April 4, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4223 • 4224 •  4225

Johnson's Russia List
#4224
4 April 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: U.N. Envoy Criticizes Russia.
2. Itar-Tass: "Chechnya. a White Book" Presented on Monday. 
3. Greg Alton: Russian Optimism/Pessimism.
4. Itar-Tass: New Party Established in Russia, Intends to Back Putin.
5. Reuters: Former Stasi Agent Recounts End of Putin Spy Network.
6. RFE/RL: Paul Goble, Oil Prices And Political Possibilities.
7. Financial Times (UK): Investors put their faith in Putin.
The potential for foreign direct investment in Russia is balanced 
by a hugely difficult trading environment, writes Andrew Jack.
8. Andrei Liakhov: RE: 4213-Mendeloff/Textbook Revision.
9. David Mendeloff: Re: Weeks on Russian textbooks.
10. the eXile: Matt Taibbi, THE WORST JOURNALIST IN MOSCOW
March Madness Finishes-With a Bang.]

*******

#1
U.N. Envoy Criticizes Russia
April 4, 2000
By ANDREW KRAMER

MOSCOW (AP) - The United Nations' top human-rights official sharply
criticized Russia on Monday for abuses in Chechnya, saying she heard ``very
harrowing'' accounts on a trip to the war-ravaged republic. 

``I am very concerned about the scale and seriousness of the allegations,''
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson said. ``Russia is a
member of the Council of Europe and as a very important member of the
United Nations has assumed international obligations under its national
human rights law and humanitarian law.'' 

The Council of Europe, the continent's leading human rights watchdog, is to
vote this week on whether to suspend Russia for rights abuses in Chechnya.
A key demand of the Council had been allowing foreign observers access to
the scene of alleged killings and other abuse. 

Russia has only recently allowed international human rights groups access
to Chechnya and has strictly controlled what they are allowed to see. 

Robinson, before leaving for Chechnya, had said she was especially
interested in going to Aldi, a suburb of the Chechen capital Grozny, where
human rights groups alleged Russian soldiers massacred scores of civilians.
But she was unable to go there, or to the Chernokozovo detention camp,
where guards allegedly tortured prisoners. 

Vladimir Kalamanov, who is President Vladimir Putin's human rights envoy to
Chechnya, accompanied Robinson on the trip and on Monday blasted her
comments. 

``It was a conversation with the deaf and dumb,'' he said, hours after
Robinson spoke to reporters. 

Kalamanov said Robinson and her delegation were given ``full access,'' and
that the reason they did not go to Aldi was because a skirmish between
Russian soldiers and Chechen rebels made it impossible. He also said
Robinson herself chose not to go to Chernokozovo. 

Even though she was unable to see some of the areas she wanted, Robinson
said she nonetheless saw much that was distressing. 

``I have very detailed and very harrowing accounts. It was not an easy few
days,'' she said, without elaborating. The three-day trip included Grozny,
refugee camps and the neighboring region of Ingushetia. 

During a 2 1/2-hour visit to Grozny on Sunday, Robinson visited a hospital,
a jail, spoke with residents of the city, and visited the site of another
reported massacre in the Staropromyslovsky suburb. 

Russia previously has allowed foreign journalists and rights workers to
visit the Chernokozovo camp. But a report from Amnesty International
recently contended that evidence of torture was removed from the camp ahead
of such visits. 

Robinson reportedly had hoped to meet Putin on Tuesday, but Sergei
Yastrzhembsky, Putin's spokesman for Chechnya, said no meeting had been
scheduled, according to the news agency ITAR-Tass. 

******

#2
"Chechnya. a White Book" Presented on Monday. .

MOSCOW, April 3 (Itar-Tass) - Presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky, 
RIA-Vesti news agency's chief Alexei Volin and Rosinformtzentr's chief 
Mikhail Margelov will present "Chechnya. A White Book" on Monday. 

The book will be presented at Rosinformtsentr, or Russian Information Center. 

Yastrzhembsky said in an interview with Itar-Tass that the book accummilates 
mostly material of the mass media. 

"The book not only tells of mass violations of human rights in Chechnya by 
militants and terrorists, it is much broader - here, the background of the 
relations of Moscow and Grozny, analysis of the regimes of (Chechnya's 
presidents Dzhokhar) Dudayev and (Aslan) Maskhadov are presented", 
Yastzhembsky said. 

He said the book cites many documents on hostage-taking in Chechnya and gives 
a focus of murders of Britons and a New Zealander, and of six Red Cross 
workers in the village of Noviye Atagi. 

Yastrzhembsky said the book capitalises on the circumstance that Chechnya had 
a spell of de-facto independence and a chance to show that "Maskhadov can 
govern the territory, and the republic will stop to be an enclave of 
terrorism and crime". 

"Makhsadov's regime had a chance to build a civilised state in keeping with 
the notions of a state that exist in the world. This chance has been lost," 
he said. 

"Two-thirds of the republic's population -- about 200,000 Russians and 
600,000 Chechens have fled Chechnya, 'independence' declared by the regimes 
of Dudayev and Maskhadov," he said. 

********

#3
Date: Mon, 03 Apr 2000 
Subject: Russian Optimism/Pessimism
From: Greg Alton <gsalton@Princeton.EDU>

To throw my favourite saying into the melee:

"Life is hard -- but, at least it's short."

