February 21, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4122 4123

Johnson's Russia List
#4123
21 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Sergei Rogov, STRANGE PHASE IN RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. Do We Need to Hustle Start-II Ratification?
2. Moskovsky Komsomolets: Natalya SHIPITSYNA and Alexei BORISOV, PUTIN AT A CROSSROADS.
3. Dominique Arel: ASN CONVENTION: PRELIMINARY PROGRAM NOW ON THE WEB. 5th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN). "Identity and the State: Nationalism and Sovereignty in a Changing World"
4. Andrew Miller: Election Fraud in Russia. In Defense of Vladimir Yakovlev.]

*******

#1
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
February 8, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
STRANGE PHASE IN RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
Do We Need to Hustle Start-II Ratification?
Sergei ROGOV, Director,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of USA and Canada 

During her recent visit to Moscow Madeleine Albright said 
that relations between the USA and Russia are entering "a 
strange phase."
Indeed, the current stage of Russo-American relations 
reveals two basic distinctions.
Firstly, the "buddy Boris - buddy Bill" epoch is over. In 
1993 the "buddies" proclaimed a strategic partnership between 
Moscow and Washington, but proved to be either unwilling or 
unable to translate political declarations into tangible 
accomplishments. The issue, however, is not the individual 
attitudes of the persons involved, but the catastrophic policy 
pursued by the Russian leadership, the policy which transformed 
Russia from a global superpower into a weak country bogged down 
in a permanent crisis. As a result, Russo-American relations 
have grown massively lopsided. The United States can no longer 
regard politically unstable, economically weak and 
internationally isolated Russia as an equal partner whose 
interests they ought to take into serious consideration. In 
fact, the pronounced partnership turned into "the leader and 
the led" pattern of relationship, with the USA attempting to 
shape major trends of Russian domestic and foreign policy. Yet 
this pattern fell apart after the financial collapse in August 
1998. Yeltsin's resignation brought an end to that epoch.
Secondly, the late nineties revealed considerable 
differences between Moscow and Washington in almost every major 
area - economic, political, military. The catalogue of these 
differences looks quite impressive and includes overseas debts 
and loans, economic sanctions and quotas, NATO expansion, 
Kosovo, Iran, Iraq, Caspian pipelines, weapons control, etc. 
Developments in Chechnya have shown that Russo-American 
relations are in a deep crisis. Should the current situation 
hold, a totally new pattern of relationship will take root to 
bring forth mutual alienation as the best option, and all-round 
confrontation in the worst case scenario. 
Thirdly, both we and the US are about to enter the 
presidential election race. The atmosphere of election 
campaigns (notwithstanding vast differences between such 
campaigns in Russia and in America) is inevitably fraught with 
excessive pre-election rhetoric which does not exactly 
encourage diplomats to look for compromises. Moreover, the 
change of leaders in both countries (first in Russia, then in 
the US) will spell not only a new personal style but also 
correction of strategic approaches.
In this light, the speech made by the US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright at the Diplomatic Academy during her 
recent visit to Moscow gives ample food for thought regarding 
the nature and configuration of the Russo-American relationship 
in the foreseeable future. She proclaimed the end of the 
transitional period in international affairs and announced the 
beginning of a "new era." To give her credit, the US Secretary 
of State dismissed the "defeatist sentiments" and made quite an 
optimistic forecast. "I am certain," she said, "that the United 
States and Russia share enough common interests to overcome the 
existing differences and jointly work out balanced approaches 
to the major risks and contingencies that we are likely to face 
in the new century." 
Unfortunately, today this scenario looks somewhat too 
optimistic. Russia's disengagement from the crisis and 
restoration of the country's economic might hinge to a large 
extent upon the terms of our integration into the world economy.
It is no secret that the US-led West establishes major 
priorities regarding the configuration of the global market. 
The necessity to play by new rules on the world's political and 
economic arena has proved to be a tough trial for the Russian 
Federation. 
The nineties witnessed Russia saddled with heavy debts it 
owed to its more efficient competitors. Boris Yeltsin, when 
signing the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Agreement on the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, acknowledged all the debts 
the USSR had amassed during the cold war era. Those were 
promptly augmented by new debts on loans borrowed from the IMF 
and the World Bank throughout the past decade. Additional loans 
from various foreign lenders and the issue of eurobonds further 
aggravated the situation. All in all, Russia received from the 
West less than $50 bln. in the nineties, and paid off over $80 
bln. However, our total debt has leapt 50 percent to reach $165 
bln. which is tantamount to the Russian GDP in dollar terms at 
the official rate of exchange. 
Suffice it to say, that after the August 1998 financial 
collapse, impoverished Russia received less than $1 bln. in 
Western loans but paid off $10 bln. to its creditors. In the 
first quarter of this year alone we are to repay another $3 bln.
in debt redemption. The more we pay, the bigger the debt 
becomes.
For the time being, thanks to the oil price hike, we are 
somehow managing to meet our debt obligations, albeit not all 
of them, for example, debts to members of the London Club of 
Creditors have been delayed. But the current oil prices will 
not last long. In all likelihood, the USA will soon use its 
mighty clout to slash the oil price, otherwise the uniquely 
long period of American economic growth, associated with 
President Clinton, may well end up in a replication of the 1929 
stock market crash.
What are we going to do in case the oil prices go down? 
Are we going to follow suit of the Bolsheviks who in 1918 
flatly refused to pay debts to the imperialists?
At present the West is unwilling to hold any serious talks 
with Russia on debt restructuring. In the summer of 1997 at the 
G-7 Summit in Cologne Yeltsin was given promises that such 
talks should start shortly... only for the promises to be 
discreetly hushed up later on. In 2000 one third of our federal 
budget (or about 4 percent of GDP in dollar terms) will have to 
be spent on foreign debt payments, which is a heavy burden even 
taking into account the facts that we have unilaterally stopped 
paying the Soviet Union's debts, and that the West intends to 
give us additional loans to the amount covering half of the 
payments due.
However, during Mrs. Albright's stay in Moscow both the IMF 
