February 29, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4138 4139

Johnson's Russia List
#4139
29 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. New York Times: Masha Gessen, Lockstep to Putin's New Military Order.
2. Interfax: RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WITHOUT ALTERNATIVE - GORBACHEV.
3. Washington Post editorial: Russia in Denial.
4. Reuters: Missing Russian reporter freed, says beaten.
5. Segodnya: YURI LEVADA: "PUTIN CAN DO WHAT HE WANTS"
6. World Socialist Web Site: Vladimir Volkov, The rehabilitation of Stalin—an ideological cornerstone of the new Kremlin politics.
7. Interfax: PUBLIC COUNCIL PROPOSES REVISION OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY.
8. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Dmitry Kosyrev, THE PRINCIPLE OF FORCE SAVING. The International Priorities of the Main Candidate for the Presidency.
9. Reuters: U.S. Seeks To Speed Troubled Trans-Caspian Pipeline.
10. Moscow Times: Igor Semenenko, Nation Is Spending Beyond Its Means.
11. gazeta.ru: Putin to Abolish Most Parties.
12. Panorama of Russia: Book Catalog Available.
13. Interfax: ECONOMIST PUTS ANNUAL CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM RUSSIA AT $15 BLN. (Yevgeny Yasin)]

*******

#1
New York Times
February 29, 2000
[for personal use only]
Lockstep to Putin's New Military Order
By MASHA GESSEN
Masha Gessen is chief correspondent at the Russian news weekly Itogi. 

In the nearly two months since Vladimir V. Putin became acting president of 
Russia, the world has barely begun getting to know him. But already, he is 
building a clear record in one area of policy: little noticed by the West, 
Mr. Putin, a former lieutenant colonel in the K.G.B., is rapidly 
remilitarizing Russian society. 

Visitors to the old Soviet Union used to be surprised at the sheer number of 
people in uniform in the streets. At 18, men were conscripted for two years 
of mandatory military service. Virtually everyone who had graduated from a 
technical, medical or foreign-languages college was considered an officer of 
the reserves and required to report for regular training exercises. 

Young schoolchildren had to take part in bomb drills and survival games, 
complete with toy guns for boys and nurse training for girls. Starting at 14, 
students learned warfare in a mandatory class called primary military 
preparation; one activity was taking apart and cleaning the famous 
Kalashnikov rifle. All men and many women were required to carry military 
cards, and the all-important internal passport also indicated military 
status. 

In the 1990's the number of people in the services dwindled as budgets were 
cut and opportunities increased in the private sector. When Russia ended its 
involvement in Afghanistan, more young men began to be exempted from the 
draft. The 1993 Russian constitution guaranteed the right to alternative 
civilian service, and a few hundred men managed to claim it by going to 
court. The military preparation class in schools was abolished in 1989. 
Training exercises for reservists were quietly discontinued. 

But like other Soviet legacies, the institutionalized military nature of 
Russian society remained ready to be resurrected. Since Vladimir Putin took 
office on Dec. 31, he has issued 11 presidential decrees. Six concerned the 
military. 

Mr. Putin's second decree -- after the one granting immunity from prosecution 
to Boris Yeltsin, the former president -- established a new Russian military 
doctrine abandoning the old no-first-strike policy toward nuclear weapons and 
emphasizing a right to use them against aggressors "if other means of 
conflict resolution have been exhausted or deemed ineffective." 

Soon another decree re-established mandatory training exercises for 
reservists. 

How many will be called up this year and whether they may be required to 
serve in Chechnya is unclear, since two of the decree's six paragraphs are 
classified as secret. (This, incidentally, is the sort of problem that 
journalists in Russia will be encountering often, since a Jan. 17 Putin order 
granted 40 government ministers and other officials the right to classify 
information as secret.) 

Other decrees related to military administration, public information about 
the war in Chechnya and commemoration of a general's death. 

Mr. Putin has also focused on the military in his capacity as acting prime 
minister. His government's first legislative action re-established military 
training in secondary schools, both public and private. Russian teenagers 
will once again become intimate with the Kalashnikov. 

The Ministry of Education's plans to expand the school curriculum to 12 years 
will also have a military impact. Boys will graduate from high school not at 
17, as now, but at the conscription age of 18, and will not have time to try 
to gain acceptance to colleges that could grant draft exemptions. As for 
alternative service, Russians can forget about it: the first young man who 
went to court to claim this right in the Putin era was jailed for avoiding 
the draft. 

On Jan. 27 Mr. Putin's finance minister announced that defense spending will 
be increased by 50 percent. Where will the country get the money, when it 
consistently fails to meet its obligations to an increasingly impoverished 
population? 

The government's latest resolution contains an eerily ingenious solution to 
one urgent social problem: from now on, military detachments will be 
encouraged to "adopt" boys 14 and older who are orphaned or have single 
mothers. 

Russia's remilitarization not only testifies to Mr. Putin's resolve to press 
on with the war in Chechnya, but signals a return to the besieged, 
us-against-the-world mindset that Russia had begun to leave behind. Yet as 
the March 26 election approaches, Mr. Putin has been complimented as a 
reformer and an inevitability by President Clinton, Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright, NATO Secretary General James Robertson and British 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. Such overtures make those of us in Russia who 
hope never again to touch a Kalashnikov feel very lonely indeed.

