March 28, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4203 • 4204   4205

Johnson's Russia List
#4205
28 March 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Itar-Tass: Russian Cartoonist Proud of Winning Oscar Prize
2. Itar-Tass: PUTIN'S Victory at Elections to Bring Economic Revival. 
(poll of experts)
3. Izvestia: Georgy BOVT and Yevgeny KRUTIKOV, GENERATION P.
Russia Has Made Its Choice. As She Understands It.
4. Nat Hooper: Putin.
5. Washington Post editorial: President Putin.
6. Reuters: Russian papers see no rapid changes after Putin win.
7. Boston Globe: David Filipov and Brian Whitmore, Analysts predict 
power struggle under Putin's rule.
8. Social Capital in Russia-Working the System or Making Government 
Work. http://www.socialcapital.strath.ac.uk
9. AFP: Russian press speculates on new PM, says opposition dead.
10. Los Angeles Times: Rachel Denber, Russia: The West must let 
the newly elected president know that continued aid is dependent 
on his human rights agenda. 
11. AFP: Putin win pushes Communists to political margins.
12. Komsomolskaya Pravda: Sergei Chugayev, WILL ZYUGANOV BE ADMITTED 
TO THE KREMLIN? The Number Three In Presidential Election Wins, 
Number Two Loses.
13. Baltimore Sun: Jay Hancock, U.S. politics might shape Russia 
policy. Election gamesmanship could derail Clinton effort to mend 
frayed relations.
14. Washington Times: Arnold Beichman, Taking measure of the aid pit.]

******

#1
Russian Cartoonist Proud of Winning Oscar Prize. .

NEW YORK, March 28 (Itar-Tass) - Russian cartoonist Alexander Petrov, who was 
given the Oscar Prize last Sunday, told Tass: "I am proud that the Russian 
school of animated cartoon film-making has been recognized in America, and 
that I have something to do with it." 

The most prestigious prize in the cinema world was given to Petrov for his 
beautiful animated cartoon film "Old Man And The Sea" by Ernest Hemingway's 
novel. 

******

#2
PUTIN'S Victory at Elections to Bring Economic Revival. .

NEW YORK, March 28 (Itar-Tass) - Vladimir Putin who won the presidential 
elections on March 26, will lead Russia "to a new era of economic growth", 
show results of a public opinion poll, conducted by the William Davidson 
Institute at Michigan State University. 

Poll respondents include prominent experts at the Stanford and Columbia 
universities, the London Business School, the Warsaw Economics School and 
other leading research centres. 

According to poll results, 60 percent out of 104 polled economists positively 
replied to a question of whether Putin's election will make "positive changes 
in Russia's economic development". 

Most economists agreed that Russia will witness substantial economic growth 
over the next years. "Two-thirds of respondents expressed opinion that 
Russia's annual rates of economic growth will amount to 1-3 percent over the 
next decade." 

At the same time, 21 percent of respondents claimed that this figure will 
reach 3-6 percent. Such data, taking into account a very small number of 
those who expressed opinion on a continued slump, give grounds to believe 
that Russia expects a considerable turn for the better in the economy, 
claimed the William Davidson Institute. 

This opinion concerning the election results is echoed by Mark Cook, head of 
the investument fund Brunswick Capital Management, controlling 350 million 
dollars invested in shares of Russian enterprises. 

Speaking in an interview with Itar-Tass on Monday, he voiced optimism 
concerning the election results in Russia. 

Cook expressed opinion that Putin now occupies very strong positions: most 
population trusts him. He enjoys support at the State Duma lower house, and 
executive structures of the state are on his side. All this shows that 
indeed, Putin can do much for Russia. 

Cook claimed that creation of a favourable climate for foreign and Russian 
investors will be a top priority task for his government. The expert stressed 
that the matter in question is not to work out any new rules or principles: 
they are all available. 

The question is how to make people observe these rules, Cook added. In other 
words, an efficient legal system is necessary. 

******

#3
Izvestia
March 28, 2000
(translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] 
GENERATION P.
Russia Has Made Its Choice. As She Understands It 
By Georgy BOVT, Yevgeny KRUTIKOV

