April 2, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4218 • 4219 • 4220

Johnson's Russia List
#4219
2 April 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Patrick Lannin, Putin Still An Enigma One Week 
After Election.
2. AFP: Russia blocks UN rights chief's visit to secret camps.
3. Cathy Fitzpatrick: Young Putin.
4. EKHO MOSKVY RADIO INTERVIEW WITH IGOR MALASHENKO, FIRST DEPUTY 
CHAIRMAN OF MEDIA-MOST BOARD, MARCH 28, 2000.
5. Remarks by Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs: RUSSIA AFTER THE ELECTIONS.]

*******

#1
Putin Still An Enigma One Week After Election
By Patrick Lannin

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Seven days after Vladimir Putin swept to victory in a 
presidential election, Russia was still waiting on Sunday to hear what he 
planned for his people.

The former KGB spy spent his first week as president-elect pinning medals on 
soldiers who had fought in rebel Chechnya, meeting his government and 
visiting a former closed city which is part of Russia's nuclear industry.

The one concrete decision he made was to keep Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev 
in his post to preserve stability in the army as it wages its Chechen 
campaign.

But his laconic manner remained unchanged, with no air of triumph, no policy 
statements signaling ground-breaking change and no feeling of historic shift.

The day after the vote was just another day in the office. There was little 
fanfare, despite the fact that Putin had managed to pull off the victory 
Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and 10 other rivals in the first round.

As in the run-up to the vote, his remarks since the election have been no 
more than hints of what he has in store.

He and his advisers have kept everyone guessing on the economy by referring 
to a grand scheme by economist German Gref, tantalizingly dropping words such 
as ``breakthrough,'' ''radical'' and ``market reforms'' into their statements.

``The main principles on which the work of the government will be based are 
the strengthening of the state and a continuation of market transformation,'' 
Putin said on Friday -- in what was one of his fullest statements since being 
elected.

Fears Of Crackdown

Such words are music to the ears of foreign investors -- but some analysts 
fear that Putin's background as an agent of the KGB Soviet security police 
and his record of crushing rebel resistance in Chechnya mean Russia is in for 
authoritarian rule.

``Putin's Russia may not be Soviet but it certainly could turn out to be 
malevolent,'' Diederik Lohman of the U.S.-based Human Rights Watch wrote in 
the English-language Moscow Times.

His group has collected a number of allegations of human rights abuses by 
Russian forces in Chechnya.

One of Russia's best known young reformers, Boris Nemtsov, has also voiced 
fears that Putin will close down the commercial television station NTV, the 
only channel which broadcasts across Russia and is not state-owned.

But Putin last week denied that his statements on the need for a strong 
Russia presaged a security crackdown.

``What we are talking about is a strong state where rules are secured by laws 
and their observation is guaranteed,'' he said.

Putin has also said he will welcome market specialists in his government, no 
matter which party they came from.

Most people's money is on First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, a 
finance specialist, eventually becoming prime minister, although other posts 
seem up for grabs.

Analysts have also tipped many of Putin's associates from his native town of 
St Petersburg for a government job, including Deputy Finance Minister Alexei 
Kudrin as possible finance minister, Gref as economy minister and ex-premier 
Sergei Stepashin as interior minister or deputy prime minister. 

*******

#2
Russia blocks UN rights chief's visit to secret camps

GROZNY, Russia, April 2 (AFP) - 
Russian officials refused to take UN human rights chief Mary Robinson to any 
of the five detention centres she had asked to see during a brief trip to 
war-torn Chechnya.

Robinson, the most senior international official to visit Chechnya since 
Russia launched its assault in September, was instead shown a few cells 
attached to a district military headquarters, leaving the UN delegation 
distinctly unimpressed.

"This place was not on our list of five," Robinson's spokesman Jose Luiz Diaz 
said. "We would have liked to have seen the places that we asked for."

They included the PAP-1 and PAP-5 detention centres located in a car factory 
in the Leninsky district of Grozny. The facilities were revealed last week in 
a critical report by Amnesty International.

Robinson asked to see PAP-1 within moments of landing at Grozny's Severny 
(Sheikh Mansur) airport, a request that sparked sharp exchanges with a senior 
Russian army officer.

"It doesn't exist any more. Your information is out of date. It was operating 
in 1996," snapped General Vakha Ibragimov. "We are destroying terrorists," he 
added.

A deputy prosecutor at the airport, however, appeared to contradict the 
assertion by telling AFP that the delegation would indeed be taken to PAP-1.

Robinson responded to Ibragimov's outburst by expressing sympathy for 
soldiers killed and kidnapped in Chechnya, saying: "I'm aware of unacceptable 
violence and violations by the Chechen side.

"But I'm also hearing of very serious problems of human rights violations 
carried out by those in Russian military uniform, in special forces uniform.

"It's very important that these be fully investigated and that those who are 
responsible do not have impunity," she said.

"It's also very important for the Russian army and for the way in which 
modern Russia as an important member of the United Nations fulfils its 
obligations."

Instead of PAP-1, Robinson was taken to a temporary detention centre in 
Grozny's Staropromyslovsky district, where two women were being held on 
suspicion of theft.

After a short time on site, Robinson visited a local market and talked with 
residents in the district, which was the focus of swirling reports in January 
of atrocities by Russian government troops.

