March 3, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4145 4146 4147

Johnson's Russia List
#4147
3 March 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
IMPORTANT: The next JRL will be Monday, March 5.

1. Reuters: Russian election moves to TV, Chechnya dominates.
2. Interfax: PUTIN YET TO CHOOSE ELECTION CAMPAIGN FORM - CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE.
3. AFP: Russian Ministry Paid $69 Million To Kremlin, Claims Le Figaro.
4. Interfax: YAVLINSKY CRITICIZES NEW T-BILL ISSUE.
5. Los Angeles Times: Robyn Dixon, Disenchanted Russians Seek Vote 'Against All Candidates' 
6. Washington Times: Jamie Dettmer, Russians for Gore.
7. Andrei Liakhov: re crime rise.
8. The Independent (UK): Patrick Cockburn, Russians covered up attack on own troops.
9. Segodnya: Oleg Odnokolenko, HOW MUCH DOES THE CHECHEN WAR COST?
10. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Sergei Mitrokhin, THE WAY WE ARE TO CHOOSE. Programs of the Main Presidential Candidates Radically Differ on Basic Economic Principles.
11. the eXile: Dr. N. I. Kimmelman, Zhirinovsky: A Complicated Diagnosis.
12. RFE/RL NEWSLINE: CANDIDATE ZYUGANOV COMPLAINS ABOUT FSB... ENVIRONMENTALISTS REPORT MORE POLICE PRESSURE...NEW, CHEAPER STATE-PRODUCED VODKA TO BE CALLED 'PUTINSKAYA'?]

*******

#1
Russian election moves to TV, Chechnya dominates
By Anatoly Vereshchagin
March 3, 2000

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia's presidential election moved onto television 
screens Friday with Acting President Vladimir Putin still out in front, but 
the campaigning was overshadowed by an ambush on Russian soldiers in rebel 
Chechnya. 

Putin's rivals launched advertising spots, some slick, some stilted, in free 
time allocated on television. And the first of several televised debates also 
got under way, though few barbs were exchanged. 

An Interior Ministry spokesman said in televised comments that 20 members of 
the crack OMON police brigade were killed in the ambush in the 
Staropromyslovsky district on the edge of regional capital Grozny Thursday 
and that 29 were wounded. 

The attack, weeks after Russian troops took control of Grozny, was a sharp 
reminder of the separatists' pledge to wage a guerrilla war against Moscow's 
forces. 

The military campaign is the chief factor behind Putin's soaring popularity 
ahead of the March 26 election. The closest of 10 challengers, Communist 
Party chief Gennady Zyuganov, lies far behind, although it is unclear whether 
Putin will score the 50 percent needed to win without a runoff. 

As the campaign moved onto prime time in a country relying mainly on 
television for news, sources close to Putin said he had no intention of 
taking up free air time as viewers already had more than enough chances to 
see him. 

``This decision is based on the need to provide equal conditions for all 
presidential candidates,'' one source in Putin's campaign told Interfax news 
agency. ``In carrying out his duties, Vladimir Putin has plenty of 
opportunities to meet voters and set out his position.'' 

The source did not rule out Putin taking part in the TV debates. 

A television debate between a current leader and an election challenger would 
be unprecedented. Putin repeatedly has been challenged to a debate by 
Zyuganov. 

His rivals' spots relied heavily on montages of life in Russia before and 
after the fall of communism. Some made digs at Putin's purportedly 
unassailable lead or the fact that he was the handpicked successor of former 
President Boris Yeltsin. 

``Our strength is not in the Kremlin walls, but in the unity of the land,'' 
ran a jingle promoting Konstantin Titov, liberal governor of southern Samara 
region. 

``Moscow is not Russia,'' said the voice-over in a spot for Aman Tuleyev, 
leftist governor of Siberia's Kemerovo region. ''Aman Tuleyev hates 
predatory, robber baron capitalism and has forced it out of Kemerovo.'' 

COMMUNIST CHALLENGER PROMISES HIGHER WAGES 

Zyuganov told voters in his spot that he would raise pensions, benefits and 
public sector wages, singling out low-paid teachers, doctors and servicemen. 
He said his program could be sustained by recovering funds taken from the 
people in the sale of state assets, including natural resources. 

Veteran liberal economist Grigory Yavlinsky, standing third in opinion polls, 
accused Putin of resorting to ``Soviet methods in which the end justifies the 
means.'' He told supporters he stood for liberals joining together to field a 
single candidate, but would proceed with his own campaign whatever the 
circumstances. 

Putin, touring Siberia's Surgut region, stuck to his tactic of endeavoring to 
provide Russians with a ``decent life'' while avoiding specific promises. 

``Any increase in salaries, pensions and benefits must take account of our 
means,'' he said, clutching a microphone in an impromptu address to oil 
workers shown on television. But he said it was obvious wages had to be 
``above the poverty line.'' 

Putin has sought in the weeks running up to the start of official campaigning 
to shift the emphasis to social concerns from his image of a tough former 
head of the security service. 

He has pledged to provide order, strengthen Russia's institutions and restore 
some of its greatness. One interview showed him at home with his family's toy 
poodle. 

