March 2, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4142 4143 4144

Johnson's Russia List
#4143
2 March 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AFP: Bure and Kournikova - a Russian love story.
2. Interfax: CENTER OF STRATEGIC PROJECTS TO PREPARE PHILOSOPHY OF RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENT.
3. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, New Thousand-Year Reich? (re Center for Strategic Projects and German Gref)
4. Interfax: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA DROPS BY 18.8%.
5. Interfax: MOSCOW BLASTS U.S. STATE DEPARTAMENT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.
6. NEW WEB-SITE FOR ECAAR-RUSSIA. (ECONOMISTS ALLIED FOR ARMS REDUCTION)
7. Jerry Hough: What Putin should do.
8. Matt Bivens: donating blood.
9. 23rd annual Arden House Conference in New York: Two Presidential Elections: What will New Leadership Mean for Russia and the United States?
10. Robert Devane: Skuratov case.
11. NTV: INTERVIEW WITH RADIO LIBERTY CORRESPONDENT ANDREI BABITSKY.
12. Boris Nemtsov: Chechnya, Russia and the World.
13. Interfax: OVER THIRD OF RUSSIANS BELIEVE ATTEMPT ON PUTIN'S LIFE IN WORKS - POLL.
14. Reuters: Patrick Lannin, ANALYSIS-Chechnya takes Putin close to poll triumph.
15. Reuters: Sweden's hunt for red herrings? (DJ: Far from being the only Cold War red herring, particularly in the Reagan era.)]

******

#1
AFP
March 2,2000
Bure and Kournikova - a Russian love story

The news that sports stars Anna Kournikova and Pavel Bure are engaged has hit 
Russia like a thunderbolt.

Pictures of the happy couple took the front page of just about every 
newspaper in the country.

While the couple involved remain coy about the engagement, Russians are 
already taking the fact for granted and they are wondering who will replace 
the number one bachelor for thousands of Russian girls.

Pavel Bure is undoubtedly a heartthrob, both on and off the rink.

He virtually single-handedly led the Russian ice hocky team to a silver in 
the 1998 Olympics, and his good looks and lavish lifestyle have made him a 
gossip column staple.

The only element missing in the golden boy's life was a matching love story.

Now it has happened, game, set and match to tennis starlet Anna Kournikova, 
and no one is more delighted than Bure's grandmother, that her grandson has 
finally found his mate.

She thinks Pavel has indeed fallen in love, and she said he told her that if 
he ever married, he would marry a Russian girl.

But that Russian girl, unlike her fiance, has relatively few fans in Russia 
because of her perceived antipathy to her home country.

Anna Kournikova's media skills leave much to be desired, she refused to speak 
in Russian during a news conference in Moscow, much to the fury of the local 
press.

Although the couple met in Florida, many Russians are sure the main 
attraction between Bure and Kournikova was their shared nationality.

Naturally everyone expects them to get married at home, but nothing has been 
confirmed yet. 

******

#2
CENTER OF STRATEGIC PROJECTS TO PREPARE PHILOSOPHY OF RUSSIAN
DEVELOPMENT

MOSCOW. March 1 (Interfax) - The Center of strategic projects will
not manage to complete a comprehensive program on the development of
economic, political and social reforms in the country by the time of the
presidential elections the head of the Center, German Gref said today.
However the philosophy surrounding such a program will be offered
to the head of state by March 26.
In an interview with the Russian weekly Argumenty i Fakty, Gref
said "At present, we have a draft document which we call a "Manifesto."
It could well be interpreted as a philosophy of this program. This
philosophy implies liberal reforms in society, in authority, and in the
economy."
The program will consist of four parts the first of which Gref has
described as a "new Social Contract [the original being Rousseau's
famous work]." It will fix commitments to be assumed by each of the
parties in the relations of "authority to citizen," "authority to
business," and "employer to employee."
The key postulate here is that state promises "must correspond with
state abilities," Gref said. At the present time, the state "does not
honor its obligations, deceives the people and deceives enterprises."
The second part of the future program is to deal with the reform of
authority. The state under market economy must first of all "learn to
use market levers rather than administrative ones," Gref said.
The third part relating to the modernization of the economy is in
fact what "was previously called" an economic program.
The concluding part of the program will deal with Russia's foreign
policy, or, as the authors put it, Russia's "new place" in the world.
The touchstone of this part is that "foreign policy must be determined
by national, mainly economic, interests," Gref stressed.
He pointed out that the authors of the program assume that "there
is no special way for Russia." The individuality of the Russian way must
consist in the assumption that "reforms that were tested by time and
world practice should be matched with Russian values and originality,"
they said.

*******

#3
Moscow Times
March 2, 2000 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: New Thousand-Year Reich? 
By Pavel Felgenhauer 

Last week, I attended a foreign-sponsored conference in Moscow, hoping to get 
a first-hand brief on acting President Vladimir Putin's future reform 
priorities. German Gref, chief of the Center for Strategic Projects, was to 
tell potential investors what Russia's future will be. 

The Center for Strategic Projects was founded last fall by Putin himself, 
while Gref is considered by many in Moscow to be Putin's right-hand economic 
guru. Today Gref is in great demand, and last week he addressed at least two 
conferences (U.S.- and German-sponsored). 