Russia has made its choice--with no moral or ideological 
trepidation and even without much thinking. The eleven 
presidential contenders have done everything to free the 
country's everyday life of torment: their election campaign has 
carried a surprisingly minuscule message for a country which is 
still struggling to emerge out of the economic crisis, a nation 
which conceivably should be seeking to make an historic choice. 
The nation has been amazingly imperturbed. Or indifferent?
It has seen the empire crumble and former ideals fall. It is 
still to devise a wholesome national idea. Moreover, it is 
living through a scaled war in its own territory and suffering 
heavy losses. 
Hopes have replaced--for the umpteenth time!--the torment 
and the trepidation. Hopes have been laced with some cynical 
expectation. Some people hope that Putin will restore order in 
the good old sense of the term. Others hope he will help build 
a new order of things. 
What Putin has been unwilling to divulge in the course of 
his election campaign has become his trump card: take me as you 
see me. You hope that wages will grow by themselves, and who am 
I to disappoint you? You fear that the "KGB man" will bring 
some people to justice, and it's good, the fear I mean. You 
believe that a resolute president will spoil oligarchs in the 
loo like Chechen bandits and redistribute the illicitly 
privatised assets--well, it's good for victory, too. 
The post-election practices may be absolutely different.
What has been, has been. Those who hope that the "Russian 
Pinochet," or "de Gaulee," or simply "strong man" is going to 
sweat to improve their life morally and materially, will be 
bitterly disappointed. 
A new generation is coming to power in Russia. The time of 
romantic democrats is past; it is now the time of pragmatic...
what? We hope we are wrong, but it looks as if Russia is in for 
a period of political boredom. The nation's political life is 
likely to start to resemble the routine of family life after 
the illusions are gone. 
Live and work will be all. But it's a lot! The philistine 
hopes that 'dictator' Putin will outlaw MacDonald's fast food 
outlets and TV promo of female pads are as illusory as the hope 
that private property will be banned, that democracy will be 
replaced by a tough Stalinist dictatorship, and that Russia 
will again be a besieged fortress. No go, comrade revanchists! 
That would have been too simple, but unrealistic. 
Russia has made its choice (in Round One or Round Two, 
does not matter). Putin will start from scratch. He has 
inherited awesome powers sanctified in Yeltsin's Basic Law. His 
leadership will be formed amid attempts to flatter him, to get 
adjusted to him. Historic experience indicates that the test of 
power in Russia can only be taken by the one who is being 
tested--a Czar, a General Secretary, a President... Will Putin 
stand the test?
Whether Putin will have a huge edge on Zyuganov--51% in 
Round One or 70% in Round two--will have no effect on the 
formation of a regime. True, some members of Putin's election 
staff may be released for insufficient canvassing capability.
Unlike the 1996 election, the 2000 election in Russia will 
have no historic significance. The nation is not standing at a 
crossroads. It has not been a choice of a lesser of two evils 
this time around. President Putin of the 2000 vintage is 
mysterious in nuances only. He is doomed to follow the course 
charted by Yeltsin. And he does not possess the image of a 
miracle-maker which Yeltsin seemed to have before his first 
incumbency. Many had been waiting for miracles then: painless 
reforms, being embraced by global civilisation...
Today, nobody is expecting miracles, which is a guarantee 
against bitter disappointment in the future.
What Putin will have to do? He will have to get rid of the 
more odious features of Yeltsin's oligarchical regime. Russia 
will hardly become a Western-type, liberal democracy--it lacks 
a social basis. Russia is likely to move towards state 
capitalism where the bureaucracy will continue to play the key 
role. 
Putin will have to bring the regional authorities to 
order, not stopping short of amending the Constitution. He will 
have to avoid international isolation and seek understanding 
with the West, for the West is the one to devise rules of the 
game in the international market. 
Putin will have to create more beneficial conditions for 
foreign capital and improve the climate for the operation of 
private capital per se. 
What will Putin fail to do no matter how hard he may try? 
He will fail to turn Russia into a totalitarian country again.
Totalitarianism calls for a national, total support. Putin's 
lazy and dependable victory--even in Round One--is not based on 
a total support. 
Putin will fail to force the country to live by the laws 
of a civilised market soon--even if he serves seven, instead of 
four, years. Even the Almighty would fail to mend the 
philistines' sponging ways and introduce a new labour ethic on 
the massive scale in seven, let alone four, years. 
Under Putin, the province will not live on Internet and 
the latest computer technologies. Instead, it will continue to 
plant potatoes in spring, collect Colorado beetles from potato 
plants in summer and gather ripe potatoes in autumn. 
Putin will fail to push the nation into the 21st century 
at one go. There are no miracles. But then, nobody expects him 
to promise any miracles...

*******

#4
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2000 
From: nhoop <nhoop@centurytel.net> (Nat Hooper)
Subject: Re: 4201-Putin Wins, Putin on Election

I'm wondering when the anti-Putin people are going to give up searching for
negative ways to portray Russia's second President?

This morning I read this by Martin Nesirky:

"Acting President Vladimir Putin appeared to have narrowly won Russia's
presidential election on Monday after a count that offered far more
excitement than the campaign and highlighted the tough job he faces."

"Narrow" win? He amasses 51.91 percent of the votes against almost a dozen
other candidates and almost 22 percent over his nearest opponent. In
American presidential elections a victory of 10 percent over a single
opponent is considered a mandate.

Here's negative assumption:

"The 47-year-old Putin, whose popularity is largely based on the war he has
waged against rebels in Chechnya..."

That does not agree with the majority of quotes of interviewed citizens
that I have read. Most of them praise his youth and energetic
leadership. 

President Putin was roundly criticized for not voicing a plan for the
restoration of Russia. I think he was wise not to. As an appointed "Acting"
President unaccustomed to holding the reins of ultimate power over the
largest country in the world, it would have been foolhardy to "Leap on his
horse and ride off in all directions". To resist the temptation to speak
out on any but the most obvious problems suggests to me that he is a
prudent man. 

And oh yes...how the naysayers love to point to him as an "Ex spy". A
negative connotation if there ever was one, quite opposite President
Putin's view that his work in the KGB demonstrated the highest form of
devotion to his country.

He has said, "It seems to me that what we have seen really reflects the
reality as it is." As I see the problem there is only one means -- to be
honest. We must clearly analyze the situation where the country is today,
be honest and direct about our proposals...."

"Some will disagree, some will support, but this position must be open and
a few years later it will become clear if we are right and the population
can draw conclusions about what was wrong and what was right in our
approach."

Note that he said, "IF we are right." 

IF he follows through on these words, I say the Russian people had elected
the right man.