managing director Michel Camdessus and the World Bank president 
James Wolfensohn made it quite clear that the release of the 
above loans would be suspended for economic as well as 
political (Chechnya) considerations. 
Can Russia break the vicious debt circle it has been stuck 
in over the past years? Honestly, this is going to be an 
insurmountable challenge unless our creditors agree to meet us 
halfway and show willingness to take into account at least some 
of Russia's interests. 
If Washington were truly willing to give due regard to 
legitimate Russian interests, President Clinton might have 
suggested to his Western allies that a long-term (say, 
20-year-long) program for Russia's debt restructuring be worked 
out. It is evident that the other G-7 members will subscribe to 
such a large-scale initiative only on condition of strong 
American commitment. However, neither the US Secretary of 
State, nor Secretary of the Treasury, nor the US President 
himself has shown any particular interest in addressing this 
issue. 
About a year ago President Clinton declared that by June 
2000 he would make a decision on the deployment of the national 
missile defence system, irrespective of the progress made at 
the Russo-American talks on adjustments to the 1972 ABM treaty. 
Mrs.
Albright did not forget to recall this plan during her recent 
stay in Moscow. Thus, the US is openly threatening to enforce a 
unilateral review of the rules hitherto practised in the sphere 
of strategic weapons, disregarding the national security 
interests of Russia. 
Does it mean that Washington intends to bring about 
gradual renunciation of the existing parity in the area of 
nuclear weapons because there is no parity with Russia in all 
other areas? Mrs. Albright is giving assurances that the 
Clinton Administration harbours no such intentions, but who can 
guarantee that the next US Administration will stand by the 
present status quo? It is pertinent to note in this respect 
that the Republican Party has declared the deployment of the 
federal missile defence system to be the cornerstone of its 
national program. And the Republicans stand a good chance to 
make it to the White House in November, 2000. 
At the same time, the US is insisting on prompt 
ratification of START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), 
giving indications that such a ratification would determine 
Washington's attitude to Putin. A statement to this effect was 
made during Mrs. Albright's stay in Moscow by an American 
diplomat who spoke on conditions of anonymity. Undoubtedly, 
this Treaty ought to have been ratified a long time ago, but 
Yeltsin lost precious time refusing to discuss the issue with 
the State Duma. However, when the Duma had finally grown ready 
for the ratification, the USA twice thwarted its vote by savage 
bombing of Iraq (in December 1998) and then Yugoslavia (in 
March 1999). Apparently, Washington has ceased to regard the 
START-II ratification as a major priority significant enough to 
justify, say, a two-week delay in executing another punitive 
action. Every American expert is certain that in ten years' 
time financial difficulties will lead to the Russian nuclear 
arsenal shrinking to a level far lower than the one stipulated 
in the START-II. 
Why then is the Clinton Administration trying so hard to 
push the ratification through as soon as possible? Probably, 
because following the blocking of new treaty on the 
comprehensive ban of all nuclear weapons tests by the US 
Senate, President Clinton does not want to end his tenure in 
office with a history of failed efforts. He would like to have 
at least one major arms control treaty in eight years 
successfully brought into force. 
We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the US 
wants to make sure that economic tribulations have rendered 
Russia pliant enough to make concessions in the area of 
strategic arms, including the ABM Treaty. Remember how many 
times Yeltsin bluffed the West with threats stretching just 
short of starting the third world war in retaliation for 
expansion of NATO, bombing Iraq or aggression against Serbia. 
Yet in the end, he always gave in to "buddy Bill."
I have been advocating the immediate ratification of 
START-II for seven years. If it had taken place in 1994 or 
1996, we would have now had START-III effectively in operation, 
with no inroads being made into the existing ABM Treaty. Today, 
however, I think that we should take our time and thoroughly 
weigh up the cons and the pros. What would happen if in 
response to the Duma's ratification of the ill-fated treaty the 
Republican-dominated Senate rejected the 1997 Protocols on the 
extension of START-II and demarcation between tactical and 
strategic missile defence systems? What would happen if in June 
or July President Clinton did give the go-ahead to his plan of 
deploying the national missile defence system in contravention 
of the existing ABM Treaty? 
The hasty ratification of START-II (which is certainly 
going to be rigidly tied to continued observance of the ABM 
Treaty) may in a few months' time leave us facing an uneasy 
dilemma: either to admit that we had been bluffing all along 
and surrender at discretion, or run the risk of open 
confrontation with the USA.
In the first case, we will demonstrate to the world that Moscow 
is too weak to protect its national interests and humbly 
resigns to Washington's dictate. In the second case, the whole 
system of strategic arms control (START-I, START-II and ABM 
Treaty) will fall apart and all hope for a compromise on 
foreign debt payments will vanish into thin air. 
At the same time, in the event that the third test launch 
of the American interceptor-missile scheduled for this April 
goes amiss, President Clinton is most likely to announce that 
further deployment of the national missile defence system will 
be suspended for logistical reasons. Furthermore, should the 
current US economic boom keep its momentum, the Republicans' 
chances for presidency will diminish and the Democrats will be 
less vulnerable to criticisms from their opponents. 
Unfortunately, Washington's course is going to be much more 
contingent on such factors as US domestic politics and military 
equipment performance than on the State Duma's voting 
procedures. 
The urgent ratification of START-II makes sense only if 
President Clinton suspends his decision on deploying the 
national missile defence system. In this case we should not 
only ratify the treaty but must immediately start talks on 
START-III and the ABM Treaty. In all likelihood, these talks 
will be still in progress when the White House becomes home to 
the next American leader. And it is with this new leader and 
his Administration that we will most likely have to discuss our 
financial difficulties. Naturally, we will have to make serious 
concessions, but reciprocity should lie at the root of each 
compromise we agree on. 
In the event President Clinton does announce the 
deployment of the national missile defence system in July, the 
unratified START-II will allow us much more space for 
manoeuvring in steering the most suitable policy for effective 
diplomatic and military responses.

