April 13, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4244 • 4245 • 4246

Johnson's Russia List
#4245
13 April 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow Times: Simon Saradzhyan, Duma Prepares To Ratify START II.
2. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, START II Is a Non-Starter.
3. The Guardian (UK): Amelia Gentleman, Moscow aims for Stalin's heights.                                     A skyscraper scheme for the capital finds its inspiration 
in the communist leader's grandiose towers.
4. Reuters: Russia's Putin names new economic adviser.(Illarionov)
5. Vladimir Mau's book: Russian Economic Reforms as Seen by an Insider: Success or Failure.
6. Patrick Armstrong: WAHHABI WEBSITE ON CHECHNYA WAR.
7. US Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich's testimony:
RUSSIA'S ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLICY.
8. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Russian Human Rights Commissioner's 1999 Report.] 

******

#1
Moscow Times
April 13, 2000 
Duma Prepares To Ratify START II 
By Simon Saradzhyan
Staff Writer

Although the State Duma is finally set to ratify the seven-year-old START II 
treaty Friday, doubts still linger as to whether Russia will benefit from 
conceding to another reduction of its strategic nuclear arsenal in light of 
the United States' persistent attempts to build up its anti-ballistic missile 
shield, experts said. 

Analysts say that even under START II, Russia will not be able to maintain an 
arsenal equal in size to that of the United States: The run-down condition of 
its existing weapons would force Russia to build new ones that it can not 
possibly afford. 

Russia will be able to maintain strategic parity only if it manages to 
convince the United States to sign a START III treaty, which calls for a 
sharper reduction in weapons than START II, Alexander Pikayev of the Moscow 
Carnegie Center said. 

Despite opponents' warnings that ratifying the treaty would irreversibly 
weaken Russia, most observers believe START II will indeed be passed this 
week. 

Leaders of the Duma's pro-Kremlin Unity faction, the Fatherland-All Russia 
faction and the liberal Yabloko and Union of Right Forces groups have already 
stated their support for ratification. 

These four factions can easily muster the 226 votes needed to ratify the 
treaty, and even the staunch opposition by the Communists and their Agrarian 
allies will not derail ratification, according to an expert with the Duma's 
international affairs committee. 

This influential committee voted Monday to recommend that the Duma ratify 
START II, which requires Russia and the United States to halve the number of 
nuclear warheads on their ballistic missiles to 3,500 each by 2007, the 
expert, who asked not to be named, said in a phone interview Monday. 

Nonetheless, the advantages of ratification are unclear for Russia. 

Any deep cuts into Russia's nuclear arsenal will weaken the armed forces' 
ability to ensure so-called "guaranteed destruction" if the United States 
decides to go ahead with deployment of a powerful anti-ballistic missile 
defense, both Pikayev and Ivan Safranchuk of the Moscow-based Center for 
Policy Studies said. 

"The strategic parity between Russia and the United States may cease to exist 
if we implement START II and the United States deploys its anti-ballistic 
missile defense," Safranchuk cautioned. 

Although such a national defense system would violate the 1972 U.S.-Soviet 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - allowing each country to deploy no more than 
100 interceptors in one area while prohibiting any nation-wide ballistic 
missile defense - both analysts believed that the United States would push 
ahead to expand its defense system, ABM notwithstanding. 

U.S. President Bill Clinton is set to make an official decision on deployment 
of such a system in June, although he may postpone the decision until 
October, Safranchuk said in a telephone interview Wednesday. 

Both Clinton and his senior foreign policy aides have repeatedly suggested 
Washington and Moscow hold talks to modify the ABM treaty, arguing that the 
United States must shield itself from pariah nations, such as North Korea, 
that are busy developing long-range nuclear arms. 

Russia has flatly refused to discuss amending the treaty, insisting such a 
shield would seriously diminish Russian strategic forces' capability to 
ensure guaranteed destruction in the event of nuclear war. "Guaranteed 
destruction" has always been the factor keeping the two countries from 
attacking each other, even in cases when one of them has attempted to build 
more warheads, threatening to disturb the quantitative balance. 

But ratifying START II alone will most likely not be enough to maintain 
quantitative parity, both Safranchuk and Pikayev said. 

The Russian military will see the number of warheads on its ballistic 
missiles drop to 3,000 or less in the next five years even if START II is not 
ratified, Pikayev said in a phone interview Wednesday. 

Hundreds of ballistic missiles will have to be decommissioned in the next 
five years after their guaranteed service life ends, and Russia can afford to 
produce only some 10 new Topol-M missiles a year to replace them, the expert 
said. 

Along with START II, the Duma is set to adopt two more bills, according to 
the international affairs committee expert. One is intended to clarify the 
definition of a national anti-ballistic missile defense system and stresses 
that Russia will walk out of START II if the United States violates the ABM 
treaty. The second bill stipulates that Russia and the United States must 
begin talks on a START III treaty that would provide for even deeper 
reductions of the two countries' strategic nuclear arsenals. 