Respectfully submitted,
Nat Hooper, an observer
Oxford, Arkansas
USA

*******

#5
Washington Post
March 28, 2000
Editorial
President Putin

THERE WERE, in the end, no real surprises in Russia's presidential elections. 
Acting President Vladimir Putin, Boris Yeltsin's designated successor, 
won--albeit with a smaller majority than expected. Now the conqueror of 
Chechnya enjoys a mandate of his own. His unequivocal defense of the Chechnya 
campaign is only one reason for concern. Evincing disdain for the electoral 
process, he offered only a vague campaign platform. His allies in the media 
stooped to antisemitism and other vile practices in their assault on his 
opponents. He has spent the bulk of his career as a KGB officer and now is 
surrounding himself with former colleagues. As his forces' quasi-kidnapping 
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Andrei Babitsky demonstrated, he 
doesn't seem to get the role of a free press in a democracy. Mr. Putin's 
foreign policy priority appears to be the restoration of Russia's 
"greatness"--perhaps through closer links to states such as Iran and China, 
and through increased attention to, if not outright meddling in, former 
Soviet republics in Russia's neighborhood.

That said, the only realistic attitude is to judge Mr. Putin by what he does 
next. He comes to power with an astonishingly scanty record, and his words 
are notably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. "Democracy is the 
dictatorship of the law," he has written. This could mean that Mr. Putin 
intends to deal with corruption and organized crime more or less the way he 
dealt with the "bandits" of Chechnya. Or, on a more hopeful view, he may plan 
to strengthen Russia's courts and clean up the police so that, eventually, 
"honest work would be more profitable than stealing," as he puts it. To the 
extent that Mr. Putin's reform proposals for Russia's economic institutions 
and judicial system show he understands the connection between economic 
prosperity and the protection of maximal individual liberty, he should enjoy 
U.S. support.

The Clinton administration, frustrated by the chronic paralysis in Boris 
Yeltsin's Kremlin, seems delighted to have an energetic man with whom "we can 
do business" (President Clinton's phrase) at the helm in Moscow. That 
business includes Russia's long-overdue ratification of the START II 
arms-reduction treaty, as well as a modification of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty to permit the United States to develop a missile defense. Mr. 
Putin favors the former and will have to be persuaded about the latter.

Russians like to say that the era of romanticism in U.S.-Russian relations is 
over; many Americans feel the same way. Mr. Putin isn't likely to turn to 
Washington for advice, and that's probably just as well for both sides. But 
the U.S. administration shouldn't conclude therefore that arms control is its 
only serious interest in Russia, and that Russia's domestic development is 
entirely Russia's business. It remains as true as ever that U.S. interests 
will be served by Russia's evolution toward a democratic, tolerant society, 
and harmed by a shift toward authoritarianism. Such democratic evolution, 
which is also in Russia's interest, should remain a U.S. priority. 

******

#6
Russian papers see no rapid changes after Putin win

MOSCOW, March 28 (Reuters) - Russian newspapers on Tuesday described Vladimir 
Putin's victory in the presidential election as the start of a new, pragmatic 
era but suggested there would be no immediate changes in policy. 

Putin, acting president since New Year's Eve, had enjoyed a big lead in 
opinion polls and won outright in the first round with about 52 percent of 
the vote. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov scored 29 percent, better than 
expected, and liberal Grigory Yavlinsky was far back in third place. 

``A new generation has come to power in Russia. The time of romantics in 
democracy has past, we have come to the time of pragmatists,'' wrote the 
daily Izvestia. 

``Putin did not give much away during the campaign. That is his trump card -- 
take me as you find me. It seems we are in for a time of political boredom, 
with politics taking on the humdrum aspect of family affairs. We shall have 
to live and work hard.'' 

The business daily Kommersant said Putin had proceeded slowly with changes 
when he headed the FSB domestic intelligence agency, and he was likely to do 
the same as head of state. 

``It is possible that he will act the same now, undertaking no radical 
shake-ups in the first months,'' it said. ``The same applies to radical 
changes in economic policy.'' 

Noviye Izvestia suggested that voters had sought a break with the turbulent 
era of Putin's predecessor Boris Yeltsin and the ill health and 
unpredictability of his later years. 

``The elections -- parliamentary in December and presidential now -- gave 
Vladimir Putin the political capital which was lacking in Boris Yeltsin in 
recent times,'' it said. 

``Only Putin can say how he can now put that capital to good use in the four 
years to come.'' 

The daily Sevodnya was blunter, saying Putin's victory and the strong 
Communist performance amounted to a ``sentence'' for Yeltsin's reforms and 
the rout of liberals led by Yavlinsky. 

``Why did the people vote for the successor to (Boris Yeltsin)?'' it wrote. 
``Because they believe he is not at all like him! A vote for Putin is a 
psychological vote against Yeltsin. Putin is expected to 'restore order' and 
that means 'clearing out Yeltsin's reforms.''' 

The Communist daily Sovietskaya Rossiya stressed Zyuganov's complaints of 
widespread irregularities in the count, dismissed by both electoral officials 
and international observers. 

Zyuganov has said he will not formally accept the outcome pending compilation 
of returns checked by party representatives. 

``The shadow of falsification hangs over every figure announced throughout 
the night by the Central Election Commission,'' the daily said. ``This fraud 
was carefully planned and organised...After such events, it is pointless to 
talk about elections as an expression of the voters' will.'' 

*******

#7
Boston Globe
March 28, 2000
[for personal use only]
Analysts predict power struggle under Putin's rule 
By David Filipov, Globe Staff and Brian Whitmore, Globe Correspondent, 

MOSCOW - Newly elected President Vladimir V. Putin has decided that the best 
model for Russia is Korea, went the joke making the rounds in Moscow 
yesterday: ''He just hasn't decided which Korea - north or south.''

