February 8, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4094 4095 4096

Johnson's Russia List
#4096
8 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Russian Journalist Wins Libel Case. (Grigory Pasko)
2. John Owen: Re 4089-Coalson/Journalism Is Hamstrung.
3. Andrew Miller: Good News for Russia!
4. New York Times: James Baker, Repairing Relations With Russia.
5. Moscow Times: Sarah Karush, Election Foes Forge Joint Duma Agenda.
6. RFE/RL: Florina Fossato, Government Rethinks Internet Control.
7. STRATFOR.COM: Herding Pariahs: Russia's Dangerous Game.
8. Vek: Andrei Sogrin, WHAT IF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE CANCELLED?
9. New York Times: Michael Gordon, Russian Justice: Crime and Harassment. (re apartment bombings)
10. Washington Times: Arnold Beichman, Putin's Revealing Personnel Choices.]

******

#1
Russian Journalist Wins Libel Case
February 8, 2000

VLADIVOSTOK, Russia (AP) - A Russian military journalist acquitted of treason 
after reporting on nuclear waste dumping said Tuesday that he had won a libel 
suit against a security official who called him a spy. 

A military court in the Far Eastern port of Vladivostok acquitted Navy Capt. 
Grigory Pasko of treason last summer for divulging information about the 
combat-readiness of Russia's Pacific Fleet to Japanese television. 

After the trial closed, the chief of the Federal Security Service's Pacific 
Fleet department, Adm. Nikolai Sotskov, called Pasko a Japanese spy in a 
newspaper interview. 

Pasko sued for libel, and on Monday a court in Vladivostok ordered Sotskov to 
pay $860 for moral damage, Pasko said in a telephone interview. Sotskov was 
expected to appeal. 

During his two-year treason trial, Pasko acknowledged giving information to 
Japan's NHK television about nuclear waste dumping by the Pacific Fleet in 
the Sea of Japan. But he said he did not divulge any state secrets. 

******

#2
Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 
From: john owen <JohnOwen6@compuserve.com> 
Subject: 4089-Coalson/Journalism Is Hamstrung

Robert Coalson quite rightly spotlights the disturbing ease with which
senior journalists and broadcast executives move back and forth between
daily journalism and high-powered jobs inside government. Mind you: 
Russian journalists might argue that they are only emulating what Western
journalists have been doing for some time. It's been going on for a long
time in the US but more recently what about former Clinton Press Secretary
and senior stratgegist George Stephanopolos going from the White House to
ABC News with a bare minimum of time outside of government service. Having
never worked as a reporter or commentator for a news organisation, he still
managed to land a high-profile job with one of American's most respected
news organisations. Or what about NBC News hiring the Pentagon's press
spokesman, Pete Williams, as its NBC News Pentagon reporter. Not even any
pretense of a "laundering" period there. 

In Britain, you can also find examples of what Coalson finds unsettling in
Russia. For example, the correspondent who became the BBC's reporter of
record from Brussels covering NATO during the Kosovo conflict, Mark Laity,
has recently become the deputy press spokesman to Jamie Shea. Then there
are countless examples of prominent politicians, even former government
ministers who turn up fronting television and radio current affairs
programs that often touch on controversial issues. For example, the former
Convervative cabinent minister Michael Portillo, who had been defeated in
1997 ( he was re-elected recently), could be seen
on Channel 4 in Britain chairing a discussion about Britiain's policies on
Europe. Portillo could hardly be considered an impartial moderator as he
is identified with the anti-European wing of the Conservative party. 

None of these examples justify this revolving door in Russian politics and
media but we all have to keep in mind what precedents we've established in
our own countries. 

John Owen
European Director
The Freedom Forum 

******

#3
Subject: Good News for Russia!
From: "andrew miller" <andrewmiller@mail.ru>
Date: Sat, 05 Feb 2000

Topic: Good News for Russia!
Title: Alas, Poor Isaac, I Wanted to Know him Well

Here are three apparently encouraging year-end factoids about Russia:

1. Its stock market out-performed America's by a whopping 1,500% in 1999,
with growth of 260% compared to a feeble 20% in the U.S.A. - Russia's
growth was fifth in the world, and the top three (Moldova, Cyprus and
Bulgaria) all have close ties to Russia.

2. According to the January 3 Wall Street Journal, in 1999 "the Russian
ruble [was] among the best currencies to have owned."

3. While Russia's population declined precipitously by 715,000 in 1999
(490,000 unreplaced deaths and 225,000 emigrations) Russia was a net gainer
in immigration with 120,000 more people moving to Russia than away.

Good news for Russia! And while it's true that (a) the miniscule base of
Russia's stock market makes its growth almost literally insignificant (the
combined market cap of all liquid stocks on the Russian exchange is less
than 5% of Microsoft's market cap alone) and (b) the WSJ said owned not
earned because the Russian currency rose against the dollar only due to
vigorous intervention by the government, mortgaging an already bleak future
of the Russian people by squandering their hard-earned hard-currency
savings, and (c) immigration to Russia occurs only with respect to de facto
refugees fleeing hell for purgatory (the government actually doesn't WANT
foreigners here, and requires people like me to leave the country every 365
days to get a new visa!), while immigration from Russia involves the upper
echelon of wealth and talent, there follows a fourth item of what might be
considered, in the same way, good news for Russia.