*******

#2
Moskovsky Komsomolets
February 10, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
PUTIN AT A CROSSROADS
By Natalya SHIPITSYNA, Alexei BORISOV

The presidential elections are just about a month away.
However, all opinion polls already show that these elections 
will be a no-contest triumph for Vladimir Putin, for sheer lack 
of strong challenge. Six months ago his name rang no bells with 
the absolute majority of Russians. Today he is the indisputable 
favourite, with half of the Russian population ready to give 
him their votes in the forthcoming elections.

The phenomenon of Putin, first and foremost, stems from 
the lack of information about him. 
Given his current status, it is probably very wise of the 
acting President to remain a Mr. X whose true face is veiled 
from the public. The fact that this face is uncharismatic does 
not put anyone off these days. Moreover, Putin is taking no 
effort to modify the impression he makes, and is consciously 
cultivating an image of the guy next door. And many fall for 
this unsophisticated ploy.
People tend to see mostly what they want behind Putin's 
"iron mask." The military see strong and efficient armed forces.
The old see decent pensions and a special social status for 
themselves. The blue collars hope that Putin will give a new 
lease of live to the agonizing factories and ensure that wages 
be paid without delay. Farmers hope he will give them land, 
whereas the former members of collective farms, still heavily 
dependent on budgetary allocations, await continued state 
subsidizing. Why not? Putin has already raised pensions, 
promised to increase wages and salaries, and to expand the 
state defence order for the military industrial complex. It 
appears that nobody is disconcerted by the fact that all the 
promises are being splashed about in the run-up to the 
presidential elections when the population is traditionally 
showered with a multitude of pledges and assurances. People 
believe him, all the same. Because they want to believe...

Choice-2000

Indeed, today the prospective president has all the 
leverage needed to bring up people's living standards to an 
appreciable level. The eight years of Yeltsin's rule crushed 
the Communists and made people believe that there would be no 
return to the totalitarianism of the Soviet era. The economic 
reforms, however, were never properly attended to and remained 
somewhat neglected.
It is the new President that is expected to bring the long- 
awaited reforms into life. He holds all the trump cards in his 
hand. With virtually unrestricted state power (bolstered by the 
popular mandate of a democratically elected President) and 
guaranteed the support of both the Duma and the Government, the 
new leader can play any sort of game at his discretion. His 
options are open, and this makes the situation fraught with 
fears as well as hopes, for we are going to learn what game the 
new President opts to play only after March 26. 
There are three possible options. The first, and the 
simplest, - to leave everything as it is and keep on Yeltsin's 
course playing the role of the quasi guarantor of democracy and 
the market economy. The second option - to revoke all freedoms 
and monopolize power. The third, and the most difficult, option 
- to embark on the road of genuine reforms. 

Pursuing Yeltsin's Course Without Him

An attempt to move on under this slogan will boil down to 
preserving the criminalized, oligarchy-dominated type of 
economy which had established itself by 1996 and led to 
disastrous consequences. Huge sums of money will continue to be 
pumped out of Russia to deposit accounts in foreign banks. The 
economy will continue to rot, with the country shifting towards 
an increasingly harsher anti-Western course taken at the end of 
Yeltsin's presidency. All those favoured by the powers that be 
will keep getting richer, while the absolute majority of the 
population will continue to slump into the misery of stark 
poverty. Putin's personal preferences in this case will be of 
minor significance, whether he chooses to keep afloat the 
oligarchs who had been supporting him or opts for yet another 
redistribution of property. Individual figures on the board may 
come and go, but the overall configuration will remain 
unchanged.
Production industries are in dire need of massive 
financial injections. Experts from the Ministry of Economics 
maintain that strategic investors with long-term interests in 
the production sector will stay out of the Russian market for 
at least another two years. Hopes for assistance from 
international financial organisations are unrealistic: in the 
best case scenario our further co-operation with the IMF and 
Co. will be reduced to the allocation of new loans for the sole 
reason of repaying old debts. The world's Big Business will not 
put a single cent into the Russian production sector until the 
rights of investors are reliably protected by effective 
legislation. 
The situation with domestic sources of investment also 
leaves much to be desired. The Government's resources can 
currently cover no more than the vital necessities of the 
country. No more than that. It may well be that tomorrow things 
will change for the worse. It is not easy to believe now that 
before 1998 oil extraction was unprofitable: the current world 
oil prices have soared to record values. Prices for non-ferrous 
metals, coke, mineral fertilizers, products of ferrous 
metallurgy have followed the upward trend. However, such 
miracles seldom last long being strongly dependent on the world 
market fluctuations. Once the export-related revenues have 
fallen down, we may find ourselves with no resources to make up 
for the lost income, as Russian manufacturers are in a very 
deep slump. 

