February 22, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4124 4125

Johnson's Russia List
#4125
22 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AFP: Russia Sees Sharpest Drop In Population Since 1992.
2. Itar-Tass: Registered Candidates for President Forming Funds.
3. Reuters: Russia's Putin praises army, promotes generals.
4. Toronto Sun: Matthew Fisher, They love him, they love him not.(Putin)
5. Moskovsky Komsomolets: A Bomb In A Red Package. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE A LITTLE HOPE.
6. smi.ru: PUTIN DOESN'T NEED "JUST EXPERTS" 
7. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ABOUT "THE ABSENCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE" AT THE ELECTIONS.
8. Len Latkovski: Re: 4122-Ken Burns on NTV.
9. Cathy Fitzpatrick: Re: Matussevich Piece About Babitsky in Russkiy Zhurnal/4122.
10. Toronto Sun: Eric Margolis, Hardliners revive old Russian dreams.
11. gazeta.ru: Special Services Rewrite Windows 2000.
12. Christian Science Monitor: Judith Matloff, The cost of thaw in US-Russia ties.
13. Moscow Times: Sarah Karush, SPS Won't Back Any Presidential Hopeful.
14. John Jaworsky: Re Soviet dissidents.]

*******

#1
Russia Sees Sharpest Drop In Population Since 1992

MOSCOW, Feb 21, 2000 -- (Agence France Presse) Russia saw its sharpest 
decline in population since 1992 last year, with the number of inhabitants 
falling by 784,500, or 0.5 percent, according to official figures cited 
Monday by the Interfax agency.

The latest figures compiled by the State Statistical Committee (SSC) showed 
that the Russian population has shrunk by 2.8 million, or almost two percent, 
in the past eight years.

The SSC estimated that the country's population on January 1, 2000 was 145.5 
million, with 1,215,800 births being registered over the previous 12 months 
(compared with 1,283,300 in 1998), and 2,140,300 deaths (1,988,700 in 1998).

The total number of immigrants to Russia in 1999 was 379,700 (compared with 
513,500 in 1998), while the number of people who emigrated from Russia was 
marginally higher at 214,900 than the previous year's 213,300 figure.

Experts attribute the falling population to a crisis in public health and 
widespread alcoholism, which has led to the mortality rate outstripping the 
birth rate by a factor of 1.5.

"Russia is on the verge of a population catastrophe due to its low birth 
rate," Valentin Pokrovsky, director of the Academy of Medecine, warned in 
January. 

*******

#2
Registered Candidates for President Forming Funds.

MOSCOW, February 22 (Itar-Tass) -- Vladimir Putin is in the lead among other 
registered cadidates to the post of President of the Russian Federation by 
the amount of means in his election fund which is already equal to 25 million 
roubles, chairman of the Russian Central Electoral Committee (CEC) Alexander 
Veshnyakov said a press conference on Tuesday. 

The election fund of Gennady Zyuganov amounts to 15 million roubles, the fund 
of Aman Tuliyev -- to about 13 million roubles, the fund of Alexei 
Podberyozkin -- to 2.5 million roubles and the fund of Grigory Yavlinsky -- 
to about 0.5 million roubles. 

The CEC chairman recalled that the election fund of the candidate for 
president can not exceed 26 million roubles. However, if there is another 
round of election and a candidate participates in it, he can add 8 million 
roubles more to his fund. 

*******

#3
Russia's Putin praises army, promotes generals
By Andrei Shukshin

MOSCOW, Feb 21 (Reuters) - Acting President Vladimir Putin said on Monday the 
war in Chechnya had raised the spirits of the armed forces and improved 
Russians' attitude to the military. 

Putin, who has built his runaway popularity on a hawkish stance on Chechnya 
and promises to rebuild Russia's military might, used a speech ahead of a 
Soviet-era army holiday to praise his generals and promote some of them. 

``The army has regained trust in itself and society believes in and trusts 
its army,'' Putin told an audience of high-ranking military, police and 
security officers in the majestic surroundings of the gold-decked Alexander 
Hall in the Kremlin. 

Putin faces a presidential election on March 26 which opinion polls says he 
is likely to win by a big margin. He has often hit on patriotic themes in the 
run up to the vote. 

The gathering was officially dedicated to the Day of the Defender of the 
Fatherland, February 23, better known in Communist times as the Day of the 
Soviet Army. 

But Putin mainly used the occasion to congratulate generals over the Chechnya 
offensive and the impact the war has had on Russian society in rebuilding 
respect for the army. 

``The way the operation is unfolding and the results already achieved show 
the real potential of our state, its defence capability,'' Putin said, 
handing out gold-braid epaulettes to the heads of the air force and the navy, 
promoted to four star generals from their previous three star rank. 

``And what is most important -- it has prompted a big shift of sentiment in 
society,'' he said. 

BOOST TO ARMY MORALE 

Army morale plunged to an all-time low after the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union due to cash cut backs and the defeat by Chechen rebels in the 
first war in the region in 1994-96. 

Russia has a formidable nuclear arsenal, second only to that of the United 
States, although much of its technology is ageing. 

Putin, virtually unknown six months ago, has struck a chord with many 
Russians with his calls to rebuild the army and the Chechnya offensive has 
been widely supported. 

``The army only earns respect and recognition when it justly defends the 
interests of its countrymen and wins,'' he said. 

The support of the military has been important for Russian presidents. Former 
leader Boris Yeltsin relied on it to put down a parliamentary coup in 1993 
and a refusal by troops to back a hardline Communist coup in 1991 was 
decisive in allowing democratic reforms to proceed. 

