March 17, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4173 4174 4175 4176

Johnson's Russia List
#4176
17 March 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Itar-Tass: Most Russians Accept Idea of Tough Autocratic Rule.
2. AFP: Russian Voters More Concerned About Prices Than Chechen War.
3. Bloomberg: Russia Says It Expects IMF to Resume Lending After Election. (Kasyanov)
4. Itar-Tass: Preparations for Presidential Elections Practically Over.
5. Nikolai Petrov: re the Gas-Vybory computer system and election counting.
6. Philip Wasielewski: Moscow Bombings.
7. Bloomberg: Russians Still Favor Putin in Presidential Election, Poll Shows.
8. AFP: Top General Gives Advice To Troops Voting Early In Presidential Poll.
9. Izvestia: Georgy BOVT and Yevgeny KRUTIKOV, IS THE WAR OVER? Chechen War's Effect on Russian Society Is Different from What Was Expected.
10. Moscow Times: Tatyana Matsuk, Honest Business.
11. St. Petersburg Times: Thomas Tymer, Historical Parallels Could Spell the End of Oligarchy.
12. The Guardian (UK): Amelia Gentleman, Bolshoi dances on edge of disaster.
13. Novye Izvestiya: Yavlinsky Is The Second Most Popular Candidate.
14. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: Gag Order Sentences All To Ignorance.
15. Reuters: Russia's Putin finds support among factory workers.] 

******

#1
Most Russians Accept Idea of Tough Autocratic Rule.

MOSCOW, March 17 (Itar-Tass) - About half of Russian citizens (54.2 per cent) 
believe that this country is historically inclined towards tough autocratic 
rule. 24.1 per cent are sure of it, and another 30.1 per cent "tend to 
support the idea." 

This follows from the results of a public opinion poll, conducted by the 
ROMIR independent research centre, which were submitted to Tass. 

The public opinion poll showed that only 21.3 per cent of Russian citizens do 
not agree with the idea. 13.6 per cent of the polled neither supported, nor 
rejected the idea, and 10.6 per cent found it difficult to answer the 
question. 

ROMIR conducted the public opinion poll, following the selective 
representation principle, with the participation of 2,000 people. 

******

#2
Russian Voters More Concerned About Prices Than Chechen War

MOSCOW, Mar 17, 2000 -- (Agence France Presse) With nine days to Russia's 
presidential election, voters are more worried about living standards than 
the war in Chechnya which has catapulted acting President Vladimir Putin into 
a commanding lead, a poll said Friday.

Twenty-four percent of people told the ARPI polling institute that inflation 
was their main concern ahead of the March 26 presidential elections, compared 
to 16 percent for the war in Chechnya, the Izvestia daily reported.

Twelve percent said they most feared losing their jobs, while the same number 
expressed concern over rising crime, the paper said. The poll quizzed 1,600 
people in 90 localities across Russia.

Izvestia said the results of the poll appeared to suggest that voters were 
tired of the images of war which daily fill television screens and newspapers.

******

#3
Russia Says It Expects IMF to Resume Lending After Election

Moscow, March 16 (Bloomberg) - Russia said it expects the International
Monetary Fund and other creditors to resume lending soon after the March 26
presidential election, when the government submits its new economic program. 

The plan, said First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, would cover at
least the next three years and address the economy's ``structural''
problems. That's the term the IMF used when it suspended lending to Russia,
calling for elimination of barter, an improved bankruptcy law and better
efforts to stem capital flight. 

``We are convinced a program will be developed after the new government is
formed that will be met with understanding and support by international
financial organizations,'' Kasyanov said. ``In the second half of the year
we will be able to finance the budget deficit'' with loans from the IMF,
World Bank and other lenders. 

Russia's 2000 budget anticipates about $5.9 billion in foreign loans,
including about $4.5 billion from the IMF and the World Bank. The fund
stopped lending to Russia in September, after approving a $4.5 billion loan
program for the country in August 1999. Other reasons cited by the fund for
the cessation in lending including concern about a U.S. investigation into
alleged Russian money laundering and the start of the military campaign in
Chechnya in September. 

Russia has continued to repay earlier loans from the IMF, which is its
third-biggest creditor, after commercial bank creditors and foreign
governments. Rising revenue from oil exports as the price of crude more
than doubled in the past year has helped the government repay its debts,
and boosted foreign currency reserves. Tax collection also increased from
machinery, chemicals, paper and other industries that that saw earnings
improve after the ruble's plunge in 1998 slashed demand for competing
imports. 

Sustainable Growth 

The government's new economic program will aim to ensure economic growth
continues, Kasyanov said. 

``It will seriously stress structural measures that will strengthen those
tendencies that today exist in the economy,'' Kasyanov said. ``This will be
the main aim.'' 

Kasyanov said the government needs IMF and World Bank loans this year. 

``We still need to receive those $4.5 billion budgeted as loans from the
IMF and the World Bank,'' he said. ``If we don't get them nothing terrible
will happen, as we learned to live in such difficult conditions, but we are
not making (not getting loans) our working plan.'' 

Russia won't borrow on international capital markets this year, Kasyanov
said. 

``I don't exclude we will do it next year,'' he said. 

******

#4
Preparations for Presidential Elections Practically Over.

