March 31, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4212 • 4213  4214

Johnson's Russia List
#4212
31 March 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Itar-Tass: STARVING RUSSIAN GETS TWO YEARS FOR `A LA CAT' MEAL.
2. The Nation: Katrina vanden Heuvel, Who Is Putin?
3. Moskovsky Komsomolets: Yavlinsky’s Failure Doesn’t Mean The Failure Of Russian Democracy.
4. Reuters: After poll, Putin and West must tackle Chechnya.
5. The Moscow Tribune: John Helmer, PUTIN'S PICKS -- What Putin's cabinet choices really mean.
6. AFP: Putin's Kremlin ready for "radical reform" says advisor.(Gref)
7. Washington Times: Alec Rasizade, Napoleon complex. Putin plans his Russian Revolution.
8. RFE/RL Job: Broadcast Director, Uzbek Service.
9. The Economist (UK): The chaos at the door. Russia’s new president is now confirmed in power. He will need both luck and judgment to turn his country round.] 


*******


#1
STARVING RUSSIAN GETS TWO YEARS FOR `A LA CAT' MEAL
Itar-Tass
March 30, 2000


A court in Russia's Nizhny Novgorod region on Thursday sentenced a man to two 
years' probation for killing and eating a cat, the Russian news agency 
ITAR-TASS reported. 


The Dzerzhnisk town court was told the man was starving when he caught the 
cat, which was a family pet, in the street. 


The concerned family began looking for the animal after it disappeared, and 
were able to trace the abductor with the help of eye-witnesses. It was, 
however, too late for the animal. 


The family took the man to court over the incident. 


*******


#2
The Nation
April 17, 2000
Who Is Putin?
By Katrina vanden Heuvel


Russia's third presidential election, on March 26, should have been
historic-the first democratic transfer of Kremlin power via the ballot box.
Instead it was, as some Moscow analysts argue, a "coup d'état" engineered
to protect the oligarchs and corrupt officials left behind by Boris Yeltsin
when he resigned. Insofar as returns can be trusted, the voters did not
deliver a mandate for any economic program, in a country that remains mired
in the worst depression of modern history. Indeed, Vladimir Putin flatly
refused to reveal his domestic policies prior to the election.


Putin's success was attributable not just to popular support for his brutal
war in Chechnya but also to the state-run media's portrayal of him as the
anti-Yeltsin-young, sober, physically robust and in charge. Putin's
campaign slogan, "Democracy is the dictatorship of law," adroitly captured
Russians' yearning for order, their disenchantment with democracy and
freedom, which they associate with economic pain, turmoil and corruption.


As acting President and as a candidate, Putin tried to be all things to all
people-a Praetorian to the oligarchs who created him; a Pinochet to the
entrepreneurial class that wants markets and private property imposed on
the country; a kind of Franklin Roosevelt to the impoverished millions who
demand social justice in the form of restored entitlements and improved
standards of living; and a patron to the military and security forces,
whose budgets he's promised to increase.


Who is the real Putin? He is a President who now must make choices that
will define his leadership. A key test will be how he treats the tycoons
who control most of Russia's richest and most profitable assets, especially
its natural resources. Will he continue Yeltsin's protection of the
oligarchy? Or will he seek legitimacy through an assault on it and
high-level corruption? It is a misperception that the Russian state is too
weak to strike at them. The man who unleashed his security forces to raze
Grozny can make war on a handful of plundering oligarchs.


On the one hand, Putin is the oligarchs' creature; on the other, he no
doubt understands that if he is ever to bring about Russia's economic
recovery, the state needs the enormous wealth the oligarchs have seized in
the name of "privatization." The potential benefits of repatriating the
wealth that has been taken abroad illegally-between $150 billion and $350
billion, according to some estimates-far exceed all the empty promises of
Western foreign investment and burdensome loans. Putin seems prepared to
use the state's power to collect taxes, pay back wages and pensions, and
mobilize internal resources for investment, which is a start. Poverty in
Russia, as he has emphasized, is "mind-boggling."


The votes of those millions of poor Russians contributed to the Communist
Party's strong showing (despite being virtually banned from state-run
media, its candidate, Gennady Zyuganov, received nearly a third of the
votes), refuting the Western axiom that it is moribund. Putin's unusual
public acknowledgment of the Communist Party's strength and his admission
that the Kremlin has failed to address the problems of the poor and working
class suggest that he may extend his alliance with the Communists in the
Parliament (a deal struck this past January) to the government he will soon
form. If so, as a price for their participation, the Communists will surely
demand action against the oligarchs-probably some measure of
"deprivatization."


What kind of political system will emerge under Putin? The accession to the
presidency of a former KGB agent, who spent his formative years in a
service that stands for the very antithesis of democratic openness, is
troubling. There was little in the campaign to reassure the West of his
commitment to basic liberties. The use of the state media to smear liberal
reformer Grigory Yavlinsky by playing on anti-Semitism and homophobia had
ominous overtones. And Putin's contempt for an independent, critical press
was obvious in the rough treatment accorded to the Radio Liberty journalist
Andrei Babitsky, whose mistake was reporting the truth about Russian
brutality in Chechnya.