*******

#4
Toronto Sun
February 21, 2000 
They love him, they love him not
By MATTHEW FISHER
Sun's Columnist at Large 

MOSCOW -- Every poll says the same thing. Many Russians are besotted by
Boris Yeltsin's chosen heir, Vladimir Putin. 

It seems inconceivable that anyone picked by Yeltsin, whose approval rating
for the last few years of his misrule was nearly nil, would strike Russia's
fancy, but the polls aren't wrong. Some level-headed friends of mine, from
all over this miserable country, will eagerly cast their votes for Putin
for president on March 26. 

In separate conversations recently these folks - a student from Nizhny
Novgorod, a computer programmer from St. Petersburg, a receptionist from
Moscow and a school director from Novosibirsk - spoke so reverentially of
Putin it was as if the former KGB colonel is already a national hero
ranking not far behind Yuri Gagarin, Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky and Peter the
Great. 

Although they sometimes didn't express themselves as elegantly, every one
of the last 30 taxi drivers I've had in Moscow felt exactly the same way. 

Putin is everything Yeltsin is not, I was told. He is a man of character
and integrity. He loves Russia and puts it before all else. He knows the
West. He's lively. He's in great shape. He's sober. 

Some of this is true. The acting president is more than 20 years younger
than Yeltsin. A tiny, trim man, he appears to be a fair and enthusiastic
judoka judging by the propaganda clips of him throwing bigger men down on
gym mats, which are shown again and again on Russian TV news programs.
Unlike the overwhelming majority of his male compatriots, he doesn't drink. 

Like Yeltsin, Gorbachev, Brezhnev and all the rest, Putin was an eager
Communist for the longest time, no matter what he now claims to be. But
compared to Boris, Mikhail, Leonid and the rest, Putin is a modern and
outward looking fellow. He speaks a foreign language (German) and sends his
kids to a German-language private school (which he cannot possibly afford
on his meagre government salary). And there may be no better way to
understand the West than having reportedly spied on NATO in West Germany
for a short time before being exposed. 

An honourable calling 

Whether Putin has character and integrity or puts the Motherland before all
else are more subjective matters. The western take is that anyone who
worked for the KGB knows the worst kind of evil tricks and was never up to
any good. But for all they suffered under the secret police, many Russians
regard spying, whether at home or abroad, as an honourable calling and a
fine calling card. 

His time as a secret agent doesn't hurt Putin with voters. It ennobles him.
It's proof he is a patriot. 

Russia's putative triumph in Chechnya fits with this. It doesn't matter if
the Chechens regroup and successfully counter-attack and kick the Russian
Army out, as they did in 1995. Putin is credited with restoring Russian
prestige. 

Having lost the Cold War and botched the peace which followed, that counts
for everything with Russians right now. 

Although muted and not heard nearly so often, there are other voices who
are doubtful about Putin. 

A well known journalist in St. Petersburg gave Putin's years in the civic
administration there in the early 1990s a scathing review. She alleged that
he left behind serious financial questions when he moved on to Moscow and
claimed that soon after Yeltsin resigned on New Year's Eve some "friends"
of the acting president had made the rounds with a stark warning.
Journalists and editors should be careful. Or else. 

A doctor from one of Moscow's top clinics who had always gone out of his
way to tell me he loved Russia so much he could never leave rang me the
other day with a surprising request. Could I help him and his family
emigrate to Canada? His terse explanation was that he had been foolish to
think the secret police would never again rule Russia. 

A prize-winning pianist who had long insisted he could not possibly live
without the inspiration and creative atmosphere provided by the Moscow
Conservatory wanted no part of Putin and his crowd, either. He confided
that he'd soon accept a longstanding offer to teach for big money in
Germany because he was convinced Putin's government would soon institute
Soviet-style exit controls. 

The opinions of those who admire Putin and those who fear him are based on
the same reading of the situation. A great many Russians have always
appreciated authoritarian rule. And a few Russians have always detested it. 

The majority should be well pleased on March 26. 

*******

#5
Russia Today press summaries
Moskovsky Komsomolets
February 22, 2000 
A Bomb In A Red Package
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE A LITTLE HOPE

Summary
Many people say that in our March elections there will be "no alternative". 
With neither Luzhkov nor Primakov running, we will have the 1996 situation - 
the opposition of a Communist who will definitely lose. But is the situation 
as innocent as it seems?

First of all, KPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) earned 3% more 
of the vote in the 1999 Duma elections than in 1995. Secondly, Zyuganov's 
rating continues to grow because the Chechen campaign has dragged on, and 
Zhirinovsky has been disqualified. According to some polls, Zyuganov's rating 
is up to 23% - compare to September's 8%.

At first the government was so focused on fighting with OVR (Fatherland-All 
Russia) that it let KPRF be. It seemed that this tolerance would last only 
for the period of Duma elections. But after December, the Kremlin openly 
sided with KPRF in the Duma. The left took all the key posts with the help of 
pro-Putin's Unity.

Of course it seems unlikely that Putin with his high rating is a weaker 
opponent for Zyuganov than Yeltsin was in 1996. But maybe victory for 
Zyuganov is not the same as it was four years ago. Putin with his resemblance 
to Andropov looks very attractive for the Communist electorate, too, and for 
many members of KPRF.

The popular point of view is that the Communist higher-ups have become 
conciliatory and thus made their way into [the country's] top offices. But it 
could be the other way around - the executive branch could have allowed the 
Communists to enter.

On the other hand, despite all external success, KPRF is having an internal 
crisis. The party is being ripped apart by platforms, trends and squabbles. 
Proof of that is its division into a few "columns" before the December 
elections. This division would not have been possible or necessary if all 
party members supported Zyuganov's ideas.