MOSCOW, March 17 (Itar-Tass) - "The preparations for the March 26 elections 
are practically over," Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Alexander 
Veshnyakov stated here on Friday in the course of an all-Russia 
teleconference, taking part in which were almost 100,000 representatives from 
94,500 district electoral commissions, 2,737 territorial electoral 
commissions, and 89 electoral commissions of the subjects of the Russian 
Federation. Taking part in it also were representatives from local governing 
bodies, high-ranking officials of the Interior Ministry, Defence Ministry, 
Justice Ministry, and the Procurator-General's Office. 

Veshnyakov noted that the endorsed lists of voters include the names of 
107,947,000 people, enjoying suffrage rights. As many as 839,000 of them are 
now abroad. Polling stations were set up on approximately 2,000 ships that 
are now at sea. Five polling stations were set up at Polar research centres, 
1,056 -- at medical establishments, 110 -- at custody centres and prisons, 
351 -- in forbidding and distant areas, and 109 -- at separately deployed 
military units. 

The chairman of the Central Electoral Commission urged the participants of 
the teleconference "to properly organise and hold the elections on March 26". 
He reminded them that shifts at enterprises with a round-the-clock working 
cycle should be arranged in such a way as to "allow their 
many-thousand-strong personnels to take part in the presidential elections, 
which is their constitutional right". 

Veshnyakov hopes that the turnout on election day "will equal to no less than 
65 per cent". "Such forecasts are grounded," he added. This is testified by 
mass media reports, but, nevertheless, much efforts are needed to make them 
come true, Veshnyakov stressed. 

He stated that the information from district electoral commissions would be 
transmitted to territorial electoral commissions and then to the commissions 
of the subjects of the Federation via the "Elections" automatic system and to 
the Federal "Elections-200" Information Centre, which will function at 
Ostankino in Moscow on voting day. The first information is expected to 
arrive from fifty per cent of the constituencies by three a.m. on March 27, 
and more than 90 per cent -- by 9-10 a.m.

The official results of the voting will be summed up by the Central Electoral 
Commission on the basis of the original protocols received from the electoral 
commissions, which are to arrive not later than April 4. 

******

#5
From: nikolay@CARNEGIE.RU (Nikolai Petrov)
Subject: RE: article from Novaya Gazeta December 1999 on the Gas-Vybory 
computer system
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2000 

The article in Novaya Gazeta on the GAS-Vybory computer system doesn't 
look very interesting, as well as the general idea to
look there for the fraud. Although the system was created by FAPSI and is
supervised by FAPSI, it doesn't look now as the main source of fraud. I
think it was designed in order to control the counting of results and
potentially it can be used for large scale falsification (one can
remember the fight of Alexander Sobyanin and some of deputies, trying to
oppose the introduction of this system, to avoid FAPSI control, or to limit
it's functions at least), but not now. The GAS-vybory system was designed 
at a time when the regional election commissions level was absent in federal
votings (like in 1993 election) and if this level will be excluded again it
can serve it's role.

The main bottleneck in present-day election counting system is the level of
territorial election commissions, where the fraud is taking place when
summing polling stations results. This level is less observed and
practically not controled by anybody (if especially take into account that
the low political activism of citizens and the electoral law don't possess
any real public control at 100,000 polling stations even like in 1989-1990,
political parties are too weak and too politically engaged to play this
role)
and more controled by regional authorities. Thus the information which is
coming to the GAS-vybory system already is checked and corrected by
authorities. How does it works? Election commissions are formed partly by
executives, partly by legislatures (formally 50:50 which meens almost total
control of executives at rayon/town level). Moreover, these collective
bodies are very Soviet in their style with the chairman and secretary
playing key role and other members being statists. The pyramide of fraud
with the regional commission at the top can easily work even with inactive
elements like polling stations, controlled by observers or having honest
election commissions (it's usually the case of regional centers). There are
a lot of weak, almost totally controled elements like closed or semi-closed
polling stations (military, jails, hospitals), countryside in general. 

There are territorial protocols, not GAS calculations which
serve as the official source of information for the Central Election
Commission. The CEC now looks like much more independent with regard to the
presidential administration than ever. However I would not overestimate
Veshnyakov's principiality. Yes, in early 1990-ies he opposed Yeltsin in
Supreme Soviet. It doesn't mean that he could be not very loyal to the
present Kremlin's master, if especially to take into account existence of an
"alternative CEC" represented by the former CEC chief Ivanchenko's the
Independent Institute for Elections which according to some data was from
the very beginning supported by Putin and can replace Veshnyakov's CEC if
needed.

In future when Russia will become more centralised and unitarian
GAS-vybory can be very useful tool for the Kremlin. Now regional leaders
are
playing the role of mediators. Due to the latter it's possible to wait for
the large-scale fraud this time inspite of the fact that election results
seem to be predefined. There will be the real competition among regional
leaders in order to serve the future president, to prove to him their loyalty
and in result to be supported by the Kremlin in forthcoming gubernatorial
elections. There is even the possibility of an avalanche effect due to the
fact that Gleb Pavlovsky will provide everybody with "exit polls" (?)
information, giving thus leaders of European part regions in the middle of
the day the clear model to look at and to try to show better results. 