I do not know whether the conference organizers paid Gref an honorarium, or, 
if so, whether Gref actually accepted such an offer. But I do know that, if 
money was paid, it was squandered. Gref's presentation was nice, but 
irrationally unspecific. Gref announced that Russian government bureaucrats 
are corrupt and that the state needs honest chinovniki to regulate economic 
development. But Gref did not tell us how to convert the numerous old Soviet 
apparatchiki and new Russian thugs that today dominate Russian's government 
into honest civil servants. The only idea put forward was the institution of 
a pay increase for the myriad bureaucrats. 

Of course, Gref did not explain where the government will find the extra 
money to substantially raise the official pay of Russian chinovniki, whose 
numbers have swollen since the demise of the Soviet Union. Nor did Gref 
explain how a simple wage hike can make good Christians out of seasoned 
Russian kleptocrats. For years the Russian Central Bank has been paying its 
chinovniki on par with commercial bank executives, ostensibly to prevent 
corruption. But is the Central Bank in fact corruption-free? The highly paid 
Central Bank chinovniki have stationed billions of public funds with obscure, 
offshore companies and done other disreputable things. 

Is Gref serious when he insists that a "strong government" under Putin will 
create "equal rules for all"? Or is this a liberal smoke screen? 

Gref's public pronouncements are pathetic in their lack of detail. 
Nevertheless, time and again Gref disclaims all possible responsibility for 
future Putin policies. Gref said that "we have a patron [Putin] and we 
[members of the Center for Strategic Projects] are just trying to figure out 
what this patron actually wants." Gref also stated that "Putin's economic 
program is being drafted by Putin's campaign staff, not by the Center for 
Strategic Projects." If Putin is a true "reformer," as many Western officials 
seem to indicate, what is Gref so afraid of? 

Putin's election manifesto, published last week, is also vague on specific 
details of future policies, but it did lay out some of what Putin stands for: 
Russia is a "rich country of poor people" and Russia's two main problems, its 
sources of weakness, are "lack of will" and "lack of firmness." This main 
tune of Putin's manifesto sounds distinctly familiar: In the early 1930s in 
Europe there was a "reformer" named Adolf Hitler, who believed that Germany 
was a potentially rich country, but that Germans were maliciously robbed of 
their wealth, and that the main source of German weakness was "lack of will." 

Today Putin's "will" and "firmness" are displayed in Chechnya, where hundreds 
of thousands of Russian citizens have been killed, tortured, robbed or 
forcibly displaced. Putin also has stated that Chechnya "is the first step" 
in establishing "a dictatorship of the law that is fair to all." 

Gref stated last week that he is preparing for Putin a 10-year development 
plan. He immediately began to mumble a disclaimer: "Well, of course, the 
present Russian Constitution allows only two four-year presidential terms for 
one man, so the same plan may be for eight years, not 10, if nothing changes, 
you know." Gref knows it will change, of course. Two days later, Putin 
spelled out the reform plan: The Constitution would be changed to expand 
Russia's presidential term from four to seven years. After the March 26 
presidential elections, one would expect, the Russian Constitution will be 
rewritten through a referendum, and Putin could become in effect a president 
for life with greatly enhanced centralized powers. Then all other citizens 
will truly be "equal" in their insignificance, compared with Putin. 

However, foreign investors need not worry too much. At least some of them 
will comprise a privileged class in Putin's Russia, just as General Motors 
and Ford did well in Nazi Germany. The only problem may be that regimes that 
kill and torture thousands to impose "order" are never truly stable. Such 
"thousand-year Reichs" tend to collapse rather early, even if their tax codes 
are sound and their employment laws efficient. 

*******

#4
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA DROPS BY 18.8%

MOSCOW. March 1 (Interfax) - Foreign investment in the non-
financial sector of the Russian economy dropped by 18.8% from 1998 to
$9.56 million last year.
The State Committee for Statistics cited these figures Wednesday.
Direct investment in the Russian economy was worth $4.26 million
[44.6% of the total sum of investment]. From 1998, direct investment
grew by 26.7%, according to the figures quoted.
Portfolio investment in 1998 fell more than five fold to $31
million [0.3%] in 1999. Other investment comprised $5.26 billion [55.1%
of the total], a 35.9% decrease since 1998.
$29.25 billion worth of foreign investment had been saved in the
Russian economy by the end of 1999.

*******

#5
MOSCOW BLASTS U.S. STATE DEPARTAMENT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

MOSCOW. March 1 (Interfax) - The accusing tone of the U.S. State
Department's annual human rights report is unacceptable, the Russian
Foreign Ministry said.
In the report's section on Russia, its authorities are blamed for a
deteriorating situation concerning legal protection in several regions.
The Russian authorities were accused of human rights violations during
the anti-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, the ministry said in
a statement obtained by Interfax on Wednesday.
The U.S. State Department "used unreliable, specially selected
information about the federal action in Chechnya," the statement reads.
The report "keeps quiet about the scale of illegal Chechen
terrorist activity. It called for the Russian authorities to implement
extraordinary measures to restore Constitutional order and protect
Russia's territorial integrity," the statement reads.
"The State Department ignored the fact that the anti-terrorist
operation was aimed at restoring human rights and legality in Chechnya."
"The accusing tone of the report is unacceptable, most notably its
attacks on the Russian Orthodox Church leadership. It demonstrates the
State Department's bias concerning the legal situation in Russia," the
statement says.
"Moreover, the report says nothing about the systematic and mass
human rights violations of tens of thousands of people in Latvia and
Estonia."
"The surprising thing is that the report does not have a section on
the human rights situation in the United States. According to a lot of
non-governmental organizations, it is far from perfect in the issues of
the death penalty, racial discrimination and anti-Semitism," the
statement reads.