This expression was taken from a collection of supposedly Russian proverbs,
and although I can't attest to its provenance, for me it captures well the
difference (if any) between Russian and 'Western' perceptions of optimism
and pessimism. Most of the Westerners to whom I've relating this saying
found it morbid and depressing -- most of the Russians thought it funny and
not particularly dark.

********

#4
New Party Established in Russia, Intends to Back Putin. .

MOSCOW, April 3 (Itar-Tass) - A new party -- the Russian Progressive Party 
(RPP) -- has been established in Russia, which intends to back Vladimir 
Putin's political course and join the Union of Right-Wing Forces. 

Yury Skugorev, the RPP representative in charge of public relations, told 
Itar-Tass on Monday that the party had been formed in early March at a 
constituent congress, however the organisers of the party intend to announce 
its establishment only after it is registered by the Ministry of Justice, 
which is scheduled for mid-April. 

The constituent congress approved the programme and the Charter of the RPP, 
and elected part of the Political council. 

Chairman of the party is Vladimir Kishinets, who is now the chairman of the 
district self-government of Moscow and the head of one of the administrations 
of the Central district of Moscow. The Vice Chairman of the party is Igor 
Kotov, the editor-in-chief of the Capital Real Estate magazine. 

Yury Skugorev noted that the party is orientated not towards "prominent 
figures", whom the RPP has not yet but is formed on a different principle. 
"We begin from bodies of self-government and district administrations," he 
stressed. 

At the same time he clearly determined political orienting points of the new 
organisation. 

According to him, the RPP "does not cross" with Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov and 
it intends to join the Union of Right-Wing Forces while now interacting with 
the Foundation of liberal reforms. 

Besides, although the RPP is "not directly Vladimir Putin's party" but it 
intends to back his ideas. 

What is more, organisers of the party have been cooperating with the Centre 
of strategic developments headed by German Gref, and give recommendations on 
issues connected with control over elected structures of cities and 
districts. 

******

#5
Former Stasi Agent Recounts End of Putin Spy Network

BERLIN, Apr 3, 2000 -- (Reuters) A former officer in the East German secret 
police, the Stasi, has revealed how he provoked the dismantling of a spy 
network run by Russia's President-elect Vladimir Putin, the Focus weekly 
reported Monday.

Klaus Zuchold, 44, now a night watchman for Germany's ZDF television, formed 
a friendship with Putin in 1985 while the latter was a KGB officer in East 
Germany, the weekly said.

In January 1990, a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Zuchold, who 
had already left the Stasi, joined the KGB.

Putin celebrated the deal with Sekt, a German wine, and reminded his new 
agent, who took on the codename Klaus Zaunick, that he was sworn to silence 
and that there would be serious consequences if he spoke out, Focus reported.

After sealing the deal with a vigorous handshake, Putin revealed the 
identities of some of his top agents in East Germany.

Zuchold was initially told to be a "dormant" agent then to gather 
compromising information on politicians, scientists and business leaders.

Eleven months later, in December 1990, he told all to the domestic 
intelligence services in Germany, leading to the unmasking of 15 East German 
spies working for Moscow.

Focus added that Germany's prosecutors decided not to bring the spies to 
justice, although information they provided helped build up a thick file on 
Putin, who left the former East Germany in 1990 after a five-year stint.

Zuchold, who went into hiding for a year because of fears of reprisals, still 
holds his former boss in high regard.

"A great guy. I always thought he would do something," he told the newspaper.

******

#6
Russia: Analysis From Washington -- Oil Prices And Political Possibilities
By Paul Goble

Washington, 3 April 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Recent increases in the price of oil are 
giving Moscow ever greater opportunities to adopt policies at home and 
project power abroad without having to take into consideration the attitudes 
of the international community. 

These increases by themselves set the stage for greater independence of 
action by the government of acting President Vladimir Putin. But even more, 
they appear likely to power a new kind of geopolitical competition between 
Russia, which earns much of its hard currency through petroleum exports, and 
Western countries, whose economies depend on importing gas and oil. 

Both Russian and Western commentators have already noted that Moscow has been 
able to finance its war in Chechnya because of rising oil prices. And they 
have pointed out that the revenues the Russian government has received from 
oil exports have allowed the Putin regime to talk about a future without 
dependence on international loans. 

But last week, there were three additional developments that suggest the oil 
price surge is likely to have an even greater impact on Russian policy in the 
future than it has up to now. 

First, Russia's deputy fuel and energy minister Vladimir Stanev announced on 
Friday that testing of the section of the Baku-Novorossiisk oil pipeline 
bypassing Chechnya will be over by the middle of May. He said that 230 
kilometers of this pipeline have been tested successfully so far and that 
another 90 kilometers will be tested over the next six weeks. 
Once the pipeline is fully tested and certified, it will be able to carry 18 
million tons of oil a year. And that in turn will certainly affect Chechnya's 
ability to earn the money it needs for reconstruction. But more important, 
this new route will seriously reduce the attractiveness of alternate oil 
routes out of the Caspian basin, including the US-supported Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline. 

At a minimum, Western governments are likely to find it harder to raise funds 
for the latter route, now that a Russian pipeline is clearly available. But 
even more, the opening of this Russian route will change the geopolitics of 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, undercutting American and European influence 
and increasing Moscow's leverage in both regions. 

