March 8, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4153 4154 4155

Johnson's Russia List
#4154
8 March 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: War reporter says not allowed to leave Russia.(Babitsky)
2. St. Petersburg Times: Anna Badkhen, Nikitin Learns Acquittal Not Enough.
3. Itar-Tass: Poll: State Should Not Interfere in Private Life.
4. Reuters: Putin says no need for election TV spots, debates.
5. Jerry Hough: Re 4146-McFaul/Indifferent to Democracy.
6. Mike McFaul: Response to Hough.
7. Tom Anthony: RE: 4151- Epstein/Pinochet.
8. RFE/RL: Sophie Lambroschini, Zhirinovsky's Return To Race Seen As Good For Putin.
9. polit.ru: Zhirinovsky's program.
10. Moscow Tribune: Stanislav Menshikov, TOO MANY COOKS IN THE ECONOMIC KITCHEN. Plus Embarras de Capital in the Economy.
11. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Goverment Rethinks Privatization Program.
12. Interfax: RUSSIA NEVER EXPECTED TO JOIN NATO - PUTIN.
13. Albert Weeks: New Russian military book.
14. Newsweek International: Ismail Khan and Steve LeVine, CHECHNYA. The Rebel Connection. Aid from groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
15. Itar-Tass: Respondents Not Expect New Duma to Be Better than Previous. 
16. Moskovsky Komsomolets: It’s Not Enough To Take Power In One’s Own Hands. ONE SHOULD KNOW HOW TO KEEP IT.
17. Moscow Times: Gary Peach, Communists Still Clueless In Economic Management. (re Sergei Glaziyev)]

*******

#1
War reporter says not allowed to leave Russia
March 7, 2000
By Michael Steen

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russian war reporter Andrei Babitsky said Tuesday 
authorities had refused him permission to travel to France to take part in a 
Council of Europe meeting on alleged human rights abuses in Chechnya. 

Babitsky, who reported for U.S.-funded Radio Liberty from behind rebel lines 
in Chechnya, was detained in January by Russian troops and disappeared for 
three weeks in a mysterious prisoner swap. 

After surfacing in the adjacent region of Dagestan a week ago, Babitsky was 
arrested but was later allowed to return to Moscow provided he did not leave 
the capital. He has since been branded a criminal by Russia's justice 
minister. 

``I've been invited to a session of the Council of Europe... but 
unfortunately today the investigator denied me the chance to take part 
because he seems to think I won't return to Russia,'' Babitsky told a news 
conference. 

The Council of Europe, a body overseeing human rights, said in a statement it 
had invited Babitsky to its Strasbourg headquarters for a meeting about 
Chechnya in April. 

Babitsky has alleged that guards at the Chernokozovo detention center north 
of the Chechen capital Grozny beat him and he heard the screams of people 
being tortured. 

Justice Minister Yuri Chaika has called Babitsky a criminal for being 
arrested in Dagestan with a false passport and for assisting ``illegal 
persons.'' The reporter has said his captors in Chechnya provided him with 
the passport. 

One of his lawyers, Alexander Zozulya, said Chaika's comments and Babitsky's 
travel ban violated Russia's constitution which calls for suspects to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty. 

Babitsky said he hoped to talk to Council of Europe envoys due to arrive in 
Moscow Thursday. 

Russian authorities have said Babitsky agreed to be handed over to Chechen 
rebels at the beginning of February in exchange for captive Russian soldiers. 
Babitsky said he still did not know who exactly had handed him over to his 
captors. 

He said he had been abducted and unlawfully detained and he held Russia's 
Interior Ministry responsible for his treatment. ``They have no idea that 
journalists have the right to gather and disseminate information,'' he said. 

He also said he had signed a contract to write a book about his experiences 
in the Chernokozovo detention camp and about what he called Russian 
atrocities against Chechnya's civilian population. 

Moscow has consistently denied allegations of rights abuses in Chernokozovo 
and Chechnya. 

*******

#2
St. Petersburg Times
March 7, 2000
Nikitin Learns Acquittal Not Enough
By Anna Badkhen

MOSCOW - Although he was formally acquitted of espionage and treason charges 
in December, environmental whistle-blower Alexander Nikitin has been denied a 
foreign travel passport - the only document that will let him leave the 
country.

Since 1996, Nikitin, a retired navy captain, has been persecuted by the 
Federal Security Service, or FSB, for co-authoring a report on the navy's 
careless handling of nuclear waste. After years of surveillance and being 
forbidden to leave St. Petersburg, Nikitin was acquitted by the St. 
Petersburg City Court last December, but the FSB appealed the decision in the 
Supreme Court, which has yet to schedule a hearing.

In January, Nikitin applied to his local Department of Visas and 
Registration, or OVIR, for a foreign travel passport.

On March 1, OVIR faxed Nikitin a letter in which it formally refused to issue 
the document prior to a Supreme Court ruling. In a telephone interview from 
St. Petersburg on Monday, Nikitin said that an OVIR official told him in a 
private conversation that the FSB had "advised" them not to issue him a 
foreign passport.

According to Russian law, a person who has been acquitted by the court may 
leave the country, even if his or her case has been appealed. At the same 
time, the law "On leaving and entering the Russian Federation" does allow 
official investigative bodies to make recommendations to OVIR regarding 
foreign travel by acquitted suspects whose cases have been appealed. De jure, 
the ultimate decision rests with OVIR.

The international environmental and human rights communities have honored 
Nikitin with numerous awards; among them the California-based Goldman Prize - 
a $75,000 environmental issues counterpart to the Noble Prize. Nikitin must 
collect these awards in person had planned to go to receive the Goldman Prize 
in April. He also planned to visit his wife, who lives in Toronto, and 
daughter, who goes to college in Massachusetts.

