February 9, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4097 4098

Johnson's Russia List
#4098
9 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russia Says Starts Final Phase in Chechen Campaign.
2. Novaya Gazeta: Akram Muzartayev, Voting Is Not Yet Elections. President gets legitimacy from arithmetic, not from electorate.
3. Kommersant - Vlas: OPINION POLL RESULTS. (re political views)
4. The Times (UK): Richard Beeston, Yeltsin promises last shock with diaries.
5. Boston Globe: Stephen Kurkjian, Documents shed light on money launder probe. $15m said to be seized from Boston, N.Y. banks.
6. James Holbrook: RE: 4096 Baker/Repairing Relations. (Views of Lyudmila Selezneva)
7. Izvestia: Georgy BOVT and Andrei KOLESNIKOV, CLANDESTINE DEMOCRACY.
8. ORT NEWS PROGRAM INTERVIEW WITH ACTING PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN (PART I). February 7.
9. Financial Times (UK): John Thornhill, RUSSIA: Business leaders push to join ICC. (International Chamber of Commerce)
10. smi.ru: CHUBAIS WILL BE TO BLAME FOR EVERYTHING AGAIN.] 

********

#1
Russia Says Starts Final Phase in Chechen Campaign
February 9, 2000
By Gareth Jones

KHANKALA, Russia (Reuters) - Russian military officials said on Wednesday
they had
started the last phase of their battle to control the breakaway region of
Chechnya and one
general confirmed two regiments would soon be withdrawn.

Russian troops have turned their attention to fighting rebels in Chechnya's
southern
mountains where thousands fled after Moscow seized the rebel region's razed
capital
Grozny. Russia launched its campaign in Chechnya four months ago.

Itar-Tass news agency quoted the military at Russia's headquarters in the
region as saying
they had ``started the concluding phase in the operation to defeat the
bandit groups in the
mountainous parts of Chechnya.''

``We know where the bandit groups are congregating. First and foremost they
will be
destroyed there,'' Tass quoted General Viktor Kazantsev, one of Russia's
top commanders
in the region, as saying in Khankala, just outside Grozny.

``The fate of the bandits has already been decided,'' he said, adding
Russian forces
controlled territory in the south from Shatili, a village across the border
in Georgia, to Itum
Kale.

But the rebel Internet web site Kavkaz.org said fighting continued close to
Itum Kale after
Russian paratroops were dropped onto a commanding height there.

Fighters were also preparing for a storming by Russian troops at the mouth
of the Argun
Gorge, one of two main routes into the mountains, it said.

It said the battles, which had raged for three days, died down while
Russian planes bombed
villages surrounding the gorge, which is littered with the hulks of tanks
destroyed during
Russia's defeat in the 1994-96 Chechen war.

General Gennady Troshev, a top commander, said late on Tuesday some troops
would be
withdrawn from Chechnya.

``In the coming days two regiments...will be taken out of Chechnya,'' he
told NTV
commercial television. It was not clear how many men would be involved.

Grozny -- A Battered City

Russian troops continued an operation to kill or capture those rebels who
remained in
Grozny, which was seized over the weekend and has been reduced to rubble
after weeks of
fighting.

The official Russian death toll stands at more than 1,100 but conscripts'
families say Russian
losses are three times higher. Some Russian newspapers published an
official list naming 279
servicemen killed in fighting last year in Dagestan, a region neighboring
Chechnya.

In Grozny, civilians have started to leave the cellars they sheltered in to
be greeted by the
sight of devastated buildings and Russian troops on the streets.

The rebels have vowed to retake Grozny as they did twice in lightning raids
against the
Russians during the 1994-96 Chechen war. That war ended when Russia decided to
withdraw its forces from Chechnya after the rebels retook the city the
second time.

Russia's military reported from an army base in Mozdok that rebels had shot
at Russian
posts overnight in Achkoi-Martan, southwest of Grozny, and in nearby
Urus-Martan.

On Tuesday, Russia's Chechnya spokesman told reporters Russia was
installing a new civil
administration in Grozny.

``It is clear to everyone the turning point has come...The process of
restoring civilian
authorities has begun,'' Sergei Yastrzhembsky said.

``Clearly a long political process is needed to work out a new status --
maybe there could
be a special status for Chechnya within the Russian Federation,'' he said.
``But we are
leaping far into the future now.'' 

*******

#2
Novaya Gazeta
7 February 2000
Voting Is Not Yet Elections
President gets legitimacy from arithmetic, not from electorate
By Akram Muzartayev
[translation by Olga Kryazheva <okryazhe@cdi.org>
Research assistant, Center for Defense Information,
Washington DC]

People would not be surprised if we tell them that the results of
parliamentary elections are changed by somebody like Rosinform [the
government's war propaganda body}. The authority in Russia is there so it
could lie.

What kind of a great country is it where people are not fooled?

But everybody wants to know true and real results. It is like those fooled
by magician and amazed by the trick trying to look under his black cape. 

Of course, numbers floating around are different. Nobody believes them, as
well as nobody believes official numbers. But-

Here is what one of the most famous and prominent politologists in the U.S.
David Johnson's site informs us about.

