February 8, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4094 4095 4096

Johnson's Russia List
#4095
8 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russia's Putin wary of publishing programme details.
2. AFP: Russia sees arms export boom.
3. Bloomberg: Radio Free Europe on Russian Reporter's Disappearance.
4. The Times (UK): Giles Whittell, Chechen warlords in bitter battle for power.
5. The Journal of Commerce: John Helmer, RUSSIANS DENY US GULF OIL CHARGES.
6. Reuters: Communist Zyuganov takes on Putin in Russia poll.
7. Kommersant - Vlast: ALL THE DUMA. (Facts and Figures) 
8. Izvestiya: Yevgeny Krutikov, White Noise. (re security agencies and journalists)
9. Los Angeles Times: Robyn Dixon, Journalists Under Pressure to Follow Kremlin's Lead. Russia: Reporter gets knock on door--and an order for a psychiatric test. Moscow is accused of trying to control news. 
10. New York Times: Doreen Carvajal, A Fledgling Publisher Will Rush Yeltsin Book
11. Segodnya: Avtandil Tsuladze, ELECTION FOR TWO. Scenarios of a Computer Game Called "Elections"] 

*******

#1
Russia's Putin wary of publishing programme details

MOSCOW, Feb 8 (Reuters) - Russian Acting President Vladimir Putin said on 
Tuesday he was in no hurry to publish details of his programme ahead of a 
March 26 presidential election as it would immediately become "an object of 
attack." 

"As soon as it is given out, it will be gnawed at and torn to pieces," Putin, 
shown on ORT television, told university students. Putin is considered a 
obvious choice for the election but his plans to reform the economy remain a 
mystery. 

He has promised to strengthen the role of the government and develop a market 
economy, a turn of phrase which has appealed to both left and right in its 
lack of precision. 

The head of a think tank recently founded to develop Putin's plans said 
details had not been worked out but that the idea was to level the playing 
field of business competition by means such as changing tax laws and closing 
tax loopholes. 

German Gref told Itogi weekly magazine that the programme would focus on a 
new social contract between the state and citizen, ways to reform the 
government, economic modernisation and economic aspects of foreign policy. 

He said Putin was committed to the plan of the think tank, the Centre for 
Strategic Reform, which would need strong political backing. "The farther 
this work is carried out, the more opponents will be encountered," he said. 

********

#2
Russia sees arms export boom

MOSCOW, Feb 8 (AFP) - 
The Russian arms industry is all fired-up for an export boom at the start of 
the millennium with increasing demand for Sukhoi or MiG fighters, T-90 tanks 
and destroyers.

In spite of some embarrassing setbacks, Russia is counting on selling arms 
worth more than four billion dollars in 2000, a record since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, Ilya Klebanov, vice-prime minister in charge of the 
militaro-industrial complex, said last week.

In 1999, sales will have exceeded the 3.5 billion dollar mark compared with 
2.5 billion the year before.

"Russia has returned as a player on the international arms market," the 
business weekly Vlast reported in its latest number.

It said the Russian industry had seized virtual complete control of the 
Chinese and Indian markets which it said were the world's biggest importers, 
but had also penetrated the difficult markets of Brazil, Colombia, Kuwait and 
Malaysia. "Russia is also present on the markets of NATO members like Turkey 
and Greece, which have become important partners," Vlast said.

Major contracts last year were for the sale to China of several dozen Su-30 
MKK fighters, along with some destroyers, while frigates were sold to India.

The order book of the main Russian exporter Rosvoorujenie is worth more than 
10 billion dollars with the keys to success being alleged viability, 
simplicity and attractive prices.

But difficulties caused by the collapse in state orders are far from being 
resolved.

There was an unusual number of accidents over the past year. Early in 1999 a 
Su-27 just purchased by Ethiopia crashed and five months later the new Su-30 
crashed at the Paris air show. They were serious setbacks for Sukhoi which 
accounts for nearly half of Russian arms exports.

In India, during trials of brand-new T-90s tanks, two-thirds of their 
missiles failed to hit their targets, prompting India to suspend talks on the 
purchase of 300 of the tanks and a manufacturing licence.

The industry still owes its successes to advances and discoveries made during 
the Soviet era. Money is short, investment is lagging and young engineers are 
leaving the sector tempted by the money they can make in banking or in trade, 
apparently causing a fall in quality.

Restructuring promised since 1992 still remains to be pushed through, notably 
in the aeronautical sector, the flower of the arms industry.

"In the past 15 years, the best known of the plane-makers, MiG, has displayed 
not one truly new model," said the business weekly Expert. "The only hope, 
the Royal Eagle (the Sukhoi S-37), has not carried out its tests and is far 
away from assembly line production."

*******

#3
Radio Free Europe on Russian Reporter's Disappearance: Comment

Moscow, Feb. 8 (Bloomberg)
-- Following are comments by Savik Shuster, director of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty's Moscow bureau; Genri Reznik, Radio Free Europe's 
lawyer; and Mario Corti, director of the Radio Liberty Russian service, on 
the disappearance of RFE/RL correspondent Andrei Babitsky in Chechnya. They 
were speaking at a press conference in Moscow. 

Babitsky disappeared almost a month ago. Then last week, the Russian military 
said it was holding him while he was investigated for possibly collaborating 
with the Chechen militants. On Thursday, Russian TV broadcast a video that 
reportedly showed Babitsky being exchanged for Russian prisoners. He has not 
contacted his family or employer since then. 

On what can be done to help Babitsky: 

Shuster: 

``I think the U.S. government could bring more pressure to bear on the 
Russian government at a presidential level -- and it's better to do it now, 
rather than after the Russian presidential election on March 26.'' 

On Acting Russian President Vladimir Putin's knowledge of Babity's capture 
and handover to the Chechens: 

Shuster 

``Putin is aware.'' 

On the Russian Federal Security Service's explanation that Babitsky is alive: 

Reznik 

``I don't believe what they say: they say a lot, but where is the proof?'' 