Pikayev reiterated that Russia's only hope of maintaining strategic parity is 
to convince the United States to sign a START III agreement in exchange for 
conceding to modify the ABM treaty. 

Clinton and his then Russian counterpart President Boris Yeltsin agreed at a 
summit in Helsinki in 1997 that START III would require the two countries' 
strategic nuclear arsenals to be reduced to some 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. Two 
years later, Russia proposed that START III require these arsenals to be cut 
to some 1,000 to 1,500 warheads each. 

In comparison, the 1991 START I treaty, which is already being implemented by 
the two countries, requires the number of warheads on strategic missiles to 
be cut to 6,000 each. Russia currently has some 3,590 warheads on its 
land-based ballistic missiles, 2,400 warheads on its sea-launch ballistic 
missiles and another 552 warheads deployed on long-range missiles that can be 
carried by the Air Force's strategic bombers, Safranchuk said. 

Washington has failed to respond to Russia's 1999 proposal on START III, and 
continues to insist that it will agree to talks on START III only in the 
event that START II is ratified by the Duma. 

Yeltsin and then U.S. President George Bush signed START II in Moscow back in 
1993. 

U.S. legislators ratified the treaty in 1996, but their Russian counterparts 
have repeatedly refused to follow suit, despite pressure from both Russian 
government leaders and senior military commanders. 

Now, the important thing seems to be not so much START II, but the agreements 
that will follow. 

"Only a START III treaty will allow us to maintain an arsenal that will be 
both affordable for Russia ... and will make it possible to continue 
maintaining some sort of parity with the United States," Pikayev concluded. 

******

#2
Moscow Times
April 13, 2000 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: START II Is a Non-Starter 
By Pavel Felgenhauer (pavelf@online.ru)

Once again, the START II arms reduction treaty seems to be on the verge of 
being ratified by the State Duma. President-elect Vladimir Putin apparently 
has ordered Duma deputies to stop their monkey business and ratify START II, 
signed in 1993 by U.S. President George Bush and Russia's Boris Yeltsin. 
Actually, START II may be ratified Friday. 

So where's the catch? Why the hurry? Why was START II not ratified before, 
and how will this ratification influence long-term Russia-U.S. relations? 

To the outside world, Russian officials and television propaganda outfits are 
saying that ratification of START II proves Russia's good intentions, its 
desire to be a reliable partner of the West, and so on. But to 
nationalistically minded Duma deputies, the Kremlin is telling a different 
story. 

Last October, one of Russia's deputy foreign ministers told me: "We tell the 
Duma deputies - ratify START II and give us a propaganda ploy to expose the 
evil Americans. Anyway, START II will never be actually implemented, because 
the U.S. will either abandon the ABM Treaty, or the U.S. Senate will not 
ratify START II and ABM amendments." 

Apparently, this scenario of ratification of a treaty that will never be 
implemented is being realized today. 

The U.S. Senate ratified START II in 1996. But since then, Russia and the 
U.S. government have modified the treaty. In New York, in September 1997, 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov 
signed a protocol postponing until 2007 - instead of the original deadline of 
2003 - the time period for final destruction of Russian land-based, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, banned under START II. Albright and 
Primakov also signed a letter reaffirming U.S. and Russian commitment to 
uphold the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and, at the same time, 
distinguishing the characteristics of so-called "theater of war" or 
"tactical" anti-ballistic systems allowed under ABM. 

The catch for a speedy ratification of START II by the Duma is that the 
treaty will be ratified together with the 1997 agreements and also with a 
special resolution that will declare Russia's intention to make START II null 
and void if the United States scraps the 1972 ABM Treaty. Of course, the 
resolution attached by the Duma is not legally binding. But if the 1997 
agreements are in fact ratified by the Duma, START II will not go into force 
before the U.S. Senate ratifies them in turn. 

To date, the U.S. Senate has refused to consider the 1997 U.S.-Russian 
agreements, and Republican Senate leaders say they may not ratify them at 
all, especial ly the ABM amendments, which are seen as a ploy by Russians and 
Clintonian Democrats to prevent the deployment of a national missile defense. 

In 1993, Russian military leaders agreed with their U.S. counterparts on 
START II limitations (3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads) because they 
hoped to deploy hundreds of new ICBMs in the mid-1990s. But today it's 
obvious that Russia cannot implement START II fully and fill all the slots 
allocated by the treaty with real weapons. 

A follow-up START III arms control treaty has been agreed in principle 
between Moscow and Washington. But this treaty has also become a source of 
discord. Moscow wants more drastic cuts in nuclear armaments, with both sides 
allowed no more than 1,500 strategic warheads; the U.S. says it wants to keep 
at least 2,500. 

U.S.-Russian wrangling on nuclear arms limitations has become ridiculous. 
During the Cold War, the strategic nuclear balance prevented local proxy wars 
from developing into global holocaust. Arms-control agreements helped keep 
the balance and were vitally important. Today's Russia cannot possibly 
counterbalance the U.S. worldwide or resume a full-blown arms race. The 
possibility that a conventional war in Europe can go global is zero. U.S. and 
Russian strategic nuclear military forces that for decades kept global 
political rivals at arm's length are today deterring only each other. 