******

#6
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2000 
From: Philip Wasielewski <pwasiel@fas.harvard.edu>
Subject: Moscow Bombings

Regarding items 2 and 3 in JRL 4174, I thought that you and your
readers may be interested to know that the active ingrediant mentioned in
both articles (ammonium nitrate/ammonium saltpeter) is nothing more than
chicken excrement. Chicken droppings are used for agricultural fertilizer
because of their high ammonium nitrate content. This can be found in any
farming supply store and is sold in large 50lb bags. 

Fertilizer bombs, even if laced with aluminum powder which is another
common material, are very common. One cannot tell if the material came
from one manufacturer or another as you sometimes can with conventional
explosives. It was a fertilizer bomb that was used by Timoth McViegh in
Oklahoma City. For someone to think that because they found ammonium
nitrate fertilizer in a certain place in Chechnya, they can connect it
with the Moscow bombings makes as much sense as connecting it with
the Oklahoma City bombing. I have seen other chemicals mentioned in the
reports about the bombings in Moscow such as Hexagon which I am not
nearly as familiar with but if the FSB is sticking with
the ammonium nitrate story then their case does not hold water.

I thought you might want to check with some other sources to double
check my information and let your readers know this so they can evaluate
further claims about the bombing. 

As I am a military officer and a Russian Foreign Area Officer I do
not want to get my name involved in this part of the debate about Chechnya but
feel free to discuss this with other persons with knowledge of explosives.
Please just don't mention my name for this particular item in your
newsletter. 

******

#7
Russians Still Favor Putin in Presidential Election, Poll Shows

Moscow, March 17 (Bloomberg)
-- The most recent poll by the All-Russian Center for public opinion 
shows that a majority of Russian voters intend to vote in the March 26 
presidential election, and the most favored candidate is still Acting 
President Vladimir Putin. 

The All-Russian Center for Public Opinion, the largest state- owned research 
company in Russia and founded in 1987, surveyed 1,600 people between October 
1999 and March 2000. The results have a margin error of 3.8 percentage 
points. Figures are in percentages. 

Which of the following statements best describes your intention to vote in 
the presidential election, if it were to take place next Sunday? 

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Mar 

3-6 10-13 

I doubt if I'll vote 8 10 7 6 7 7 7 

I don't know if I'll vote 13 16 13 18 18 11 11 

Most likely, I'll vote 20 16 16 20 11 15 11 

I'm sure I'll vote 12 12 10 8 8 14 11 

I will definitely vote 44 44 52 46 55 53 59 

Difficult to answer 3 2 2 2 1 0 1 

Do you think it is possible that many voters will not come to the election 
because the result seems to be already known? 

Mar 10-13 

Yes or likely yes 41 

No or likely no 42 

Difficult to answer 17 

Who would you most probably vote for in the presidential election if it were 
to take place next Sunday? 

Jan Feb Feb Feb Feb Mar Mar 

28-31 4-7 11-14 18-21 25-28 3-6 10-13 

V. Putin 58 57 59 59 56 59 58 

G. Zuganov 15 17 19 18 21 22 21 

G. Yavlinskiy 3 4 4 3 5 4 5 

V. Zhirinovskiy 2 2 3 3 3 * 3 

A. Tuleyev - - 2 3 2 2 2 

Other 7 5 1 3 3 0 0 

Against all 1 3 4 2 2 3 2 

Difficult to answer 9 7 7 8 9 6 6 

was not on the list 

The poll of March 13 also showed: 

K. Titov, E. Pamfilova, Yu. Skuratov - 1 percent each S. Govorukhin, U. 
Dzhabrailov, A. Podberyozkin, Ye. Savostyanov -less than 1 percent 

In your opinion, who will be the next president of Russia? 

Nov Dec Jan Jan Feb Feb Feb Mar Mar 

21-24 28-31 14-17 18-21 25-28 3-6 10-13 

V. Putin 33 52 69 67 74 74 74 74 75 

G. Zuganov 7 5 4 5 4 3 6 4 5 

Other 12 11 3 4 1 1 0 2 2 

Difficult 48 32 24 24 21 23 20 20 18 to answer 

Which of the following you would not like to see in the position of president 
of Russia? 

Feb Feb Mar Mar 

11-14 18-21 3-6 10-13 

V. Zhirinovskiy 50 52 * 51 

G. Zyuganov 28 29 24 27 

G. Yavlinskiy 18 19 24 22 

Yu. Skuratov 13 19 24 22 

U. Dzhabrailov 8 16 30 28 

A. Tuleyev 7 9 14 12 

E. Pamfilova 6 10 15 16 

S. Govorukhin 6 11 14 14 

V. Putin 5 5 5 7 

A. Podberyozkin 4 8 12 11 

K. Titov 4 6 11 7 

Ye. Savostyanov 3 6 10 8 

No such candidates 3 5 6 3 

Difficult to answer 21 18 29 17 

wasn't on the list 

Do you think that Putin will win in the first round of the election, or will 
a second round be necessary? 

Mar 

3-6 

Putin will win in the first round 44 

Second round will be necessary 36 

Difficult to answer 20 

Do you think that Putin will still be respected by Russians by the next 
presidential election in 2004? 