OFFICIAL ACTUAL
Communists: 24% 33
Medved 23 14
OVR 12 21
SPS 9 3.4
Yabloko 6 12
Zhirinovsky 6 

We repeat, these figures cannot be reinforced by any particular trust. But
here's the question: Are they closer to reality than the official figures?

Let's check it by using military logic, which democratic Russia is used to. 

Well, imagine the map of MINE fields, which candidates follow on their way
to the throne. Everybody has received the official data, and the authority
holds real data.

Looking at the map, Fatherland All Russia decided not to move. The
authority, knowing the real 21%, understands that IT remains the main
competitor, and kills Fatherland (Yastrzhembsky, Yakovlev, Shaimiyev and
dynasty, and those who did not kill the dragon.)

Union of Right Forces plays with their 9% size biceps, but the authority
knows that there are only 3.4%. Get out of the way! The authority needs
communists, scared of their 24%, who in reality have 33%. They are the real
support on the way to the Kremlin. 

Overall, political actions of the authority prove that D. Johnson is more
realistic than the numbers of Tsentrizberkom, which like Ivan Susanin
[Russian national hero] led the opponents to the swamp. But he did not die.


Chubais called Putin's electoral success the medical fact. He is certainly
right. (Unfortunately, the genius does not sit in Kremlin, he just cleans
suits for its temporary hosts.) 

Since the fact is medical, we need to name the diagnosis. Even the quick
look at the body proves that presidential elections in Russia had
already took place on December 19, 1999. Yeltsin legitimately gave power to
Putin based on the results of this event. 

But the results-.

Did Yeltsin know? Yes, Yeltsin knew!

He checked the successor's popularity; his ability to play outside of
morality frames, outside of the Constitution, where, basically the
authority dwells.

Yeltsin was not choosing a successor, he was creating him.

Marked by the first Chechen blood, Yeltsin stained the successor's hands
with it.

Born in the dirt of the election technologies of 1996 (he was never elected
afterwards), Yeltsin stained his successor with it. Now he could pass on
the nuclear suitcase and become a saint. 

Not the elections, the triumphant inauguration of the new president will
take place on March 26. 

The map of the minefield on the way to the throne will decorate the secret
agent's museum of the mysterious Russia.

P.S.: Gleb Pavlovsky compared Putin with an honorable knight, who drafted
all the honest to a fight. But nobody showed up. Pavlovsky did not clarify
that the knight (of sword and mantilla) indicated the wrong time.

They will show up after the winner is announced. 

*******

#3
Kommersant - Vlast No. 5
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
OPINION POLL RESULTS

The following poll was conducted by the ROMIR sociological 
service on January 22 and 23 this year among 2,000 respondents 
in more than 90 cities, townships and villages of 41 
constituent territories of the Russian Federation.

Question: What should be the political orientation of the 
next President of Russia?

Answers:

1. Right .................... 18.7%
2. Extreme left ............. 14.0%
3. Centrist ................. 9.9%
4. Moderately left .......... 9.9%
5. Pro-monarchy ............. 0.1%
6. No clear-cut political
orientation .............. 8.1%
7. Does not matter .......... 20.3%
8. Difficulty to answer ..... 19%

The following poll was conducted by the ARPI sociological 
service on January 28-30 among 1,600 respondents in more than 
90 cities, townships and villages. (Possible error: 2.5%.) 
Question: What is Vladimir Putin's political orientation?

Answers:

1. Not quite clear ............ 59.0%
2. Centrist ................... 21.0%
3. Right ...................... 14.0%
4. Left ....................... 6.0%

*******

#4
The Times (UK)
9 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Yeltsin promises last shock with diaries
BY RICHARD BEESTON, DIPLOMATIC EDITOR

BORIS YELTSIN is planning to grab the headlines one more time before he
bows out of public life. This year he intends to publish his memoirs,
which, he promises, will cause a sensation. 

The former Russian President, who stunned the world by resigning on New
Year's Eve, is reported to be close to completing Midnight Diaries, the
story of his last turbulent years in office. 

For the first time, the notoriously unpredictable former Kremlin chief is
expected to deliver his account of the most dramatic episodes of his rule.
These include the two bloody wars in Chechnya, his hard-fought re-election
campaign in 1996, his battle with ill health and his unexpected resignation
from office. 

The book should also shed light on how Vladimir Putin, the acting
President, was plucked from relative obscurity and groomed to take over. 

Andrew Nurnberg, Mr Yeltsin's literary agent, said that he had just
returned from visiting the former President and that he expected that a
manuscript would be ready in May and that the book would be published in
the United States in October. 

Mr Yeltsin told his agent that he wanted to avoid copying the typically
dry, self-serving autobiographies of other former statesmen. 

"As we have come to expect from Boris Yeltsin, you can expect some
surprises in this book," Mr Nurnberg said. "Yelstin told me that he wanted
this to read like a good meal: you want to eat more and more." 