On the decisions to arrest Babitsky and to turn him over to the Chechens: 

Reznik 

``Either we are dealing with incompetence or a simple abuse of power.'' 

On what the Babitsky case means for human rights in Russia: 

Reznik 

``It is impossible to say what this case means for freedom in Russia -- we 
still don't have any information.'' 

On the government's reply to questions about the case: 

Reznik 

``We can't exercise our rights; we are being obstructed. 

``If Babitsky is wanted for questioning and if there is a warrant for his 
arrest, his lawyers have a right to see the files on the case. 

``Andrei is a civilian: he was detained without a lawyer. And questioned 
without a lawyer. He was unable to contact his office, a lawyer or anyone 
else. And then he was exchanged for unknown people in masks by military 
personnel, even though he is a civilian.'' 

On Babitsky's character and professional skill: 

Shuster 

``What happened to Andrei? No one bears any responsibility for him. From a 
humanitarian point of view, this is a monstrous situation. 

``Andrei knew that a good war correspondent is a living war correspondent: he 
knew how to take care of himself. I think he was given no choice.'' 

Mario Corti 

``He was a friend and a colleague. What they did to him is worse than the 
actions of bandits and terrorists.'' 

********

#4
The Times (UK)
8 February 2000
[for personal use only]
Chechen warlords in bitter battle for power 
FROM GILES WHITTELL IN MOSCOW 

AS SHAMIL BASAYEV's foot was amputated under local anaesthetic last week 
outside Grozny, he let the video cameras roll. The rebel warlord's flair for 
publicity may serve him well as Chechens and the wider world wait for a 
leader to emerge from the wreckage of the republic's latest war. 

Driven from their ruined capital, Chechnya's separatist leaders are holed up 
in snowbound mountain strongholds or fighting their way towards them. Three 
were killed in the siege of Grozny and those who survived are still united 
against their common Russian enemy. But experts agreed yesterday that as the 
war moves to the mountains, an even messier power struggle has begun between 
Chechnya's volatile armed factions. 

For Chechens still dreaming of independence, the most obvious man on whom to 
pin their hopes remains President Maskhadov. Chosen by more than 60 per cent 
of voters after commanding Chechnya's defence forces three years ago, he fled 
Grozny's bombardment in November. Yesterday he was attempting to bolster his 
claim to Chechen leadership from an unspecified hideout high in the Caucasus. 

"We have enough men and ammunition for a long drawn-out guerrilla war," he 
was quoted as saying on Russian television. His spokesman in Moscow, Sharip 
Yusupov, claimed in an interview with The Times that more fighters were 
joining Mr Maskhadov,most of them former civilians driven to take up arms by 
the destruction of Grozny. Mr Yusupov added: "All Chechen people including 
Basayev support President Maskhadov as their political leader and top 
military commander." 

The problem for Chechnya is that few people believe this. Undermined by three 
years of often bloody clan rivalry, Mr Maskhadov has been further weakened by 
military defeat and the need to move constantly between safe houses in the 
bitter Caucasian winter simply to survive. He is Chechnya's only faction 
leader with a higher education and the semblance of cabinet ministry. 

He is powerless to unite Chechnya's armed separatists, however. "There is no 
single Chechen political leader, thanks to the Chechen tradition of clan 
warfare," Aleksei Malashenko of the Carnegie Institute in Moscow said 
yesterday. 

"This absence will be very difficult for Moscow, but to create an artificial 
figurehead with whom to negotiate will only create more problems in the long 
run." 

Potential pro-Moscow leaders are not in short supply. The Kremlin has already 
released from prison Bislan Gantamirov, a former Grozny mayor and convicted 
embezzler, to lead a pro-Moscow militia in the fight for the capital.Such 
figures are already branded collaborators and are unlikely to command respect 
in the mountains where locals say the flame of Chechen independence has never 
died. 

Here, Mr Basayev, a former computer salesman and Soviet Army fireman, now 
ranks as Chechnya's best-known warlord, loathed by the Russians but admired 
for his military daring. Minus a foot, he is more popular than ever among 
diehard separatists. But as a potential figurehead Mr Basayev is hamstrung, 
since Russia will not include him in talks. 

One man experienced in negotiations and warfare is Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. He 
pressed Russia to withdraw after the 1994-96 war and leads Chechnya's third 
most powerful political faction. 

*******

#5
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2000 20:41:08 +0300 (MSK)
From: helmer@glasnet.ru (John Helmer)
Subj: RUSSIANS DENY US GULF OIL CHARGES 

Coming in The Journal of Commerce:

RUSSIANS DENY US GULF OIL CHARGES 
Moscow asks for independent analysis; U.S. group holds stake in tanker 
company
By John Helmer
Journal of Commerce