Mar Mar 

3-6 10-13 

Yes or likely yes 31 30 

No or likely no 19 24 

Difficult to answer 50 46 

(The All-Russian Center for Public Opinion www.wciom.ru) 

******

#8
Top General Gives Advice To Troops Voting Early In Presidential Poll

MOSCOW, Mar 17, 2000 -- (Agence France Presse) Russian troops serving in 
Chechnya on Friday began voting early in presidential elections, with a top 
commander on hand to offer thinly-veiled support for acting President 
Vladimir Putin.

Some 100,000 government soldiers fighting Chechen guerrillas are entitled to 
vote in 46 tented polling stations across the breakaway republic, Russian 
television quoted officials as saying.

Mini-ballot boxes will even be flown to frontline troops and remote mountain 
points to make sure servicemen can cast their ballots in the first round, 
which gets underway for most Russian citizens on March 26.

Soldiers in Chechnya began voting soon after 8:00 a.m. (0500 GMT), the 
Interfax news agency reported.

"I think soldiers have already made their choice," the acting Russian 
commander in Chechnya, General Gennady Troshev, said at a polling station in 
the eastern Grozny suburb of Khankala.

"We know who is the one who, today, together with the military, is fulfilling 
this mission (in Chechnya), who supports us. I think everything will be 
fine," he said in comments broadcast by the private NTV channel.

"Who they vote for is their business. The most important thing is not to make 
a mistake, but to choose the most worthy, so as not to say afterwards that 
'he's terrible.'"

"If we do that, Russia will be able to hold its head up," said the general, 
whose down to earth manner is popular with troops. 

*****

#9
Izvestia
March 17,2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
IS THE WAR OVER?
Chechen War's Effect on Russian Society Is Different from 
What Was Expected
By Georgy BOVT and Yevgeny KRUTIKOV

The Agency for Regional Political Studies has recently 
asked 1,600 people in 90 towns and villages of 49 Russian 
constituent territories to answer the question: Which of our 
domestic problems bothers you more than others? The answers 
were divided as follows (possible error - 2.5%): growing prices 
- 24%; the threat to lose one's job - 12%, a deteriorating 
crime situation - 12%, others - 35%. Only 16% named the war in 
Chechnya. This is not much for a country waging active 
hostilities accompanied by heavy casualties in its own 
territory.
It is not the first month that practically all news 
programs begin with reports on hostilities in Chechnya. At 
first television channels, in particular, those controlled by 
the government, tried not to upset viewers: blood, death and 
fierce fighting were shown only as the background. Lately, 
there have been less mercy on the viewers, and people, 
sacrilegious as it might seem, began to be used to reports from 
funeral ceremonies (and television workers to highlighting such 
events). The West, which from time to time sends delegations 
headed by lords and other human rights activists on 
fact-finding missions to the Caucasus, seems to be sure that 
inasmuch as the war in Chechnya has raised Vladimir Putin's 
formerly low popularity rating so high and which was the basis 
of last autumn's election campaign and is the basis of the 
current campaign conducted by the acting President, it must be 
generally approved by Russians. But there is ground to call in 
question the sureness about the popularity of the war. 
Something prompts that the development of relations between the 
war and the Russian public has again embarked on a peculiar 
course, which is different from what the domestic and foreign 
connoisseurs of the mysterious Russian soul predicted.
Putin's political death was predicted last autumn if the 
war in Chechnya would be protracted. It was alleged that unless 
federal authorities overcome bandits by November, nothing short 
of martial law plus the cancellation of the election would save 
the regime. Many said: wait till there are numerous coffins;
Russia will shudder and the trigger-happy premier will fall out 
of popular love. The Premier has since become the 
President-in-waiting who has ample chance to become the 
full-fledged President in the very first round of the election.
And this despite the fact that coffins have been counted in the 
dozens lately. Does this mean, however, that this phenomenon, 
which has shocked so much the politicians who have been famous 
for their anti-war sentiments since the first Chechen war, has 
awakened the collective patriotic awareness of Russians as a 
nation and urges them to demand insistently and perfectly 
sincerely that the enemy be exterminated in its den almost 
regardless of price? To put it differently, has the fair war 
(the majority of Russians calmly and without any emotion 
believe this), which, in a sense, is a war of liberation in the 
name of establishing constitutional order in one of the Russian 
constituent territories, become a "culture medium" for new 
Russian patriotism? Or has something different happened and 
Russians have simply got accustomed to the televised scenes of 
the war, which actually does not concern the majority of them 
(as their relatives, friends and acquaintances are not fighting 
in it), and are a step short of being tired of seeing such 
scenes?
By and large, if there were some cynical calculations that the 
war could unite people, raise their spirit and enhance the 
prestige of federal authorities, they have not proved to be 
true thus far. The main thing on which Putin's high rating is 
based can soon turn to be general apathy, tiredness of 
continued exposure of negative aspects in our day-to-day life 
(be it the war or the permanent shortage of money) and the lack 
of belief in the possibility of changes for the better in the 
foreseeable future - that is, in the absence of all which was 
previously called "a situation of popular enthusiasm." It is a 
good thing that the war has not become the foundation for such 
enthusiasm, for this is lethal for any society in the final 
count. It is good that we no longer believe in socio-political 
and economic miracles, as we used to believe in the early 90s. 
It is also good that we have grown more pragmatic. Only one 
thing is bad: the war has become incredibly protracted.
The main political result of such protraction is the 
rejection on a mass scale of any information about the war, 
which is sooner psychological than sociological and which no 
one openly admits. Information on casualties and reports from 
the battle fronts remain top news because of their own 
"status", rather than proceeding from their rating in public 
attention. It goes without saying that all feel sorry for "our 
poor boys," but it is an abstract feeling from afar. Mourning 
is declared only in those few cities which have had the bad 
fortune to be the venue of elite military units, while it is 
life as usual in neighbouring regions. In the hierarchy of the 
values and fears of the majority of non-politicized Russians 
the war is far from the first place, to put it mildly. And this 
is a horrifying thing. Even a small urbanized part of 
Russians, who take the war close to their hearts not only 
because they are related or acquainted with some of the 
soldiers fighting in it, feel keenly mostly in connection with 
the cool political calculations similar to the above mentioned 
deliberations about prospects for the growth of Putin's rating.
This war is for a long time. It has not become a small and 
victorious war any way you look at it, either in the military 
or patriotic sense. Psychologically it has been won by a small 
group of the high-ranking brass as their revenge for the first 
Chechen campaign and the way to restore their privileged 
position in society (sometimes undeservedly, as the 
circumstances of the present war show). Society, however, has 
only stood to lose and become tired to death of the protracted 
war.