********

#2
PUTIN YET TO CHOOSE ELECTION CAMPAIGN FORM - CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

MOSCOW. March 3 (Interfax) - The election campaign committee for
acting President Vladimir Putin issued comments on Friday on reports
that Putin, who is running for Russian president, has refused to use
gratis any of the broadcast time he is entitled to in his campaign.
"It is the candidate himself and not his [campaign] committee that
makes the decision on any election campaign method. He may or may not
use suggestions by the committee," committee chief Dmitry Medvedev said,
as quoted by the committee press service.
"Vladimir Putin has already said that there are no special election
campaign events on his schedule. On the basis of this position, the
committee has drawn up for him several scenarios for a restrained
campaign. Among them are such that do not involve the candidate's direct
participation... At the present moment, we are doing preparatory work on
all the scenarios.
"Choosing the type of campaign is the job of the candidate himself.
I have no doubt that, as soon as Putin makes a final decision on this
matter, it will become known to everyone."
"We do not rule out," said the press service, "that the true source
of the information about [Putin's] refusal to use broadcast time gratis
was not the committee but one of the electronic media groups where we
had sent an official refusal to use any broadcast time within the next
few days.
The reason for the refusal has already been explained by Dmitry
Medvedev, leaving aside the fact that today the acting president is in
[the Siberian town of] Surgut and is physically unable to take part in
the debates on the radio or on the TVTs [television] channel."

*******

#3
Russian Ministry Paid $69 Million To Kremlin, Claims Le Figaro

PARIS, Mar 3, 2000 -- (Agence France Presse) The Russian finance ministry in 
1995 secretly paid $69 million to then president Boris Yeltsin's private 
office to pay for the refurbishment of the Kremlin, Le Figaro newspaper 
reported Friday.

The newspaper published photographs of three documents showing transfers of 
money in August, September and December 1995 from the ministry to the 
President's Affairs Office.

The first document says the money is for "the reconstruction of the Kremlin 
in Moscow, work to be carried out by the Mabetex company."

The Swiss-based Mabetex is under investigation on suspicion of conniving with 
members of Yeltsin's entourage to overcharge for the Kremlin work then pay 
out the surplus money as kickbacks.

Last month a Swiss prosecutor issued a warrant for the arrest of Pavel 
Borodin, former head of the president's office, since fired by acting 
President Vladimir Putin, in connection with the affair.

The paper noted that in the Russian budget, supposedly supervised by the IMF 
and the World Bank, no mention was made of these cash transfers to the 
president's office, which it described as an "immense octopus."

"(The office) mixes together commercial activity with public money without 
accounting to anyone, because everyone owes it something." Le Figaro said. 

*******

#4
YAVLINSKY CRITICIZES NEW T-BILL ISSUE

MOSCOW. March 3 (Interfax) - Yabloko party leader and presidential
candidate Grigory Yavlinsky has criticized the government's decision to
revive treasury bill auctions.
In the absence of stable economic growth, "this is very dangerous.
A financial pyramid will emerge again and it may possibly collapse
again," Yavlinsky said in a Friday address on Radio Rossii.
Current economic growth is sickly, as it is a result of the August
1998 devaluation of the ruble, Yavlinsky said.
An improved employment situation would point to stable economic
growth, he added.
Yavlinsky criticized a possible referendum for partial land
ownership. "The Constitution has resolved all these issues, let's
implement them," he said.
The Constitution should stipulate a general "federal level"
decision, while regions should "take into consideration local
particularities to make suitable decisions," he said.
Regarding Chechnya, Yavlinsky insisted on both the elimination of
guerilla formations and a political settlement. "One cannot be dealt
with in the absence of the other," he said.
Humanitarian problems should also be addressed in Chechnya,
Yavlinsky remarked.
However, "it is unacceptable to throw around money" the way it was
done when resolving Chechnya's socioeconomic problems in 1995 and 1996,
he said.