*******

#6
Date: Wed, 01 Mar 2000
From: "stanislav menshikov" <menschivok@globalxs.nl> 
Subject: NEW WEB-SITE FOR ECAAR-RUSSIA

Announcing the brand-new ECAAR-Russia site on the world-wide web

Dear Friends,

ECAAR-Russia is the Russia national chapter of the international system of
associations of ECONOMISTS ALLIED FOR ARMS REDUCTION. Initially created in
the late 1980s in the US, ECAAR today has national affiliates in the United
Kingdom, France, Canada, Israel, Netherlands and Belgium, India, Japan,
South Africa, Chile, Australia and Russia. 

We are happy to announce that the ECAAR-Russia site on the web is now
operative. The address is http://www.ecaar-russia.org 

2/3 of the information is in Russian, and about 1/3 in English.There are
also direct links to homepages of other national ECAAR affiliates. 

Our activities are summarized in "What is ECAAR-Russia" (found on the main
menu) and discussed in detail in the regular ECAAR-Russia Newsletters (last
one dated January 2000) -- see menu..

The site features SPECIAL REPORTS on:

RESTRUCTURING THE RUSSIAN MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
RUSSIA FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21st CENTURY 
MEASURES TO RATIONALIZE THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
MACROPOLICIES TO HELP RE-START ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RUSSIA

Also soon to appear on the site:

NEW PAPERS ON REFORMS IN RUSSIA BY: 
MARSHALL GOLDMAN
JOSEPH STIGLITZ
DAVID ELLERMAN

You are VERY welcome to participate in our FORUM. Send your comments,
questions and short manuscripts and we shall publish them in this section.
If you have an article or paper that is just written and not yet published
elsewhere, feel free to send it to us and we will place it in the Papers
section. 

All mail to the site should be addressed to info@ecaar-russia.org.

You are free to forward this message to any colleagues you wish to keep
informed. You may want to post a notice in your Newletter and on your web
site, including a link connection to our site at

http://www.ecaar-russia.org. If you do so, please let us know.

You are also free to reproduce our materials on your site with due
reference to the source. We would appreciate letting us know of such
publications.

All my very best wishes,
Stanislav Menshikov
Co-Chair
ECAAR-Russia

******

#7
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2000
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@duke.edu>
Subject: What Putin should do

The speculation about what Putin will do continues endlessly, but 
no one can know. We should focus on what he should do.

The word "strong state" has several meanings. Many are police 
repression or support of Pinochet market reform. But strong state can also 
mean a strong economic role. It can mean a willingness to control the 
streets if the rise in food prices from agricultural reform causes some 
unrest. But we should encourage real agricultural reform and the use of 
the state to support investment until a sound banking system is formed, 
instead of precisely the opposite as we have done.

The discussion about Yasin is not totally informed. Originally 
Yasin was a proponent of the German or Japanese banking system, closely 
tied to government. That is what is needed. But when he predicts 2-3 
percent growth over the next years, that implies he will not or will not 
be permitted to go that way, for it would produce stronger growth.

I still think that the problem is Yeltsin. He always put 
together incompatible advisers and insisted on subsidies. The result 
was the mess Russia got. The point needs to be made that the best is 
the enemy of the good. There are going to be subsidies, and the West 
should not pretend otherwise. Consumption can be subsidized either 
directly through things like free electricity, or it can be subsidized 
through investment that produces jobs and output. The latter is 
obviously better, and the West should encourage it. I continue to think 
that Yeltsin rules and that this will become official after the 
election. Someone in the Family or otherwise should tell him that he 
needs to go back to his roots as a construction engineer and 
administrator. He needs to go back to the agricultural reform of NEP 
and his grandfather. If he understands this and forgets the bad advise 
he has been getting, Russia will boom. That will benefit the 
investments of the Family, and everyone will be happy. The enormous 
danger is that the rise of oil prices and the writing off of loans will 
just relieve the pressure to get foreign investment to cover deficits and 
allow them to continue the failed policy of the past for the next five 
years. It would be a dreadful prospect. To repeat, Yeltsin is a 
construction engineer, and he should start emphasizing construction. 
It would even make him feel good.

*******

#8
Date: Wed, 01 Mar 2000 
From: Matt Bivens <bivens@imedia.ru> 
Subject: donating blood

Last week Komsomolskaya Pravda invited those of us who work in the Pressa
Publishing House building to come donate blood to help Russian soldiers
wounded
in Chechnya. I did so, and since I was an American and Moscow Times editor
I had
the pleasure of being interviewed by a Komsomolka reporter, who wanted to know
why I was giving blood, and did it mean I supported the war?

For all sorts of reasons, I chose my words carefully. I said something nice --
that during the first war I had enjoyed the hospitality of soldiers and
officers
in Grozny, and so was happy to return some hospitality (or blood, or whatever)
-- and then I said, "But I think what's happening in Chechnya is nerazumno
(unreasonable; unwise)." At that the reporter's face fell, he thanked me and
left. The next day (Saturday, Feb. 26) I found myself quoted in Komsomolka
saying: "One can hold different opinions [mozhno po-raznomy otnositsya] about
what's happening in Chechnya." And then telling my nice soldier hospitality
story.