As the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals were diminished after the end of the 
Cold War, arms agreements have become more complex and increasingly 
insignificant politically. START treaties are only a cause of senseless 
squabbles between nationalistic morons. 

In the future, the United States and Russia most likely will keep as many 
nuclear weapons as each side sees fit and affordable, while political 
relations between East and West will be determined by Russia's internal 
policies, including its behavior in Chechnya, as well as the successes or 
failures of its economy. 

Pavel Felgenhauer is a Moscow-based, independent defense analyst. 

*******

#3
The Guardian (UK)
13 April 2000
[for personal use only]
Moscow aims for Stalin's heights 
A skyscraper scheme for the capital finds its inspiration in the communist 
leader's grandiose towers
By Amelia Gentleman in Moscow

The Moscow skyline is about to be transformed by a building programme which 
could give it many as 60 new skyscrapers inspired by the Stalin tower blocks 
which currently dominate it. 

Work has just begun on the first, an updated version of the Stalinist 
original, and sites have been allocated for the next six. Moscow city council 
has given permission for another 53 in the next 15 years. 

When Joseph Stalin ordered the construction of Moscow's seven showpiece 
skyscrapers - grandiose structures characterised by their wedding-cake 
silhouettes - just after the second world war he was determined to prove that 
Russia could keep up with the west in terms of architectural extravagance and 
innovation. 

"We've won the war and are recognised the world over as the glorious victors. 
We must be ready for an influx of foreign visitors," he is quoted as saying. 
"What will happen if they walk around Moscow and find no skyscrapers? They 
will make unfavourable comparisons with capitalist cities." 

The new project is part of the mayor Yury Luzhkov's dream of seeing the city 
regenerated as a rival to western European capitals. 

Stalin's neo-gothic blocks form a ring in the centre of Moscow; Luzhkov's 
skyscrapers are designed to form a new ring just beyond the centre. "Every 
one of the 60 buildings will be an original adornment to Moscow," he said as 
the first stone was laid. 

The luxurious high-ceilinged flats in the original skyscrapers were handed 
out to favoured members of the party nomenklatura, but the new ones are 
intended for another brand of elite. The developer behind the project, Konti, 
hope that Russia's "newly emerging upper-middle classes" will be prepared to 
pay over the odds "to secure themselves a prestigious address with panoramic 
views over Moscow". 

The first 43-floor block will have underground parking, a shopping centre, 
restaurants, and possibly a nightclub, 10 minutes' walk from the city centre 
on the edge of the green expanse of Victory Park. 

Konti is keen to emphasise the "ecologically clean environment" - fresh air 
is a valuable commodity in Moscow. 

By Russian standards the flats will not be cheap: an average-sized two-room 
flat will cost about £57,000 - a price even Konti concedes is expensive, even 
though the land on which the blocks are to be built has been given to it by 
the city council. 

Much of the £12.5m profit the firm expects to make on each block will go back 
to the council and be channelled towards renovating Moscow's crumbling 
"Krushchev blocks" - the identical five-storey shoe-box-like buildings put up 
by Stalin's successor in the 60s to house the capital's booming population, 
which are in urgent need of repair. 

Western investors are being courted by the developer, but if they prove 
unforthcoming Konti will not start work on the second block until the money 
from the sale of the 444 flats and offices in the first building is banked. 

The idea of launching such a grandiose scheme when Russia's economic 
situation remains unstable has caused some controversy. Difficult and 
expensive to build, skyscrapers are usually preferred only when land is 
scarce and exorbitantly expensive, which is not the case in Moscow. 

There is no building company in Moscow with the necessary expertise, and much 
of the work on the higher levels will be contracted out to foreign companies. 

Alexander Shchetinin of Konti said the grand scale of the project was 
designed with urban regeneration in mind. 

"This is more than just a commercial programme, it is a social project too. 
We want to make the blocks focal points for the surrounding areas." 

Each block will be slightly different, but there will be a stylistic unity to 
the project, he said. "It won't have the pomposity of the original Stalin 
buildings, but every block will be reminiscent of the original series, 
recreated in a modern style." 

The architecture critic Grigory Revzin said that with estimated prices 
approximately twice the Moscow average, he was doubtful whether enough people 
would be attracted to buy skyscraper flats. 

"These blocks are being developed as prestigious living spaces. But research 
into the reality of housing people in skyscrapers shows that psychologically 
it's very hard: you never see the ground, it's like living in an aeroplane." 

*******

#4
Russia's Putin names new economic adviser

MOSCOW, April 12 (Reuters) - The Kremlin said on Wednesday President-elect 
Vladimir Putin had named Andrei Illarionov, a pro-market economist known for 
his independent views, as an adviser. 

Illarionov, head of the Institute for Economic Analysis, has sharply 
criticised the policies of previous governments and pressed for an end to 
borrowing from the International Monetary Fund, stressing that Russia had to 
rely on its own resources. 