*******

#10
Moscow Times
March 17, 2000 
Honest Business 
By Tatyana Matsuk 
Tatyana Matsuk is senior scientific adviser at the Economica publishing 
house. She contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. 

Is there honest business in Russia? After major scandals involving laundering 
of Russian money in the West, many people are asking this question. To answer 
it methodically, one must understand how Russian business first developed 
after the demise of the Soviet Union and in what conditions it now exists. 

During perestroika, those who flooded into the business community were those 
who essentially were already involved in business (illegally, of course) and 
those who had connections that allowed them to obtain credits, orders and 
production facilities, to register easily and establish contacts with foreign 
partners. They came from the shadow economy and nomenklatura. From 1990 
through 1995, I tried to get involved in business; I associated with members 
of the budding business community and consider my experience telling. 

At first, I met a swindler. He falsely presented himself as a functionary of 
the board of entrepreneurs so that, with its help, he could (1) interest 
solid partners and (2) obtain access to big money. He succeeded in his first 
goal, but not in the second. But I don't think he limited himself to one 
attempt. 

Then there was the cooperative that published children's books and toys, 
created by three people who understood nothing about children or publishing. 
One of them was a former KGB colonel with ties to the powers that be. The 
second was a retired military officer who knew how to win contracts to 
service military garrisons. The third was a merchant marine and experienced 
smuggler who knew how to work with documentation, give bribes to bureaucrats 
and circumvent laws. The three didn't trust each other, and the cooperative 
warehouses were always being pilfered. (The smuggler was the most honest, 
decent one of the bunch.) 

My next potential partner was the young director of a small enterprise, a 
subsidiary firm of the largest monopoly in the country. He began his career 
in production, where he was involved in Komsomol work. Then he was noticed by 
management and invited by a functionary to work with a foundation whose goal 
was to save a unique environmental site. In fact, the employees of the 
foundation were involved for the most part in saving material well-being - 
their own and that of their patrons. The new young employee helped them with 
this, and he was awarded with an enterprise in the capital. 

I learned a lot of interesting things from him about "business:" about paying 
off bureaucrats and directors who want to privatize a concern in their favor; 
how developing commercial banks pay racketeers with information on their 
clients; how almost military discipline reigns among those working in the 
shadow economy, in which managers are paid a lot, but from which you can 
leave only "feet first." 

Then came the time when it was easy to register a business, but there were 
other problems: renting a facility, getting licenses, obtaining access to 
information, attracting investment. The children of bosses appeared on the 
business scene; their parents created all the conditions necessary for the 
setup and development of their business. These "children's" businesses didn't 
fool the partners; could they really be considered honest and successful 
given the lack of equal conditions for all in the competitive struggle? 

After the 1991 putsch failed, during the beginning of Boris Yeltsin's 
reforms, during a relativelyquiet couple of years, and before the crisis of 
Aug. 17, 1998, professionals from various fields went into business. Some 
wanted independently to create their own businesses; others simply couldn't 
remain any longer in their chosen profession. Unfortunately, because of high 
taxes, pressure from the bureaucracy and criminal element, financial and 
other difficulties, few of them succeeded. Those who did succeed were those 
who to a significant degree set aside their moral compass. 

I remember well a successful businessman, a former nuclear physicist who grew 
up with Andrei Sakharov's children. He was a very bright man, honest with his 
partners, but he didn't care what he did, and his guiding impulse was this: 
"I'm not interested in politics, because I don't care which clerk I give my 
bribe to. Before, I was involved in what eight to 10 other people do in the 
world, but any academic boss could 'smear me on the wall.' And now I can show 
the government that I'm smarter than its entire machine, because I know how 
to get around any new restrictions. I derive pleasure first and foremost from 
the recognition of my own intellectual superiority." 

So there are three types of business one can identify that have become 
closely intertwined in Russia: 

First, criminal business with a very wide range of activity - from the drug 
trade, prostitution, racketeering and contract killings to production of 
counterfeit goods, smuggling, control over banks and enterprises, money 
laundering and transfer of funds overseas. This type of business in many ways 
can be traced to the Soviet shadow economy, and the conditions of life today 
are pushing more and more people into it. 