For now, the restabilization of Russia's disintegrating nuclear
infrastructure and arsenal must be Washington's highest priority.
Far-reaching disarmament agreements must be negotiated and programs for
Russia's denuclearization seriously funded. For the same reason, nothing
should be done to provoke Russia under Putin into building more nuclear
weapons-no further expansion of NATO and no building of a National Missile
Defense system that would revise the ABM treaty. So far, the signs are not
good. Although Putin has urged the new Duma to finally ratify the Start II
treaty and has re-established relations with NATO (broken off after the
Kosovo war), Washington continues to push for NATO expansion and unilateral
revisions to the ABM treaty. And at informal talks in Geneva this past
January, Defense Department officials opposed a Russian offer to reduce the
number of warheads on each side to 1,500 in the future Start III talks.


Above all, the stability of the world's largest nuclear country depends on
its economic recovery. Washington should now respect Russia's ability to
decide what constitutes constructive economic policy rather than arrogantly
impose conditions. Both Washington and Moscow must understand, after nearly
a decade of lost opportunities, that without economic recovery and social
justice for the dispossessed, there will be no stability, democracy or
pro-Westernism in Russia.


******


#3
Russia Today press summaries
Moskovsky Komsomolets 
March 30, 2000
Yavlinsky’s Failure Doesn’t Mean The Failure Of Russian Democracy
Summary


It’s difficult to understand why the failure of the Yavlinsky-Savostyanov 
bloc (5.84%) in the presidential election is to be considered the failure of 
Russian democracy. It is only Yavlinsky who lost ­ but he always looses.


Actually, Yavlinsky was appointed the banner of liberal democracy only 
recently and only by select media sources. Because in reality this banner is 
too multi-colored. Never were democratic parties able to convince the Yabloko 
leader to give up his personal ambitions in the name of a common cause. And 
after such a defeat, a sensible politician must immediately leave big 
politics. While Yavlinsky has stated that he wants to create (and possibly 
head) a wide democratic coalition. This is not a good idea ­ it’s obvious 
that greater than 5.84% of Russia are democratic people, and they didn’t want 
to vote for Yavlinsky. And they probably didn’t vote for Zyuganov, either. 
Why, then, must Yavlinsky be called the banner of Russian democracy? Only 
because he really wants to be?


Yavlinsky’s idea concerning a democratic coalition is dictated by the danger 
of an oncoming dictatorship. But can Putin really become the oppressor of 
democratic freedoms? Maybe he can. But is he planning to and does he want to? 
So far we can’t tell from his actions. After all, Putin was recommended to 
the Russian society by Sobchak, Yeltsin and Chubais, so it’s hard to believe 
that he can be a lover of despotic regimes. Plus, it’s hard to believe that 
only 5.84% of Russian citizens are against dictatorship.


In any case, it’s a little too early to start a fight against dictatorship. 
If it’s necessary, we’ll come to the White House like we did in 1991.


*******


#4
ANALYSIS-After poll, Putin and West must tackle Chechnya
By Timothy Heritage

MOSCOW, March 30 (Reuters) - The war in Chechnya provided the springboard for 
Vladimir Putin's meteoric rise to the Russian presidency but it could bring 
him down to earth just as quickly. 


Western leaders, who muted criticism of Russia's military campaign before 
Sunday's vote in an effort to keep relations with Putin on an even keel, have 
sent clear signals since the vote that they now want a swift change of policy 
on Chechnya. 


But ending the war with victory only half-complete would frustrate Russia's 
armed forces, open Putin to criticism from his political opponents and puzzle 
his supporters. 


There is no easy way out for Putin and probably no way to resolve the 
conflict without upsetting either his domestic audience or foreign leaders. 


``Chechnya will be a serious problem for Mr Putin for a long time,'' said 
Yevgeny Volk, an analyst at the Heritage Foundation think-tank in Moscow. 
``It is likely to develop into a classic guerrilla war that will last a very 
long time.'' 


That is not good news for Putin, or for the West. 


NEW WESTERN RESOLVE? 


Western leaders hinted at a new determination to persuade Putin to end the 
six-month-old conflict in their messages of congratulations after Putin's 
election win. Almost all referred to Chechnya, underlining the West's 
concern. 


The depth of the international community's resolve, often weak over Chechnya, 
remains questionable. U.S. President Bill Clinton failed even to mention 
Chechnya when discussing policy on Russia at a news conference on Wednesday. 


But some Western officials say that, with the election out of the way, Putin 
has more room for manoeuvre over Chechnya than at any point since Moscow 
launched the war and the international community should push hard for changes 
now. 


``We must stick to our principles,'' Gilbert Dubois, acting head of the 
European Union's delegation to Russia, told Reuters. 


``Symbolically this is a new era and I hope it will allow Mr Putin to change 
his views and to try to find an acceptable ceasefire and open serious 
negotiations as soon as possible...The ball is now in Mr Putin's court.'' 


Failure by Putin to respond would dent hopes of a new beginning to relations 
with the West, which became strained in the last years of Boris Yeltsin's 
presidency. 


It would also damage his chances of attracting substantial foreign investment 
to Russia and limit his flexibility in negotiations with the West on other 
matters. 


At the same time, the West will be anxious not to alienate Putin completely, 
and risk driving Russia closer to China or rogue states such as Iraq. 


NO EASY SOLUTIONS 


Putin's political needs have changed now the election is over. But that is no 
guarantee he is about to change policy on Chechnya, even if a long campaign 
would drain resources needed to finance reform of the economy. 


``It (the war) is painful, yes, but the people consider it justified,'' 
Colonel-General Valery Manilov, a senior military officer, said this week 
when asked why voters favoured Putin despite the loss of some 2,000 
servicemen. 


``That's the key to understanding this phenomenon -- why the people supported 
him, why they voted in such large numbers.'' 