Personal Budget of an Average Russian
(Right)
----------------------------------------------- 
Years 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 thousand roubles 
----------------------------------------------- Per capita 
monthly 
living 
subsistence 1.9 20.6 86.6 264.1 369.4 Per capita 
monthly 
wages 6.0 58.7 220.4 472.4 790.2 Per capita 
monthly 
pensions 1.6 19.9 78.5 188.1 302.2 
------------------------------------------------ (left) 
------------------------------
Years 1997 1998 1999
roubles
------------------------------
Per capita 
monthly 
living 
subsistence 411.2 493 750
Per capita 
monthly 
wages 950.2 1,050 1,565
Per capita 
monthly 
pensions 328.1 399 520
------------------------------
Chances for improvements are no more than wishful thinking.
Western investors will flee from the Russian market, and the 
threat of imminent economic sanctions against Russia may well 
emerge. Massive pumping of worthless roubles into the economy 
will trigger hyperinflation leading to empty shop shelves, long 
queues, the open defiance of regional leaders, total 
disintegration of the Russian market and large-scale social 
unrest.
It will not be the first time that Russia has faced such a 
situation. As a matter of fact, these conditions have been 
replicating themselves throughout all Russian history. When 
"the rulers cannot, and the subordinates will not," social 
unrest promptly flares up and escalates into a revolution. The 
people in such circumstances are ready to welcome any "iron 
fist" that would enforce law and order and provide them with 
daily bread.
Vladimir Putin will simply have to become a dictator unless he 
wants somebody else to step in and take control. 

Dictatorship or Power for Power's Sake 

Incidentally, many believe that Putin will establish a 
dictatorial rule much earlier to pre-empt the described course 
of developments. With a licence to monopolize power, he simply 
will not see another way to retain it. 
Of course, he will not be able to become a dictator 
overnight. Despite his unrestricted authority, he is not yet 
strong enough to fight against all his opponents at once.
Therefore, he is likely to resort to unhurried step-by-step 
strangulation tactics. He has already gained full control over 
all national power agencies. Now he needs to subdue the 
oligarchs and set up a rigid system of political hierarchy. It 
does not appear to be a very difficult task. The very first 
court trials of high-ranking "corrupt" bureaucrats will find a 
welcome response from the impoverished population. Putin is 
smart enough to be able to make full use of large-scale popular 
support to ensure the prompt political and financial emaciation 
of the oligarchs. It would be absurd to share power with them. 
Dictators do not share. 
The absolute majority of the population will be quite 
happy, at first. People tend to associate strong power with 
stability, predictability and confidence in the future. 
However, the first eight or nine months of the new regime will 
dispel all illusions.
People will expect that the long-awaited establishment of law 
and order will entail marked improvement of their standard of 
living.
Yet they are going to be in for a song with a very different 
tune. Increased administrative pressure will disrupt heating 
and power supplies, provoke people to sweep flour, salt and 
matches off the shop shelves and give rise to spiralling 
inflation. This will make the population spend their earnings 
at feverish pace to be able to make a purchase before the price 
tag has taken on another zero to register one more 10-fold 
price hike. With a further increase in administrative pressure, 
the situation will be changing only from bad to worse. 
The further course of developments is quite predictable.
Nationalization and confiscation will be the only pillars of 
the government's policy. The chances are that our food industry 
may strain itself to the limit and manage to provide for the 
big cities on a more or less regular basis. Less populated 
areas will have to face disrupted food supplies and frequent 
shortages in basic necessities.
Predictably, the government will not be able to devise any 
other way out except by beefing up the military-industrial 
complex, thus maintaining Russia's long-standing image as the 
world's bogey. (Russia will not be able to earn money with 
traditional exports of its mineral resources, as such exports 
will be barred by the imposed economic sanctions.) But even if 
the authorities restore the basic proportions maintained in the 
Soviet economy, where 80 percent of all industrial production 
accounted for defence-related products and a mere 20 percent 
covered the needs of the civilian sector, it will not rescue 
the dictatorship. As compared with the USSR, Russia has 
enormously depleted its resources. 
The finale of this scenario will be sad. It will be sad 
for the country, for the people and for Putin himself, because, 
if he takes this path, it will lead him into disgrace like all 
other dictators. Incidentally, it is not easy today to secure 
absolute power. Owners of property will stand up against any 
encroachment on their possessions. The past decade has let 
people feel the taste of normal life, and they will not give it 
up without a fight. And it remains an open question whether 
Putin can win that war. Hence, hopes that a new Russian 
dictatorship is but a stretch of imagination still linger on. 
At the same time, the frenzied anxiety openly displayed by our 
financial elite today, and the ongoing brisk redistribution of 
property may imply that these hopes are based on rather shaky 
grounds. 