*******

#2
RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WITHOUT ALTERNATIVE - GORBACHEV

ST. PETERSBURG. Feb 26 (Interfax) - The upcoming Russian
presidential election is without alternatives, former USSR president
Mikhail Gorbachev told journalists upon arriving in St. Petersburg on
Saturday.
Gorbachev will attend the founding conference of the regional
branch of the United Social Democratic Party.
Acting Russian President Vladimir Putin has "an obvious advantage,"
he said. Gorbachev said he regrets that former Prime Minister Yevgeny
Primakov refused to run for the presidency.
"If Primakov, whom I have always supported, were participating in
the election it could be considered as having an alternative," he said.
Gorbachev "knows nearly all the candidates for the presidential
post personally," he said, adding that "questions should be asked to all
of them, primarily Putin. Nothing is known about his program
foundations," he said.
"Dictatorship is impossible in Russia under any authorities in the
Kremlin," he said. "A system of effective authorities is needed and law
is needed, but this should not be dubbed a dictatorship," he said.

*******

#3
Washington Post
29 February 2000
Editorial
Russia in Denial

IT IS DECREASINGLY DENIABLE that Russia's armed forces have committed major 
abuses--war crimes--in Chechnya. The most vivid recent evidence is videotape 
from a German television network, which shows Russian troops roughly 
disposing of the handcuffed bodies of executed Chechen fighters. Physicians 
for Human Rights (PHR) has just surveyed 326 Chechen refugees in next-door 
Ingushetia. Fully 44 percent had seen civilians killed by Russian fire. PHR 
has also compiled firsthand accounts of systematic torture and extortion at 
the notorious Chernokozovo "filtration camp," where Russian forces send 
military-age male Chechens and interrogate them about their links to the 
Chechen rebels. Foreign journalists who have interviewed former inmates have 
heard similar accounts.

Still, Russia tries to deny. "Falsification of the year," snorted Kremlin 
spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky when confronted with the German videotape. He 
said the offending network should be expelled from Russia. Observers from the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, of which Russia is a 
leading member, have been denied access to the battle zone, as has the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. The only official outside inquiry 
permitted so far consisted of a single day's visit to devastated Grozny by 
Alvaro Gil-Robles, head of the Council of Europe's human rights commission. 
He was told that his group could open a Grozny office in a few weeks--though 
whether anything will remain of Grozny by then is an open question.

The Clinton administration needs to demand greater accountability from the 
government led by acting Russian President Vladimir Putin. A good place to 
start would be the March 20 session of the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, whose high commissioner, Mary Robinson, has herself forthrightly 
called for Russian military murderers and torturers to be held to account. 
The upcoming meeting gives the United States and its European allies (who 
have also tap-danced around the question of Russian culpability in Chechnya) 
a chance to establish a formal international panel of inquiry on the war, 
without fear of a Russian Security Council veto. The Clinton administration 
has played down the brutality of the Russian campaign in Chechnya so as not 
to rock the diplomatic boat before Mr. Putin secures long-overdue 
ratification of the START II nuclear weapons treaty from the Russian Duma. 
Such a trade-off may be defended as pragmatic diplomacy or condemned as 
submission to blackmail. But certainly it raises a question: If Russia flouts 
international law when it wages war against its own citizens, how 
scrupulously will it adhere to any arms control treaty with the United 
States? 

*******

#4
Missing Russian reporter freed, says beaten
By Patrick Lannin

MOSCOW, Feb 29 (Reuters) - Russian reporter Andrei Babitsky, who went missing 
for a month in Chechnya after being handed over by Russia to Chechen rebels, 
returned to Moscow on Tuesday and said he had been beaten at a controversial 
detention camp. 

The return of the 35-year-old caused as much surprise as his first 
reappearance on Friday in Dagestan, a region to the east of Chechnya, and 
maintained the aura of mystery that has surrounded his treatment by the 
Russian authorities. 

Babitsky, who reported for U.S.-funded Radio Liberty behind rebel lines, was 
first arrested on the outskirts of the Chechen capital Grozny in mid-January 
and held in northern Chechnya. 

Russia announced the swap in early February, sparking an international outcry 
and questions as to whether he was in the hands of the rebels, the security 
forces or pro-Moscow Chechens. Russia and the loyalist Chechens insisted the 
rebels had him. 

IN THE HANDS OF SADISTS 

``I can say to you that at first I was not in the hands of the special 
security forces but of sadists who detained me at the Chernokozovo 
concentration camp,'' Babitsky said in an interview on Radio Liberty's 
website. 

He was referring to a Russian camp to the north of Grozny which has been at 
the centre of allegations of human rights abuses in Chechnya, which Russia 
has vigorously denied. 

Saying that beating of inmates was routine at the camp, Babitsky added: ``I 
do not consider what happened to me as a beating because in Chernokozovo a 
beating is a real torment. 

``This is a torture which people undergo with or without a particular 
purpose.'' 

``As far as I am concerned, I underwent a 'routine light initiation' which 
everyone without exception goes through when they arrive there,'' he said in 
the interview accessed in Russian via www.svoboda.org/news/. 

``This is a few dozen blows of a truncheon on the body which go fairly 
painlessly after two or three days and do not leave any serious irreparable 
internal consequences.'' 

RETURN TO MOSCOW ``STRANGE'' 

Asked on Russian commercial NTV television how he had been released and 
returned to Moscow, he said: ``In a very strange way, without informing my 
wife, on an empty plane, though my wife is now in Makhachkala (Dagestan) and 
there was no problem picking her up to join us.'' 

