February 2, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4085 4086 4087

Johnson's Russia List
#4085
3 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russian liberal foresees ABM compromise. (Arbatov)
2. Bloomberg: Russian Duma's Glasiev on Economic Policies.
3. Reuters: Russian economist wants strong state, then reforms.(Vladimir Mau)
4. AP: Prosecutor: Putin Won't Fight Graft. (Skuratov)
5. Izvestia: STRUCTURE OF FARMLAND OWNERSHIP.
6. APN: President without political convictions. (Poll)
7. Reuters: -Russian oil baron impressed by Putin. (Mikhail Khodorkovsky)
8. Dan Epstein: Observations on Duma Election.
9. Alistair Stobie: re: Fairlamb/Russia's Turnaround/4084.
10. Versiya: Who Blew Up Russia? (Terrorists had been trained at G.R.U.). A version of Pyotr Pryanishnikov.
11. Moscow Times: Simon Saradzhyan, Police Paint Grozny Native as Bomb Suspect.
12. Izvestia: Alexander Sadchikov, EXCESSIVE SOVEREIGNTY IS NO LONGER IN VOGUE. The Kremlin Is Going to Clamp Down on Regional Leaders. (DJ: This is an interesting development for those reformers in Washington and elsewhere who have been enthusiastic about regional power...but are now trying to like Putin.)
13. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright: Speech at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow.]

*******

#1
Russian liberal foresees ABM compromise
February 2, 2000

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A leading liberal in the Russian parliament said 
Wednesday he could envisage a compromise between Moscow and Washington on the 
Anti-Ballistic Treaty (ABM), which the United States wants changed to 
accommodate its plans for a national missile defense. 

Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Duma's defense committee, told U.S. 
reporters a deal would probably include a steep cut in the limits on 
strategic warheads, coupled with an end to the ban on missiles which can hit 
more than one target. 

Arbatov, a member of the leading Russian liberal party Yabloko, said such a 
deal would only be possible when relations between Russia and the United 
States improve and after this year's presidential elections in both 
countries. 

He said better relations were also needed before Acting Russian President 
Vladimir Putin submits the START II arms control treaty to the Duma for 
ratification. But when he does submit it, the Duma would probably agree to 
ratify, he added. 

The United States has been pressing Russia to approve amendments to the 1972 
ABM treaty, which outlaws the kind of missile defense system Washington says 
it needs to protect the country from what it calls ``rogue states''. 

The Russians, worried the system might undermine the deterrent effect of 
their own nuclear arsenal, have opposed any changes, saying ABM is the 
cornerstone of arms control. 

Arbatov, speaking by telephone from Moscow, said: ``Provided the political 
background is favorable...I think that after presidential election both here 
and in the United States, there is some ground for a compromise.'' 

Russia would let the United States deploy anti-missile missiles in a second 
area in return for a START III treaty which makes concessions in Russia's 
favor, he said. 

The U.S. concessions in START III would include reducing to between 1,000 and 
1,500 the ceiling on the number of strategic warheads each country can have 
in its arsenal and allowing the Russians to deploy MIRVs (multiple 
independently targeted re-entry vehicles), Arbatov added. 

``That type of system is cheaper for Russia and would be a guarantee for 
Russia that American defenses would never be able to undermine Russian 
strategic deterrence and instead would be only directed against rogue 
states,'' he said. 

The United States favors keeping the ceiling at between 2,000 and 2,500, as 
proposed by President Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in Helsinki in 1997. 

*******

#2
Russian Duma's Glasiev on Economic Policies: Political Comment

Moscow, Feb. 2 (Bloomberg)
-- The following are comments from Sergei Glasiev, the head of the 
economic policy committee in Russia's lower house of parliament, the Duma. 

``Budget revenue may be increased twice during the next two years. For that 
we need to set up taxes on natural resources, and to improve collection of 
revenue from the money market and from the sale and rent of state property.'' 

``All of our reforms have existed for serving financial speculators, not for 
serving the industrial sector.'' 

Glasiev also said that the communists are planning some changes to the 
constitution. 

``If (Communist Party leader Gennady) Zyuganov wins the presidential 
election, the constitution reform will be done.'' 

*******

#3
Russian economist wants strong state, then reforms

MOSCOW, Feb 2 (Reuters) - A Russian government economist said on Wednesday 
the country should strengthen the state and then implement structural reforms 
in a year or two. 

Vladimir Mau, head of the goverment's Economic Reforms Centre, told a news 
conference Russians supported Acting President Vladimir Putin largely because 
the economy had not fallen apart under his stewardship, though standards of 
living were falling. 

He outlined elements of a long-term economic strategy that a 
government-related think tank to which he belongs, the Centre for Strategic 
Research, is drawing up. 

"Our main task for an initial period is to maintain economic stability and 
reform political and legal spheres," said Mau. 