Liberal Patriotism. A New Course

Still, Putin gives the impression of being a sensible 
person. He will have to achieve where Yeltsin failed, i. e. he 
is obliged to carry out economic reforms and save Russia. And 
he stands a unique chance to succeed. 
What do people want today? They want to make an honest 
living, to go on vacations and have fun, to have their children 
educated in good schools and universities, to give nice 
presents to those they love. People have granted Putin with the 
credit of trust. This gives him a realistic opportunity to 
elevate Russia to a decent standard of living. Only a policy 
blending together values of liberalism and state patriotism can 
lead the country to this strategic goal. It means that the 
state will set the rules of the game and enforce an 
unconditional compliance with them. In other words, the state 
will regulate the country's economy by establishing effective 
laws, taxes, tariffs and duties, and making sure that the 
observance of the above is strictly controlled. Once conformity 
to the established regulations is ascertained, further 
interference of the state into business operations shall be 
barred. 
In other words, the state will act like a "civilized" 
racketeer. It will provide all legal entities and individuals 
with a competitive business environment as well as effective 
protection from any criminal encroachments. 
It stands to reason that if income tax goes down from 45 
percent (last year's average) to 20 percent, most people will 
readily pay what is due. Tax evasion as well as the notorious 
tax reduction schemes will in this case lose their attraction 
as they will cost one more. The same will be also true in 
regard to businesses and enterprises which currently have to 
pay off up to 80 percent of their profits, gaining next to 
nothing in return.
Should the taxes be lowered to a more feasible level, tax 
collection would promptly rise from the current 65 percent to 
as high as 90 percent. Customs duties should likewise become 
more reasonable, whereas the punishment for illegal customs 
clearance operations must necessarily be both severe and 
inevitable. 
As the sole owner of the country's natural resources, the 
state must first and foremost pursue the goal of replenishing 
the national coffers, instead of pandering to the interests of 
a handful of oligarchs who make money on its resources. 
Moreover, despite the fact that the state owns a sizeable share 
of the country's property, this wealth yields an 
unproportionally small profit to the state budget, mostly 
because of egregious mismanagement by state-appointed 
administrators. It will be up to Putin to decide which is going 
to be more in the country's interests - to sell the property or 
change the managers. He will also have to focus on the 
performance of regional administrations. As things stand now, 
only 8 out of 89 regional subjects of the Russian Federation 
can satisfy their own needs.
The rest demand money from the central government, which is of 
little wonder, for the existing system allows regional leaders 
to bear no responsibility for what is going on in the 
territories within their jurisdiction. 
The new President will have to induce the State Duma to 
pass new up-to-date administrative, criminal and economic 
legislation, and subsequently enforce unconditional compliance 
with the latter without exception. This will take him a long 
time, stretching anywhere between at least one year up to the 
entire term of presidency. Only after that Vladimir Putin (or 
his successor) will be able to put his hand to ensuring true 
growth in the economy. 
Therefore, for the time being, it is not the reforms that 
Putin has to address but problems of a pre-reform transition. 
The state which has given business too loose a rein, will have 
to take matters back in hand and demonstrate unequivocally 
that the law is binding to everyone. 
Current measures to establish elementary order in such 
problem areas as customs, banking, wholesale and retail 
trading, and capital flight, are already paying off. With the 
population's support, these primary measures can be followed by 
true structural changes in the national economy. The country's 
banking system will have to be remodelled so that people can 
trustfully keep their earnings in bank accounts, and the 
economy as a whole can draw investments at reasonable interest 
rates. Prompt reforms in the actual production sector are also 
vitally important. The state is not in a position today to 
support all industrial branches, therefore it will have to 
define its major priorities.
At present these may extend to the fuel-and-energy complex 
(with greater depth of oil refining), aerospace industry, motor 
industry, domestic and industrial electronics, computers, and 
agriculture (focusing on advanced transgenic and other 
techniques allowing massive yields for minimum investment).
Nothing can help put the planned reforms safely back on 
track without investments, both internal - from the domestic 
banking sector, and external. The latter will be granted only 
after our Western partners have made sure that the investor's 
rights in Russia are reliably protected. When business builds 
enough trust in the state, it will be possible to pronounce 
taxation amnesty for all exported capital, the amount of which 
is currently estimated in the range of $300 to $350 bln. A 
sizeable part of this huge sum can well return to Russia. The 
arrangement might be as follows: the Russian government turns a 
blind eye (for one year, at least) to the origin of capital on 
condition that it is invested in the Russian economy, with 
subsequent profit taxation incurred in due course. If this 
plan works and, say, a tenth of the exported capital comes back 
to Russia, the Government may cease worrying about new Western 
loans. 
Having chosen the policy of reform, Putin will have to 
steer a balanced course between anarchy and authoritarianism, 
both in politics and in the economy. The golden path leading 
to success is very narrow, with chances to lose the shaky 
balance and fall into one of the extremities being quite 
realistic. An error, however, will be too costly, as it will 
throw Russia back a few decades. At the same time, successful 
reforms spell the guarantee of a decent standard of living. 
Russian people in this case will have a chance to move upward 
from the 71-st place in the world's quality of life ranking 
table. Besides, the new era may well be closely associated with 
the name of the second Russian president.
Which of the three roads will Putin choose? 