The moral of the story is: I got a free Komsomolskaya Pravda t-shirt. Plus a
headspinningly large plastic cup of red wine (it rejuvenates the blood, it
seems) and lots of orange-caviar-on-white-bread snacks. Komsomolka reports
that the blood drive raised enough to "help 60 wounded soldiers."

******

#9
Date: Wed, 01 Mar 2000 15:51:16 -0500
From: Daniel Gurvich <dgurvich@fas.harvard.edu>
Subject: 23rd annual Arden House Conference.

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Prof. Marshall I. Goldman has asked me to forward some information to you
regarding the 23rd annual Arden House Conference on East-West relations,
which our Davis Center for Russian Studies sponsors jointly with the
Harriman Institute at Columbia. Please find a brief statement about the
conference and a copy of the program attached as MS Word files. Please add
a notice on our confrerence to your list. Thank you very much for your help.

Daniel Gurvich
Staff Assistant 
Davis Center for Russian Studies
Harvard University
1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-8900
(617) 495-8319 fax
dgurvich@fas.harvard.edu

23rd annual Arden House Conference

The Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University and the Harriman
Institute at Columbia University will hold their 23rd Annual Conference on
East-West Relations on April 14th-16th this year. The theme will be "Two
Presidential Elections: What will New Leadership Mean for Russia and the
United States?"

This year's program promises to be one of the best. Those who have already
agreed to participate include Boris Nemtsov, the new Deputy Speaker of the
Duma and former First Deputy Prime Minister, Vladimir Lukin, a leader of
the Yabloko Party and the former Russian ambassador to the United States,
as well as Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador at Large to the NIS. US
Representatives Curt Weldon (R-PA) and Nita Lowey (D-NY) have also agreed
to participate in a discussion between Duma members and Congressmen about
how the different parliamentary bodies view the relationship.

One of the most interesting sessions will look at "Money Laundering, or how
to be Taken to the Cleaners in Russia". Thomas Fuentes, the Section Chief
of the Organized Crime Division of the FBI, will participate, as well as
Raymond Kendall, the Secretary General of Interpol, and Raymond Bonner, a
writer for the New York Times who has followed closely the money laundering
activities and the Russian Mafia. There will also be sessions on the
economic situation, US-Russian conflict, the struggle for stockholder
rights, and prospecting and holding on to oil. The conference usually
attracts high level representatives of the business, government,
journalistic, and academic communities.

******

#10
From: "Robert Devane" <robertdevane@transts.ru>
Subject: Skuratov case.
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2000 

Just in case this doesn't get picked up by the media, I'd like to give JRL
readership a heads up on last night's Glas Naroda (Voice of the People) on
NTV. Last night's program, hosted by Yevgeny Kiselyov, focused on the Yuri
Skuratov case. In addition to Skuratov, featured guests of the program
included Tamara Marschakova, Deputy Chairperson of the Constitutional Court,
Valentin Stepankov, former Prosecutor General, and Yuri Bagrayev, a major
general in the Military Prosecutor's Office, who was initially given
Skuratov's case to investigate. The most interesting remarks came from
Bagrayev. He charged that the case that served as the official reason for
Skuratov's removal from office was concocted with gross violations of
Russian law. Most importantly, he directly linked Vladimir Putin and the
current head of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev to these violations of law.
Bagrayev charged that Putin and Patrushev had exceeded their authority, and
that their actions could serve as the basis of launching a criminal case. I
believe that this was the first instance of Putin being accused of criminal
wrongdoing by a competent prosecutor. Even though Bagrayev has been de facto
removed from his job, de jure he remains on active duty and is therefore
formally a military prosecutor.

One other incident should be mentioned. Immediately after Bagrayev's remarks
there was a momentary glitch in the live broadcast of the program. It looked
as though the signal was momentarily cut off and resumed a couple of seconds
later. From a layman's perspective it looked as though some redundancy
system kicked in. Coincidence or not?

******

#11
TITLE: INTERVIEW WITH RADIO LIBERTY CORRESPONDENT ANDREI BABITSKY
(HERO OF THE DAY NTV PROGRAM, 19:40, FEBRUARY 29, 2000)
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE

Anchor: Good evening, this is the Hero of the Day program. A
few days ago, here in this studio, I spoke with the wife of the
journalist Andrei Babitsky, Lyudmila. When we were parting, I told
her: "Lyuda, let's hope for the best. For some reason I believe
that Andrei is alive and will return home soon."

It had so happened that only a few days after my talk with the
wife of Valentin Vlasov he returned to Moscow from his Chechen
captivity.

I am very glad that this time, too, a similar thing has
happened. Andrei returned home last night. After his difficult
previous days he could not come to the studio. That is why I am
offering you an interview that was recorded last night by my
colleague Airat Shavaliyev immediately after Babitsky's return to
Moscow. You have heard a part of this conversation in the news
bulletin. Now I am offering you a fuller version.

Babitsky: I will be quite brief. As you know, I have just
returned. The entire family is not sleeping. 

Well, on the 2nd, I believe it was February, investigator
Chernyavsky of the Naursky Prosecutor's Office signed a resolution
on my release from detention. This was done in substitution of ...

Shavaliyev: Excuse me, but could you start with the very first
day?

A: Oh, that is such a long story. Then I will be very
fragmentary. On the 16th I tried to leave the city of Grozny
through the settlement of Staraya Sunzha, a suburb of Grozny which
at the time was divided into two parts. One part was controlled by
federal troops and the other by the Chechen home guard.