********

#5
Los Angeles Times
March 3, 2000
[for personal use only]
Disenchanted Russians Seek Vote 'Against All Candidates' 
By ROBYN DIXON, Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW--Russians, legendary for their stoicism, have suffered quietly 
under their share of venal and unscrupulous rulers over the centuries. But a 
political movement has sprung up that argues the time has come to say nyet to 
politicians. 
One wing of the movement clambered onto Lenin's mausoleum in Red Square 
in December and hoisted aloft a banner with the simple slogan "Against 
everyone." 
Another faction, the Nyet Campaign, hopes to recruit former Soviet 
leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev to urge voters to turn out in force for the March 
26 presidential election and exercise their right to mark ballots "against 
all candidates." 
Others are campaigning to boycott the elections entirely. 
Acting President Vladimir V. Putin is expected to hold on to power in 
the election. But the Nyet Campaign is urging Russians to register a strong 
protest vote against an electoral process that it argues was manipulated to 
maneuver him to victory. Putin was elevated to his post by the Dec. 31 
resignation of his predecessor, President Boris N. Yeltsin, and the election 
was moved up three months. 
Advocates of a protest vote run the gamut from anarchists to 
ex-socialists, but they have in common an endearing eccentricity and an 
idealistic refusal to grapple with political reality that seems to symbolize 
much about the nature of politics done the Russian way. 
They make up just one small thread in Russia's political web, but they 
are intensely factionalized and tangled in complex theoretical debate about 
the correct way forward. They are no less divided than are the nation's 
liberal democratic or Communist factions. 
Nearly 2 million Russians checked the "against all candidates" box in 
the December parliamentary elections. The category drew more votes than 20 of 
the 26 parties in the race and topped the ballot in some 
constituencies--which, under election rules, forced a new poll in those 
areas. 
Given these numbers, it seems that the various advocates of a protest 
vote could win support--if only they could run a united and well-managed 
campaign. 
But wading against a tide of public apathy in an election in which the 
result is not in doubt, their message seems doomed to be lost in the 
confusion of the competing protests. 
Vladimir V. Pribylovsky, coordinator of the Nyet Campaign, looks down on 
the boykotisty, as he calls them--the groups pushing for an election 
boycott--and laughs at the artistic anarchists who climbed onto the Lenin 
mausoleum with their banner. 
The Nyet Campaign hopes to persuade a majority of voters to cast their 
ballots "against all candidates," which would invalidate the presidential 
poll and force new elections--a process that, in theory, could go on until a 
candidate wins a majority. 
But even as he spells out the goals, Pribylovsky, a veteran of small 
opposition splinter groups, admits that the plan is hopeless. 
"I think Putin will win," he says, "and if he doesn't, the ballot will 
be rigged" to make him appear the victor. 
Pribylovsky contends that an election boycott would only make it easy 
for the authorities to falsify the results by giving them piles of unused 
ballot papers to cast. 
"If the election results are to be rigged, then let them toil over it," 
he says. 
Claiming to represent the intellectual cream, the Nyet Campaign also 
distances itself from people who check the "against all candidates" box out 
of apathy. 
"For me and my group, an ethical consideration is important," 
Pribylovsky says. "We don't want to join up with people who just don't care." 
The anarchist Nongovernmental Control Group, responsible for the 
mausoleum banner, sees protest as bordering on a form of living art. It 
stages vivid and often crude acts: Members once gathered in Red Square to 
spell out an indecent Russian three-letter word with their bodies. 
Its most recent protest effort, in mid-December, foiled by the FSB, the 
main successor to the Soviet-era KGB, was an attempt to post signs reading 
"polling booth" on public toilets. 
The group, which plans another stunt before the presidential poll, says 
it will consider itself successful if 10% to 15% of voters opt to oppose all 
candidates. 
"All we want to do is to send the authorities a clear message," says 
Anatoly F. Osmolovsky, "chairman" of the group, "that something is seriously 
wrong with our state if several million people took the trouble to come to 
the polls and express their mistrust and contempt by voting against all 
candidates." 

*******

#6
Washington Times
March 3, 2000
[for personal use only]
Russians for Gore
By Jamie Dettmer 

MOSCOW. As the bruised but unbowed Arizona Sen. John McCain heads off to 
New York and California maybe he should ponder coming out with a novel 
post-Cold War campaign slogan that could boost his appeal to Reagan 
Democrats. How about, "Vote For Me — The Candidate The Russians Like The 
Least!"
Across Russia's political spectrum — from Gennady Zyuganov's communists 
to Western-tilted economic reformers grouped in coalitions such as the Union 
of Right-Wing Forces and Yabloko — Mr. McCain is the most disliked of the 
White House contenders — the one politicians here hope to see fail in this 
U.S. election cycle and soon.
His call in January for the International Monetary Fund to stop loan 
dealings with Moscow until Russia's brutal war in Chechnya is halted is only 
one of the McCain stances to have rankled. Others include his strong support 
last summer for NATO's intervention in Kosovo and his readiness to send in 
ground troops to wrest control of the Serb province from fellow Slav Slobodan 
Milosevic, if the bombing of Serbia failed to result in Western victory.
And the White House candidate Russians most want to see succeed Bill 
Clinton? His vice president, Al Gore, who has a substantial fan club here in 
Russia cheering him on and rooting for him to see off Bill Bradley's 
challenge and vanquish the Republicans in November — although that viewpoint 
is not shared by the communists or Grigory Yavlinsky, the head of the 
pro-reform Yabloko party.
At one time Mr. Gore, who liked to cite his Russia experience as clear 
proof of why he should be entrusted with the White House, would have made 
much of his high-standing in Russian political circles. In the mid-1990s, Mr. 
Gore took to making upbeat speeches about the excellent prospects for 
economic and democratic reform in Russia, claiming that the Clinton-Gore 
administration's slavish policy of support for Boris Yeltsin was a gamble but 
one paying off.
The vice president has been noticeably reticent about his central role 
in Russia policy. His five years as co-chairman with then-Russian prime 
minister Viktor Chernomyrdin of a commission that became Washington's main 
coordinating link to Moscow has also failed to appear much in his campaign 
literature.
Last fall, prompted by the Bank of New York money-laundering scandal and 
circumstantial evidence that International Monetary Fund donations had been 
misused by Kremlin officials, Mr. Bradley — ahead even of the Republicans — 
tore into the vice president, criticizing Mr. Gore for continuing to support 
aid for Russia. Mr. Gore's aides fear that he remains vulnerable to attack 
and the last thing they want to highlight is the vice president's chumminess 
with Mr. Chernomyrdin, whose name has become in Moscow a byword for 
corruption. Questions, of course, remain about how much Mr. Gore knew about 
the Russian's graft — and for that matter corruption among Russia's ruling 
class as whole.
While the Kremlin has been careful in making public comments that could 
be construed as supporting one U.S. candidate or another, government 
officials make no secret that they hope Mr. Gore will be the next U.S. 
president. One reason for their liking of the vice president, they say, is 
that Mr. Gore is a known quantity, someone they have dealt with closely for 
several years and who is up to speed on Russian affairs.
That view is echoed openly by businessman and Russian presidential 
candidate Umar Jabrailov. "He's clued up about Russia-U.S. relations. He 
would not have to start from scratch on the issue," he said.
Another more disguised reason for the Kremlin's Gore preference is that 
it believes he is readier to compromise and, in the words of one official, 
"more understanding of the difficulties Russia faces" in implementing the 
economic and political reforms much of the West deems necessary. Mr. Gore's 
critics would no doubt argue that means the Kremlin sees him as a pushover.
Outside the confines of the Kremlin, politicians are more ready to 
express their assessments of the American presidential candidates. In reply 
to a question posed recently by the online political magazine Gazeta.ru about 
who he would prefer to succeed Mr. Clinton, communist leader Gennady Zyuganov 
was highly critical of the Republicans for their "hawkish and highly negative 
attitude towards Russia." He singled out Mr. McCain as having an "even 
harsher attitude towards Russia than his party opponent, Texas Governor 
George Bush."
But the communist chief is not happy with Mr. Gore either because of the 
Clinton's administration's "firm backing of the Yeltsin regime." He added: 
"All the current pronouncements by Albright, Gore and company on this issue 
are nothing more than attempts to save face."
Economist Grigory Yavlinsky, the head of the pro-reform Yabloko party 
and another one of Mr. Putin's election rivals, hardly ever agrees with Mr. 
Zyuganov on anything but he does concur that the Clinton-Gore administration 
made a huge blunder in banking all on Mr. Yeltsin and turning a blind eye to 
Kremlin corruption. And like his communist opponent he maintains that the 
White House is determined to disguise much that has gone wrong with Russia, 
mocking the administration's tendency to describe Mr. Yeltsin's successor, 
Vladimir Putin, as a "reformer."
Russian politicians who aren't reform-minded — or communist — are very 
clear where their preference lies. Ironically, the party of rabid right-wing 
nationalist Alexander Zhirinovsky is in the Gore camp. Mr. Zhirinovsky's son, 
Igor Lebedev, needed only a single laconic sentence to describe where his 
father's misnamed Liberal Democratic Party stood on the American election: 
"Gore would be a better U.S. president for Russia."