*******

#3
Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2000 10:15:11 -0500
From: Dominique Arel <Dominique_Arel@Brown.edu>
Subject: ASN CONVENTION: PRELIMINARY PROGRAM NOW ON THE WEB

5th Annual Convention of the
Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN)

"Identity and the State:
Nationalism and Sovereignty in a Changing World"

Columbia University, 13-15 April 2000
PRELIMINARY PROGRAM NOW ON THE WEB

The ASN Convention continues its impressive growth. The 5th Annual 
Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) 
will feature the unprecedented number of 105 panels, almost twice the 
size of the convention two years ago, spread over eleven sessions 
from Thursday April 13, 1 PM, to Saturday April 15, in the evening. 
Close to 500 people will be on panels. The full preliminary program 
is now available on the ASN web site: http://asn.uno.edu.

All post-Soviet areas will be covered in tremendous depth, with 
fourteen panels on the Balkans, thirteen on the Russian Federation, 
twelve each on Ukraine, Central Asia, and Central Europe, six on the 
Southern Caucasus, five on the Baltics, and almost two dozens on 
thematic and cross-regional themes. Special events will include a 
roundtable on the 2000 Russian Presidential Election, roundtables on 
the recent work of Jack Snyder and Valery Tishkov, the INCORE Tip 
O'Neill Annual Lecture, delivered by Fernand de Varennes on minority 
rights, and several panels devoted to the recent/ongoing wars in 
Kosovo and Chechnya.

Panels on the Russian Federation at the convention will include:
Dagestan in Comparative Perspective
State Formation in the North Caucasus: History, Prospects, and Problems
Military Tactics and Operational Art of Yeltsin's Second Chechen War
The Russian-Chechen War(s)
State Formation in the North Caucasus: History, Prospects, and Problems
Why Do Conflicts Not Turn Violent?: The Cases of Tatarstan, Ajaria, and Crimea
Russia's Regions and Republics
Ethnicity and Regionalism in Siberia
Nationalism and Federalism in the Russian Federation
Russia In Search of Itself
Extremist Variants of Russian Nationalism
Orthodoxy, Ethnicity, and Civil Society in Russia
Conflict and Identity in Russian Foreign Policy
Nations and Empire in Russia
The Kosovo War: Perceptions, Representations, Myths

The convention is unveiling a full section devoted to new 
documentaries and feature films exploring ethnonational and identity 
issues in the post-Communist world. No less than four films will be 
devoted to Chechnya: THE MAKING OF A NEW EMPIRE (Netherlands 1999), a 
documentary on a Chechen warlord; IMMORTAL FORTRESS (US, 1999), 
featuring interviews with Shamil Basayev and Salman Raduyev; along 
with CHECKPOINT (Russia 1999) and PURGATORY (Russia, 1998), two 
feature films set during the first Chechnya war. The Balkan wars will 
also be featured prominently with the documentaries A CRY FROM THE 
GRAVE (UK, 1999), on Srebrenica, and THE VALLEY (UK, 1999), on events 
in the Drenica Valley of Kosovo in Summer 1998, as well as a panel on 
The Yugoslav Wars on Film. Other films to be shown include TRADING 
STORIES (US, 1999), on Jewish property and restitution in the Czech 
Republic; BLACK WORD (Slovakia, 1999), on a Roma settlement in 
Eastern Slovakia; and HERR ZWILLING UND FRAU ZUCKERMANN (Austria, 
1999), on an elderly couple from Chernivtsi (Chernorwitz), in 
Ukraine. All screenings will be followed by discussion with the 
audience.

The convention is consolidating its status as the World Annual Event 
on Nationalities Studies. Over one hundred and fifty panelists will 
be travelling from overseas for the event (plus an additional three 
dozens from Canada). Almost 40 percent of paper-givers are 
international participants (and this does not include the large 
amount of non-US born participants currently residing in the United 
States).

LOCATION. The convention will be taking place in the International 
Affairs Building (IAB) of Columbia University, 420 W. 118th St. 
(metro station: 116th St., on the Red Line). Registration will be on 
the 6th Floor of IAB and the panels will be held on several floors.

REGISTRATION. Registration fees are $30 for ASN members, $50 for 
non-members, and $15 for students. A registration form can be 
downloaded from the ASN web site (http://asn.uno.edu) or requested 
from our Convention Director Gordon Bardos (address below). People 
who plan to attend the convention are strongly encouraged to 
pre-register, since places are limited.

SCHEDULE. Registration will begin at 11 AM, Thursday April 13, on the 
6th Floor of IAB. People who sent preregistered will need to pick up 
their name tag and the convention program. On the Thursday, the 
panels will run from 1 PM-7.30 PM. On Friday and Saturday, from 9 AM 
to 6.30 PM. The convention will end on the Saturday evening, April 15.

ACCOMMODATION. The convention does not have arrangements with a 
particular hotel. A list of recommended hotels can be found on the 
ASN web site.

