April 4, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4223 • 4224 •  4225

Johnson's Russia List
#4225
4 April 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Ivanov denounces Western interference in Chechnya.
2. Reuters: Putin liberal opponent quits as governor. (Titov)
3. Jerry Hough: Yeltsin.
4. Interfax: Analysis: Russian forces changing tactics in Chechnya.
5. Trud: Alexander Protsenko, DRAFTING THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM.
A New Russian Government Is Still Nowhere to Be Seen; However, 
They Have Already Started Translating Its Program into Life.
6. Moscow Times: Vladimir Kozin, The Future of the Nation With Putin at Helm.
7. Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev: To Join Or Not To Join? Nato and 
Russia's Ruling Class.]

*******

#1
Ivanov denounces Western interference in Chechnya
By Patrick Lannin

MOSCOW, April 4 (Reuters) - U.N. human rights chief Mary Robinson urged
Russia on Tuesday to set up an independent commission of inquiry into
``serious and documented'' allegations of human rights abuses in separatist
Chechnya. 

Robinson told reporters at the close a five-day tour of the North Caucasus
region that she believed human rights violations had been committed and
Kremlin authorities were becoming more aware of the seriousness of the
charges. 

Her request to meet President-elect Vladimir Putin went unanswered. 

In Geneva, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan backed Robinson's
call for an investigation. Speaking to reporters before addressing the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, Annan said he would meet her later in the day
on her return from Moscow. 

But Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told Robinson bluntly that Russia
would tolerate no interference in its internal affairs and was capable of
investigating instances of abuse itself. 

Russian forces have launched new air raids on rebels in mountain areas of
Chechnya in what the Kremlin calls an ``anti-terrorist operation.'' 

Twenty-five police commandos killed in an ambush last week were being
buried in the Urals region of Perm, where crowds filed through a sports
stadium to pay their respects and public buildings were draped in black
bunting. 

Altogether 43 servicemen died in the attack, the latest in a series of
setbacks to the military operation. 

Putin, wearing a mourning armband, attended the funeral in Moscow of three
other officers killed in the region -- agents of the FSB domestic
intelligence agancy he once headed. 

INQUIRY WOULD GIVE RUSSIA CREDIBILITY 

Robinson's statement said an independent commission, long demanded by human
rights groups, would ``provide a very public expression of the government's
willingness to fight impunity and rebuild the trust of the Chechen civilian
population.'' 

The statement said such a commission ``would go a long way to providing a
credible and sustained response to the large and growing number of
documented reports of violations allegedly committed by the country's
military personnel.'' 

``I do believe that there have been serious human rights violations,'' she
told a news conference, adding that she had listened to eyewitness accounts
of looting and mass killings. 

She described her talks in Moscow as constructive. ``I believe there is a
more serious realisation of the seriousness of the scale of human rights
allegations that require to be investigated,'' she said. 

Human rights groups have identified several instances of killing of
civilians by Russian troops. During her stay, Robinson has been careful to
be even-handed in also pointing to abuses by Chechen separatists before and
during the conflict. 

FOREIGN MINISTER DEFENDS OPERATION 

Ivanov mounted a strong defence of the military onslaught, telling Robinson
that her visit had been accompanied by an unprecedented ``propaganda
offensive.'' 

``In this connection, he rejected accusations of systematic human rights
violations by federal forces and said Russia was able to investigate
individual incidents thoroughly and objectively on its own,'' a ministry
statement said. 

Ivanov told Robinson that Russia had been open to international delegations
despite the fact that Chechnya was considered an internal issue, and Moscow
was ready to cooperate in bringing aid to the region. 

In Strasbourg, the political committee of the Council of Europe's
parliamentary assembly was to discuss whether to suspend Russian
membership. The Council has few powers but is of symbolic importance to
Russia in its bid to integrate with Western organisations. 

Russian news agencies quoted the military as saying air strikes had been
launched on areas south of the Chechen capital of Grozny. 

The city, largely destroyed, was captured in February and the Kremlin said
weeks ago its forces had eliminated all but a few vestiges of resistance. 

But Russian losses continue to mount in surprise attacks and in outbreaks
of fighting in remote villages. 

*******

#2
Putin liberal opponent quits as governor
By Peter Henderson

MOSCOW, April 4 (Reuters) - A Russian regional governor who ran against
Vladimir Putin in last month's presidential election has resigned his post,
a spokeswoman said on Tuesday. 

A source close to Konstantin Titov, governor of Samara region, said Titov
had given no reason for standing down but might run for the office again,
seeking a vote of confidence after his poor showing in the presidential
election. 

Titov, who split liberal ranks by running against Putin, sent his letter of
resignation to the regional legislature, his spokeswoman told Reuters. 

Legislators in Titov's Volga River region will consider the resignation on
Thursday and call a new gubernatorial election within 70 days if they
accept it, she said. 

Titov won only 1.5 percent of the vote in the presidential election,
compared with Putin's more than 52 percent. He took 20 percent of the vote
in his home region, one of the few relatively well-off Russian provinces. 

``The small number of votes he got, 20 percent, could be seen as a lack of
confidence. So he would take a decision to give up his current duties and
run again in the early poll,'' the source close to Titov said. 