In the weeks ahead of Russia's financial crisis in August 1998, Illarionov 
warned of the dangers of the government's practice of resorting to domestic 
borrowing to finance the country's budget deficit. 

He also predicted a devaluation of the rouble, which the government and 
central bank were fiercely resisting at the time. Eventually, Russia 
defaulted on its domestic debt and devalued the rouble. 

Illarionov, a member of the think-tank involved in drawing up Putin's 
long-term economic strategy, has said the IMF could help Russia better by 
drafting economic policy rather than distributing new funds. 

In an interview with ORT television after his appointment, he said it was too 
early to talk about concrete measures planned by Putin, who is due to be 
inaugurated on May 7. Putin says he is committed to market reforms but his 
plans remain a mystery. 

Illarionov said Russia's economic situation was relatively encouraging now 
despite a drop in oil prices in the past two weeks as a result of output 
increases by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 

He also warned of the dangers of relying too much on revenues from exports of 
natural resources, the main stimulus for a budding economic recovery in 
recent months. 

``In the long-term we will not get very far if we remain addicted to the oil 
needle,'' he said. 

*******

#5
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2000 
From: Joann Fong <jfong@riia.org> (
Subject: Vladimir Mau "Russian Economic Reforms as Seen by an
Insider: Success or Failure"

Dear Mr. Johnson,

I am writing to you from the International Economics Programme at the Royal
Institute of International Affairs. You had included an overview of
Professor Stiglitz's papers on the IMF and Russia in this email and I
thought you might be interested to know that we have recently published a
book by Vladimir Mau entitled "Russian Economic Reforms as Seen by an
Insider: Success or Failure". It is a response to Professor Stiglitz's
paper entitled Whither Reforms?

I have attached a summary of the publication for your interest.
If you have any questions about the publication, please don't hesitate to
contact me. 

Best regards,
Joann Fong
Programme Administrator
International Economics Programme
RIIA
T: +44 (0)171 957 5742
F: +44 (0)171 957 5710
jfong@riia.org
www.riia.org

Russian Economic Reforms as Seen by an Insider: Success or Failure?
By Vladimir Mau

Russia's struggle to build a market economy on the ruins of central
planning has been strongly criticized by Western observers. For example,
Professor Joseph Stiglitz's Whither Reform? Contains a set of 'accusations'
contained in Stiglitz's paper to reflect on the Russian transformation.
Four main questions are therefore considered:
· Could Russia have followed the Chinese model?
· What was the role of financial stabilization and of institutional reforms?
· How successful was the Russian privatization process?
· What was the role of Western advisers?

Vladimir Mau shows that most of the criticisms originate from a complete
ignorance of the transformation that Russia had to undertake, given the way
in which Soviet central planning functioned and the social and ethical
wasteland bequeathed by the Soviet system. His paper argues that this
transformation has been a revolution, comparable to the European
revolutions of the past. Such an approach contributes to a better and more
helpful understanding of contemporary Russia.

******

#6
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2000 
From: Patrick Armstrong <ab966@issc.debbs.ndhq.dnd.ca> 
Subject: WAHHABI WEBSITE ON CHECHNYA WAR

For a fully rounded view of what's happening in Chechnya, I recommend a
look at this site which is evidently run by Khattab and based, I am
told, in Malaysia.

http://www.qoqaz.net.my.

*****

#7
US Department of State
12 April 2000 
Text: State Department's Sestanovich on Russia's Election 
(April 12: Discusses election of Putin; Chechnya; U.S. policy) (1980)

Speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about Russia's
March 26 presidential election which was won by acting President
Vladimir Putin, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich said
"leadership change in Moscow does not alter the premises of American
policy."

A Russian leader committed to reducing Cold War arsenals, stopping
proliferation, building a stable and undivided Europe, and supporting
the country's democratic transformation "will find in the United
States an eager and active partner," Sestanovich said April 12. He is
special advisor to the Secretary of State for the New Independent
States.

The ambassador noted that according to international observers, the
Russian election produced "few procedural improprieties." Other points
made by Sestanovich about the election: there were fewer votes for the
communist candidate than in previous elections; the "politics of
personality" carried the day; the opposition did not have equal access
to the media as did the Putin camp; and Putin acknowledged that
millions of voters had expressed dissatisfaction with their standard
of living and economic prospects.

He pointed out that Putin continued to take aggressive action in
Chechnya during the presidential campaign. The Chechnya conflict
"casts a long shadow" over "the many opportunities before us for
enhanced Russian-American cooperation," he added.

The United States supports the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights' call for an independent Russian commission of inquiry,
bolstered by international experts, into human rights violations in
Chechnya: "We have urged the Russian government to embrace this
proposal, and take credible steps showing that it will actually
enforce international standards of accountability," Sestanovich said.

Other critical issues Putin must deal with, he said, are: promoting
economic growth; fighting crime and corruption; continuing to
cooperate with the West on non-proliferation, export controls,
improving security over Russia's weapons of mass destruction, finding
peaceful commercial work for former Soviet weapons scientists,
ratification of START II, and continuing discussions on START III and
changes in the ABM treaty.