One woman at the market, who gave her name as Zena, said she had not been in 
the district during the alleged massacre of civilians, but said she had 
relatives who had since gone missing.

"In my family, for example, my cousins we can't find them among the bodies or 
among the living.

"In this war most of those who died are children, civilians, women. It's the 
genocide of a people," she added.

Robinson's visit to Grozny had earlier been shortened by a three-hour delay 
in arranging a helicopter to Grozny. UN officials declined to comment on the 
official reasons given for the hold-up.

On Saturday, Robinson visited refugee camps in the neighbouring Russian 
republic of Ingushetia, where she called for alleged atrocities by Russian 
troops to be thoroughly investigated.

UN participation would lend any such inquiry credibility.

"What I heard today leads me to believe that there is a very serious 
situation that needs to be inquired into, a very serious situation of not 
isolated incidents but quite a pattern of violence," she said Saturday.

The UN rights chief said she had also heard reports of Chechen guerrilla 
fighters using civilians as human shields, and called for these to be 
investigated as well.

Robinson, who has been denounced by Moscow as anti-Russian for her sharp 
criticism of its six-month crackdown in Chechnya, is to report back to the UN 
Human Rights Commission in Geneva on her return April 4.

******

#3
From: "Cathy Fitzpatrick" <cfitz@ilhr.org>
Subject: Re: 4217-Lukin/Young Putin
Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2000 

Alexander Lukin notes that "In 1975 [Putin] began to full-time work for the
KGB and possibly (it is a common practice for KGB agents) studied at the
high school of KGB which is situated in Moscow (although this fact cannot be
found in his biographies)."

In fact, this fact can be found in his biographies. The reporters'
interviews with him collated in the book "First Person" (available in
Russian at www.viagrus.com and soon to be published by Public Affairs in
English) indeed describes how, after five months in counterintelligence in
St. Petersburg, he was sent for one year of special training in Moscow. He
says: "For several months I went through the formalities and knocked off
some cases. I was sent to agent training for six months. Our school in
Leningrad wasn't too exceptional. My superiors believed that I had mastered
the basics but that I needed some field preparation. So I studied in
Moscow, and then came back to Petersburg for about half a year in the
counter-intelligence division."

Reporters then ask him directly: "What year was this?" He replies: "What
year? It was at the end of the 1970s" -- not giving the exact year for some
reason, and this bears scrutiny. He does say that he went to work for the
KGB in 1975, after his 1975 graduation (this fact is also contained in the
www.fsb.ru website biography) So we can estimate that he would have first
gone to Moscow for special training in 1976 or possibly 1977.

>From his wife's interviews, we learn that Masha, the Putins' oldest daughter
was born "when I was in my fourth year of school, and Volodya left for a
year to study in Moscow." In another place she says that they went to
Dresden when Putin served in the GDR and Masha was a year old (she's about
15-16 today). That means that Putin also spent a year of training in Moscow
before going to the GDR--he says he went to the GDR in 1985, Luda says they
went to Dresden in 1986, but maybe she came later after he was settled.
Here, she is obviously referring to another session of training in Moscow,
not the session "from the late 1970s."

In sum, if Putin "in the late 1970s" went to Moscow, he could still have had
Jean-Claude Leck-Lochet as a roomate, since he left his family in St.
Petersburg and lived somewhere in Moscow--we don't know where. Could a
Leningrad State University law graduate and KGB trainee be housed at the
Lomonosov Law Facultry for cover? He wouldn't have had Jean-Claude for a
roomate for the entire period of 1974-79 in Moscow, however, because he went
back to work at the KGB in St. Petersburg during this period, but there is
at least a year of overlap. We would also have to determine if it would be
common practice for a KGB trainee to be housed with a foreign student.

AFP is famous for giving wrong information for many countries, not just
Russia, but we can't be sure that there isn't something to this story, can
we?

*******

#4
TITLE: INTERVIEW WITH IGOR MALASHENKO, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF 
MEDIA-MOST BOARD
(EKHO MOSKVY RADIO, 15:30, MARCH 28, 2000)
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE

Anchor: My name is Alexei Venediktov. Our guest today is first
deputy chairman of Media-MOST Board, a person who has been known as
a political technologist during the 1996 elections, Igor
Malashenko. 
Many of our listeners watched your discussion with Irina
Khakamada and Gleb Pavlovsky on NTV in the evening. Last night we
got many questions why we had invited Pavlovsky and had not invited
Malashenko. Unfortunately, you spoke at different times. Perhaps,
we will bring you together some day.

Malashenko: It's very regrettable because I hope to meet with
Gleb on the radio and I regret that this didn't happen.

Anchor: We will organize such a meeting.

Malashenko: I'll be happy to take part in it.

Anchor: My first question would be as follows: What do you
think of the political results of the presidential elections? I
mean, we know the outcome but different people understand their
political effects differently. 