RIA news agency quoted Titov as saying that he might run again for governor
``if the people express their confidence.'' 

Titov ran against Putin on a pro-reform platform, and in doing so split the
ranks of the SPS liberal party of which he is a leader and to which former
Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and businessman Anatoly Chubais belong. 

They both supported Putin for president, though other senior leaders
supported Titov on his claims of being a real reformer. 

Russian agencies quoted Titov's political allies as saying they were taken
by surprise by his decision to resign, though some also said it could be an
election strategy. 

Samara is an industrial centre and home to Russia's largest car maker,
AvtoVAZ. 

It is one of the few regions which is a net donor to the federal budget,
and Titov ran his campaign on his record for freeing up the regional
economy by cutting bureaucracy and attracting investment. 

*******

#3
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2000 21:38:49 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@duke.edu>
Subject: Yeltsin

I had lunch with a friend from Moscow today. I said that I had 
an eccentric theory that Yeltsin still ruled. He looked quizical and 
said that the great majority of knowledgeable people in Moscow believed 
that. And that Yeltsin has come out of hiding at the time the Minister 
of Defense was reappointed tends to back it up.

Either the Post or the Times came out with an editorial saying 
Putin should shape up human rights in Belarus. That makes no sense 
unless Putin is a code word for Yeltsin, who will be chairman of the 
Union Council.

But the question arises. If large numbers in Moscow think that 
Yeltsin rules and the Times editorial board assumes this, why is the 
speculation never discussed in the American media? I could provide 
an answer, but, alas, it would do my reputation as a sound, sober 
analyst no good. It would show that I listen to Rush too much on my 
commutes to Durham and back each week. But certainly all the speculation 
about what Putin will do is reported, and it certainly is less reliable 
than speculation about Yeltsin for no one has the slightest 
evidence of what Putin will do. Putin probably doesn't know because
Yeltsin probably hasn't told him yet.

It is not only that speculation about Yeltsin is not reported. We 
still read about "oligarchs." There are no oligarchs. They are the 
people close to Yeltsin who support his rule with subsidies, bribes, 
etc. That is what Berezovsky is, and so is Chubais, who occupies the 
same role but is part of the checks and balances against Berezovsky--and 
vice versa--like Zhdanov and Malenkov under Stalin. The fact that the 
family is still around is more evidence that the head of the family is.

I have never believed that I am always right. I push 
predictions and analyses as a way of advancing hypotheses to be tested 
and of stimulating discussion. I try to change prediction and analysis 
as more evidence comes in. But it is really discouraging--even sad--to 
be involved in the discussion of the last half dozen years. There is no 
discussion, no attempt to weigh evidence. My book on Gorbachev, which 
is really solidly researched and innovative, is not even damned. 

Ah well, the traditional complaint of the old. At least this 
old man can go back to the love of his youth--American history--and I 
haven't even had to teach about Russia for 5 years, only American politics.
My book on Presidential Electoral System: The Importance of the Symbolic
Issue will be finished by the fall. t was fun to polish the section on 
Ulyssis Grant--actually a first-class president--the other day and read a 
little more about him. His campaign of 1868 was a classic. He refused
to travel or campaign, but stayed at home. When reporters or anyone 
else came to visit, he refused to see them and to say anything about his 
views. And since he had been a non-political general, no one knew 
anything about his views. And, here, we did not think that Yeltsin 
and Putin understood American democracy.