Second, and also on Friday, the Russian authorities began construction of a 
new oil terminal on the Gulf of Finland near St. Petersburg. When completed, 
this port will be Russia's second largest, capable of exporting up to 12 
million tons of oil to the West. But perhaps even more important, the opening 
of this port will allow Russian firms to bypass the Baltic states. 
Until the price of oil rose, the Russian authorities frequently had talked 
about starting this project but had not been able to find the funds to 
construct it. Now, with oil revenues at a new high, Moscow has the 
opportunity to build something which Russian officials and analysts have 
suggested will allow them to save money and increase their influence in the 
Baltic region. 

The new port is likely to allow Moscow greater flexibility in its dealing 
with the Baltic states by allowing Russian firms to send oil through some or 
none of the three at Moscow's discretion. That will simultaneously reduce the 
revenues each of the Baltic countries now receive from transit trade and 
increase their uncertainty about the future, both of which the Russian 
authorities are likely to exploit to expand their influence there. 

And third, according to a report from Baghdad earlier last week, the Russian 
government lined up with those in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries to oppose the increase in production the United States and other 
Western countries had sought to send oil prices in a downward direction. 
Russia did not prevail this time. It is not a member of OPEC, and American 
influence proved to be too strong. But by clearly supporting those within the 
cartel who oppose increasing production, Russia has positioned itself not 
only to cause more trouble for the Western economies in the future but also 
to cement its friendship with anti-Western oil-exporting countries. 

That too points to a new geopolitical competition based almost entirely on an 
increase in the price of oil. Obviously, if prices fall significantly, Moscow 
will find its ability to move in all three of these directions reduced. But 
even if they do, Russia's willingness to exploit the politics of oil prices 
is likely to remain a major new component of the post-post-Cold War 
international system.

*******

#7
Financial Times (UK)
4 April 2000
[for personal use only]
Investors put their faith in Putin
The potential for foreign direct investment in Russia is balanced by a
hugely difficult trading environment, writes Andrew Jack 

Vladimir Putin's victory in Russia's presidential election has prompted
many long-term investors to re-examine a delicate calculation: the
potential attractions of the vast Russian market set against its huge
existing pitfalls. 

"We are seeing the first wave of fresh interest in Russia since 1998," says
Scott Blacklin, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Moscow.
"It was easy for companies to cross Russia off their list over the last two
years, but now the lawyers and accountants here are saying that lots of
companies are putting their toes in the water again and doing due diligence." 

Portfolio investors certainly have reasons to cheer. Since the beginning of
the year, the economy has been picking up steadily, commercial Soviet-era
debt has been restructured, the credit rating agencies have begun to
prepare upgrades and Eurobond and share prices have increased sharply. 

But the enthusiasm of those who look for short-term speculative gains
stands in sharp contrast to the more cautious approach of foreign direct
investors. Their expertise and capital may be vital in developing the
fledgling Russian economy, but many have had bitter experiences in the
past, and are reluctant to commit substantial sums over a long period. 

Russia's size, its 147m population, the strength of its education system
and the poorly developed market system ought to offer enormous potential
for foreign investors. 

While most of them remain coy about figures, some have been able to turn a
profit. McDonald's, which has opened 52 fast food outlets since 1990,
claims to have been in the black since the mid 1990s. 

Undeterred by the Russia's latest crises, Philip Morris, the US tobacco
company, and Caterpillar, the US engineering group, have both opened
factories on the outskirts of St Petersburg in the last few weeks. Fiat of
Italy has signed a joint venture in Nizhny Novogorod with Gaz, producer of
the Volga car. 

Yet all these projects are the result of very long-running and often
frustrating negotiations. The Swedish furniture manufacturer Ikea, for
example, began talks with the Soviet authorities in 1988. It has only
recently opened its first branch. 

According to official figures, direct foreign investment across the country
was just $4.2bn in 1999, up from $3.3bn in 1998 and down from a peak of
$5.3bn in 1997. "That is still tiny, even compared with other parts of
eastern Europe," says Sergei Prudnik, an analyst with the brokerage Troika
Dialog in Moscow. 

As Eivind Djupedal, regional head of Cargill, the international
agricultural production and trading group puts it: "I think Russia has to
rank among the most difficult operating environments in which we work
anywhere in the world." 

A case in point was the contract killing of a senior executive at Baltika,
a highly successful Scandinavian-controlled brewery in St Petersburg, at
the start of the year. 

But there are many other mostly prosaic, obstacles, such as the long and
contradictory tax code and the ubiquitous bureaucracy. As a result of
strong cultural differences and disagreements with local partners, many
companies prefer to undertake "greenfield" investments, or to have, at the
very least, majority control in any joint venture. But that can still leave
them vulnerable to a market in which foreigners are viewed with suspicion -
as tempting targets for criminal groups and politicians alike. 

Joel Hellman, an economist with the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, argues that it is the lack of respect for property and
contract rights, and for the role of minority shareholders, that remain the
principal barriers for potential investors. "So far, the positive signs are
few and far between," he says. 

For companies that are already present in Russia, however, there have been
some indications of change over the past few months. 

Last December, BP-Amoco, the petroleum giant, and other shareholders won
back control over their investments in Sidanco, a Russian oil company,
after alleged abuses to the bankruptcy process. 

Earlier this month, the US-Russia Investment Fund won a court ruling that
appeared to bring to an end challenges brought by former "red directors"
and the federal state property ministry, questioning the legality of the
controlling stake it acquired last year in Lomonosov, the historic St
Petersburg porcelain factory. 

And Karl Johansson, managing partner of Ernst & Young for Russia, points to
a meeting last month of the Foreign Investors Advisory Council (FIAC),
which represents many large investors in Russia and which he co-ordinates.
Mr Putin himself attended, and impressed delegates by his attentiveness and
"hands-on" approach, as well as pledges to create enhanced tax deductions. 