MOSCOW. Russian tanker operators continue to deny that the oil cargo 
halted by the U.S. Navy in the Gulf of Oman last week, and unloaded in
Oman for analysis on the weekend, is of Iraqi origin.
Vladimir Mikhalik, spokesman for Sovfrakht, acknowledged seeing Monday's
reports from the Pentagon, claiming that the tests show the oil is Iraqi,
and was being transported in violation of the United Nations sanctions
regime.
"Transpetro-Volga representatives are on the way to Oman," Mikhalik said.
"There they will request an independent chemical analysis of the oil
products. We question the results of the analysis that was made,
especially given the earlier statements by some U.S. defense
officials that Iraqi and Iranian oil products have similar
characteristics since oil is being drilled at the same shelf. We also doubt 
that U.S. officials will provide space satellite photographs."
"We insist that the ship was going from an Iranian port. This was
already the second such trip by Transpetro-Volga's tankers. Russia is strictly
observing all the international shipping regulations and the U.N.
sanctions." 
Sovfrakht, according to the spokesman, "is the intermediary company on 
this contract, working as a regular broker." Sovfrakht dates from the Soviet
period as a shipbroker and shipping agent.
The tanker, which was first intercepted and boarded by U.S. forces last 
week, is the Volgoneft-147. The ship owner is Transpetro-Volga, which
is an affiliate of SFAT, Russia's largest private rail carrier of crude
oil and oil products. 
SFAT's major export destinations are ports in the Baltic, and the
Black Sea, including Novorossiisk and Odessa. It carries about 12% of Russia's
oil exports by rail -- about 430,000 metric tons per month -- on a fleet
of 6,500 tankercars. Only the state-owned Rail Ministry fleet of 12,000
tankercars is larger.
SFAT's sea-going tanker fleet includes 17 vessels of around 5,000 dwt,
six of which are river-sea class tankers. They transported about 650,000
tons of crude and products in 1998 and again in 1999. 
Most of SFAT's shares are Russian owned, except for a 10% stake, which is 
held by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and a 
20% holding of Transcisco Trading Company. Transcisco is a U.S.-based 
company, affiliated with the Trinity Industries engineering group. It 
received its shareholding in SFAT as part of a deal to supply the technology 
for heating oil products to accelerate the unloading process from rail to
tanker.
U.S. oil executives in Moscow say they have no knowledge of the affair.
One pointed out there are three grades of Iranian crude -- Iran Light
API 34; sulphur 1.40 %; Iran Heavy, API 31, sulphur 1.70; Lavan Blend, API
34, Sulphur, 1.80 -- and two grades of Iraqi crude -- Basrah Light, API 34, 
sulphur 2.10%; and Kirkuk, API 36, sulphur 2%
"It seems to me," the source said, "that Iranian Lt and Basrah Lt are 
identical with an API at 34, but with different sulphur content -- 1.40% for 
Iranian and 2.10% for Iraqi. It would be hard to fudge."
According to Mikhalik of Transpetro-Volga, the tanker cargo was not crude 
oil, but "mazut" (Russian for heavy oil lubricant, a semi-solid).
"This type of tanker is perfect for mazut transportation. It was loaded at 
a river port in Iran, where the draught is not very big." 
Other sources confirmed that SFAT's tankers typically ply the Mediterranean
and other international seas during the winter, when the Russian river system
is frozen. "The ship owner," said Mikhalik, "is going to make claims of 
about $200 million for the losses caused by the tanker arrest."
Sovfrakht officials claim they provided documentation of the cargo
to the Russian Ministry of Transport, which is responsible for monitoring
Russian compliance with the sanctions regime. The documentation included
"the contract for oil products transportation, the export manifest issued by 
the Iranian national tanker company, the certificate for the oil products 
transported, shipping documents, etc. The contracts indicate that only 
Iranian companies were involved, and only Iranian navigators were used."
The Russian shipping officials claim the vessel's movement was monitored
by a Russian satellite tracking system. They say the ship was loaded with
mazut at the Kuranshakhr port in Iran, and is fully insured.
According to a source at SFAT, "the density of the oil products in the 
tanker (0.9460) proves that this is not oil, but mazut. This is also proven 
by the certificate for the cargo."

*******

#6
Communist Zyuganov takes on Putin in Russia poll
By Ron Popeski

MOSCOW, Feb 8 (Reuters) - Veteran Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov on 
Tuesday became the first registered candidate for Russia's presidential 
election and said he could overhaul heavily favoured Acting President 
Vladimir Putin. 

Putin, his campaign already moving into high gear, promised more money for 
scientists, a move away from Soviet-era pledges of equality, and measures to 
create ``Western-style political parties.'' 

Electoral officials said he was likely to be formally registered at the 
weekend, ahead of a Sunday deadline. 

Many Russians appear resigned to a lopsided result in the March 26 poll. 
Putin, in office since Boris Yeltsin stepped down as president on New Year's 
Eve, holds a big lead in opinion polls and most serious rivals have pulled 
out of the race. 

Russian television stations showed Zyuganov, soundly beaten by Yeltsin in the 
1996 election, being applauded by members of the Central Election Commission 
overseeing the contest. 

``Our chances are good in this election,'' Itar-Tass news agency quoted 
Zyuganov as saying. He said he was confident of winning in the first round, 
the agency added. 

ZYUGANOV COMPLAINS OF LOADED CONTEST 

But Zyuganov, who brought the party back into Russia's political mainstream 
after a 1991 ban on its activities was lifted, complained the contest was 
loaded in Putin's favour. 

``Things are unbalanced, that's obvious to everyone,'' he said in televised 
comments. ``One candidate makes statements all day long and the others can't 
even get their declarations published. I find this position totally 
unobjective.'' 

Putin is clearly taking advantage, even before his official registration, of 
friendly coverage from the only two television networks broadcasting 
throughout the world's largest country. 

In an interview with one of them, ORT, on Monday evening, he called for an 
end to Russia's chronic political instability and pledged to finish off 
Chechen rebels to help build a strong post-Soviet state -- a favourite theme 
since taking office. 

The interview's second segment was to be aired on Tuesday. 

Putin has built much of his popularity on successes in the campaign to subdue 
separatists in Chechnya and pledges to restore some of Russia's greatness. 
Critics say he has failed to produce details of his plans to right Russia's 
limping economy. 

On Tuesday, he told academics in Zelenograd, a technology centre outside 
Moscow, that Russia's future depended on devoting attention -- and financial 
resources -- to science. But scientists, he said, also had to learn to manage 
limited funds. 

``Full-fledged development of science is impossible without state support,'' 
Russian agencies quoted him as saying. ``In these difficult times, you will 
have to become not just the author of your ideas but also managers.'' 

He later told students that stability and predictability in Russia would 
emerge only when political parties were formed under Western principles. He 
did not elaborate, but said: ``I think whoever is elected president will deal 
with this issue in full.'' 

Most opinion polls put Putin well ahead of the field. 