Following is the text of Sestanovich's prepared statement:

(begin text)

"RUSSIA'S ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLICY"

Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich
Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the New Independent
States

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
April 12, 2000

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Russian
presidential election with you and your colleagues and to explore its
implications for American policy. Nothing can do more to help us get
our Russia policy right than regular consultation between Congress and
the Administration.

Let me begin with the election results. Your program today includes
some of our country's best commentators on post-Communist politics, to
help you dig beneath the surface of the news. Yet even the headlines
tell us a great deal about Russian politics after Boris Yeltsin.

The first headline is, of course, that the election happened. We
witnessed a constitutional process, with multiple candidates, very
high turnout, and -- according to the many international observers on
the scene -- few procedural improprieties. I recall the confident
forecast of a distinguished Russian analyst after the 1996 election,
that Russian voters would never again have the chance to pick their
president at the polls. In the past decade, elections have become the
only legitimate way to select Russia's leaders.

A second headline is that Russian voters showed even less interest
than they did four years ago in returning the Communists to power. Mr.
Zyuganov, the Communist standard bearer for the second time in a row,
received two million fewer votes than he did in the first round in
1996, and eight million fewer than he did in the second round that
same year.

A third headline. Russian politics, at least at the presidential
level, remains the politics of personality. It revolves around
individual leaders rather than around programmatic alternatives among
which the voters choose. While rebuffing the Communist party, Russian
voters have not transferred their allegiance to other parties. Polls
indicate that that they turned to Mr. Putin because across the
ideological spectrum voters were confident that his views were their
views.

I would frame a fourth headline this way: The election displayed the
strength of Russian democracy, but also its weaknesses. One of these
was highlighted by the Putin camp's misuse of state television, to
smear other candidates or to keep formidable rivals from entering the
race. Speaking to the press on election night, Mr. Putin himself
acknowledged that the opposition did not have equal access to the
media -- a problem that is hardly unique to Russia, but no less
serious for that. The emergence of genuinely independent media remains
a real challenge in deepening democracy in Russia.

Fifth were signs of voter dissatisfaction. Yes, the Communist party's
appeal is down, but on the day after his victory Mr. Putin
acknowledged that he had to respond to the tens of millions of
Russians who, in voting against him, were protesting their standard of
living and economic prospects. Many of his own supporters, of course,
were protest voters too, and he will need to answer to them as well.

Finally, while the Russian presidential campaign was conspicuously
weak on substantive debate, one issue did more than any other to
define Mr. Putin's political profile, and that was the war in
Chechnya. In seeking the presidency he said many things that sounded
positive to Western ears -- from his conciliatory remarks about NATO
to his hints about how he would approach economic reform. But no
statements on the campaign trail spoke as loudly as the Russian
military campaign in Chechnya.

Mr. Chairman, we have by now all read many attempts to explain who
Vladimir Putin really is. It can make for fascinating reading, but as
a guide to his future actions it's probably a vain effort. We may
learn who Mr. Putin has been, but who he is - and what place he will
have in Russia's historic transition -- will increasingly be defined
by what he does. We may learn less by digging into his biography than
by digging into his inbox, to try to understand the political choices
that he faces.

No issue is likely to bulk larger in Mr. Putin's in-box than promoting
economic growth. Polls throughout the campaign indicated that this was
the top issue on voters' minds, and given the conditions in which
Russians find themselves today it could hardly have been otherwise.
Consider this. Over 35% of Russia's population lives on just over one
dollar a day. Rising oil prices and import substitution have rallied
the Russian economy in the past year, and created a budget surplus,
but it would quickly disappear if the price of oil dropped below $20 a
barrel. Sustained growth will require much more structural reform and
much more capital investment. To improve its investment climate, the
new Russian government is going to have to fix its tax laws and
banking system. Mr. Putin has promised quick action on investment
legislation, the tax code and production sharing agreements. He has
every reason to do so.

An equally big problem in the Russian president's in-box is crime and
corruption Taking on this issue is good politics, since three of four
Russians believe that too little progress has been made toward
achieving the rule of law. But doing so also has real practical
significance for a new president who wants to do his job. His ability
to get things done, to get the bureaucracy to respond to his
directives, depends on choking off corruption among officials at all
levels. Mr. Putin has said new money laundering legislation will be
one of his top priorities, Legislation is also needed to stem
corruption and organized crime, but new laws alone will not be enough.
Much work needs to be done to strengthen their enforcement.

Mr. Putin can hardly ignore a third set of issues in his in-box,
involving security cooperation with the West. In the past decade such
cooperative efforts have led to the deactivation of almost 5,000
nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, improved security of
nuclear weapons and materials at more than 50 sites, and permitted the
purchase of more than 60 tons of highly enriched uranium that could
have been used by terrorists or outlaw states. Today, that cooperation
continues. Our Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative will help Russia
tighten export controls, improve security over its existing weapons of
mass destruction, and help thousands of former Soviet weapons
scientists to participate in peaceful research projects with
commercial applications.