Overall, KPRF right now is a time bomb. And if the social and economic crisis 
worsens and Putin fails as President and Zyuganov as President and Secretary 
General of KPRF, it could blow up. And the explosion would be very powerful.

*******

#6
smi.ru
18:58 21.02.00
Government
PUTIN DOESN'T NEED "JUST EXPERTS" 
The Rightists have overestimated their capability of influencing the Acting 
President, the Sunday "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" says. "Even in the times when 
Yevgeny Primakov was Prime Minister, criticism of the head of the RAO UESR 
company Anatoly Chubais was heard less frequently than now, under Vladimir 
Putin". During the last month, Putin has three times directly or indirectly 
given to understand that he is dissatisfied with the work of the country's 
chief power engineering manager. First, Putin said RAO UESR is providing no 
ready money for the State; then, that Chubais likes to think of himself as a 
power engineering specialist (thus disappointing the supporters of Chubais as 
a candidate to the post of Prime Minister); then, that there would be no 
splitting up of the company (thus forestalling Chubais' plans for a 
restructuring of RAO UESR). Still, NG thinks, it is not a question of Putin 
gradually and deliberately ousting Chubais, it is just a question of the 
Acting President having cooled off somewhat towards him. This threatens 
Chubais with nothing really dramatic. As pragmatic as Chubais himself, 
Vladimir Putin is not interested in taking any radical steps against him. 
"Chubais likes working at RAO UESR", Putin said. 

Comment: The hullabaloo raised around Chubais in the media and in the Kremlin 
circles began when the latter accepted the role of a public politician again. 
As could have been predicted, the role has been an extremely colorful one, 
independently of this or that particular mise en scene he was engaged in. The 
Rightists believed Chubais would bring them closer to the Kremlin. However, 
Putin was not amused by the Rightists' attempts to "tame" him and bared his 
teeth, allowing even such a figure as the Minister for Fuels and Power 
Engineering, Victor Kalyuzhny (long expected by everybody to become an "ex" 
himself), to attack Chubais. What the Acting President is probably doing 
today is simply sounding out each and every figure with whom he might be able 
to work on a constant basis in the future. And the main prerequisite for his 
choice will be the presence of political will in his partner. In Putin's own 
words, politicians without will are just experts. Chubais is not "just an 
expert". The more so that, as claimed by "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", in private 
conversations Vladimir Putin "gives a very high assessment of the managerial 
talents of Anatoly Borisovich Chubais, says that Chubais is quite worthy of 
becoming President of Russia himself and that he, Putin, is even prepared to 
listen to his economic advice". 
"Nezavisimaya Gazeta": Putin's Privatization according to Chubais

*******

#7
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
February 22, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
Express-Poll
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ABOUT "THE ABSENCE OF AN 
ALTERNATIVE" AT THE ELECTIONS
Some experts believe that the talks about the disruption 
of the elections are advantageous for the Candidate No. 1 
while others say that this plays into the hands of his rivals
By Natalia YASHINA

Due to ever more frequent talks that the presidential 
elections of March 26 may not take place at all because of the 
electors' possible low turn-out, a correspondent of 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta requested renowned Russian political 
analysts to answer the following question: what stands behind 
these talks as there is no real rival for Putin at the 
presidential elections? 

Sergei Markov, The Foundation for the Development of 
Entrepreneurship
Of course, it is Vladimir Putin who is most of all 
interested in making everyone talk about this. The point is 
that theoretically this threat does exist. That is why the main 
counter-measure is to simply talk about it. The Putin team as 
if is trying to bring to the notice of Putin's electors that 
the main threat consists not in the fact that other candidates 
may get more votes but in the fact that he may fail to get the 
sufficient number of votes because people will not come to the 
polling stations. The Putin team is trying to explain this to 
people and thus raise their turn-out. That is why, discussions 
and talks on this score are organised by the Putin 
headquarters, I am sure of this. These people are right in 
using this electoral technology. If the Putin headquarters were 
not doing this, they should have been dissolved. 

Vyacheslav Nikonov, Politika Foundation
I believe that everyone, except Putin, is interested in 
this scenario because the duration of the electoral campaign is 
very short and actually no candidate will have time to carry 
out his campaign. Most likely, the Putin team stands behind the 
talks about the possible disruption of the turn-out as it is 
not interested in such development of the events. When there is 
no intrigue in the electoral campaign, turn-out may indeed fall;
that is why the creation of any intrigue, of any struggle 
increases interest and may raise the electors' turn-out. And in 
real fact, the elections will take place: even if somewhere 
turn-out is lower than required, the requisite votes will be 
added. 

Georgy Satarov, Indem Foundation
It seems to me that the formulation of the issue is 
absolutely wrong. I don't think that there are political forces 
in the country which can seriously influence in such a scope 
the public opinion and the electors' non-participation in the 
elections. This formulation of the question generated by our 
inclination towards the theory of conspiracy is not very 
serious and the problem of the electors' non-participation in 
the elections is a little far-fetched. 

Sergei Kurginyan, the Experimental Creative Centre 
Foundation
All anti-Putin forces are interested in this. All, except 
Putin. Communists, YABLOKO, the Union of Right Forces are all 
interested in this. The only one who is not interested is Putin.
The talks about the electors' low turn-out are empty because 
people all the same will come to the polls. 