Babitsky's reports had angered the Russian authorities, which said that he 
was to be charged with siding with the rebels. His colleagues denied the 
allegation. 

After weeks of speculation after the handover about where he was and whether 
he was even alive, Babitsky resurfaced late on Friday in Makhachkala, the 
Dagestan capital. 

In a fresh twist, he was arrested for holding a false passport and only 
released after the intervention of Acting President Vladimir Putin. Putin 
said he doubted Babitsky was dangerous enough to warrant being held in 
custody. 

TO TELL ALL ABOUT CHECHNYA 

``I intend to inform society as fully as possible about what happened to me 
and about what is happening in Chechnya, what I have seen,'' he told Radio 
Liberty. 

``I think that this is not only a guarantee of safety for me and my family 
but in a certain way it could also influence the situation, with arbitrary 
rule on a monstrous scale and the nightmare which is happening in Chechnya,'' 
he said. 

Russia's five-month-old offensive has been criticised in the West for an 
excessive use of force. Moscow says its fight is with terrorists and bandits, 
and to restore order in the region. 

Babitsky said on NTV that before being detained in Dagestan his captors, who 
had kept him somewhere in Chechnya, forced him into agreeing to flee to 
Azerbaijan. 

He said they had taken his passport and identification papers and forged an 
Azeri passport but failed to remember they needed a border stamp. He was then 
handed to a local guide, who was supposed to take him to Azerbaijan. However 
Babitsky persuaded to drive to Dagestan, where he was arrested. 

*******

#5
Segodnya
February 28, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for pesonal use only]
YURI LEVADA: "PUTIN CAN DO WHAT HE WANTS"
Russians value might more than principles now Chief 
presidential candidate Vladimir Putin gave a clear signal to 
the population by calling for "spoiling the terrorists in the 
loo." Yuri LEVADA, director of the National Public Opinion 
Research Centre (VTsIOM), discusses the specific features of 
rating 2000 with Segodnya correspondent Svetlana OFITOVA.

Question: Vladimir Putin, whose rating has skyrocketed to 
incredible heights, is the most widely discussed politician 
today. Is it true that more than 50% of the population would 
vote for him?
Answer: Indeed, his rating has been high and stable of 
late.
Vacillations are negligible. As many as 59% of those who plan 
to come to the polling stations would vote for Putin. However, 
Muscovites like him less than the people in the provinces.

Question: What influences ratings? Loud statements or 
image?
Did Putin's connection with the Unity's collusion with the 
communists affect his rating?
Answer: No, it simply showed the people that Putin can do 
what he wants. His faction can join these or other forces and 
push through the parliament anything they want. The people 
regard this as a sign of might. Russians value might more than 
principles now, and this is why they like Putin's statements. 

Question: His promise to "spoil the terrorists in the loo" 
was probably the most popular with the people, wasn't it?
Answer: Exactly. He charmed the people in this way and 
showed his resolve and accessibility. And many people really 
believed that he would do what nobody could before him. 

Question: That is, the bulk of the people like the words 
"spoil" and "loo," and they are prepared to follow the man who 
uses them?
Answer: "To spoil in the loo" is not ordinary slang. It is 
criminal slang, which has a specific meaning. It means to kill 
people where they live. It means that we must not just stop the 
alleged terrorists from coming to Moscow or erect the so-called 
cordon sanitaire around the Chechen villains; we must kill them 
all on the spot. 
So, this was not just a shocking phrase, whose essence we 
did not immediately understand. Now we see that major forces, 
resources and hopes are being employed to fulfil this task. If 
not for the war, Putin would have been half as popular as now. 
Do the people want to follow him? No, but they like what's 
going on.
We asked the people if they would go [to Chechnya] or send 
their son, husband or brother there. Only 15-16% said "Yes," 
while two-thirds refused to go. They are enjoying this display 
of might, although our polls say the bulk of the people are 
getting tired of the war. This is why both the generals and 
Putin are saying now (getting ready for the elections, are 
they?) that the war would end soon.

Question: Did you ask the people what guides them in their 
choice of politicians -- mind, heart, or something else?
Answer: The people certainly use guidelines, but these 
guidelines are usually something traditional or shallow. This 
means that they vote for those for whom they have grown used to 
vote (mostly communists). 
We had fierce democrats shortly before, who knew for whom 
to vote, but they have either become extinct or their idols 
have disappeared. And the rest vote for whomever they like. In 
this case, most people like Putin and they will like him for 
quite some time yet. 

Question: Why do they like him?
Answer: Because he makes promises. And he promises what 
the people need -- order, democracy, wages, victory, and so on. 
And they believe him. 

Question: What are the ratings of the other politicians?
Answer: The gap between Putin and them is very big. The 
runner-up, Zyuganov, has 17-19%, and next come Yavlinsky and 
Tuleyev with 3%. 

Question: Can the situation change before the elections?
Answer: Nobody would raise his rating. Putin has reached 
his limit, and the rest have simply no chances.

Question: Is it true that the people in Russia are ready, 
and even want, to live under somebody's thumb? Why?
Answer: The people invented the state, politics and 
leaders because they need them. Putin is a smart man in his 
place. He's shrewd. And it will always be like this, even if 
his team is doing everything for him. Because he cannot get out 
of his skin now; it's his skin. They invented the Bear to put 
him against the Wolf. And the Wolf is Chechnya. 