The problem is that Mr Putin has so far issued no economic programme, and
the statements he has made on the campaign trail have proved contradictory.
He has called for a "dictatorship of law", a fight against corruption, and
indicated support for the free market and foreign investors. 

But he has also endorsed protectionism and state intervention, and is seen
as still being too closely linked to a number of disproportionately
influential business "oligarchs", against whom he has so far shown no sign
of action. 

Mark Bond, president of the Anglo-Russian Finance & Investment Corporation,
says: "Most investors will wait for another two to three months. We still
don't know who Putin is, or what he will do. The initial impression is
good, but has he got enough support people around him?" 

His own experience is salutory. After long delays and attempts at
intimidation against him, he achieved a court judgment last year
compensating him for $7m in shares his company had purchased in the
privatisation of Baikal Airlines - which had been expropriated by the local
administration. But officials have refused to implement the judgment. 

Without changes to the current system, he argues: "The only direct
investors that can operate in Russia are huge companies with enough
political power to lobby and big resources to throw at the problem. As soon
as you rear your head here, you can get shut down immediately." 

*******

#8
Date: Mon, 03 Apr 2000 
From: "Andrei Liakhov" <liakhova@nortonrose.com> 
Subject: RE: 4213-Mendeloff/Textbook Revision

Comments on Mendeloff

Firstly I would like to state that my position on Russian education is
biased as I'm a very proud product of it who has made it both over there and
over here. In my very determined view World history in general and
Russian/Soviet history in particular was one of the subjects with the best
and most demanding curriculum. Those who argue that Russian textbooks need
radical re-writing in my view either have not read the textbooks or have a
Hollywood influenced view of History where everything revolves either around
the mighty and good US of A or the "shiny gentle knights of the "Round
Table"". 

In fact neither is true, as well as the Soviet version which was faulty in
many respects too. The reality is that Russia as any other country has waged
wars throughout its history which were neither bloodier nor more savage than
any wars waged by other countries (and certainly the arrogant XIXc. USA).
The Russian history since late medieval times can be compared to the history
of the British Empire, however Russia did not exterminate the whole tribes
and did not have the concentration camps like the Brits or the Americans
(Boer war and American Indian wars of the mid XIXc respectively). But, also
unlike the Brits the Russians did not bring a lot of order and progress to
the new territories. 

However, since bloody Chengis Khan invasion in the XIIc-XIIIc Russia has
proved to be a stumbling bloc for every dictator/state/knight with ambitions
of World domination. That fact is most conveniently absent from every
standard history textbook in the West. Although no-one would argue that the
final defeat of Napoleon came in the battle of Waterloo, the mere fact that
the English were capable of landing in France was made possible by the
Russian Army headed by Kutuzov which defeated Napoleon at Borodino and
entered Paris. The situation was repeated in the Second World War with
Hitler at the great cost to Russian people. I always wondered why the
definition of the Holocaust is only limited to Jews - about 7 million
Russian civilians were killed during WWII and it would be only fair to
restore the memory of these people to its proper place. It would also be
fair to remember that no Normandy invasion would be possible if the Soviet
Army would not be in hot pursuit of the Germans and that all the decisive
victories of WWII were won at the Eastern front (including the storming of
Berlin). I can't remember any of the Western textbooks I've seen dealing
adequately with this!

However it would be also fair to say that the whole chapter on the internal
policies after the October Revolution of 1917 needs a thorough and fair
revision, as the Communist regime has done a lot of damage to all the people
of the Soviet Union, including firstly and foremostly the Russians
themselves. However despite the atrocities it would be also fair to say that
during that time the Russians managed to do some remarkable things and turn
their country into a world power. The modern Soviet/Russian history needs
also a fair look - which currently I think is impossible to achieve as too
much petty politicking and intrigue is involved. 

However when it is done the Russian history textbook will never resemble a
"Saving Private Ryan" type Hollywood hype of which the Americans are too
fond - otherwise I'm afraid we'll soon whiteness some "professor" stating
that the Russians blew up the N-bomb in Hiroshima or that in fact the
Russians were responsible for the Vietnam debacle or Cambodian tragedy.

*******

#9
Subject: Re: Weeks on Russian textbooks
Date: Mon, 03 Apr 2000 16:05:47 -0400
From: David Mendeloff <dmendel@MIT.EDU>

I would never be so bold as to make assertions about the nature of
Russian history textbooks and history education upon reading only two
textbooks. Yet this is precisely what Professor Weeks does.
Ironically, Weeks implies at the end of his JRL submission that I have
obviously not read the books to which he refers and am therefore
ill-informed. I can assure JRL readers that I have based my opinion
not only on a careful reading of those two books, but also the
remaining ten (seventeen if you count revised editions) 20th century
world and Russian history and six 19th century Russian history titles
that have been published since 1992 and included on the Federal Set of
Textbooks (Federal'nyi komplekt uchebnikov) -- that is, those books
that have been recommended by the Ministry of Education for use in
public schools.

Additionally, in the course of nearly four years of research on my
doctoral dissertation I have interviewed many of the authors of those
textbooks, editors and publishers at the major textbook publishing
houses, educational journalists, historians, educationists, teachers,
NGO and IO representatives, public intellectuals and Duma members
active in education issues, and Ministry of Education officials
including former ministers and current and former deputy ministers and
bureaucrats. I have also attended meetings of the history and social
science section of the Federal Textbook Review Board (Federal'nyi
Expertnyi Soviet) and interviewed FES officials and textbook
reviewers. I mention this not because I think my view is the only
correct one, or is more valid that that of Professor Weeks. I do so
only to indicate that my view is in fact well-informed. I would
encourage Professor Weeks to read those other ten books before
reaching any conclusions.

