March
24, 2000
This Date's Issues: 4193 • 4194
4195
Johnson's Russia List
#4194
24 March 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Washington Times: David Sands, Putin makes effort to keep
his height secret from voters.
2. Novaya Gazeta: If You’re Sick – Vote?!
3. AFP: What they said (and wished they hadn't) during the
campaign.
4. Reuters: Cynicism wins in Russian election campaign.
5. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: 'Liberals for Yavlinsky' and Other
Ñ™†"™®.
6. IntellectualCapital.com: Richard Pipes, Putin's Coronation.
7. Dale Herspring: Re: 4192-Mahoney.
8. Andrei Sitov: Committee to Protect Journalists report.
9. Ann Cooper (Committee to Protect Journalists): Response to
Sitov.
10. Segodnya: Sergei Markov, WHY TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS WHEN THEIR
RESULT SEEMS CLEAR ENOUGH? (re goals of main candidates)
11. Bloomberg: Russian Industry Determined to Share Putin's
Success.
12. Reuters: Russia Internet Use Seen Doubling In 2000.]
*******
#1
Washington Times
March 23, 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin makes effort to keep his height secret from voters
By David Sands
MOSCOW — Vladimir Putin's possibly Napoleonic political tendencies have
been given a thorough airing in the run-up to Sunday's elections. The acting
president's personal Napoleonic stature is a much more closely guarded state
secret.
The fact that the diminutive Mr. Putin looms large — figuratively and
literally — in the broadcasts on Russia's most widely watched television
networks could stand as a symbol for the low-key but highly effective media
campaign he has waged, controlling both the images voters see and the terms
of the debate in the crowded presidential field.
Although the 47-year-old Mr. Putin has been much in the public eye in
recent days, television coverage almost never shows the 5-foot-7-inch acting
president standing next to a taller man. Instead, he is shown seated, playing
with the family poodle, climbing (alone) out of the cockpit of a Russian
fighter jet, or meeting with stooped pensioners or elderly women, as the NTV
television network pictured him during Tuesday's visit to Nizhny Novgorod.
In large crowds, Mr. Putin is typically shown striding past crowds of
onlookers, making it hard for the viewer to get a clear sense of scale.
When Mr. Putin does meet with taller people, as in his one-day summit
earlier this month with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the cameras oblige
by photographing the leaders from below, making both seem toweringly tall.
The stratagem, part of a carefully cultivated Kremlin media offensive,
appears to be working.
A new poll released yesterday by the Romir polling group puts Mr.
Putin's support at 57 percent, comfortably above the absolute majority he
needs to avoid a runoff. The poll, conducted March 18-19, represents a
rebound for the president from previous surveys and by law is the last that
will be published before Sunday's vote.
If Mr. Putin's height (which he reportedly augments with shoe lifts
covered by extra-long trousers) is hard to discern, evidence of the election
itself is almost nonexistent in downtown Moscow.
Extensive drives through the central city and a long walk in the
environs of Mr. Putin's Kremlin office reveal just three campaign posters —
single billboards for reformist candidates Grigory Yavlinsky of Yabloko and
Samara region Gov. Konstantin Titov and a lonely handbill for nationalist
Alexei Podberyozhkin of the Spiritual Heritage bloc.
While dominating the airwaves, Mr. Putin's street presence isn't any
more prominent. Two men brave a spring snow squall outside a central Moscow
subway station sporting sandwich boards detailing in fine print the acting
president's skimpy election platform.
The boards themselves offer just a head shot of the president.
Mr. Putin's ragtag band of nearly a dozen challengers has been reduced
to complaining about each other's media coverage and climbing unusual
platforms in a bid to get noticed.
Mr. Yavlinsky, who has waged perhaps the most energetic campaign against
Mr. Putin's record, was criticized for a Feb. 29 stop at a Russian military
base and for the frequency of his appearances on Russian news broadcasts,
even though he lags far behind the front-runner.
The economist and former top Kremlin aide under Mikhail Gorbachev even
appeared on a Russian cooking show this week, discoursing on his affection
for herring and potatoes.
"I plug in my iron and Yavlinsky is there," complained ultranationalist
Vladimir Zhirnovsky.
For his part, Mr. Yavlinsky this week complained that the ORT network,
whose coverage of the Putin candidacy has been highly favorable, had refused
to air one of his campaign commercials and had not run taped news programs in
which he had taken part.
The station, owned by Russia's biggest television company, denied the
charges. And four candidates with rock-bottom poll numbers, including former
State Duma Deputy Ella Pamfilova, the only woman in the race, competed this
week on the Russian version of "Who Wants to be a Millionaire." Their
television appearances may have helped their recognition ratings, but not
their campaign bank accounts: All winnings went to charity.
"The media are so sure that Vladimir Putin is going to be elected
president that they aren't giving readers any alternative," observed media
critic Francesa Mereu in the Moscow English-language weekly Russia Journal.
*******
#2
Russia Today press summaries
Novaya Gazeta
March 23, 2000
If You’re Sick – Vote?!
Summary
Russia is a country of the absurd. The upcoming elections will probably
become a show worthy of our country. But in order for this to happen, it is
necessary to provide audience attendance.
Even the Moscow city hospitals have decided to ensure political activity. A
“Novaya Gazeta” journalist called 35 hospitals in Moscow. It turns out that
21 of them have demanded a special certificate allowing all the patients in
the hospital to vote – otherwise they wouldn’t be hospitalized. The hospital
employees say that “this is how it should be” and “this is the presidential
elections – there is no other way”.