"But it looks like I am not going abroad any time soon," Nikitin added.

*******

#3
Russian Poll: State Should Not Interfere in Private Life 

MOSCOW, March 5 (Itar-Tass) - Most of Russians 
think the state should not interfere in their private life but freedom of 
an individual should not infringe freedom of other people, judging by 
results of a public opinion poll made by the ROMIR Independent Research 
Center for 2,000 people and given to Itar- Tass. 
More than one third of the respondents are prone to think that 
interests of society are higher than interests of an individual. A 
total of 16.4 percent of the polled fully share this opinion, and 18.9 
percent are inclined to agree with it. Some 24.3 percent of the 
respondents said both yes and no, and 17 percent were inclined to 
contradict that statement. Some 10.8 percent of the polled disagreed, 
and 12.6 percent found it difficult to answer. 
Over 60 percent of the polled do not think that the state should 
interfere in their private life. Some 38.4 percent are absolutely 
positive about that, and 25.8 percent are inclined to think so. A total 
of 14.5 percent of the polled said both yes and no, and 12.6 percent 
disagreed. A total of 8.8 percent found it difficult to answer the 
question. 
More than 80 percent of the respondents think that freedom of an 
individual must not infringe freedom of other people. A total of 59.4 
percent of the polled fully share that point of view, and 26.4 percent 
are prone to think so. Some 5.4 percent said both yes and no, and there 
was almost none to think the opposite. Some 7.7 percent of the 
respondents found it difficult to answer. 

*******

#4
Putin says no need for election TV spots, debates

IVANOVO, Russia, March 7 (Reuters) - Acting President Vladimir compared 
electioneering on television to endorsing household goods on Tuesday and said 
he preferred action to advertising. 

Putin, favourite in the March 26 presidential election, said statesmen had to 
``prove that they are capable through actions'' and not through television 
spots akin to advertising. 

``Television debates are just this sort of thing. Spots even more so,'' he 
told reporters in Ivanovo, northeast of Moscow. ``I believe it is out of 
place in a campaign to deal with matters like determining which is more 
important, Tampax or Snickers.'' 

Putin's campaign has relied heavily on an uncompromising stand in the drive 
against Chechen rebels. Critics say he is vague in proposals for the ecnomomy 
and other pressing matters. 

Communist Party leader Gennady Zuganov, far behind Putin in second place in 
opinion polls, has long challenged Putin to a television debate. 

Television is among the most important sources of news in Russia, the world's 
largest country across 11 time zones. 

Others candidates in the field of 12 began screening free television 
publicity spots last week, some slick montages, others standard appeals from 
behind a desk. 

Television debates have also pitted some candidates against one another, but 
these have been short and lacking in passion. 

*******

#5
Tue, 7 Mar 2000 15:51:49 -0500
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@duke.edu>
Subject: 4146-McFaul/Indifferent to Democracy

It has been a long time since I found so much to agree with in a
Michael McFaul article as in his recent Washington Post piece. But then
the conclusion was very disappointing: a plea for the continuation of the
old democratization program. The fact is that that program has been in
place for a dozen years and it has done nothing to avoid the present
situation. In fact, I think that it was a major cause of it, for if the
US had had a different democratization program, Russia would be booming
economically and doing well politically.

The problem with the civil society model of democratization is
that it forgets all of the lessons of Europe (discussed in Maurice
Deverger's work) and of Latin America. As the latter literature says,
democratization is based on a pact among elites. The reason
democratization failed in Latin America a century ago and is failing in
Africa is that there is no real pluralism in the elite, based on
autonomous power resources, and hence no possibility of a pact.
Democratization worked in Latin America in the 1980s because there were
such solid elites (and because the Pope told one of the elites, the
Church to keep supporting democracy).

The implication for democratization in Russia was clear. It was
necessary to create solid elite groups. The core had to be the business
elite, the political elite, and the regional elite, but a real effort
should
have been made to create a solid trade union and a rural elite. Instead
American democratization agreed the business class was evil nomenklatura
and that the regional elite were bad Communist governors in a majority of
cases. It called for privatization to steal the property rights of the
former and to deny independent taxes to the latter. It treated the
rural vote as anti-democratic because it was anti-Yeltsin and supported
an exploitation of the countryside and small town to support "democracy"
in the cities. It opposed any economic policy that trade unions could
be built on and built all parties on a narrow sectarian base.

The reason for an industrial policy based on German-like and
Japanese-like bank-industrial complexes on investment is first of all
economic. I just read Chace's biography of Acheson. MacArthur as tsar
of Japan had been trying to break them up. When Acheson came in in
1949, he reversed policy because economic growth was the priority in
American policy to Russia. Acheson understood the complexes were good
for growth at that stage. But an industrial policy is also necessary
for democratization. There must be a business elite underlying at least
one party. There must be industrial jobs and goods to distribute for a
trade union. There must be agricultural reform to get the kind of
peasant support for democracy found in Japan, Korea, India, etc.

A civil society democratization only atomizes society with all
the results that Hannah Arendt described so well in her books. We need
elite groups. I am for exchanges, but we should focus on the sort of
exchanges that Jim Billington is running with the Library of Congress.
That should be doubled and tripled, and an effort should be made to be
utterly systematic in bringing over deputies at all levels down to raion,
officials at all levels--not the favored "activists" who have done so
much harm to democratization. A real effort should be made to ensure
that they are connected with counterparts--education officials with
education officials, etcs, so that groups with translators can learn
about what is important to them. I have nothing against civil society,
but it is what develops in latter stages of democratization, not what
democratization rests on, and we need to focus on our priorities.