Putin will do all he can to keep that support. But the longer the war goes 
on, the harder it will be to avoid Russian casualties mounting and public 
enthusiasm for the war waning. 


A quick final victory would be attractive but risky, and maybe impossible. It 
would require an all-out military push which might please the Russian army 
but would probably cost many lives and involve a degree of force unacceptable 
for the West. 


A more likely scenario is a long struggle to root out the last Chechen 
separatists at the risk of frequent guerrilla attacks. Manilov said such a 
campaign could last 10 years. 


``Of course everyone wants to end this quickly, but we won't be rushed,'' 
Manilov said. 


MIXED SIGNALS 


That is certainly not what the West is looking for, and the message from 
Moscow since the election is at best mixed. 


The chief of General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, took the unusual step 
on Wednesday of saying a Russian colonel had been arrested for allegedly 
raping and killing a Chechen woman. 


The move appeared intended as a sign to the West, which wants independent 
investigations into reports of human rights abuses in Chechnya. 


In another gesture to the West, which has demanded greater access to Chechnya 
for international officials and observers, the Russian authorities look 
likely to allow United Nations human rights chief Mary Robinson to visit the 
region next week. 


But Putin's first personnel decision after the election was to retain Defence 
Minister Igor Sergeyev, widely interpreted as a sign of continuity in 
Chechnya although Sergeyev would be an easy scapegoat if the tide of the war 
turned. 


Putin's first acts after the vote also included pinning medals on Russian 
soldiers who fought in Chechnya and telling Interior Ministry troops they 
were a ``guarantee that this region will be freed of the bandits and peaceful 
life restored here.'' 


******


#5
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2000
From: "John Helmer" <helmer@glas.apc.org> 
Subject: PUTIN'S PICKS -- What Putin's cabinet choices really mean


The Moscow Tribune
March 31, 2000
PUTIN'S PICKS -- What Putin's cabinet choices really mean
>From John Helmer in Moscow


It will take the new President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, at least another 
month to decide whom he will choose for his prime minister and new government.


In Russian villages, they say that if you want to ride in the farmer's cart, 
you must join in his song. So listen carefully now, and you will be able to 
hear, not only which voices are desperate to be heard, but also what tune 
they think Putin wants to hear. 


Already, those who want to hang on to their positions have announced their 
intention, as Central Bank chairman Victor Gerashchenko put it, not to 
resign. Those aspiring to be picked, like the ever-hopeful governor of
Saratov, Dmitri Ayatskov, have gone on state television to explain 
coquettishly how they have been summoned for a meeting in the Kremlin. 


Kommersant -- a newspaper which has not improved on its reputation since it 
was bought by Boris Berezovsky -- disclosed this week that 
it had been given an official document, listing Putin's choices. These are 
better understood as Berezovsky's selection. Accordingly, it can be 
understood that his desire for prime minister is Mikhail Kasyanov; for 
first deputy prime minister Alexei Kudrin; for deputy premiers, Alexei
Gordeev 
(Agriculture), Yuri Shevchenko (social policy), Leonid Reiman (science and 
technology), and Ilya Klebanov (industry policy); for Minister of Economy, 
German Gref; for Minister of Finance, Victor Khristenko; and for Minister of 
Interior, Sergei Ivanov.


Since all of these people are currently serving in the government, their 
selection, if confirmed, would mean that Putin means business as usual, and 
will continue to obligate himself to Berezovsky and his minions. It should 
also mean that the president is not yet sure enough of himself, or 
of his political base, to take any initiative likely to risk the pact he made 
with former President Boris Yeltsin, his family, and cronies.


If the new president insists on packing the government with men from St. 
Petersburg, as the Kommersant list also suggests, there is no hope of an 
anti-corruption drive to satisfy the hopes of most Russians and foreign 
investors in Russia. All that will happen is that a new gang of raiders 
will fasten upon the state's resources to feed, instead of the gang that 
were nurtured under Yeltsin. 


The alienation from Moscow -- apparent from Putin's double failure to win a 
majority of Moscow votes in the parliamentary and the presidential 
elections -- will also continue, and deepen.


Kasyanov is a problematic choice for two reasons. He is identified by Russian 
businessmen as too close to Roman Abramovich, the Yeltsin family banker and 
controller of Sibneft oil company, as well as the two largest aluminium 
producers, Krasnoyarsk and Bratsk. Kasyanov also faces serious allegations in 
the press that, while a finance ministry official, he benefitted personally 
from decisions he took on bond redemption payments.


If Putin means to keep his distance from the oligarchs, who control most the 
country's wealth, let alone destroy them as a class, as he said recently, he 
cannot appoint Kasyanov. 


Kudrin and Khristenko have the appearance of technocrats from years of
service 
in the Finance Ministry. But their patron has been Anatoly Chubais, and if 
Putin reappoints them, he has made a behind-the-scenes alliance with Chubais,
the man who did more than anyone to cause the financial crash of August 1998. 
That would preserve continuity with all of the so-called reform efforts of 
the Yeltsin period. Which is to say, grand larceny by the banking sector, and 
pauperization of the rest of the economy.


The Economics portfolio is not half as influential for economic policy as the 
Finance Minister or the Central Bank chairman. It is a relic of the State 
Planning Committee (Gosplan) of the Soviet era. Nowadays, it is the door 
through which industry lobbyists must pass to secure government favours. The 
largesse it can distribute is much more limited, however, than the feeding 
trough provided by the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank. 