Surveys quoted for two weeks running by Russian state television at the 
weekend gave him 48 percent support, well ahead of Zyuganov's 12 or 13 
percent but short of the 50 percent needed to win outright in the first 
round. 

******

#7
Kommersant - Vlast No. 3. 
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
ALL THE DUMA
(Facts and Figures)

Deputies

All in all, 441 deputies have been elected to the State 
Duma - 407 men (92.3 percent) and 34 women (7.7 percent). As of 
the time of putting this issue into print, the Duma mandatory 
commission had registered 440 deputies.
The deputies' average age is 48.9 years old. The 
difference in age between the youngest and the oldest deputy is 
54 years. The best represented deputies' age-group is that 
between the ages of 45 and 55. In the Duma, there are 7 
deputies aged 70 or over, and 13 deputies aged 30 or younger.
The largest number of deputies of the same age (28) are 53 
years old.


Age Number of deputies
---------------------------------------------- 
1. Under 45 140
2. Between 45 and 55 203
3. Over 55 98
--------------------------------------------- 
Education and Scientific Degrees

According to the data of the Central Election Commission, 
the overwhelming majority of deputies have a higher education.
The commission managed to find out where 298 parliamentarians 
had studied. Among the deputies, there are 40 graduates of 
Moscow State University, 7 graduates of the Moscow Higher 
Technical School named after Bauman, 40 graduates of various 
polytechnical institutes, and 16 of agricultural institutes.
Forty-one deputies finished a vocational or technical secondary 
school, and 31 - a military school. Six deputies graduated from 
the Military Academy of the General Staff.
The Duma has 63 candidates of science, including: 21 - of 
economics, 6 - of law, 8 - of history, and 8 - of philosophy.
There are also 15 full members of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences and 13 graduates of the Higher Party School sitting in 
the Duma. There are 38 deputies with the Doctor's Degree in the 
Duma, including 10 Doctors of Economics, 8 - of Law, 4 - of 
History, 2 - of Philosophy.

Working Career

The largest group of deputies (51 deputies from among 
those whose biographies have been followed in greater detail) 
started their working careers as engineers or research workers. 
Thirty-nine deputies are former officers of the Armed Forces, 
of the interior ministry and security services.
Besides, 9 deputies worked as investigators after receiving 
juridical education.
There are many deputies in the new Duma who started as 
workers: 25 fitters, 22 foremen, 6 agronomists and 6 mechanics. 
There are workers from the sphere of humanities as well: 16 
teachers (plus two schoolmasters), 11 journalists and 8 
doctors. There are only 2 lawyers in the State Duma.
Representatives of some rare trades are also met in the 
Duma: a Young Pioneer leader, driller, veterinary surgeon, 
zootechnician, chief of the reading room, pig tender, tree 
pruner and merchandising specialist.

Deputy Veterans

There are 162 former Duma deputies in the new State Duma, 
including 77 deputies who worked in the first Duma (1993-1996), 
28 people's deputies of the RSFSR and 11 people's deputies of 
the USSR (some of them stepped down before the expiry of their 
term). Fourteen parliamentarians will work in the Duma for a 
third term: they became people's deputies of the RSFSR in 1990 
and then worked in both the first and second State Dumas. A 
recognised veteran of the Russian parliament is the cosmonaut 
Svetlana Savitskaya who has been working at all the four Union 
and Russian legislatures since 1989.
Out of the 10 deputies of the second Duma who attended 
fewer sessions than others, 5 (50 percent) have been reelected. 
They are Vladimir Bryntsalov, Boris Gromov, Sergei Kovalev, 
Viktor Pokhmelkin and Sergei Shashurin. Nine out of the 24 
deputies (37.5 percent) of the second Duma who never asked for 
the floor over the four years of their work in the Duma, have 
been reelected to the new Duma. Thus the percentage of the 
reelected tight-lipped deputies and "shirkers" - 50 and 37.5 
percent, respectively - is higher than the percentage of the 
reelected deputies in their total number (162 out of the 450 
deputies, or 36 percent). Thus, our advice to the deputies who 
want to win seats in the fourth Duma is to attend fewer Duma 
sessions and keep silent - being inconspicuous increases your 
chances of being reelected.

Officials

The new Duma has many former representatives of the 
executive branch of power. First of all, there are 6 ex-prime 
ministers of the USSR and Russia (from as early as 1985). They 
are Nikolai Ryzhkov, Yegor Gaidar, Viktor Chernomyrdin, Sergei 
Kiriyenko, Yevgeny Primakov and Sergei Stepashin. Only two 
ex-prime ministers, i.e. Ivan Silayev and Valentin Pavlov - 
will not sit in the new Duma (the latter prefers working at the 
Free Economic Society). The list of other former state 
officials is also impressive. Among former professional 
executives of Soviet times sitting in the new parliament today 
are the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR 
and chairman of the State Planning Committee Yuri Maslyukov, 
the first deputy minister of the interior of the USSR Boris 
Gromov, the first deputy defence minister of the USSR Viktor 
Kulikov, the minister of culture of the USSR Nikolai Gubenko 
and the minister of the mineral fertiliser industry of the USSR 
Nikolai Olshansky. Former members of the Cabinet also make a 
sizeable group, including 3 vice-premiers, 2 ministers of 
agriculture, 2 ministers of fuel and energy, one finance 
minister, one minister of foreign economic relations, and one - 
of labour and social development.
Law-enforcement agencies, security services and the army are 
also represented in the new Duma: there is one former interior 
minister, one defence minister and two deputy defence 
ministers, one minister of justice and one deputy emergencies 
minister.
The regional elites are represented by the ex-premier of 
Bashkiria, ex-ministers of economics of Mordovia and Chuvashia, 
ex-ministers of agriculture of Buryatia and the Rostov region, 
and the minister of information and the press of Dagestan.