I do not deny that laudable advances have been made in the revision of
Russian history education since Soviet days. They have. That Russian
history textbooks are no longer simple tools of ideological
indoctrination and now mention issues that were previously taboo is a
good first step. But that alone does not make these texts any
better. We must judge the books on their own terms and not
necessarily in comparison with Soviet texts. Next to Soviet texts,
almost anything looks better. But there is still much that is
obviously inadequate and even dangerous in the new ones. We should be
honest about that. 

I should note that Professor Weeks articulated the same views
expressed in his JRL submission in an article he wrote for Transitions
in January 1999. I encourage readers to take a look at the letter I
wrote in response to that article published in the March 1999 issue.
(Given that exchange I find it odd that Professor Weeks still believes
I have not read the two books he cites.) Rather than rehash the
points I made in that letter, I include it below. 

I am glad that people are actually interested enough in the content of
Russian history education to want to debate it. It is an important
issue that has received too little attention. I hope that debate and
discussion continues.

David Mendeloff
Department of Political Science and Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

>From Transitions, March 1999:

OVERBOARD ON THE PRAISE 

Just as history itself is open to multiple interpretations, so too, it
seems, is the nature of history textbooks. Albert Weeks takes the view
that post-Soviet Russian history textbooks have changed profoundly,
and all for the good, since the end of the Soviet era ("Russia Goes
Back to School," January). As Weeks argues, today "all periods are
treated with stunning candor."

As someone who has examined closely all the ministry approved
20th-century Russian and world history textbooks published since 1992,
I found Weeks's gushing enthusiasm for those texts to be
baffling. While Weeks is correct about the de-Sovietization, in both
tone and style, of most of the new textbooks, his glowing praise of
their content is misplaced. In fact, the vast majority of those
textbooks continue to whitewash and distort some of those events in
Soviet history that are of the most relevance to contemporary Russian
inter-ethnic and international relations--events that actually demand
the greatest candor and self-reflection.

Weeks reaches his conclusions from a selective reading of only two
history textbooks. However, at least 12 different 20th century Russian
and world history textbook titles have been federally sanctioned since
1992 and are the most widely used in Russia's schools. At least one of
the titles he discusses--V. P. Ostrovskii and A. I. Utkin's Istoriia
Rossii XX vek (The History of Russia in the 20th Century)--is indeed
one of the more enlightened of the new texts, but even it suffers from
serious and disturbing flaws.

Weeks praises the two texts he looked at for covering "the Nazi-Soviet
Pact and the consequent Soviet territorial expansion," but he never
tells us how those events are actually portrayed. In fact, the
interpretation found in those and most of the other books that Weeks
did not look at differs very little from the standard Soviet view:
they still argue that the pact was signed for purely defensive
reasons, never even considering the fact that Josef Stalin's decision
was motivated at least as much--if not more--by his desire for pure
territorial aggrandizement, as the Secret Protocols make clear. The
textbooks still treat the annexation of the Baltic states and the
western republics as a legal, voluntary unification with the Soviet
Union, rather than a result of coercion (a view, by the way, that is
still the official position of the Russian government). The texts in
no way see Soviet territorial expansion as a consequence of the
Nazi-Soviet Pact, as Weeks's article implies. Furthermore, they omit
mention or discussion of the bloodshed that resulted from Soviet
occupation of those territories beginning in 1939. (Weeks claims that
these books discuss Soviet genocide. Hardly. While they may make
passing reference to "Soviet excesses" or "numerous deaths," the word
"genocide" or descriptions of genocidal behavior are simply never
used.) The truly candid and self-critical discussion that is most
needed on these subjects is nowhere to be found.

One should not minimize the extent to which Russian history textbooks
have changed. But the significance of such change must be taken with a
grain of salt. Just because the new texts mention previously taboo
material does not automatically make them worthy of our
praise. Weeks's glowing review is simply unwarranted. The views
presented in the textbooks are much more complicated than Weeks leads
us to believe. While there may be much to praise, there is also much
that deserves our concern and derision.

******

#10
From: "Matthew Taibbi" <matt_taibbi@hotmail.com>
Subject: march madness
Date: Mon, 03 Apr 2000 

THE WORST JOURNALIST IN MOSCOW
March Madness Finishes-With a Bang
Press Review 
By Matt Taibbi
the eXile

In this issue we will bring you an account of the final game in the eXile's
first annual Worst Moscow Journalist tournament. I know the winner, but I
might as well admit right now that I didn't stay for the end of the game. I
left in the third quarter.

I left in the third quarter, with John Thornhill of the Financial Times
still battling it out with David Hoffman, because I couldn't stand to watch
anymore. The house was packed with spectators, but unlike them I was no
longer finding any enjoyment in the spectacle. My emotions ran in a
different direction. I wanted to kill somebody.

On the one hand, it's funny watching a bunch of blowhard hacks lie and
cheat and cut corners in print, using patchwork grammar and tortured logic
all along the way, pillaging their thesauruses to pad their word counts,
etc. That kind of thing can't help but be funny. It's one of those
immutable laws of the human experience; stupid people will always make good
theater for smart alecks.