******

#4
Analysis: Russian forces changing tactics in Chechnya

MOSCOW. April 3 (Interfax) - Despite an apparent lull, the Russian
forces are not ending their operations in Chechnya to crush rebel groups
and neutralize their leaders.
Russian generals are saying that the separatists' main forces and
their command posts, mountain bases and camps have to be destroyed
before the end of April, the time leaves come out on the trees and
mountain passes are cleared by melting snow.
This means, military experts believe, that the Russians will step
up their military activities soon.
Other evidence is the fact that Russian forces have carried out a
regrouping and taken up positions in the foothills and mountain regions.
Moreover, top Russian commanders are saying there are no immediate plans
for any serious personnel cuts in the Russian forces in Chechnya.
The military is saying, though, that it will most likely be
impossible to rout the rebel forces by May.
Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of Russia's general staff, has
told Interfax that heavy fighting is being replaced by "reconnaissance
and search operations," which "will be carried out jointly by units of
the armed forces, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Interior
Ministry."
One of the main goals is to prevent rebel leaders from bringing
together scattered groups under one command. One of the purposes of such
operations is to eliminate rebel leaders Khattab, Shamil Basayev and
Ruslan Gelayev. "The neutralization of each of these bandits would
seriously weaken the military zeal of the terrorists," a Russian general
has told Interfax.
Priority today is given to operations by army, FSB and Interior
Ministry anti-guerrilla forces and paratroop reconnaissance teams. There
are daily skirmishes in the Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt districts, where the
principal rebel forces are concentrated. "Reconnaissance and search
operations" are also being conducted in the Shatoi and Itum-Kale
districts.
The military says the success of the Chechnya campaign largely
depends on how successful Interior Ministry forces are in combing rebels
masquerading as civilians out of Russian-controlled territory. So far,
little progress has been made.
Evidence for this are rebel raids in villages that have been the
targets of so-called "mopping-up operations," both "milder" and "more
rigorous" ones. Russian units do not usually leave their well-fortified
posts and arrest only people moving through villages or towns.
The Russian command says there are some 1,000 rebels and numerous
rebel weapons and ammunition caches in the Russian-controlled part of
Chechnya. Scattered rebels can at any moment come together for strikes
in the Russian rear.
Another first deputy chief of the general staff, Valery Manilov,
has said there remain around 400 rebels in Grozny alone, although the
Russians captured the Chechen capital two months ago.
Neither Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev nor Interior Minister
Vladimir Rushailo can give even an approximate date when Moscow will
begin withdrawing its forces from Chechnya.
Meanwhile, sources in the Russian command in Chechnya have told
Interfax on conditions of anonymity that Moscow may lose control over
Chechnya if it starts reducing its forces in the region.
While the Russian forces are getting ready for a spring offensive,
the rebel leaders are waiting for the mountain passes to open. For them,
this means the arrival of more mercenaries and supplies of weapons and
money.
For this reason, the Russian command plans to wrap up most of the
fighting before May. "Before that time, it is necessary to destroy the
larger gangs and their depots and mountain bases and deprive the
[Chechen] fighters of the opportunity to step up action against federal
forces," a senior Russian military official has told Interfax. For this
reason "there will be no immediate radical reductions" in the Russian
forces, he said.
So a kind of contest has begun in Chechnya: the rebels' job is to
remain in hiding until the trees turn green and then employ more
aggressive tactics, while the Russian forces' task is to prevent them
from doing this.
However, the military are aware and publicly admit that it will
most likely be impossible to clear Chechnya of rebels even within a
year. The task is to persuade the local population to deny support to
the rebels. This would avert a lengthy guerrilla war.
Therefore, important as military action is today and tomorrow,
there is an increasing need for economic and political measures to
normalize the situation in Chechnya. To launch these, Russia need not
wait for either trees budding or mountain passes opening up.

******

#5
Trud
April 4, 200
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
DRAFTING THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM
A New Russian Government Is Still Nowhere to Be Seen;
However, They Have Already Started Translating Its Program 
into Life
By Alexander PROTSENKO, Trud economic analyst 

Numerous cross-roads necessitating specific political 
decisions often appear in the course of our work and during its 
various stages. We have already made headway in drafting the 
government's program; however, this would not have happened 
without political approval on the part of acting Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. This was disclosed to reporters the 
other day by German Gref, who is mostly responsible for 
elaborating the governmental economic-reform program, due to be 
implemented during the next decade.
According to Gref, the relevant national-reform ideology 
has already been charted, what with principled debates receding 
into the background. From now on, the Center for Strategic 
Research, which is headed by Gref, would be expected to 
complete some technical work alone. In a nutshell, his center 
should compile the program's sections (that are being drafted 
by different groups), modifying them and also "wrapping" the 
entire document in a beautiful package. All this will require 
1.5 months. The draft program should be finalized by the time a 
new Russian government emerges.
So, what does the future have in store for Russia after 
May? The projected program suggests a "fast-paced" 
socio-economic development scenario for Russia. Nonetheless, 
the speed of national economic recovery still remains largely 
unclear. 5-percent and even 10-percent annual growth rates are 
envisaged at this stage. The acting president, who has ordered 
this program, prefers a rather radical economic-growth 
scenario. Those particular tasks now facing our center often 
compel us to seriously assess various options for attaining 
such goals, Gref stressed.
Technically speaking, Russia can chalk up even more 
impressive growth rates. This can be done by cutting back on 
social spending and investing all money into production- 
modernization programs, etc. However, such a concept is not 
feasible just because Russia now lacks reserve political 
strength. To cut a long story short, the people of Russia can 
no longer tolerate additional privations for the sake of a 
"brighter future". Vladimir Putin, who understands this only 
too well, demands that the program's authors chart a line 
making it possible to preserve social stability and to prevent 
any decline in present-day consumption levels. Moreover, the 
acting Russian president intends to attain pre-crisis 
(1997-vintage) levels as quickly as possible.
Continued national economic reforms are seen as the main 
task that will be accomplished with the new program's help.
First of all, such economic reforms are called on to create a 
controllable economy. Second, the afore-said reforms will 
apparently promote market relations. As of today, the 
under-reformed Russian economy keeps abiding by its own laws;
besides, it's virtually impossible to control such an economy 
with the help of generally accepted methods.
The list of drastic changes, which were "inadvertently" 
mentioned by German Gref at the news conference, includes 
mandatory land sales and purchases that are being actively 
opposed by the KPRF (Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation). It's well-nigh impossible to create a normal 
business environment without land that constitutes a tremendous 
investment resource. The national tax system will also 
experience some rather serious changes. For example, the entire 
tax burden will be reduced and distributed more fairly.
Federal tax privileges will be axed, as well. Regional 
authorities will no longer be able to grant extensive 
privileges to their "favorites". On the whole, this program 
proceeds from the premise that the nationwide power vertical 
must be restored. Among other things, it stipulates some really 
tough sanctions toward regional governors, in case the latter 
dare violate federal legislation. The Russian banking system 
will also be revamped, thus enabling (and compelling) local 
banks to subsidize the real economy.
The draft program also aims to overhaul Russia's 
law-enforcement agencies, judicial system and armed forces.
Therefore one can safely say that this is a rather 
comprehensive 300-page document.
As is known, different Russian governments had already 
drafted specific reform programs in previous years, even 
implementing some of them. But in what way does the current 
program differ from previous documents? Replying to this 
question, former Deputy Minister of Finance Oleg Vyugin, who 
also plays for German Gref's team, noted that the previous 
period of the government's activities had been linked with many 
very good intentions. However, their practical implementation 
had left a lot to be desired, he added. We do hope that a more 
harmonic correlation between various ideas and their 
translation into life will constitute the next period's key 
difference, Vyugin said in conclusion.
But who will eventually acquire the draft program?
Besides, how consistently will it be fulfilled? Well, these 
questions still remain to be answered. The program's ownership 
is still being debated at this stage. Naturally enough, German 
Gref made a negative reply, after being asked whether he had 
suggested his own line-up of a future cabinet to Vladimir 
Putin. We keep writing the program, he pointed out, adding that 
he and his team were not indifferent to, who will implement it. 
However, this issue doesn't constitute our prerogative, Gref 
added, also noting that he had not yet been offered any 
position inside the future cabinet.
However, the man, who is mostly responsible for 
elaborating Vladimir Putin's program, has already received some 
additional powers for himself. The Russian Federation's acting 
president has already decided to establish a narrow working 
group that would be responsible for coordinating the activities 
of the Government, the presidential administration and the 
Center for Strategic Research. The group includes 
presidential-administration chief Alexander Voloshin, First 
Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, First Deputy Minister 
of Finance Alexei Kudrin and German Gref in charge of the 
above-mentioned Center for Strategic Research. 
According to Gref, that "narrow group" will, first of all, 
seriously amend a three-bill package, which has already been 
submitted to the State Duma, which deals with foreign-trade 
regulation, and which also stipulates capital-export curbs. The 
Center for Strategic Research also bears a grudge against some 
other draft and even endorsed normative documents. However, 
there now exists an opportunity to modify such documents within 
the overall draft strategy's framework.
In other words, the draft program is already being 
implemented.