I have always had a yen no visit the picturesque Ukrainian port city of
Odessa, where some of my favorite writers lived and worked (especially
Isaac Babel). I hold a resident visa in Russia, but since Ukraine is now a
separate country it requires me to have (that is, to pay for) a separate
tourist visa (though no such requirement is imposed on Russian citizens,
who can travel as freely to Ukraine as Americans to Mexico - incidentally,
I would be very interested to know if any JRL reader can advise me whether
an American resident alien can travel as freely to Canada as an American
citizen, and whether Russia requires an American resident in Ukraine to
have a visa to visit Russia). So when an invitation to stay at the Odessa
home of a friend of a friend appeared unlooked for, I started making travel
plans. The first step, of course, was a visa.

My only prior foray into Russia's bread basket was something of a
non-starter. Intending to travel by train from the Russian Black-Seaside
town of Novorosisk ("New Russia") north to Kursk, where I was then
residing, I booked passage on a Russian train which, unbeknownst to me,
would pass through the interlying Ukraine for an hour or two en route. 30
minutes inside Ukraine the train was stopped and boarded by Ukrainian
customs soldiers. They held the train for more than two hours, searching
luggage and checking documents, demanding bribes for the continued passage
of any baggage or persons they deemed untoward ("too big" and "too heavy"
and "wrong color" were common indicia of untowardness, as I recall, though
my Ukrainian isn't what it might be - but many tears were shed during this
interval by those who had forgotten the need to pack extra rubles when
traveling through cash-strapped Ukraine). 

When they found I had no visa for Ukraine, a remuneration was likewise
suggested. When I did not pay (here I do not mean to imply a heroic
refusal but simply a lack of funds - had I the money, I like to think I
would have been heroic then, and used the money to bribe my way out of
prison later, after becoming an international cause celebre grew tiresome,
or I wasn't noticed, whichever came first - but the I like to think many
things) I was summarily ejected (somewhat bodily) from the conveyance and
placed (in the fullness of time after a brief, though fascinating,
internment) on one going in the opposite direction. I thence had a
somewhat roundabout journey to Kursk, via the cities of Rostov-on-Don and
Voronezh (a journey which I do not mean to be understood to begrudge, as
these are two charming Russian cities which I highly recommend to the
gentle reader, along with my beloved Kursk itself, should that old bedbug
Wanderlust bite). Fortunately I am not that kind of person for whom your
average Russian might be inclined to wait the fourteen hours I was late,
and the people who were going to meet me in Kursk upon my arrival went home
after only three (call the station and page them, you say? Oh, ye of
little Russia!).

This experience made me hold my breath and squint when I called the
Ukrainian Consulate here in St. Petersburg to inquire after the visa. If I
may paraphrase the charmingly uncharming young lady who responded to my
query: "You idiot, we don't give out that !$#&* kind of ?@$&% information
over the phone! [cost, time to process, required documents, etc.] Come
into the office and we'll tell you in person." Click.

Luckily, I had been squinting. 

And so I set out one chilly morning a few days ago, bright and early,
bright-eyed and bushy-tailed, and none the worse for two glasses of chilly
vodka in the classic Russian tradition of adequate preparation for such
events, half a sheet to the sub- arctic wind you might say, for the
historic heart of Piter, a Molotov cocktail's throw from the Winter Palace,
where the "Northern Capital" of the Ukraine in Russia is to be found. The
sentry, armed with a Koloshnikov and a bullet-proof vest, who stood on the
bridge over the troubled sidewalk that connected the street to the entry of
the otherwise looking-like-an-apartment- building Ukrainian Consulate,
Little-John-like to my Robin Hood, frowned protectively and stood stoically
in place as I made as if to enter.

If I may again paraphrase: "Halt, Who Goes There?!" he bravely declared.
Reaching for my trusty quarterstaff I explained my business, whereupon he
entered into an inner monologue of some considerable duration but then,
just as I began to think better of my adventure, he relented and I gained
admittance. Inside, on the second floor of what still looked like an
ordinary, dark, unlit, gloomy, dark, unlit apartment building I found a
line of a dozen or so hapless, chairless, heatless individuals waiting
outside a locked steel door. A few sheets of paper were cellotaped to
wall purporting to give information. Reading them, I gathered that they
did not.

"Who's last in line?" I ventured, "how long have you been waiting?" Their
glances spoke the timeless Russian answer: "Well, looked at it one way,
we're all really last in line, aren't we?"

I went home.

Having gathered my strength, I telephoned the consulate once again to
explain my predicament. I used what you might call as few uncertain terms
as possible, given that they were holding most of the visa cards. This
time I was informed that the young lady couldn't answer my questions
because she didn't know, but someone did who might or might not be in later
but wasn't now.

I hung up.

In the fullness of time, I learned by various means well known to those who
dwell in the Land of the Midnight Gun that if I wanted a visa to visit
Ukraine I could indeed get one, but I would have to shell out seventy-five
clams for it because I'm an American and, apparently, that's what the U.S.
government charges Ukrainians if they want a visa. Chernobyl, Disney World
- you know. It's kind of a "so there, take that, nyaah!" kind of a deal
on both sides, exactly the sort of thing we pay diplomats to do, provoke
and alienate. This sum, by the way, is roughly the average income of
Russian person for a month (for a Ukrainian, it's a somewhat more imposing
sum), and in most pecuniary respects I'm not that different from an
ordinary Russian person (the difference might be that I'm a university
professor, and so paid quite a bit less than the average) - so it's like if
they asked you to pay, say, $750 for a visa ($75 is roughly triple the
price of a round trip train fare - third class, which is how we university
professors travel in Russia these days - to Ukraine from Piter). What
would you have done?