ASN MEMBERSHIP. People can now directly join a fast growing ASN on 
the convention pre-registration form. In addition to getting a 
significant discount at the ASN convention, ASN members receive 
annually four issues of Nationalities Papers, the field's leading 
journal; six issues of the Analysis of Current Events, containing 
up-to-the-minute analyses of ongoing events; and two issues of 
ASNews, the association's newsletter. An annual membership costs a 
remarkably low $50 annually---$30 for students.

BONUS FOR ASN MEMBERS. ASN members have also the option of 
subscribing to Europe-Asia Studies (formerly Soviet Studies), which 
publishes eight issues a year, for $55, almost a hundred dollars less 
than the regular subscription price. Convention panelists can take 
advantage of this offer directly on the convention registration form.

BOOK EXHIBIT/SALE OF PAPERS. Publishers will exhibit their wares in 
the exhibit room, located in the spacious Dag Hammarskjold Lounge on 
the 6th floor, near the registration desk. The convention innovated 
last year by selling convention papers for $1 apiece and the 
experiment proved hugely successful. At least 20 copies of each paper 
will go on sale in the book exhibit on Friday, April 14, at 11.15 AM.

We look forward to seeing you at the convention!

For information on panels:
Dominique Arel
ASN Convention Program Chair
Watson Institute
Brown University, Box 1831
130 Hope St.
Providence, RI 02912
401 863 9296 tel
401 863 2192 fax
darel@brown.edu

For information on registration, exhibits
and advertisements in the convention program:
Gordon Bardos
ASN Convention Director
Harriman Institute
Columbia University
1216 IAB
420 W. 118th St.
New York, NY 10027
212.854.8487 tel
212.666.3481 fax
gnb12@columbia.edu

*******

#4
From: "Andrew Miller" <andcarmil@hotmail.com>
Subject: Election Fraud in Russia
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 

Topic: Election Fraud in Russia
Title: In Defense of Vladimir Yakovlev

Preface: The St. Petersburg Times is an excellent, though flawed, 
source of information about Russia for those outside it. A reader must 
understand those flaws or risks being seriously mislead. The writer of 
these words can be taken by no one for a Russian apologist, and has 
previously devoted high praise to the work of a St. Petersburg Times 
reporter.

A recent debate on literature unfolded this way, on the pages of The St. 
Petersburg (Russia) Times: the paper’s arts editor, perhaps unaware that 
the scribe was a Nobel laureate, wrote a column arguing that Briton John 
Galsworthy was a bad writer nobody liked and therefore Russia’s passionate 
affinity for him was odd and perhaps worthy of scorn. A Russian reader 
wrote in defense of his countrymen, saying that indeed Galsworthy might be 
awful in English but contending that clever Russians had elevated hack 
Western writers to various states of literary grace in translation (this in 
lieu of simply choosing good ones – the unheard of Willa Cather, Toni 
Morrison and Jane Austen leap to mind – and translating them accurately), 
and in any case pointing out that Galsworthy was really good on Russian TV.

In Russia, truth and fiction (as well as Pravda and Galsworthy) exist in a 
kind of disconcerting yet exhilarating symbiosis that makes for interesting 
study.

If, for example, you are interested in doing some meaningful sociological 
research one day, phone up a Russian university (any one will do, but a good 
place to start would be Russia’s Harvard, Moscow State University) and ask 
the Dean how many students have been disciplined/expelled for cheating in 
the last year/decade/century. Then, take a Russian student out to a 
restaurant, buy him a few champagne cocktails and some nice zakuski, and ask 
him how many students actually do cheat. The two answers you’ll get will 
be, in order, nobody and everybody, possibly qualified by an almost 
depending upon the number of drinks. Perhaps you think I’ve now obviated 
the need for your interesting research but fear not, for nobody will believe 
what I say whilst you may find yourself more persuasive, as I will explain 
below.

Cheating is a way of life, a norm, in every Russian state university. 
Teachers turn a blind eye to it, students consider it an academic subject to 
be studied and mastered like any other. There are rule-proving exceptions, 
of course, but with what goes on in front of them every day in the halls of 
government, who can blame them for thinking this is simply a requisite 
skill?

But there’s more to the story. During the Soviet dictatorship, cheating 
was one available means of concerted social protest. Both teachers and 
students knew full well that many subjects they were forced to study were 
either pure garbage (crass politics) or fundamentally flawed due to a lack 
of modern information, and refusing to actually study (indeed, even teach) 
these subjects was a way of thumbing one’s nose at the establishment. Many 
Russians view this as a form of courageous and admirable defiance, and are 
proud of it.

Now that you’ve got the results of your study, there are two possible 
proposals for resolving the problem of cheating in Russia (aside from the 
obvious answer of deciding it’s a good thing). On one hand, you might tell 
everybody that cheating is wrong, explain it to them so’s they’d understand 
you see, and then punish everybody (but we’re not talking about gulags or 
anything of course) who does it until they stop. Or alternately, you could 
tell everybody they’ve been the victim of a massive high-level conspiracy 
to deprive them of their honesty and there’s really precious little they can 
do short of sitting tight and hoping for the best, namely that some knights 
on white chargers will come along and clear everything up. Which one would 
you choose?