Second, business involving the nomenklatura and their ilk. Those involved in 
this type are those who were and are in power, along with members of their 
families. Here the rules of the game are important, convenient for those who 
have the most power. Proximity to power is one of its most important 
components: more power, more money. 

Third, the business of true professionals. There are almost no conditions in 
which it can develop normally in this country right now. But the people who 
are capable of engaging in it are still out there. I know businessmen of 
small enterprises who don't give bribes to bureaucrats or pay racketeers. But 
the West to date hasn't paid them the attention they deserve, because they 
don't have oil wells, banks, patrons, mortgages and guarantees. Investment in 
their business is a risk; to open markets to them is to open up the dangerous 
possibility of having truly strong competitors some day. 

But the West has no other option than to support true Russian professionals - 
if, of course, the West truly wants to see Russia as a safe, prosperous 
country. 

******

#11
St. Petersburg Times
March 17, 2000
Historical Parallels Could Spell the End of Oligarchy
By Thomas Rymer
Thomas Rymer is the deputy editor of The St. Petersburg Times.

WITH Russia's presidential elections less than 10 days away, Vladimir Putin 
seems a shoe-in to take the "acting" out of the title acting president. Putin 
has, to some degree, a small group of Kremlin insiders - often referred to in 
Russia as "the family" - to thank for putting him in this position.

The conventional wisdom is that this group of oligarchs, who turned Boris 
Yeltsin's Kremlin into a virtual sultanate, when faced with the prospect of 
the end of the Yeltsin era, were in the market for someone who could assume 
the mantle of "their man" in power. The conventional wisdom also goes that, 
once in power, Putin will remain beholden to these figures and, as a result, 
continue to act in their interests.

Purveyors of conventional wisdom, however, might do well to look in their 
history books. For a look back - admittedly a long way back - reveals a 
Russian leader who came to power under very similar circumstances. What 
happened after that leader came to power should make us ponder just what 
course Putin could, and just might, steer if and when he is elected.

On June 21, 1762, a group of Russian noblemen, unhappy with the pro-German 
attitude of Peter III, overthrew the tsar and replaced him with his 
33-year-old wife, Catherine.

The noblemen, led by the Orlov brothers, Alexis and Grigory, not only feared 
that they stood to lose the position of favor and influence that they had 
enjoyed at the Russian court under Peter's mother, Elisabeth I, but had 
serious reason to believe that the elevation of the new tsar left them in 
danger of arrest and possible death.

The future Catherine the Great was seen as the perfect solution to their 
problems. Her position on the throne would be dependent, they thought, on 
their patronage, and as such she would be the perfect puppet tsarina through 
whom they could continue to pursue their own agendas. They couldn't have been 
more wrong.

Within a short time, Catherine was able to put together a personal power base 
allowing her to act without the support - and often against the wishes - of 
this group at court. She used this base to reign over Russia for 34 years - a 
period which was arguably the most eventful in imperial history.

The parallels between Catherine and Putin are interesting. Putin was a 
shadowy figure before moving into politics, a former KGB colonel who had 
spent most of his time as an agent doing something in the former East 
Germany. Catherine, born Princess Sophie Fredericke Auguste von Anhalt-Zebst, 
spent a little anonymous time in Germany (or at least what would later become 
Germany), living in the Prussian town of Stettin until she was summoned to 
the Russian court at the age of 14.

Like Putin, Catherine learned the ropes in politics by working for 
heavyweights. In his case, it was a stint as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg 
under Anatoly Sobchak. Catherine acquired much of her political acumen 
watching her mother-in-law, Elisabeth, who knew quite a bit about maintaining 
and using power in a dog-eat-dog environment.

During the 28 years Catherine spent at the Russian court before assuming 
power, she had the chance to learn how important it was to maintain reliable 
sources of information when one's rule is dependent on support from a 
nobility with its own interests. Putin's time in the KGB, and the fact that 
the last job he held before Yeltsin named him prime minister was as the head 
of the KGB's successor agency, the FSB, suggests that he might a have a 
little bit of knowledge in this area as well.

The value of such ties can't be overlooked. In fact, it was ties of this sort 
that Catherine utilized in her own campaign. She actively cultivated, and 
ultimately received, the support of Russia's internal security agencies and 
the elite units of the Russian army - the guards regiments later provided the 
foundation of her power base.

In parallel, it's hard to believe that Kremlin oligarchs like Boris 
Berezovsky or Roman Abramovich are more popular in Russian military circles 
at present than the acting president, who has so adamantly backed the 
campaign in Chechnya.

The Russia that Catherine left behind her was vastly different than the one 
in which she came to power. She made significant changes to Russia's system 
of education, to the organization of state and local government, and to the 
obligations of different social groups to the state.

For Putin to make any significant changes in Russia, there is little question 
that the power of the oligarchs must be curtailed, if not broken entirely. 
Russia faces many problems, not the least of which is a constitution that 
places an inordinate amount of power in the hands of the president. That 
power will be another advantage for Putin should he choose to rule without 
oligarchal consent.