And the Central Election Committee (CIK) knows nothing about this violation
of voter rights. “We didn’t receive any information of this sort. This is
impossible. The elections are the personal business of all voters. It is for
them to decide whether they want to vote in the hospital or not,” said one
CIK employees.
The employees of the Obligatory Medical Insurance Fund of Moscow (and there
is no way to be hospitalized without an insurance policy) agreed with CIK:
“We haven’t heard anything about this. We didn’t get any instructions. Call
the Health Protection Committee of Moscow – maybe this is their initiative.”
The employees of the Health Protection Committee had the same reaction –
surprise: “This is impossible! Name at least one hospital that does this –
we’ll see what they’re up to!”
Some Moscow hospitals respect the voter rights, however. They say that voting
is a voluntary thing. After all, the people come to hospitals to get medical
treatment, not to vote.
On March 26, a number of people in hospital robes will come to the ballot
boxes. It’s even possible to make “medical-political” forecasts – the
neurology department will vote for Zhirinovsky, surgery – for Yavlinsky,
reanimation – for Putin…
So, the hospitals are already covered. Now it’s time to work with the
brothels and bullpens.
********
#3
What they said (and wished they hadn't) during the campaign
MOSCOW, March 23 (AFP) -
>From "Shithouse" to "Stalinism," from hopes for a "happy planet" to tampax
and chocolate bars, Russia's plodding campaign for Sunday's presidential
election has occasionally flickered into life.
Herewith an assorted collection of what they said during a campaign triggered
by the shock resignation of Boris Yeltsin on the eve of the new millennium.
All the following are candidates except Yelena Bonner, widow of Nobel
laureate Andrei Sakharov.
VLADIMIR PUTIN, acting president and front-runner:
"Democracy is the dictatorship of the law. The stronger the state is, the
freer the individual."
"We will wipe out the terrorists wherever we find them. If we find them in
the shithouse, then that's where we'll do it."
Television campaign spots "are like adverts. You don't need to know during
the middle of an election campaign whether Tampax or Snickers are better".
GENNADY ZYUGANOV, the Communist Party leader
"If power doesn't change hands, Russia will see a new (ruble) devaluation and
a military-political dictatorship this summer."
"Putin can easily demonstrate that the 'dictatorship of law' which he
declared envisions a strict compliance with legal principles in a democratic
state... primarily by annulling his illegal law on privileges for
(ex-president Boris Yeltsin) and his entourage."
GRIGORY YAVLINSKY, leader of the liberal Yabloko Party:
Accused Putin of employing "Soviet methods, according to which the ends
justify the means" used by those in power, in particular in Chechnya, where
Russian forces have waged a ruthless war against separatist forces since last
October.
VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKY, ultranationalist leader
(Communist Party chief Gennady) "Zyuganov has already fallen ill and he could
have tuberculosis, for he is in frequent contact with little old ladies."
"I am telling you in advance that I will exterminate them (separatists) all.
Rivers of blood will flow. Ten million or 15 million will die, but the
remaining 135 million will live normally."
YURY SKURATOV
(On Putin) "I get the impression that he can just read out prepared texts for
the cameras, but he cannot take part in discussions and answer unexpected
questions.
"If such a debate could take place I would ask him a whole range of
questions."
UMAR DZHABRAILOV, the only Chechen standing in the election
"The past generation bequeathed the Earth to us, we must do all we can to
safeguard future life, to leave our children and future generations a
beautiful, kind, and happy planet that is Earth."
YELENA BONNER, widow of Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov:
"Under Putin, a new stage in the introduction of modernised Stalinism has
begun. Authoritarianism is growing harsher, society is being militarised, the
military budget is increasing."
********
#4
Cynicism wins in Russian election campaign
By Anatoly Verbin
MOSCOW, March 24 (Reuters) - Cynical pragmatism has replaced romantic notions
about a new democracy in the run-up to Sunday's presidential vote -- a
fundamental shift that has produced the dullest election campaign in
post-Soviet Russia.
Contenders and the media appear to be resigned, or looking forward, to the
expected victory of Acting President Vladimir Putin and are more busy trying
to carve out their niches in life under his rule than fighting an election.
``No one expected the election campaign to be so grey, dull and impersonal,''
wrote political analyst Dmitry Pinsker in the weekly magazine Itogi.
``It stands no comparison with the recent tumultuous parliamentary poll and,
if we recall the passions of four years ago, the senselessness of the current
campaign becomes striking.
``It seems that the issue is the favourite -- the race entirely reflects his
personality.''
It has not been like this since Mikhail Gorbachev allowed relatively free
polls in the Soviet Union.
In 1991, Boris Yeltsin became the first elected president of Russia, then
part of the Soviet Union, overcoming fierce resistance from the Kremlin's
Communist rulers.
His dominant character determined the collapse of the Soviet Union and
Russia's ups and downs since then.
In 1996, Yeltsin won again, beating opposition Communist leader Gennady
Zyuganov in a fierce battle decided by Yeltsin's personality, huge financial
and media support and a clever PR campaign playing up fears of a Communist
comeback.
His slogan was ``Vote with your heart'' and he paid for the victory with his
own heart, falling ill and never fully recovering until his shock resignation
on December 31, 1999.
Yeltsin's frenetic search for a successor in the last two years of his rule
finally brought in Putin, first as prime minister in August and then as
acting president on New Year's Eve. The 47-year-old career spy has since done
what appeared absolutely unthinkable just nine months ago.