Malashenko: The fact is that we do not know what political
effects these elections may have because Putin has to act. I mean
Vladimir Putin was absolutely right when he said that everything
would only begin after elections, not end. 
Someone has made a good joke about 19th century novels: if a
novel has a happy ending, everything ends with a wedding. Although
people who know life believe that this is where the narration
should only begin. 
We should begin our narration now. Vladimir Putin has to make
several inevitable decisions which will show the direction in which
he will be moving. The most immediate ones will be appointments,
the appointment of the presidential administration chief of staff
and prime minister, although, as far as I understand, he has taken
a time-out on the prime minister till inauguration. So, this will
happen not earlier than the end of the first 10 days of May because
it has been said that he is unlikely to be appointed now. But these
will be very important appointments.
If we call things by their proper names, right now the
administration chief of staff is Voloshin, the head of the
government is Kasyanov. Journalists are arguing who of them are
more controlled by Roman Abramovich. I do not think this is such a
crucial argument and that these figures are worth being argued
about. If one of them or both preserve their positions, this will
send a very clear signal that nothing has changed and there is no
new political reality of which you have asked me.

Anchor: Let's look at the results of elections. Did you expect
this outcome? Roughly speaking, Putin received 53 percent, Zyuganov
31 percent and Yavlinsky 6 percent. I have rounded the results by
the rules. Could you comment on each of these results?

Malashenko: I can only speak of my personal expectations and
how much they have come true. Vladimir Putin achieved the result
that I expected, given his election campaign. About 1.5 months ago
I expected a better result.
As regards Zyuganov, it was a surprise to me. I'll tell you
frankly, it was an unpleasant surprise. I didn't think that
Zyuganov would exceed the result achieved by the CPRF in the
December elections. I think this is a very serious signal and it is
very regrettable that analysts and those who comment on the outcome
of elections have not paid proper attention to this fact.

Anchor: Why is it so serious? 30 percent --

Malashenko: I remember and know that there were some hotheads
after the December elections who, dizzy from success, said the Duma
could be dissolved in about a year's time, the Communist Party
would not receive anything and it would be finished once and for
all, there would be a stable pro-Kremlin or pro-government, you
name it, parliament.
I think that now we see that this talk was Utopia because the
Communist Party has once again demonstrated its strength. No, it's
not strong enough to get supreme power in the state, but it's quite
strong. Why did this happen?
I think that in the December elections people did not choose
ideology. They chose not between the left and the right, between
communists and democrats, but between those who represented the
power and might of the state and those who advocated a softer and
more amorphous, in voters' view, approach toward such a problem. 
So, Putin who has demonstrated strength and toughness in
Chechnya received support. The right who supported him and who
acted quite aggressively and convincingly, I mean primarily
Chubais, also received surprisingly strong support. However, the
communists kept on talking about a strong state but it smelled of
something very old, Soviet and gone forever. This is why many
voters turned away from them. 
Now this effect is wearing off and we are going back to the
same situation which we thought we had overcome in the December
elections.

Anchor: Before we move on to Yavlinsky, I would like to talk
more about Putin. You said you had expected this result. Did you
expect him to win in the first round?

Malashenko: I most certainly expected him to win in the first
round. Moreover, about a month and a half or two months ago I
thought he would score an even more convincing victory.
Putin did not need the advertising campaign that was launched
on television. Yes, he did not use commercials. But did he need
them if the first and the second state-run channels carried out an
aggressive pro-Putin advertising campaign, and all other companies,
including NTV, also gave a lot of time and attention to his work
because he was incumbent president and any of his step often made
the headlines. 
The Chinese have this old principle: the ruler of whom nothing
is known is the highest. Of course, you may laugh at this, but
there must be some mystery, there must be some enigma in the ruler
in Russia just like in China. In this respect, Putin made a
brilliant start when people were ready to vote for him without
knowing anything about him, and some maybe because they did not
know anything about him.
By the way, Yeltsin understood this very well. Even at the end
of his rule, when Boris Nikolayevich had very few secrets left, no
one could obfuscate things and create a mystery out of nothing
better than he.

Anchor: We will return to Putin, but let's talk of the third
candidate, Yavlinsky. How would you assess this results?

Malashenko: I expected this result, because Grigory
Alexeyevich presented himself as a human rights activist. In the
Duma elections he also presented Yabloko as a party seeking to
protect the rights and freedoms of people. Although I would not use
the word party, because this is a definition of a human rights
organization.
This is an extremely important and useful work for society.
However, you cannot claim political power and you cannot claim many
votes in Russia because -- of course, we have learnt to pronounce
such words as human rights after Academician Sakharov, but I don't
think that these values have taken so deep root and that people are
so aware of the need to protect them that Yavlinsky could get more.
That is why, I think, Yavlinsky got exactly what he could have got.

Anchor: Yavlinsky's opponents are surprised at his results or
are feigning surprise. They are saying that he had such a powerful
resource as NTV and Media-MOST and that this did not work.

Malashenko: The opponents are lying as always. They are trying
to generate the idea that they had a dangerous and influential
adversary. They were lying when they were saying that NTV and other
Media-MOST outlets were campaigning against Putin. They were lying
when they were saying that all these media outlets were supporting
Yavlinsky. Nothing of the sort.
Yavlinsky conducted his own campaign. It is not difficult to
notice that during the Duma elections and the presidential
elections he conducted two different campaigns. And in this sense,
there were two different Yavlinskys. So, the opponents, I suggest
to them, should at least have bothered to invent two different
stories. I mean about the parliamentary and the presidential
elections.
He conducted a very vigorous and aggressive campaign, but
still... 

Anchor: ...performed as in the past.

Malashenko: And performed as in the past. I think this means
that the number of Russian voters who are prepared to vote for
Yavlinsky personally and for human rights values is roughly such. 
On the other hand, I must say that this is not a small number.
I do not think that there are many countries in which a human
rights activist and a human rights organization regularly get such
a number of votes. 