******

#6
Moscow Times
April 1, 2000 
The Future of the Nation With Putin at Helm 
By Vladimir Kozin 
Vladimir Kozin is a senior adviser in the Foreign Ministry's European
Cooperation Department. The views expressed here are not necessarily those
of the Foreign Ministry. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. 

The victory of Vladimir Putin in the elections has elicited a dual
reaction here and abroad with regard to the future of Moscow's foreign
policy. Will it be tough or more moderate? Will the Kremlin expand its ties
only with the East, or with the West, or will it limit them in general? 

There is no doubt that the main direction of Russian foreign policy - the
mutually advantageous cooperation with all countries on the principles of
peaceful coexistence, without interfering in their internal affairs - will
remain its cornerstone. 

As was publicly announced Monday by Igor Ivanov, the foreign minister,
"corrective measures will be introduced" into Russia's foreign policy,
given various changes in the world, the results of the presidential
election and the new concept of Russia's foreign policy, approved at a
meeting of the Security Council two days before the election. 

Vladimir Putin himself outlined in brief his future foreign policy
immediately after preliminary voting results were announced Sunday. He said
he wanted to make that policy honest, with a realistic analysis of
regional and global conditions, and "without miracles." 

In the article "Russia on the Eve of the Millennium" in December and his
open letter to the voters in February, Putin has stated that Russia will
strive to form a conception of a multipolar world; to broaden the attempts
of various governments to strengthen global security; to cooperate on
control of nuclear and conventional weapons; to prevent and regulate
regional conflicts, including participation in international peacekeeping
operations in the fight against international terrorism and the drug trade;
and to be integrated in the global economy and strengthen interaction with
international economic and financial institutions. 

While he was acting president, Putin stressed that the Kremlin would base
its foreign policy on the foundation of national interests and at the same
time counteract attempts to ignore those interests by others. There was
also an allusion to the fact that Russia might have "zones of vital
interests." 

In the opinion of Russia's second president, although Russia has ceased to
be an empire, it has not lost its potential as a great power. Putin
clarified that he defines derzhavnost not in terms of the country's being
powerful militarily, but in its ability to be a world leader capable of
defending its national interests. 

The key words that Putin uses in describing his foreign policy are caution,
sober consideration, watchfulness, clear formulation of tasks and realism. 

Putin's international contacts will grow. This year a meeting of the G-8,
the Group of Seven leading industrial nations plus Russia, is scheduled fo
July in Okinawa, Japan. Separate talks will be conducted with leading
Western nations (including Britain, the United States, Germany) and East
(China, India, Japan). There may be a new meeting with the leadership of
NATO, with which there are still differences of opinion. There will be
further talks on global problems linked to the implementation of
international agreements such as NPT, ABM, FMCT, CFE, START and various
proposals on the creation of nuclear-free zones. The hypothetical
possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia will be no greater than
it would be by other nuclear powers, and it would only be used against
outside aggression. 