Party and YCL Functionaries

Among the Duma deputies there are 23 former secretaries of 
party committees, 35 secretaries of district and city CPSU 
committees, and 22 secretaries of regional (territorial and 
republican) CPSU committees (13 of them were first secretaries 
of the CPSU committees).
Seventeen parliamentarians used to head regional KPRF 
committees (some of them continue to keep their posts now).
Fourteen deputies held various posts (from adviser to 
secretary) in the CPSU Central Committee. 
There are fewer former YCL functionaries in parliament:
27 ex-secretaries of district and city YCL committees, and 8 
ex-secretaries of regional YCL committees. Two deputies used to 
work at the YCL Central Committee, and one of them, i.e.
Boris Pastukhov, was first secretary of the YCL Central 
Committee.

The Wealthy and Famous

Twenty-two deputies in the new parliament are included in 
the list of "100 Leading Politicians of Russia in 1999" (as 
compiled by the Nezavisimaya Gazeta and the Vox Populi 
service). Three of them, i.e., Yevgeny Primakov, Boris 
Berezovsky and Gennady Zyuganov, are among the first ten 
politicians on the list, keeping the 2nd, 5th and 7th place, 
respectively.
Six deputies are mentioned by the All-Russia Public 
Opinion Research Centre as potential candidates for the 
presidency in Russia. According to the public opinion poll 
(conducted on January 6-10, 2000), their ratings are as 
follows: Gennady Zyuganov - 18 percent, Yevgeny Primakov - 8 
percent, Grigory Yavlinsky - 3 percent, Vladimir Zhirinovsky - 
2 percent, Gennady Seleznyov - 1 percent, and Sergei Kiriyenko 
- 1 percent. Despite the fact that the majority of the Duma 
deputies used to work in commercial structures, only 5 deputies 
have been put on the combined rating list of the most 
influential entrepreneurs of the Expert magazine. They are 
Boris Berezovsky, Viktor Chernomyrdin, Iosif Kobzon, Vladimir 
Bryntsalov and Georgy Boos.
Eighteen parliamentarians have been included in the 
combined rating list of influential politicians compiled by the 
Expert magazine in the summer of 1999. Among the top ten on the 
list are deputies Viktor Chernomyrdin (5th place), Sergei 
Stepashin (6th), Yevgeny Primakov (7th), and Boris Berezovsky 
(9th place).
Six out of the 50 wealthiest Russians (see the list of the 
Cult of Personalities magazine for 1999) have won Duma seats, 
including: Boris Berezovsky (3th place on the rating list), 
Viktor Chernomyrdin (16th), Vladimir Bryntsalov (19th), Roman 
Abramovich (21st), Iosif Kobzon (22nd), and Mikhail Gutseriyev 
(36th). Only one deputy - Boris Berezovsky - is included in the 
list of the 50 most influential financiers of Russia compiled 
by the Bankir (Banker) journal.

Names and Surnames

The most widespread surname among the deputies is Nikitin, 
with four Nikitins sitting in the Duma. These are followed by 
the Kovalevs, Kulikovs, Medvedevs and Semenovs, with three 
deputies bearing one of the above surnames.
Confusion arises with 18 pairs of namesakes, such as Artemiev, 
Afanasiev, Grachev, Gutsiriyev, Ivanov, Klimov, Kolomeitsev, 
Kosterin, Kuznetsov, Melnikov, Mikhailov, Reznik, Rodionov, 
Romanov, Ryzhkov, Strelchenko, Tikhonov and Shokhin.
The most widespread name is Alexander, with 45 Alexanders 
and one Alexandra (Buratayeva) in the Duma; these are followed 
by Vladimirs (44), Nikolais (29) and Sergeis (29).
The most widespread patronymic in the Duma is Nikolayevich 
(44). It is followed by Ivanovich (41) and Alexandrovich (24). 
There is also one Nikolai Sukhoi (meaning "dry" in Russian) and 
one Vladimir Mokry ("wet") in the Duma.

Heroes and Prize Winners

Among the deputies, there are 6 Heroes of the Soviet Union 
and 4 Heroes of Socialist Labour. Three deputies have been 
awarded the title of Hero of Russia: Yevgeny Zelenov - for the 
evacuation of Russian diplomats from besieged Kabul, Alexander 
Karelin - for his sports achievements, and Yelena Kondakova - 
for participation in a space flight. Deputy Valery Kuzin is 
Hero of North Ossetia-Alania. Twenty-five deputies bear the 
title of merited worker, including 6 merited builders, 3 
doctors, 2 physical culture workers, 2 actors, 1 oil and gas 
industry worker, and 1 zootechnician of the Republic of Mari 
El. 
The new Duma has 4 State Prize Winners of the USSR, 2 
winners of the Leninist Komsomol Prize, a winner of the prize 
of the USSR Journalists' Union, and a winner of the Lipetsk 
regional literary prize named after Ivan Bunin.

Compiler: M. Lukin

*******

#8
White Noise
By Yevgeny Krutikov
Izvestiya, February 4, 2000
[translation by Olga Kryazheva <okryazhe@cdi.org>
Research assistant, Center for Defense Information,
Washington DC]

Russian Special Forces create agencies to work with journalists

Special Forces want to know how reporters get information. 
Rumors floating around Moscow about creating new structures in Russian.
Intelligence Services to work with journalists become more and more real. 

Primarily, we are talking about creating temporarily services in form of staff
structures that closely work with journalists and are not legalized by any
written or other contracts. This means the renewal of control work with mass
media, which almost stopped with the disintegration of KGB and massive
contraction of “secret agents” (also known as “voluntary helpers”) net.
Secret
agents collect information of first importance (in other words make dossiers)
on journalists, uncover pseudonyms, sources of information used by
journalists,
create databases, enabling them to recognize writing styles, etc. Here we are
talking about completely developed organization, aimed on following and
controlling the situation in the press and in the journalists’ environment. 