As for me, I reconsidered travel to the Ukraine.

In closing, I have two things to say: First, contrary to what you may be
thinking, Ukraine is by my lights a very useful place which I now
vigorously adore. This is because this benighted, neo-medieval quagmire
makes Russia, where I actually live, look so wonderfully excellent by
comparison that I can't help bearing it a goodly amount of good will.
Second, and I hope the Ukrainian powers-that-be are reading this, sometime
this summer, "when they least expect it," I'm going to travel down to the
charming city of Belgorod and stay overnight with some charming pals I have
there. Then, bright and early the next morning, I'm going to board an
"electrichka" bound for Kharkov (a large Ukrainian city just across the
border), the electrichka being a kind of hard-wooden-benched torture
chamber of a train on which no one with foreign credentials ever rides and
no one with any money either, and which, for that very good reason, is
never stopped or searched or even looked at askance by the customs
koshmari, and I'm going to cross into Ukraine without no damn tourist
visa. Then, I'm going to stay overnight with a professor I happen to know
in Kharkov (say that "kh" as if you were going to spit out a loogie, the
way a good Ukrainian would) and the next day I'm going to go merrily down
to Odessa and soak up all its glories to my heart's content, and I'm not
going to buy a single Ukrainian-made souvenir or send single postcard, and
what's more I'm even going to brown-bag my lunch in Belgorod, and if
anybody ever asks me if they should go to Ukraine I'll tell them they'd
have more fun in Lyubianka (never try to play nyahh-nyahh with in American,
we invented it!). Except you, of course, gentle JRL reader, who has
already got the inside scoop.

If the Ukrainian border fuzz is indeed a JRL recipient to you I say: Just
try and stop me. Nyaah!

Andrew Miller
St. Petersburg

PS: In the interests of full disclosure, however, I must reluctantly say
that it's still unfortunately true that a foreigner must pay ten times more
here in Piter to gain admission to cultural attractions (i.e, the
Hermitage, Peterhopf and the Kirov/Mariinsky Ballet) than does a Russian,
even though this is contrary to Russian law. As yet, again unfortunately,
nobody over at the Hermitage or the Kirov have been arrested. Apparently,
Pushkin never told Russians the one about the goose that laid the golden
Fabarge egg. And further on Ukraine s behalf let me add that, compared to
Belarus, it is paradise revealed.

PPS: Some readers are interested, so I would like to offer the following
clarification as to why I don't more often comment on good things or
good-deed-doers in Russia. First, Russian people can't take compliments,
especially from foreigners. They either discount them as lies or they let
them go to their heads as even vodka doesn't. They don't take compliments
as encouragement to do more and better, but as justification for doing less
and preening. Anybody who has ever lived here knows that. Second, I'm an
iconoclast here. Anything good I said, especially about a specific person,
would be taken by the entrenched establishment (which reads the JRL) as the
kiss of death (having said this, you can imagine how they take my
criticisms!). I don't think anything tangibly good would flow to such
people as I might name to compliment (the outside world seems more or less
content to let Russia go down in flames, and while I can't say I agree with
them I certainly can't say I blame them much), at least not enough to
counterbalance the bad. Third, I care far more about what happens to
Russia than any person who doesn't live here and spend most of my time
working as a volunteer to help Russians solve their problems, and I think
my efforts to do so are as useful to American interests as to Russian - so
I'm immune to being called a Russia-basher. Fourth, I must be in some
sense a provocateur as provocation is, in the vast majority of instances,
the only tactic I have seen reliably (though still only occasionally) jolt
Russians out of their apathy, fatalism and intermittent sloth. And finally,
Russia is in the middle of an abject, life-threatening crisis, mostly of
its own making, and I don't want to say or do anything to distract
anybody's attention from that crucial fact. But if I didn't think there
was hope for Russia, I wouldn't live here.

******

#4
New York Times
February 5, 2000
[for personal use only]
Repairing Relations With Russia
By James A. Baker III
James A. Baker III was secretary of state under President George Bush.

In June 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin came to Washington to
celebrate "partnership and friendship" with the United States. "We have
left behind the period when America and Russia looked at each other through
gun sights," he told a joint session of Congress.

Nothing better symbolizes the subsequent decline of Russian-American
relations than the recent announcement that Russian military strategists
had approved use of nuclear weapons "to repel armed aggression" -- which
some see as a threatening expansion of Russian nuclear doctrines.

The change, however, is less a cause for concern than for regret.

Russia is saying it will not rule out using nuclear weapons to defend
itself, even from conventional attack, if all other means fail. Militarily,
this reflects Russia's weakness, not its strength. The new policy does not
mean the United States need fear an offensive Russian nuclear strike.
Russia knows the strength, the reach and the effectiveness of the West's
strategic nuclear deterrent far too well to take such a risk.

Diplomatically, however, the new policy signals deep distrust, even fear,
of the West. On the nuanced scale of diplomatic rhetoric, Russian leaders
now reject "partnership and friendship" and embrace "cooperation" -- a step
backward.

Russians today believe we exploited the collapse of the Soviet Union to
weaken Russia. To a surprising degree, they blame us for their economic
troubles. They think we pushed reforms to enrich the few and impoverish the
many.