Alexander Shokhin, the Committee for Credit Institutions 
and Financial Markets
Since a week ago I was one of the first to say that the 
elections may not take place due to the electors' low turn-out, 
naturally, all real opponents of Vladimir Putin are interested 
in this because in this case there appears a four-month period 
to prepare for the next elections. Those who by virtue of a 
number of reasons have not yet come to their senses after the 
parliamentary elections, will have an opportunity to re-group 
and create either a coalition or nominate new candidates for 
presidency, etc. But these scenarios, to my mind, are fraught 
with the prolongation of the period of unpredictability and 
uncertainty for Russia. Apart from that, owing to the fact that 
the Constitution does not have clear-cut formulations as 
regards the mechanism of the performance of duties after the 
three-month period and after the early presidential elections, 
there may appear "hot heads" who would want to interpret the 
Fundamental law in some or others' favour. In particular, not 
in favour of Vladimir Putin. That is why this scenario is of 
course, unfavourable both for Russia and Putin. I believe that 
Putin's latest statement about his support of the idea of a 
referendum and the variants with the Union of Right Forces are 
not the demonstration of closeness to the ideology of 
right-wing forces on the issue of land, the deputies' 
privileges but an attempt to create an intrigue in the first 
round of the presidential elections. If it is combined with the 
holding of the referendum, the electors' turn-out will 
undoubtedly be higher. Now about the turn-out. Polls show that 
slightly more than 50% of electors will come to the polling 
stations. But the predetermined nature of the outcome of the 
elections makes unnecessary the participation of many in this 
technical procedure as everything has all the same been decided 
and even those who are ready to vote for Putin, and also his 
supporters, may neglect their civil duties due to this 
predetermined nature and the absence of a real alternative at 
the elections. This is not because people will vote as if 
against Putin, but a number of his supporters may not 
participate at all as everything is already clear. It is 
important that the first round should take place irrespective 
of whether it will be the sole one or not. We say that the 
invalid elections create the situation of unpredictability. 
This must be prevented. 

*******

#8
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000
From: Len Latkovski <latkovski@hood.edu>
Subject: Re: 4122-Ken Burns on NTV

The commentary by "x" on the connection between the standards of military
behavior by Union forces in the mid-19th century during the American Civil
War and Russian behavior in Chechnya in 1999-2000 is amazingly silly, and
even offensive. Using that argumentation any current atrocity can be
excused by comparison to a past action of Americans, or British, French or
other Western liberal powers, for that matter. There is no question that we
can find examples of brutality, massacres, and other highly objectionable
actions by some U.S. forces in various campaigns in American history. The
Filipino Revolt is a prime exhibit. But now the world now is a full century
into the process of defining and defending basic human rights, war crimes
and acceptable standards of human conduct. These standards must be applied
in Chechnya, in Kossovo, in Sierra Leone, in the current Western campaign
against Iraq, or anywhere else, fully and fairly and consistently and
unequivocally. To use a 19th century standard today should hardly be our
guide. Otherwise we can all imitate Italy's actions in Ethiopia in 1935. 

Len Latkovski, Ph.D.
Professor of History
Hood College
Frederick, Maryland

*******

#9
From: ilhr@perfekt.perfekt.net (Cathy Fitzpatrick)
Subject: Re: Matussevich Piece About Babitsky in Russkiy Zhurnal/4122
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 

Re: Matussevich's piece about Babitsky in Russkiy Zhurnal. It's important
for readers to know that Russian Journal is supported by the Russian
Institute and the Fund for Effective Policy and is edited by Gleb
Pavlovsky, often described in Newsweek as a "Kremlin insider" or
"consultant" who once had a post in the Yeltsin administration and who is
now supporting Putin. The style of this article is like an old-fashioned
Soviet "podval," clearly designed to smear Babitsky and RL without raising
the slightest curiosity about the responsibility that Putin bears for
Babitsky's disappearance. We cannot be sure whether the many broadcasts
and comments cited by Matussevich are accurate and true, but the well is
already poisoned. I've queried Radio Liberty about his comments myself. I
regularly read the transcripts on the RL website, and I find it improbable
that the editors would have let pass something like "small-scale
degenerate gangsters." And if they did allow such commentary, it must be
noted that RL's coverage of Chechnya is in a context with a variety of
sources, so that if Shuster runs an interview with Udugov, for example, we
don't have to fear that he has neglected to run the official point of view
and any fresh information that overturns it. 

I've listened to hours of RL tapes recently as part of a study. And if
anything, RL has been a little too cautious about leading off its news
briefs at the top of the hour with the latest Russian disinformation
dispatch about Chechnya. To be sure, brave reports like Mariya Eismont and
Babitsky have been given prominence, as well they should -- they should be
awarded journalism prizes. Savik Shuster's editing and reporting have been
superb throughout this war. (As for gangsters, it is hard to know how to
assess the creeping thuggishness of Russian official discourse, from Putin
on down, where Jamey Rubin is called a "gorshok" and where Chechens are to
be hunted down and "zamocheny v sortirakh." ) 

Quite disturbing is notion that Russian reporters employed by the
Congressionally-funded Radio Liberty are "not ours". Of course Russian
liberals apprehensive about Putin are not "svoi" for this gang at Russkiy
Zhurnal, but they are no less Russian and perhaps the better patriots. And
perhaps busy and urbane Moscow intellegentsia have no time to listen to
Radio Liberty, but having been on RL talk shows occasionally myself, I'm
amazed at the people who call in from the provinces, careful and informed
listeners all. Matussevich must not know how war journalism works.
Particularly in an extremely dangerous war zone like Chechnya, you have
really no space to operate independently and safely. You either accept the
Russian armed escort, or you go with Chechen fighter groups, or near them.
That hardly means you've on the Chechen side -- Russian journalists,
whatever their sympathies in the last war for the underdog, have gotten a
good deal more cynical and suspicious of Chechens after several years of
seeing their colleagues kidnapped. It means you're covering the war from
one side of the conflict, a perfectly acceptable exercise for any news
organization, and one easily corrected by putting such reportage in an
overall context with a variety of types and sources of reporting. 