Certainly, Mr Yeltsin's last two books, Against the Grain, which tracked
his rise to power, and A View from the Kremlin, which covered his first
years in office, were lively enough. He gave a graphic account in them of
how he came to power after the failed coup of 1991 and how he retained
power after the abortive revolt of 1993. He also provided insights into the
close-knit circle of people who ran Russia in the 1990s. 

The big question is what Mr Yeltsin will disclose about allegations of
corruption among his Kremlin staff and allegedly within his family, in
particular, his daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko, and his two sons-in-law. 

As with the other two books, this one is being written with the help of
Valentin Yumashev, a former journalist who went on to join the Kremlin
staff and who is close to Mrs Dyachenko. Russian publishers expressed
doubts yesterday that Mr Yeltsin would come clean about the shadier
dealings within the Kremlin, although they thought that the details could
come out in other books due out this year. 

"There is a Yeltsin publishing boom going on," Gleb Uspensky, who runs
Russia's respected Vagrius publishing house, said. "I know of three books
coming out later this year. Everything you ever wanted to know about him
will be out in print." 

Mr Yeltsin's book is being published by PublicAffairs, a New York house run
by Peter Osnos, a former Moscow correspondent for The Washington Post. He
edited Mr Yeltsin's last book. 

No British publisher has yet been approached for a British edition. 

*******

#5
Boston Globe
9 February 2000
[for personal use only]
Documents shed light on money launder probe 
$15m said to be seized from Boston, N.Y. banks
By Stephen Kurkjian, Globe Staff

Federal agents seized more than $15 million in two accounts at BankBoston
and Bank of New York in 1998 as part of an international investigation into
money laundering and capital flight out of Russia, according to documents
released yesterday in US District Court in Boston.

The documents, including portions of an FBI affidavit that sought the
seizure of the bank accounts in November 1998, were ordered released by US
District Judge Robert E. Keeton after The Boston Globe and The New York
Times filed motions late last year seeking their release.

The documents shed light on the immense problem of US financial
institutions being used by Russian businessmen to move funds out of the
Russian economy into safe havens in the West. They also reflect the
difficulty that US and internal law enforcement officials face in helping
Russian authorities stanch the flow of that money.

The office of US Attorney Donald K. Stern had opposed the release of the
documents, stating that it could jeopardize an ongoing investigation by US
and Russian authorities.

''The investigations encompass the same individuals and corporate entities,
the same bank accounts in Boston and New Jersey and the same US and foreign
financial transactions as are the subject of the sealed seizure
affidavits,'' Stern and Assistant US Attorney Michael J. Pineault told
Keeton last month in a written status report on why they opposed release of
the affidavit.

However, Stern's office consented in March to allow for the seizure of the
accounts to be dropped and the $15 million to be returned to Swinton Ltd.,
the company in whose name the accounts were written.

According to sources familiar with the investigation, Swinton was
controlled by nine principals of a Russian firm that in 1995 had sold its
license to provide telephone and other communications services in Moscow to
a US-based firm, Global Telesystems, a giant telecommunications firm in
Virginia.

The sources, who asked not to be identified, said that authorities in the
United States and Russia are trying to determine whether the money in the
accounts represented payoffs to the Russians for allegedly selling off
their Moscow license and equipment for below its value.

Jacob Laufer, a New York lawyer who represents Swinton, and officials at
Global Telesystems have denied any wrongdoing.

Stern was out of state yesterday and could not be reached for comment.
Federal officials said in September, when the Globe first reported on the
case, that Stern's office had consented to giving the $15 million back to
Swinton, because of the perceived difficulty in proving that the money had
been gained by illegal means.

While much of their affidavit that had sought the seizures was edited, the
two federal agents investigating the case stated in the document that the
$15 million wound up in the accounts ''in the course of a single,
connected, money laundering conspiracy.''

The details of the alleged conspiracy were blacked out of the copy of the
affidavit released by Keeton yesterday. But the agents, William A. Schureck
of the FBI, and Andrew A. Moore of the Customs Service, said in the
document they believed the case was another example of corrupt Russian
businessmen using US financial institutions to hide their profits. Although
Russian law prohibits capital flight out of the country, US officials
believe that the equivalent of $2 billion a month in rubles was being
transferred out of Russia, the agents stated in the 1998 affidavit.

*******

#6
From: "James Holbrook" <James.Holbrook@jac.af.mil>
Subject: RE: 4096 Baker/Repairing Relations...
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 

Dear JRL readers,

I don't know if James Baker reads JRL or not, but he says something in his
NYT piece that could be misleading. Toward the end of his article, he
writes: "[A]lmost all elements of Russian society want democracy and
capitalism."

Last night I attended a guest talk by Moscow Professor Lyudmila Selezneva,
an eminent historian currently visiting the Royal Institute of International
Affairs in London. Among many interesting insights and observations, she
said that recent figures show about 15-20
percent of Russians to be "reformers" and "democratizers." This contrasts
significantly with "almost all elements of Russian society."