*******

#7
Date: Fri, 03 Mar 2000 
From: "Andrei Liakhov" <liakhova@nortonrose.com> 
Subject: re crime rise

Any Russian Government has infinite number of ways how to manipulate crime
figures. Even when it does not want to manipulate these on purpose, any
figures of crime rise or fall reflect just the most recent adjustments by
the Statistics Department of the Ministry of Interior to the procedure of
registration of facts "capable of being recognised as criminal offences" or
criminal convictions database. The system is extremely cumbersome and
complicated, and periodic changes in the system of registration of criminal
acts made by the Ministry of Interior from time to time make any attempt to
figure out trends during periods when different systems were in place
practically impossible. I do not know whether JRL is the proper forum to
discuss intricacies of that, but due to two specific factors ((i) initial
criminal act registration procedure and (ii) criteria for selection of
criminal acts for federal and inter regional statistics databases) crime
figures may be quite easily tweaked by the Statistics Department as and when
required.

In addition as there is a difference between criminal offence (i.e. criminal
act recognised as such in court proceedings) and "acts capable of being
recognised as criminal offences" (pre conviction) there are different
databases for these categories. The Ministry if and when required chooses
between the two in its official press releases without specifying what
exactly "crime" means or may select to "lose" the required number of
criminal acts in transfer to the convictions (i.e. acts proven as offences)
database in post trial registration. It may also chose to calculate one act
twice - in pre and post conviction databases, thus bloating the figures
(usual pre budget Duma scare tactics). Some offences may be registered as
one (if done by the same person or a group) as the so called "multi-episode
offence" and although e.g. thieves could have committed 100 burglaries,
statistically it will be 1(sic!) offence as there is just one criminal case
opened by the relevant CID department. If, during police investigation a
case is split in two or more cases, the department head may OR MAY NOT
submit registration reports for "new" offences.

Furthermore local police chiefs are not very keen on proper compliance with
the criminal act registration requirements as it may affect their image (and
promotion, and salaries) with the Ministry. That too has a further
distortive effect on the criminal statistics, particularly on corruption
statistics. 

Thus any reports of crime rise or fall in Russia must be treated with
extreme caution, as it may well be that we are just being prepared for a
"substantial reduction in crime" in March 2001 as one of the first
achievements of President Putin.

*******

#8
The Independent (UK)
3 March 2000
[for personal use only]
Russians covered up attack on own troops 
By Patrick Cockburn in Moscow 

Masked Russian army security men shot dead two of their own soldiers and 
said they were killed by Chechen guerrillas. Details of the cover-up were 
given to The Independent by Valery Gordeyev, a former army officer. 

Six months ago he received a zinc coffin holding the body of his 26-year-old 
son, Vyacheslav, an army captain, who had been killed by a bullet in the 
chest. "They lied to me," Colonel Gordeyev said yesterday as he recalled his 
struggle to find out how his son died. "They told me that a group of Chechen 
fighters got into my son's camp and killed him." 

By then Col Gordeyev had established for himself, through friends in the 
army, that the real story was entirely different. His son had died trying to 
defend his soldiers from masked Russian security troops who opened fire on 
them when they were sleeping in their barracks in Dagestan. 