Anchor: 15 hours 49 minutes in Moscow. I remind listeners that
our guest is Igor Malashenko. Let us now go over to an analysis of
the election returns. A month from now only Putin will be making
his first appointments. Then it will be possible to identify the
system that is going to form. The more so that I think we all agree
that the Yeltsin stage is over. Do you agree that a new Russia is
emerging? 

Malashenko: I do not know. But I do firmly know that we have
a change of generations in Russian politics. This is so and this is
gratifying.

Anchor: Is this important or not? 

Malashenko: Perhaps, I am motivated by generation egoism. But
that is really so. And of course, this is important. I call these
people the generation of 1952. If we look around, we will see that
there are many of them. These are Stepashin and Yavlinsky, Putin
and Skuratov, and many, many others. The change of generations has
taken place. But I do not know if politically we can describe this
as a new Russia. But I can say with confidence that we are dealing
with a post-Yeltsin Russia, with a post-Yeltsin political regime.
I am not implying anything negative. You see, the word regime has
acquired a derogative meaning in our country.
We do not know how far the Putin regime is going to depart
from the Yeltsin one. And this is much more important than
personnel appointments. You see, Putin has a very broad but very
amorphous political support.
For instance, the political part on which he definitely
relies, Unity, is not really a party in the strict meaning of the
word. It was simply announced that the new party of the ruling
elite is called Unity and everybody was asked to vote for it. And
they voted for this shingle and, of course, first of all, for
Putin. But it is extremely difficult to rely on this amorphous
force.
So when and if Putin encounters problems, and he cannot but
encounter problems since any president engages in the solution of
problems, he will have variants of action. One of the variants is
to seek an alliance with the Communists. This depends in many ways
on Putin because it is no joking matter to come to terms with the
Communists. But the Chernomyrdin government was quite successful at
this. But it had to pay a price for this. All these political
compromises that have a price, the role that the Communist Party
will play in society as a result of them and so on... Will Putin
resort to this or will he prefer to try to fight for the creation
of his own really stable but not such a broad political base? We
will get an answer to this within the next few months. And then we
will be able to identify his regime.

Anchor: You are speaking about an alliance, Igor, but Gennady
Zyuganov said in an interview to us that this year's presidential
elections offered a choice between the CPRF and the KGB.

Malashenko: Wonderful. I will remind you that Lubyanka is only
two steps away from Staraya Ploshchad. It is claimed that
underground passages link them. That is why there is nothing
unusual in this. In the past there existed a very firm alliance of
the CPSU and the KGB. According to Zyuganov, it is a game of
pretence that they have parted and are faking a two-party system.
But I take this very seriously. I do not support the theory that
nothing has changed and that the sly communist nomenklatura has
been pulling the wool over our eyes all these years.
In my opinion, there is a grain of truth in this. So far,
especially at the December elections and to a lesser extent at the
presidential elections, our voter chose not so much between
ideologies as between a stronger state and a weaker state. And
here, of course, in the latter case the KGB is preferable to the
CPSU.
We know from sociological polls that many people regard Putin
as a sort of Stirlits. So, I think that in Zyuganov's metaphor
there definitely is a grain of truth.

Anchor: I do not like questions that start with an if, but
still I am going to put this question: If Zyuganov and Putin were
to qualify for the second round, whom would you have voted for?

Malashenko: I do not regard this as a choice between the KGB
and the CPSU, I regard this as a choice between Putin and Zyuganov,
as a choice between a communist and a non-communist. Under all
circumstances, quite obviously, I would cast my vote for a
non-communist.

Anchor: In his recent interview to a famous publication, a
supplement to The New York Times, New York Review of Books, the
prominent American financier Soros said, I quote from Interfax,
that Vladimir Putin's rule is likely to be authoritarian and
nationalistic.

Malashenko: Frankly, I do not know how Soros is rated as an
expert on Russia. I think that we have an element of
authoritarianism, de facto authoritarianism in Russia. This existed
under Yeltsin as well because the state is quite capable of
controlling society's political life. Since this is so, we have an
element of authoritarianism.
As to nationalism and chauvinism, I do not agree with this.
There is the wide-spread view that supposedly there is an upsurge
of nationalism in Russian society because the war in Chechnya has
been supported one way or another. I don't think so. I think that
for several years Russian citizens have been humiliated by the
defeat in the first Chechen war. They needed some medicine to get
rid of this complex, and the massive use of military force in
Chechnya provided such a medicine.
So politically, the war in Chechnya is over and its goal has
been achieved. Its purpose was to remedy society from this terrible
syndrome of defeat. This is why, as many editors and journalists
admit now -- although formally, Chechen news should be given top
priority and begin news programs, people do not quite like this
because they have already gotten their portion of medicine and been
happy to forget everything. I think this is also a phenomenon that
needs to be studied. It may not be quite positive, but it has
nothing to do with nationalism or chauvinism.

Anchor: And one more question at the end of our discussion
with Igor Malashenko. Let me remind you that Igor Malashenko is
first deputy chairman of the Media-MOST Board. We are talking about
new power and the press. There are two components. We know that
licenses of ORT and TVTs may be revised. What do you think of such
a regime? We also know of the threats to close NTV and we know of
the threats of changing the terms of licensing and of attempts to
strip the press of its benefits. My attitude toward all this is
negative, but what is yours?