As JRL readers are, I am sure, aware, "democracy" and "capitalism" are
fairly dirty words in Russia. A family member living in Moscow a couple
years ago recounts how his taxi driver swore and cursed "capitalism" (or
was it "democracy"?) when another driver swerved and cut him off. "That's
democracy for you" was this average Ivan's verdict.

Mr. Baker is right to note that many Russians blame us for their economic
troubles.
In this light, it is misguided to assume that most Russians still want the
imported
ideas from the West. What they want, according to Prof. Selezneva, are the
imported
goods. The same figures she quotes about 15-20 pecent of Russians being
westernizers
include this one: over 50 percent would like to continue economic
cooperation with the West and continue receiving Western goods.

In the larger context of his article, the significance of Mr. Baker's
comment
that almost all Russians want democracy and capitalism may be questionable.
But I think it is misleading in a stereotyped way to continue seeing Russia
through market- (and democratically) filtered glasses.

Prof. Selezneva's verdict, by the way, on how the Russian government will
be after March 26: We're definitely talking about a more authoritarian
Russia. One that is neither "reformist" nor "communist," but something
different and possibly new. She sees two variants, with signs that either
might come about: 1) "stronger dictatorship" type government, with limits
on freedoms, individuality, the press, and political and economic
liberties; 2) authoritarianism that has duality at its core. Duality in the
recognition of the need to engage the west economically but at the same time
to create a greater place
for the state in the economy. While she used the term very guardedly,
especially considering the audience and the current headlines in the UK,
she said that maybe, after looking for one for a number of years, Russia
may be about to elect its own Pinochet (minus, she hopes fervently, any
killing). In any case, she noted that it's too early to believe Putin's
rhetoric, designed as it is to win a campaign. But she is cautiously
hopeful that after March 26 he will reveal himself to be a strong-willed,
new type of Russian leader.

So much for a butchered summary of a most interesting presentation on a
most complex issue.

*******

#7
Izvestia
February 9, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
CLANDESTINE DEMOCRACY
By Georgy BOVT, Andrei KOLESNIKOV

Vladimir Putin begins his election campaign--it 
is likely to formally get off the ground on February 12 when he 
is registered as a presidential contender--with a sensation. 
At his meeting with university students in 
Zelenograd yesterday, he said he would not hurry to publicise 
his election platform--lest it "comes under attack." 
"As soon as you make it public, they will start 
gnawing at it and tearing it to pieces," Putin explained. 
Running in a democratic election with a
clandestine platform is something unheard of in the 
political theory and practice. 
Is this a new style of running the country?

Election campaigning in today's Russia is not only "in": 
it is a new state of society and of its relations with the 
authorities. Seen from this angle, aspiring for an elected 
position, especially the supreme executive post, should 
inevitably denote a dialogue between the aspirant and the voter 
on matters of concern for the voter. 
Such matters may be commonplace, but they help draw a 
single information picture. They are also the questions that 
the voter wants to have first-hand answers to, and if he does 
not, he starts seeking answers elsewhere.
Another piece of news that appeared yesterday was that 
General Kolesnikov, First Deputy Minister of the Interior, had 
resigned. Kolesnikov confirmed the fact yesterday. His 
commentary was to the point as befits a no-nonsense police 
officer: details are pending coordination with the acting 
president. 
All the press can do is make guesses. What is it? A 
triviality or the habit to make personnel decisions behind 
closed doors?
For several days in a row the press has been making wild 
and horrible guesses about the case of Radio Liberty's Andrei 
Babitsky, who has been swapped for several Russian soldiers 
kept prisoner by Chechen bandits. Clumsy commentaries offered 
by various officials effectively placed the blame at Putin's 
door.
The acting president's reaction is sought after in such 
situations. None was forthcoming, just like in the case of a 
Russian tanker's arrest by the US Navy.
The hush-hush centre of strategic studies, located in 
Yakimanka Street in downtown Moscow, is writing a programme of 
the country's life for ten to fifteen years ahead. The latter 
number has tempted a number of analysts to make guesses whether 
Putin has nothing against spending, say, fourteen years in the 
Kremlin, and whether his administration has already drafted a 
constitutional proposal to the effect. The election is a good 
time to report one's plans to the public. But Putin keeps mum. 
Rumours circulating in the Russian government's White 
House are weird, indeed: nobody knows what the future president 
plans to do. They say he intends to reinforce the state. In 
what way?
By mobilising active reserve officers to all more or less 
meaningful positions?
They say he wants to reinforce the state structure by 
providing equal rights to all constituent members. In what way 
will the Constitution be amended in this connection?
Who does he want to have for a premier? Mikhail Kasyanov?
But does not Putin's recent statement--the premier must "have 
Kasyanov's qualities"--mean that Kasyanov is not destined to be 
the PM? Putin never says a word on the score. Exasperated White 
House bureaucrats then start suggesting most exotic figures for 
the premiership. 
Habitually, a presidential contender suggests a platform 
and key players of his team. In America, one is the Veepee. In 
Russia, it is the PM. Putin pretends not to hear whispers in 
the White House. But neither does he answer questions that 
interest many far beyond its walls.
Take Sergei Shoigu's strange suggestion: "Putin for Unity 
leader? Why not?" There is no fire without smoke? But Putin's 
yesterday's statement to the effect that stability in Russia 
calls for "Western-style" parties has not made things any 
clearer. Does he intend to stand in the lead of the Unity 
movement? Mum's the word. 
Putin's episodic speeches leave many questions unanswered.
Not surprisingly, the latest poll conducted by the Agency of 
Regional Political Information indicates that 59% of pollees 
are finding it hard to say whether Putin is Centrist, Leftist 
or Rightist. 
Unpublicised plans are meanwhile underway to build new 
bodies of either authority or management. They say there is a 
project of building an agency to combat corruption in the 
bodies of authority. For its boss, various sources favour 
Viktor Cherkesov, former chief of the FSB department for St. 
Petersburg, who is said to be close to the acting president, 
and Vitaly Prilukov, chief of a similar outfit for the Moscow 
Region. 
There is also an idea to form an intersectoral commission 
for constitutional security--ostensibly to equalise the 
provinces. But nobody knows anything definite. 
Boris Yeltsin has been known to give his favourites a 
rough ride. He has also been known for his system of checks and 
balances: Soskovets vs. Chernomyrdin, Chubais vs. Korzhakov, 
etc.
The inner struggle was tough indeed, and information often 
leaked, although secrecy, unexpected appointments and equally 
unexpected dismissals became Yeltsin's speciality. In effect, 
this kind of running things was Soviet. 
It looks as if Vladimir Putin wants to add more secrecy. 
It looks as if the acting president and his team see openness 
in daily work and personnel changes in the upper echelons as a 
harmful information leak. Which is a mistake at the start of 
the 21st century. 