That joke, as Russian political humor tends to do, got to the heart of the 
question that hung in the air yesterday as Putin's election victory was 
declared official.

Putin wants to strengthen the Russian state - this is one clear message that 
has come out of the former KGB agent's deliberately vague campaign. But will 
it be the kind of strong state that establishes an orderly economic and 
political system and clamps down on corruption, or will it be the kind of 
strong state that uses police power and repression to shut down dissent and 
control every aspect of life?

Neither, Russian and US analysts said yesterday. If anything, Putin's Russia 
looks in many ways like that of his predecessor, Boris N. Yeltsin, but with 
teeth. They suggested that Putin's main focus in the coming weeks would be 
using his new mandate to consolidate his control over Russia's power 
structures. They predicted a power struggle between Putin on the one hand, 
and financial and regional elites on the other, for control of the government.

Analysts doubted that Putin's plans were so far-reaching as to include 
streamlining Russia's bloated bureaucracy, combating rampant bribe-taking, 
and encouraging an independent court system. Instead, they predicted an 
anticorruption campaign whose true goal is to reduce the influence of Putin's 
rivals for power.

''Putin's in-house definition of a strong state is a state where all the 
other players are weaker than his administration,'' said Boris Makarenko, an 
analyst at the Center for Political Technologies, an independent Moscow think 
tank.

Putin yesterday gave few overt clues about his plans, saying only that ''a 
lot of things that will lead to many controversies need to be done.''

But Putin's body language spoke volumes. The president-elect's first public 
appearance was at an annual celebration of Russia's Interior Ministry army, 
the same troops who are fighting Putin's campaign in Chechnya.

In familiar surroundings, Putin repeated the theme that got him elected: The 
military could, and would, defeat the rebels who had humiliated Russia in 
1996 by driving federal troops out of Chechnya. 

Never mind that the campaign in Chechnya is beginning to look like a 
quagmire. Yesterday, Russian jets were again bombing parts of the republic 
thought to be cleared of rebels for good. For most Russians, Chechnya is a 
success that demonstrates Putin's resolve and decisiveness.

The trouble, analysts say, is that as the only clear accomplishment of 
Putin's six months in power, first as prime minister and since New Year's as 
acting president, Chechnya does not provide a good example of a revitalized 
state.

''Putin managed to produce success in Chechnya by using military force and 
police methods to suppress a rebellion, by giving commands and having the 
people to carry out his orders,'' said Timothy J. Colton, director of Harvard 
University's Davis Center for Russian studies. ''The problem is these methods 
are not going to reform the economy. He cannot conduct reform by giving 
commands. He's not going to solve problems by the same methods he used to 
crush'' the Chechen rebels, Colton said. 

Does Putin understand that? One of his first moves yesterday may provide a 
glimpse. Putin ordered his interim government to pay back wages to state 
workers by April 15. This is a popular move that looks decisive, like bombing 
Chechnya. But it does not get at the heart of the problem.

Wage arrears in Russia are caused by large, fundamentally ineffective 
factories that cannot keep up with their payments because they themselves are 
owed money. Usually, the biggest debtor is the state, which is unable to pay 
its bills because of widespread tax evasion and misallocation of state funds. 
Yeltsin got into the habit of periodically ordering the state to pay off 
these back wages, essentially earning political capital by bailing out 
factory directors. This gave the directors an incentive to avoid paying wages 
since they knew the state would bail them out eventually.

Putin's order indicates he is choosing, in the short run, Yeltsin's tactic, 
rather than the difficult steps - closing factories, cutting out waste, 
retraining workers - that would relieve the underlying crisis.

It was Yeltsin who once said that the Russian state is ''too weak where it 
should be strong and too strong where it should be weak.''

Meddlesome bureaucrats have too much power over small businesses, 
nongovernmental organizations, and independent media. Instead of providing 
essential services and public order, ''the people who make up the state see 
their positions as means for personal aggrandizement,'' said Fritz Ermarth, a 
former analyst on Russia for the CIA.

Putin has promised to clean up this system, but he himself is a product of 
it. His career as a bureaucrat in St. Petersburg's local government in the 
early 1990s was blackened by questionable financial deals. More recently, as 
head of the FSB, the KGB's domestic successor, Putin pressed treason charges 
against environmentalists who have reported on the ecological dangers posed 
by nuclear waste.

Russian journalists who have reported on Putin's alleged links to corruption, 
or criticized the campaign in Chechnya, say they have been subjected to 
harassment. The evidence is not damning enough to predict outright that Putin 
will crack down on dissent, but the signs are not encouraging.

Then there is the question of whether Putin has any motivation to change the 
system. The main issue is the role of the so-called ''oligarchs,'' business 
moguls who have exerted heavy influence on government policy in recent years.

''In Russia right now, the state is the oligarchs,'' said Boris Nemtsov, a 
former Cabinet minister and a leader of Russia's small liberal movement. 
''For me, a strong state means the rule of law, less bureaucacy, and 
independent courts. If Putin wants to create a strong state in the terms that 
I understand it, he needs to separate [the state from the oligarchs], but I 
don't know if he has the strength to do this.''

Putin's advisers had suggested that a big victory would give him the mandate 
to rout the oligarchs. But with 95.5 percent of the vote counted, Putin had 
won 52.6 percent. This was more than the simple majority needed for an 
outright victory, but a disappointing tally for a candidate whose 
favorability rating topped 70 percent in January. It may affect his ability 
to push for change, if that's what he wants.

******

#8
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 
From: Craig Weller <craig.weller@strath.ac.uk>
Subject: Social Capital in Russia-
Working the System or Making Government Work

Dear David,
This may be of interest to JRL readers.