He has all but won the election long before voters cast their ballots on
Sunday, depriving the campaign of spice. The question which remains wide open
is what Putin will do after the ballot, but it has had little impact on
campaigning.
PUTIN WON PRESIDENCY IN PARLIAMENTARY POLL
It appears Putin ensured his victory in the parliamentary election in
December last year, when little more than a nod in favour of a new political
grouping, Unity, was enough to make it the second biggest force in
parliament.
Since then, he has totally dominated Russian politics and it is difficult to
describe the campaign for the presidency, the biggest prize in the world's
biggest country, as a race.
Putin is not officially campaigning and has in effect no campaign
advertisements. He has declined to take part in televised debates with his
rivals.
He is so confident of a victory he took a day off at the Black Sea resort of
Sochi on Sunday, a week before the poll.
But, his everyday presence on all television channels and media-grabbing
``business'' trips, like his journey to rebel Chechnya in a fighter jet on
Monday, appear more than enough to secure him a win, most probably in the
first round.
The other contenders seem to put up only the pretence of fighting. To varying
degrees they all admit Putin will win and some underline their eagerness to
work with the likely future leader. No one has attacked Putin personally.
The satirical puppet show Kukly on the commercial NTV television has
portrayed Putin's rivals as prostitutes trying to lure him as a customer.
The law says those who win less than three percent of the vote will have to
return state funds allocated to them for campaigning. Clear outsiders have
limited their activity to a small number of events.
But they grab every opportunity to appear on television, taking part in
everything on offer, including quizzes and other shows, often demonstrating
worrying gaps in education and an occasionally awkward command of their
native language.
One of them quit theatrically on Tuesday night during a live TV show, some 10
minutes before the deadline for quitting. The country hardly noticed.
The group of more serious contenders, like Zyuganov, expected to come second,
liberal Grigory Yavlinsky and ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, all
poll veterans, go through all the motions but with an obvious lack of heart.
Even Zhirinovsky's visit to a gypsy fortune-teller, accompanied by
vodka-drinking and dancing with young girls, enlivened the campaign for less
than a day.
The media, which waged such fierce attacks on some of the parties ahead of
the December parliamentary election that international observers expressed
concern, are calm and generally quiet, paying remarkably little attention to
the poll.
A general unwillingness to take Putin on during the campaign may well be
justified by an old Russian saying:
``Don't spit into the wind.''
******
#5
Moscow Times
March 24, 2000
EDITORIAL: 'Liberals for Yavlinsky' and Other Ñ™†"™®
It was another one-day wonder: Some of the country's leading "liberals" -
Anatoly Chubais, Yegor Gaidar, Boris Nemtsov, Irina Khakamada - were
described by Interfax on Wednesday evening as being prepared to join forces
with Grigory Yavlinsky.
Well, not quite. It turns out that Chubais and Gaidar are, apparently,
ready to join a broad coalition with Yavlinsky ... after the presidential
election. (Then, they will no doubt make Yabloko some ridiculous offer, and
when Yavlinsky declines the others will smugly chant that Yavlinsky is
haughty, and not a team player.)
Khakamada and Nemtsov, meanwhile, are more proactive - by Friday they were
"campaigning" in the provinces. But for what, exactly? Nemtsov says their
position is that Vladimir Putin and Yavlinsky should go into a runoff race,
instead of Putin and Gennady Zyuganov. Does that mean, as logic might
suggest, that Nemtsov is campaigning for Yavlinsky? No, it means he is
campaigning for a Putin-Yavlinsky runoff. (Perhaps this is more
backside-covering: If the Putin regime becomes a reign of terror, Nemtsov
can always claim he had backed Yavlinsky. Otherwise, Nemtsov can still
scurry about looking for a job in the Putin Cabinet by claiming he "opposed
Zyuganov.")
So is Yavlinsky about to soar to new heights even so? Most likely not;
judging from ORT's 30 minutes of Yavlinsky-bashing on Wednesday night, the
Yabloko leader could instead be in danger of going the way of
Fatherland-All Russia.
If so, let it be said that Yavlinsky - like Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov
before him - will have been a reluctant participant in his own political
assassination. Because even Yabloko has always opted to play the Moscow
political game by the accepted rules - with rule No. 1 being that there are
no appeals directly to the people, because the people are unwashed, and
brought us 1917, and so can't be trusted.
After all, where was the principled opposition - first and foremost Yabloko
- when the August 1998 ruble crash brought down the banking system? Why
were there no Yabloko-organized street demonstrations or protests? Learning
that Yavlinsky likes pelmeny and can't tie his own tie is, just like the
wavering endorsements of Khakamada and Nemtsov, far too little and far too
late. It certainly doesn't substitute for a real dialogue with the public,
as opposed to one with sympathetic media circles.
There is one more consideration. It is intriguing that the Kremlin chooses,
in the final hours, to savage Yavlinsky - while leaving the far more
vulnerable Zyuganov untouched. That's because the Kremlin wants Zyuganov
around forever, as a straw man - and as a substitute for real, principled
critics like Yavlinsky.
- Matt Bivens
*******
#6
IntellectualCapital.com
March 23, 2000
Putin's Coronation
by Richard Pipes
In the unanimous opinion of experts and pollsters, Russia’s presidential
elections scheduled for Sunday, March 26, are a foregone conclusion: acting
President Vladimir Putin is expected to defeat his only serious rival, the
head of the Communist Party, Gennadi Zyuganov, by a margin of five to two if
not better. There remain only two unresolved questions: whether enough voters
will turn up to meet the constitution’s requirements, and whether Putin will
get 50% or more of the votes to avert a run-off election. But even if neither
requirement is met, the outcome is not in doubt: Putin will be Russia’s next
president.