******

#6
World Socialist Web Site
www.wsws.org
The rehabilitation of Stalin—an ideological cornerstone of the new Kremlin
politics
By Vladimir Volkov
29 February 2000

The replacement of Boris Yeltsin by Vladimir Putin as president of Russia
signifies not only a change in the personal composition of the Kremlin
leadership, but also a shift in political emphasis. By forging an alliance
with the Duma (Russian parliament) Communist Party faction under Gennady
Zyuganov, the Kremlin has departed from its official liberal-democratic
orientation, and now regards Stalin's heirs as its strategic partners.

This change in course did not take place overnight. It was already being
prepared under the cover of the Yeltsin regime. But now the Kremlin no
longer feels the need for concealment and is announcing its change in
ideological orientation. It is not doing this by means of an official
document. Instead, a number of influential political newspapers and
commentators are expressing what the Kremlin, for understandable reasons,
does not wish to say on its own behalf. Among these organs are the
newspaper Nyezavissimaya Gazeta, which is controlled by oligarch Boris
Berezovsky and editor-in-chief Vitaly Tretyakov.

Taking the occasion of Joseph Stalin's birthday to review the Duma
elections, Nyezavissimaya Gazeta published an article on December 22, 1999
that is presumably the most accurate reflection of the new Kremlin line to
date. The article is entitled “Stalin—Our One and All”, with the subheading
“Russian Reformism as a Dictatorship”.

The article, penned by Tretyakov, attempts to justify authoritarianism and
dictatorship as necessary and civilising instruments of change in Russia,
while at the same time seeking to rehabilitate Stalin in public opinion as
“one of the great statesmen of the twentieth century”.

It must be admitted that the article contains some valid
insights—especially where the author underscores the correlation between
the current regime and Stalinism. “We have no idea”, writes Tretyakov, “how
much in our private lives—not to mention politics or the state—originates
from what Stalin developed personally, or was conceived and developed under
his personal leadership. Most important of all, however, is the fact that
our entire 'nomenklatura'-based, bureaucratic system was almost completely
cut to size by and for Stalin. Genetically, today's government official is
a Stalinist, even if he has an anti-Stalinist attitude.”

All of that is entirely correct, as are some of the characteristics of
Stalin's reign that Tretyakov describes: “In actual fact, Stalin
re-installed the empire and the monarchy (albeit, not a hereditary
monarchy). The nation, the state and the reforms were of greater value to
Stalin than the population, the people or the individual.”

This is followed by an, in some ways, insightful characterisation of
today's Russian politicians. “And are our reformers of a different calibre
than Stalin?” he asks, and then continues: “The enlightened chekist [secret
policeman] Vladimir Putin, the enlightened hard-line reformer Anatoly
Chubais and the enlightened oligarch Boris Berezovsky—these are, in effect,
three of Stalin's faces in today's world.”

But what is Stalin? “The quintessence of Russian pragmatism” and the
“quintessence of Russian reformism in its cruelty, inhumanity and
brutality—rarely effective and usually a failure.”

We agree that Stalin lives on in today's Russian politicians. But how can
Stalin be the “quintessence of Russian reformism”? And, indeed, what is
meant by “Russian” reformism? Does this include the October Revolution of
1917, for instance, with its clear-cut internationalist perspective, since
it introduced great reforms? If, on the other hand, what is meant is
harshness and brutality, these are aspects that have emerged throughout the
history of the world up to this very day. What is so specifically “Russian”
about them?

The author does not attempt to disentangle these contradictions. His
assignment is to crudely adapt history to the current political
requirements of the Kremlin. This rapidly becomes clear as he continues.

“Stalin created the ideal monarchy,” Tretyakov writes, “but, of its two
possible products—a nomenklatura/government official class or a civil
society—he could only bring forth the former. Therein lies his limitation.
That is his curse.”

This a false balance sheet. Contrasting a “nomenclature/official class”
with a “civil society” is fallacious in the light of Soviet history
(providing, as is apparently the case, one is to understand the latter as
meaning a society with a bourgeois structure). As Trotsky already pointed
out in the 1930s, the Stalinist bureaucracy, which had come into being as a
privileged social stratum, was merely a transitional phase in the formation
of a new class of capitalist owners, i.e., the basic element of a “civil
society”. The only force which could have stopped this counterrevolutionary
process was the working class.

Far from preventing the restoration of capitalism and the victory of “civil
society”, Stalin actually paved the way for it by “creating” the
nomenklatura. And it is precisely because of its origins in the
nomenklatura that today's Russian capitalism is so corrupt and criminal.

Further along in the article, the author attempts to place Stalin at the
same level as great figures of history, comparing him in particular with
Peter the Great. “Stalin, of all leaders, was the one who put into practice
the geopolitical and industrial legacy of Peter the Great [the Russian czar
who ruled from 1682 to 1725]. And more than that—he surpassed it.”

“Peter the Great was a reformer and oriented to the West,” Tretyakov
continues. “True, he was a dictator, but an enlightened one. And was Stalin
not a reformer? Was he not enlightened?” For Tretyakov, the only difference
between Stalin and Peter the Great is that Peter was oriented to the West,
while Stalin was “a Byzantine who believed in Russia as a special form of
civilisation.”

The article ends with the following thoughts: Stalin did many “terrible”
things, but also much that was “honourable” and “good”. So: “Don't badmouth
Stalin. Stalin is our one and all, just like Pushkin. Two poles of
Russian—and, not least of all, political—culture.”