Social Capital in Russia-
Working the System or Making Government Work

Russians have long understood the importance of social capital 
networks. The CSPP has pioneered the use of empirical social science 
measures to identify the variety of networks that Russians use- modern, 
anti-modern and informal- and who is excluded. Now there is a special 
website devoted to social capital in Russia. The website's address is 
http://www.socialcapital.strath.ac.uk

Professor Richard Rose
Centre for the Study of Public Policy
University of Strathclyde

Craig Weller
Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP)
University of Strathclyde
Glasgow G1 1XH
Scotland
Phone:0141-548-3403
e-mail: craig.weller@strath.ac.uk
fax: 44-141-552-4711
http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk
http://www.socialcapital.strath.ac.uk

******

#9
Russian press speculates on new PM, says opposition dead
MOSCOW, March 28 (AFP) - 

Russia's press pronounced the opposition dead Tuesday after Vladimir Putin's 
election as president, and speculated feverishly about who would replace him 
as cabinet chief.

"The revolution is over. Forget about it," the popular Moskovsky Komsomolets 
daily headlined its front page, expressing the widespread view that Putin's 
first round victory Sunday had finally consigned the Communists to history.

Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, who in 1996 forced Boris Yeltsin into a 
run-off vote after sneaking close to him on the first ballot, was left 
trailing in the dust with 29 percent to the victor's 53 percent.

"Zyuganov is not challenging Putin's leadership. He's content just to 
reaffirm his role as the main opposition," the liberal Izvestia daily wrote.

Russia's bitterly divided liberal forces were again left on the margins with 
Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky scratching six percent in the presidential 
poll, the press said.

"The democrats squabbled for a long time among themselves and they died in 
one day - March 26, 2000," Sevodnya declared on its front page.

Turning its attention to the new political landscape under Putin, the 
newspaper said First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov was the 
president-elect's likely choice as prime minister.

"Few doubt that the current (First) Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov 
will become the next prime minister," the daily said in its first issue since 
Sunday's election.

Kasyanov, who has been de facto cabinet chief since Putin's elevation to the 
Kremlin on New Year's Eve, is a known quantity in the West having acted as 
Russia's chief debt negotiator for the past seven years.

Fluent in English, he has spent nearly a decade in Russia's economics and 
finance ministries.

But Moskovsky Komsomolets said another serious contender was Alexander 
Kudrin, current deputy finance minister who has been in effect running 
ministry since Kasyanov's promotion. 

Like Putin he is a native of Saint Petersburg.

"The rumour before the election in political circles was that the main battle 
for the premiership is between Kasyanov and Kudrin," the newspaper said.

The Novaya Izvestia newspaper said Putin's priority was to ensure the 
government in the White House remained firmly under the Kremlin's thumb, in 
contrast to the chaotic last years of Yeltsin's rule.

"The new president has to put in place a new system of power in the country. 
In the last four years there were two centres, the president's administration 
and the government, which too often were in conflict," it said.

Above a front page photograph of Putin apparently with an angel's halo, the 
Vedemosti business daily said ironically of Russia's new strongman: "He 
didn't promise a thing, because he decided it wasn't right for us."

******

#10
Los Angeles Times
March 28, 2000
[for personal use only]
Make Sure Putin Gets the Message 
Russia: The West must let the newly elected president know that continued 
aid is dependent on his human rights agenda. 
By RACHEL DENBER
Rachel Denber Is Deputy Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division at 
Human Rights Watch and the Former Head of Its Moscow Office

With the elections behind him, President Vladimir V. Putin can now begin 
his agenda of restoring a "strong state" to Russia. In recent weeks, U.S. 
leaders have charitably hailed him as an effective leader who will prevent a 
rollback to the command economy and Soviet-style rule. 
This is an exceptionally myopic view that the U.S., and much of the rest 
of the world, may come to regret. Putin's Russia may not be Soviet, but it 
certainly could be malevolent. There is more than one kind of police state. 
Putin knows the language of democracy, and has repeatedly pledged to 
uphold the rule of law. But his commitment is clearly selective. When he took 
over as prime minister, Putin's job was to reassert Russian control over 
Chechnya, which, we have learned, he views as his "historic mission." His 
performance in the armed conflict there demonstrates that he will observe 
democratic principles only so long as they do not interfere with his special 
projects. 
The Russian army has slaughtered and maimed thousands of civilians in 
bombing and shelling. Human Rights Watch has been able to document 122 cases 
of civilians being summarily executed, and there may be many more. Russian 
forces have looted civilians' homes, arrested thousands of Chechen men and 
tortured untold numbers of those whom they have detained in special 
"filtration camps." 
Hundreds of thousands of Chechens live in squalid and humiliating 
conditions in refugee camps. Many either have no home to return to or are too 
terrified of the brutality of Russian soldiers to return. Russian actions in 
Chechnya have so deeply alienated Chechens that it is unclear how Russia can 
ever establish the legitimacy necessary for peaceful rule there. 
This is an ominous indication of what the rest of Putin's tough 
law-and-order agenda for Russia may mean. He is not interested in human 
rights or due process. He is willing to vilify non-Russian citizens to 
achieve his goals. A former KGB agent, he reaches readily for the tools of 
what Russians call "the power ministries"--defense, interior, the 
intelligence agencies--to solve problems and carry out policy. 
And Putin is not swayed, not a bit, by the scolding rhetoric of the 
West. There's been less of this than Western leaders like to pretend. Beyond 
some tough rhetoric, the Clinton administration has undertaken no effective 
action to make the brutal conduct of the war in Chechnya truly costly for 
Putin. So far, the U.S. has rejected any link between support for the World 
Bank or International Monetary Fund loan payments in return for improvements 
in Russian conduct in the conflict. The U.N. Commission for Human Rights, the 
world's most important forum for promoting human rights, is currently in 
session, but the U.S. is unlikely to sponsor a resolution there calling for 
action to stop abuses in Chechnya. 
This has left Putin, during his formative months as acting president, 
feeling confident that his relationship with the U.S. and the West will not 
suffer, no matter how ruthlessly he goes about pursuing his goals. This is 
precisely the wrong strategy to take at this important juncture in Russian 
history. 
What did the West fight the Cold War for? Did it spend those many long 
years tussling over the fate of individual dissidents and penalizing Moscow 
for the fate of Soviet Jews just to see the Russians commit war crimes 
against innocent civilians, and look away? The United States must stand now, 
as it tried to stand then, for the protection of human rights in Russia. This 
is the basis of good governance and stability in Russia, in China and 
everywhere else. 
Putin, like every Russian leader before him, wants very badly to sit at 
the table with the major Western powers. But a seat at that table must be 
earned. Leaders who preside over gross violations of human rights shouldn't 
get one. The time for making that clear to President Putin is right now. 