I entered the territory controlled by the federals and it was
there that I was recognized. I was identified as a journalist, I
immediately presented my documents. All the subsequent claims that
I was detained as a person who had to be identified are not quite
clear to me. I had my passports with me, my accreditation card of
a foreign correspondent.

Then I was taken to Khankala. Not what journalists who had
covered the first war regarded as Khankala but to an open field.
There was an encampment there consisting of trucks used as their
office by army intelligence officers. Two of my cassettes that I
had filmed in Grozny were taken from me. They contained unique
frames. I think those were the last video pictures ever taken by
anyone before Grozny was stormed. Those, again, were pictures of
thousands of peaceful civilians many of whom, as we now know, were
killed by federal artillery shells.

I spent two nights in Khankala, in the so-called Avtozak, a
truck converted into a prison cell. On the third day I was taken to
what the Chechens call a filtration center, the preliminary
detention center in Chernokozovo.

I believe I am the only journalist of those who covered the
first and the second Chechen wars who has seen a filtration center
from the inside. I must say that all these horrors that we have
heard from Chechens who had been there have been confirmed.
Everything that we read about concentration camps of the Stalin
period, all that we know about the German camps, all this is
present there. 

The first three days that I spent there, that was the 18th,
19th and the 20th, beatings continued round the clock. I never
thought that I would hear such a diversity of expressions of human
pain. These were not just screams, these were screams of every
possible tonality and depth, these were screams of most diverse
pain. Different types of beatings cause a different reaction.

Q: Are you saying that you got this treatment? 

A: No, that was the treatment meted out to others. I was
fortunate, it was established at once that I am a journalist, true,
nobody knew what type of a journalist I was. Everybody there were
surprised that a journalist happened to be there. In principle, the
people there cannot be described as intellectuals. They decided
that there was nothing special about this, that such things do
happen in a war. As a journalist I was "registered", as they say,
only once. They have this procedure there. When a new detainee is
being taken from his cell to the investigator he is made to crawl
all the way under a rain of blows with rubber sticks.

It hurts but one can survive it. This is a light treatment as
compared with the tortures to which Chechens are subjected day and
night, those who are suspected of collaborating with the illegal
armed formations. There are also cases when some testimony is
beaten out of detainees.

Q: What is the prison population there? 

A: In my opinion... I was in cell No. 17 during the first
three days. In that cell there were 13 inhabitants of the village
Aberdykel (sp.--FNS). Most of them were young. Judging by their
stories, I am not an investigator and I could not collect a
sufficiently full database, but in such an atmosphere one very
rarely doubts the veracity of what you are told. Mostly these were
young men who had nothing to do with the war. They were really
common folk. They were treating everything happening around them as
a calamity but they were not taking any sides. They were simply
waiting for this calamity to pass either in this direction or that
direction. 

Beatings as a method of getting testimony. This is something
that, unfortunately, is very well known in Russian and not only
Russian history and tradition. But I must say that apart from
everything, in my opinion, in all this torture, as it seemed to me,
a large part is due to sheer sadism. In other words, an absolutely
unwarranted torturing of people.

For instance, I heard ... You know, you really can't see this
because all this happens outside of your cell. But the type of the
screams leaves no doubt about what is happening. You know, this
painful reaction. For two hours a woman was tortured on the 20th or
the 19th. She was tortured, I have no other word to explain what
was happening. That was not a hysteria. I am not a medic but I
believe that we all know what a hysteria is. There were screams
indicting that a person was experiencing unbearable pain, and for
a long period of time. 

On the 21st, for instance, a man was tortured for several
hours.

Q: On the 21st of what? 

A: On the 21st of February. No, I am confused with dates. I
left Grozny in January and that was in January. A man was tortured.
He was told that something would be cut off. He was dragged along
the corridor. On the third or fourth day, I do not know in
connection with what, such rampant beatings, such maniacal, sick
beatings, unjustified beatings, beatings unjustified by third
degree interrogations, suddenly began to subside. There were fewer
beatings during the day. This nightmare shifted to the evening,
then the night.

It seems to me that my presence there must have played a role.
You see, some sort of officials began to appear and ask me about my
attitude to what was happening there, if I was subjected to
beatings. Then very definite officials began to appear, the
Prosecutor of Naursky district, the Prosecutor of Chechnya. A
person who introduced himself as a member of the commission for the
release of unlawfully detained servicemen in Chechnya came to me on
the 31st. He said that the Chechen side, through Magomed
Khochilayev, a Dagestani, on behalf of Turpal Atgeriyev, a field
commander, had publicly suggested to swap me for Russian prisoners
of war on condition that I am immediately released.

He asked me if I was ready for such an exchange. I replied
that I was not prepared to give an immediate answer because I was
afraid that my professional reputation could be hurt. I was
suspected of assisting unlawful armed formations and for this
reason this was a difficult matter for me. I was told that this did
not present a problem, that this could be somehow resolved. I said
that I did not know how this could be resolved. I said that in
principle I could not quite understand this variant from a legal
point of view but if somebody could gain freedom as a result of
this, the more so that I had hoped that Turpal Atgeriyev, with whom
I was familiar, proceeded from humanitarian considerations, then I
was ready for this.

I said I was prepared for this and at the same time I refused
to admit being guilty of anything. As an innocent Russian citizen
I was prepared to take part in the exchange. 

On the second, as I said, I was released from detention. I was
ready to go home when a vehicle, popularly called a "tablet", drove
up and I was taken to Gudermes.