The first organization of this sort was created right after Chechen fighters
invaded Degestan. It became the “sinecure” for colonels, where they developed
staff schedule, and where the director of new organization received a lot of
benefits and started to act in a certain way with his subordinates. The
general and the staff of this organization acted unprofessionally both in the
field of special propaganda and in discussing Caucasus problems. During
conversations with the author of this article the director of the agency could
not even name Georgian official television channels propagating pro Chechen
information correctly, and sincerely believed that cellular phones and reports
on air should be prohibited, because “the fighters block the transmission.” 

Main Intelligence Agency’s specialists on special propaganda refused to
cooperate with the new agency. In addition, this new agency failed to
establish connections with FSB. According to Izvestiya, the counter
intelligence
officers continued to have oral fights with military officers over the
questions on working with journalists. Before, special agencies used
journalists as the sources of information for press. The first signs of
changes
in the relationship between special agencies and mass media appeared when
Yevgeny Primakov, former KGB agent, moved to the White House. He could not
develop stable relationships with persistent journalists. Leakage of
information and regular contacts of other officials with media annoyed him.
Former KGB agents consider the so-called “informal” contacts particularly
dangerous. As a result, Yevgeny Primakov issued a specific order prohibiting
government officials from contacts with press. 

Today, the times of so-called “white noise” are coming back. The main purpose
of new structures will be uncovering journalists’ sources in the power
structures, the process that could be easily framed as measures for
“protection
of the State Secret.” Director of FSB General Zdanovich in his interview 
with Izvestiya’s reporter called the information on creating of the new 
agencies for
working with mass media “absolute bluff.” Alexander Zdanovich stated:
“There is
an agency for protecting of the State Secret in the FSB structures, and one of
the purposes of this agency is finding sources of leakage of information,
including press.” According to FSB director, “this agency works not with
journalists, but with those FSB employees who allow themselves to share secret
information with reporters.” General Zdanovich emphasized that FSB pays
particular attention not to those legal and popular mass media sources, but to
unregistered sources, including the Internet, that “propagate political
extremism and terrorism.” 

Sergey Popov, member of FAPSI, Center for Information and Public
Relations,
stated in his interview with Izvestiya: “FAPSI does not have anything to do
with
the emerging new structures for working with mass media.” According to the
law
on operative-investigative services, FAPSI does not have a right to listen to
telephone conversations, as well as collect data on journalists, uncover
pseudonyms, etc. In our opinion, the statement that FAPSI does not have a
right
to listen to the telephone conversations is not true, even if the law says so.

*******

#9
Los Angeles Times
February 8, 2000 
[for personal use only]
Journalists Under Pressure to Follow Kremlin's Lead 
Russia: Reporter gets knock on door--and an order for a psychiatric test. 
Moscow is accused of trying to control news. 
By ROBYN DIXON, Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW--Even as Russia trumpets its triumph in taking the capital of 
Chechnya from separatist rebels, journalists in the country are feeling new 
pressure to report what authorities approve of--and only what authorities 
approve of. 
Since the Chechen war began in late September, journalists in Russia 
have been detained, interrogated, arrested and even ordered to undergo 
psychiatric tests, in what many see as a dangerous wave of government 
intimidation. 
Alexander Khinstein, 25, who annoys the authorities with his sensational 
and often vicious reports attacking top officials, got a knock on his door 
from the FSB, the main successor to the KGB, on Jan. 17. 
He was at home ill when his mother opened the door to the agents, who 
carried guns and--like the secret police who came for political dissidents in 
Soviet times--a warrant to take him to a psychiatric clinic. The clinic is in 
Vladimir, 110 miles east of Moscow. 
But the journalist, who works for TV-Tsentr and the Moskovsky 
Komsomolets newspaper, avoided detention on a technicality: He had a doctor's 
certificate that he was sick, so under Russian law he could not be detained. 
He still faces the psychiatric test and must answer an accusation that he 
falsified a 1997 driver's license, which he denies. 
Khinstein finds it odd that he should be asked to travel so far for a 
psychiatric test that could easily be carried out in Moscow. 
"Such things have not happened since Soviet times. This really makes me 
think that there is something fishy about this trip to Vladimir, and it only 
increases my reluctance to go," he said. 
Like Khinstein, Andrei Babitsky, 35--a correspondent for U.S.-funded 
Radio Liberty--broadcast material that authorities did not like and wound up 
in trouble. His reports from Chechnya contradicted the official line on the 
war in the breakaway republic, and in mid-January he was taken into custody, 
accused of aiding the separatist rebels. 
Last Thursday, officials announced that they had traded Babitsky to 
Chechen fighters in return for three Russian prisoners. But he still has not 
been heard from, and there are deep fears for his safety. 

Officials Seek Media's Help in Waging War 
Top Russian officials have been exhorting journalists to help wage an 
information war against the Chechen rebels. The pressure, coupled with tough 
action against individual journalists, has created an atmosphere of press 
intimidation. 
Numerous other journalists have been detained and interrogated. In 
December, Russian authorities accused two reporters, from the Reuters news 
agency and Associated Press, of being foreign spies because they had reported 
that more than 100 Russian soldiers had been killed in a Chechen attack. When 
they returned to Moscow, they were detained for two hours and questioned by 
police. 
In October, a British journalist and an American photographer were taken 
into custody for several days in Chechnya because they did not have Russian 
press accreditation. In December, seven Western journalists who were 
accredited by the Russian Foreign Ministry were detained and questioned for 
nine hours, as authorities demanded that they obtain additional accreditation 
cards in order to cover the war. 
Expressing deep concern last week about Babitsky's fate, the New 
York-based group Human Rights Watch criticized Russian authorities for 
harassing journalists and imposing what it called a virtual ban on coverage 
of the war. 
"Russia is keeping international and local journalists out of Chechnya 
through arbitrary and obstructive regulations," said Jean-Paul Marthoz, 
European press director for the organization. "Russia is arresting 
journalists for not having accreditation, which Russian authorities refuse to 
provide them in the first place." 

