happens in Russia, these rumors are false.

Q: A question for Mr. Karaganov. How may Russia's foreign
policy be affected by the ratification of START-2. First, its
immediate impact on President Putin's position and its strategic
impact on Russia's foreign policy and its military-political
concept.

Karaganov: I think it will have no strategic impact for one
simple reason. This is only one of the numerous questions and it no
longer place the fundamental role it played two or three years ago,
unfortunately. Simply because we have lost time.

As for the treaty itself, if it is ratified, it will send a
strong psychological and political signal that Russia will most
likely embark on the path of integration, rather than isolationism,
with the rest of the world, although it will continue to decisively
protect its interests.

As you know, and this is described in the report quite
thoroughly, there are very strong isolationist tendencies in the
Russian public and political communities. These tendencies also
exist in the interests of Russian oligarchic groups which do not
want let foreign competitors in. Although we have always called
ourselves enlightened patriots, in this particular situation,
ironic as it may seem, we are going against the trend, against the
isolationist-nationalist trend. We think that in this situation it
is deadly for Russia.

Q: Nezavisimaya Gazeta published excerpts from an interview
with Vaclav Havel yesterday. He was shocked by the fact that most
of Russian people support Putin on Chechnya. There is no consensus
(inaudible)...

Karaganov: Does anyone want to answer this question? You want
us to speak for Putin, but that would be too much to ask of us. Let
alone to speak for the West.

Q: (Off mike).

Karaganov: But why? Apparently this is how he understands
this. We may of course do this, but this is not related to the
theme of our discussion and the Council's work.

Q: No one has read the book yet.

Karaganov: As regards Vaclav Havel, I will express my point of
view. He is a brilliant person and therefore he has a right to have
his own opinion, which we must respect. And we should understand
that this is how we are perceived and take this philosophically.

As for your question about Chechnya, of course, this is a very
high price for the consolidation of society, but if this is the
only price for the humiliation to which society and the political
class have been subjected, perhaps this is a smaller price than the
one we would have had to pay for the hideous mistakes made in the
last 10 years.

Moderator: Vyacheslav Alexeyevich wants to answer this
question.

Nikonov: No, I don't. I just want to say that not only Vaclav
Havel but many other people think the same way. Even Sergei
Adamovich Kovalyov thinks the same way, also a brilliant person.
Different people have different opinions, but it is obvious that
Russia is not doing all it could in terms of foreign policy and
foreign propaganda in connection with Chechnya.

Q: You are trying to create some system for Russia where it
would be honest to say that you have no answers to some questions.
Do you have competitors in the Russian public life who think that
they have all the answers? And my second question. During the
parliamentary and presidential elections a score of programs was
presented both by parties, various groups and individual
politicians. Which of them is the closest to yours?

Karaganov: We invited everybody from Communists to moderate
Communists to reasonable Liberals (inaudible)... and Khakamada
participate in our tables. We stay conspicuously over all parties.
I can assure you that none of the parties or rather semi-parties,
because there are practically no real parties in this country,
recognizes this as its program.

We are trying to create a supra-party program. This is why I
cannot say whose views we share most. I think no one's. We fear
that we may become close to some party of power and then we will
die as a civic society organization.

As for whether or not we have competitors, I think government
bodies and the funds which deal with this question on behalf of the
state will become our competitors, because we sincerely hope to
help them in what they are doing. In this sense we have no
competitors.

If we take this program that has been worked out by a large
number of the boldest and strongest experts who have thoroughly
explored all political aspects, I think we have no competitors
either. 

Salmin: May I add a couple of words? Do you know what is
important here? Political programs and party programs belong to a
different genres. When politicians present their programs in
elections, they have a right -- and this is part of the game -- to
say: one that two by two is five and another that two by two is
sixteen.

Our task was to stick to the position that two by two is four,
that is, to offer a systemic analysis of what is happening and
should be happening in the country. There are certain resources and
conditions, and society and the state must know this.

This is anon-state program. We cannot say that some minister
of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, or the President will
take this book and read it in the evening when no one can see him
in order to start issuing corresponding decrees or submitting bills
to the Duma in the morning. Not at all. This is a different genre,
too. It differs from a state program or a ministerial program or a
government program just like a map differs from a combat order. 
There can be no combat order without a map. But a map is not a
combat order, it's a map.

Q: Will the focus be shifted again from Jews to Arabs? How do
things stand with the Jewish question?

Karaganov: We have no problems with the Jewish question. If
you mean the authors, they were not discriminated against by their
ethnic background. If that is what you mean.

As for concrete directions of Russian -- concrete areas of
regional policy were not explored in this section. It was only
emphasized that we have secondary areas of foreign policy which may
be very important for the strengthening of our positions, which
should be preserved as the country cuts down on its obligations,
because we are still playing the role of semi-global power.

It was pointed out that we should maintain our active position
in the Middle East in order -- not because this is a matter of
paramount importance, but because our position in the Middle East
allows us to influence many other vital interests.

I can assure you that at the operational level this does not
mean a shift from Israel to Arabs. This means that we should play
both cards as vigorously as possible.

Q: You mentioned that one of the challenges facing the
President is to support the declining freedom of the press. How
would you describe the current status of the freedom of the press
in Russia and what is your vision for the future?

Karaganov: This question was not specially discussed, but it
was raised. I will give you an assessment of the texts and my own
assessment. I believe the state of the free press is the most
unfavorable one since 1992. This is connected, first of all, with
the high level of monopolization of the press, the merger of
monopoly groups which control the press together with the state.
There are also attempts by the state to directly influence the
press. This was particularly evident during the election campaign
when censorship was introduced in a number of regions. This is
unacceptable. Thirdly, there is the general desire to have a
stronger state and fear of this strengthening, typical of the
Russian intelligentsia. Yes, we want a strong government and always
fear it.