Russia's political psyche
Inevitable as it appears, this prospect is nonetheless astonishing. A year
ago, no one but Putin’s superiors in the secret services and a few
politicians in St Petersburg knew of him. And yet a country of 150 million,
in deep psychological and economic turmoil, is willing to place at the head
of its government for the next four years a man of whom it knows next to
nothing, who has no record of any accomplishment, and who offers no program
except the promise of strong leadership.
One can offer for this enigma several explanations.
Russians have very little experience in multiparty elections and, indeed, in
the give and take of political culture is rooted in the traditions of the
communal village where all questions were resolved by acclamation and the
objective was unanimity. They are bewildered and even disgusted by the open
conflict among contenders for high office, viewing it not as a healthy
contest of opinions and interests but as selfish pursuit of private gain. In
the polls conducted not long ago, in the answer to the question, “Have
multiparty elections brought Russia more harm or good?”, 52% responded “more
harm” and only 15% said “more good.” These results mean that only one in
seven Russians has a positive view of democratic processes; the rest either
reject them or do not care one way or the other.
For this reason, Russians tend to rally behind a single leader who promises
to solve all their problems. In this manner a synthetic unanimity can be
obtained that gives the country the feeling of unity -- and unity spells
strength. It is an amazing spectacle to see one after another of Putin’s
potential rivals jump on his bandwagon, until only a couple of serious
contendors are left.
The novelty of Putin
This said, the question remains: Why Putin?
It is precisely his obscurity that attracts Russian voters. They want their
leader to produce miracles, to restore to their country its international
stature of a Great Power, and to solve all their domestic problems, beginning
with low salaries and arrears in wages and pensions. He is to crack down on
crime. They know from experience that the other, familiar candidates cannot
achieve these marvels because they have tried and failed. He just might.
Putin has very cleverly exploited these sentiments, drawing on public opinion
polls and employing public-relations techniques borrowed from the West. He
knows what the voters want, and he promises to satisfy their desires without
spelling out in detail what he will accomplish and how he will go about it.
His message is simple: “Trust me.” He projects a macho image whether routing
competitors on the karate mat or massacring Chechen civilians. He speaks
sparingly, using down-to-earth language that occasionally shades into
criminal slang. He is a self-assured leader in sharp contrast to the bumbling
Yelstin.
He is helped by the fact that what is left of his opposition presents no
serious threat. The Communists are quite demoralized. Their constituency
consists mostly of older and less educated voters who have been especially
hurt by the inflation that followed free-market reforms and by the collapse
of social services. It is a group that dwindles year to year. Zyuganov has no
clear program to offer them except vague promises that if elected he will
restore all the good features of Communism and none of the bad. But Russians
have tried Communism and want no part of it.
The other serious rival is Grigorii Yavlinsky, the head of the liberal
Yabloko party. A courageous politician, he is one of the few to have openly
condemned the Chechnya campaign. His following is concentrated in the large
cities and confined to the better-educated voters. His democratic program is
unlikely to attract more than 10% of the electorate.
The China model
What kind of a president will Putin make? Given the deliberate vagueness of
his program, one can only make tentative assessments.
Judging by his pronouncements, Putin believes in two things: the free market
in economics and authoritarian rule in politics. This program, if one can
call it that, has been linked to policies pursued by czar Alexander III, who
reigned between 1881 and 1894, which combined encouragement to capitalist
industry with rigorous enforcement of autocracy. But a more likely model is
contemporary China, which has managed rather successfully to blend capitalism
with strict party monopoly on political life and public opinion.
Putin has more than once expressed the belief that western-style democracy is
not suited for Russia -- at any rate, for some time to come. Recently, he has
gone so far as to state that “Russia has from the very start developed as a
super-centralized state. It is part of its genetic code.” On another occasion
he blamed the collapse of the Soviet Union on “laxness.”
So there can be no question that he will attempt to strengthen the power of
Moscow over the provinces and make life difficult for opposition parties.
Centralization also implies harnessing public opinion in support of
government policies: a foretaste of which are the harassment of newspapers
and television networks that do not support the war in Chechnya, as well as
the indictment of Radio Liberty’s correspondent who broadcast from Chechnya
as a “criminal.”
In foreign policy, Putin is cautious. He makes no secret of the fact that he
wants Russia once again to be an international power. He speaks of reviving
the national spirit. He wants to substantially increase the military budget,
and he is quietly reintroducing military training into schools. A new
military doctrine stresses foreign dangers to Russia and commits its armed
forces to making first use of nuclear weapons. But Putin seems well aware of
the need for foreign loans and investments and softens his tough nationalist
rhetoric with pledges of cooperation with the West.
As Boris Nemtsov, the one-time prime minister under Yelstin, recently put it:
“Putin enjoys such broad support because people don’t know what kind of a
person he is, and they pin their expectations on him. As they get to know
Putin, they will become more sober.” It seems a reasonable judgment.
Richard Pipes is Research Professor of History at Harvard University. In
1981-82 he served as Director of East European and Soviet Affairs in the
National Security Council. He is a contributing editor of
IntellectualCapital.com.