Moscow will neither allow others to interfere in its internal affairs nor
to dictate conditions for how it will act at home, including how it should
react to attempts to pull the country apart through large armed uprisings,
separatism and terror. 

Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski said the election of Vladimir
Putin was a "good sign" for Russia, Europe and the rest of the world. How
Putin performs in the area of foreign policy will become clear in the near
future. 

******

#7
Date: Mon, 03 Apr 2000 
From: "Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev" <dmitri_glinski@mtu-net.ru> 
Subject: To Join Or Not To Join? Nato and Russia's Ruling Class

To Join Or Not To Join? Nato and Russia's Ruling Class
By Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev
(Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev is currently Senior Research Associate at the
Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the
Russian Academy of Sciences. Co-author with Peter Reddaway of The Tragedy
of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy, US Institute of
Peace, 2000) 

Odi et amo: qua re id faciam, fortasse requiris:
Nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior.
Catullus

I hate and I love: you may inquire, why am I doing it:
I don’t know, but so I feel, and it’s excruciating.

Over more than half a century of Nato existence, attitudes of Soviet and
Russian leaders to this alliance have been anything but indifferent. In
1949, at its inception, no less than Joseph Stalin, no matter what his
hidden intentions might have been, privately conveyed his interest in
joining the club. His failed bid was followed by the flare-up of the Cold
War with venomous anti-Nato rhetoric in Moscow and soon by the Alliance
expansion to include Greece and Turkey. In March 1954, a year after his
death, new Soviet leaders gave the idea another try. In their official
response, Britain, France, and the United States dismissed the Soviet
request for membership as “completely unreal.” The following year saw the
birth of the Warsaw Pact and the accession of West Germany to the North
Atlantic Treaty.

Thirty-five years later, in December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, whose government
was not yet even universally recognized, dispatched a message to the session
of the North Atlantic Council in which he bluntly raised the issue of Russia
’s membership in the Alliance. In a few days, Russia's foreign ministry
explained that a clerk had missed the word "not" in the final version of the
document: "today, we are not raising the issue of Russia's membership..."
Following that, for almost a decade both sides agonized over the problem of
Nato’s (yet another) eastward enlargement, and then over the Alliance’s
military action in Kosovo. Although at least until 1997 the option of Nato
membership for Russia was openly debated by Russia’s senior experts and
politicians, the appearance of an unshakeable anti-Nato consensus emerged
with the start of the Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia. Now
virtually everybody, including former proponents of Russia’s integration
with the Alliance, forecast a long-term freeze in Nato-Russia relations.
But another jolt was soon to come.

In February 2000, Nato’s Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, was welcomed as
a guest in Moscow; then, on March 5, 2000, the anniversary of the death of
Stalin (of whom the Acting President is known to be a devoted admirer),
Vladimir Putin told his BBC interviewer that he did not see why Russia would
not join Nato--under certain conditions, of course. Nato’s predictable
response was that Russian membership was “not on the agenda.” In a couple
of days, with considerable help from other Russian officials, Mr. Putin
retreated (not unlike his predecessor) by explaining his statement to the
Russian public as entirely hypothetical.

The cyclical pattern of this saga is familiar to the growing number of
Russians who believe that history--their history, at least--repeats itself,
and yet its lessons are rarely if ever learned. It is more difficult to
figure out the purpose and the timing of Mr. Putin’s remarks, from the point
of view of Russia’s interests and even his own domestic political
considerations. For proponents of a real Nato expansion, in the West as
well as in the East, Mr. Putin’s knock at the door of the Alliance was
certainly a boost for their cause. Russia’s military allies in the CIS
could see this as another sign of Russia’s inconsistency and will feel
themselves less bound to the Tashkent Treaty. At home, Putin’s initiative
came under attack from both of his closest electoral rivals--not only
Gennady Zyuganov, which would be predictable to Westerners, but also the
leading democrat in the race, Grigory Yavlinsky. (The latter observed that
one of the negative consequences of Putin’s statement would be that if Nato
expands to the Baltic states and Ukraine, Russia would now be compelled to
absorb this in silence.)

Of course, from the towering height of his popularity rating, the Acting
President did not feel particularly bothered by their critique. But neither
could he expect to attract new voters by making an overture to Nato, less
than a year after a nationwide upsurge of solidarity with the bombarded
Serbs and mass demonstrations in front of the US embassy. Evidence suggests
that Mr. Putin, feeling and behaving as an anointed winner, made his
statement without regard for the electoral campaign that was under way. One
may suspect that he would have wanted to defuse some of the Western critique
of the Chechen war, but this would have been a disproportionate response.
Besides, the fact that Mr. Putin represents the fifth generation of Russian
leaders contemplating the idea of joining the bloc that was created with the
purpose of defending its members from the Red Army prods us to look beyond
short-term rational calculations. Mr. Putin’s signal of interest in the
Nato military machine came from his heart, if it can be put this way.