The political significance of the Nyezavissimaya Gazeta article is obvious:
the intention is to rehabilitate Stalin and make his legacy part of state
politics in the interests of the new ruling class. As for the quality of
the arguments put forward to this end, the whole construction rests on
sophistry and historical falsification.

Tretyakov simply ignores the historical background. The fact that Peter the
Great was a reformer, Stalin came along later in history and both of them
“dirtied their hands” is no proof that Stalin was also a reformer.
Determining the actual historical significance of an event or historical
figure requires examining which social forces this person based himself on,
and in whose interests and towards what development of society he acted.

Merely posing this question is sufficient to demonstrate the immense
difference between historical figures such as Peter the Great and Stalin.
Peter fought against centuries-old Russian backwardness and isolation. He
based himself upon the most progressive social forces of the time, promoted
the development of individual initiative and directly addressed the
necessity of incorporating the experience of Western Europe into Russian
society and closing ranks with developments in the West.

By founding Saint Petersburg, he opened a window to Europe and broke with
the Muscovite-Asiatic traditions of the past. He forced the boyars [Russian
nobles] to shave off their beards and fought against the system of
hereditary official positions engendered by patriarchic traditions. Peter
availed himself of barbaric methods and not infrequently settled accounts
cruelly and brutally with his opponents. But he pushed Russia forward, and
did not need to lie in the process, because his intentions and words were
one with his deeds.

Stalin was a completely different type of politician. To become dictator of
the Soviet Union, he had to break with his revolutionary past. He thus did
not incorporate the best values of modern civilisation—on the contrary, he
was the embodiment of nationalist reaction against the greatest
revolutionary movement in the history of the world.

Stalin revived the worst aspects of Russian backwardness which had been
openly and mercilessly swept aside by the October Revolution. Instead of
recognising the supremacy of world economy, Stalin cultivated the
restricted and nationalistic concept of “socialism in one country”. Instead
of promoting creative activity and free thought, he organised inquisitorial
trials and witch-hunts. In his politics, he based himself upon the new
caste of privileged bureaucrats and destroyed the best elements of
society—first and foremost the leaders of the revolution and broad sections
of socialist intellectuals and workers. Stalin pulled the country back.
That is why lies and the continual rewriting of history became necessary
elements of his method.

If there is one event in Russia during the past two centuries that could,
in a certain sense, be called a continuation of Peter's reforms, it is the
October Revolution of 1917. Both events provided the country with a mighty
impetus for developing from backwardness to civilisation. Both events
brought forth outstanding leaders and cultural progress. As opposed to
this, the Stalin regime embodied counterrevolution and historical
retrogression. It paved the way for the catastrophe that befell Russia in
1991.

Equally monstrous is Tretyakov's construction of a connection between
Stalin and Pushkin. They do not form “two poles of Russian culture”. Or, to
be more precise, they do form these two poles, but in a completely
different sense than Tretyakov would have us believe.

If one is to follow the Nyezavissimaya Gazeta editor's train of thought,
Pushkin is the quintessence of Russian culture, and Stalin is the
quintessence of Russian politics. But in actual fact, there are good
traditions of “Russian culture, including politics” and there are bad
traditions of Russian culture and politics. Pushkin and the Russian
Revolution of 1917 belong to the first category, Stalin to the second.
These two traditions stand in contradiction to each other—they do not
supplement one another.

Pushkin's distinctive traits were free-mindedness, independence, a
farsighted European outlook and disdain for all forms of “jingoist”
patriotism. As opposed to this, Stalin combined within himself the worst
elements of Russian backwardness: inertia, narrow-mindedness, prejudice and
despotism.

This, then, is the balance sheet: The necessity of rehabilitating Stalin
and his methods of “state leadership” is the clearest expression of the new
Russian capitalism's place in history. Incapable of solving the problems of
Russia's population, it attempts to survive by invoking the darkest shades
of the past. That in itself is reason enough why it must be banished to the
realm of the shades as quickly as possible.

******

#7
PUBLIC COUNCIL PROPOSES REVISION OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

MOSCOW. Feb 26 (Interfax) - Russia's non-governmental Council for
Foreign and Defense Policy advocates a concept "of selective
involvement" in the state's foreign strategy.
This concept is spelled out in the "Sketch of Russia's Foreign
Policy Strategy" which the council members will discuss on Saturday.
Russia must "firmly defend a small set of its vitally important
interests," the sketch reads.
Russia should give up "chasing the 'great power' phantom,"
according to the document.
Russia must "do its best to avoid confrontation. This is
particularly applicable toward the countries and regions exerting an
impact on [Russia's] economic development," the document says.
"Tough rhetoric" should be abandoned, it adds.
Russia's official foreign course for building "a multi-polar world"
"corresponds to its overall interests" but "has serious drawbacks," the
document reads.
When applied "in the Russian-Chinese dialogue, [this course]
acquires not only an anti-U.S., but also a pro-Chinese nature,"
according to the draft.
"Do we want to be involved in the tense Chinese-U.S. relations even
on the side of friendly China," the document asks.
Russia's foreign policy should focus on "seeking benefits for the
country primarily in its economy. It must not merely retaliate to
challenges and threats in the sphere of traditional security," according
to the document.
The Council for Foreign and Defense Policy is a public
organization, which draws up recommendations in domestic and foreign
policy and presents them to the Russian leadership.