*******
#7
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2000
From: falka@ksu.edu (Dale R Herspring)
Subject: Re: 4192-Mahoney, 23 Mar 2000
Permit me to note that I am a believer in the "mixed economy" and
that I believe this kind of economic system will do more to promote
the development of democracy than any other. I also spent more
than twenty years as a Foreign Service Officer with the Department
of State and I have 29 years as an officer in the US Navy, both
active and reserve. I also find it difficult to believe there are people
who still believe in a Marxist form of economic/political state after
what has happened during the last 15 years.
Having said that, I must admit that I find a lot of what Mr. Mahoney
said to be accurate. One of the lessons I learned working for Les
Aspin on the Hill was that the US does not give foreign aid to be
nice. I can still remember a conversation with the late
Congressman Aspin. I noted that morally we should be doing x or
y. Aspin responded somewhat angrily -- "Look young man, this
country provides aid because it is our interest. We are not in the
business of providing charity." I think we must always keep that in
mind when looking at US aid to Russia or any other country.
I also believe that our aid program to Russia will go down in history
as one of the most mismanaged and incompetently hanlded. I also
agree with Mr. Mahoney that trying to get a capitalist or mixed
economy in Russia in a relatively short amount of tiem was one of
our primary goals. The problem was that we were not prepared for
the chaos and corruption that is part of every day life in Russia
(and was behind the scenes before communism collapsed).
Instead of devising a system that was "Russian friendly" we both
promised too much and exercised far too little control over how the
money was spent. In 1989 the Russians looked upon us as
saviors, and now the situation has changed. To be sure, things
like Chechnya played a role, as did a number of other variables.
The bottom line, however, was not that capitalism was bad for
Russia, it was that a number of American economists, who knew
nothing about Russia worked closely with a number of Russians
who appear to have not known much about capitalism -- and the
result was chaos and corruption at the highest levels. I find it
incredible that senior policy makers (both here and in Russia) are
prepared to listen to economists who know little or nothing about
the culture, history, language and pecularities to the country they
are dealing with. As a consequence, american aid was piled upon
an already chaotic econmic system.
Where I suspect I disagree with Mr. Mahoney is that this was not
part of some sinister plot. I spent enough time in Washington to
know that is seldom the case. To be sure, we pushed aid in an
effort to create a capitalist state, but the Russians also bore
responsiblity. They did not have to accept it. Assuming this was
part of a plot is silly. Mr. Mahoney worked for AID and I suspect
he could also tell stories of how illogical things were from time to
time.
The US and others now have a chance to turn things around. I
assume Mr. Putin will be elected, and I assume that he will
continue to be interested in closer ties with the West. I think we
need to review our policy and this time come out with a well-
thought out approach (sans our economists from MIT). I am not
sure it will work, but yes, I do want us to push for a mixed
economy, albeit one a la' Russe. We cannot expect Volgograd to
function just like Kansas City or Chicago. This will not be an easy
task, indeed, we are entering on unchartered territory -- but there is
an opportunity to start over -- assuming of course that we are
prepared to do so.
*******
#8
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2000
From: WashTASS@aol.com (Andrei K.Sitov)
Subject: Committee to Protect Journalists report
Dear David,
I'd like to draw the attention of JRL readers to a story that I feel has been
completely missed. In my opinion it's a glaring example of the double standard
that helps to explain why many people in Russia and other countries of the
former Soviet bloc tend to regard the West with more than a little mistrust.
Yesterday the Committee to Protect Journalists released its annual report -
Attacks on the press in 1999. It deplored the death of 34 journalists around
the world. It also said the highest country total was 10 people for Sierra
Leone.
According to the report itself both these statements are factually incorrect.
The CPJ says five journalists died in 1999 in Yugoslavia as a result of the
Kosovo conflict: "three Chinese journalists were killed when NATO bombed the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade" in May and "two German journalists were shot and
killed in Kosovo" in June. In the chronological list it also includes the
killing of a Serb journalist on April 11.
But the report also says that "NATO... bombed the (Radio and Television
Serbia) station's central studio in Belgrade on April 23, killing 16 people".
The CPJ's European coordinator Emma Gray told me the Committee decided NOT TO
RECOGNIZE ANY OF THESE PEOPLE AS JOURNALISTS because they "incited hatred and
violence" working for the state-run station of the Milosevic regime.
Now that's what I call guilt by association. No one ever proved that any of
the victims was personally guilty of anything other than being in the way of
a NATO attack. To preempt possible objections - I know that only some of
these people were reporters. Most were technical support staff, camera people
etc. It doesn't change anything. Overall, as ITAR-TASS correspondents
reported from Belgrade, more than 20 journalists were killed in Yugoslavia
last year.
I don't think any further comment is needed but I'll give you my personal
take anyway. By stooping to such convoluted distortions of truth the CPJ has
reneged on its obligation to stand up for journalists everywhere regardless
of who threatens them and has forfeited its right to criticize others
including the government in Yugoslavia and for that matter in Russia. This is
very unfortunate because we do need all help we can muster foregray@cpj.org
safeguarding the freedom of the press.
Andrei K.Sitov
ITAR-TASS Bureau Chief
washtass@aol.com
******
#9
From: Ann Cooper <acooper@cpj.org>
Subject: Sitov e-mail
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2000
Dear David Johnson,
Andrei Sitov, the ITAR-TASS bureau chief in Washington, sent us a copy of
the e-mail he wrote to you about the Committee to Protect Journalists and
its listing of journalists killed because of their work in 1999. Although we
released the information on killed journalists in January, it drew attention
again yesterday because the list is included in our annual book, Attacks on
the Press in 1999, which we released at a Washington press conference
yesterday morning. Our decision to not include the Radio and Television
Serbia employees on the list was one taken after considerable research,
including in Belgrade, and discussion among the CPJ staff. Mr. Sitov refers
to "convoluted distortions." It is certainly true that our position is a
complex one, and one that has been misinterpreted by some. That is why I
wanted to send you a copy of a letter we sent to The Spectator magazine in
London, in response to a February commentary by Charles Glass. As this
letter explains, we take a very broad definition of journalist. We do defend
state broadcasters. But we cannot defend a media outlet that is used to
incite violence, as RTS was during the wars in Bosnia and Croatia.