Malashenko: One of the problems is that Vladimir Putin does
not consider the press as an ally to the same extent to which Boris
Yeltsin did. Yeltsin was good at turning to the press for support
at critical times in 1991, 1993 and 1996, and he always got it. But
he knew how to do this.
Vladimir Putin does not know how to do this yet. His personal
political experience is very limited and, unfortunately, he is
surrounded by staffers and allies who do not know how to work with
the press. All they can, if they can do this, is turn mass media
into means of propaganda -- as it has happened to the first and
second Russian channels which have lately been shamelessly used for
propaganda purposes, in order to destroy Yavlinsky who, as those
people imagined, was taking votes away from Putin... To announce
for the whole country to hear that there is almost a plot of Jews
and Free Mason, that Putin is opposed by some unknown but dangerous
adversary... And as a result of this the mass media was lowered to
God knows what level.
I have no doubt whatsoever that Putin had nothing to do with
this. And, of course, he never gave such instructions. But this was
done for his sake and, if you want, in his name. That is why he
will have to take a stand: is he prepared to put up with such
things, is he prepared to reduce the mass media to the status of
mere propaganda outlets? If so, on his way to his aim he will have
to destroy many media outlets.

Anchor: Regardless of the way he decides on?

Malashenko: No, no, I mean if he decides that it is in his
interests to use the mass media as an instrument of propaganda, if
he decides that some media outlets must be simply destroyed, such
as NTV and Ekho Moskvy. All sorts of verbal camouflage can be used,
it can be said, for instance, that we are not closing down media
outlets but simply changing owners. But the result will be the one
that I mentioned. Of course, a whole number of newspapers will be
endangered as well, such as Novaya Gazeta, Obshchaya Gazeta and so
on.
The second question: is the political elite and society ready
to put up with such attempts? We do not know the answer to this
question yet. But it is now up to Putin to make the choice. I do
hope that he has drawn conclusions from his election campaign. I
hope he is aware that his campaign headquarters, Channel One and
Channel Two that tried to run ahead of the locomotive have robbed
him of some votes. I hope he realizes that the unseemly things that
we saw on Channel One and Channel Two were absolutely senseless and
counter-productive.
If he understands this, if he tries to treat mass media
outlets precisely as mass media outlets and accepts the rules of
the game that are in force in a democratic society, then I will be
calm about the future of the press. But this is an answer that we
are yet to learn about.

Anchor. Thank you, Igor. I remind listeners that this was an
interview to Ekho Moskvy by Igor Malashenko, First Deputy Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the Media-MOST holding.

******

#5
Department of State
Washington, D.C.
March 28, 2000

Remarks by Thomas R. Pickering
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
At Meridian House/Smithsonian Seminar: "Russia: Sleeping Superpower?"

RUSSIA AFTER THE ELECTIONS

Thank you very much for inviting me to be here this evening to kick
off the Meridian House and Smithsonian lecture series, "Russia
Revisited: The Sleeping Superpower?" It is a good time to review the
scene, just two days after the Russian presidential elections.

The three and a half years I spent in Russia from 1993-1996 were among
the most fascinating in a long career in diplomacy.

I hope that my time there, the thousands of miles traveled across that
country's 11 time zones, and visits to nearly 60 of the 89 equivalents
to our states will help to provide some insight into our discussion of
U.S. policy towards Russia.

The title of this seminar, "Russia -- Sleeping Superpower?" gives you
an idea of why we are all here together tonight. Even after the
breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia is the largest country in the
world, a bridge -- or perhaps a divide -- between Asia and Europe.
Rich in natural resources, perhaps the richest in the world, and with
a skilled labor force, Russia has the potential to become a globally
competitive market economy.

Russia's transition will take many years and today Russia is at yet
another crossroads in that process.

Two days ago, the Russian people elected Vladimir Putin as the second
president of the Russian Federation. Reflecting both his popularity
and the lack of opponents of any stature, Putin won just over 52% of
the vote.

Putin had the obvious advantage of incumbency, which he used to the
utmost. There are also serious questions about manipulation of the
media. Overall, however, there were no major election irregularities
and, as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe noted,
they did not affect the outcome of the elections.

The election also was interesting in that there was something of a
cautionary voice expressed by some Russians in the larger than
expected vote for Putin's primary opponent, communist candidate
Zyuganov, and because Putin's majority was a bit less than was
expected.

Whether they meant to or not, some Russians have sent a signal that
all is not well and they will be watching closely what President Putin
does. So will we.

But clearly, too, Putin has a mandate. There is no question that many
Russians missed the absence of central control and welcomed the
emergence of a strong leader. Thus far, it also seems that Putin has a
more direct and straightforward rapport with the Russian people than
did his predecessors. Since the election, he has acknowledged both
that the large vote for the communists should be interpreted as a
protest vote and that hard times are still ahead for Russia and
Russians.

That level-headedness and openness are interesting indicators of how
Putin may work with and for the Russian people.

The next critical question is, what will he do with his mandate?
Putinology has become a cottage industry in Moscow and Washington. You
only have to read the daily papers to know that. We've all heard about
Putin as a KGB Lt. Colonel in the '80s; Putin as St. Petersburg deputy
mayor and reformer in the '90s.