The U.S. and Russia have also been partners in developing the
foundations of a stronger non-proliferation regime. Russia's transfer
of dangerous technology and knowhow to Iran has not been fully turned
off, but we have made some progress. We believe Mr. Putin and his team
understand how this problem can undermine our ability to cooperate
across the board.

Strategic arms control is one issue in Mr. Putin's in-box that has
already shown movement, with the scheduling of a Duma vote on START II
for this Friday. Since last summer's G-8 summit in Cologne, we have
held discussions with the Russians on START III reductions and changes
in the ABM Treaty. Ratification of START II would move us closer to
real negotiations, on deeper reductions in Russian and American
nuclear forces and on countering the new threats we face while
preserving the security of both sides.

Mr. Chairman, on economic and security issues alike, Mr. Putin's
in-box suggests the many opportunities before us for enhanced
Russian-American cooperation. The conflict in Chechnya, however, casts
a long shadow over these opportunities. When I appeared before this
committee on November 4, I said that we did not dispute Russia's right
to combat a terrorist insurgency, but that we could not let this fact
blind us to the human cost of the conflict. Today the numbers speak
for themselves: a quarter of a million people displaced, thousands of
innocent civilians dead or wounded, and thousands of homes destroyed.
It will take decades and millions of dollars to rebuild Chechnya.

Allegations about atrocities by Russian forces have only strengthened
the concerns that I raised here last November about the Russian
Government's commitment to human rights and international norms. In
response to persistent pressure from the U.S. and other western
nations, Russia has agreed to grant ICRC access to detainees, agreed
to reestablish an OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya and agreed to add
Council of Europe experts to the staff of Russia's new human rights
ombudsman for Chechnya.

These steps are a start, but only a start, and speedy follow-on
measures are essential. The UN Commission on Human Rights is seized
with the issue of Chechnya this week, and its deliberations will test
whether Russia is prepared to respond to international concerns. The
U.S. has supported High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson's
call for an independent Russian commission of inquiry into human
rights violations, bolstered by the participation of experts from
international organizations. Such a commission could investigate
allegations, prepare a public report and refer cases to prosecutors
for action. We have urged the Russian government to embrace this
proposal, and take credible steps showing that it will actually
enforce international standards of accountability.

Mr. Chairman, leadership change in Moscow does not alter the premises
of American policy. We continue to see an historic opportunity to add
to our security, and that of our allies, by reducing Cold War
arsenals, stopping proliferation, building a stable and undivided
Europe, and supporting the democratic transformation of Russia's
political, economic, and social institutions. As President Clinton has
said, a new Russian leader committed to these goals, and to the
international norms on which they rest, will find in the United States
an eager and active partner.

******

#8
Russian Human Rights Commissioner's 1999 Report 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta 
April 4, 2000
[translation for personal use only]
First part of 1999 report of RF Human Rights Commissioner 

Introduction 

This report on the Federal Commissioner's activities in 1999 is 
hereby submitted in accordance with the Federal Constitutional Law "On 
the Commissioner of Human Rights in the Russian Federation (Subsection 1 
of Section 31). 

The report contains information about the status and restoration of 
human rights and liberties in the Russian Federation, the guarantee of 
their protection, observance, and respect by central and local government 
agencies and officials, and international contacts and cooperation with 
law enforcement organizations for the improvement of Russian human rights 
legislation. 

The Commissioner's conclusions, opinions, and suggestions are based 
on a thorough analysis of the individual and group inquiries he has 
received from citizens, public associations, and non-governmental law 
enforcement organizations and on the subsequent findings of the 
Commissioner and of agencies of the executive branch of government, the 
judiciary, and the procuracy, acting on his instructions. The materials 
used in this process included information submitted to the Commissioner 
of Human Rights in the regions of the Russian Federation, the records of 
official trips to the regions, the reports compiled by members of the 
Commissioner's staff, the analytical data of national and international 
applied-science conferences, the results of sociological research, and 
items pertaining to human rights issues in the national and foreign news 
media. 

The report is being submitted to the acting President of the Russian 
Federation, the Federation Council and State Duma of the Federal Assembly 
of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation, the Superior Arbitration Court of the Russian 
Federation, and the acting Prosecutor-General of the Russian Federation. 

"The individual and his rights and liberties are the highest 
priority. The state is obligated to acknowledge, observe, and protect 
human and civil rights and liberties"--Constitution of the Russian 
Federation (Article 2). 

I. Human Rights Issues in the Present Socioeconomic Atmosphere in 
Russia 

Russia is currently living through a period of difficulties connected 
with reforms in the political, economic, social, cultural, legal, and 
spiritual spheres of life. The 1993 Constitution of the Russian 
Federation officially recorded the democratic bases of Russian statehood, 
established a new set of relations between the center and the regions, 
and provided the society and the government with legal mechanisms for the 
resolution of conflicts. 