Why, Russians ask themselves, did the United States, after promising that
NATO was strictly a defensive alliance, lead it into an offensive war
against Russia's ally, Serbia? After the anti-ballistic missile treaty
served as one cornerstone of the Russian and American nuclear relationship
for 27 years, why does the United States now want to build an antimissile
defense system that will destroy the balance? And, by the way, what right
does America have to criticize Russia's struggles to keep itsfederation
together in a war no less brutal than the one America fought to preserve
its own union?

Americans are equally frustrated -- by misuse of international loans,
stories of money laundering, Russian opposition to American foreign policy
initiatives in Kosovo and Iraq, Russia's tactics in Chechnya.

So, in this climate, what should the United States do?

First, remember Russia's importance to our own security and prosperity.
Russia's weapons of mass destruction pose threats if they fall into the
wrong hands. Russia's economy struggles today but has enormous potential.
Russia retains influence as a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council. And Russian organized crime infiltrates the West.

Engagement is the only sensible way to encourage a stable, democratic and
prosperous Russia. But our expectations must be realistic. Compared with
Western models, Russia's economy and democracy are disappointments.
Compared with Communism and czarism, however, they reflect major progress.

Some retreat from the euphoria of 1992 was probably inevitable. But it is
possible to repair the relationship. Whatever the outcome of elections in
both countries this year, the winners should prepare, quickly and
deliberately, to make a fresh start to restore good will.

For the United States, that means recognizing that the relationship with
Russia is not friend-or-foe, with nothing between. Russia has made great
strides in political and press freedom, and almost all elements of Russian
society want democracy and capitalism. But our new leaders will also need
to recognize that Russia will have its own foreign policy, independent of
ours. We should oppose Russia when its policies conflict with our interests
and values.

Our involvement with Russia may not immediately produce results. There will
be setbacks. Through it all, we must be patient, persistent and a bit
modest. Only this approach can stop the drift toward enmity and make
possible an ultimate return to friendship.

******

#5
Moscow Times
February 8, 2000 
Election Foes Forge Joint Duma Agenda 
By Sarah Karush
Staff Writer

Political realities made unlikely allies out of three minority factions in 
the State Duma, but Fatherland-All Russia, the Union of Right Forces and 
Yabloko said Monday they have found common ground to work together on a 
number of substantial legislative initiatives. 

They unveiled a program that includes doing away with deputies' immunity from 
prosecution, lowering taxes, reforming the judicial system and passing a law 
on alternatives to military service. 

"The rumors of our death [as a coalition] have turned out to be strongly 
exaggerated," Yabloko Deputy Sergei Ivanenko said at a joint news conference 
with representatives of the other two factions. 

The three factions banded together after the Communists and the 
pro-government Unity faction divided among themselves all the key positions 
in the Duma, parliament's lower house, at its first session Jan. 18. They 
boycotted the first several Duma sessions, eventually announcing they would 
return this Wednesday. 

While Russia's liberals have long hoped for cooperation between the Right 
Forces and Yabloko, Fatherland-All Russia was previously seen as the natural 
ally of the Communist faction. 

But at Monday's news conference, Fatherland-All Russia Deputy Valery 
Grebennikov enthusiastically promoted the liberal agenda. Specifically, he 
spoke of the need to continue judicial reform, a process that was begun in 
the early '90s but soon ground to a halt. 

Grebennikov said judicial reform included expanding the institution of jury 
trials - currently at work in only nine of Russia's 89 regions - and 
revamping the criminal and civil codes. 

In his speech to the Duma on its opening day, acting President Vladimir Putin 
named passage of new criminal and civil codes as things that should be top 
priorities of the new legislature. This seems to indicate that Unity will 
support such measures. 

But Lev Levinson, who has helped draft many human rights-related bills and is 
currently an aide to Right Forces Deputy Sergei Kovalyov, was skeptical. 

"Reform can go either way," he said, pointing to the latest criminal code, 
which went into effect in 1997 and is not considered much of an improvement 
by human-rights advocates. 

Levinson said that in the previous Duma it was the pro-government factions, 
including Our Home Is Russia, that held up judicial reform. At that time, 
Grebennikov sat with Our Home and, according to Levinson, did "absolutely 
nothing" for reform from his post as deputy chairman of the committee on 
legislation and judicial reform. 

Another much-awaited reform, that of the tax system, may be more realistic to 
expect from the new Duma. 

Alexei Zabotkin, an economist at investment bank United Financial Group, said 
that due to improvements in tax collection, the government - and thus, Unity 
- will likely not be opposed to lowering taxes. 

But he said such a reform could not be expected for this fiscal year since 
the budget is already set. The issue is not likely to be discussed in the 
Duma until after presidential elections, when a prime minister will be 
appointed, he added. 

Missing from the list of joint initiatives was legislation on the purchase 
and sale of land, a key issue on the liberal platform. 

"Our faction does not have a unified viewpoint on this issue," Grebennikov 
said. 

But Right Forces Deputy Viktor Pokhmelkin said he and two other deputies from 
his faction had submitted a land bill to the Duma on Jan. 31. 

*******

#6
Russia: Government Rethinks Internet Control
By Floriana Fossato

The Russian government has proposed state regulation of the content of 
Russian websites, a move that, if implemented, would limit the spread of 
information on the Internet. RFE/RL's Floriana Fossato reports from Moscow 
that Internet-based media are trying to convince the government that the 
Internet is too global a phenomenon to be regulated by one country's 
government. 