I was held in a militia precinct there. The next day, at about
eleven, I was brought out and here, I thought, some mistake was
made with the route and I would be driven out through Dagestan. But
I was taken to a locality that I did not recognize. I saw the road
only through a small barred window. Then a short, skinny young man
came up. I believe he looked like a conman. "I am Igor," he told
me. "Remember, you signed a statement about your readiness to take
part in an exchange." "Yes," I said, "I did sign such a statement
but since then certain events have taken place. I have been a free
man for less than 24 hours. Yet, I was under guard. I regard this
as arbitrariness, I believe that the persons guilty of this should
be punished. Besides, it was said that the exchange would take
place not earlier than after seven days. So far only three days
have passed. I thought that I would have a chance to meet with my
wife." In short, I told them that they were coercing me. 

They tried to explain to me that I am acting hypocritically.
I said that this did not matter. I told them that I had stated my
attitude to them and was prepared for any further development. You
know, there were five men with submachineguns around me and I
realized that in those circumstances there was nothing that I could
do. 

I was handed over to some unidentified persons. I do not know
who they are to this day. This happened as follows. I got into a
vehicle, a mask was put on my head. I was brought to a village and
for three weeks, from the 3rd to the 23rd, I was made to live in a
locked house where I was guarded by two persons. I do suspect who
those people were. But this is a very complex and long story. There
are many versions and each has its proof. But I can't outline them
briefly. 

From Chechnya I was taken to Makhachkala in the trunk of a
car. My escorts insisted, without giving me any option, that I
cross into Azerbaijan. I did not want that. Then they handed me
over to a local guide who was to take me across the fields into
Azerbaijan by a roundabout route. There he was to put me in a taxi.
But I managed to convince the guide that I must go to Makhachkala. 

That was how I found myself in Makhachkala. You know, I had my
fears that these people, on learning that I had not gone to
Makhachkala and changed my route, would try to find me. I did not
go to the law enforcement bodies because I had the feeling that the
people I mentioned had rather good contacts with the law
enforcement bodies. In any case, I was driven in the trunk of a car
from Chechnya through all the checkpoints without any hitches. The
car was never inspected. 

That was why I decided to resort to the services of my
colleagues first of all. On reaching Makhachkala I telephoned my
correspondent in the Caucasus Oleg Kusov, asked him to leave for
Makhachkala immediately and it was my intent, already with Kusov,
to approach our friend in the press center of the Dagestan's
Interior Ministry.

After making the call from a pay phone in the morning I
registered in a hotel and during the day, when I went to a cafe, I
was identified by a local militia officer. I was detained, a day
later I was charged, I was arrested. It is very strange that I was
put in a preliminary detention center and it is very strange that
already last night people from Moscow, those whom I had asked to
guarantee the security of my family in connection with certain
events in Chechnya, told me that they were taking me to Moscow on
my request. 

True, I had a slightly different request. There are many
circumstances that I simply cannot describe briefly.

Q: Do you link these developments with the remarks made by
Putin yesterday? He said that it was not expedient to keep you
behind bars.

A: You know, let this be the last question. I link everything
that is happening with some horrendous, terrible story that I
cannot unravel. I can only make conjectures. And I am deeply
convinced that the authorities, including the Interior Ministry
that is supposedly trying to help me now, are very, very seriously
involved in this confusing situation, in this nightmare experienced
by my family, in my personal very serious troubles and problems,
those that I have experienced during the past two months.

Anchor: Many things are not clear. And, judging by everything,
Andrei does not want or cannot speak about many things. It is hard
to believe that an experienced journalist has no clear idea about
the reasons why events had developed precisely the way they did,
why all this had happened precisely with him.

I hope that we will have a possibility soon to hear from him
the things he is keeping silent about so far.

I thank you for your attention, goodbye. 

*******

#12
Date: Wed, 01 Mar 2000 
From: Nina Khrushcheva <nkhrushcheva@iews.org> 
Subject: Boris Nemtsov on Chechnya 

David: below is Boris Nemtsov's latest article on Chechnya. Please be so
kind to put it on your list. Thank you, Nina
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright:
Project Syndicate: Association of Newspapers Around the World
February 29, 2000

Chechnya, Russia and the World
by Boris Nemtsov

MOSCOW: As the war in Chechnya is winding down and tempers subside, it
may be a good time to revisit the question of what the war has been
about and where it will lead in the future. The West has reacted to the
conflict as a revival of Russian imperialism and a sign that Russia’s
relations with the world are about to grow cold again. Many Russians,
including democratic reformers who do not support many facets of Russian
policy, feel misunderstood.

When Russians speak of their national interests people see visions of a
Soviet-style empire striking back. Nonsense. Except for a small number
of fanatics and a few Slovophiles, Russians see no way back to the
imperial past.

Nor do they want it, even if they could have it. Today, no
irredentist/nationalist movement has significant support in Russia;
nothing like the 15-30% of the vote for the radical nationalists in
France and Austria. I think the Russians don’t get much credit, or even
recognition, for the rather unprecedented equanimity with which they
shrugged off the centuries of imperial tradition. One of the reasons
Russia accepted so peacefully the break-up of the Soviet Union was that
many recognized that the empire and democracy were incompatible. What
Russians seek is economic renewal that they hope will pave the way for
Russia to play a more important role in the life of Europe and the
world.