"Russian leaders today have a real contempt for human rights", said Col 
Gordeyev, adetermined-looking man who retired from the army a year ago after 
32 years' service. "If a well-educated senior officer like me has these 
problems finding out about the death of his son, imagine what it would be 
like for some poor soldier's mother in a village." 

On the night he died, Capt Gordeyev had just been put in command of a 
70-strong unit of soldiers who originally came from Dagestan, east of 
Chechnya. They had been serving with two ιlite Russian divisions stationed 
near Moscow. When Islamic Chechen guerrillas invaded Dagestan in August, the 
Dagestani soldiers asked to be sent to the front in a single unit to repel 
them. 

Russian television and the press extensively reported on their patriotic 
gesture. They fought against the Chechens and their commanding officer was 
wounded. 

Capt Gordeyev was sent to replace him. At the same time the Dagestani 
soldiers were told their group was to be disbanded and they were to be posted 
to other units. 

Some of the soldiers were angered that the promise made to them in Moscow 
that they could serve together wasbeing broken but their protest was purely 
verbal. Nevertheless, soon after they had gone to sleep in their barracks at 
Buinaksk, in Dagestan, on 20 September, the commander of the camp sent a 
special unit, numbering some 30 men, to punish them. 

"Soldiers wearing masks came into the barracks and started to shoot," Ratmir 
Akhmedov, one of the Dagestani soldiers told the newspaper Novaya Gazeta. 
Most of the shots were fired at the soldiers' legs or at the ceiling. Two of 
the Dagestanis were wounded. Capt Gordeyev came from his quarters and told 
the masked men to get out and shouted "lie down on the floor" to his own men. 

He remained standing, at which point, said Private Akhmedov, a shot fired 
through a window by one of the masked men standing outside the barracks hit 
Capt Gordeyev full in the chest. 

Arslan Aliev, another of the Dagestani soldiers, said: "Capt Gordeyev died in 
our arms as we were bringing him to the first-aid post." By this time the 
shooting had stopped, leaving two men dead and several wounded. 

Ever since he buried his son, Col Gordeyev, who is now an executive in a 
large company, has sought an inquiry into the death, which he hopes will lead 
to the punishment of those responsible. So far he has got nowhere, although 
some 30 witnesses in the barracks at the time signed statements describing 
how Capt Gordeyev was shot dead. At his funeral his battalion commander said 
he died "defending his subordinates from arbitrary authority". 

Nevertheless, army prosecutors, after first refusing to reply to inquiries, 
at first pretended that Chechen fighters had killed Col Gordeyev's son in a 
raid on his barracks. Later they admitted their claim was a mistake. 

In January Col Gordeyev delivered a letter asking for an inquiry to the 
office of Vladimir Putin, Russia's acting president. The official in charge 
treated him with contempt. "I said I would appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights," said Col Gordeyev, "but the official told me, 'Five thousand 
people are already doing that. Who needs you?' " 

*******

#9
Segodnya
March 3, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
HOW MUCH DOES THE CHECHEN WAR COST?
By Oleg ODNOKOLENKO

How much did Russian tax-payers have to spend on the North 
Caucasian anti-terrorist operation? We are not asking this 
question out of idle curiosity because the federals still have 
to re-establish constitutional order in Chechnya, also 
restoring its war-torn economy. The Russian Federation's acting 
president, who behaves rather cautiously, doesn't cite any 
statistics whatsoever. For his own part, First Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Finance Mikhail Kasyanov has recently 
noted that the entire operation cost 5 billion roubles. This 
sum total was apparently spent by the Government by late 
January 2000.
According to Kasyanov, the federal center, which wanted to 
spend 3.5 billion roubles on the entire anti-terrorist 
operation, was, nonetheless, unable to attain this goal. 
Kasyanov's statement has served to confuse Russia's wise men. 
For instance Yegor Gaidar's research institute estimates that 
at least 4 billion roubles are being spent on pacifying 
Chechnya each month. Frankly speaking, any person, who can use 
a pocket calculator, will have no trouble proving that Kasyanov 
doesn't tell the whole truth. Each soldier fighting in Chechnya 
gets an average of 900 roubles per day.
Multiply this sum by the number of soldiers serving with the 
combined army group's combat elements -- 50,000, all told. (The 
entire combined-army group numbers 93,000 -- Ed.) After that, 
you should multiply the resultant sum total by the Chechen 
campaign's duration, or 180 days; and you'll get about 8 
billion roubles.
Therefore it turns out that nearly 8 billion roubles were spent 
in the form of "combat" payments alone.
But that's not all. Segodnya asked a group of experts to 
do some figuring the other day. And here's what they have found 
out.
Transport costs, e.g. the transportation of troops and 
ammunition trains, as well as daily aircraft flights, etc., 
cost approximately 2.5 billion roubles. Add to this fuel costs, 
which are usually disregarded during just about any war. Quite 
possibly, that two-billion-rouble sum being stipulated within 
the framework of the entire weapons-and-equipment procurement 
program has already been "fired" through gun barrels, experts 
say. The remaining appropriations, e.g. additional rations, 
free uniforms and footwear, funeral subsidies, as well as 
compensations to the families of KIAs (Killed In Action), which 
include 10-year wages, and disability pensions, seem like a 
mere trifle against this background.
Kasyanov, who is not a man in uniform, knows only too well 
that any cheap wars are out of the question. Meanwhile one 
should keep in mind that presidential elections are fast 
approaching.
Consequently, unregistered defense appropriations tend to 
tarnish the entire show-case prosperity picture a great deal.
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Finance boasts a time-tested 
"virtual-reality" accounting methodology. For example, one can 
say that all petroleum, oil and lubricants, as well as 
artillery shells, which are borrowed from reserve depots, cost 
nothing at all. By the way, Gen. Kornukov in charge of Russia's 
Air Force, who hinted not so long ago that his units lack 
top-quality munitions, was rebuked for making this statement. 
But the thing is that anyone, who takes something from one 
place, should replenish such stocks from some other source. 
Consequently, this would require additional federal-budget 
appropriations.
The federal center has found a rather interesting option, 
as it pays money to all personnel taking part in hostilities. 
The relevant appropriations are derived from the budget's 
pay-grade item early each year, that is, when ample financial 
opportunities still exist. Besides, a bill on amending the 
federal-budget law is to be drafted throughout the fourth 
quarter when local law-enforcement agencies are even unable to 
pay generals' aides.
The aforesaid bill's provisions would mention the war's 
real-life cost, as far as Russian tax-payers are concerned. 
However, this will only happen after elections.
Meanwhile Russia's citizens should know all about specific 
defense-spending volumes and their break-down at a time when 
this country keeps spending a greater share of its GDP on 
defense and security (with the exception of state-debt 
servicing appropriations) than on the entire economy. The 
Russian defense budget fits into several federal-budget items, 
thereby enabling the authorities to juggle with statistics, as 
they fit. For its own part, the State Duma is also having 
trouble monitoring Russia's defense appropriations just because 
only a limited number of its members can take part in drafting 
the national defense budget.
Should the Government pay less money to its soldiers, who 
are involved in hostilities? Besides, should it spend less on 
their weaponry? Well, these issues seem irrelevant today.
Perhaps, the personnel of combat elements should get five times 
or even ten times more money. Meanwhile we just bluntly pose 
the question of the anti-terrorist operation's real costs, also 
inquiring about other defense-related appropriations. In fact, 
this implies elementary respect for our own legislators and 
voters.