Apropos
To explain reasons behind his resignation, Vladimir 
Kolesnikov told NTV: "As I see it, I may be a hard man to work 
with. Sorry, no other comments."
He said he regretted that he cannot be with the team he 
used to head in order to see a number of cases through. 
Kolesnikov categorically rejected the suggestion that his 
decision is connected in any way to the apprehension and 
subsequent swap in Chechnya of Radio Liberty's Andrei Babitsky.

********

#8
TITLE: ORT NEWS PROGRAM INTERVIEW WITH ACTING PRESIDENT
VLADIMIR PUTIN (PART I)
VREMYA ORT NEWS PROGRAM, 21:00, FEBRUARY 7, 2000)
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE

Anchor: We present the most detailed interview ever by Acting
President of Russia Vladimir Putin. He is interviewed by my
colleague, Mikhail Leontyev.

Q: Good evening, Vladimir Vladimirovich.

Putin: Good evening.

Q: Let us start with Chechnya because it is the most important
developing event. They say there are signs of a turning point.

A: Well, a turning point it is. We didn't have any doubts that
it would end in the restoration of legality and the extermination
of the terrorists. If anyone had doubts about it, I didn't doubt
the outcome for a second, otherwise we wouldn't have started what
is happening there.

As for the actual military actions today, yes, the terrorists
have got another object lesson and the damage inflicted on them
will be very hard to repair. In that sense, one can speak about a
turning point. But there is always the question, what will happen
next? Next we should see total liquidation of the major bands,
their scattering and extermination and then, as the military have
already said, we will launch a planned withdrawal of military units
from the territory of Chechnya while simultaneously stationing
there one of the Armed Forces divisions on a permanent basis.

Q: What exactly do you mean by a major band?

A: It means a band which is 10, 15, up to a 100-strong. And
clearly some people will have hidden an automatic rifle somewhere
or a grenade thrower and we will be confronted with manifestations
of violence and armed struggle for some time yet, but that would be
a far cry from what we faced when large bands, numbering thousands
of people, invaded the territory of Dagestan.

What we have managed to accomplish, together with you, we have
managed to bring it home to every ordinary citizen how tragic the
events that are happening are and how important they are for the
destinies of the country. And you would agree that only recently,
as late as the summer of last year, we would have had difficulty
predicting what the public reaction would be to what began in the
North Caucasus again. Even if it did not start through our fault.
We did not attack Chechnya. Aggression against the territories of
other subjects of the Russian Federation was launched from the
territory of Chechnya.

And still there was no confidence about how the public would
react to everything what is happening. And it took a degree of
courage in order to make decisions and build up a sequence of our
actions, I mean military actions. So, there is public recognition.
I would agree with you that even that is not enough. Of course,
these people should be proud of.

As for the allegations that we are hiding something, that is
not true. Let me just repeat that we should not allow the idea
about excessive casualties on our side with the aim of causing
moral damage to society. This is the pitch that some quarters are
making to the public consciousness. And this is really dangerous.
At all times and in all armed conflicts this thesis has always been
used. We may recall the "defeatism" of the Bolsheviks. They wanted
Russia to be defeated in World War I hoping that the regime would
fall and they would come to power. This is a fact.

And the same happened during the first Chechen campaign. I am
not going to delve any deeper into history.

Q: Russia, I understand, has become aware of the necessity of
what is happening there, even though at a terrible price. One can
see that.