Surely in the blanket of Russian disinformation, and the news blackout and
lack of access to the region, travelling in the war zone with Chechens to
cover the story of atrocities is acceptable, and it does not make Babitsky
a poor or biased reporter. I think any U.S. news organization, if they
had been offered by RTS a tape of a U.S. soldier being interrogated by
Serbs while NATO bombed, would run the tape, as part of the story of POWs
-- with proper commentary and context, a concept that seems alien to
Matussevich. The use of this particularly propagandistic device a la Putin
-- "How would you feel if Texas broke off or you woke up one morning and
the Watergate Apartments were blown up?" -- is a dead giveaway for the
purpose of this article -- to somehow counter the growing reaction in the
West and in Russia itself to the Babitsky saga. 

Now what if Jeff Trimble, after more than a month of frustration looking
for his reporter, did start to speak of him in the past tense, or even
describe him as "wild"? He certainly didn't put this in a press release,
if in fact he ever said it. It sometimes happens that arrogant news
officials at headquarters dump on their reporters out in the field and hang
them out to dry. I saw this happen while working at CPJ. But that doesn't
seem like Jeff Trimble to me, who has been trying to move heaven and earth
to find Babitsky. And what if he did say it, and what if Babitsky was
the biased reporter Matussevich seems to think? That would in no way remove
the responsibility from Putin from explaining where he is and releasing
him immediately in any event. 

The punishment for bad journalism shouldn't be death or disappearance. The
Russian government has violated the Geneva Conventions by turning a
non-combatant, a journalist, over to combatants -- end of story. They
need to account for him. Putin has taken responsibility for him. Let
Matussevich prompt Putin to find Babitsky. I would have to say that
Trimble's analysis of the throat-cutting -- that it is not some sort of
genetic predisposition of the Chechen people but comes out of desperation
and a desire to make dramatic gesture -- is in no way intended as a
justification of this violation of international humanitarian law. 

Matussevich seems to think that RL deliberately waited 10 days before
complaining about Babitsky's disappearance, and timed it to Albright's
visit -- a patent absurdity. It is common for war correspondents,
including Babitsky himself, to be out of touch for lengths of time, and it
is common for news organizations to try to use quiet diplomacy for some
days to make sure their reporters aren't harmed, and not to go public
until they get no answers. That's exactly what RL did. Matussevich's
diatribe is one good reason why a "foreign" broadcasting operation like
Radio Liberty is still needed in Russia today. And far from reviving
cartoonish cold-war broadcasting, RL is breaking through the resurrected
Empire of the Big Lie. 

Cathy Fitzpatrick, International League for Human Rights 

********

#10
Toronto Sun
February 20, 2000 
Hardliners revive old Russian dreams
By Eric Margolis, Contributing Foreign Editor 

The creeping coup that overthrew Boris Yeltsin late last year marked the
unlamented end of Weimar Russia. The Yeltsinshchina, or Yeltsin era, was an
unnatural, anomalous period that couldn't last. 

When a massive flight of capital from Russia in mid-1998 sounded the death
knell for the moribund Yeltsin regime, Russia's security services, armed
forces and military-industrial complex, joined forces to seize power and
oust Yeltsin. The Communist party gave tacit approval. A former KGB
officer, Vladimir Putin, was selected as the hardliners' strongman. 

Tellingly, at a Moscow banquet, another former KGB official, presidential
candidate Yevgenny Primakov, an ostensible rival of Putin, reportedly
toasted the victory of his fellow chekist, or secret policeman, in
regaining power. 

Russia is now in the hands of a younger generation of hardline leaders -
some of them Communists, some of them extreme nationalists - who are
determined to restore their country's military strength, prestige and
economic power. This column has predicted such a development since 1995,
when it became clear the deeply corrupt Yeltsin regime was being massively
bribed by the U.S. and Europe to co-operate with American strategic policy
and give western interests a free hand. Such behaviour was totally out of
sync with Russian geopolitics, history, nationalism and self-interest. 

Western-style PR 

If the Russians learned one thing from the West, it was public relations.
The Kremlin neatly silenced U.S. protests over its butchery in Chechnya by
calling it an operation against "Islamic terrorism," a buzzword sure to
bring the U.S. onside. Kremlin spinmeisters are now depicting Putin as a
young, determined, democratic reformer who simply wants to get Russia back
to work. 

While Putin's domestic policies remain cloudy, there's no doubt he and his
backers have launched a high-intensity campaign to restore Russia's
pre-1991 strategic power - and begin reassembling the old Soviet Union. The
western media have ignored this issue, or failed to connect the dots. In
addition to Russia's brutal laying of waste to Chechnya: 

* The Kremlin recently proclaimed an aggressive new nuclear doctrine "in
response to growing threats from NATO and Islamic terrorists." Nuclear or
conventional weapons will be used without warning against any threats to
Russian territory or, ominously, "to Russia's allies." Previously, Russia's
policy was to employ nuclear arms only in response to nuclear attack
against its own territory. 

* Belarus, which broke away from the dying Soviet Union, has rejoined the
Russian Federation. This is the first significant step in reassembling the
old USSR. Moscow continues attempts to isolate Ukraine, the most important
defector from the Soviet Union, through diplomatic and economic siege. The
Baltic states are also under growing pressure to bend to Moscow's will. 

* The Russian defence budget was just increased 50% for new weapons
systems, including aircraft, armour, artillery and "smart" munitions. A new
generation, highly accurate, road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27) ICBM is about to
be deployed. 