No one can say for sure that Putin won't continue to act in the interests of 
his oligarch sponsors after the elections: To turn on them would be the 
classic case of biting the hand that feeds you. At the same time, no one can 
predict that he won't turn around and try to limit their power in the 
interest of increasing his own. And should he chose to challenge the primacy 
of those who brought him to the throne, there's a historical reason to 
believe that it just might work: It did for Catherine.

******

#12
The Guardian (UK)
17 March 2000
[for personal use only]
Bolshoi dances on edge of disaster 
Unable to shore up its unstable walls and foundations, Moscow's ballet and 
opera showcase is asking the world to help
Amelia Gentleman in Moscow 

Despairing that state funds will come through in time to rescue Moscow's 
Bolshoi theatre by shoring up its crumbling foundations, the Bolshoi's 
general director is putting out a plea to theatres around the world for 
urgent help so that one of Russia's great cultural institutions is not forced 
to close. 

According to Vladimir Vasiliyev, essential repairs to the 19th century 
building have been postponed so long that he is now living in daily fear of 
some disaster. 

As long ago as 1987, a detailed survey concluded that the theatre should shut 
immediately so major structural repairs could be carried out, alongside a 
comprehensive rewiring, refitting and restoration programme. 

The intervening years of political turmoil in Russia and chronic money 
shortages have meant the work has not begun. 

Last weekend water began to seep through the ceiling of the lavish 19th 
century building, home to ballet and opera companies. A few months ago the 
electricity failed in the middle of a performance and the theatre-goers had 
to be guided out by torch light. 

"These problems are trifles compared to what could happen," Mr Vasiliyev 
said. "If the walls subside we will have a serious problem; we will have no 
choice but to lock our doors." 

Ill-advised architects built the theatre on a swampy patch of land in the 
heart of Moscow, and since its opening night the building has been troubled 
by the threat of subsidence. During a performance in 1902, the walls of the 
auditorium began to sink, wedging shut the doors to all the theatre boxes. 
The audience had to clamber over barriers to get out. 

No one knows how seriously the foundations have deteriorated in the 13 years 
since the last survey, and thorough research into the problems cannot be 
conducted while the building is in use. 

A smaller, sister theatre to the Bolshoi is partly built, and when this is 
completed the productions are meant to move there for the duration of the 
renovation. But acute funding problems have halted building work at the new 
site and it is unclear when it will resume. Weary theatre officials do not 
expect the new building to be finished before 2002. Until it is ready, the 
Bolshoi's rebuilding cannot begin. 

The theatre's problems are common to almost all of Russia's great cultural 
institutions as they struggle to adjust to the realities of post-Soviet 
funding. The government has promised to pay the £110m cost of the sister 
building and to provide £220m for the Bolshoi's restoration. But long delays 
in providing the final £34m for the new theatre have produced the current 
standstill. Mr Vasiliyev does not expect this money soon. 

"Russia faces an extraordinary amount of problems. There's widespread need - 
pensioners aren't paid and people live in terribly bad conditions. 
Reconstruction of the Bolshoi represents a massive hole in the budget which 
[the government] cannot fill." 

Mr Vasiliyev has been forced to come up with his own fundraising ventures. 
Supported by the UN cultural agency, Unesco, he has organised an 
"international day of solidarity" with the Bolshoi on March 28, the company's 
224th birthday. Theatres round the world are being invited to donate any 
profits from that night's box office to the Bolshoi coffers. 

The glittering interior of the Bolshoi's gilded auditorium gives no hint of 
the deprivation backstage, the shabby, cramped dressing rooms and the 
communal shower rooms - reminiscent of a run-down youth hostel - where world 
famous ballet and opera stars have to prepare for their performances. Beneath 
the stage a stray ginger cat climbs on massive pieces of outdated production 
machinery from before the second world war. 

Mr Vasiliyev, a former ballet star who this month celebrated his fifth 
anniversary at the helm of the Bolshoi, is deeply frustrated: "Our equipment 
and technology is outdated, the sound equipment isn't good enough and the 
lighting system needs to be replaced," he said. 

"The staging of our productions becomes more and more difficult. 

Crumbling culture

State Historical Museum , Red Square Moscow: Full of Tsarist and Stalinist 
memorabilia. Under repair for more than 10 years, but less than a third 
restored. 

Tretyakov Gallery , Moscow: Showcase of Russian art. Constant delays in 
paying museum staff. No money for acqusitions. 

State Literature Museum : Full of manuscripts by writers including 
Tolstoy,Chekhov. and Dostoevsky. No money for the expansion of exhibition 
halls, so most of the collection remains in storage. 

Konstantin Stanislavsky Museum , Moscow: It pays tribute to the creator of 
the Method approach to acting. Building was flooded when the central heating 
exploded. 

St Saviours of Nereditsa , Novogorod: No money to restore 12th century 
frescoes. 

Prince Yussupov mansion, Archangelskoye: Grandiose museum with family's art 
collection. Shut for 10 years because no restoration funds. 

******

#13
Russia Today press summaries
Novye Izvestiya
March 17, 2000 
Yavlinsky Is The Second Most Popular Candidate
Summary

All the sociologists are unanimous in naming the three leaders of the 
presidential marathon. They are Putin, Yavlinsky and Zyuganov. The fact that 
the acting president is in the first place is no surprise to anyone. However, 
the unexpected difficulties that the Russian military have met in Chechnya 
have caused a crack in Putin's election campaign. His popularity has begun to 
decrease. Even the farce of having presidential elections in Chechnya against 
the roar of the bombing will not be able to save the situation. And Putin's 
pursuers are getting closer to him each day.