******

#8
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
February 28, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
THE PRINCIPLE OF FORCE SAVING
The International Priorities of the Main Candidate for 
the Presidency 
By Dmitry KOSYREV

The international section of Vladimir Putin's "open 
letter" is the most mysterious part of this document. The thing 
is not only that the document consisting of 57 newspaper lines 
deals with the issues that scientific-practical conferences 
examine for hours, but in the typical for many of Putin's 
speeches ability to say something acceptable and long-awaited 
for the people of the different and sometimes opposite 
convictions. 
At first glance the idea of the document -- and precisely 
one, not several- is obvious. First, "only real, including 
economic interests of the nation should be the law for Russian 
diplomats." One should also "recognise the supremacy of 
internal goals over foreign policy ones -- we should learn this 
at last." Second, "our force saving of today by no means 
signifies that we have no foreign expansion in the good sense 
of the word." Third, our place in the world directly depends on 
the successful solution of our internal tasks. All the rest is 
just an explanation of this position, such as the need to 
clearly and coherently formulate our national interests or the 
thesis about the undesirability of participation in some 
international projects, if we cannot afford them.
It stands to reason that the open letter is meant 
primarily for broad masses of the electorate. Obviously, on the 
one hand, the acting President dissociates himself from the 
syndrome of the hurt feelings of a great power, typical of 
Russian self- consciousness in recent years, the striving to 
return Russia onto the road of global "confrontation with 
imperialism" and at the same time, an inclination to see the 
signs of national humiliation where there are none at all. On 
the other hand, Putin does not back the advocates of isolation 
either, that is, those for whom foreign policy priorities 
depend on the geographical sign: first of all, CIS, all the 
rest is too far away and is not very much needed. An important 
point is that the controversy with great power electors, of 
whom there is an absolute majority in this country, would be 
risky for any candidate, were it not for an obvious logic of 
the starting point of speculation: first, "real," especially 
economic, interests (but not only them). 
It is easy to see that all these "general" ideas start to 
seem unconvincing when applied to present-day realities. Thus, 
the nation's problem now is not that it is being invited to 
deal with global matters, worth big money, but vice versa -- it 
is not being invited anywhere in particular and this costs it 
too much.
In recent years foreign policy has been going out of its way to 
return Russia the markets and partners lost for political 
considerations, although these markets have already been 
occupied by rivals. Then, the letter cautiously circumvents a 
serious problem: Russian business is unable yet to make it to 
foreign markets on its own, with the government acting as a 
trailblazer (and economy is a bad helper in this case). If this 
is not done, the markets would be occupied, as has been said 
above. That is, before Putin's internal economic program yields 
its fruit, Russia, given a "thrifty" foreign policy, may find 
itself in even greater economic isolation and then the said 
program would produce no effect.
The foreign policy objectives mapped out in the letter, 
though, do not bar the way to further clarification of 
guidelines for Russian diplomacy and this is its merit.

******

#9
U.S. Seeks To Speed Troubled Trans-Caspian Pipeline

ISTANBUL, Feb 29, 2000 -- (Reuters) The United States has agreed to submit 
detailed financial proposals for a trans-Caspian gas export pipeline to 
Turkmenistan next month in a bid to boost the troubled project's viability.

John Wolf, U.S. President Bill Clinton's special adviser on Caspian basin 
energy policy, told a news conference that he had agreed at a meeting with 
President Saparmurat Niyazov last week to take measures to speed up the 
project's execution.

"President Niyazov agreed that he would expect a detailed project plan from 
the TCGP consortium at the end of March," Wolf said.

Niyazov, frustrated at the lack of progress in a U.S.-backed plan to pump 
Turkmen natural gas reserves to Turkey, last week cast the project's future 
in doubt by agreeing to supply vast volumes of gas to Russia over 30 years.

But he has already pledged to supply the Turkish line with an eventual 30 
billion cubic meters (bcm) a year. Turkmenistan would be unable to meet that 
demand at the same time as pumping 50 bcm to Russia yearly.

Turkmen gas production last year was 23 bcm.

Washington keenly supports the $2-2.5 billion Turkmenistan-Turkey pipeline 
because it bypasses Russia and Iran - two rival players in the resource-rich 
Caspian.

"We supported this year's (Turkmen) gas sale of 20 bcm to Russia," Wolf said. 
But he added, "To tie for 30 years, one ought to have a very good idea of 
what the markets are."

Responding to a suggestion that Turkey might then purchase Turkmen gas via 
Russia, through the Blue Stream gas pipeline project, Wolf said: "The 
agreement for Turkey to buy gas from Turkmenistan is via the trans-Caspian 
gas pipeline."

Construction on the Blue Stream project, which involves a pipeline running 
from Russia to Turkey beneath the Black Sea, has already begun.

NO 'GREAT GAME' REPEAT, U.S. SAYS

Wolf also played down media reports that his meeting last week with Niyazov 
was a showdown of sorts, with the Turkmen leader irritatedly blaming the U.S. 
official for politicizing the pipeline issue and delaying its construction.

"Contrary to press reports, the meeting had a constructive conclusion," Wolf 
said, adding that Niyazov's intensity "only underscored his strong desire to 
bring the TCGP to fruition as soon as possible."

He said the United States did not seek to impose its energy policy on the 
region, to minimize Russian or Iranian influence.