There is much talk of Putin's statements that Russia must be a strong
state, but little insight into what he means by all of this. Pundits
are even analyzing the acting president's [president-elect's]
fascination with judo to predict what he will do.

Much of this speculation says a great deal more about the analyst than
it does about the patient on the couch. The truth is that we don't yet
know what kind of a president Vladimir Putin will be. While it flies
in the face of our quick-to-judge, faster-to-act society, the course
Putin will follow is not yet clear, and there is therefore more than a
certain degree of "wait and see" necessary. But make no mistake: even
as Putin's tenure begins, we actively are protecting our interests and
seeking to influence events.

Once Putin is inaugurated, most likely May 5th, he will formally
nominate a prime minister and appoint a cabinet. In fact, reports
today indicate that he may announce his choice for prime minister
quite soon. The people he places in positions of responsibility will
be among the early indicators of where Putin intends to take Russia.

There is no doubt that the questions -- and ultimately the answers --
about Russia's new president are important. Putin is likely to be the
single most influential person in Russia for perhaps the next eight
years, should he win a second term. But it also is important to
remember that there are other factors at work as well. Other power
centers are developing in Russia -- the regions, the military, the
oligarchs, even the much-maligned Russian Duma.

Decentralization is a matter of fact in Russia, with the regions
gaining more autonomy. Over the last decade, regional governors have
had to adjust as the center provided fewer subsidies, but also less
control. Governors, who are now elected rather than appointed, and
elected local legislators, have created their own political and
commercial power bases, with which Moscow has had to reckon.

Likewise, the Duma, while constitutionally far weaker than the
presidency, has matured somewhat. The December parliamentary elections
brought in more democrats, fewer radicals, and the Duma seems inclined
to be more serious about the business of enacting legislation. That
could be one salutary evolution with good effect for the days ahead.

Most important, the hallmarks of a democracy -- free and fair
elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, the rule of law,
a civil society -- are beginning now to take hold, although this
process is very far from being complete.

Nevertheless, as these practices become stronger and
institutionalized, any given individual will become less important.
Russia would then have the time- honored institutions to fall back
upon, not one person making a decision today that could be reversed
easily tomorrow. These new institutions also will make it harder for
the corrupt to compete. This in itself will be a welcome change.

Sunday's presidential elections mark Russia's first democratic
transfer of power in its 1,000-year history. One of the most
overlooked facts about this election is that democratic elections are
becoming unchallenged in Russia as the way to select leaders. Since
the break-up of the Soviet Union, there have been three nationwide
Duma elections and now two presidential elections, not to mention
hundreds of regional and local elections. Almost all of them passed
without significant complaints of malfeasance.

When former President Yeltsin resigned, he appointed Putin as acting
president and presidential elections were called. This is the
procedure as outlined in the Russian Constitution. There was certainly
criticism that the system was being manipulated, to Putin's advantage,
but no one questioned the constitutionality of the process or tried to
come to power by other means. This is a significant development in a
country that not ten years ago was a communist country in which people
had no say in who their leaders would be and in which the decision
process itself was shrouded in mystery.

Another overlooked development is Russia's progress toward developing
a civil society, particularly outside the major cities of Moscow and
St. Petersburg. This is something that was evident to me in my travels
in Russia four years ago and I think it is even more evident now.

Russia today boasts 65,000 non-governmental organizations, up from
just a handful a decade ago.

For those of us who live in the United States, it is hard to
understand what a profound development this truly is. But imagine
America with only the government and a few private businesses -- no
American Cancer Society, no animal shelters, no women's shelters, no
Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts, no foundations, no lobbyists, no
Smithsonian or Meridian House to bring you these lectures.

Such organizations of a free and civil society affect all of our
lives, every day. In Russia, they are starting to do so as well.

That is where the real change is taking place in Russia. And as
individuals get used to the idea of taking control of their lives and
their communities, it is the insurance policy that Russia can never go
back to what it was before.

Such changes are reflected in other areas as well. Private business is
expanding and some is flourishing despite the severe economic
hardships after the collapse of the ruble in August of 1998. Try to
imagine a state without individual initiative in the area of business
and competition. This, too, is a welcome and potentially very
significant change.

But let me also be clear on another important point. Russia is still
very much a work in progress. No one is under the illusion that
Russia's path to democracy and a full market economy is getting any
easier. And we realize that Russian transformation is not a matter of
months or years, but something that probably will take decades and
generations.

I think it is worthwhile to turn for a moment to Russia's economy,
where the transition from a state run to a market driven system has
been slow and has disappointed many -- not the least of which is
Russia's own population. It is clear now that this process will take
longer than any of us thought.

This is most telling in the economic conditions under which many
Russians find themselves now today. Over 35% of the population lives
on just over one dollar a day. Inflation is down from 80% in 1998,
which is truly good news, but still reached 36% in 1999, which truly
is not good news.

These figures are discouraging for what they suggest about the
possibilities for consumer spending and investment, as well as the
effects of such poverty on the public's faith in the new economy, on
its health, infrastructure, and social institutions. Social services
and education suffer from years of budgetary neglect.

Still, Russians are looking forward, not back to staid communist
ideals, for their economic future. Equally important to note is that
the economic indicators are beginning to show some signs of recovery.
GDP, industrial production and the trade surplus all grew in 1999,
while the budget deficit, wage arrearages, and unemployment declined.