But by being so busy laughing at their brains, you can sometimes forget
that these people have bodies, too. They have heads with little beady eyes,
and backs bent in cringing, worshipful postures. When you picture those
dumb brains packed into very real human bodies, bodies which breathe and
secrete stuff, and snort and scheme and masturbate in the shower and look
shiftily back and forth in crowds and change their tones of voice when
their superiors call and feel an itch to salute when a dictator walks
by-when you picture all of that, these people stop seeming funny. They
become disgusting-physically repulsive.

Try this test. On the one hand, pick, using your own discretion, the person
or persons you believe to be the vilest figures from human history, with
the caveat that they must all be leaders of men. My list, just off the top
of my head, would include people like Hitler, Stalin, Mobutu Sese Seko, and
Joe McCarthy. Pick someone so vile that you could imagine yourself pulling
the trigger out of moral necessity should you find yourself transported
back in time to a position right in front of them, with a gun pointed at
their heads.

Now imagine that when you find yourself face to face with this person, you
notice that he's not alone. Behind him, bent like a pretzel, is a little
hanger-on with a mouth full of drool carrying a pen and paper and wedging
his nose in your villain's ass. He's cooing in ecstasy as he drives his
tongue up, say, King George's anus. If only his majesty would give him an
order to carry out, any order, he would erupt in a paroxysm of pure
pleasure. He's so happy, in fact, that he barely notices you standing there
with the gun. How could he notice you? What else is there, when one already
has the master's ass?

If the hanger-on was there alone, you wouldn't shoot the way you might with
a Hitler. After all, he's not important enough to warrant committing the
sin of murder. But ask yourself: between master and slave, who would you
loathe more? Who would more make your flesh crawl to be near? Who would you
be more horrified to hear had visited your home-your family, your wife--
while you were away?

Hands down, every time, I bet you'd choose the hanger-on. He is not as
dangerous as His Majesty, but he is infinitely more vile. He is not a man,
but a bug. A virus. A growth. He has no will of his own, and no desire
either, save to experience the thrill of being a useful vessel for
discharge of power. And yet he visits your house every day, this human
bug-virus, riding on the magic carpet of a newspaper delivered through your
mail-slot.

The election of Vladimir Putin was a dark day for Russia, and for America
too-and not just because he is a thief and an autocrat, but because his
hangers-on have made his rise mean more than what it is. By himself,
Vladimir Putin is just another petty dictator with a Swiss bank account, an
army of drunken cops at his disposal, and a willingness to trample his own
mother if she crosses him in public. The world has produced thousands of
these monsters, they're a dime a dozen, nothing new. What is new, and what
is even more disgusting than the rise of a petty dictator, is the
phenomenon of a gallery of independent onlookers insisting that we believe
that these petty dictators aren't bad, but good. That authoritarianism is
okay as long as business is good. That snitches and spies are good people
whom only the guilty have to fear. That torturers and repressors deserve
some credit for dressing well and having a good serve.

Vladimir Putin is a reality I am ready to face with at least some patience.
The rise of such figures is probably an inevitability, a sign from God that
we all have to improve ourselves as people if we wish to avoid such
political consequences. But all you people who are buried tongue-deep up
his ass, you're different. You make me sick. David Hoffman, John Thornhill,
John Lloyd, Maura Reynolds, all of you-you are all beneath contempt. There
is no excuse for you. There is no way that I could have failed as person,
or anyone in Russia could have failed as people, that would justify the
existence of people like you. The only crime any of us are guilty of in
that respect is continuing to tolerate you. But I'm renouncing my life of
crime on that score. If I see any of you, I will slap you. For starters.
Don't believe me? Try me. You all know where I spend my time in Moscow.

I don't expect the rest of you to do the same. But I would like you to ask
yourself: should I say yes the next time David Hoffman invites himself to
my home? Do I want John Lloyd around my kids? Should I let these human
cockroaches in my door, these Evremondes, these junior Inquisitors and camp
guards, just because they happen to write for the Washington Post, or the
New York Times? It's time, I think, we stopped giving these people the
respect that they get; it's time we started treating them as pariahs. If
people like these are not social outcasts, then we have no society worth
protecting. 

Mercifully, this tournament is over. From what I saw, it was a hard-fought
final. And it had all the pomp and ceremony you'd want in a major sporting
event. Even I had to admit that, as I sat out the fourth quarter at home,
TV off, my copy of Soldier of Fortune open to the classified ads. In any
case, here's how the action went-or how I heard it went, anyway:

PREGAME

As expected, Maura Reynolds of the Los Angeles Times sang the national
anthem before the packed house at the Starlite Diner arena. Dressed in
jackboots and a gown made from a Martha Stewart bedspread, she got those
rockets red-glaring as she belted out her March 24th piece, "In the West's
View, Putin Very Well Could Be the Businessman's Special." The piece came
with a tag under the headline: "Russia: Foreign investors predict a boom
under the autocrat and expect he'll impose a little law and a lot of order
on the unruly but promising economic system."