******

#6
From: "Mike McFaul" <mmcfaul@ceip.org>
Subject: Response to Hough
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2000 

Professor Hough has an interesting and compelling argument for a rethinking
of democratization and democratic assistance programs. I still take a
different view. I do not believe that the problem in Russia (or many other
post-communist transitions) is the lack of agreement on the basic rules of
the game. This problem was central in 1991 and again in 1993, and therefore
prevented pacting from occurring. Now, however, there is a great deal of
consensus among elites. De facto pacts have occurred, and those who have
bought into the new political economic system include the enterprise
directors and rural elites that Professor Hough discusses. Notice, for
instance, the extraordinary vote for Unity in the countryside. Its seems to
me a reasonable hypothesis that rural elites helped to produce that vote.
It is not surprising to me that rural reps soon defected from Fatherland to
move closer to the new party of power.

The problem is not the need for pacts. Rather, the problem facing Russia to
which Hough rightly eludes is that there are not AUTONOMOUS elites with
independent resources from the state. Governors , oligarchs, and especially
regional duma deputies are beholden to the state. This creates a situation
where there is not enough competition in either the political or economic
realm.

When I advocate support for civil society, I mean support for all those who
are pursuing economic or political goals outside of the state. This means
support for small business people as well as the so-called "radical
advocates." It means support for trade unions and agricultural communities
as long as they are truly independent. I see the empowerment of these
autonomous actors as the only way to constrain state behavior. Obviously,
the few elites that have some autonomy --i.e. Gusinsky -- play a much more
important role, but these are not people that U.S. assistance programs
should be helping.

Finally, I have a very different read on the beneficiaries of the U.S.
assistance program to Russia. Support for "elites" has in fact resulted
from the U.S. program. Hough's strategy, especially in the early years, has
in fact been implemented. Who gained from privatization and loans for
shares? Certainly not the "radical advocates." Hough may be right to say
that liberals in Russia and some policymakers in the U.S. treated his
"business class" (i.e., the enterprise directors) with disdain, but this
elite group most certainly benefited from privatization. They won; the
liberals lost. Who gained from IMF loans? Bankers, not trade unionists.
Even elites in Russian military enterprises have done a lot better at
securing assistance from the U.S. than their party building counterparts.
In fact, the latest battle over money to Russia put more money into
Nunn-Lugar at the direct expense of democracy assistance. I personally
think both Nunn Lugar and democracy asst are worthy goals. I even think
that IMF loans still have their time and place in the cause of Russian
reform (though perhaps not now). But I also believe that more attention
needs to be given to those committed to preserving democracy.

******

#7
From: "Tom Anthony" <t&l.anthony@aya.yale.edu>
Subject: RE: 4151- Epstein/Pinochet
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2000 

Dan Epstein's note about the importance of the institutions of a democracy
is well-taken and correct. However, I will point out that a better parallel
for the role of a "St. George," a liberal savior for his country, was
Ataturk in Turkey (the treatment of the Armenians on his watch
notwithstanding). Ataturk made Turkey a republic voluntarily, while
Pinochet stepped down only under great duress. I am afraid that I must
agree that there is no likely candidate in Russia for the role of Ataturk or
St. George. I am not at all comforted by the thought of nuclear-armed Russia
being ruled by a Pinochet, and am concerned that Mr. Epstein is right in his
comparison, that we are in store for a long and painful period of
"restoring order" in Russia.

******

#8
Russia: Zhirinovsky's Return To Race Seen As Good For Putin
By Sophie Lambroschini

A Supreme Court decision Monday brought Vladimir Zhirinovsky back into 
Russia's presidential race, one month after the nationalist party leader was 
barred from running. Zhirinovsky is not expected to get more than 5 percent 
of the vote, but Moscow correspondent Sophie Lambroschini reports that 
allowing him to run could benefit the Kremlin by generating some small 
interest in this lackluster campaign. 

Moscow, 7 March 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Trotting back out onto the electoral field, 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky regains his former political role as a useful, tame 
competitor for the Kremlin.

That is how Russian media see the Supreme Court decision Monday to overturn 
several lesser court decisions and allow Zhirinovsky back to compete in the 
March 26 presidential election. The leader of the ultranationalist Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia had been barred from running last month by the 
Central Electoral Commission, which was applying a strict new election law. 

Under the new law, candidates must declare not only their own income and 
property, but also that of their spouses and adult children. Zhirinovsky, the 
commission found, had failed to register an apartment belonging to his son. 
The two-room flat was worth less than 1 percent of the Zhirinovsky family's 
fortune in real estate. But that omission was enough to disqualify the 
candidate.

Zhirinovsky had had trouble with the Central Electoral Commission ahead of 
December's parliamentary elections, when his party was barred from running 
because its candidates had too many income disclosure violations. At that 
time, as now, he ultimately won that battle in the Supreme Court. 

When the decision was read out on Monday, Zhirinovsky was ecstatic: 

In the context of this particularly listless presidential campaign, in which 
acting President Vladimir Putin is heavily favored, Zhirinovsky's 
reappearance ranks as a major event. Zhirinovsky's presence in the race is 
expected to pull a few votes away from Putin -- but as Zhirinovsky's 
popularity stands at a paltry 5 percent compared with Putin's 45 percent, the 
Liberal Democratic leader will probably not influence the outcome. 

Still, his presence could have the indirect effect of re-invigorating the 
campaign. More than half the registered voters must vote if the election is 
to be valid, and some analysts have been warning that turnout on March 26 may 
be too low. They argue that Putin's lead is so great that many voters see the 
outcome as a foregone conclusion and do not consider their vote important.