*******

#10
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
March 3, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
THE WAY WE ARE TO CHOOSE
Programs of the Main Presidential Candidates Radically 
Differ on Basic Economic Principles 
By Sergei MITROKHIN, State Duma deputy, Yabloko 
Putin. Results of "Yeltsinism"

Our present situation makes about half of Russia's 
potential electorate dream of a return to the situation which 
existed in the 80s and only 5% to 10%, that is, those who made 
a fortune during the Boris Yeltsin era, or a period of 
"Yeltsinism" will vigorously fight for the continuation of the 
present course because they have a lot to lose otherwise. A 
considerable part of Russia's population (the coming election 
will show how large) realise that Yeltsins come and go, while 
the country in which they and their children will live deserves 
a better lot. They want their creative potentialities to be 
given vent at last so that they could help handle this problem.
What are the platforms to be appraised by those voters who 
will really choose between candidates and not mechanically vote 
for the one who is being imposed on them? Let us consider the 
economic planks of the platforms of the presidential race 
leaders - Gennady Zyuganov, Vladimir Putin and Grigory 
Yavlinsky, as it is the views of one of them that will 
determine the country's possibilities in its domestic and 
foreign policy.
Putin's economic program is unlikely to be made public at 
all. The best which can be expected from him is a new political 
manifesto of a kind, similar to that he made in the end of 
February.
Zyuganov's and Yavlinsky's intentions are well known from 
the election platforms of the parties they head, which form the 
base of their presidential programs.
Putin rather highly appraises the results of his Cabinet's 
work in the past few months, believing that he takes credit for 
the current production growth. In the meantime, experts almost 
unanimously say that the devaluation resource has been 
practically exhausted and predict a period of stagnation 
fraught with the danger of a new recession. The authorities, 
however, ignore their warning. They do not take into 
consideration the temporary character of the factor of high 
world prices on energy sources, which ensure a relative 
well-being of the country's current financial situation.
Meanwhile, it is important to foresee difficulties with 
budget performance owing to our burdensome foreign debt 
liabilities. But these are current tasks, because there is no 
ground to hope that we will be unable to preserve present 
positive economic dynamics. Growing budgetary tax proceeds do 
not raise any doubts about the fulfilment of the obligations 
with regard to wage and pension indexation. If the situation 
begins deteriorating, the government has a powerful reserve in 
the form of tightening performance discipline (a crackdown on 
floppiness, changes in the composition of ministries, etc.).
There are doubts, however, about the stability of both the 
course pursued and the country's economic system. The position 
of the government concerning the external debt causes anxiety. 
The issue at hand is not the failure of the negotiations with 
the London Club of creditor banks but the striving to delay the 
solution of the problem till later, instead of searching for 
its positive settlement now that there is a chance to improve 
some things. I would not like to think that there is a link 
between Mikhail Kasyanov's behaviour and the possibility for 
certain commercial structures to make big money on changes in 
the quotations of the Russian debt.
Very serious apprehensions are raised by the notorious 
treasury bills, or the GKO pyramid, the risk of building which 
contenders to the country's leadership are going to take in the 
next four years. The previous GKO pyramid which emptied the 
pockets of people also began with the GKO yield not exceeding 
he established level for some time. Enough of the tales that it 
is allegedly a non-inflationary means to cope with budget 
problems.
We have already paid for the imprudence of the builders of the 
first pyramid by a three-fold growth of prices and the loss of 
our savings in the so-called system-forming banks. Against this 
background, it is difficult to understand Putin's words that 
it's unbecoming to us to be "petty thieves" Maybe he doesn't 
like the word "petty"?
Proceeding from the real state of affairs in all the 
spheres and the situation of each Russian, Zyuganov and 
Yavlinsky unanimously appraise Yeltsin's course as "tragic" for 
the present and future of Russia. But while communists do not 
take the trouble to provide any arguments, believing that the 
substitution of reforms by capitalist restoration could not 
produce any other results owing to the faulty character of the 
aim itself, Yavlinsky blames Yeltsin and his team for strategic 
mistakes they made in the course of reforms, which discredited 
reforms and democracy in the eyes of Russians. Without making 
ideological assessments, Yavlinsky regards a market-based 
system as the only possible system now for the solution of the 
entire package of the problems of the country as a whole and 
each of its citizens in foreign and domestic policies, 
economics and the social sphere.
Both Zyuganov and Yavlinsky are sure that the country has 
been plunged into decay and a considerable part of the 
potential it inherited from the plan-based system has been lost 
(eaten up, squandered and stolen) in the past ten years.