* Last November, Putin declared Russia's zone of "strategic interest"
included regions south of Russia and the Baltic. Yeltsin had previously
declared all the states of the former Soviet Union as being "within Russian
security borders," an inconvenience played down by the West. KGB operations
in East Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia have doubled. 

* The carrier Kuznetsov and its flotilla will deploy to the Mediterranean.
Russian naval units are returning to refurbished bases in Cam Ranh Bay,
Vietnam, and Tartous, Syria after years of absence. 

* Russian garrisons and bases, including brigades in Armenia, Georgia and
Moldova, will be reinforced. Georgia was recently pressured into accepting
a new Russia air base. Russian troops back Abkhaz separatists in Georgia.
Some 22,000 Russian troops are battling Islamic anti-communist insurgents
in Tajikistan. Russian arms and advisers are flowing into Afghanistan, to
support the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Russian security forces and KGB
protect the "red sultans" who rule the semi-independent former Soviet
republics of Central Asia. 

Monitoring e-mail 

* 800 Russian intelligence troops outside Havana still monitor most
electronic communications, including cellphones and e-mail, in the eastern
U.S. and Canada. 

* Moscow has reactivated its strategic alliance with New Delhi, supplying
India with long-range TU-22 bombers, fighters, missiles, submarines and
advanced military technology. Russian arms are also again flowing to
Angola's Marxist regime, and in growing quantities to China, including,
most recently, destroyers equipped with new SSN-22 Sunburn missiles
designed to sink U.S. aircraft carriers and Aegis-class combatants.
Russia's once moribund military-industrial complex is returning to vigor. 

* Russia has revived its top secret bio-warfare program - supposedly
dismantled under Yeltsin - according to recent defectors. In a favourite
Russian intelligence ploy known as the "false flag" operation, millions in
aid that Israel got the U.S. to give to Russia to make jobs for military
scientists to prevent them from going to work for Arab states or Iran was
reportedly diverted into bio-warfare projects. 

Russia is going back to being Russia after a decade of political amnesia.
The Kremlin is flexing its muscles and reasserting Russia's traditional
strategic interests. But cautiously, since Moscow still needs western aid
to rebuild its shattered economy. 

We're not quite back to the Cold War yet, but it's clear Russia's historic
rivalry with the West has resumed. Western leaders just don't want to see
the writing on the Kremlin's walls. 

******

#11
gazeta.ru
Special Services Rewrite Windows 2000 
Alexander Kondratyev, staff writer

Windows 2000 is presented to the world today, but in Windows 2000 imported 
to Russia Microsoft has decided to drop some fragments disapproved by the 
Federal Agency on Government Communication and Information (FAPSI). 

The main feature that makes the Windows 2000 operating system different 
from previous versions is the 128-bit encryption software, but it will not be 
included in versions imported into Russia. The irony is that just a few years 
ago the export of such software from the US was strictly forbidden, because 
the US National Security Agency feared that the FAPSI or the Chinese would 
crack it. The FAPSI and the Chinese, for their part, called for an import ban 
on the 128-bit keys because they doubted they could crack them. All this has 
had a negative effect on Microsoft sales. 

At one point the debate on the encryption software included in Windows 
2000 acquired the scale and intensity of the millennium bug debate. "Here is 
the real problem of 2000!", was the alarming verdict of many sections of the 
computer media. It was widely believed that the FAPSI would never agree to 
import software it is unable to crack, while the ambitious Microsoft would 
not alter its global strategy for the sake of Russia alone, especially since 
the country largely relies on pirated Microsoft products. 

Certain psychological factors have influenced the outcome of the 
issue. Had the FAPSI banned the import of encryption software to Russia 
altogether, it would have amounted to an unconditional surrender to the NSA. 
FAPSI could not possibly admit that 128-bit keys are unbreakable. On the 
other hand, Microsoft is a commercial body, not a national secret service it 
makes no difference to them if Russians are happy to acquire substandard 
software, just as long as they pay for it. 

The issue has been resolved with both sides managing to arrive at a 
decision worthy of King Solomon. On Thursday morning Microsoft issued an 
official statement saying that the company had consulted the FAPSI about the 
possible restrictions on the import of 128-bit encryption software. The FAPSI 
and Microsoft have agreed that pending the result of consultations, the 
FAPSI would not impose any restrictions on the import of Windows 2000. 
However, in accordance with Russian law, Microsoft has decided to exclude 
128-bit software from its Russian exports. The encryption software in 
question will not be included in either the Russian or English versions of 
Windows 2000 available to Russian wholesalers and retailers. 

The result is that all sides, with the possible exception of the 
Russian consumer, are content with the outcome. It remains to be seen whether 
the "lighter" version will cost less, and if and how this could affect the 
policies of Microsoft and the FAPSI towards Russian distributors who 
fearlessly sell any kind of software, including a proliferation of pirate 
software. A visit to Moscow's popular Gorbushka cd market is a copywriter's 
nightmare; one has to look very hard to find legitimate products. 

*******

#12
Christian Science Monitor
22 February 2000
The cost of thaw in US-Russia ties
Dismissing Chechnya, NATO's chief signed a deal with Russia's leader Feb. 16. 
By Judith Matloff, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

A new pragmatism is ending the mini-cold war that began last spring between 
Russia and the West. Moscow's acceptance last week of a NATO olive branch 
makes clear just how far both sides will go to avoid confrontation. 

It appears the West has decided to forgive Moscow its human rights abuses in 
Chechnya, while Russia will transcend nationalist pressure so the two sides 
can stay engaged. 