Leonid Sedov, an analyst with the Russian Center for Public Opinion Study 
(VTSIOM), says that polls have been predicting lower turnouts as election day 
draws nearer, decreasing from 60 percent to about 54 percent. Sedov says 
Zhirinovsky's presence could attract renewed attention to the race. And 
Russian television (NTV) implied the court decision was made specifically to 
benefit Putin, pointing out that there's nothing better than a scandal to get 
people to vote.

But in addition to providing potential for renewed interest, the court 
decision benefits Putin in another way. Putin, like Zhirinovsky, is suspected 
of having property in his family that he did not declare -- a run-down house 
belonging to his wife. 

Putin's spokesmen have said the disclosure law does not apply to that 
particular property, because, they argue, a house does not have to be 
declared if the construction on it is not finished. But Russian media had 
been treating the issue as a potential problem for Putin. 

If that were true, the Supreme Court's decision could create a precedent that 
would exonerate Putin and others.

Aman Tuleyev, another candidate suspected of having undisclosed property, did 
not hide his relief at the court decision. He said that now his problem with 
an undeclared apartment "is not worth an egg."

But the presidential race might be in for another unexpected twist. Aleksandr 
Veshnyakov, the president of the Central Electoral Commission, said that the 
commission might mount a challenge to the Supreme Court's decision. 

******

#9
polit.ru
March 7, 2000
Zhirinovsky's program

Vladimir Zhirinovsky has promulgated his program of 10 points. First, 
he wants to set up 7 guberniyas instead of the 89 subjects of the Federation. 
Second, "to declare an economic amnesty." Besides, third, to impose a state 
monopoly on alcoholic, tobacco and sugar products. Fourth, to agree with 
India, Iraq, Libya and other debtors on the repayment of their debts. The 
next point - to sharply increase wages in the public sector, to raise 
pensions, to ensure a regular payment of child allowances and social benefits 
for veterans and invalids. The sixth point - to write off all the tax and 
fine debts for agricultural producers. Seventh, to fight with utmost severity 
against crime and corruption, for which purpose to re-establish the KGB. 
Eighth, to lower taxes: 30% is the maximum an enterprise should pay to the 
state. The ninth point envisages an end to the war in the Caucasus and the 
prevention of new wars with the help of secret services. In the last, foreign 
policy-related point Zhirinovsky suggests that foreign policy be made 
"extremely egoistic," with major partners - Iraq, Libya, Iran, Serbia, Libya, 
Iran, Armenia and Belarus. 

*****

#10
Moscow Tribune, March 7, 2000
TOO MANY COOKS IN THE ECONOMIC KITCHEN
Plus Embarras de Capital in the Economy
By Stanislav Menshikov menschivok@globalxs.nl)

As the presidential election campaign gains tempo, Russia is overflowing
with economic talent. The Centre for Strategic Studies (working for Mr.
Putin) is drawing on a wide range of economists with conflicting ideas. The
confusion is so high that the Centre, by its own admission, may not be able
to come up with a coherent programme before the elections. From Mr. Putin's
web site we just learned that in addition to having a lawyer's degree from
the university and a career in foreign intelligence cum public
administration, he is also a Doctor (in Russian: Candidate) of Economics.
The site does not specify where and when he obtained that other degree, but
we do know that his recent letter to the electorate contains very little
economic substance. 

On the other side of the political barricade, Mr. Yavlinsky is famous for
his flow of economic proposals that have never been accepted by anybody
except his immediate colleagues. Within the Union of Right-Wing Forces,
Messrs. Gaidar, Chubais and Kiriyenko are all economists of sorts whose
practical record in government has been dismal. Mr. Zyuganov is fortunate
to have as adviser a qualified economist (and not a communist!) Sergei
Glaziev who now also chairs the Duma committee on economic policy. 

Many cooks in the economic kitchen may not be too bad if there is enough
substance in their suggestions.

For instance, the Zyuganov-Glaziev team presented a bunch of figures
(totalling 860 billion roubles) representing potential sources of doubling
revenues of the federal budget. These sources include eliminating capital
flight, nationalising or at least putting under strict government control,
oil and gas exports, bringing order into the natural monopolies, reducing
barter and money surrogates, etc. Total suggested savings are about equal
to this year's projected federal budget.

While some of these points are indeed well taken, the team does not explain
how exactly it would go about their implementation. Our main doubts,
however, arise from Mr. Zyuganov's insistence on using practically all
additional revenues for drastically increasing salaries of government
employees, pensions and student stipends. But one could argue that it is
equally important and more practical to use at least part of that money for
increasing stagnant capital investment.

The fact is that today's Russia is, paradoxically enough, suffering from an
embarras de capital, not from its shortage. In 1999 depreciation and net
profits (after taxes) exceeded 1.3 trillion roubles. Only slightly more
than a half of this went into domestic investment leaving nearly 600
billion roubles in excess capital. Nearly two thirds of this sum (360
billion roubles) was transferred abroad, i.e. represented capital flight.
The remainder helped increase excessive reserves of commercial banks which,
instead of lending to private companies, parked the money with the Central
Bank or invested in dollars providing additional downward pressure on the
rouble exchange rate.

Large oil, gas, metals and other companies, as well as commercial banks are
awash in spare capital but are not investing in the real economy One can
understand why oil companies found it hard to invest when the world price
of oil was around $10 per barrel. Why they cannot invest on a major scale
today when oil sells at $30, is beyond comprehension unless one accepts
stories that the oil industry is a combination of fiefdoms that maximise
personal fortunes of their manager-owners instead of maximising the value
of shareholders' equity, as they should. The same question relates to
commercial banks that are even less eager today to lend to expanding
industrial concerns than they were when the same concerns were on the verge
of bankruptcy. 