"This is not, not, a replay of the old great game, and it's not a James Bond 
movie either," he said. "These initiatives are important to the countries' 
economic and political futures, a goal to which the United States remains 
firmly committed."

The consortium leading the Turkmen-Turkey pipeline project includes U.S. 
companies General Electric Capital Services and Bechtel and the Anglo-Dutch 
oil and gas major Royal Dutch/Shell.

******

#10
Moscow Times
February 29, 2000 
Nation Is Spending Beyond Its Means 
By Igor Semenenko
Staff Writer

Despite rising oil revenues and an above-target tax take, the Russian 
government will face "serious funding shortages" in March and is again set to 
borrow from the Central Bank, a leading official said Monday. 

In remarks at a meeting with acting President Vladimir Putin and senior 
ministers, First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov suddenly dumped the 
optimism he has displayed this year about Russia's finances, The Associated 
Press reported. 

The looming financial crunch comes as something of a surprise considering 
numerous upbeat statements from a variety of officials to the effect that 
Russia's finances were in good order. 

But with the International Monetary Fund unwilling to resume its lending 
program to Russia, every day on the presidential campaign trail seems to 
bring further costly promises from Putin. 

The State Pension Fund has already pulled out all the stops to meet the 
acting president's pledge to both raise pensions and pay off pension arrears 
at an estimated cost of more than $1 billion. 

Putin's similar vow to raise public sector salaries by 20 percent in April 
and repay all wage arrears by April 15 is looking harder to fulfill. Despite 
much official optimism, the federal government's wage arrears increased 2.3 
percent last month, according to the Russian Statistics Agency. 

These and other expensive promises come at a time when expenditures 
traditionally boom and revenues shrink - election time. 

Russia is due to make $740 million in foreign debt payments in March, 
Kasyanov said earlier this year. And Monday he said dipping into Central Bank 
reserves may be the only way to fulfill those obligations. 

With the ruble essentially stable in recent months and a booming trade 
surplus feeding into Russia's hard currency reserves, the Central Bank has 
sufficient funds to meet these debts - and perhaps other needs. Russia's 
reserves stood at $13.3 billion on Feb. 18, the Central Bank announced last 
Friday, down $100 million from Feb. 11. 

This year's budget sets a $1 billion limit for borrowing from the Central 
Bank, and some analysts are saying the government may already tap that much 
by spring. 

"I expect the government to borrow $500,000 to $1 billion from the Central 
Bank in March-April this year," Mikhail Zadornov, a State Duma deputy and 
former finance minister, said last week at a briefing. 

Kasyanov would not explore in detail how much the government would need to 
borrow from the Central Bank, to which it already owes $6.5 billion, 
according to sources close to the Finance Ministry. 

Tax Minister Alexander Pochinok and his aides have several times this year 
boasted that tax collection was coming in well above target. 

In February, the government will collect some 53 billion to 54 billion 
rubles, according to Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko, overfulfilling 
the target of 51 billion rubles. 

Budget revenues were above target by 10 billion rubles in the previous month, 
so, "If this performance continues, then 2000 revenues will be 50 [billion] 
to 60 billion rubles higher than the 800 billion rubles planned," Troika 
Dialog brokerage concluded in its morning report Monday. 

The improved cash flow has owed much to a series of revenue-raising measures 
enacted over recent months, including hikes in export duties on scrap metal, 
duties introduced on natural gas exports and excises raised on beer from 25 
percent to 40 percent. If the government goes ahead with a proposal to raise 
the oil export tax - introduced early last year at a maximum of 5 euros ($5) 
per metric ton - to 20 euros a ton from its current level of 15 euros per 
ton, that should bring in a further $50 million a month. 

But even with such boons and the huge cash balances the federal government 
had on its Treasury accounts at the beginning of January, it seems that 
Russia can't keep its spending in line with revenues. 

"The Treasury had 30 billion rubles in cash and part of January expenditures 
was financed with funds rolled over from last year," former Finance Minister 
Mikhail Zadornov said last week at a briefing. 

Strangely enough, considering general expectations that IMF funding would be 
hard to come by this year, much of Russia's financial heartache now is due to 
the lack of fresh funds from the IMF and other international lenders like the 
World Bank, analysts said Monday. 

That's because the 2000 budget assumes such funds will be forthcoming. 

"It is clear that loopholes are left in the budget, drafted on the assumption 
that international financial institutions lend to the government," said 
Oksana Dynnikova, an analyst with Economic Expert Group. "But with such high 
oil prices, it's all a matter of willingness to collect taxes." 

Meanwhile, other analysts have said the spectacular revenue collection 
performance of the Finance Ministry over recent months is unsustainable 
because it has been based on squeezing funds out of the regions under a 
decree that runs out at the end of February. 

Former Finance Minister Zadornov said last week that the federal government 
had put the squeeze on regional governments and forced them to share more 
revenues with the federal center by prohibiting offsets from January onward. 

A new decree issued Dec. 29 stated the regions had to pay all federal taxes 
in cash in the first two months of this year. 

Regional governments have traditionally paid part of the taxes owed to the 
central government through mutual settlement schemes, also called offset 
schemes. 

"The tax office will insist that enterprises pay taxes in cash even if they 
try to pay taxes through mutual settlements," said Yelena Zhukovskaya, head 
of the department with the government of Leningrad Oblast. 