Alternatives: Appraising Feasibility

Let us begin with Putin because owing to the lack of 
information, very little can be added to his striving to avoid 
"sharp steps" in the pursuit of the previous course. Realising, 
however, that this course is unattractive for the absolute 
majority of Russians, the emphasis is on the need for order in 
the structures of the executive branch and behaviour of 
independent economic players. This has a traditional definition 
as enhancement of the role of the state, though each of our 
candidates interprets it differently.
In my opinion, Putin and Zyuganov overestimate the 
possibility of the state to exert influence on economic 
processes. Suffice it to mention the fact that real-sector 
enterprises are closely tied to the external market through 
sales markets and sources of raw materials and their economic 
situation depends on the situation in these markets and the 
currency exchange rate. Market situation is beyond our 
possibilities, and even communists to not dare to talk of the 
administrative formation of the ruble exchange rate or 
globalisation of customs regulation. The position of Yavlinsky 
looks much better against this backdrop. Realising the 
hopelessness of management by fiat, he sees the role of the 
state in the formulation of the legislative rules of the 
behaviour of market players and enhancement of control over the 
unconditional fulfilment of these rules. But the creation of 
such legislation is rather doubtful, because the structures 
which have got used so much to economic chaos and which stand 
to benefit by it know how to prevent the adoption of laws which 
do not suit them.
The platforms pay much attention to investments in the 
basic assets of real-sector enterprises. Judging by everything, 
for the government the issue is reduced to restoring the 
attractiveness of the Russian market to foreign investors. In 
Putin's position we are unlikely to find a difference between 
portfolio and strategic investors.
Communists show much anxiety with the state of the 
production assets of real-sector enterprises and regard the 
restoration of state capital investment in science-intensive 
and high-tech industries as a matter of prime importance. The 
strategic precept of Zyuganov's program is that these 
industries are the locomotive which is to pull the country out 
of the crisis. Such an approach is rather problematic, in our 
opinion, as it overestimates the possibilities of the real 
sector with regard to the implementation of target-oriented 
programs.
Yavlinsky's program emphasised the extreme urgency of this 
problem. As distinct from Zyuganov, he does not think that the 
crisis can be overcome thanks to breakthrough industries. His 
position is based on a more sober appraisal of both the state 
of the production base and the capability of the managerial 
apparatus, which has been spoiled by the utter lack of 
responsibility and corruption, to pick out such industries and 
enterprises and ensure the consistent implementation of 
programs.
According to his concept, the economic attractiveness of the 
real sector will be restored after the logjam created by 
radical reformers of the first wave is cleared and when 
financial resources are no longer locked in the banking sphere 
because of the incomparable rate of return in production and in 
financial speculations but freely flow into the real sector. 
Such a situation will be also attractive to banks, domestic 
banks account holders and strategic foreign investors. Then 
efficient owners will replace time-servers parasitizing on 
production assets, which they obtained during voucher 
privatisation, by exploiting them till complete depreciation.

******

#11
From: Matt Taibbi <exile.taibbi@matrix.ru>
Subject: Zhirinovsky: A Complicated Diagnosis
Date: Fri, 3 Mar 

Zhirinovsky: A Complicated Diagnosis
by Dr. N.I. Kimmelman
the eXile

Vladimir Zhirinovsky certainly appears to be the most eccentric of 
prime-time Russian politicians. His often inflammatory rhetoric, fast pace 
of seemingly disorganized speech and hysterical fits have often raised a 
question about his sanity. In public opinion, which is formed by smatterish 
nonsense presented by mass-media pseudo-psychoanalysts, he is considered 
either a schizophrenic (or sometimes paranoiac) or a completely sane 
individual who has adopted such act for the sake of popularity. Neither 
view is true, as we will now establish.

The key to understanding Mr. Zhirinovsky's psyche, we believe, lies in this 
contrast, or even conflict between two basic psychological traits. On one 
hand, he is notorious for his aggressive and irrational behavior. On the 
other hand, he manages to maintain himself as a high-profile politician, 
who is often taken seriously, especially if a certain number of votes is 
needed for some critical decision in the Duma. No schizophrenic or class 
clown would be able to remain in prime-time limelight for almost ten years, 
carefully maneuvering between outrage and respectability and never missing 
an opportunity to cash in. Zhirinovsky is perfectly sane in a forensic or 
psychiatric sense, but he is far from healthy from psychoanalytical point 
of view.