If most of the profits of oil, gas, metals and other exporters were
invested in their own industries while banks started lending to successful
businesses, domestic capital investment would increase enormously and
capital flight would fall. Calculations show that for every additional
billion roubles invested at home capital flight is reduced by 0.9 billion.

There is also need for stricter control over the utilities. Contrary to Mr.
Chubais's claim that he succeeded in raising to 50 per cent the share of
cash in the revenues of RAO EES, the actual share is only 30 per cent and
the company is heavily in arrears on its taxes. Why is Mr. Viakhirev free
to use Gazprom money for buying 30 per cent in Media-Most is another issue
worth looking into.

Changing the business psychology of Russian big business tycoons is among
the top priorities of any future administration (be it Putin, Zyuganov or
whoever). Today oil tycoons are heavily buying into aluminium shares
instead of investing into more oil or aluminium production which remains
stagnant. The oligarchs should be strongly induced to act in the national
interest. By proclaiming an equidistant approach to all businesses, big and
small, Mr. Putin is missing his chance to radically improve conditions for
sustained economic growth. By insisting on using potential investment money
for wages and pensions, Mr. Zyuganov is equally failing to tackle the
crucial problem of the economy.

Too many cooks with dubious ideas about cooking will never run a successful
restaurant.

******

#11
Goverment Rethinks Privatization Program

Rossiyskaya Gazeta
1 March 2000
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Igor Tsukanov: "Privatization: To Be Continued" 

The members of the Duma Committee on Property 
approved the government's initiative to recall the draft state 
privatization program from the Duma. This does not mean that the 
privatization process is over, however. In fact, it is just beginning. 
The government submitted the privatization program to the State Duma 
back in 1998. As the reader may recall, the deputies had some serious 
objections to it. The main section of the document, the list of 
enterprises slated for privatization, became a bone of contention between 
the government and the people's representatives. The list enraged the 
Duma majority, giving it a perfect opportunity to keep accusing the 
executive branch of selling the Motherland for a song and committing 
various other sins. 
Today's members of parliament seem less hateful and more capable of 
seeing the big picture. Nevertheless, the program has been recalled 
from the State Duma: State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev received a 
letter to this effect from RF First Vice-Premier Mikhail Kasyanov a few 
days ago. 
Is this absurd? Not at all. The recalled program was the one the 
state needed in 1998. It included the notorious list of enterprises and 
also served as a theoretical supplement to the 1997 Law "On the 
Privatization of State Property and the Fundamentals of the Privatization 
of Municipal Property in the Russian Federation." So much has changed 
since that time, however. 
In the final analysis, the list turned out to be unnecessary: The 
Cabinet of Ministers is already authorized to manage and dispose of state 
property. Starting this year, a proposed list of privatization projects 
will be attached to the annual federal budget law. 
As for the second part of the program, the theoretical section, the 
RF Ministry for State Property (MGI) now feels that it should have been 
revised long ago, along with the 1997 law on the privatization of state 
and municipal property. It now plans to draw up a new comprehensive law 
on privatization and submit it to the deputies in place of the old program. 
It is unlikely that anyone would dispute the need for improvement in 
the existing law. The specific changes could be disputed, however. RF 
Minister for State Property Farit Gazizullin believes that the state 
should have more methods of selling the property it no longer needs. 
Today there are only three: auctions, competitive bidding sessions with 
investment requirements, and the inclusion of the state property in the 
charter capital of a joint-stock company. MGI officials believe that 
this is not enough to give the state effective control of the process. 
These views were expressed quite succinctly: No one will ever "get away 
with" another state-owned block of stock for mere kopecks--unless, of 
course, the state itself feels the need to lower the price. 
Some people might argue, saying that the days of large-scale 
privatization are over, and that major transactions have been few in 
number in the last couple of years. Not many such transactions are 
planned for this year either: the two-stage sale of the 3.7-percent 
block of stock in Gazprom, 19.68 percent of the Slavneft stock, and 
blocks of stock in ONAKO and LUKOIL. Meanwhile, according to F. 
Gazizullin, sales of stock in almost 1,500 enterprises are planned for 
this year. 
Now that the lion's share of the property has already been sold, what 
is the point of this belated caution? Is there really any need for new 
methods of privatization now? 
We believe that there is a need. First of all, no one has cancelled 
the official MGI mission to replenish the treasury. It is true that all 
of the income from privatization will be used, as it was last year, 
exclusively to cover the budget deficit. Nevertheless, according to the 
Ministry of Finance's assignments for 2000, this income is supposed to 
amount to around 18 billion rubles--more than double the 1999 figure! 
It is not surprising that the agencies in charge of state property want 
to be free to sell everything "on the list" at a maximum profit. 
There is also a second reason. The state is known to have a huge 
"reserve" of unnecessary property, which is just taking up space and 
costing money to maintain. The MGI compiled a state property directory 
about a year ago and learned that state-owned unitary enterprises alone 
numbered 14,000! All of them have to be managed, they all have utility 
bills to be paid, and so forth. Meanwhile, the state could not possibly 
need more than 1,500 of these! Which would be better: to keep feeding 
the parasites for no good reason, or to turn them over to private owners, 
even if only at a low consignment price? 
This also applies to the sale of smaller items: the dilapidated 
vehicles that were once used by a military unit, for example. The 
drafters of the new law feel that the consignment sale of these items for 
low prices should also be authorized. 
The MFI would also like to spend as little time and money as possible 
on all sorts of unnecessary formalities. The ministry believes that 
these include the mandatory starting bids for auctions and competitive 
bidding sessions (they often are not made public abroad, so that prices 
will not be driven down in advance) and the applications for 
privatization (this should be done only on the government's initiative). 
On the other hand, the MGI wants to revive the practice of stock 
trading and, in addition to this, to allow joint-stock companies to buy 
their own stock from the state when there is no other buyer. Gazprom 
shares will "sell like hotcakes," as the saying goes, even if they 
represent only a hundredth of a percentage point, but who will want to 
buy one or two percent of the stock in a small business?... 
Actually, the situation is not that clear-cut even in the case of 
Gazprom. When some of the state-owned Gazprom shares were offered for 
sale last year, everyone knew that Ruhrgas would be the only buyer. We 
can only wonder why anyone felt that an auction had to be held. The 
negotiations with the buyer should have been followed by a simple 
handshake. Current standards and regulations, however, preclude the 
direct sale of shares to an investor. The new law, Deputy Minister of 
State Property Sergey Molozhavyy told us, should authorize the state to 
do this. This, of course, will create numerous opportunities for abuses. 
That is why, S. Molozhavyy explained, each of these cases will require an 
additional "oversight" decision by the government. 
The legislative bill probably will be forwarded to various 
departments and regions for discussion in the near future. MGI 
officials expect the document to make its way through parliament without 
any particular difficulties this time. This expectation, however, might 
be too optimistic. 
The aggressive stance of the MGI probably will not appeal to 
everyone, and neither will the decisive role the new law might assign to 
the government in the control of the privatization process. Many of 
these decisions were made by the President in the past: Two of his 
edicts from 1993 and 1994, for example, still regulate the sale of assets 
of strategic importance to the state. MGI officials, on the other hand, 
feel that their privatization should be decided by a stroke of the 
Russian Prime Minister's pen. If the deputies insist on categorically 
prohibiting the privatization of any particular enterprise, they will 
have to pass the appropriate law. 
At this time, we still do not know whether the members of our 
parliament (and Russian presidential candidate Vladimir Putin) are 
willing to give the government carte blanche.... 