Some Worry About Controls Under Putin 
Editors and human rights advocates in Russia fear that the controls now 
being imposed on war correspondents may be applied more generally should 
acting President Vladimir V. Putin, a former KGB colonel, keep power after a 
presidential election in March. 
Masha Lipman, deputy editor in chief of Itogi magazine, said it seems 
the military was after revenge in its treatment of Babitsky. 
"I think it sends a very alarming signal," she said. 
Unlike Babitsky, who is highly regarded for his fearless coverage of 
Chechnya, Khinstein enjoys little respect in Moscow's journalistic community, 
where many see him as a scandalmonger and political player. 
Despite criticisms of his style and sources, Khinstein is a high-profile 
opposition journalist, better known to Russians than Babitsky, and his 
persecution sends out a chilling message. 
"[Khinstein and Babitsky] are two journalists who are really critical of 
government policy. They're both in trouble. I think it represents a danger," 
said Vyacheslav A. Nikonov, a former Kremlin aide and now director of the 
Politika think tank. "Other journalists see what's going on, so they're 
becoming more and more cautious, especially the chief editors, who know 
they'll be in trouble if they run certain things." 
He said the government could lean on editors without heavy-handed 
efforts at Soviet-style censorship: It could raise licensing fees, pursue a 
newspaper over taxes or temporarily close down a publication under fire 
safety regulations. 
Even before Babitsky's arrest, Putin's appointment as acting president 
evoked dismay among some human rights advocates. Sergei I. Grigoryants, 
president of the Glasnost human rights fund, argued that Putin wanted to 
silence opposition and control the media. 
"The war in Chechnya came in very handy for this purpose," he said. 
"Citing strategic considerations and Russia's national interests, the Putin 
administration set new rules for the media to cover the military campaign in 
Chechnya, and it will start applying these rules in everyday life too." 
Khinstein is associated with media aligned with the Moscow mayor, Yuri 
M. Luzhkov. The journalist campaigned vigorously against one of the mayor's 
enemies, the powerful oligarch Boris A. Berezovsky, who owns the newspaper 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta and controls the majority state-owned national ORT 
television network. 
In December's parliamentary elections, Khinstein ran and lost as a 
candidate of Fatherland-All Russia, the bloc then associated with Luzhkov and 
former Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov. 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta Editor Vitaly Tretyakov said Khinstein's work was 
suspicious because he regularly printed transcripts of tapped conversations 
between politicians and powerful oligarchs. 
"But, in terms of public opinion, Khinstein may be viewed as a 
journalist persecuted for his professional activities, so it may create the 
impression that freedom of speech is encroached upon. Such practices are 
unacceptable," Tretyakov said. 
Khinstein knows he has not attracted much local sympathy but hopes that 
international human rights groups will pick up his cause, as they have 
Babitsky's. 
"Journalism has become one of the riskiest and most dangerous 
professions in Russia. And naturally, this bodes ill for democracy and for 
the freedom of the press in Russia," he said. 
"I think that what happened to Babitsky and me is just a trial balloon. 
The authorities want to check the public reaction to repressive actions taken 
against journalists. What will our society say--will the people swallow it or 
will they protest and revolt?" 

******

#10
New York Times
February 8, 2000
[for personal use only]
A Fledgling Publisher Will Rush Yeltsin Book
By DOREEN CARVAJAL

Less than a month after ceding power, Boris N. Yeltsin is preparing to
publish 
his memoirs of two tumultuous terms as president of the Russian republic with 
a new American publisher that has offered the enticement of speed rather than 
an outsize advance. 

With a handshake at his villa outside Moscow, Mr. Yeltsin, 69, agreed last 
month to publish his memoirs, tentatively titled "Midnight Diaries, with the 
co-writer from his previous two books, Valentin Yumashev, a former Russian 
magazine journalist who was a chief of staff in Mr. Yeltsin's administration. 
The book is scheduled to appear in stores in October. 

The deal was a coup for the two-year-old publisher PublicAffairs, which was 
the only American company considered by Mr. Yeltsin's London-based literary 
agent, Andrew Nurnberg, who shunned the traditional ritual of courting the 
richest publishers for the most generous advance. In October Mr. Nurnberg 
approached Peter Osnos, the publisher of PublicAffairs, with a proposal, and 
a few months later Mr. Osnos, who is fluent in Russian, was flying to Moscow 
to meet with Mr. Yeltsin. 

"Time is of the essence for a memoir of this kind," Mr. Nurnberg said. "This 
is not going to be a long, portentous philosophical tract. This is going to 
be a personal, vivid account told from the heart about his recent years in 
office, trials and tribulations, the disappointments. And that should be 
published as soon as possible. 

"Why? It was Harold Wilson, the British prime minister, who once said that 'a 
week in politics is a long time.' The publishing industry has seen to it, 
regrettably over the years, that if they leave political memoirs too long in 
the making the sales are very much lower." 

Mr. Nurnberg and Mr. Osnos would not reveal the amount of Mr. Yeltsin's 
advance, although Mr. Nurnberg said it was significant. Mr. Nurnberg retained 
the power to sell the foreign rights to the book, which are considered likely 
to generate more income than Mr. Yeltsin will earn from his American sales. 

Mr. Osnos, who was a foreign correspondent in the Soviet Union for The 
Washington Post before becoming an editor at Random House, edited Mr. 
Yeltsin's last book, "The Struggle for Russia," which was published in 1993 
by Times Books, then an imprint of Random House. 

Mr. Osnos left Random House to found PublicAffairs, which specializes in 
nonfiction titles that the company can publish quickly. For example, 
PublicAffairs produced copies of the Starr report, about President Clinton's 
relationship with Monica S. Lewinsky, hours after it became available. It 
also published a title by the international financier George Soros after he 
abandoned a slower-moving publisher. 

Mr. Yeltsin is expected to provide a much more personal account in this 
memoir than he did in his previous books, written when he was constrained by 
his political positions. The book grows out of late-night conversations 
between Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Yumashev while he was in power. 