Moscow, 7 February 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Russia's Internet community has fought 
off the first try by the government to regulate the Russian part of the World 
Wide Web. Internet experts say they have told the government that the only 
way to control the flow of information in Russia would be to cut off Russian 
computers from the rest of the world -- a move that would be almost 
impossible in today's market economy.

Internet specialists and site-holders met with top Kremlin officials, 
including Vladimir Putin, then prime minister and now also acting president. 
They say they managed to convince Putin that two draft decrees, prepared by 
the communications and media ministries to establish state regulation on 
Russian websites, need to be further worked out.

The draft decrees, prepared last December, would regulate the registration of 
Internet addresses for Russian websites and qualify them as "mass media," 
subject to licensing.

Putin said he would not sign the decrees in their original form and ordered 
the creation of an expert council of Internet professionals. The experts are 
to advise government officials and make sure state attempts to control 
information on the web don't go too far. 

Even though the immediate danger seems gone, Russia's Internet community 
remains concerned. Headlines such as "Russia's Communications Ministry Is 
About To Take Control of The Internet" are not uncommon.

According to the Moscow-based Center for Media Law, the main problem with the 
law is that it does not make clear which of the nearly 18,000 Russian 
websites can be considered media publications that must be registered. (The 
text of the draft decree on registration of online media is available in 
Russian at www.deadline.ru/dosie/gov000112.asp)

They warn that, if the final decree also lacks clarity on the issue, the law 
could be broad enough to mount a serious challenge to freedom of speech in 
Russia.

Those who run Russian websites say they are encouraged. They say the 
government may be having second thoughts on whether to launch an all-out 
assault on the Internet. 

Anton Nosik is one of Russia's best-known Internet specialists. Over the last 
few years, he has created and managed some of the most successful Russian 
websites dealing with political and economic news. He is now the chief editor 
of www.lenta.ru and www.vesti.ru -- two highly-rated sites that provide news 
and commentaries. 

"Serious people do not expect a regulation of freedom of speech, or a 
limitation of freedom of expression on the Internet, because it is clear that 
this is unrealistic." 

Were the draft decrees a case of some ministry officials going further than 
their superiors in their attempt to control a fast growing sector? Nosik says 
that could well be the case. 

"The Internet [community] was awaiting an attempt of the authorities to 
regulate it since 1995 or 96. Internet professionals realized that officials 
could not allow the existence of a sector that is developing fast and 
producing incomes, but that is totally outside their regulation. Since the 
beginning, the question was when will authorities understand that they can 
make money regulating [the Internet]? And how [could they do that]? Either by 
extorting a share of profits in place of the registration, or by directly 
asking bribes for the registration of Internet projects."

Nosik was at a meeting of Internet professionals who met with Putin on 
December 28, says the Internet experts explained clearly at the meeting that 
control would be possible only following what Nosik called the 
"Chinese-Vietnamese method." 

In that model, he explained, the Internet service available in the country is 
closed to the outside world, and selected foreign web servers are 
inaccessible. That model, he says, would be "a totalitarian system of the 
Internet." Nosik says Putin now has to decide.

"If the authorities decide to follow such a model, then it becomes possible 
to grant licenses and those who do not have a license cannot operate. But if 
you don't make this decision, if Russian users can keep accessing Yahoo and 
so forth, then all texts can be available through that and [we can] forget 
talks about licensing. There is America, where licensing is not requested and 
Russian sites can be available here from there. The situation is very simple. 
In order to forbid any one thing, the authorities first will have to forbid 
everything. The consequences of full [Internet] control in terms of image, 
social and political implications are clear enough [to everybody], including 
to Putin."

Nosik adds that singling out only online media would now be impossible. He 
says that Internet media, considered an elite product only four years ago, 
now represent a growing part of the Russian media picture. And if it were to 
take on the Internet, the government would have to take on all media in the 
country.

According to Nosik, Putin told Internet professionals that, if the government 
were faced with a choice between maintaining freedom of access or regulating, 
it would choose freedom. Those who publish on the Internet want very much to 
believe that. 

******

#7
STRATFOR.COM Weekly Global Intelligence Update
8 February 2000

Herding Pariahs: Russia's Dangerous Game

Summary

Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported a number of
weak, corrupt states - from Angola to North Korea - in order to
offset the West. When the Cold War ended, Russia no longer needed
or wanted to maintain its global confrontation with the West, and
it cut these allies loose. Now, however, after a decade of
diplomatic and economic silence between Moscow and its former
client states, Russia is reactivating some of its old
relationships. This will ultimately help rewrite the rules of
relations with the West.

Analysis

Despite Russia's social, demographic and economic decline, Russia
under acting President Vladimir Putin is managing to politically
reassert its interests throughout much of the former Soviet Union.
At the recent summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States [
http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c0001260125.htm], Putin
demonstrated his ability to lure and cajole the other CIS members
into cooperation. Putin's tough line in Chechnya
[http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c0001190220.htm], too, has
earned him fear and grudging respect in much of the former Soviet
Union. Yet the Chechen war has all but ostracized Russia throughout
the West.

As a result, an upcoming trip by Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov to North Korea illustrates a new decision by Moscow to
change the rules of the larger diplomatic game with the West. No
longer content to dine on the scraps the West deems fit to dispense
from the table of the IMF, the Putin government is attempting to
increase Russia's leverage by re-activating Soviet-era
relationships. In doing so, Moscow is clearly attempting to alarm
Western governments.