I hope this letter will help explain our position, but I also invite you to
contact me, via e-mail (acooper@cpj.org) or phone in New York (212)465-9344,
extension 102, if you would like to discuss this further.
Sincerely,
Ann Cooper
Executive Director
Committee to Protect Journalists
To the Editor:
Charles Glass (When It's OK to Kill a Hack, February 5) infers a position
that the Committee to Protect Journalists never took: namely, that because
CPJ does not believe Radio and Television of Serbia (RTS) employees are
journalists, we do believe that NATO had a right to bomb them. This is not
so, and has never been our position.
On April 23, the same day that NATO forces bombed the RTS studios in
downtown Belgrade, CPJ sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana
condemning the attack, which killed 16 people. We have not moved from that
position, and remain dismayed that NATO forces would deliberately target a
civilian media installation. Under international humanitarian law, a
civilian facility only becomes a legitimate military target if it is used
for military purposes. In CPJ's view, broadcasting anti-NATO propaganda is
not a military function. Meanwhile, NATO has yet to provide evidence backing
its claim that the station was integrated into the Yugoslav military's
command and control apparatus.
However, whether or not RTS was a legitimate military target is an entirely
distinct question from whether or not the station's employees are
journalists.
Each year in January, CPJ publishes a list of journalists killed around the
world. During 1999, 34 journalists were killed while carrying out their
professional responsibilities in countries ranging from Sierra Leone to
Colombia. CPJ applies an extremely broad definition in determining who is a
journalist. In general, we do not make distinctions based on content,
political views, or whether or not a particular media outlet is state-run or
privately owned. There is one exception to this rule, however: our
consistent policy has been to exclude any media outlet that is used to
incite violence.
While RTS played a limited role in inciting ethnic violence in Kosovo last
spring, during the decade of the Balkan wars the station was a critical
instrument in the ethnic violence carried out by the Belgrade regime. It
played a direct role in fanning ethnic hatred during the wars in Croatia and
Bosnia, repeatedly broadcasting images of massacred Serb civilians, many of
them staged or invented, and urging Serbs to seek revenge.
The RTS executives and staff who conducted these broadcasts are largely
still in place, and, obviously, the government that used the station for
this purpose is still in power. This was the reason for CPJ's decision not
to include the 16 RTS employees killed in the April 23 attack on our annual
list.
Let me repeat, though, that regardless of whether or not CPJ considers RTS
employees to be journalists, they are civilians under international
humanitarian law, and, as such, entitled to certain basic protections.
Sincerely,
<<...>>
Ann Cooper
Executive Director
Committee to Protect Journalists
*******
#10
Segodnya
March 23, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WHY TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS WHEN THEIR RESULT SEEMS CLEAR
ENOUGH?
By Sergei MARKOV, director, Institute of Political Studies
Following below is a survey, which deals with the main
presidential candidates' goals.
The 2000 Russian presidential elections are really unique
in many respects. Most contenders adhere to the following
principle -- participation in the election race, rather than
victory, counts first. This can be explained by the fact that
everyone is sure of Vladimir Putin's victory. It's also crystal
clear that Gennady Zyuganov and Grigory Yavlinsky are going to
place second and third, respectively. Meanwhile each candidate
keeps tackling his own important political tasks in the course
of the present-day presidential election race.
Vladimir Putin, who doesn't struggle for victory, is sure
he will win. Vladimir Putin will have to attain the following
four goals in the course of his own election campaign: 1) to
ensure the required voter turn-out; 2) to win already in the
first round; 3) to sweep every Russian region; 4) to score a
legally sound victory. Vladimir Putin would perceive all-out
popular support as a veritable carte blanche for resolutely
alterging the entire national political system and specific
economic rules of the game.
Once elected, Putin would face no less difficult and
diverse tasks:
- Putin will have to create effective institutions of
state authority. This can be acomplished by defeating all those
numerous financial-bureaucratic groups, which, in essence, have
privatized the afore-said institutions of state authority, thus
rendering them powerless. Putin needs all-out popular support
for the sake of deprivatizing the state.
- Putin will also have to merge the Russian Federation's
economic, political and legal space into one single whole at a
time when this country is de facto turning into a
confederation. As a matter of fact, most regional constitutions
and charters run counter to the Russian Federation's
Constitution. Quite a few territories are now ruled by
essentially authoritarian political regimes. Putin needs
wide-scale public support in order to subordinate regional
governors, as well as the presidents of national republics, to
the federal center. Besides, Putin's landslide victory in every
constituent member of the Russian Federation is highly
desirable.
On the one hand, most voters' confidence in Vladimir
Putin's victory can do him a disservice, possibly reducing
local voter turn-out to less than 50 percent, which is seen as
a critical level. Consequently, election returns would be
declared null and void.
Putin must attain yet another goal. Putin has to score a
legally sound victory, while racing against his opponents.