******

#12
RUSSIA NEVER EXPECTED TO JOIN NATO - PUTIN

IVANOVO. March 7 (Interfax) - "Nobody is going to admit Russia into
NATO. One would not expect anything else. We have never thought that
this could happen," acting Russian President Vladimir Putin said in
Ivanovo, a regional seat north of Moscow, on Tuesday.
Putin was referring to a remark made by NATO Secretary General
George Robertson that Russia's admission is purely hypothetical. Putin
had said earlier in a BBC interview that Russia could eventually join
NATO.
"But if we are not expected there, we do not understand why we
should border NATO," he said.
His response to a BBC question was prepared in advance, Putin said.
Russia is prepared to cooperate with NATO in the political field,
he said.
When NATO was being set up in 1949, the Soviet Union was prepared
to join it but NATO closed its doors on the country, Putin said. "The
Warsaw Treaty was signed in response and confrontation began," he said.
"Today the Communist Party does not have a monopoly of power and
there is no Soviet Union or Warsaw Treaty but NATO is expanding its
activities and its zone of interests," Putin said.
On the other hand, there are two components of NATO's activities,
one military and the other political, and the latter has been expanding
lately, he said. Russia has an interest in cooperating in the political
field, Putin said.
"There are problems, however, as far as the political component is
concerned," he said. In particular, Russia was strongly opposed to the
NATO action in Yugoslavia, Putin said.

******

#13
Date: Tue, 07 Mar 2000 
From: Albert Weeks <AWeeks1@compuserve.com> 
Subject: New Russian military book

JRLers with an interest in Soviet and Russian 
military affairs should obtain the new, comprehensive
254-page, 20X25cm illustrated Russian book,
RAKETNIY SHCHIT OTCHESTVA (Missile Shield of
the Fatherland), introduction by Rocket Forces CINC
Col.-Gen. V. N. Yakovlev, published in Moscow, late 1999.
Although expensive and in limited edition, this valuable book
provides virtually first-ever, open information on such 
things as exhaustive details concerning Russia's 
anti-missile defense system around Moscow and 
its linkup to the Pletsetsk cosmodrome; biographies of .
the little-known leading figures in the secret research 
and development of nuclear weapons and rockets in the 
USSR begining apace in the '40s; descriptions of 
Soviet missile innovations, such as "cold launch," submarine-
launched missiles, etc.; tables of actual numbers of 
launchers and warheads going back to the '50s (stats 
on numbers of missiles, etc., which in some cases are 
in excess of lower Western estimates, including those of IISS, 
CDI, et al.); blame on the U.S. for the "arms race" and 
other recycled former Soviet-propaganda themes; 
fullsome praise of hawk-epigones like Marshal Dmitri F. Ustinov;
map showing location of Soviet-run military installations in Cuba,
and much else that will inform and/or surprise some readers.
After reading this book, those who once believed in 
the motto, "Two Apes on a Treadmill," may want to 
revise their position into: "One Ape Driving the Treadmill."
JRL readers may write me for information on how to 
obtain this book.

******

#14
Newsweek International
March 13, 2000
[for personal use only]
CHECHNYA 
The Rebel Connection 
Aid from groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
By Ismail Khan and Steve LeVine

Russia now proclaims that the war in Chechnya is winding down. Last week the 
government announced that the last rebel stronghold in Chechnya—a town called 
Shatoi, south of the capital, Grozny—finally fell to Moscow's troops. The 
rest is mere mopping up, military officials said. Yet three days later, 37 
Russian troops were killed just outside Grozny in a swift ambush. Evidently, 
the rebels had not heard that they are beaten.