What is different in comparison with 1991 and even 1954 is that Mr. Putin’s
dovish stance on Nato (also visible in the foreign policy sections in the
new National Security Concept and military doctrine, both of which
coincidentally expand the room for internal repression) is markedly at odds
with his draconian domestic profile. And likewise, in this latter respect,
he is sincere and straightforward in his expressions (which helps explain
the extent of his public approval). He does believe that all Chechen
fighters that resist the Russian army after three years of de facto
independence are gangsters that deserve to be “rubbed out in the loo;”
simultaneously, he does believe that it is acceptable for a Russian
government agency to negotiate with gangsters over exchanging a Russian
citizen employed by a foreign radio station for Russian soldiers. He does
believe that the Russian party system should consist of his own bloc created
overnight by government officials and of the domesticated communist party,
while all other organizations and societal forces can be dispensed with.

This combination of repressive instincts at home with a pro-Nato stance in
foreign policy would be hard to imagine some seven to ten years ago, in the
rosy period of Russia’s democratic aspirations. For Putin’s predecessor,
democracy and the West were closely related. Yeltsin's retreat from the
values of the democratic movement that had brought him to power went
generally hand-in-hand with his anti-Western evolution, and this was only a
natural linkage for the entire Gorbachev-Yeltsin generation. In this
regard, the worldview of Putin and his cohorts represents a sea change. It
says as much about Russia’s own evolution as about its changing perceptions
of the West.

It would be too easy to label this policy pragmatic and rational, as opposed
to ideological. First of all, pragmatism is also a distinct ideology in its
own right. Secondly, Putin's is a very special type of pragmatic ideology.
Informed by recent evidence, it is based upon the belief that not just
domestic but also international public opinion is easily manipulated and
does not really matter--at least at the present stage in history. This is
an element of the enduring doctrine of authoritarian Westernization. The
Kremlin is confident that the West will close its eyes upon whatever happens
in Russia, no matter what newspapers say, because of its interest in arms
control, IMF-style economic polcies and debt repayment - and because in the
wake of the Balkan war the West’s own gloves are less than shining clean.

This brings us to the third feature of this "pragmatism": the Putin detente
resembles in certain key elements the Nixon-Brezhnev era (which,
coincidentally, was the formative period of Mr. Putin’s career). He is a
quintessential detente politician--a global horse trader. Although many
Westerners, as well as Russians, would find a comparison between Chechnya
and Kosovo inherently wrong and repulsive, pro-government media in Moscow
portray, between the lines, the West’s muted response to Chechnya as a
recognition of its quid pro quo equivalence with Nato’s Kosovo campaign. In
this scheme, to use Mr. Putin’s jargon, the Caucasus is our “loo” and the
Balkans is yours. It was also not by chance that, of all Western leaders,
Mr. Putin chose to stage a royal reception for no other but Tony Blair, the
principal Kosovo hawk. A Soviet-era diplomat who was active in the late
1960s and 1970s privately admitted to this author seeing clear historical
parallels with that period--when US actions in Vietnam were believed to
justify Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and when it was acceptable to
trade a dissident Soviet citizen, like a hostage, for a Soviet foreign
agent. This was the era when the gap between Western values and the
behavior of Western elites on domestic and global scale became wider or more
visible than usual, and Soviet commercialized nomenklatura (intertwined with
intelligence networks) filled this gap with their ideology and practices.

In choosing Nato as the focal point for his diplomatic offensive, Mr. Putin
steps right into the middle of a controversy that has been one of the
central topics of Russian foreign policy debate over the past ten years.
Albeit a newcomer to this debate, he is certainly not alone in his belief
that Nato and Russia (under the Yeltsin political dynasty) would fit each
other well. Indeed, an array of prominent politicians and top security
experts, some of them just recently converted Cold War hawks, promoted at
different points Russia’s accession to the Alliance. As late as 1997, the
most vocal and insistent “lobbyist” for this idea was financial "oligarch"
Boris Berezovsky, acting in person as well as through his media empire and
political allies. The Berezovsky case is indicative for all those who
believe that even in sheer power politics, psychology always matters. In
one of his programmatic articles, he wrote that the West’s denial of Russia’
s integration into its security alliance would be no less than “totally
aggressive” with regard to Moscow. Soon afterwards, the Berezovsky media
outlets turned most unabashedly to anti-Western rhetoric.

It is worth noting, that not only most Russian democrats, but also committed
Westernizers among them, such as Sergei Kovalyov or Ella Pamfilova, were
never on record as advocates of Russia’s Nato membership. For his part,
Aleksei Arbatov, top security expert of Russia’s democratic camp, as early
as 1992 analyzed the idea from a strategic point of view and concluded that
it was senseless and counterproductive for both Nato and Russia.

Thus, Mr.Putin’s overtures to the Alliance did not come out of the blue.
They reflect a broader policy outlook, a sort of operational code,
characteristic for the currently predominant element of the new Russian
nomenklatura. This elite group (which can be described as hard-line or
authoritarian Westernizers) seeks a wholesale identification for itself with
the North American and Western European establishment “mainstream,” viewed
as a single entity, standing in opposition to the “Asiatic” and
“underdeveloped” world and to Russia’s own unbearable “backwardness”. The
latter, a product of its unfortunate location at the frontier of the
“civilized” universe, must be eliminated through comprehensive
Westernization of society. Given Russia’s diversity, even within ethnic
Russian majority (not to speak about other ethnicities, especially in the
Caucasus), significant strata of society, while not necessarily
anti-Western, will never fit into such a monolithic, homogenized, indeed
fundamentally intolerant vision of a Westernized Russia. Which means that
authoritarian methods, social engineering, manipulation and coercion,
especially against “backward” social and ethnic groups, are seen as a
legitimate way to remove these obstacles. People with this mindset are
emphatically modern, technocratic, well-dressed and polished, speaking
foreign languages, but fundamentally illiberal and disdainful of democratic
procedures. In fact, for these individuals, the goal of such a
Westernization is not human progress nor improving the lot of the Russian
people: rather, it is a way to confirm by force their own superior,
“vanguard” status in society and politics, along Lenin’s famous dictum: kto
kogo?