Ivanov is set to visit North Korea Feb. 9-10, the first time in a
decade that Russia has significantly engaged the Pyongyang
government. The last major dignitary from Moscow was then-Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in 1990. Like Shevardnadze
then, Ivanov now will discover an economically backwards, corrupt
and teetering regime that has survived by completely separating
itself from the international community. In the Russian government
press, a so-called Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighbor Relations
and Cooperation, which will be signed, is being trumpeted as an
important event. The Putin government hopes that North Korea will
function as a geopolitical level for Russian influence in a very
dynamic - and very tense - region.

On another front, at least one prominent politician has announced
that another old relationship is being revived: the one between
Moscow and Baghdad. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, head of the ultra-
nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, announced Feb. 7 that he
reached an agreement with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on the
stationing of Russian warships at Iraqi naval bases. It remains to
be seen whether the Russian government was even aware of
Zhirinovsky's efforts, but the goal appears the same - gaining a
potential diplomatic lever that will complicate every Western
action in the Persian Gulf.

Ivanov is also planning to visit Vietnam Feb. 13-14. Due to a large
population, mineral resources and proximity to trading routes,
Vietnam holds significant promise as a trading partner for Russia.
Politically as well, Vietnam and Russia share a significant
relationship. Vietnam serves as the coordinator of relations
between Russia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This
role, the Moscow-Beijing relationship and Russian membership in the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation trade grouping are Russia's three
links to the Pacific Rim. Furthermore, Vietnam's recent decision to
abandon economic reforms has left it looking to old allegiances for
support.

Russia views these states as political chips in a larger game with
the United States. North Korea, Iraq and Vietnam oriented toward
Moscow would grant Russia the ability to apply pressure on three
regions vital to U.S. security.

However, Moscow's attempt to rewrite the geopolitical rules will
not come easily. Iran, despite its past friendly relations with
Russia, will react sharply against any new foreign presence in the
Persian Gulf. China will not take kindly to any Russian attempts to
gain influence either in North Korea and Vietnam.

But the prime target of Russia's change in strategy - the West -
seems oblivious to the change. Europe and the United States are
still holding out the possibility of IMF loans if Russia rectifies
its bad behavior in Chechnya. However, few in the West realize that
Russia no longer cares. After 10 years of nearly terminal decline,
Russia has ceased to play by Western rules.

The new strategy is risky. Putin is hinting at the potential of
confrontation with the West, knowing full well that its choice of
strategies may place Russia against Iran and China as well. But the
Putin government appears to believe that Russia can no longer
remain in its intolerable economic and political limbo. Instead, it
is striking out on tried-and-true methods of global engagement that
worked for the Soviet Union for a half century. Ivanov's trips to
North Korea and Vietnam are but the opening steps.

******

#8
Vek, No. 5
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WHAT IF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE CANCELLED?
By Andrei SOGRIN

Optimism has become a distinctive feature of our society 
on the eve of the presidential elections. All kinds of experts 
assure Russian citizens in the mass media that Putin will win 
in the first round and, if not in the first, then certainly in 
the second. It is understandable that these conclusions are not 
unfounded - they are confirmed by the ratings of sociological 
services and the unusually high level of the potential 
electors' trust for Putin can hardly be doubted by anyone. So 
far the acting President wins in all respects - the State Duma 
has become loyal, the KPRF has finally turned into "the 
opposition of Her Majesty" and the right forces continue to 
support Putin despite all their doubts. 
However, this calmness may quite have an unpleasant end.
Presidential elections are recognised as valid, if 50 per cent 
of the electors come to the polls. Taking into account the 
general euphoria and the wide-spread opinion that it is all 
clear with the elections and there is no sense to go to the 
polling stations, the so-called "lazy" electors may simply 
ignore them. 
Despite their legendary disciplined behaviour, some of the 
Communist electorate may not come to the polls proceeding from 
the simple considerations that since Zyuganov is the loser at 
the presidential elections from the very start, there is no 
sense in going to the polling stations. The same 
considerations, most likely, may appear in the minds of the 
supporters of Yavlinsky. 
Of course, this prospect is hardly probable for the first 
round (although this cannot be said for sure). But in the 
second round where Vladimir Putin and Gennady Zyuganov are most 
likely to face each other, the probability of the mass failure 
of the electors to turn up at the polls is extremely great. 
However, it is not clear what is the percentage of the 
electors' turn-up in the second round, under which the 
elections can be recognised as valid. Some political analysts 
believe that 25 per cent is enough while a correspondent of Vek 
failed to get a clear-cut answer to this question at the 
Central Electoral Commission. However, the federal law on the 
elections of the President of the Russian Federation says 
explicitly that "the Central Electoral Commission recognises 
the elections of the President of the Russian Federation 
invalid, if the elections were attended by less than half of 
the electors on the electors' lists at the moment of the end of 
the voting." However, the law does not specify which round of 
the elections this applies to, which fact unambiguously points 
to the application of this law both to the first and the second 
rounds. 
The specifics of the psychology of our people (its 
traditional and undying reliance on the off-chance) may play a 
bad trick on Putin and all the other residents of Russia. In 
case of the disruption of the elections, they will be 
postponed, according to the Constitution, till summer - this 
means that the country will be in a suspended state for several 
more months.
western investors who already today do not invest money in the 
Russian economy waiting for the results of the presidential 
campaign, will postpone their "development" of Russia for an 
uncertain period. 
Are the chances that the situation with the presidential 
elections turn out in this way great? There are two opinions 
among experts on this issue: some believe that the probability 
of the disruption of the elections is quite possible while 
others are sure that such prospects are hardly probable. 