This is not to say that there is no dose of resentment about the way
Russia has been treated. For a decade we experienced humiliation after
humiliation: the loss of superpower status; vast and disorienting social
problems; NATO's eastern expansion. No one pays any attention to
Russia: not over Yugoslavia; not even over decisions concerning former
soviet republics, where a significant part Russian population still
resides. The West often claimed to be helping; Russia made a show of
gratitude. But honestly speaking, nothing has been done that could not
be explained by pure self interest.

Not that the West did not have a right to act in its self-interest. But
so does Russia. For many people, including our educated, liberal, and
pro-western sectors, the second Chechen war offered a chance to show
that we have not lost everything. Almost all Russians now believe that
we must defend our interests. This is the psychological basis of Putin’s
popularity.

That Russia’s genuine national interest ­ and not its imperial ambitions
­ have been at the root of the second war in Chechnya is not, I think,
sufficiently recognized. Indeed, I was myself a strong supporter of
Putin at the beginning of the hostilities, especially when the campaign
was directed at terrorists. Chechnya was a hotbed of anarchy and
terrorism, with various clans brutally competing with each other and, in
the process, threatening the stability of the whole region. The
aggressive conflict was already spreading to the neighboring Dagestan
and lawlessness was a real danger.

The Chechen War was, in essence, a war for our Constitution, which
differs from, say, the American Constitution only by the depth and
length of its tradition. Imagine if Alabama suddenly overthrew all
democratic institutions. I am sure America would not hesitate for an
instant in reestablishing constitutional government, even if force had
to be used in the process.

So far, the West will not grant Russia the same rights of democratic
self-defense. Russia’s democracy is deemed young, its constitution
unsettled. Because Russian constitutional norms are considered
unstable, imposing them by force appears wilful, anti-democratic. Yet
Russia has the same obligations to defend its constitution as any
country. By defending our constitution we defend democracy.

To be sure, wars have a logic that often defeats the good intentions
with which they are began. As the offensive progressed, the Chechen
bandits largely hid in the mountains, while the Russian might was turned
on the cities where civilians were dying. I could not support the
barbaric bombings and, as war that far outgrew its anti-terrorist
beginnings and the number of refuges reached 200,000, without the
government’s providing a viable program of aid, I began to waiver.

There is also the political price. Though the war brought Putin great
popularity, it also weakened his position. Our generals know that
Putin’s political success depends on Chechnya, and they are blackmailing
him by asking for a 150% increase in defense spending, military training
in schools, and a call up of 20,000 army reservists. Putin must finish
the war soon if he wants to restore his independence.

So far Putin has offered no long-range plan. I am convinced that the
hardest phase of the fighting will end shortly after the elections. Yet
partisan war will burn, like a fire underground. What will we do then?

Since no viable local partner is in sight, Russia will have to start
working alone to reestablish elementary order in Chechnya. A
Governor-General must be appointed, with responsibility for restoring a
basis for human life: a chance to start rebuilding the economy, help for
whose who cannot work, and reconstruction of the shattered
infrastructure. But the people of Chechnya must be brought in as soon
as possible to participate in their government: I think some sort of
parliamentary system would be the best, so that the various clans would
have to work with each other to form coalitions, rather than excluding
each other, as they did under the presidential regime of the last few
years.

The outcome of the Chechen war that matters most for Russia and the
world is the conflict’s impact on our democratic evolution. And here
there is some room for optimism. Elections are preserved. So, too, is
freedom of speech, freedom of the media, and the multi-party system.
The supposed hand-over of the journalist Babitsky to the Chechen rebels,
and the subsequent fears for his life, inspired widespread public
revulsion. This was a very positive sign, for it meant that democracy
has taken root here. The life and treatment of one man mattered, even in
the frenzy of war.

If this year’s violence in Chechnya had occurred in 1991, there would
have been a real threat to our democratic aspirations. But even though
ours is a young constitutional tradition, Russians have been breathing
democratic air for ten years now. We don’t want to breathe any other.
The Chechen war was not only about preserving the Russian state, but
also about preserving our democratic constitution. Russians and
Chechens paid a heavy price in lives lost. We must make sure it is not
in vain.

Boris Nemtsov is a former deputy prime minister of Russia, currently one
of the leaders of the Unity of Right Forces political party and the Vice
Speaker of the Russian Duma.

******

#13
OVER THIRD OF RUSSIANS BELIEVE ATTEMPT ON PUTIN'S LIFE IN WORKS - POLL

MOSCOW. March 1 (Interfax) - Over a third of Russians, 35%, are
inclined to believe that plans for an assassination attempt against
acting Russian President Vladimir Putin, about which the media has
lately reported with reference to the law-enforcement agencies, have
actually been laid, the All-Russia Public Opinion Survey Center (VTsIOM)
told Interfax on Wednesday.
Another 21% of Russians take the view that all this was feigned by
the special services to raise their authority, while 23% believe that
the stories of such an alleged attempt are merely a move in Putin's
presidential campaign. Another 21% of those surveyed were undecided.
These figures were derived from a representative poll of 1,600
adult respondents conducted by VTsIOM on February 25-28, immediately
after Putin's visit to St. Petersburg, where, according to the special
services, the attempt was prepared.

******

#14
ANALYSIS-Chechnya takes Putin close to poll triumph
By Patrick Lannin

MOSCOW, March 2 (Reuters) - Vladimir Putin's forceful drive in bringing the 
Chechnya War close to victory for Moscow has brought him to the brink of a 
personal triumph in presidential elections later this month. 