******

#11
Putin win pushes Communists to political margins

MOSCOW, March 28 (AFP) - 
Vladimir Putin's presidential election victory will consign Russia's 
Communist Party to the political sidelines and prevent the heirs of Lenin 
from again storming to power, analysts say.

Gennady Zyuganov, the colourless Communist party chief, polled more strongly 
than expected in Sunday's election, but his 29 percent of the vote left him a 
distant second to the favourite.

And many believe the outcome confirmed that the Communists will only ever 
play second fiddle in post-Soviet Russian politics.

"The revolution is over. Forget about it," the popular Moskovsky Komsomolets 
daily trumpeted on its front page as it savoured Putin's victory, mocking 
Russians still nostalgic for the Soviet Union.

"The Communists' last chance was in 1996, when they still had a chance of 
beating Yeltsin. Now it's over," said Yury Korgunyuk, an analyst from the 
Centre for Applied Political Studies.

Four years ago, Zyuganov forced an ailing and unpopular Yeltsin into a 
run-off vote after sneaking close to him on the first ballot.

But he bitterly -- and most observers agree justly -- blamed the Russian 
media for uniting in a smear campaign against him that helped Yeltsin triumph 
on the second round.

This time around, the 54-year-old claims vote-rigging helped Putin secure a 
first-round win.

But he has not pretended that he could have beaten the former KGB spy in a 
head-to-head contest. Putin enjoys huge popularity thanks to the crackdown in 
rebel Chechnya, and has wooed voters from left to right with his vision of 
national renewal.

"Zyuganov is not challenging Putin's leadership. He's content just to 
reaffirm his role as the main opposition," the liberal Izvestia daily 
commented.

The former politburo member has battled hard over the past decade to freshen 
up his party's staid ideology and appeal to younger voters, without whose 
support the Communists can have no long-term future.

Shortly after taking the helm in 1993 he forged a broad alliance with 
leftists, nationalists and social democrats who advocated a mixed economy.

He also tried to purge the image of dictator Joseph Stalin from his party's 
ideals and modernise its campaign slogans.

But he struggled to hold such a broad alliance together and repeatedly came 
under pressure from hardline nationalists who held most senior party posts, 
and who frequently threatened to vote out Zyuganov for going too liberal.

His broad "red-brown" alliance crumbled under centrifugal pressures in last 
December's parliament vote, which saw the Communists' grip on parliament 
significantly loosened.

Zyuganov can take comfort that his leadership is safe after he avoided an 
ignominious result in the elections, said Vyacheslav Nikonov from Fond 
Politika.

"But the election also showed that the Communist Party will always get a 
respectable level of support but has no real chance of getting to power," he 
added.

Indeed, some commentators say that the Communist leader does not aspire to 
the brutal realities of government, preferring to lead a powerful political 
force in parliament.

"Power always means responsibility. They're used to their position and happy 
with it," said Korgunyuk.

In the future, if Putin succeeds in his self-appointed task of modernising 
Russia's Sovietised economy, then the Communist vote is expected to drop 
dramatically as wealth percolates down to its voter base.

Already Putin's nationalist rhetoric has succeeded in winning converts among 
some of Zyuganov's elderly and working-class electorate.

In the "Red Belt" in southern Russia, he made inroads into traditional 
Communist strongholds, coming out on top in the Krasnodar region and 
Zyuganov's native agricultural Oryol region.

But while the Communist have no prospect of gaining power in the government 
White House, Lenin's disciples are not yet a spent force, analysts say.

"The Communist Party has a core base of support and it will be a feature on 
the political landscape for at least another 10 years," Korgunyuk concluded.