So far, Gref, one of Putin's St. Petersburg favourites, has done little
except 
open the door for everyone to appeal to Putin for support of their economic 
policy advice. Gref's statements on Putin's behalf are vague enough to allow 
everyone to hope for precision that will favour their interests. The 
Economics Ministry is just the place for him, but he is not a decision-maker.


If Putin cannot renovate the leadership of the Finance Ministry and the 
Central Bank, then he will allow the two biggest law-breakers in the Russian 
economy to continue their uncontrollable business. The Finance Ministry has 
never carried out its functions in conformity with the laws enacted by 
parliament. It regularly violates the budget law. It also conceals its 
operations to a degree that is incompatible with the spirit, as well as the 
letter, of the Russian constitution. It has been the loyal accountant to the 
mob that stole the state.
The Central Bank is no better, and if the records of its transactions were 
ever to be fully audited, and made accountable to parliament, then the 
illusion of its statutory independence could be replaced by something much 
more effective. Putin has met recently with men who are suitable candidates 
to run the Central Bank. They are men who are honest; who are not 
responsible for the theft of state assets in the past; who didn't profit 
from the crash; and who do not view the Central Bank as a commercial 
venture run for the benefit of its own officers. 


To them, and to Putin, Gerashchenko has announced it will be over his 
dead body, threatening a fight. If Putin favours Gerashchenko, there can be 
no clean-up where it is most required -- the Russian banking sector.


The published rumour that Putin intends to appoint another St.Petersburger, 
Sergei Stepashin, as the new head of the Accounting Chamber, Russia's 
independent state auditor, is a song in the same key. The Accounting 
Chamber is the only dedicated corruption fighter in Russia whose reputation 
remains intact. It is the nearest Russia has to the Untouchables -- the 
legendary federal American agents who were able to break up Crime Inc. in
Chicago and New York 70 years ago.


Stepashin has been irreversibly compromised by acts of commission and 
omission during his terms as head of the Federal Security Service and the 
Ministry of Interior, and as Prime Minister. He isn't untouchable, and if 
Putin taps him, it will threaten the Chamber even more than Yelstin could.


******


#6
Putin's Kremlin ready for "radical reform" says advisor


MOSCOW, March 30 (AFP) - 
Vladimir Putin is ready to implement radical reform to revitalise Russia's 
stunted economy, a Kremlin policy think-tank chief said Thursday as he gave 
the first broad hints of the new president's plans.


"There is today in Russian the political will" to implement "radical 
reforms," said German Gref, who heads the Centre for Strategic Studies set up 
by Putin to plot Russia's development blueprint.


Gref said the 10-year strategy planned to ensure Russia's conversion to a 
full market economy, saying only drastic action could free the economy from 
the shackles of the Soviet-era.


"Russia is right now in such a state that it doesn't respond to the classic 
measures employed in the rest of the world," said Gref, adding that the pace 
of work had been stepped up.


The plans include a sharp reduction in taxes including abolition of a tax on 
turnover, a key demand of business leaders, said Arkady Dvorkovich, a finance 
ministry expert and another centre member.


Tax rates will also be slashed as well as social security charges, and there 
will be changes to the tax base and tax exemptions, he said.


The fiscal revamp will be phased over a number of years along with reform of 
the country's creaking pensions system, said Dvorkovich.


Economists say that easing Russia's crippling tax burden would help increase 
the finance ministry's tax haul by reducing fraud, one of the biggest 
problems confronting the government.


Putin, elected to a four-year Kremlin term on Sunday, has to date sent mixed 
signals on the economy and his policy pronouncements have contained few clues 
about where he plans to take Russian economic policy.


He has pledged to combat poverty and tackle social problems with threats to 
cut off the powerful business tycoons' access to the levers of powers, but 
talk of stronger state regulation has made foreign investors nervous.


The new Kremlin chief chaired an economic strategy group comprising members 
of the centre, the government and the Kremlin administration on Thursday, 
said Gref.


Putin Thursday set up a task force to coordinate the work of the three 
branches, said Gref. It includes First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov, the finance minister and favourite to become cabinet chief; 
Alexander Voloshin, the Kremlin chief of staff; and Deputy Finance Minister 
Alexei Kudrin, a Putin friend and fellow native of Saint Petersburg.


Interfax quoted Kasyanov as saying that the president-elect had urged all 
three parties to speed up their work on the economy blueprint, which Gref 
said ran to more than 300 pages.


Details would be published once Putin names a new government following his 
inauguration, some time in May.


Outline budget plans for the next four years have also been drafted by the 
policy unit, said Gref.


Meanwhile, Stanley Fischer, number two at the International Monetary Fund is 
due to take part in a seminar in Moscow next week at the invitation of 
Yevgeny Yasin, a senior member of the Gref centre.


Gerard Belanger, the top IMF official for Russia, will also attend reported 
Interfax, citing Martin Gilman, the Fund's representative in Moscow.


Putin has on several occasions called for an improvement in relations with 
international institutions, notably the IMF which last September froze loan 
payments to Russia.


******


#7
Washington Times
30 March 2000
[for personal use only]
Napoleon complex
Putin plans his Russian Revolution
By Alec Rasizade
Alec Rasizade is a senior associate at the Historical Research Center.