******

#9
New York Times
February 8, 2000
[for personal use only]
Russian Justice: Crime and Harassment
By MICHAEL R. GORDON

MOSCOW, Feb. 7 -- Timur Dakhkilgov is a soft-spoken man who toils for long 
hours in a gritty dye factory to support his pregnant wife and two small 
children. He is also a victim of the Kremlin's war against terrorism. 

After a series of mysterious bombings rocked the Russian capital in 
September, Mr. Dakhkilgov was publicly identified as the leading suspect in 
the case and cast into prison, where he says he was tortured and warned that 
his family would be turned over to a vengeful mob if did not confess. 

His only offense, it turned out, was that he was born in Grozny, the capital 
of the breakaway region of Chechnya in southern Russia. After three long 
months in jail he was finally exonerated and released. 

"The police were not interested in my explanation," he said in an interview 
last week. "Their only goal was to get me to tell them what they wanted to 
hear, especially after we were shown on television as terrorists." 

Mr. Dakhkilgov's detention shows one dark aspect of Russia's struggle against 
the militants who are still battling Russian forces from their lairs in the 
Caucasus mountains. 

Four months after explosions devastated apartment houses in Moscow and other 
parts of Russia, killing almost 300 people, the authorities have yet to find 
the culprits. 

While officials still contend that Chechen militants are responsible, the 
Federal Security Service, Russia's domestic intelligence service, said last 
month that it was investigating 14 suspects, none of them Chechen. There has 
been speculation in the Russian press that the security services may have 
planted the bombs to build popular support for war in Chechnya. 

None of that has eased the anxiety of people from the Caucasus, who even 
before the bombings were routinely stopped here for document checks, forced 
to pay bribes to corrupt policemen and apprehended on the slightest 
suspicion. Even after his release, Mr. Dakhkilgov and his family are uneasy. 

"We are praying that nothing worse happens to us" and that he is not taken to 
prison again, said Mr. Dakhkilgov's wife, Lidiya. 

"I am afraid that our candor will do us more harm," she said. 

Tall, lean and with a dark complexion, the 32-year-old Mr. Dakhkilgov is 
Ingush by nationality, with forebears from a region that borders Chechnya. He 
is a double victim of the wars in Chechnya. He and his wife fled their home 
in Grozny in 1994 after the first war with the Chechen separatists. 

Mr. Dakhkilgov took his family to Moscow the next year and landed a job at a 
dye factory. The job paid 1,200 rubles a month ($43 at current exchange 
rates). With fumes of sulfuric acid and chemical dyes in the air, the working 
conditions were rough. 

But Mr. Dakhkilgov was more apprehensive about life outside the factory 
gates. He registered with the Moscow police, a requirement for all newcomers 
to the city, and carried proof of his registration. That did not protect him 
or his wife from being harassed by the police. 

"Even if you have registered, you are in trouble if you are stopped," Mrs. 
Dakhkilgov said. "When they see in your passport that you used to live in 
Grozny, blood rushes to their heads." 

To reduce the trouble, Mr. Dakhkilgov decided to avoid commuting and live in 
a rundown hostel near the factory. His entire family lives in a tiny but 
clean room filled with worn furniture, almost all of which belongs to the 
hostel. The only item they own is a secondhand crib for the baby who is due 
in April. 

The door to their room was recently repaired. The police broke it down when 
they began their search in September. It was an ominous sign of what was to 
come. The investigative techniques used by the Moscow police included 
torture, isolation and threats against Mr. Dakhkilgov's family, he said. 

His ordeal began after an apartment house was leveled in a explosion on Sept. 
8. He was summoned to a local police station, where he was fingerprinted and 
photographed. 

After a second blast a few days later, Mr. Dakhkilgov and his brother-in-law 
were arrested and taken to the police station in the Butovo section of 
Moscow. The next day Russian television reported that the terrorists had been 
arrested. 

Mr. Dakhkilgov had an excellent alibi. He was working the night shift at the 
factory when the second blast occurred. His neighbors vouched for his 
character. But the police were suspicious of the traces of chemical dyes that 
were left on this hands from his work in the factory, speculating that they 
might be the residue of bomb-making ingredients. 

Denied access to a lawyer, he was later transferred to the main Moscow police 
station on Petrovka Street. He was there less than a week, but the police 
seemed to be intent on forcing a confession before the federal security 
officials entered the case. 

"They put a plastic bag over my head and kept it there until I began 
suffocating," he said. "Then they would take it off just long enough so I 
could take a couple of breaths and put it back." 

Mr. Dakhkilgov was also beaten repeatedly, he said, but what scared him most 
were the threats against his family. 

"They said they would take my wife and kids to the blast site and tell people 
they are the family of the terrorists," he said. "Imagine what the crowd 
would do to them." 

Mr. Dakhkilgov insisted on his innocence and was transferred on Sept. 22 to 
the custody of officials from the Federal Security Service, one of the heirs 
of the K.G.B. He was jailed in Lefortovo prison. As frightening as the 
experience was, he said the treatment in the federal prison was far better 
than at the hands of the Moscow police. 