Future critics must not have any reasons for contesting the
president-elect's legitimacy with the help of any possible
election-legislation violations. Putin's campaign headquarters
is trying to solve this problem by minimizing all campaign
coverage. Any promo footage, as well as campaign posters and
leaflets calling on the people of Russia to vote for Putin, are
nowhere to be seen at this stage. Putin, who doesn't try to
persuade the electorate, merely runs the country instead.
Gennady Zyuganov
His campaign is also renowned for its rather low profile.
In fact, Zyuganov doesn't necessarily have to conduct a a
large-scale campaign for the sake of achieving his own
political goals, which are as follows: 1) to make it into the
second round; 2) to reaffirm the KPRF's status as the main
opposition force, as well as his own status as the
leftist-patriotic coalition's only leader. With this in mind,
Zyuganov must give his voters an opportunity to repeat their
traditional behavior at the polls and to vote for Zyuganov; 3)
to strengthen KPRF chapters, as well as those of its allies, by
promoting the KPRF's regional chapters and those of its allies
throughout the current election campaign; as is known, all
parties thrive on elections, fading away without them; 4) to
formulate a new political partisan line in conditions of
Vladimir Putin's personal-power regime and projected reforms
that would be based on liberal patriotism's ideological
foundation. Consequently, the KPRF leader will have to organize
a rather serious intra-partisan discussion. Putin's tough and
effective North Caucasian policy, as well as his patriotic
rhetoric, have placed the Communists in an involved situation.
>From now on, they can't criticise Russia's powers-that-be for
being weak and unable to tackle the most important problems.
Nor can the KPRF criticize them for subordinating national
interests to foreign forces.
Zyuganov doesn't necessarily have to spend much money on
mass-media coverage, if he wants to achieve such goals. This
can be explained by the fact that local voters know him only
too well. Lack of political promo footage within the framework
of mass-media bodies would enable Zyuganov to focus on the
performance of KPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation)
grass-roots organizations proper. Meanwhile a possible second
election round doesn't depend on Zyuganov's showing. The second
round will take place, in case Vladimir Putin fails to collect
more than 50 percent of all votes already during the first
election round.
Grigory Yavlinsky would like to attain several main goals:
1) to retain his status as a main liberal-opposition leader; 2)
to preserve his party and to prevent the establishment of a
bipartisan system; 3) to defeat his liberal competitors; 4) to
strengthen Yabloko's chapters during the current election race.
Consequently, Yavlinsky's election campaign must be as
intensive as possible, if he wants to achieve such goals. The
mein the Kremlin don't conceal their intention to overhaul the
national partisan-political system and to retain not more than
3-4 parties on the local political scene. The list of such
parties would include a pro-government party, which, in turn,
would be based on the Unity movement, as well as the KPRF
(Communist Party of the Russian Federation), which is seen as
an obvious, albeit not dangerous, opposition force. Yavlinsky
would be expected to convince his voters in the course of
heated discussions with these two political forces that Yabloko
is entirely different, thereby defending his niche against
imminent annihilation as a result of that joint attack by a
pro-government party and the KPRF. At the same time, Yavlinsky
must defend his niche during that confrontation with yet
another influential liberal bloc, e.g. the Union Of Rightist
Forces (Russian acronym, SPS), which openly claims the right to
gobble up Yabloko. Therefore Yavlinsky must strengthen his
movement's territorial chapters in the course of the
present-day campaign, making them more active and immune to a
possible take-over by SPS regional chapters, all the more so as
SPS had suddenly surged ahead of Yabloko during the December
19, 1999 parliamentary elections.
And now I'd like to say a few words about No. 4 runner-ups
and their main tasks.
Konstantin Titov strives to achieve the following goals:
1) to strengthen SPS (Union Of Rightist Forces) chapters; 2) to
emphasize the fact that SPS doesn't merge with the
pro-government party, and that it boasts its own partisan
position, ideology and leaders; 3) to become a federal-level
politician; 4) to obtain the status of the main liberal
political force; 5) to defeat his main liberal opponent Grigory
Yavlinsky.
Aman Tuleev hopes to attain the following goals: 1) to
assert himself as a federal-level politician; 2) to consolidate
his electorate; 3) to consolidate his Kemerovo-region positions.
******
#11
Russian Industry Determined to Share Putin's Success
Moscow, March 23 (Bloomberg)
-- Russia's top oil and gas producers and biggest electric utility have
done all they can to let Vladimir Putin know they'll support him in Sunday's
presidential vote, even as polls show he's almost certain to win.
OAO Lukoil Holding, OAO Gazprom and RAO Unified Energy Systems even have
called on their 1.4 million employees to vote for Putin. In return, they want
a simpler tax system and less bureaucracy, as well as Putin's backing for
specific projects.
Big business also threw its support, and cash, behind Boris Yeltsin in the
last election. Unlike in 1996, however, when an ailing Yeltsin was trailing
his communist challenger, Putin should easily defeat his 10 opponents, with
or without the companies' help. As president, he'll have fewer political
debts, and a freer hand to pursue his own agenda, analysts said.
``It's a defensive reaction by the companies to the inevitable fact that Mr.
Putin will get elected,'' said James Henderson, director of research at
Renaissance Capital brokerage. ``I don't think Mr. Putin is building up a lot
of debts to the companies themselves.''
Still, Lukoil President Vagit Alekperov, Gazprom Chief Executive Rem
Vyakhirev and UES Chief Executive Anatoly Chubais are determined to share in
Putin's success. The three companies have combined revenue of $26 billion,
more than the $21.6 billion in this year's federal budget.
Obsequious Executives
Vyakhirev criticized coverage of the Chechen war by television station NTV,
which is partly owned by Gazprom, saying the reports were too critical of
Putin's government.