Since Sunday's election of Russian President Vladimir Putin, analysts 
and foreign policy planners have been searching for clues as to what is on 
the mind of this curt man. For a historian of modern Europe, however, the 
answer is obvious, as it takes only one glance at the history of France over 
200 years. The modern history of France is known for its classical clarity of 
the stages of the political process. It provides a lesson in what we should 
anticipate in the case of post-totalitarian Russia.
Similarities between Napoleon Bonaparte and Vladimir Putin are not 
limited to facial features and short stature. Matching is the time of their 
arrival on the political scene and the social need for a statesman of this 
caliber. Separated by the distance of 200 years, the circumstances in 
post-revolutionary France and post-communist Russia are strikingly similar, 
for, notwithstanding all the technological progress, the nature of man and 
human society has changed little, if at all.
An old historic axiom holds that, after a period of revolutionary 
change, inevitably comes a period of reactionary consolidation or 
counterrevolution. The political leader of such period is to be of the 
statecraft represented in contemporary Russia by Vladimir Putin, like it was 
exemplified by Napoleon in France 200 years ago.
The great Russian historian Eugene Tarle wrote in his biography of 
Napoleon that, if it had not been General Bonaparte, the French people and 
the social requisites of post-revolutionary France would have found another 
leader of exactly the same type among the bevy of young French generals 
propelled to the highest military ranks in the period of revolutionary wars, 
including the bloody civil war in the province of Gironde.
Likewise, the accession of Mr. Putin was largely carried on the support 
among Russians for his prosecution of the civil war in Chechnya. More 
important, Russian society as a whole is tired and exhausted of the political 
and economic upheaval, as were the French 200 years ago. The Russians need 
the stability and predictability of strong government rule to rise from the 
abyss of social-economic plight into which the post-communist reforms had 
cast them. Had the conditions in Russia been more stable than they were in 
1999, it is probable that Mr. Putin would have lived out his days as no more 
than a diligent KGB officer.
But we have seen that conditions in the past decade were exceedingly 
chaotic. Corruption, profiteering and financial ruin added to the woes of a 
people already bowed down by the miseries of a lingering transition period 
and the national humiliation of an imploded superpower. So profound is the 
mood that the millions who supported the Chechen war would welcome a new 
autocracy as the only hope of relief.
The same mood resulted from the decade of terror and turbulence during 
the French Revolution of 1789-1799. When Abbot Sieyes, one of the members of 
the ruling Directory who actually called Bonaparte to power, was asked later 
what he had done to distinguish himself during the revolutionary terror, he 
responded dryly, "I survived."
In some respects, the Russian liberals and reformers have become victims 
of their own success. Both reformist leaders who plucked out of obscurity and 
promoted Mr. Putin to the Kremlin prominence, are now gone, symbolically 
closing the decade of reforms: The ex-mayor of Saint Petersburg and his 
former law professor Anatoly Sobchak died recently, and his former boss 
President Yeltsin abruptly resigned one month before.
Mr. Putin's election as the legitimate president will signify the end of 
the tumultuous period of Russia's democratic change and the commencement of a 
period of consolidation of the Russian state. Similarly, in the fall of 1799 
the Revolution in France came to a close with the 18 Brumaire (Nov. 9) coup 
d'etat of Bonaparte. Russia is ready for the same fate; if not Mr. Putin, 
another strongman shall be called to complete the work of history.
We don't know much about Mr. Putin, but we know almost everything about 
Napoleon. No matter how shrewd, egotistical and unscrupulous he was, he knew 
that the people were tired of disorder and corruption, and that they longed 
for the return of stability and welfare.
Like Napoleon, the energetic Mr. Putin is going to deal what in effect 
will be a final blow to the transition period with all its features, as we 
knew them under the Yeltsin presidency. In general historic terms, Mr. 
Putin's ruling period may be regarded as the initial stage of the Russian 
popular reaction against the liberal ideals which had made all those great 
changes, but ruined millions of lives in the 1990s.
Mr. Putin has already revealed his ambivalence toward democratic 
principles and practices, believing perhaps that Russia might have to 
sacrifice part of democracy in the short run to achieve more important 
economic, social and state consolidation goals. His real aim is to preserve 
those achievements which comport with national greatness and the military 
glory of Russia, and will continue those accomplishments of his predecessors 
which he can adapt to the purposes of concentrated government.
Mr. Putin has said in an open letter to voters that, after having a 
popular mandate, he would not continue to tolerate the circle of prominent 
financial magnates known in Russia as the oligarchs. His pledge echoes the 
want of an overwhelming majority of the Russian people. As for the former 
Soviet republics, the resurrection of Russian nationalism will demand a 
revision of internal borders of the former USSR hastily disbanded by the 
three Slavic presidents in 1991. Rebuilding Russia as a great power, Mr. 
Putin will begin to reassert its influence throughout the former USSR's 
territory, but without restoring the unitary state with all its mounting 
problems. He is smart enough to understand that Mr. Yeltsin's rationale in 
getting rid of peripheral indigenous republics is irreversible.
Having no certain political ideology, Mr. Putin has a certainly 
predetermined place at the helm of contemporary Russia, for he is the type of 
leader that history has unerringly chosen for this role at this time, 
regardless of whether we like it or not.


******


#8
From: "Donald Jensen" <JensenD@rferl.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2000 


Dave,
Would appreciate if you could post the following on the JRL. Interested
parties
can also contact me directly.
Thanks,
Don



Broadcast Director, Uzbek Service


Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcasts in 26 languages in Central and
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East. We are
currently seeking to fill the following position to be based in Prague,
Czech Republic:


You will oversee the operation of the broadcast department, the Tashkent
bureau, and a world-wide network of freelance reporters, ensuring that the
news output, information and feature programs are balanced, and in
adherence to RFE/RL policy and the highest standards of journalistic
integrity and accuracy. You will be responsible for program development and
implementation, editorial control, and administration of the department's
budget. 