The chill began last spring when Russia froze relations with the Western 
military alliance to protest its three-month bombing of Yugoslavia over 
Kosovo. It deepened when NATO criticized Russia for using excessive force in 
its fight against Chechen separatists in recent months. 

But the thaw agreed to last Wednesday between Russia's new leader, Vladimir 
Putin, and NATO's new chief, Gen. George Robertson, heralds a renewal of the 
strategic partnership. 

General Robertson's courting visit was a strong signal to Acting President 
Putin that he can do as he likes, if, as expected, he is confirmed in the 
March 26 election. 

The nuclear factor 

Forget that Putin has muzzled the press in his six weeks in power. Look past 
the United Nations' and European Union's condemnations of the Chechen 
campaign, which has driven some 250,000 refugees into neighboring regions. 
What is important is that the West does not want to alienate a Russia with 
thousands of nuclear warheads, analysts say. 

For his part, Putin has overridden the objections of Russian generals hostile 
to NATO's eastward expansion. Russia's new leader appears to be indicating he 
acknowledges the importance of Western help to develop his country's 
dilapidated economy. 

"Neither side wants serious conflict," says Pavel Ivanov, an analyst at 
Moscow's National Security and Strategic Research Institute. 

"First we will finish the war in Chechnya. Then America will elect its next 
president. Over the coming year we will find out how to develop relations 
with NATO because these relations are so important to both of us," he says. 

No one expects an end to upsets in their intrinsically rocky relationship, 
however. This former superpower will always resent NATO for its adoption of 
former Soviet satellites. The agreement signed last week - working toward a 
peaceful, undivided Europe - could easily fall apart. 

More important, Putin has yet to show what he intends by increasing military 
spending and unveiling a new security doctrine that broadens the Kremlin's 
authority to use nuclear weapons. 

These very same weapons are driving the West to push for enhanced dialogue. 
President Clinton in particular is keen to leave office with an arms-control 
deal that has so far proved elusive. 

Washington is frustrated by the foot-dragging of Russian parliamentarians, 
who have so far refused to ratify the 1993 START II strategic arms treaty. 
Their reluctance is due in part to concern over Washington's desire to modify 
the 1972 Antiballistic Missile treaty, which is a keystone in arms control. 

The sense of urgency is growing, and Washington is pushing for a summit as 
soon as Putin is inaugurated. As a sign of intensifying dialogue, Russian 
Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov left for Washington last week. 

This focus on greater engagement leaves little room for sanctions over 
Chechnya. Washington's attitude seems to be to leave the criticism to human 
rights groups. Notable was the muted concern voiced by the administration at 
the disappearance in Russian military hands of Andrei Babitsky, a reporter in 
Chechnya for US-funded Radio Liberty. 

'Don't hold relations hostage' 

Former Defense Secretary William Perry applauds the "softly, softly" 
approach. "I regard US-Russian relations as the most important security issue 
today," he said during a roundtable discussion in Moscow on Feb. 16. "I don't 
think they should be held hostage [to differences over Chechnya]." 

The only lever the West can wield on Chechnya is economic, and it has failed 
to do that effectively. The International Monetary Fund delayed releasing 
more money to Russia, reluctant to fund the Chechen war. But a different 
message was sent on Feb. 11, when the London Club of private creditors agreed 
to forgive $1.6 billion of Russia's Soviet-era debt. The London Club also 
agreed to postpone repayment on the remaining $21.2 billion until 2008. 

This is a sign Russia has bounced back from the financial crisis of 1998-99, 
when it defaulted on $40 billion in debt. 

Moscow is hoping the London deal will inspire a similar agreement with the 
Paris Club of governmental creditors, to which it owes $40 billion in Soviet 
debt. 

*******

#13
Moscow Times
Tuesday, February 22, 2000 
SPS Won't Back Any Presidential Hopeful 
By Sarah Karush
Staff Writer

Leaders of the Union of Right Forces, or SPS, announced Monday their party 
would not support any given candidate in the presidential elections in an 
apparent attempt to avoid a split within their fledgling association of 
diverse democratic groups. 

While leaders of the party's State Duma faction have voiced their support for 
acting President Vladimir Putin, many SPS members take issue with Putin's 
record in Chechnya and his KGB past. The candidacy of Samara region Governor 
Konstantin Titov, a key figure in SPS, has further complicated matters. 

So rather than risk an embarrassing internal struggle, the SPS coordinating 
council chose not to support any of the candidates. 

"The unity of SPS is my priority," faction leader Sergei Kiriyenko told 
journalists after the council meeting ended. 

Titov - who sits on the coordinating council along with Duma Deputies 
Kiriyenko, Boris Nemtsov, Irina Khakamada and Yegor Gaidar, and Unified 
Energy Systems head Anatoly Chubais - said he was satisfied with the 
unanimous decision. "There could not have been any other decision," Interfax 
quoted him as saying. 

But it was unclear whether the party would later return to the issue. While 
Titov said the council decided to support no one, Nemtsov offered a different 
account. He told NTV television the decision simply means SPS would not have 
its own candidate, but leaves open the possibility of supporting someone. 

The issue of whom to support in the March 26 elections was supposed to be 
discussed at an SPS party congress later this month. But Titov said the 
congress would likely take place only after the elections, Interfax reported. 

Many observers have forecasted such a postponement, but for Titov it was a 
step back from his statements at a news conference Thursday, when he 
predicted the congress would be held and everyone - "except maybe Kiriyenko 
and Chubais" - would support him. 

Many of the organizations that formed the SPS election bloc have already 
declared their support for Titov. 