The acting president's forceful prosecution of the war against the rebels in 
Chechnya has helped turn him from a virtually unknown head of Russia's 
domestic security service in the summer of 1999, to the country's most 
popular politician. 

Some have called Chechnya Putin's only policy but analysts said the end of 
the war was unlikely to cause his ratings to fall. 

Victory seemed likely to prove the acting president was a man who sticks by 
his promises, giving him key political collateral ahead of the March 26 
presidential vote, they said. 

Although his concrete plans if he wins the election are still vague, analysts 
said they thought Russians would give him the benefit of the doubt. 

``He is the first and only person who has shown an ability to take decisions, 
the ability to carry them out and the ability to take responsibility,'' said 
political analyst Leonid Ionin, deacon of Russia's Economic Higher School. 

``In the end, Chechnya has been the lever he is ready to use to turn Russia 
inside out,'' he told Sevodnya newspaper. 

YELTSIN'S HEIR 

Putin began to scale the political heights in August 1999, when he was 
surprisingly plucked by former President Boris Yeltsin from leading the FSB 
security service to take over as prime minister. 

The shock was doubled when Yeltsin named Putin as the man he wanted to 
succeed him, a goal Yeltsin began to realise when he resigned on New Year's 
Eve and named Putin acting president. 

The war has been the backdrop on which Putin has harked on themes of 
rebuilding Russia's might and creating greater stability and order, aims with 
which many Russians agree. 

Taking the war to a successful conclusion seems to confirm these goals and is 
in stark contrast to the pitiful failure of Russia's forces in the previous 
Chechen campaign, from 1994-96, when Moscow's troops withdrew from the region 
in defeat. 

BRIEF BUT STRONG RECORD 

But without the war, does he have any policies? Alain Rousso of the Carnegie 
Centre think tank said this did not matter. 

``The distance between today and the election is so short that he will 
continue to ride this additional bump that he gets from concluding the war in 
a successful fashion, at least in the estimation of most Russians,'' he said. 

``I think that he has got a message that is likely to appeal to a wide cross 
section of voters and now he has a very brief but potent record that will 
tell them that this is a guy who can get things done,'' he said. 

Most opinion polls give Putin a clear lead over his nearest rival, Communist 
leader Gennady Zyuganov. 

The latest from the ROMIR agency, taken February 26-27, gave Putin 60.4 
percent versus 59.6 percent the week before. A poll by the VtSIOM centre this 
week gave him 56 percent. Zyuganov generally polls around 20 to 25 percent. 

WHAT ABOUT ECONOMY? 

Putin has filled in some of the gaps in other areas of policy and as acting 
president has notably spoken of the need to increase the social welfare of 
Russians, millions of whom live on the breadline after stop-start economic 
reforms. 

His recent open letter, published in newspapers, spoke again of the need for 
a strong Russia and to reduce poverty. 

Financial analysts said his general stated plan for the economy seemed 
relatively straightforward. 

``It is a strong state, creating a stable environment which will allow the 
market to operate and hopefully put Russia on a medium-term path of growth,'' 
said Roland Nash, an economist at Moscow finance house Renaissance Capital. 

``What is less known is what he means by a strong economy,'' said Nash, 
adding that Putin might be disinclined to take decisions to shut down big, 
state-owned factories that do not make a profit and reallocate resources. 

Nash said Putin's top economic priorities should be to impose tough budget 
constraints, create a stable legal base to help tackle corruption and reform 
the tax system to widen the income tax base and reduce the tax burden on 
industry. 

Putin's brief term of office has been buoyed by generally good economic news: 
the economy expanded 3.2 percent in 1999, the biggest post-Soviet rise, which 
came after a sharp 4.6 percent fall in 1998. 

The rouble has only slowly depreciated against the dollar, while prices for 
Russia's key oil exports have been high. 

******

#15
Sweden's hunt for red herrings?

STOCKHOLM, March 2 (Reuters) - Herring, not enemy submarines, may have been 
responsible for underwater noises that put Swedish armed forces on alert 
during the Cold War, Stockholm media reported on Thursday. 

A Soviet submarine once ran aground off Sweden, but many suspicious noises 
before and after then could have been caused by fish, a new report by Supreme 
Commander Owe Wiktorin said. 

The sounds emitted by herring are similar to those of a submarine propeller, 
according to the report handed to Defence Minister Bjorn von Sydow on 
Wednesday. 

The report marked the second time authorities have blamed a swimming threat 
for the country's submarine scares. Mink that had escaped from farms and gone 
wild were identified five years ago as emitting sounds comparable to 
submarines. 

``First it was U-boats. Then it was mink. Now it's even worse - the noises 
were herrings,'' the daily Aftonbladet said. 

Tests by navy investigators during 1999 established the similarity between 
the sounds of submarines and herrings, concluding that ``neither in future 
nor in the past can this sound be taken as proof of enemy trespass.'' 

At the height of the Cold War, neutral Sweden was inclined to believe reports 
of alleged enemy activity off its lengthy coastline. In 1981, a Soviet U 137 
submarine became stranded on rocks close to the Swedish mainland. 

``It had more to do with Swedish domestic politics than foreign relations. 
The political agenda was driven by a mixture of defence activism and 
nationalism,'' the Expressen said. 

``But now it's over. The herring swims along the coast. It's best caught with 
a line, a few hooks and lead weight.'' 

******

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