In this piece Reynolds unironically reports on the phenomenon of Western
leaders embracing a regime that is authoritarian and repressive so long as
it protects commerce. Here is how the piece opens:

'MOSCOW--Just days before Russian voters are expected to elect a dour
autocrat as president, many Westerners share a surprising conviction: A
little authoritarianism might be just what Russia needs.
'Of course, that's not precisely the way they--or the man likely to be
voted president Sunday, Vladimir V. Putin--are putting it.
'"No one wants to use the word 'authoritarian' because it doesn't go over
well," says Alan Rousso, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank.
'"Instead, the language Putin is using and everyone else is using is
'strong state.' "
'A strong state is one that can collect taxes, enforce laws, safeguard
nuclear stockpiles and manage the economy--all things that everyone agrees
Russia needs. And on this score, nearly everything Putin has said and done
since he became acting president Dec. 31 matches up with what the West
wants.
'"He's sending all the right signals," says Z. Blake Marshall, executive
vice president of the U.S.-Russia Business Council. "Looking at all the
evidence, you can build a picture that is quite promising and suggests
better days are ahead."
'In fact, Putin's economic agenda reads like a foreign investor's wish
list: simplifying the tax code, legalizing land ownership, enforcing
shareholder rights, stemming capital flight. And unlike former President
Boris N. Yeltsin, Putin seems to have the clout with lawmakers to make
those wishes come true.
'The other major area of direct concern to the West is nuclear safety.'

Could you imagine any journalist during the Soviet era writing, "A little
authoritarianism might be just what Russia needs?" No, of course not. Back
then every chain-smoking dissident poet who ever had his rhyme scheme
criticized was lionized by people like Reynolds as a champion of
progressive values. It will be remembered that we cared about Russians'
rights back then. But now that we run the world, we don't give a fuck. Buy
your Coca-Cola and get back to lock-up, borscht-eater.

Reynolds's defense for this article would doubtless be that none of the
opinions in it are her own. She herself isn't saying that a little
authoritarianism might be just what Russia needs; she's saying that's what
other Westerners are saying. She doesn't embrace the concept of a "strong
state", she just defines what other people mean by it when they say it. 

Well, bullshit. A person who disagreed on principle with this thesis-- with
the idea that authoritarianism is okay as long as trade routes are
secured-would not write an article in this way. I certainly wouldn't. The
sub-headline wouldn't read "Could be the Businessman's Special", but,
"Businessmen Admit they Don't Care about Rights." Okay, you say, but Maura
Reynolds can't write the latter, because the Times wouldn't allow that kind
of non-objective writing.

But why not? The second version is no less slanted, no less objective, than
the real version. The real version leads off with two straight quotes
supporting the idea of benevolent authoritarianism, then says blankly, as a
statement of fact, that the one area of direct concern to the West is
nuclear safety. This last trick, the blanket statement of fact, has the
effect of rendering all other considerations secondary to the issue of
nuclear safety. I have to say it makes me more uncomfortable being an
American in Russia, knowing that articles like these are out there. Could
you imagine sitting with the parents of some kid who was slaughtered in
Chechnya and explaining to them that, according to the Los Angeles Times,
the only area of direct concern to your people is nuclear safety? That
Putin according to your countrymen is "sending all the right signals"?

Furthermore, Reynolds deliberately confuses her rhetoric throughout the
piece. She says Yeltsin didn't have the clout with lawmakers-this is
absurd. He bombed the shit out of them and they didn't peep once after
that. When he needed them to, they got in line. Every time. What's more,
what autocrat needs legislation anyway? Yeltsin willed much of the laws
governing privatization into being by decree (with U.S. support,
incidentally). Putin, if he needs to, will do the same. The whole point of
authoritarianism is that it exists as an antecedent to participatory
parliamentary democracy. If the Fuhrer needs "clout" with lawmakers, then
he's not a Fuhrer at all, but an executive. Nonetheless Reynolds allows her
sources to use the word "legislation"-a word we Westerners associate with a
parliamentary process-- as a smokescreen to distract the reader from the
nature of the autocrat's business:

'In fact, after nine years of Yeltsin's volatile leadership, what Russians
and Westerners appear to crave above all else is political stability.
'"We are confident that Putin will get in, and we believe he will bring
stability," says Chris Lacey, head of General Motors' regional division
here.
'"Whether it becomes more authoritarian, the important thing is what he
does to legislation. We all need to know what the rules of the game are.
What we can't have is a situation where the rules are changing all the time."'

Since when did it become okay to say things like this in public? I always
thought it was indecent for an American to think authoritarianism was okay,
much less say so in public, as a spokesman for his p.r.-conscious employer.
I don't get it. If somebody out there understands this, please don't
hesitate to send in an explanation. And the home of the brave.

THE GAME
David Hoffman (1), Washington Post, def. John Thornhill, Financial Times

Big-money players always show up for the big games. Hoffman sure as hell
showed up for this final. He ran away with the Worst Journalist 2000 title
through his coverage of the story that was tailor-made for his peculiar
propaganda skills; the Putin phenomenon and the presidential election.

Hoffman had a great game plan. He blitzed Thornhill in the first half with
a revisionist history of the Chechen conflict, then switched to the
election in the second half. His clever tactic in the Chechen story, as
seen in his March 20 article, "Miscalculations Paved Path to Chechen War",
was to race past the cautious apologies for the war favored by rivals like
Michael Gordon of the New York Times, and simply declare (as implied in the
headline) the whole business an understandable accident:

'The story of how Russia and Chechnya slid back into war has been the
subject of debate and intense speculation here and abroad. The outbreak of
hostilities coincided with the unexpected rise of acting President Vladimir
Putin as Yeltsin's hand-picked successor, and led to speculation that the
Kremlin engineered the war in order to propel Putin to power, or at Least
influence the March 26 presidential elections.

'However, a reconstruction of key turning points on the road to war in
Chechnya shows Russian officials and Chechen fighters were driven by a
series of miscalculations, rather than by a calculated ploy.