The ideal candidate will have a minimum of 10 years professional journalism
experience including work in a fast-paced, international news organization,
relevant work experience in one or more Central Asian country, broad
knowledge of political, economic, and social structures of Central Asia
and the rest of NIS, as well as strong general knowledge of international
affairs. A proven ability to develop, present, and implement effective and
innovative solutions to complex technical and operational problems under
tight deadlines is essential. Proficiency in Russian language is a definite
plus.
Requirements:
We require a university degree in journalism or related field, or
equivalent practical work experience in a related discipline, as well as
native-level spoken and written English, and proficiency in Uzbek language.


We offer excellent salary and benefits including relocation, housing, and
comprehensive health insurance. 
To apply please submit detailed resume and cover letter outlining
qualifications and salary requirements to:


E-mail: jobs@rferl.org, Fax: +420-2-2112-3420 Post: Human Resources
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*******


#9
The Economist (UK)
April 1-7, 2000
[for personal use only]
The chaos at the door 
M O S C O W 
Russia’s new president is now confirmed in power. He will need both luck and 
judgment to turn his country round 

FIRST impressions of Moscow’s international airport provide a good gauge of 
the state of the country. In Soviet times, it was like a police station. 
Under Boris Yeltsin, it became a slum. Recently, it has smartened up a 
little: the duty-free shops offer more choice, parking is less anarchic, 
two-hour waits at passport control are much rarer. On the drive into town, a 
huge gleaming outlet for Ikea, a Swedish furniture shop that opened in Moscow 
last week, exemplifies the hopes of foreign investors in Russia. 


In relative terms, then, an improvement: the sort of thing optimists cite 
when arguing that Vladimir Putin, elected president last Sunday with a 
comfortable 53% of the vote, can restore his country’s fortunes. For all the 
jolts of the past ten years, the market is at work; standards are rising. 
Given the chance, Russia too will root itself in the capitalist, democratic 
world. 


Pessimists notice other things at the airport. The waits are still long, 
confidence tricksters rife; the taxi mafia are no less thuggish, still 
charging five times the proper rate for the ride into town. Ikea has 
struggled for nearly two years with obstructive and corrupt bureaucrats to 
get the store open. In any normal country, foreign investment on this scale 
would be welcomed with flowers and champagne. 


Compared with other well-educated, industrialised countries, Russia is 
dismally poor. Average wages in the country of Sakharov and Rostropovich are 
around $65 a month—less than the cab ride from the airport to town. In 
neighbouring Estonia, occupied by the Soviet Union for half a century but 
independent again since 1991, they are now around $300. 


Russia’s economy has shrunk almost every year since the collapse of 
communism. Output has fallen by about 53% in ten years, according to official 
(and notoriously dodgy) statistics. Even allowing that much of what the 
Soviet economy produced was junk or useful only to the armed forces, living 
standards have fallen for the vast majority of the population. The physical 
infrastructure is decaying: hospitals, roads, prisons, schools and railways, 
with the exception of a few prestige projects in Moscow and other better-off 
cities, are in a shamefully bad state. Russians are badly fed, badly dressed, 
badly housed, badly treated. 


The clearest sign of decay is that Russians die young and have so few babies. 
The population is now smaller by 6m people than it was a decade ago. Murray 
Feshbach, an American demographer, believes that worsening health and 
continuing poverty may reduce Russia’s population, currently 143m, to as 
little as 80m by 2050. 


Social misery is matched by political gloom. Corruption is blatant, crime 
endemic. The rich and powerful are above the law. The two main television 
channels are slavishly pro-government; most of the regional media, both print 
and broadcast, are in the pockets of local political leaders. 
Independent-minded journalists and nosy pressure groups are likely to be 
harassed. 


Then there is Chechnya. Hopes that the previous war there, in 1994-96, had 
cauterised Russia’s imperialistic instincts have been dashed. This conflict 
is even bloodier than the last; and this time, despite international protests 
about acts of brutality, public opposition has been minimal. The government’s 
argument—that invasion was the only possible response to the bombings of 
apartment blocks and the invasion of Dagestan last summer, all supposedly 
orchestrated from Chechnya—has so far failed to convince most outsiders. It 
has proved effective at home not because of logic or evidence, but because of 
the deeply-held feelings of victimhood that most Russians share. 


The war has also coincided with a marked remilitarisation of society. New 
decrees have reintroduced military training in schools, abolished in 1989, 
and restored mandatory training for reservists. The rules on conscription 
into the armed forces are tightening, as is the definition of official 
secrets. Senior military figures are more visible at public events. With the 
arrival of Mr Putin, old KGB hands have become more influential. The 
government has announced a 50% rise in spending on military equipment—and 
this in a country that cannot pay its foreign debts or feed itself. 


Put out some flags 

Yet there are also cheerful signs. Chiefly, the economy is picking up: growth 
last year was, if you believe the official statistics, a record 3.2%. 
Foreign-currency reserves are rising by around $1 billion a month. Inflation 
is under control, more taxes are being collected, the rouble is stable, and 
public finances are looking remarkably healthy, at least by Russian 
standards. 