In recent years several laws have been passed in the Russian 
Federation to strengthen the guarantees of the observance of civil 
rights, and fundamental international agreements on human rights have 
been ratified. In spite of this, the democratic changes and the 
economic reforms have not produced the anticipated results and have not 
contributed to appreciable progress in the defense and protection of the 
rights and liberties of Russians. 

Sweeping violations of civil and political rights, and especially 
socioeconomic rights, are being reported. The rights of refugees and 
displaced persons are still being violated, the earlier problems in the 
penitentiary system still exist, the rights of servicemen are restricted, 
and there are apparent signs of extremism and anti-Semitism. The lack 
of respect for the law and the contemptuous attitude toward the rights 
and legitimate interests of citizens are having a negative effect on the 
state of the society as a whole and are causing the Russians to mistrust 
the authorities. 

Under these conditions, it is important to record and report major 
violations of human rights for the purpose of mobilizing public opinion 
and encouraging government agencies to eliminate them. 

The Constitution of the Russian Federation defines the Russian State 
as a social system in which the socioeconomic rights of citizens are 
guaranteed by law, and in which the aims of official policy include the 
establishment of the necessary conditions for the free development of the 
individual, living the kind of life he deserves. Pursuant to Article 25 
of the General Declaration of Human Rights and Article 11 of the 
International Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the 
strategic goal of the social state is the guaranteed right of the 
individual to the standard of living required for the health and 
happiness of this individual and the members of his family, and to 
compensation for unemployment, illness, disability, advanced age, or any 
other event causing him to lose his means of making a living as a result 
of circumstances beyond his control. 

The socioeconomic state of the Russian Federation in the 1990s 
indicated that these principles are still only the announced goals of 
national development and the projected standards of the future. To a 
considerable extent, the chosen economic strategy turned out to be 
impracticable. The emphasis on the resolution of macroeconomic problems 
led to the destruction of the country's economic potential, a decrease in 
production output in all sectors of the economy, and the reduction of the 
average life-span of our citizens. The chosen form of privatization did 
not result in the restructuring of the economy and did not create a class 
of property owners. The absence of a strategy for the conversion of the 
military-industrial complex caused serious problems in the sphere of 
public employment. The ineffective tax policy, primitive settlement 
practices, barter transactions, and the exorbitant cost of credit in the 
physical production sector severely complicated the civilized development 
of market relations. 

The financial crisis that broke out in August 1998 had a serious 
destabilizing effect on the Russian economy. Millions of Russians were 
barely able to survive. Real private monetary income dipped to 50 
percent of the 1991 figure and real wages plunged to less than half of 
the earlier amount. Russia is now among the bottom 20 percent of the 
world's nations in terms of the 33 indicators the United Nations uses to 
determine the standard of living. Citizens with an income below the 
minimum subsistence figure now represent a third of the population. 
Differences in property and income levels are growing. The payment of 
wages in the form of enterprise credit cards and vouchers is becoming a 
common practice, putting Russia in the same position as countries with 
the most primitive distribution systems. 

The chronic shortage of budget resources is limiting the state's 
ability to pursue an active social policy. As a result, the social cost 
of economic reform has been too high for the Russian public. 

In 1999 there were 252,000 reported crimes in the economic sphere, or 
20 percent more than in the previous year. 

The general deterioration of economic conditions has complicated the 
observance of citizens' rights to life, liberty, and personal 
inviolability. 

The political instability, severe social conflicts, and economic 
crisis created inter-ethnic problems in the republics of North 
Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, and Karachay-Cherkessia and resulted in armed 
conflicts the Chechen Republic and the Dagestan Republic, costing the 
lives of thousands of Russian citizens. Hostile acts of terrorism in 
Buynaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk killed hundreds of civilians, including 
children. 

The reforms in Russia have been accompanied by an unprecedented 
increase in violations of the socioeconomic rights of the laboring public 
and the diminished ability of the state to oversee their observance. 

Labor and wages--the main factors contributing to the economic 
development of the society--have been jeopardized. The low level of 
wages gives enterprises no incentive to make technological improvements 
in the workplace, encourages malingering, and prevents the growth of 
labor productivity. The average national wage is now almost equivalent 
to social survival benefits. Real per capita income, wages, and 
pensions cannot provide most workers, pensioners, and their families with 
a normal standard of living. 

The chronic delays in the payment of wages and the lack of a sense of 
collective responsibility by administrative personnel and hired labor for 
the economic state of enterprises are compounding the problem. A delay 
of one or two months, not to mention longer delays, in the payment of 
wages can create serious economic and psychological difficulties for most 
low-income families. The failure to pay wages on schedule is usually 
one of the main causes of large-scale demonstrations by workers, which 
essentially can be defined as a response to the violation of their human 
rights. 

People in the northern regions and regions with a high rate of 
unemployment have to work for a limited variety of food items, which 
essentially constitutes forced labor. A complaint the Commissioner 
received from the workers on a collective farm in Bilibinskiy Rayon in 
the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, for example, said that they had not 
received any wages for 21 months. In lieu of wages, they were offered a 
limited supply of foods from the municipal store--one loaf of bread a day 
and one kilogram of sugar and two or three kilograms of cereal grains a 
month. 