Today, of all the many faces of the contemporary West, they are inclined to
choose Nato as their privileged partner. Obviously, this is a rather
selective view of integration with the West. Why not integrate by starting
to observe the norms and regulations of the Council of Europe, or by signing
the European Social Charter, as advocated by Russian liberals? But these
are clearly not the priorities of Mr. Putin and his team.

Still, why Nato? What is in it for Russia’s hard-line Westernizers, or, to
use Nato’s own parlance, what would be its mission from their standpoint in
the unlikely occasion that it decides to expand to the borders of Iran and
China? Given the material and moral condition to which Russia’s political
leadership has driven its military, present-day Russia could only be a net
consumer, not a net provider of Alliance security. Does the Kremlin
envision Nato as a guarantor of Russia's borders with smaller nations? Or,
perhaps, Mr. Putin and like-minded members of the elite would eventually
welcome Nato’s help to keep peace at home, starting with the Caucasus? But
this does not really require a membership.

That is a fundamental issue that is important not only for Russia’s foreign
policy debate, but also for Nato and other Western actors as well to reflect
upon themselves. Over the past decade, a lot has been written and said on
this score by Russian experts and politicians favoring membership or some
form of integration with Nato. Below is an attempt to systematize these
writings from the point of view of their underlying images of what a Nato
expanded to include Russia would represent, and what is the purpose for
Russia to join the Alliance.

Russia's Authoritarian Westernizers' Images of Nato:
1. Balance of power view: Nato as the European Concert.
This nostalgic vision, shared by some in Russia’s security establishment,
sees Russia’s military integration with the West essentially as a
restoration of the 19th century European “Concert of Powers,” each with its
respective sphere of influence. With its fundamentally hierarchical vision
of the world, it sees Nato as a gateway to the balance of power system.
This approach has been fairly obvious in the Kremlin’s haughtiness and
reluctance to deal with small European countries, its belief that everything
can be arranged in Washington and Bonn and its addiction to such
dysfunctional assemblies as the European “troika.” No wonder those small
European countries, including former Soviet allies, were put off by this
approach and reinforced in their desire to join Nato. Among Russian
“Euroatlanticists” of this vintage some would join the Alliance to help
“keep Germans down,” while others hope that Russia in such a “multipolar”
Nato would become a counterweight to Americans.

2. Ideological view: Nato as an anti-communist Holy Alliance.
This image is often transpiring in Moscow elites’ recurrent talk about the
desirability of Nato transformation into a “political” rather than a
military alliance. This view of Nato was certainly a factor behind Yeltsin’s
failed attempt to join. The problem with this approach in the 1990s was
that among the old and the aspiring members of the alliance many have
communists in the legislature as well as in the government. As for Russia
itself, promoting integration with the alliance for “political” reasons was
often a poorly disguised attempt to recruit more foreign actors in the cold
civil war between the Kremlin and the leftward-leaning parliament.

3. The global government view: Nato as a club of world rulers.
Another variation of the Great Power syndrome, this approach was most
evident in the linkage that Russian experts and diplomats made, from 1994
on, between Nato expansion and Russia’s ceremonial seat at G-7. Yeltsin
finally conceded to Nato expansion by signing the Nato-Russia Founding Act
in May 1997, under the informal condition of G-7 extension to G-8.

4. Developmental view: Nato membership as a reward for political and
economic development.
This is from the repertoire of the classical “vanguard” mentality of Russia’
s modernizers. In 1990s, a number of advocates of Nato integration with
Russia opined in public that Russia would have already joined the Alliance
if not for certain social strata that were “still unprepared for it.” This
instilled in some a genuine hope that Russia would be welcome in the
Alliance once it achieves “maturity.” Although perhaps stimulating for
some, the idea was illusory and fraught with misunderstanding. Nato is
clearly neither a tool of nor a reward for economic or political
development, whatever is meant by this term, otherwise Switzerland would be
a member and Portugal would probably not.

5. Containment view: Nato as a protection against Muslim and/or Chinese
pressure.
This was a rather diverse set of arguments that remained forever in the
inchoate and undifferentiated stage. The objects of containment were the
old fears of Russia's ethnic nationalists--the “Yellow” and the “Green”
peril. Sometimes it implies the threat of a traditional war on Russia’s
Asian borders, sometimes just the inability to contain migration and
commercial penetration from the East. In this perspective, beside regular
security concerns, there has been a distinctly racial undercurrent. It is
not by coincidence that some of the new Duma leaders who welcomed Putin’s
overture to Nato have been known for their rabidly anti-Muslim and
anti-Caucasian animus. Given a profound rift between those who believe that
Russia is a squarely European power (some of them ethnic Russian
nationalists) and those who see it as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
Eurasian community, some of the former would welcome Nato as another voice
in Russia’s internal debate over its civilizational identity. And how about
sharing responsibilities in the fight against Islamic terrorism?