******

#12
Komsomolskaya Pravda
March 28, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] 
WILL ZYUGANOV BE ADMITTED TO THE KREMLIN?
The Number Three In Presidential Election Wins, Number Two Loses
By Sergei CHUGAYEV, political news analyst

The returns of the March 26 presidential election will 
certainly have a serious effect on the political fates of the 
Number Two and the Number Three in the presidential 
race--Gennady Zyuganov and Grigory Yavlinsky, respectively. 
Paradoxically, the Number Three contender in the 
presidential marathon, Yavlinsky has won, while the runnerup 
who has had an appreciable lead on the Yabloko leader, has lost.
No matter how insignificant the number of votes cast for 
Yavlinsky may seem in comparison with the votes of the two top 
aspirants for the presidency, Yavlinsky's third place is a 
significant achievement. For the first time in many years in 
the history of post-Communist parliamentary and presidential 
elections, the third place has gone to a democrat and human 
rights advocate, rather than a nationalist patriot. 
This achievement enables Yavlinsky and his followers to 
claim the status of a system-building party in a new political 
system which Vladimir Putin seems to intend to construct. 
Zyuganov's performance has been much less satisfactory. He 
has lost yet again. He has failed to live up to the 
expectations of his party comrades again. Are the necessary 
conclusions forthcoming?
The reader may remember that the standing of the party 
leader cum the Communist faction leader was rather precarious 
in the 1996 election. Zyuganov's comrades have been saddened by 
the results of the latest Duma elections, too. Zyuganov is now 
doomed to wear the label of an "eternal loser." Will not the 
young and ardent Communist functionaries view this circumstance 
as a good pretext for ousting their older comrade? Zyuganov 
certainly has every reason to feel concerned.
Presumably, he has obtained an insurance policy in good time.
It is known that the top crust of the Communist Party 
split in early February. Some of the party's top functionaries 
demanded waging a struggle on Putin to the victorious end. They 
wanted to call on Communist sympathisers to boycott the 
election and thus thwart it. 
Others deemed it necessary to launch negotiations with the 
then acting president and to swap an adequate turnout for a 
guarantee of getting a number of high postings in the future 
executive authorities. 
It is common knowledge that Putin's staff has been viewing 
adequate turnout as well-nigh the most problematic matter. 
Our sources indicate that Zyuganov's envoys were 
signalling their readiness for such negotiations with Putin's 
men in February. It is thus far unknown whether any bargaining 
took place. 
One thing is known: Zyuganov's rhetorics became much 
milder in early March. In February, he openly threatened to 
call on his sympathisers to boycott the election; in March, a 
boycott was out of the question. 
The result is well known: the disciplined Communist 
Party's fans came to the polls en masse and thus effectively 
made sure that the election was recognised as valid. 
Zyuganov's aggressive campaign seems to have been 
primarily spearheaded at the Communist top crust--to enable him 
to fend off accusations and suspicions in the future.

******

#13
Baltimore Sun
March 28, 2000
[for personal use only]
U.S. politics might shape Russia policy
Election gamesmanship could derail Clinton effort to mend frayed relations
By Jay Hancock 
Sun National Staff 

WASHINGTON -- The Clinton administration is eager to repair frayed relations 
with Russia now that Vladimir V. Putin has consolidated power as the newly 
elected president. But many analysts suggest that those plans could be 
derailed by the uncertainty and political gamesmanship that are sure to 
precede the U.S. elections in November.

Near the top of Washington's list of Russian priorities is renegotiating the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty so it would allow the construction of a 
limited U.S. anti-missile defense.

The United States also favors fundamental economic reforms in Russia, a major 
treaty on reducing offensive nuclear weapons and an end to atrocities in 
Chechnya.

"We believe we have an enormous amount of work we can do with Russia in 
various fields -- first and foremost in the security field, in the field of 
arms control, and in the field of economic relations," said James Foley, a 
State Department spokesman. "We want to work together with Russia."

Those goals would be difficult to achieve at any time, but they will be 
especially so this year, say Russia specialists, who noted that a lame-duck 
U.S. president and a Congress facing elections might lack the strength or 
will to offer Putin the concessions he will seek in any deal to amend the 
treaty.

"Considering the upcoming U.S. presidential elections and the general shape 
of domestic politics in the United States, the West seems in for a rough 
ride" with Russia, said Nikolai Sokov, a former Russian diplomat and now a 
senior researcher at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in 
California.

"Do you want market reforms? Yes, but you have to support [Russia], and you 
have to be softer on Chechnya," he said.

Some analysts say they think the Clinton administration has a good chance of 
negotiating relatively narrow modifications to the anti-missile treaty.

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has been conducting informal 
discussions with Moscow on the matter. Russian moderates are said to prefer 
an amended treaty to an out-and-out abrogation by the United States -- a move 
that would be more likely under a Republican president, analysts say.

"There are good reasons for both presidents to want a deal this year," said 
James Goldgeier of George Washington University. "The Russians seem to be 
sending signals" that they are open to negotiation on the missile treaty.

At the same time, Russia might want to link such negotiations to wider talks 
on offensive arms reductions, financial aid from the West or other matters. 
If that happens, Putin might wait for a new U.S. administration, one that 
will be in a stronger political position to negotiate a broader agreement, 
analysts said.

"There is no need to [modify the treaty] right now," said Yuli Vorontsov, 
former Russian ambassador to Washington. "It's better to leave this issue for 
discussions of the two new presidents of our countries."

In a phone call with Putin yesterday, Clinton said, he urged the Russian 
leader to "strengthen the rule of law, to intensify the fight against crime 
and corruption and to join us on a broad common agenda of international 
security."

Clinton's final message to Putin, he said, was "my concerns about the war in 
Chechnya."

Some Republicans have argued that the United States should move to block 
financing for Russia from the International Monetary Fund until Moscow 
loosens its grip on Chechnya. The IMF is considering allocating more money 
for Russia. If that matter comes up for a decision before November, some 
analysts believe the Clinton administration will oppose the package so it can 
look tough against Moscow.

That could lead to a new breach with the West and lend political support to 
Russian hard-liners and isolationists, Sokov said.