In spite of the present state of the Russian economy and its 
resources, however, the failure to pay wages, pensions, and benefits is 
one of the human rights violations that cannot be categorized as 
unavoidable. Strict compliance with ILO Convention 173, protecting the 
interests of the workers of insolvent employers, is essential, and it 
assigns priority to the payment of wages. 

There have been more frequent incidents of unlawful dismissals, 
mandatory leaves without pay, and other violations of the Labor Code of 
the Russian Federation. Labor contracts are not negotiated in the 
manner prescribed by law at many of the new commercial organizations. 
Close to 20,000 illegally dismissed workers are reinstated in their jobs 
each year by court order. 

Labor safety and equipment safety requirements were likely to be 
ignored during the period of economic crisis. The working conditions of 
more than 43 percent of the laboring public are inconsistent with public 
health standards. The rate of industrial accidents has risen sharply. 
Some of the provisions of the 1993 Fundamentals of Labor Safety 
Legislation in the Russian Federation have been disregarded. Labor 
safety funds are not being established, labor safety divisions have 
suffered personnel cuts or have been completely eliminated, and the 
executive agencies of Russian Federation members have been too slow in 
setting up subdivisions of the State Labor Safety Administration. 

Human rights violations in the employment sphere have been acquiring 
broader proportions. There were 9.1 million unemployed workers in 1999, 
but only 1.3 million were registered as unemployed with agencies of the 
employment service. More than 4 million people are working part-time or 
are on mandatory leave. The high rate of unemployment among women is 
particularly alarming. There is no effective demand for the graduates 
of higher and secondary specialized academic institutions. Many of them 
can expect to join the ranks of the unemployed as soon as they graduate. 

Workers have recently been more likely to turn to the courts for the 
protection of their rights. The number of wage complaints handled by 
public courts rose from 19,000 in 1993 to 1.3 million in 1998--an almost 
70-fold increase. 

Laws on the rights of labor in the Russian Federation and their 
observance are not completely consistent with the principles of a 
law-governed social state. Several federal laws pertaining to labor 
rights and the interests of the laboring public do not meet present 
requirements and must be amended or supplemented. 

The unhealthy state of the economy has had a particularly negative 
effect on the status of social vulnerable segments of the population. 
There are around 30.5 million elderly people in Russia today. In other 
words, almost one out of every five Russians falls into this category. 
Eighty percent of them are living below the poverty line. 
Cost-of-living adjustments in pensions are not keeping up with the rate 
of inflation. The present system of values is eroding the self-esteem 
of the elderly, and they are treated as virtually superfluous members of 
society. The number of boarding houses for the elderly is rising, but 
so is the number of applicants. There are over 18,000 today. 

The general state of economic crisis has caused a pension security 
crisis. The average pension in Russia is equivalent to 73 percent of 
minimum subsistence. There is a system of double pensions in the 
country. The pensions paid to some categories of citizens, in the 
amount of 75 percent of their salary, are 6-10 times as high as the 
maximum labor pension. 

The rights of many retired individuals receiving pensions based on 
the individual minimum rate are being restricted. The pension increases 
for veterans who spent the Great Patriotic War working in air defense 
facilities, on defensive construction sites, and on front-line railroads 
and highways have been postponed indefinitely. 

Nothing has been done for the last several years to compensate 
citizens for the health impairments caused by exposure to radiation at 
the time of the Chernobyl accident, other accidents, and the subsequent 
clean-up operations. The number of disabled individuals who have not 
received free vehicles has risen. There has been a steady increase in 
violations of pension laws and the non-observance of the rights of the 
elderly and disabled by local government agencies and the public housing 
and utilities sector. 

Pensioners who spent 20-30 years working in the northern regions are 
in dire straits. They have no chance of a normal life today, and the 
program to resettle them in other regions has reached a virtual 
standstill. The physical survival of the northerners is in jeopardy. 
Russia is the only country in the world today that is not pursuing a 
protectionist policy in its own northern territories. 

Migration problems are now more acute in the Russian Federation. 
There is a growing need to migrate for economic and political reasons, 
and this is one of the factors compounding the country's socioeconomic 
difficulties. According to the Russian State Statistics Committee, more 
than 5 million people have moved to the Russian Federation since 1992. 
Furthermore, only 1.2 million meet the official definition of displaced 
persons and only 106,000 can claim refugee status. 

The poverty of these migrants has turned refugees and displaced 
persons into one of the most vulnerable social groups in Russia. People 
who seek refuge from persecution in Russia are frequently put in a 
position in which they have no opportunity to contribute their knowledge 
and energy to the state that has offered them asylum and has become their 
second home. Their inability to fight discriminatory practices and the 
indifference of officials on their own motivates them to live in migrant 
communities and to form public associations for the protection of their 
rights. Organizations of this kind have been established in Voronezh, 
Kaliningrad, Saratov, and several other oblasts. 

(To be continued) 

******

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http://www.cdi.org/russia