President Putin already has announced that one of his key objectives
will be to improve the standard of living under which Russians are
living. In that regard, he has said that the government will pay its
employees back wages as of April 1. Such steps are important,
particularly if they prove to be the beginning of a new way of doing
business, and of an approach to governance and the economy in which
the people at large benefit, not just the oligarchs. And of course,
you can imagine what it has been like in a country like Russia when
arrearages have gone back many months -- and you can imagine what
would occur if that happened in our country.

In addition, high oil prices and a weak ruble could mean a higher
growth rate in Russia in 2000. If this were accompanied by controlled
spending and long-needed economic reforms, it could lay the groundwork
for longer term growth.

The economic course is Putin's to set, and will be a mark both of his
commitment to reform and of his ability to influence the Duma. The
next steps in Russia's political and economic transition will require
continued dedication on the part of Russia's leaders and patience on
the part of its people.

It will require the same of American officials and the American
public. We need to remember that they (and we) are in this for the
long haul -- not just for today's headline. And I hope we have now put
the "Who Lost Russia?" debate behind us. Secretary Albright I think
said it best last fall when she said "the suggestion made by some that
Russia is ours to lose is arrogant; the suggestion that Russia is lost
is simply wrong."

But, the hearts and minds of Chechnya's people, both Russians and
Chechens, are Russia's to lose. I frankly must tell you how
disheartened I was when fighting in Chechnya began again last autumn.
I lived through the previous conflict and saw its divisive toll not
only in the Caucasus but throughout Russian society.

We don't dispute Russia's right to fight terrorism on its own soil. An
armed incursion by Chechen separatists into Dagestan last August and
apartment bombings may be the events that triggered the current
fighting.

That, however, does not excuse the Russian government's decision to
use massive military force against civilians inside Chechnya. The
numbers speak for themselves: 200,000 people displaced, thousands of
innocent civilians dead or wounded, and thousands of homes and
businesses destroyed since last September.

It will take decades and millions of dollars to rebuild Chechnya.
Moreover, allegations about atrocities by Russian forces have raised
questions about the Russian government's commitment to human rights
and international norms.

Likewise, the Russian government's decision to clamp down on the
media's ability to cover the conflict and its treatment of Radio
Liberty's Andrei Babitsky have raised questions about its commitment
to freedom of the press.

I hope that Russia will move quickly to investigate these allegations
in concert with the international community, and to protect all of its
citizens and their basic freedoms, as enshrined in Russia's
Constitution.

We raise our concerns about Chechnya at every opportunity we have to
talk with Russians, from the president on down. Slowly the West is
making some progress. In the fall, the efforts of the U.S. and others
were instrumental in gaining access for international donors to the
region and possibly in averting a humanitarian disaster.

Putin has said he does not want Russia to be isolated internationally.
He has also stated that he sees Russia as a part of Europe. We need to
keep on raising Chechnya with the Russians, to keep on moving them in
the right direction on Chechnya and toward the international norm of
the global community.

What do we want the Russians to do now? Here are a few of our
thoughts:

-- Let the International Red Cross come back in to deal with detained
and displaced people.

-- Let the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's
assistance mission return to deal with human rights monitoring and
humanitarian relief.

-- Let the Council of Europe provide its expertise to the staff of
Russia's human rights ombudsman Kalamanov to investigate the
allegations of atrocities.

-- And let Russians begin to explore with Chechens the development of
a political settlement.

With the fighting in Chechnya, many Americans naturally ask why their
government remains committed to engagement with Russia. The answer is
a simple one: because our policy of engagement with Russia advances
the safety and security of the American people. This is our enduring
national security interest beyond the disagreements and the
disappointments of the moment.

For much of the past fifty years, Russia and the United States have
been adversaries. That era happily has now passed. Despite the
well-known areas of disagreement with Russia, the end of the Cold War
has meant a more constructive relationship, whether one measures our
bilateral cooperation on reducing nuclear weapons material, or our
cooperation internationally, or the growing ties among our citizens
and business people.

As Russia continues its journey from communism, we need actively to
engage Russia so that it becomes a productive member of the world
community.

Since the Cold War ended, the U.S. has pursued three overriding goals
in our relationship with Russia: The first is to increase the safety
of the American people by working to reduce Cold War arsenals, stop
proliferation, and create a stable and undivided Europe. The second is
to work with Russia internationally, and the third is to support
Russia's effort to transform its political, economic, and social
institutions at home.

It is crystal clear why we work so hard on arms control and
non-proliferation. Why we care what kind of a country Russia becomes
is sometimes less obvious, but it come down to the same thing: U.S.
national security interests.

A Russia that boasts a healthy economy, strong institutions, and a
political system that works is a country that understands that future
progress depends not on dominating others, but on forging economic and
political partnerships in the global community. To paraphrase Prime
Minister Thatcher, that would be a Russia we can do business with.

And there is no downside. The zero-sum world of the Cold War is gone;
we have nothing to lose by a Russia that is economically and
politically strong and confident about its own security, and
everything to gain by a Russia that can be a full partner in the world
community.

Furthermore, a stable, prosperous, and democratic Russia is much more
likely to be a good partner on arms control and questions of
international security and peace.