"He intends to talk about everything, including the allegations of 
corruption," Mr. Osnos said, adding that Mr. Yeltsin envisioned a book that 
he described as being "fresh like a great meal so it should make people want 
more." 

Mr. Osnos said: "It's very clear that it's not meant to be some theoretical 
tract, but a personal account of these first two terms in Russian democracy. 
And he clearly wants to tell that story in a very personal way." 

That means that Mr. Yeltsin will also explore the dramas in his recent 
political career, from the conflict in Chechnya to his health problems. 

Are these health problems behind the rush to publish Mr. Yeltsin's memoirs? 
Mr. Nurnberg and Mr. Osnos said that after leaving office Mr. Yeltsin appears 
to be thriving. 

"I see Mr. Yeltsin regularly, two or three times a year," Mr. Nurnberg said. 
"He was doing quite poorly in the autumn, but when I saw him the other day he 
literally looked like a man with a weight that had been lifted from his 
shoulders. He was energetic, joking all the while and very, very spirited. 
His health has been a problem, a considerable problem." 

******

#11
Segodnya
February 8. In 
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
ELECTION FOR TWO
Scenarios of a Computer Game Called "Elections" 
By Avtandil TSULADZE

Yevgeny Primakov has announced his final decision not to 
run for presidency this spring because the principles of 
democracy are being trampled underfoot. It is more likely, 
however, that Primakov was guided by more pragmatical 
considerations. The failure of his election association at the 
State Duma elections, a split in his parliamentary faction, an 
abortive attempt to hold out against the Duma majority, his own 
low approval rating (5 percent, according to VTsIOM), the 
shortage of financial resources, the absence of a team capable 
to alter the situation in the sphere of information and a very 
short presidential election campaign are the main reasons 
behind his decision. He cannot fight with the Kremlin by 
sending it messages, can he?
Gennady Zyuganov thinks that Primakov's withdrawal from 
the race is good news. Zyuganov also says that Putin's high 
rating and his own 13 percent rating are "sham". He is sure 
that he will inherit Primakov's and other candidates' votes. To 
believe Zyuganov, the KPRF is the only force capable of 
confronting the regime. At first glance, Primakov's withdrawal 
should bring us back to our usual dilemma "communism or 
reforms" and like in 1996, when we had to choose between Boris 
Yeltsin and Zyuganov, this year we are to choose between 
Zyuganov and Yeltsin's shadow - Vladimir Putin.
What, in fact, will be the intrigue of the elections? The 
very election technology presupposes the presence of an 
intrigue.
If there is none, it should be invented. What tale shall we be 
told this time?
The latest slight reduction of Putin's approval rating has 
shown that he needs to have a strong enemy for an 
uncompromising clash. Chechens can no longer be regarded as a 
strong enemy.
There is an external foe - the West. The role of the internal 
foe is to be played by Zyuganov. The Kremlin has already got 
accustomed to his face. What are the possible scenarios of the 
forthcoming elections?
1. Traditional Scenario - "communism or reforms". Zyuganov 
will be first given a start and allowed to "catch up" with 
Putin.
Small wonder he will be the first registered candidate. When 
his popularity rating hits the critical mark of 25 percent, a 
powerful onslaught on communists will begin. Putin will rush 
forward to prevent the restoration of a totalitarian system, 
re-division of property, long lines of people to get prime 
necessities, coupons and other communist horrors. But will that 
go for the second time in a row? It is common knowledge that a 
bomb does not fall in the same hole twice. Experienced spin 
doctors know that there are no two similar campaigns and that 
it is very risky to use the same election techniques twice. 
What is more, Zyuganov continues to be associated with the 
threat of a communist comeback, while Putin has not had the 
time to win the laurels of a democrat and a reformer. It is 
sooner just the other way around: Putin reflects the sentiments 
of people disappointed in reforms.
2. Mobilisation scenario. Putin will accentuate the 
serious challenges Russia may face. Suffice it to mention what 
he said at the Russian Security Council session on February 4: 
to believe Putin, we are surrounded by enemies. He has more 
than once talked of the threat of the country's disintegration, 
presenting the operation in Chechnya as the method to avert it. 
Putin has also warned of the danger of new bomb explosions. And 
all this is accompanied by triumphal reports on the seizure of 
Grozny and the hoisting of the Russian flag on the "reichstag" 
- Aslan Maskhadov's residence. To put it in a nutshell, the 
atmosphere of horror is being escalated in the country. In such 
a situation Zyuganov is to play the role of the one who 
"deviates from the mainstream", that is, a politician who 
agrees with the "general line of the party" but is too mild on 
some concrete issues and insufficiently consistent, principled 
and tough with regard to the enemies. He has already begun 
implementing this scenario by slightly criticising the Chechen 
operation and calling it violence. The mobilisation scenario 
seems to be more probable and feasible.
3. "Order vs. Chaos" scenario. Attempts will be made to 
discredit Zyuganov with the help of left radical movements 
which will support him too zealously, thereby creating him the 
image of an extremist. A more liberal and civilised Putin who 
will be more consistent and tough at the same time will look 
better against this background. Zyuganov will be associated 
with the offensive of chaos and disorder and Putin -- with the 
restoration of law and order. Even if this does not become the 
main strategy, it will, nonetheless, be used as an auxiliary 
technique.
4. "A Fearless Hero Fighting Against Dark Forces" scenario.
Zyuganov may dare openly strike an alliance with Yuri Luzhkov 
and, probably, Primakov. This would enlarge his electorate and 
make his chances to come to power better than in similar 
previous cases. But then the Kremlin will be able to launch a 
campaign against "dark forces" which have allegedly united 
against the genuine hero, Putin, and which want to ruin Russia. 
In that case, it will be possible to "spoil in the loo" not 
only rotten communism but a certain new formation which will 
inspire even more horror among voters by its incoherent 
character.

******

Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: 
http://www.cdi.org/russia