This brings me to the point. Recently, the JRL published the February 15 
editorial of The St. Petersburg Times (supra). The editorial went along 
with the lead story that day, to the effect that ballot boxes in local 
election district 208 had possibly been stuffed with perhaps as many as 
5,000 bogus votes in the recent elections for federal Duma.

Vladimir Yakovlev, it was speculated, may have had something to do with the 
aforesaid stuffing. Yakovlev is the second freely elected mayor in the 300 
years of St. Petersburg’s existence. He is one of the first people in the 
whole history of Russia ever to ascend to political power in a peaceful 
transition from one democratically elected leader to his opponent. His 
predecessor, who just passed away, was Anatoly Sobchak, who fled the country 
immediately upon his defeat apparently to elude indictment for embezzlement 
on a grand scale while in office.

Under the Yakovlev administration, St. Petersburg has had one of the least 
unstable and least credit-unworthy financial records of any place in Russia. 
The vast majority of the city’s residents, according to Gallup, support 
his reelection. When gubernatorial elections were postponed from December, 
1999, to May 2000, by Moscow court order days before the poll, a huge 
demonstration of supporters poured into Palace Square, opposite the 
Hermitage, to protest (far more, for example, than mourned slain federal 
Duma deputy Galina Starovoitova).

Since Yakovlev’s election, The St. Petersburg Times has never published an 
item about him that did not contain an attack upon him. When it reported 
the Palace Square protest, for example, it claimed that some protesters had 
been forced into the square against their will and did not quote anybody who 
claimed to be there voluntarily. It interviewed Yakovlev prior to the 
December ballot, devoting a page of text to the piece but giving only three 
column inches of quotes to Yakovlev.

Concerning the recent alleged election fraud, the Times’ only source for 
the story was Ruslan Linkov, a failed candidate in District 208 who received 
less than 13 percent of the vote. What neither the editorial nor the story 
mentioned was that Linkov was also a failed candidate for Petersburg City 
Council last year, and in that race he was endorsed in a Times editorial. 
Linkov is the young former legislative aid of murdered Duma deputy 
Starovoitova and his only electoral credential is his affiliation with her 
and her party.

It is very important for JRL readers to know that when Starovoitova was 
assassinated the Times wrongly reported that the weapon used to kill her was 
an exotic special forces model, and then used that claimed fact to speculate 
about a major high-level conspiracy that might have involved Yakovlev (the 
paper thought Yakovlev’s failure to appear for Starovoitova’s funeral was 
further evidence of his guilt). When the story about the gun proved false 
(it was a readily available model) the Times did not correct the record.

The winner in District 208 was Otechestvo candidate Valentina Ivanova, and 
the Times pointed its finger at her party, coincidentally also formerlly 
Yakovlev’s (who it named in connection with the affair although he had 
previously broken with the party), as the “obvious target” of blame – though 
at the same time it said “it is impossible to tell who is the villain” or 
even if there was one, since the alleged bogus votes might not have made any 
difference in the result and it had no proof they were for Ivanova. In 
neither the editorial nor the news story did the Times publish Ivanova’s 
margin of victory, which could easily have been two or three times the 
amount of bogus ballots. This made it impossible for readers to judge the 
story for themselves.

It seems to me that the Times editorial was premature and not based on 
credible facts. But far more important, even if the fraud did occur and 
Ivanova did win by dirty tricks, I believe that the editorial’s thrust was 
fundamentally flawed. That thrust was that undesirable people come to power 
in Russia not by being freely chosen but by means of dirty tricks that 
frustrate the will of the people. This is the worst kind of ethnocentrism, 
quite surprising from a paper published in Russia, and even I, as a 
foreigner, can’t help but be somewhat offended by it as a result.

Because it simply isn’t true. The Russian Constitution, for example, calls 
for criminal trials by jury. They don’t occur here. But that isn’t because 
of any conspiracy. In my opinion, any public opinion poll would show that 
the Russians, who weren’t asked about what the Constitution would say, it 
was rammed down their throats, place a far higher premium on safe streets 
than on individual liberty and don’t favor juries. The idea of an OJ 
Simpson verdict is wholly anathema to them. They, perhaps foolishly, trust 
their government not to put innocent people in jail. Westerners may not 
like this, but it’s nonetheless a fact.

Russians have elected what Westerners might well think all manner of 
political flotsam and jetsam into the current Duma. These people, like 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, did not get where they are via dirty tricks, no 
dirtier anyway than the ordinary politics of life on the street in Russia. 
Insofar as elections can or ever will be clean in Russia, they were selected 
freely and fairly. Compared to Russia’s past, Russia is now a paragon of 
blissful democracy. Inconvenient, uncomfortable facts to be sure. But 
facts nonetheless. Yakovlev probably isn’t clean. Maybe he’s dirty. But 
there’s no evidence at all that he isn’t the best Piter can get right now, 
and it’s certain he’s what the people want. For a foreign paper to 
speculate so brazenly, on the basis of nothing like conclusive evidence, 
about his potential electoral fraud is highly damaging to fragile democratic 
values in Russia, to say nothing of our relationship with the Russian people 
and ought not to occur.

And now a bubble burst, and now a world.

Andrew Miller
St. Petersburg, Russia

*******

Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: 
http://www.cdi.org/russia