6. Crusader’s view: Nato as the pillar and the battering ram of Western
civilization.
An expanded variation of the same, this belief, which harks back to Russia’s
Byzantine legacy, was part of the grand utopian vision of Russia’s
self-anointed Westernizers in the early 1990s. Thus, Andrei Kozyrev, when
arguing for Russia’s integration with the Nato, spoke of “the need to
‘advance eastwards’ the lines of `common defense’...of the values of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” and reminded his Western
audience that on the Asian borders of this zone “the main burden is ...
shouldered by Russia...” In other words, Atlanticists at the helm of Russian
foreign policy had no problem in principle with the idea of an “eastward
expansion” of “European values,” that is, the West, against the Asian
“Rest.” The only divergence between them and some Western proponents of
Nato expansion as an alliance was whether Russia was entitled to be a part
of the West’s expansionary drive, or whether it should be relegated to “the
Rest.”

7. Neo-mercantilist view: Nato as a market for Russian arms industry.
In this author’s opinion, this was perhaps the only defensible argument in
favor of Russia’s integration into the Alliance, at least in the early
1990s, that grew not out of ideological whims of the establishment but out
of national economic needs. Entering Western arms’ markets with Russia’s
military products, if it were possible, would help rescue Russia’s high-tech
industries, reduce the brain drain and the current spread of weapons and
military technologies from Russia to countries potentially hostile to itself
and the West. (In fact, the centrality of this goal for the survival of the
most advanced sector of the Russian economy may have explained the otherwise
remarkable acceptance and support by Russia’s military industrialists, like
Arkady Volsky, with regard to Moscow rapprochement with the West, to the
breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and even the loss of previous weaponry
consumers in the Third World.) But this was a very complicated foreign
policy task that required, inter alia, a substantially different scenario of
economic reforms. In any event, it was an argument for internal use. Arms
markets in all Nato countries is an area of strategic concern and
protection, and Russia’s attempts to enter it would mean a tough game, as
long as Russia’s military production still remained competitive by Nato
standards. The idea looks largely anachronistic these days, when Russian
arms traders struggle to preserve their markets in countries such as India.
But Rosvooruzheniye’s recent predictably failed attempt to sell military
aircraft to Turkey (in spite of Putin’s personal intervention, which
virtually coincided with Putin’s Nato remarks) underscores the link between
the Russian government's belated efforts to rescue its high-tech industries
and its recurrent interest in the possibility of admission to Nato.

These are the perspectives that were advanced at different times by
advocates of Russia’s Nato membership. Some of them are more defensible
than others, but none of them conforms to Nato’s official mission for which
it was created and to those new tasks to which it has been (unwisely)
expanded. From a rigorous Western standpoint, the Alliance is not (and was
not intended to be) a balance of power mechanism in the 19th century style,
much less a global directorate, a vehicle for an international Westernizing
crusade or a Judeo-Christian bastion against hostile civilizations. It is
hard to deny that it does represent a closed weaponry trading cartel, though
it was not so by design. But the whole point of this analysis is that Nato
is consistently viewed as such by Nato-friendly parts of the Russian elite,
that would be delighted to join. And as we all know, in politics perception
and reality are not that far apart. Beside, Russia is Nato’s key outside
partner on a strategic scale, and its elites' perceptions supposedly have
some impact upon the evolution of the Nato identity. There are certain
reasons, not only in Russia but also in Nato, why Russia’s security
establishment, including Mr. Putin himself, is inclined to see Nato in such
a light, why they see no obstacles to membership in this kind of an
Alliance, and why they believe that this way of integration into the West is
not incompatible with authoritarianism. To put it otherwise, there is an
increasing convergence between Nato real actions, as they have evolved since
1994, and the views of the Alliance that are held by the Russian
nomenklatura.

It may be open to debate whether Moscow elites’ bouts of love and hate
toward their recent strategic adversary were a major catalyst for Nato
resurgence in the 1990s and for the disproportionate role that it assumed in
regional and global politics. Whatever the case, if the theory of vicious
cycles has any value, one would expect another burst of self-confidence by
interventionists in the West, Nato’s new expansion and involvement in poorly
thought-out ventures which will make it again a scarecrow in the
nomenklatura garden, new resentment in Moscow and a likely shift from
pro-Western to anti-Western authoritarianism.

Before following the Kremlin’s lead to enter this vicious circle,
governments of Nato countries would be well advised to re-examine their
policies. If gentlemen with Mr. Putin’s and Mr.Berezovsky's outlook and
background are eager to join, while Russia’s progressive, democratic forces
are not enthusiastic with the idea, something went wrong. It turns out that
today’s Nato stands very far from those values that its members were
supposed to uphold. As shown by historical evidence, zealous and aggressive
projection of power for power’s sake tends to subvert those principles on
which the power was built and for which it was supposed to serve as an
instrument.

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