At the same time Putin's opponents are very close to each other. Yabloko 
leader Yavlinsky has made his campaign more active in the last weeks before 
the election. He is second to only Putin in number of appearances in the 
media. The cause for this is probably the fact that Yavlinsky is closer to 
journalists that any other candidate, and they try to inform the voters of 
all of his activities.

During a TV debate with Kemerovo governor Aman Tuleev, Zyuganov announced 
that he would definitely make it to the second round of elections. And his 
conviction is well-grounded. The present election situation might again turn 
into a "democrat-communist" fight. But the resources of the KPRF 
(Communist Party of the Russian Federation) leader are very limited. Just 
like in December of 1999, about 1/5 of all voters will vote for Zyuganov. The 
main fight is for the 80 percent of voters that do not accept the Communists.

In one of his interviews Yavlinsky called Putin a typical "Homo Soveticus". 
This term was made up by an American reporter in Moscow in the 1930's. It was 
used to describe the Soviet person who has double conscience - on one hand, 
he accepts the Communist ideology because it is necessary; on the other hand, 
he continues to be a Russian patriot and an enemy of the Bolsheviks at heart.

With his criticism, Yavlinsky helps Putin define his political preferences. 
The Yabloko leader warns that the voters that supported Zyuganov before are 
now ready to support Putin. And those who supported Putin are now ready to 
support Yavlinsky. And this tendency continues to grow.

*******

#14
Moscow Times
March 17, 2000 
EDITORIAL: Gag Order Sentences All To Ignorance 

The government already controls just about everything that the people think 
about the war in Chechnya, thanks to a chokehold over the only two national 
television stations, ORT and RTR. But keeping the war hysteria at fever pitch 
means fiddling around the edges of a propaganda system that already works. 
And so we have the Press Ministry's new warning: A newspaper or television 
station that lets "terrorists" speak directly through its pages or airwaves 
can be sanctioned by the government. 

Sanctioned how? It's not clear. Who qualifies as a "terrorist?" That's also 
not certain. Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev and Movladi Udugov have been 
named specifically, but there are dozens of Chechen leaders more odious than 
Maskhadov; what about them? On Thursday the Press Ministry could not provide 
us with a list of who can and cannot be featured in our pages. 

Britain also brought in such a gag rule in the 1980s regarding the Irish 
Republican Army. Yet we would note some key differences between the IRA and 
the Chechens. 

For starters, the IRA was a self-declared terrorist group: It blew up 
civilian targets and then took credit for that. No Chechen has yet taken 
credit for any of the apartment blasts; key rebel leaders accuse Moscow 
political circles of blowing up the apartments. 

(Basayev and Salman Raduyev did, by contrast, proudly declare their roles in 
terrorist attacks on Budyonnovsk in 1995 and Pervomaiskoye in 1996; Basayev 
also surely led the 1999 invasions of Dagestan, though some have argued he 
was helped or egged on by Moscow political circles). 

Also, during Britain's gag order Northern Ireland civilian centers were not 
being mangled by fuel-air bombs, or by a marauding national army. 

Whether in England or Russia, it is insupportable to impose prior restraint 
on whom the media can interview. It is even more outrageous here, when 
Chechen leaders may have testimony to share. And - this crucial fact of life 
always seems lost on Vladimir Putin's Kremlin these days - giving someone the 
opportunity to make their case does not amount to an endorsement of it. The 
Moscow Times constantly runs letters and commentaries the editors do not 
agree with. 

We suspect many Russians would be curious to hear in some detail from 
Maskhadov, the elected president of Chechnya, and a man broadly seen (before 
the war) as a moderate and sensible leader. But no, the Press Ministry knows 
best. The people cannot be trusted; they must be protected from hearing 
Chechens talk about what has been going on in Chechnya. After all, elections 
are less than two weeks away. 

- Matt Bivens 

******

#15
Russia's Putin finds support among factory workers

MOSCOW, March 17 (Reuters) - Acting President Vladimir Putin, hot favourite 
to win Russia's March 26 presidential election, did not need to woo workers 
at a factory outside Moscow on Friday. They had already been won over. 

``Thank you for Chechnya,'' some of the workers at a factory producing fake 
fur told Putin after the former KGB spy had met the governor of the huge 
Moscow region, Boris Gromov. 

Putin owes his popularity mainly to his uncompromising stance on breakaway 
Chechnya, where he has vowed to destroy Moslem rebels and restore control 
over the unruly region. 

Putin pledged to crack down on theft from factories and again said the 
election was no foregone conclusion but added he hoped to win. 

``It doesn't matter which round I win in. It is the result which matters,'' 
Interfax news agency quoted Putin as saying. 

``We will solve this (stealing) together with the police,'' Putin told the 
workers, many of whom shouted that they would back the 47-year-old in the 
upcoming election. 

According to latest opinion polls, Putin could win more than 50 percent of 
the vote in the first round, thereby eliminating the need for a second round. 

The polls put Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov in second place with about 20 
percent of the vote, with liberal leader Grigory Yavlinsky languishing in 
third place. 

******

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