Most important, there is now a clutch of well-managed Russian-run big 
companies. That would have seemed a contradiction in terms five years ago. In 
most industries, there are now one or two big firms that are gaining market 
share by making better, cheaper products. Most, such as Baltika, a 
Scandinavian-owned brewer in St Petersburg, stick to the domestic market; but 
a few, such as Severstal, a steel producer in northern Russia, or Kaskol, an 
engineering conglomerate, are managing to produce high-quality goods for 
export. There are successful small companies too, for example in software or 
fashion, whose spark and innovation are a world away from the clunky monsters 
of the Soviet era. 


The people working in such enterprises are perhaps the single most hopeful 
sign of change to come. Well-educated, open-minded, well-travelled, they are 
a kind of Russian that has barely existed for three generations. So far the 
country has mostly failed to exploit their talents: Russian organisations 
tend to be slow-moving, hierarchical places. Yet Mr Putin, who is 47, has 
several youngish people round him. And although the first wave of youngsters 
in senior positions has proved disappointing so far, a generation that barely 
remembers the Soviet Union can hardly fail to change Russia for the better. 


Anders Aslund, a Swedish economist, says that even before the first reforms 
he expects from Mr Putin—of government, the tax system and land ownership—the 
economy is already much stronger than current statistics suggest. The pain of 
the August 1998 financial crisis, when Russia defaulted on its debts and 
devalued the rouble, has forced managers to start running their companies 
properly and turn their attention from financial fiddles to exports. “There 
is a massive qualitative improvement,” Mr Aslund says. Add good political 
leadership to Russia’s other advantages—a cheap and talented labour force, 
huge amounts of idle industrial capacity, generous natural resources—and 
there may be a vigorous economic revival. 


Or it may be a mirage. After a 75% devaluation, it would be amazing if local 
producers of goods such as fertiliser, steel and textiles did not enjoy 
something of a revival. Roland Nash of Renaissance Capital, a Moscow-based 
investment bank, notes that although more cash is flowing into Russia, a 
large amount still flows straight out again; investment, despite a blip 
upwards at the end of last year, is still minimal. Even the Russian companies 
now touted as success stories do well mainly because of high tariff barriers 
and cheap energy, rather than because their management and products are 
world-class. 


The economy is also sustained by high prices since early 1999 for oil and 
other raw-material exports, which create a remarkable trade surplus (about 
20% of GDP). As a result of devaluation and inflation, the $5.5 billion the 
government raises annually from the energy sector are worth twice as much as 
18 months ago. “This has given them a window of opportunity and they are 
wasting it,” says a prominent investment banker specialising in Russia. 


The reasons for this are primarily political rather than economic, as 
management consultants at McKinsey pointed out in a comprehensive and highly 
pessimistic recent report on Russian productivity. There are good Russian 
managers and successful Russian companies. But whereas, in a normal economy, 
good performance is rewarded, in Russia it may well be penalised. Size and 
success attract the attention of gangsters and corrupt bureaucrats, 
especially local ones. If you try to put a competitor out of business, 
instead of enjoying a bigger market share you risk a visit from his political 
or criminal cronies: at best a raid from the arbitrary and rapacious tax 
police, at worst a car bomb or bullet. That makes the need for political 
protection, with the costs and compromises it brings, all but irresistible 
even for the most able managers. 


Imprisoned by history? 

Explanations for this endemic lawlessness vary. Pessimists believe it is 
ingrained by history. Modern Russia rests on the moral and intellectual 
foundations of feudalism and communism, which are antithetical both to 
democracy and to a properly functioning economy: “a thousand years of 
negative selection”, as one Moscow-based American financier puts it. Russia 
tends to punish, not promote, its brightest and best. 


Centuries of bad government have also instilled a deep mistrust of 
officialdom. The idea that a government agency might be a partner, rather 
than a foe, still strikes most Russians as odd. That breeds corruption. Rules 
and regulations are drafted on the assumption that everyone will cheat 
wherever possible. They are therefore absurdly tight (even minor documents 
must be stamped and notarised to have any legal force). As a result, obeying 
the rules fully is all but impossible. Instead, the public ignore them, cheat 
all the same, and bribe. Officials, for their part, have no reason to be 
loyal to their ill-managed, corrupt institutions, and happily settle for a 
backhander to make up for their miserable pay. 


As a result, the state is both too strong and too weak. It is too strong, in 
that it can crush with quite disproportionate force those who offend it. The 
prospect of a raid by machinegun-toting tax inspectors in balaclavas, who can 
confiscate anything they like, intimidates all but the most powerful 
businesses. 


But the state is also too weak. Enforcing a court judgment against a strong 
opponent is very hard. State watchdogs that are supposed to bind 
Leviathan—such as the Audit Chamber, whose leading light, Yuri Boldyrev, is a 
popular anti-corruption campaigner—lack the needed muscle and teeth. And so 
politics and economics are all too easily perverted. 


Ten years ago, Poland’s chances were dismissed with equal vigour. Poles were, 
supposedly, culturally unsuited to democracy and capitalism; they were 
disorganised, cliquish and stroppy. In German, Polnische Wirtschaft (Polish 
practices) was a colloquial expression meaning a hopeless muddle. Now Poland 
has one of the strongest economies in Eastern Europe. 


Wrong about Poland, wrong about Russia, the optimists argue. The real cause 
of poor institutional and legal infrastructure has been bad political 
leadership, coupled with an awful starting position. The final years of 
communism signally failed to prepare Russia for capitalism. The country was 
exhausted by hyperinflation and shortages. The isolation of the Soviet era 
(and its duration: it lasted for seven decades compared with Poland’s four 
and a half) meant that there was no living memory of market economics or 
democracy. The Soviet obsession with heavy industry and armaments hugely 
distorted the structure of the economy. 