Investigators later concluded that the traces of chemicals on his hands had 
nothing to do with bomb making. A lawyer was found who contested the charges. 
And Mr. Dakhkilgov was finally released on Dec. 10. His brother-in-law was 
also cleared and freed. 

Security service officials later told The Moscow Times that they were 
satisfied that Mr. Dakhkilgov was innocent. 

Mr. Dakhkilgov and his wife said it would be pointless to ask for 
compensation or file a protest. They say that they could never win and that 
their complaints would simply attract more attention from the authorities. 

They leave the neighborhood near the factory as rarely as possible, going 
only to the market when supplies of food run low. Though they are practicing 
Muslims, they are too scared to go one of Moscow's mosques. 

"You know what the policemen usually say?" Mrs. Dakhkilgov said. "They say, 
'We shall send you back to your motherland.' But where is that motherland, 
and what did they turn it into?" 

******

#10
Washington Times
February 7, 2000
[for personal use onlly]
Putin's Revealing Personnel Choices
By Arnold Beichman
Arnold Beichman, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a
columnist for The Washington Times. He is the editor of the forthcoming
"CNN's Cold War Documentary: Issues and Controversy" (Hoover Press).

Almost 40 percent of the high officeholders appointed by Russia's Acting
President Vladimir Putin, himself a onetime KGB spy stationed in East
Germany, have been KGB agents and may still be members of the KGB successor
agency, the FSB. Mr. Putin headed the FSB before ex-President Boris Yeltsin
selected him to be prime minister.

This startling revelation titled "Putin's Men: Who's Who?" comes in the
Jan. 26 issue of Komsomolskaya Pravda, a Moscow daily. Of 24 Putin
appointees, 10 have secret police backgrounds. A possible analogy would be
if on his election in 1988, President George Bush, interim head (1976-77)
of the Central Intelligence Agency, had appointed 10 former CIA agents to
his Cabinet.

This news about Mr. Putin's administration comes at a time of rising
disquiet among observers inside and outside the country about the state of
democracy in Russia. Police armed with a warrant are seeking the arrest of
a crusading journalist for a "psychiatric examination." That tactic was
used in Soviet days by Yuri Androprov's KGB on the assumption that anybody
who was unhappy in the Soviet Union was obviously psychopathic.

News about the war in Chechnya is heavily censored. Assassinations of Duma
members are unaccounted for by police and are not even a matter of debate
in the Duma. The bombing of three apartment buildings in Moscow and
Volgodonsk last September attributed to Chechen terrorists now is believed
to have been instigated by the Russian secret police themselves as what is
called in Russian a "provokatzia," a provocation.

Recently after the November Duma elections, whose results are now in
question, Mr. Putin and other party leaders in a post-election Kremlin
conclave commemorated Josef Stalin's 120th birthday with a toast.

Earlier, Mr. Putin, while serving as chairman of the FSB, placed flowers at
Andropov's grave in Red Square and on his monument at the onetime KGB
Lubyanka headquarters. Dr. John Dunlop, Hoover Institution expert on Soviet
and Russian history, says Mr. Putin's slogan seems to be, "Back to
Andropov." That would fit with an extant belief that Russia today is a
pseudo-democracy.

The author of the Moscow newspaper article, Igor Chernyak, listed the names
of Mr. Putin's 24 high-level appointees. The 10 with secret police
backgrounds or appointments include:

(1) Viktor Cherkesov, first deputy director of the Federal Security
Service, or FSB.

(2) Nikolai Patrushev, 49, FSB director. Had worked for the KGB Leningrad
Region Department since 1974. In 1992-94, was both the security minister of
Karjala and the chief of the local KGB department. Later he was transferred
to Lubyanka, popular term for KGB headquarters in Moscow.

(3) Sergei Ivanov, secretary of the Kremlin's Security Council. Messrs.
Putin and Ivanov were the same class at the KGB Institute of the Red
Banner, and served in the intelligence agency together.

(4) Vladimir Kozhin, 40, chief of the president's business management
department. He now heads the Russian Federal Service of Currency and Export
Control (VEK). While Mr. Kozhin is not known to be a secret service man,
VEK is effectively controlled by the secret services and employs only
officers of the FSB.

(5) Viktor Ivanov, 40, a deputy chief of the Kremlin staff. After Mr. Putin
was appointed FSB director, he invited Ivanov to Moscow and placed him in
charge of the FSB internal investigations and later made him a deputy to
the FSB director.

(6) Yuri Zaostrovsky, 44, a deputy to the FSB director, a Muscovite. He is
the son of an intelligence officer and has worked for counterintelligence.
When Mr. Putin came to Lubyanka, Mr. Zaostrovsky was appointed chief of the
FSB economic security department.

(7) Nikolai Bobrovsky, a deputy to the chief of the premier's secretariat.
Studied with Mr. Putin in the KGB's Institute of the Red Banner.

(8) Sergei Golov, deputy head of the foreign relations section of the
president's business management department. He served with Mr. Putin in the
FSB.

(9) Valery Golubev, chief of the St. Petersburg mayor's department of
tourism. Mr. Putin and Mr. Golubev served together in the KGB.

(10) Sergei Chemezov, head of Promexport, worked with Mr. Putin in the FSB.

The expose concludes with this disturbing paragraph:

"Many of them are virtual unknowns, but then few people in Russia heard of
Col. Putin only a few short years ago. It is a fact that the number of St.
Petersburg men, former secret service officers whom the acting president
knows 'in action', has been snowballing.

"The question is what it will lead to."

*****

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