'Russian analysts, military specialists and others interviewed for this
article suggested both Russia and the Chechen fighters bungled badly as
they responded to escalating tensions. The Chechen leaders and warlords,
now battered and in hiding, have yet to give their side of the story.'

Hoffman, as is his wont, lies here. Both Maskhadov and Basayev have blamed
the apartment bombings which precipitated the war on Boris Berezovsky.
Anyone who wants to find those denials can look them up on www.ichkeria.ru.
This has long been a matter of public record. I was shocked (and I wasn't
the only one, folks-an annotated version of this article was sent to me by
an angry fellow journalist) to see him print such a blatant misstatement of
fact here.

Later, Hoffman scrambles to depict Maskhadov-who I don't defend, but
still-as an ungrateful traitor who turned his back on a Russian government
that tried to do right by him:

'According to several officials, Russia's leadership tried to help
Maskhadov, and for several years quietly supplied him with weapons and money.'

First of all, why does the Kremlin get to have anonymous sources in the
Washington Post on such a crucial matter? You can be damn sure no anonymous
Chechen sources will ever appear in that paper. Secondly, what about the
flip side to all that "money"? Would Hoffman ever print what happened to
all those budget funds allocated for the "Chechen Reconstruction Fund"?
Would he mention that the Russians conveniently destroyed most of the
properties in Grozny they had theoretically "rebuilt"? And why doesn't
Hoffman mention the fact that no Kremlin official ever agreed to meet with
Maskhadov after Lebed's peace deal? 

In any case, Hoffman went into the half with a big lead. While he was in
the locker room, the crowd was given a real treat-the famous John Lloyd
halftime show. Lloyd wowed fans last summer with an 8,000-word piece in the
New York Times magazine which excused the Young Reformers for their
multitudinous fuckups on the grounds that they meant well. IN this piece
(March 19, "The Logic of Vladimir Putin), again in the Times magazine, he
explains away Putin's KGB past on the grounds that the post-Stalin Chekists
were just a bunch of yuppies:

'The Soviet secret police became, after Stalin's death, much more of a
"thinking corporation," and in doing so became increasingly attractive to
the upwardly mobile.'

To make the pill more palatable, Lloyd coats this thesis with a soothing
base of tennis imagery and nice clothes:

'Aleksandr Lebedev is head of the Russian National Reserve Bank, and was in
the late Gorbachev years an officer - an intelligence officer, not a K.G.B.
man" -- in the London Embassy. He is still in his 30's, fluent and subtle
in English, beautifully dressed, working from a sumptuous office. "They
came out of the best places -- Moscow State, Leningrad State, the Moscow
State Institute for Foreign Relations," Lebedev said. "The state was
looking for people with a talent to make others feel well disposed toward
them. Tennis was encouraged, so you could move easily in high society in
the West."'

So snitches dress well, speak English, and can make a fourth for doubles in
a pinch. That's good enough for the New York Times, I guess. 

Lloyd went on to dazzle the crowd by praising Putin's decision to protect
Boris Berezovsky from prosecution as a "shrewd" move:

'Primakov, himself a former spy master (in foreign intelligence), began to
move against businesspeople and politicians he thought corrupt. Putin was
ordered to investigate Boris Berezovsky, the billionaire financier and
patron of the Yeltsin "family" -- the extended circle of relatives and
trusted associates that helped make key decisions, agreed on key
appointments and drew a tight protective ring around the former president.
Putin refused.

'It was a shrewd choice -- to defend an ailing and politically weakened
Yeltsin against Primakov, then the most popular politician in Russia, with
the Communist and nationalist opposition forces in ascendancy.'

I wonder what Lloyd would have written about the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
Macbeth was shrewd, too. He might have shown up as the "billionaire king"
in a Lloyd article. This is amazing stuff, and the crowd certainly
appreciated it. I was still there for that part-the noise in the stadium
was deafening.

Hoffman simply ran away with this thing in the second half. As expected,
most of the Western press applauded the Putin coronation. But no one got
that tongue in deeper than good ol' Dave in his March 27 election wrap-up:

'This turnaround suggests a fundamental change in the Russian electorate
may be unfolding, analysts and politicians said today. In the Yeltsin
years, there was a huge fault line between the democrats and reformers on
one side, and the Communists and nationalists on the other. Yeltsin's
campaign in 1996 was cast as a black-and-white contest between the forces
of reform and of communism.

'But now a different fault line is being drawn. Some analysts say it is a more
pragmatic one: a division between those who have adapted to the new Russian
market democracy, and those who have not. The adapters, especially young
people, voted for Putin, while Zyuganov continued to pull those who have
not managed to find a place in the new society--an older, more traditional
electorate.'

So Putin represents the electorate which has "adapted" to the fact of
having no choice-er, to market democracy. The people who didn't vote for
Putin were just a bunch of commies hobbling around on walkers. You see,
jailing journalists and leveling civilian populations-that's just
pragmatism. If you don't agree, well, then, you must be a red. Or old. So
just die already! Let's move on, okay?

Hoffman's article went on, but by then I was gone. I had canned goods and
hollow-points to order. This year's newly-crowned Worst Journalist will
spend the year 2000 in the same place he spent 1999-in his Moscow office,
licking thugs' asses by day, trolling cocktail parties with his hand
extended for kissing by night. I'll be in the woods. I'm thinking Montana.
See you there next year, sports fans.

*******