Moscow's flag flies over Chechnya's capital, but that does not mean defeat 
for the rebels—in part because the resistance spills well beyond the Chechen 
borders. Aid in the form of money and manpower is coming from sympathetic 
Islamic groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Peshawar, Pakistan, NEWSWEEK 
interviewed a baby-faced Chechen calling himself Mossab who spelled out the 
battles to come. Dressed in a white cap and a camouflage jacket with a small 
badge declaring allah-o-akbar ("God is great"), the 21-year-old Mossab was on 
his way to Afghanistan four years after his father's death in the last 
Russian-Chechen conflict. Now, the young man says, militants in Afghanistan 
were going to show him how to "wage a jihad." "The Russians are calling us 
terrorists," says Mossab. "But what are they doing? They are killing women 
and children trapped in their houses in Grozny. When the time comes, I will 
return to my country and take part in the jihad."

The Chechens' connections are no secret. Chechen fighters have trained in 
Afghanistan for years. Shamil Basayev, the Chechen commander, has visited at 
least twice, in March and May 1994, according to representatives of two 
Kashmiri rebel groups for whom Afghanistan is also a sanctuary. And in 
January the Chechens established a diplomatic mission in Kabul. Former 
Chechen vice president Zemilkhan Yandarbayev, a central figure in the 1994-96 
war with Russia, appointed a junior aide to lead the mission.

But just how much support the Chechens are getting from outside remains a 
murky subject that is of keen interest to intelligence officials in both 
Moscow and Washington. A series of NEWSWEEK interviews in both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan sheds some light on the depth of that support. In February, 
Yandarbayev went on a widely publicized nationwide tour of Pakistan. Moscow 
was (and remains) furious at the Pakistani government for granting 
Yandarbayev a visa. But that didn't stop him from what appears to have been a 
successful fund-raising tour. At a rally in Peshawar, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the 
head of Pakistan's biggest Islamic party, contributed about $185,000. So it 
went at dozens of mosques that Yandarbayev visited, where it's likely he 
raised tens of thousands more. For a decade, Afghanistan has been the world's 
main incubator of armed Muslim militancy, and the Chechens will find a 
sanctuary there to regroup. Kashmiri militants operating from Afghanistan 
have in the past routinely sent arms and men to Chechnya. The support channel 
began in Afghanistan, led to Tajikistan and from there cut across the Caspian 
Sea to Chechnya. Habibullah Shah, president of a Kashmiri group called 
Harkat-i-Jihad-i-Islam, said he had used the trail to dispatch two or three 
dozen men to Chechnya in recent months.

For now, the leaders of several militant Islamic organizations say, sending 
men, arms or ammunition to Chechnya is effectively impossible. The Russians 
have closed the transit routes. That means the current donation of choice is 
cash, to buy weapons from Russia and neighboring states. "I wish we could do 
more for them. Being Muslims, this is our duty," says Bakht Zamin, head of a 
Kashmiri rebel group called Al-Badr that is among several that have 
established funds for the Chechens in Peshawar. "The public response has been 
more than enthusiastic."

Yandarbayev does not have a free hand in Pakistan, of course. Pakistan 
authorities desperately want Bill Clinton to visit this month, and the United 
States wants an end to chaos in Chechnya. After Yandarbayev's rabble-rousing 
tour, embarrassed Pakistani authorities asked him to leave. On Feb. 25, 
Yandarbayev departed on a plane bound for Dubai, but not before planting 
seeds of trouble. Aslam Farooqi, leader of a militant group called 
Sipah-i-Sahaba, told Yandarbayev: "Let the government declare jihad, our men 
[will] go to Chechnya." For Russian President Vladimir Putin, those words 
convey a grim truth: he can't end the war just by saying it's over.

With Bill Powell in Moscow

*******

#15
Respondents Not Expect New Duma to Be Better than Previous. 

MOSCOW, March 7 (Itar-Tass) -- Residents of the Russian Federation are not 
inclined to hope that the newly elected Duma will work more effectively than 
the previous Duma. Over a third of respondents polled by the Indpepndent 
Research Center ROMIR ( 38,3 percent) believe that the work of the new Duma 
will be approximately the same as the work done by the previous Duma. 

The results of the poll which came to Itar-Tass show that around one-fourth 
of citizens (26.1 percent) expect the work of the new Duma to be slightly 
better than that of the previous Duma, whereas only 7,9 percent of 
respondents expressed the opinion that the activities of the New Duma would 
be much more efficient. Around 5,7 percent of respondents polled have 
expressed slightly less optimism in the activities of the new Duma, whereas 
4,2 percent of respondents said that the work of the new Duma will be 
considerably less effective. Around 17,8 percent of respondents interviewed 
were undecided. 

ROMIR interviewed 1,500 respondents selected in accordance with the all- 
Russia representative criterion. 

*******

#16
Russia Today press summaries
Moskovsky Komsomolets
7 March 2000
It’s Not Enough To Take Power In One’s Own Hands.
ONE SHOULD KNOW HOW TO KEEP IT
Summary

The number of registered presidential candidates so far is the same as the 
number of players on a soccer team. The difference is that here there is no 
coach, everyone plays against one another (or so it seems) and there is no 
bench for reserve players. Which means that the players who leave the game 
have no one to replace them. The thing that elections have in common with 
soccer is that everyone tries to hit the same goal.

But the level of training is different for all players. In this case, it is 
proved not only by the candidates’ election slogans, but also by their 
programs for the country’s development. This is what shows whether this or 
that candidate is ready to not only take power, but also use it for the good 
of every voter.