We believe that Zhirinovsky's personality, as we know it, is build around a 
castration complex. We may only speculate on what may be the traumatic 
roots of this disorder, but the two most readily available hypotheses are: 
threat of circumcision or actual circumcision. The first scenario often 
develops as a boy indulges in excessive masturbation. Alarmed parents in a 
futile attempt to stop him from this inappropriate activity threaten to 
take him to a doctor, who will cut it off (depending on the gravity of 
case, "it" may refer to foreskin or even the penis itself). The other 
scenario is that a boy is circumcised at a relatively mature age, and then 
becomes a subject of ridicule by peers and suffers from acute sense of 
inferiority. (Let me remind you that vast majority of boys in Russia, and 
especially Kazakhstan, where the subject of this article was born, are not 
customarily subjected to this operation). In the unconscious, circumcision 
symbolically represents the act of castration, and threat of circumcision 
or late involuntary circumcision leads to formation of castration anxiety.

Whatever caused it in our subject, the castration complex is manifest in 
his lack of trust and integrity. A castration-complex personality is never 
fully secure in his encounters with others, never trusts them and is afraid 
of intimacy. He always suspects deceit, betrayal, a covert attempt at 
performing forced castration. The fact that all the property of 
Zhirinovsky's "Liberal-Democtaric" party was registered in his name, as he 
did not trust his fellow party members, goes to illustrate this argument. 
Another example of this is that when elected Deputy Speaker of Duma, 
Zhirinovsky transferred leadership in his party to his little-known and 
inexperienced son, rather than some prominent figure. The threat of 
castration emanates from the superior figures, or sometimes peers. Only in 
rare and, we must note, some very complicated cases is it associated with 
offspring.

Zhirinovsky's notorious lack of integrity and commitment is another 
expression of his castration anxiety. This type of personality would never 
put himself in the situation of obligation or commitment, where he can be 
held for his word, since in a castration-fear-driven unconscious this would 
have the connotation of being held by the penis, and possibly being 
subjected to castration. In order to avoid this, such an individual tries 
hard to be slippery and flexible as an eel, to constantly change his 
position and alliances.

However, as some critical readers would probably notice, this is not a full 
picture of Mr. Zhirinovsky's personality. What we still have unaccounted 
for is his aggressive and violent side, behavior typical for a 
hyper-phallic macho personality. Does this contradict our hypothesis?

No, it does not. In fact it is yet another symptom of his underlying 
neurotic conflict. Unconsciously, the subject fears that he may have been 
subjected to castration. He also fears that this may become public 
knowledge. So, in order to prove himself and others that he is intact, he 
resorts to this exaggerated phallic behavior. As a result, we observe a 
complex castration-phallic type of character, whose main pattern consists 
of announcing: "I have a penis!", and then quickly retracting: "But I will 
not let you touch it, or you will castrate me!".

******

#12
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 4, No. 45, Part I, 3 March 2000

CANDIDATE ZYUGANOV COMPLAINS ABOUT FSB. Communist Party 
leader and presidential candidate Gennadii Zyuganov commented 
recently on the latest statements of the Federal Security 
Service (FSB) about possible terrorist attacks and possible 
attempts on the life of acting President Putin, "Pravda" 
reported on 3 March. Zyuganov said that "the FSB is not 
supposed to announce terrorist acts--it is supposed to 
prevent them." He continued that such an announcement is 
"either a demonstration of incompetence by the secret 
services or a moral and psychological preparation of the 
public for attempts on the acting life of the president and 
for the next bombings of their apartment buildings." JAC

ENVIRONMENTALISTS REPORT MORE POLICE PRESSURE. A spokesperson 
for Greenpeace's Moscow office told "The Moscow Times" on 3 
March that a local district police station received orders 
from the Moscow Interdepartmental Anti-Terrorist Commission 
to seal their offices. However, the orders so far have not 
been implemented. Meanwhile, the Union of Councils for Soviet 
Jews issued a press release the previous day reporting that 
prominent scientist and environmental researcher Vladimir 
Soifer has been officially informed by Russian police that he 
is forbidden to leave the country and will be arrested if he 
attempts to do so. Last month, a spokesperson for the 
Primorskii Krai directorate of the FSB accused Soifer of 
being in possession of documents that could be of use to NATO 
in its program for high-precision weapons (see "RFE/RL 
Newsline," 22 February 2000). JAC

NEW, CHEAPER STATE-PRODUCED VODKA TO BE CALLED 'PUTINSKAYA'? 
Deputy State Property Minister Sergei Molozhavy said on 2 
March that legal vodka production accounts for between 65 
percent and 70 percent of total output. He added that the 
traditional level of legal vodka production in industrialized 
countries is around 75 percent. "Kommersant-Daily" reported 
the next day that State Duma deputy (Fatherland-All Russia) 
Gennadii Kulik proposed the previous day establishing a state 
monopoly on low price vodka, which would sell in stores for 
20 rubles (70 cents) for a half-liter. According to the 
daily, the chairman of the board of Rosalko suggested that 
the vodka be called "Putinskaya" vodka. Addressing a round- 
table on the role of the state in the alcoholic drink market, 
Kulik declared that "vodka helps us to conduct a normal life" 
and that the price of a bottle of vodka in relation to the 
average wage is too high. JAC

*******

Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: 
http://www.cdi.org/russia