Let me tell you concretely the kinds of things we have done with
Russia over the past eight years to protect and build your security.

The United States has helped to deactivate almost 5,000 nuclear
warheads in the former Soviet Union, removed nuclear weapons from
three countries (Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan), destroyed hundreds
of missiles, bombers and ballistic missile submarines that once
targeted our country, strengthened the security of nuclear weapons and
materials at more than 50 sites, helped put in place barriers against
illicit trafficking in weapons materials and technologies, and
purchased more than 80 tons of highly enriched uranium -- enough to
make more than 3,000 nuclear warheads. We will be using it to make
electricity in our nuclear power plants and we have an agreement to
purchase a total of 500 tons over 15 years, with an option to increase
that amount later.

That kind of cooperation is also evident in the Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative, which will help Russia to tighten export
controls, improve security over its existing weapons of mass
destruction, and provide increased opportunities for thousands of
former Soviet weapons scientists to participate in peaceful commercial
and research activities.

To combat nuclear proliferation, the U.S. and Russia have been
partners in developing the foundations of a stronger international
non-proliferation regime, based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons.

Our policy of engagement is also designed to help Russians build the
prosperous and democratic country that will be America's partner in
meeting the challenges ahead in this century.

U.S. assistance programs have brought more than 35,000 young Russians
to the U.S. for training, they have helped 275,000 Russian small
businessmen with financing or training, and they have reached out to
300 independent TV stations in Russia's provinces.

Russia and America also have common interests on many international
issues. Last year alone, Russian and American soldiers stood
side-by-side to keep the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo; our diplomats
helped to negotiate the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe signed by 53 members of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe; and our scientists worked to ensure that Y2K
brought no nuclear mishaps.

Our policy of engagement also means that we engage in areas where we
have strong disagreements. This is what grabs the headlines and for
many becomes the entirety of the relationship.

Indeed, the relationship has had its share of very heavy weather over
the past year, between Kosovo and Chechnya, and our deep concerns
about Russian support for missile and nuclear projects in Iran.

But I also want to point out that during the Kosovo campaign, when
media pundits were predicting the absolute end of the relationship, we
were quietly continuing our work on other issues.

During this period, we concluded agreements on the framework for the
historic CFE Adaptation Treaty, negotiated a Civil Air Agreement, a
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and the list goes on.

Are all of these issues headliners? No. But, for example, it is
crucially important to the airline industry and all the companies that
depend on them and all of you who travel -- that we have a Civil Air
Agreement.

As for Kosovo, despite virulent debate, the Russians proved to be
instrumental in the diplomatic solution that brought an end to the
military action. Cooperation on the ground between Russian and other
KFOR troops remains excellent. The military-to-military relationship
and the NATO-Russia relationship are both getting back on track now,
too, and the U.S., Russia and others are meeting today in Europe in
the Contact Group to chart a future course together in Kosovo.

It is the hallmark of a mature relationship that even when two
countries profoundly disagree, they can still do business together.
Both Russia and the United States recognize that it just makes more
sense to engage: we simply have too many interests in common --
political, security, cultural, and commercial -- to do otherwise. And
we can engage in a mature way, without linking progress in one area to
progress in all others. It is in our common interests to cooperate
where we can and to manage our differences where we cannot.

In the wake of the weekend elections, Russians face decisions on
critical issues, from the economy to Chechnya. A young and vigorous
president is about to lead Russia into the new millennium. He is
different from his predecessors -- who exhibited bold strokes of
bravery at key points in the breakup of the former Soviet Union. He
came to power through the ballot box in a country already seven years
old. He now will have to make happen what his predecessors' bold
decisions made possible.

Putin will be judged at home in large measure on his willingness and
ability to implement economic and political reform and restore the
confidence of the citizenry in the state and in the economy.

He will be judged by the world by how he deals with the country's
internal instabilities, how he engages with weak neighbors across
Russia's borders, and the role that Russia chooses to play
internationally, as well as by his own personal skill at furthering
Russia's economic and political reform.

Today, the question of "Whither Russia" is very much on America's
mind, whether one is in business, government or academia. It is, of
course, a question whose answer does not lie in Washington; the answer
lies instead with Russia and in the decisions that the new government
will make.

The problems that need to be addressed are clear. Will the new
government create a positive, fair, and transparent business climate?
Will it tap the immense ingenuity of the Russian people and strengthen
its democracy? Will Russia make the changes that will inspire its own
people as well as the international community to invest in that
economy?

We don't know where Russia will go. That is Russia's choice to make.
But as Secretary Albright stated recently, "All we can be sure of now
is that the result will be distinctively Russian. And that it will
depend ultimately far less on decrees handed down in Moscow ... than
on the decisions made and opinions formed in Russia's classrooms,
farms, factories, and living rooms."

No shadows hide the problems Russia must face, but it is equally true
that no every day adversity can diminish the extraordinary potential
of that land and people. We here today share an admiration and a hope
for Russia, even as we know clearly its problems, and remain in awe of
its potential.

The United States welcomes its new relationship with Russia and
strongly believes that a healthy relationship between our two
countries is the best course. Each thereby is made more secure, and
our citizens and business people are given more opportunity.

The relationship will be stronger if Russia completes its democratic
and economic transition. We can play a constructive role to help that
happen. It is clearly in our interest to do so and for our government
and people and country to be part of that process.

Thank you all.

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