In absolute amounts, additional cash revenues raised through this scheme 
could come to some 4 billion to 5 billion rubles, about 8 percent of the 
federal government's budget in January. 

Another important source of emergency funding has been the federal 
government's moves to underpay natural monopolies, such as Gazprom and 
Unified Energy Systems . 

Deputy Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said two weeks ago that the government 
had recently cleared its power debts for 1998, but had failed to pay its 1999 
power bills. 

He could not put a figure on last year's debts, saying the level of the 
government's debts to UES would not be tallied up and verified until April. 

*******

#11
gazeta.ru
February 28, 2000
Putin to Abolish Most Parties
Aleksandr Kornilov,
Svetlana Nesterova

At a Unity congress the acting president made it clear that two or, at most, 
four parties would do for Russia. 200 that exist on paper are redundant. 
According to Vladimir Putin, the other party with a future are the 
Communists. All the rest will have to fight it out. 

The inaugural congress of Unity, acted out on Sunday in the Kremlin 
Palace instead of “Swan Lake”, made history even before its numerous 
delegates left the Palace at nearly 11 p.m. The crucial address was delivered 
by the acting president, and the entire event was timed accordingly (it 
started at 6:30 p.m., unusually late for a party congress). Putin’s main 
point was the necessity of party sequestration, allegedly long overdue in 
Russia. The acting president believes the country does not need such a 
dazzling array of parties. Just two or four will do. Two are already known: 
Unity, to become a party right after the presidential elections, and the 
CPRF. Putin’s remarks on communists were unexpectedly warm – he dubbed them a 
“system-forming” party. Forsooth, Gennady Zyuganov could declare 27 February 
another red holiday. Of course, one should not jump to conclusions (for 
instance, with regard to the preservation of the Mausoleum in Red Square). 
But another mistake would be to underestimate Putin’s statement. He does not 
do or say anything lightly. 

Some other novel statements were made by the Minister of Emergency 
Situations, Sergey Shoigu, unanimously elected leader of “the Bears”. He 
urged his associates (Vladimir Putin among them) to reconsider the 
relationship of the state and the parties (serious ones, naturally). 
According to Shoigu, state power in Russia “must finally become that of the 
party”. “Again” should be substituted for “finally” here, but the idea as 
such enjoyed wide success among not only 1,500 Unity delegates, but also many 
political scientists, pro-Unity and otherwise. The idea has its pros and 
cons. On the one hand, Russians have not yet forgotten the 6th article of our 
former Constitution on “the organizing and directing” role of the CPSU. On 
the other, transition to a “party-state” structure seems quite possible. 
Parties answering the new requirements (to be carefully devised by the 
Kremlin) will have a worthwhile purpose – to come to power not just in name 
(through the Duma), but in fact (by means of a presidential candidate). All 
of Vladimir Putin’s presidential term could be spent in creating such a 
system, but time is not the crucial factor here. 

As for “party sequestration”, the Ministry of Justice should have no 
difficulty in working out new strict rules for party registration (for 
instance, by increasing the minimal number of regional party activists), and 
then put a new registration into effect. 90% of the likes of “Cedar” (the 
greens), Movement in Support of the Army and other mediocrities would then 
expire, let alone small fry. The scale of the forthcoming sequestration is 
apparent from the possibility that even such respectable bodies as Yabloko, 
Fatherland-All Russia and Liberal Democrats could come under threat. To avoid 
the effects of Putin’s party reform they might have to join forces. 
Meanwhile, in the new system the role of the ruling party is claimed by Unity 
itself. It could become just that in a legal sense too right after 
presidential elections. Sergey Shoigu has indicated that he could well resign 
his post of the formal “Bear” leader in favor of President Putin. Besides, 
Boris Gryzlov, head of Unity faction in the Duma, points out that even now 
“the Bears” are in full control of the Duma and are able to pass any law in 
the interests of their party. That is, in the interests of Vladimir Putin. 

*******

#12
From: PanoramRus@aol.com (Michael Braun
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000
Subject: Book Catalog Available

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should be ready for mailing in about two weeks. Please let us know if you 
would like a copy sent to you by sending us your current mailing address. We 
will also try to post in on our web site, where we have our complete catalog 
and a number of specialized catalogs, as a pdf file.

For those who do not know us we are a US-based vendor of scholarly books from 
Russia and the CIS, and we have been in business since 1989. We have been 
told many times that our selection is very good, and our prices are 
competitive. We invite you to see for yourselves. Our web site is below.

Sincerely yours,
Michael Braun
Panorama of Russia
P.O. Box 44-1658
Somerville, MA 02144 USA
(617) 625-3635
http://www.panrus.com/ 

******

#13
ECONOMIST PUTS ANNUAL CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM RUSSIA AT $15 BLN

MOSCOW. Feb 28 (Interfax) - The lowest estimates put capital flight
from Russia at about $15 billion a year, a senior economist said on
Monday, arguing that it usually made no sense for Russians to invest at
home.
Improving Russia's investment climate is the country's main
economic task, Yevgeny Yasin, director of the Expert Institute and a
former Russian economics minister, told Moscow's Ekho Moskvy radio.
It was private domestic investment rather than state or foreign
capital inputs that would be able to bring about economic growth, Yasin
said.
He said Russia needed annual economic growth of 4% or 5% to join
the ranks of industrialized countries.
Yasin said bringing capital back home was mainly an economic
problem because "in most cases, it is simply unprofitable for capital to
work in Russia."

******

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