This is beginning to spread to the journalists as well and we
see lots of examples of self-censorship. This is extremely
dangerous. If freedom of the press perishes, if the free press
perishes, we will have no chances of our country's positive
development. It is one of the main tasks of Russian society and
Russian leadership to preserve freedom of the press even if this
goes against the current trends in the mass media.

Press service of the Georgian Embassy. A question to Mr.
Karaganov. Some Russian politicians encourage separatism outside of
Russia. So is it possible that as a result they got Chechen
separatism inside of Russia/ 

Karaganov: We are a public organization, we do not deal with
politicians, we deal with problems. We are not supported from the
outside, we are our own supporters. We will deal with the problem
of separatism if some of our members decide to study it. We have
discussed this problem more than once but so far there is no group
of members that has decided to tackle it systematically. As I told
you, we are an organization of volunteers. For this reason the
Council does not have a stand on this particular situation. 

Q: Ambassador of Uzbekistan Shaislamov. I have looked through
the chapter Foreign Policy and Challenges of the 21st Century. What
is your stand on such challenges as religious extremism, in
particular Islamic one, on narco business in the context of the
problems encountered by Russia in the Northern Caucasus? This is
something more than just separatism. What do you think about this? 

Karaganov: We were the first organization in Russia to sound
the alarm about drug addiction and narco business. We are preparing
a new report on this. 

In our opinion, this is a very big problem. We do not regard
this particular problem in our book. As to the problem of
extremism, we treat it very cautiously. You see, there are ultra
Westerners who would like to put us on a collision course with the
Islamic world, to force Russia assume an anti-Islamic stance, to
declare any nationalism and conservatism in the Islamic world as a
manifestation of extremism. In all our discussions we support our
state in that we must restrict the influence of the more extremist
groups. 

As to Chechnya, we have not taken a stand because this is
something that our organization simply cannot do. 

Zatulin: While Mr. Baturin is getting ready I will say a
couple of words. I would like to support a tradition that exists
since our Council was formed in February 1992. This tradition can
be called the tradition of the dissenting opinion. 

I think that most of our members have their dissenting views
on some of the things that are outlined in the book. Considering
the large assembly here today, I would like to say that I cherish
this book just as much as today's speakers. 

I did take a certain part but I definitely am not one of the
authors. There are worthier people. But some other people did take
part in producing this book. I just want to say that we take on too
much by saying that this book is a map by which you can write
combat orders.

This book is a cross-section of the state of our elite, not
the whole elite, but of its part, a respected one. But this is not
a milestone document. From this point of view, it only registers --
and this is what makes it historically important and significant as
a literary and historical monument -- some fears, hopes, phobias
and complexes of our elite.

For example, a lot of furious words have been said about
self-isolation, and this undoubtedly is an integral element of our
elite's outlook, a very strong complex that we will not be let into
Europe.

I think we should have paid more attention to the arguments of
the people who insist on certain foreign policy and domestic policy
consolidation. And from this point of view it would be wrong to try
to shake this off.

But I just want to say that Sergei Alexandrovich was not
telling all the truth when he said that we are absolutely
supra-party and did not have any sympathies during elections. Many
of us, including myself, participated in the Fatherland -- All
Russia bloc and the fact that Academician Primakov initiated work
on this series of reports -- At that time he was candidate No 1 for
the President of Russia -- shows that this strategy was written for
another president and reflected some other sentiments. Although
this fact was somewhat adapted during the work on the book, it
should -- I mean when we read and analyze this work, we make
certain conclusions.

Karaganov: Thank you.

Zatulin: I am finishing. I repeat, we would be happy to
present this strategy for Russia as an agenda for the President
2000, but I think that this is only our analysis of our elite at
the end of last year and in the beginning of this one. 

Karaganov: Thank you. I can confirm that we have never had a
consensus. Thank God, we have Konstantin Fyodorovich Zatulin, who
can always prove something to us. Let me remind you one more time
that we began this work long before the elections. During the
elections many members of the Council -- at least 20-30 percent --
supported Fatherland -- All Russia, but not all of them wanted
Primakov as President, some wanted Luzhkov. And I assure you, it
was written for a hypothetical president.

By the way, we are happy that President Vladimir Vladimirovich
Putin does not differ, for the time being, ideologically from what
Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov said. Simply he is a more energetic and
younger man, which is encouraging. 

Now I would like to give the floor to Yuri Baturin, a member
of our Council who has participated in a space mission.

Baturin: Excuse me, but my remark is less serious than the
previous one. Dear colleagues, the final section of the book we
presented today says what high offices read the documents prepared
by the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy: the State Duma, the
presidential administration, etc. And it emphasizes that the most
important thing though is to establish horizontal ties.

Let me give one document to honorable Sergei Alexandrovich
Karaganov. This document provides evidence of vertical ties. It is
called "On Getting out of the Crisis" and it was prepared for the
Assembly of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy in February
of last year. Just several days after these theses had been
discussed, I sent the document to my colleagues at the orbiting
station Mir by a space cargo ship which arrived there on February
22, 1999, as evidenced by the stamp of Mir's post office.

It stayed there for half a year and was thoroughly studied, as
proved by the signatures affixed to it by cosmonauts Viktor
Afanasyev, Sergei Avdeyev and French astronaut Jean Pierre Egnere
(sp.?) and by Mir's seal. This document was brought back to Earth
by cosmonaut Sergei Avdeyev. I would like to hand it over to Sergei
Alexandrovich and say that first, never before have documents of
the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy been read so high,
congratulate him on the new excellent work and wish him to expand
his activities.

Karaganov: Thank you. This means that only stars are higher.
Thank you.

*****

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