A comparative analysis of all candidates allows us to limit the number of 
forwards to three. Vladimir Putin is the center forward; Grigory Yavlinsky 
plays on the right wing, and Gennady Zyuganov on the left.

Gennady Zyuganov hasn’t changed his platform, and we’ve already experienced 
what he could have done during decades of Soviet power.

>From the time he left his post of deputy prime minister, Grigory Yavlinsky 
has been staying far from the real government of the country. His “500 days” 
program would have allowed him to enter the government and would have led the 
country to a normally functioning economic model. But neither “the Family”, 
nor the oligarchs needed it.

The government is run not by a single person, but by a group of like-minded 
persons. At least this is how it’s supposed to be. Not an autocrat like Boris 
Yeltsin in the beginning of his reign, not “the Family” that ruled the 
country at the end of Yeltsin era, but a team of professionals, aimed at 
solving a common problem. Neither Vladimir Putin nor Gennady Zyuganov have 
this type of a team.

Only Grigory Yavlinsky already has a team that could form a new government 
right now if it was necessary and could unite all the intellectual elite of 
the country.

There are two elements that guarantee not only gaining power but also the 
ability to keep it. The first is the very detailed development of a very 
thorough program. The second is a good team of intelligent associates that is 
able to realize these plans. Grigory Yavlinsky has both.

*******

#17
Moscow Times
March 7, 2000 
THE ANALYST: Communists Still Clueless In Economic Management 
By Gary Peach
Staff Writer

The Soviet communists always did have a peculiar way with numbers, as if they 
were trying to be mathematical magicians. They could pull fantastic figures 
straight out of a hat, or, if up looked better, "from the ceiling," as the 
Russian expression goes. Any book on the former Soviet Union's economy is 
replete with anecdotes as to how the apparatchiki flaunted the most 
incredible numbers while planning industrial output, compiling statistical 
reports, and just holding diplomatic meetings. 

Sadly, they haven't changed. At a press conference last week called to 
promulgate their economic platform, Gennady Zyuganov's contemporary 
Communists displayed once again a remarkable knack for stretching and bending 
the numbers. 

The man behind the Communist Party's latest round of numerical hocus-pocus is 
Sergei Glaziyev, an economist by training and now chairman of the State Duma 
committee for economic policy and entrepreneurism. Although his knowledge of 
economics is extremely warped, as he has aptly demonstrated over the past two 
years, and he understands free enterprise about as much as he does ancient 
Illyrian folklore, Glaziyev was handed this chairmanship thanks to Unity's 
cunning alliance with the Communists to divvy up parliament's committees. In 
the meantime he is also acting as Zyuganov's chief economic adviser for the 
duration of the presidential campaign, and it was his unabashed 
economy-wrecking plan that was announced at last week's press conference. 

According to Glaziyev, should the next president become Zyuganov, the 
Communists will beef up the federal budget by 860 billion rubles ($30 
billion). With a wave of the wizard's wand, they will double the state's 
annual income. Instilling order in Gazprom, Unified Energy Systems and the 
Railroads Ministry will bring 90 billion rubles ($3.1 billion), organizing a 
state monopoly in the vodka industry 60 billion ($2.1 billion), and 
nationalizing exports of natural gas, oil, and metals a whopping 110 billion 
($3.9 billion). 

The lion's share of the Communists' revenue explosion - over one-third of it 
- will materialize by finally resolving the country's endemic problem of 
capital flight. After Zyuganov wins the presidential elections, Glaziyev has 
assured us that he will find over $11 billion, roughly half of the estimated 
amount that leaves the nation on an annual basis, just by shutting down the 
country's financial borders. Taken together, this money will be enough, 
Zyuganov says, to quickly pay off the country's foreign debts and forever 
wash Russia's hands of international debt clubs and lending organizations. 

Depending on how one wants to read it, Glaziyev's income-boosting plan can be 
considered either another empty campaign promise or evidence of a profound 
case of economic illiteracy. But considering how serious the committee 
chairman is taking his ridiculous revenue checklist, it would seem that there 
is a fair degree of economic ignorance on display here. It's not that 
cracking down on Gazprom or UES wouldn't bring additional budget revenues, or 
that stemming capital flight needn't be tackled; certainly these are vital 
interests to be addressed by any future president. The problem with 
Glaziyev's thinking is that it is antediluvian. 

The words "monopoly" and "nationalization" - pillars of an ideology that was 
buried once and for all during the last decade - predominate, and indicate 
that the Communists have learned nothing from either past experience or 
present reality. Business must be made to suffer for the state's sake, and 
the largest sectors of the economy should be on a tight leash. If a firm is 
big and making a lot of money, then it should at least be controlled, if not 
nationalized. If something is being exported, then it belongs to the state. 

Unfortunately, the problem extends far beyond a campaign-related press 
conference. Glaziyev harbors a mass of other wacky ideas that, since he 
chairs the aforementioned committee, are being typed up into draft laws that 
will make their way to the Duma for a general debate and eventual vote. 

And certainly there will be more. For anyone who wants to get a sense of what 
to expect and familiarize himself with the way Glaziyev thinks in general, 
the best document to study is former Deputy Prime Minister Yury Malyukov's 
economic program released in October 1998 to pull Russia out of its crisis. 
Glaziyev was the main architect of this appalling crisis program that 
contained a range of brilliant ideas, from ignoring domestic debt to weaning 
out circulation of the U.S. dollar in the economy. Thankfully, the program 
remained a draft. Now, however, we may see some of the ideas therein float 
back to the surface. 

Glaziyev showed us last week that Russia's Communist economists have yet to 
comprehend the impact of their past mistakes and the significance of the 
global economy. In all likelihood, they never will. 

******

Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: 
http://www.cdi.org/russia