Lev Ponomaryov, co-chairman of the Democratic Russia movement, said those 
members of SPS who were supporting Putin were likely motivated by 
"considerations of the moment." 

"Putin is not one of us, ideologically," he said in a telephone interview, 
adding that the acting president has not even approached prominent liberals 
to ask for their support. "He doesn't need our help." 

On the other hand, Titov is a long-standing member of the "democratic 
community," and has "a normal dialogue" with SPS member parties, Ponomaryov 
said. 

But rejecting Putin outright would put the party in a difficult situation, as 
it declared its support for Putin during the parliamentary election campaign 
in the fall - a move that many say helped SPS win 8.52 percent of the vote. 

Once in the Duma, SPS appeared to have gotten the raw end of the deal when 
the pro-Putin Unity faction entered a tactical alliance with the Communists, 
depriving SPS and other so-called minority factions of influential committee 
chairmanships. 

Since then, SPS leaders have been more critical of the Kremlin, but are not 
quite ready to give up on Putin. Khakamada said in an interview last week SPS 
would continue to pursue a "dialogue" with him. 

And some observers interpreted recent moves by Putin as gestures of goodwill 
toward the liberals. 

On Friday, for example, Putin said he supported SPS's initiative to hold a 
referendum on reform - including legal protection of property rights, limits 
on deputies' immunity from prosecution, the development of a volunteer army 
and amendments to the Constitution limiting the president's rights. 

Also Friday, Unity teamed up with SPS to vote against the Duma's previous 
decision to transfer many of the powers of the legislation committee - the 
one committee controlled by SPS - to another committee headed by Communist 
Anatoly Lukyanov, Segodnya reported. 

While such gestures may appease the faction leaders, they are unlikely to 
have an effect on people from Ponomaryov's camp, which has firmly condemned 
the decisions Putin has made in Chechnya. 

Such a point of view is shared by a few SPS deputies who make up what 
Khakamada calls "the human rights wing" of the faction. Former human rights 
commissioner Sergei Kovalyov is the best-known representative of this group, 
and he has announced his support for Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky for 
president. 

*******

#14
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 
From: "JOHN (IVAN) JAWORSKY" <jjaworsk@watarts.uwaterloo.ca>
Subject: Re: Soviet dissidents

Since Andrei Liakhov invited a healthy debate on the legacy of the Soviet
dissidents, I would like to comment on his contribution (JRL #4122). First
and most important, I strongly recommend that generalizations about
*Soviet* dissent and dissidents be based on more than the experience of
dissidents from Russia. Dissidents in the Baltic States, in Ukraine
(especially Western Ukraine), and in some other regions of the USSR, had a
real or potential base of support among ordinary citizens that was much
more significant than the support enjoyed by most dissidents in Russia.
The case of the Crimean Tatars provides what is probably the most dramatic
example of mass support for dissident activity. Demonstrations and
petition-signing campaigns organized by Mustafa Dzhemilev and other Crimean
Tatar dissidents (many were imprisoned for their activities) attracted the
support of tens of thousands of Crimean Tatars exiled in Central Asia at a
time when it was very difficult to organize even a small demonstration or
petition-signing campaign in Moscow. 

Some JRL readers might argue that the individuals to whom I am referring
were nationalists rather than "real" dissidents. This was not generally
the case. For example, although the dissidents from Ukraine included some
eccentrics and xenophobic nationalists (such individuals could also be
found among the dissidents from Russia), they were greatly outnumbered by
individuals who combined an interest in national rights with a strong
interest in human/minority rights. Thus Iosif Zisels, a former political
prisoner and now a leading Jewish community activist in Ukraine, has
recently noted that of all Jewish communities in the post-Soviet region the
one in Ukraine was the most active. Among the reasons for this he noted
"support from national-democratic circles not only during the 'perestroika'
period but, what is much more important, during the preceding
twenty-year-long period of covert activities and repression." Zisels, a
former member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group, is referring
here to the cooperation between political prisoners of Jewish and Ukrainian
background in Brezhnev-period penal institutions which is mentioned in a
number of samizdat documents as well as the memoirs of several former
Jewish "refuseniks" and human rights activists (e.g., Natan Sharansky).
Likewise, the absence of inter-ethnic conflict during the return of the
Crimean Tatars to Crimea from the late 1980s on is largely due to the great
restraint and capable leadership demonstrated by Mustafa Dzhemilev, a
dissident "veteran" who is still the leader of the Crimean Tatar community. 

One might also argue that in some Soviet republics, cynical communist
apparatchiks such as Leonid Kravchuk (Ukraine's first president) rather
than dissident leaders, were responsible for the drive for independence
which led to the USSR's collapse. Such an argument is far too simplistic,
and greatly underestimates the influence of the former dissidents. For
example, Kravchuk's two main opponents during the 1991 presidential
campaign in Ukraine, Chornovil and Lukianenko, were former dissidents, and
they as well as other former dissidents played a very significant role in
determining the agenda for domestic political developments in Ukraine just
before and following Ukraine's independence. Some former dissidents, and
many elements of their agenda, were coopted by Ukraine's communist
nomenklatura elite, and the former dissidents soon lost much of their
influence. However, their impact just before and after the collapse of the
USSR should not be underestimated.

I would also disagree with some of the other generalizations made by
Andrei Liakhov. Yes, samizdat was read by only a tiny proportion of the
population, but many individuals listened to the texts of samizdat works
made available to a much larger audience through Radio Liberty and other
foreign radio broadcasting outfits. My main point, however, is that a
Russocentric view of the Soviet dissident experience is very misleading,
and greatly distorts any attempt to discuss the legacy of Soviet dissent.

******

Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: 
http://www.cdi.org/russia