As for our Western partners, is it the case that they do not
understand this or are pretending that they do not understand? You
know that some channels which have not been able to see as much of
you as they would like to, have invited, for example, Mr. Vedrine
and asked him what sort of man they think Putin is. And what is
Mrs. Albright like? What are they really like and is it true that
they don't understand our actions or pretend they don't understand?
And in general, what do they want from us?

A: Well, I can't get into the soul or the mind of every
concrete politician and tell you with certainty what he or she
thinks or understands and what he/she doesn't. I can only speak
about my own perceptions. I think there is some times
misunderstanding. Very often they are motivated by the internal
political process in the countries where they live and in which
they hold government office. They think about the election
situations at home. But who among them knows better than we do that
if pieces of territory are torn away from Russia that would lead to
total loss of control over the country. This is something that only
we ourselves are capable of knowing and feeling.

Besides, when I tell some of my colleagues things that are
very clear to us, I could see that though they do know in principle
what is happening there, they are not very keenly aware of the
danger and acuteness. Let me explain. I am deeply convinced now
that it is not only or largely the matter of Chechnya itself. In
the large post-Soviet space we have now faced the problem of
redistribution of power, or, if you like, attempts to bring about
geo-political changes. Let us think about the events in Tajikistan.

We have the 201st Division there. And if we pull it out, we
will face tragic events there within a month. We are very well
aware of this. Do our partners in the West understand this? Well,
Tajikistan is just one area. And there is also Uzbekistan and
Kirghizia, whose territory was invaded by large bands last year and
these bands seized large areas in the mountains. And there are
other danger points, in terms of aggressive designs of some
extremist forces. And these extremist forces are obviously trying
to make this territory their haven. In this context, Chechnya is
just one element of the overall struggle for the recarving of the
world.

It is not accidental that the people who have taken control of
the Chechen territory are not content with the struggle for the
independence of Chechnya and went further. They crossed the borders
of Chechnya with the aim of separating more territory from Russia
to create a state from the Black to the Caspian Sea.

Apparently, there is the impression that this region of the
former Soviet Union is so weak that it can become easy prey. But
judging from what happened in Kirghizia, for example, they have
grounds for thinking so. They went in and nobody stopped them. They
seized a large area and took hostages, including foreign ones, they
were Japanese if you remember.

And there is yet another danger. We all speak about a possible
disintegration of Russia. If these extremist forces manage to gain
a bridgehead in the Caucasus, not only in Chechnya, but also to
tear away other territories. That contagion may go up the Volga and
spread to other republics. And then we would face either total
Yugoslavization of Russia or one would have to agree that this
territory will be divided up into several independent states.

Did anyone give thought to the political and geopolitical
consequences of such development in the world. And when I talked
with my partners I told many of them that we were not only
disappointed with the Western position, we think that it is in the
national interests of the overwhelming majority of Western
countries to give direct political and economic support to Russia
in its struggle against international extremism.

Q: President Lukashenko of Byelorussia has said that he has
agreed that Russia would defend Byelorussia if Byelorussia is
attacked.

A: Byelorussia is our ally and we will defend Byelorussia.
Concern about allies is not, you know, concern about some third
states, it is concern about our own national security because
security tasks are something that we share with our allies.
Otherwise those states wouldn't be our allies.

Q: A naive question: who are our allies?

A: First of all, all the members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States. We have allies in Europe, a good many. We can
count as our allies all those who share our view about the
multi-polar world, for example.

Q: Are there any countries, perhaps not great powers, but our
neighbors, which are thinking along these lines and with which we
have a meeting of minds -- other than Byelorussia?

A: I think that especially after the events of summer of last
year the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union and the
Transcaucasian republics have been giving thought to it. Why don't
we ever say -- that is, they just mentioned it in the press in
passing and that was all. But the Western countries now actively
support Georgia, and that is a good thing. Georgia is a friendly
state. But it was on the territory of Chechnya that terrorists were
trained who made an attempt on Shevardnadze's life. And the Georgia
side is aware of this. The Federal Security Service caught these
people and has already extradited some of them to the Georgian
security service. This is a proven fact. These terrorists were
trained on the territory of Chechnya.

In the same way terrorists were trained in Chechnya who tried
to assassinate President Karimov of Uzbekistan. In other words, an
enclave of bandits was created in Chechnya where terrorists were
trained to stage assassination attempts on the leaders of other
states. It obviously went beyond the territory of the Chechen
Republic itself. But people try not to recall this. Why?

Q: One gets the impression that Russia constantly presents to
the International Monetary Fund some kind of documents and reports
to prove that we have fulfilled and overfulfilled agreed programs,
but we are not given any credits, we are treated badly. We say that
the IMF --

A: Those who treat us badly won't stay alive for three days.
Let's leave aside the question of treating us badly.

Q: Are we seeking credits? What is the basis of our relations
with that organization?

A: I would just like to tell you that it may look as if some
kind of bargaining and a struggle for credits is taking place. But
I don't think this is by any means the most important thing. I
think it would be very wrong for us to break off our relations with
the international financial institutions. But it would be equally
wrong to beg for anything.