``We must help Acting President Vladimir Putin to maintain the authority to
manage this great country,'' Vyakhirev said in a statement.
Chubais, also a leader of a party that challenged Putin's supporters in
December parliamentary elections, said on Russian television this month he'll
help Putin ``with all necessary means . . . I trust Putin. I trust this
man.''
Lukoil's Alekperov said in an interview: ``We are making every effort to
ensure Putin's victory.''
Putin, who has been acting president since Yeltsin's Dec. 31 resignation, has
offered few specifics about his planned economic program. He has said enough
to suggest his priorities coincide with industry's -- he wants to encourage
foreign investment and understands the key role of Russia's oil and gas
companies.
Property Rights
``First of all, the state should overcome the weakness and inefficiency of
its government in everything that concerns property rights, investors' rights
and creditors' rights,'' Putin said at an investors' forum in Moscow this
month. ``We will be persistently moving in that direction.''
Already, Russia's leading companies have benefited from investors' optimism
about Putin. Lukoil has gained about 50.25 percent in the past month, while
Gazprom has risen 11 percent and Unified Energy Systems has gained 56.1
percent in the same period. Russian stocks could fall next week if Putin
fails to win a clear majority, and a second round of voting is required,
analysts said.
Putin is likely to receive 53 percent to 55 percent of the vote, while his
nearest challenger, Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, will get 22
percent to 24 percent, according to the All- Russian Center for Public
Opinion, based on its analyses of several recent polls. If no candidate
receives a majority, there will be a second-round runoff between the top two
vote-getters.
Executives have criticized some of Putin's actions since taking over as prime
minister in August -- but they blame various ministers for pushing their own
agendas and are convinced Putin will bring in new people after the election.
Putin took on the dual role of acting president on Dec. 31, when Yeltsin
resigned.
Oil companies opposed the government's decision to double crude oil export
duties -- but they blame Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko for that.
They also opposed a government decision to restrict fuel exports, though they
say Oil Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny is at fault.
Industrial Allies
Putin hasn't hesitated to use his allies in industry. He made Vladimir
Bogdanov and Vadim Somov, president and vice president of AO Surgutneftegaz
Oil Co, the parent company of OAO Surgutenfetgaz, Russia's No. 3 oil
producer, his representatives in the west Siberia and the Leningrad regions.
Surgut said this week it expects Putin to help the company's $1.2 billion in
projects near the Baltic Sea if he's elected.
Putin ``knows and understands the tasks which we set out for the projects and
he supports them.''
Surgut can't count on Putin's help, analysts said, though he is aware of the
need to support Russia's biggest industries.
``I don't think there's any indication he's going to do any special favors,''
said Henderson at Renaissance. ``He's also not going to do them any harm.''
Attracting Investment
Putin wants to make Russia ``a preferred investment option for not only
foreign, but Russian investment,'' said Bill Kimsey, chief executive officer
of Ernst & Young International.
Some executives warn it's too early to say what Putin may do after the
election. Many companies have too much experience with bureaucratic delays,
corrupt officials, legal challenges, political instability and economic
crises to expect anything to change soon in Russia.
``Russia's problem is that it's competing for the world capital,'' said Ralph
Alexander, vice president of BP Amoco Plc., world's third-largest public
traded oil company, which has invested about $1 billion in Russian projects,
Russian media reported. ``It needs to demonstrate the outcome of existing
investments in a positive way.''
If he wins Sunday's election, industry leaders expect Putin to change the
cabinet and try to establish a strong government that will force regional
authorities to follow its lead.
Putin says he'll insist on the rule of law, though instituting those changes
may require undemocratic methods that many Russians fear. Business executives
say Putin can be trusted.
``Once elected President, Putin will act in accordance with his
announcements,'' Lukoil's Alekperov said in an interview. ``A lot of people
who used to work with Putin say that he has always been faithful to his
obligations.''
*******
#12
Russia Internet Use Seen Doubling In 2000
MOSCOW, Mar 23, 2000 -- (Reuters) The number of Russians using the Internet
regularly is expected to double this year but it could be some time before
significant e-commerce takes off, the head of a Russian Internet direct
equity fund said on Wednesday.
"We don't expect that one year down the road there is going to be a vast
development," Jean Michel Broun, acting chief executive of Ru-Net Holdings
Ltd, told Reuters in an interview.
He cited Gallup figures showing 1.7 million Russians accessed the Internet on
a monthly basis by the end of last year, still a tiny figure for a country
with a population of about 145 million.
"People are expecting the market to double this year," Broun said. He added
that the biggest numbers of users were in Moscow and St Petersburg and most
had university or higher education.
Ru-Net, with starting capital of $20 million, was opened by Baring Vostok
Capital Partners and Russia's United Financial Group. It announced last week
it had bought a $3 million stake in online book and music seller Ozon.ru.
Asked about other investment prospects, Broun said Ru-Net was looking at a
variety of options: "There are a few pieces of real estate to be
occupied...We are talking about general horizontal portals."
Few investment deals have been made so far in the Russian Internet, but Broun
said a number of sites stood a chance of becoming success stories if they
were actively developed.
He said development of e-commerce was hindered by a combination of factors,
including lack of adequate payment mechanisms and low disposable income, but
profitable businesses could still be developed.
"It is going to take some time and it will depend on the models of the
companies. It will very much vary from company to company," he said.
"You have to keep costs extremely tight...There is a way to run tightly
managed companies profitably here."
******
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