"Last fall, when I visited the Russian Defense Ministry, I had the strange 
feeling that the office of Jesse Helms was in that building," Sokov said, 
referring to the North Carolina Republican senator. "The people used the same 
language."

U.S.-Russian relations have been on hold since the 1998 economic crisis 
brought down Russia's economy and weakened Boris N. Yeltsin's hold on power. 
Moscow's brutal action in Chechnya did not help matters.

As Yeltsin's health deteriorated, it became clear that any substantial 
rapprochement with Washington would have to wait for his successor.

Putin is a vigorous leader who has given both Russia and the world the sense 
that he will push hard to get things done.

"After so much big talk and so little walk during the Yeltsin era, the people 
in Russia wanted someone who could do things," said Dimitri Simes, president 
of the Nixon Center in Washington.

But Putin also is beset by domestic constraints -- corrupt tycoons blocking 
reform, hard-liners seeking expanded military power, Communists favoring a 
return to central planning.

While Putin has spoken favorably of the economic reform prescribed for Russia 
by the White House, he might be prevented from implementing it.

It is not even clear that Russia's legislature will approve the START II arms 
reduction treaty, a goal of the Clinton administration and especially of 
Congress. The United States has ratified the treaty, and ratification by 
Russia is deemed the starting point for any new arms-reduction talks.

*******

#14
Washington Times
March 28, 2000
Taking measure of the aid pit
No matter Vladmir Putin now officially becomes Russia's elected president, 
there is a job for the U.S. Congress to undertake without delay: a serious 
investigation of the Russian financial scandals of the last decade.
By Arnold Beichman

No matter that Vladimir Putin now officially becomes Russia's elected 
president, there is a job for the U.S. Congress to undertake without delay: a 
serious investigation of the Russian financial scandals of the last decade. 
Billions of U.S. dollars intended to help the Russian economy seem to have 
vanished into thin air, thin air being a metaphor for Swiss and other 
overseas havens for stolen or laundered money. Congress must uncover who 
profited from the American aid program to post-Soviet Russia. Were any 
Americans involved in these scandals?
For, as has been known for years, the international aid program for 
Russia has been one of the most witless, most unpoliced and most mismanaged 
in modern history. Much has been written about the financial disaster visited 
upon post-Soviet Russia in the attempt to introduce cold-turkey privatization 
and marketization. Too little has been written about the swindling that has 
gone on — until now.
An article in the current National Interest ought to be studied 
carefully by Reps. Benjamin Gilman, New York Republican, chairman of the 
House International Relations Committee and Rep. Jim Leach, Iowa Republican, 
chairman of the House Banking Committee. Mr. Gilman stated last October that 
"the corruption within the Yeltsin government in Russia is extensive. . . . 
[and] goes to the top of the Russian government." Mr. Leach routinely talks 
about a "Russian kleptocracy."
The National Interest article in the spring 2000 issue is by Janine R. 
Wedel, a faculty member of the University of Pittsburgh graduate school of 
international affairs. Her article is titled ominously: "Tainted 
Transactions: Harvard, the Chubais Clan and Russia's Ruin." Professor Wedel 
ought to be invited by Congress to testify about her explosive bill of 
particulars.
As an anthropologist, she has applied her specialty to dissecting how 
financial aid to Russia was diverted to secret bank accounts while Western 
advisers, notably Harvard faculty members, among others, stood by and, at 
best, did nothing to stop the looting.
In her expose, Miss Wedel introduces the concept of "transactorship" so 
as better to illuminate the murky dealings that have been going on since the 
Soviet Union sank into oblivion in 1991. By "transactors" Professor Wedel 
means "players in a small, informal group who work together for mutual gain, 
while formally representing different parties." The adjectival phrase, "cozy 
manner" applies to the transactors, American advisers and Russian 
representatives, whose "activities ran directly counter to the stated aims 
and of the U.S. aid program in Russia," writes Professor Wedel. Transactors 
may also have been involved in criminal activities.
It's up to Messrs. Gilman and Leach and their colleagues to find out 
what has been going on. Professor Wedel's charges are too serious to be 
ignored.
The National Interest article fingers the Harvard Institute for 
International Development (HIID); Harvard professors Jeffrey Sachs and Andrei 
Shleifer; Anders Aslund, a Sachs associate; Russian economists Yegor Gaidar 
and Anatoly Chubais as the "transactors" who together planned the transition 
from a centralized socialist economy to what was to be a market economy.
The U.S. General Accounting Office has been investigating HIID 
activities in Russia and Ukraine. The Clinton administration, says Professor 
Wedel, "delegated virtually its entire Russian economic aid portfolio —
more 
than $350 million — for management by the Harvard Institute." Delegating so 
much aid to a private entity, according to GAO officials is unprecedented.
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, himself a former Harvard faculty 
member and earlier chief economist at the World Bank, has described the 
HIID-Chubais Clan as a "dream team." Such backing, writes Professor Wedel, 
"enabled the Harvard-Chubais transactors to exact hundreds of millions of 
dollars in Western loans and American aid."
"Secrecy shrouded the privatization process . . . which was largely 
shaped by the Harvard-Chubais transactors," writes Professor Wedel, "[and] 
which was intended to spread the fruits of the free market. Instead, it 
helped to create a system of 'tycoon capitalism' acting in the service of a 
half dozen corrupt oligarchs. The 'reforms' were more about wealth 
confiscation than wealth creation."
Chairmen Gilman and Leach, it's your move. The sooner the better.

Arnold Beichman, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a columnist 
for The Washington Times.

******