In general, we are a large and basically self-sufficient
country. You know the Russian proverb: "If they give you something,
take it, if they beat you, run." It may be crudely put, but the
basic idea is right. If they give you credits and do so on good
terms, it would be stupid to renounce them. Stupid. And
international financial institutions offer credits on good terms.

But obtaining credits should not be an end in itself. I think
the aim today is to maintain good working relationships with
international financial institutions, including the IMF, as an
expert organization, an organization whose aim is to fit emerging
market economies into the world economy. And in that sense I for
one think that we should not terminate relations with international
financial institutions, we should develop them with all of them,
with the World Bank and the IMF. But the is does not mean that we
should go begging for anything.

For instance, our relationship with the World Bank is shaping
up very positively. You know that in spite of any political
processes, we have obtained a credit --

Q: For the first time in 15 years we have seen a significant
industrial growth. The reasons are clear. Oil prices are high. But
then we have seen good oil prices three or four years ago but there
was no growth.

A: You are right, of course, that there were situations
previously when prices not only for oil but for many other
traditional exports were going up but we didn't feel a serious
impact on the economy of the country as a whole.

What has happened this time around? A number of factors. One
has to admit that not only high prices for our traditional exports
went up in the world markets which had a positive impact on us, but
the collapse of August 1998, the devaluation of the ruble, improved
the situation for the enterprises which export their goods due to
import-replacement. To put it in a simple way, people stopped
buying imported goods because they proved to be too expensive for
them. That is a fact. But it would be wrong to claim that this was
the only factor.

I think the economics division in the government has managed
to take advantage of the situation this time around in order to
pursue a tough and consistent policy and achieve a real growth in
production. In other words, we managed not to squander the extra
revenue that we received. We tried not to generate social demand
too much. We were very keen to do something noticeable in the
social sphere. But then we would have siphoned off resources from
industry. In short, it is a delicate balance.

On the one hand, the ultimate goal is the well-being of the
people, but it cannot be achieved by eating up all the revenues.
Well-being can only be based on the real growth of the economy.
Besides, we have managed to stick to the main macro-economic
parameters of the budget.

Q: Oil prices are high. They will hold for a year or a year
and a half and then they situation may worsen. What should be done
in the economic field? What are the tasks in order to achieve
sustained growth?

A: Above all, one shouldn't make a fuss. Yes, the oil price
situation is good, yes, we should take advantage of it. But you
shouldn't think that when the situation changes everything will
collapse -- the client goes away, the plasters are removed -- yes,
it will be more difficult for us to solve the tasks facing us in
restoring the market economy, in integrating it with world economic
system. But it will not be impossible. That's why I say we should
maintain good relations with the international financial
institutions, partly for the reason I have just given.

Q: Are you aware of the possibility of a change of heart among
investors to Russia? Let us face it, investors have practically
left Russia.

A: Yes, definitely yes. What were we missing most of all? We
didn't have a strong state. We missed the instruments that would
guarantee acceptable conditions for investment. That's the first
thing that we missed. Secondly, for years we have lurched from one
putsch to another. We missed political stability. who would invest
anything in a concrete project. I have worked in St. Petersburg on
a large number of projects. I know these negotiations from the
inside. A potential investor comes along. Let us suppose he is
going to invest 100 million. First of all, he has to dig that money
into our soil. Then a certain period of time has to elapse before
he can recoup the investments he made in our economy and then it
takes a certain period of time for the investor to gain a profit.
Otherwise, the whole exercise is futile.

But if we develop from one putsch to another and it is
anybody's guess when the next putsch will take place, and what its
political consequences will be who would invest? If he isn't sure
that he will get his money back, not to speak of making a profit.
But there will be no large-scale investment until we have a stable
political system, stability and a strong state that protects the
market institutions and creates good, favorable conditions for
investment.

Q: Are you a factor of stability?

A: I think that the president who will be elected must be such
a factor, no matter who is elected the president of Russia. I am
sure that the person who will be elected president will work
comfortably especially after we have completed the operation in the
North Caucasus.

Q: So, you are ready to present to that person a completed
operation in the North Caucasus?

A: I am ready to present it to Russia. And not to present it,
but just to carry it through and assume that I have fulfilled that
part of my duty to my country. But this is only the beginning of
the restoration of the state, of the strengthening of the state.
That is why the mass of the population in the country has given
such support to it. Because even the most common of people have
seen that this indicates a commitment to strengthen the state. And
we will work in that direction.

Q: What do you mean by the state in the area of politics and
economics? People have been speaking about a police state. For
example, one of your predecessors, Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov, in
withdrawing from the presidential race said that he had taken a
difficult decision because the country is far removed from
democracy and civilization and that he wouldn't like to sully
himself dealing with such a country. Yes?

A: No, that's not the way he put it. I think it would be
unfair to interpret what he said in this way. In general, Yevgeny
Maximovich is one of the people who have no other interests than
those of the state. One can understand these interests in different
ways, one could argue with him. He has often been referred to as a
"statist", that is, a person who puts the interests of the state
above his own. And this is certainly true of Primakov. He is a very
experienced man and, whatever his official position, I know that he
would never refuse to meet with me and discuss concrete issues with
me. And even if he does not hold any official position, I will
always, unofficially, respect that man and set great store by his
opinion.