Mr Yeltsin’s weak and chaotic presidency compounded these problems. Reforms 
were hijacked by cronies bent on enriching themselves rather than making the 
economy work. This discredited both market economics and the West, which is 
now seen as peddling advice at best impracticable, at worst maliciously 
wrong-headed. 


Reform and its obstacles 

It is possible that Russia is being held to unreasonably high standards. The 
other 11 countries that experienced 70 years of Soviet rule—Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and the like—have all done even worse. A fair verdict on the 
economy is that there are at least some hopeful signs amid the gloom. The 
huge challenge for Mr Putin is to show that these are not temporary 
exceptions, but can be sustained and repeated. 


So far, his government, like its two predecessors, has managed to provide one 
essential precondition for improvement: macro-economic stability. That is a 
good start, but it is not enough. The pernicious, growth-killing behaviour of 
bureaucrats, criminals and corrupt managers has to change. And that will 
require a huge shake-up in the way the country is run. 


The two greatest obstacles to change are regional leaders and the tycoons, 
known as “oligarchs”. Between them, these two groups are much more powerful 
than the federal government. Taxes paid by the oligarchs’ companies keep the 
government afloat; their backhanders provide a comfortable life and a secure 
retirement for those with power and influence. In return, they expect the 
state and its servants to protect their interests—for example, by keeping 
foreigners out, loopholes open and competition down. 


Tackling an individual oligarch is not too hard. Some fell from power when 
the 1998 financial crisis bust their businesses. Others are already cringing 
before Mr Putin’s icy frown. An early target may be Rem Vyakhirev, the 
self-important boss of Gazprom, the national gas company. Mr Putin’s admirers 
in the West hope that he will also go after Boris Berezovsky, a clever and 
manipulative Kremlin insider with interests in oil, aluminium and the media. 
But removing the oligarchs from government altogether looks unlikely, at 
least in the short run. After all, Mr Putin has, and indeed needs, his own 
favourites. 


At least the oligarchs present a clearly defined row of targets. Dealing with 
the 89 regions of Russia, almost without exception badly and corruptly 
governed, will be even harder. The local chieftains—governors, mayors, and 
presidents—run their patches as private fiefs. Most have every reason to want 
things to continue as they are. Like the local Communist Party secretaries in 
the Soviet era, they will willingly pay lip-service to the fashion in Moscow, 
so long as they can continue their powerful, comfortable lives without 
interference. 


In theory, the Kremlin has a juicy carrot and some formidable sticks. The 
carrot is money: all but a dozen regions receive federal subsidies. The 
sticks are the “power ministries”—the army, police and courts. But federal 
subsidies are hard to adjust quickly, and the loyalties of the local police 
and army are often divided. In Mr Yeltsin’s time, attempts to bring under 
control the far-eastern Maritime Territory foundered when the local armed 
forces turned out to be under the thumb of the fearsomely idiosyncratic 
provincial governor. 


Mr Putin’s main weapon so far is probably blackmail, something his former 
employer, the KGB, was very good at. One well-known governor has already been 
brought discreetly into line with a warning that his son’s role in running 
the region’s top bank is under investigation. Russia’s local elections are 
open enough for a weak incumbent to lose, especially if he is damaged goods 
and faces a well-financed opponent. 


Another idea floated publicly by some of Mr Putin’s supporters is to have 
governors appointed, not elected. Many governors would prefer to worry about 
pleasing one powerful man in Moscow rather than lots of cantankerous voters. 
Such a system might establish more firm-handed government, but would be 
another sorry step backwards for Russia’s already feeble democracy. 


Either way, the key for Mr Putin is to create some good examples. If even a 
few regions of Russia were prosperous and well-governed, they would show the 
rest of the country that things could get better. There will always be parts 
of Russia, especially in the Caucasus, that have been so ruined by rule from 
Moscow that they will remain poor and miserable for generations. Yet, as in 
Italy, the southern fringe can be ignored if other bits of the country are 
prospering. 


The best example, both for squeezing the oligarchs and for frightening the 
governors, would be to start in Mr Putin’s own office. Under Mr Yeltsin, the 
presidential property office embodied extravagance, secrecy and corruption. 
Its former head, Pavel Borodin, once valued its assets—perhaps fancifully—at 
$600 billion. At a time when Russia was all but bankrupt, he spent $400m on 
renovating some historic rooms in the Kremlin, claiming that this was not 
taxpayers’ money but “our own”. One of Mr Putin’s first acts was to move Mr 
Borodin to a different job. To restore openness and accountability at the top 
could be his first priority. 


With enough luck, grit and vision, the new president and his team can perhaps 
start turning Russia into a law-abiding and prosperous country. But two 
dangers lurk. The first is that, if reforms go awry, the government will look 
for specific culprits, whether “speculators”, “wreckers” or “provocateurs”, 
and in the process trample on human rights without doing anything to further 
real reform. History provides many examples of the punishments and 
sacrifices, usually pointless, that Russian rulers can order in the name of 
speedy modernisation. 


The other danger is the emergence of a pugnacious nationalism. The lesson of 
Chechnya is that a war, coupled with cloyingly loyal television, is one of 
the few things which can make Russians show warm support for their 
government. If the promised economic revival, lawfulness and efficiency fail 
to materialise, Mr Putin may look for another distraction. In a country 
plagued by hastily conceived short cuts, the greatest test of Mr Putin’s 
presidency will be to avoid yet another one. 


******