As for your question, how I feel about the state and what it
means for me, it is above all a mechanism to guarantee the rights
and freedoms of the individual and the citizen. That is paramount.
In the economy, it is approximately the same. The state should
generate the general principles of managing the economy. And
especially important, it should guarantee uniform application of
the rules. There should be no preferences or privileges for any
individuals or groups or firms. This is the key function of the
state. This is a highly moral function, but it is justified from
the economic point of view. Not only is it justified, it is much in
demand in Russia today.

So, when we speak about the strengthening of the state, and I
have already had occasion to speak about it, but it bears repeating
that the strengthening of some institutions of the state which are
directly linked to the market and guarantee an equal playing field
for all the economic entities is a very important condition.
Without it, there can be no conditions for investment.

Anchor: You will be able to watch the second part of Vladimir
Putin's interview with Public Russian Television on the Vremya
information channel tomorrow.

********

#9
Financial Times (UK)
9 February 2000
[for personal use only]
RUSSIA: Business leaders push to join ICC 
By John Thornhill in Moscow

A new class of Russian business leaders is trying to improve its country's
poor image abroad by pressing for membership of the International Chamber
of Commerce, the world business organisation that helps set voluntary rules
and standards for trade and investment.

The ICC is continuing to consult its corporate partners in Moscow, but
expects to admit Russia as a full country member at the chamber's annual
meeting in May. Russia would become the 71st country to join the ICC.

Maria Livanos Cattaui, secretary-general of the ICC, said that for the past
four years the chamber had remained sceptical about the Russian business
community's commitment to abiding by international standards.

But a new class of professional entrepreneurs and managers was emerging
that was committed to playing by a higher set of rules.

"You cannot push people in a direction in which they do not want to go,"
she said in an interview in Moscow.

"But we believe we have now found the right people. Russian business is
itself coming to the understanding that it has to change its image.

"A lot of people here are sophisticated enough to realise that the wild
west days are over and that Russian business needs to regain its confidence
and credibility," she added.

The ICC currently has 17 corporate members in Russia, including the
Sibirsky Aluminium Group; Sberbank, the savings bank; UES, the electricity
group; Vympelcom, the mobile telephone operator; and Troika-Dialog, the
investment bank.

Ms Cattaui said the chamber could help Russia implement a consistent set of
business rules and disciplines, and ease its accession to the World Trade
Organisation.

The ICC also operates the International Court of Arbitration, which helps
settle cross-border commercial disputes.

Russia's reputation among international investors plummeted in August 1998
following the country's devastating financial crash and has been further
damaged by a series of international money laundering scandals. But Russian
suspicions of foreign intentions have also grown markedly.

An opinion poll conducted by the VTsIOM agency last month found that 53 per
cent of Russians believed that the International Monetary Fund was harming
the country. Only 3 per cent of the 1,600 respondents believed that the IMF
was of definite help.

******

#10
smi.ru
17:22 07.02.00
Government
CHUBAIS WILL BE TO BLAME FOR EVERYTHING AGAIN 
The February 5 issue of "Izvestiya" says that the Kremlin has chosen the 
oligarchs to be, using Vladimir Putin's expression, "bashed in the loo". They 
are Anatoly Chubais, Rem Vyakhirev and Boris Berezovsky. The reprisals have 
started with Chubais, who has been demanded to yield a blocking stake in the 
RAO UESR company headed by him to the State. In the opinion of Alexander 
Shokhin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Credit Organizations and 
Financial Markets, the votes of the foreign shareholders of RAO UESR are in 
effect controlled by Anatoly Chubais. It is to him that the votes of foreign 
shareholders owning ADRs (American Depository Receipts) are transferred. 
Shokhin believes that such votes should be transferred to the Board of 
Directors instead or that all the ADR holders should simply be deprived of 
the right to vote. As a result of either of these measures, Anatoly Chubais, 
who is impossible to dismiss without the consent of the foreign shareholders, 
will become "manageable" again. 

Comment: The theory that this pretext will be used to attack the oligarch 
looks quite convincing. It is known that the RAO UESR boss irritates many 
people in the Government precisely by his "irremovability". One should also 
take note of the critical remarks about the situation in the company, quite 
unexpectedly made in public by Vladimir Putin. The problems of all the three 
above-mentioned magnates with the authorities have indeed become worse 
recently. However, the most curious thing here is the choice of names. 
Throughout the recent years, Chubais, Vyakhirev and Berezovsky have been 
considered irreconcilable enemies and, moreover, any two of them, in any 
combination, are hardly likely to become allies against the third one. Who 
knows, though, how they will behave in case all the three suddenly have a 
common enemy? But things would sure become very interesting then. 
"Izvestiya": The First Blood 
SMI.RU: "Izvestiya" Stands Up in Defense of Chubais 
SMI.RU: Chubais Strengthens His Rears

******

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