He said that phase would take a year or two, during which the government 
should refuse to revise the Constitution, put regional legislation in accord 
with federal laws, work out a mechanism to dismiss regional governors and 
strengthen the legal system and defence ministries. 

"Before investing money in any sphere we must have strong army, police and 
courts, otherwise all the money will be stolen," Mau said. "Only after that 
we can talk about serious structural reforms." 

He described Putin's economic policy as "liberal nationalism, in the English 
meaning of both words." 

Yevgeny Yasin, a former Economy Minister and also member of the think tank, 
told Interfax news agency it would work out a draft of the long-term 
strategic economic programme by April. 

*******

#4
Prosecutor: Putin Won't Fight Graft
February 2, 2000
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV

MOSCOW (AP) - Russia's suspended chief prosecutor on Wednesday accused acting 
President Vladimir Putin of being reluctant to combat graft in the Kremlin 
because of his close ties to Boris Yeltsin's corruption-tinged 
administration. 

``As in the past, there is still no political will at the top to fight 
corruption,'' said Yuri Skuratov, suspended last year amid allegations of 
accepting the services of prostitutes in exchange for blocking criminal 
investigations. 

``Vladimir Putin was designated successor after careful selection work by the 
`family,''' Skuratov said, referring to Yeltsin's inner circle of advisers. 
``It would be difficult for him to take such action, and I don't think he 
will do that.'' 

Skuratov said there was ample evidence against chief of staff Alexander 
Voloshin who kept his job under Putin, as well as business tycoons Roman 
Abramovich and Alexander Mamut who have close Kremlin ties. 

``The entire Kremlin inner circle has problems with the law,'' Skuratov said 
at a news conference. ``I don't say they are criminals, but all this evidence 
must be thoroughly investigated.'' 

Skuratov also claimed Putin was reluctant to investigate corruption when he 
was deputy chief for St. Petersburg in the early 1990s, and later as head of 
the Federal Security Service, a powerful KGB successor. 

He scolded Putin for granting Yeltsin immunity from prosecution after leaving 
office, which he said violated the constitution. Skuratov had been 
investigating kickback allegations against Yeltsin. 

Skuratov was suspended in April. Yeltsin wanted Skuratov fired, but the upper 
house of the Russian parliament refused to back his ouster. 

Skuratov denied the allegations, and the probe remains stalled. Earlier this 
week prosecutors opened a new investigation into charges he illegally 
accepted 14 business suits as a gift. Skuratov said he paid for the suits. 

Skuratov is a candidate in the March 26 presidential election, which Putin is 
widely expected to win. 

*******

#5
Izvestia
January 20, 2000
STRUCTURE OF FARMLAND OWNERSHIP

1. Collectively-owned lands - 56%
2. State reserve - 9%
3. State lands in people's use - 9%
4. State lands used by agricultural
enterprises - 16%
5. Other private lands - 1%
6. Lumber industry complexes - 3%
7. Farmers - 6%

--------------------------------------------- 
Source: Data of the State Land Committee (Goskomzem). 

******* 

#6
APN
2 February, 2000
President without political convictions
Elena BASHKIROVA,
Director of ROMIR
Natalya LAYDINEN,
PR manager

In January, ROMIR agency conducted a research on a random basis (N=2000) in 
41 subjects of the Russian Federation (207 points). The Russians were asked a 
question which political convictions the next president of Russia should 
adhere to. Respondents could give several answers to the question.

In general, research on the similar subject conducted by ROMIR before showed 
that politicians` personal qualities influence on an electoral choice of the 
majority of the Russians more than familiarisation with their political 
programs.

Though, recently tendency toward more attention to political convictions of a 
presidential candidate has increasingly grown 20.3% of respondents said 
adherence of the future Russia`s president to certain political views is of 
no importance for them. 1% of respondents stated the president of Russia 
should not have pronounced political convictions at all. By the way just this 
approach had ensured Unity (party deprived of any distinct ideology, headed 
by popular persons) a success in the parliamentary elections.

It is interesting that 18.7% of Russians think that the new president must 
adhere to right convictions that is to liberal or democratic views.

14% of Russians thinks that the new government leader must stick to extremely 
left political convictions, in other words, they want him to be a communist. 
9.9% of Russians want the new president to be supporter of moderate left 
convictions that is to be a socialist.

Almost the same number of respondents would prefer the new state head to 
adhere to centrist ideology. There are almost no monarchy supporters in 
Russia now. 19% of Russians found it difficult to answer. Thus if those who 
have a certain opinion on preferable convictions of the future president are 
taken into account it is found out that almost equal number of Russians are 
followers of the president who is to a certain extent is a supporter of 
democratic views (liberal, centrist) and of socialist convictions (communist, 
socialist.) In this case citizens when making a choice will be guided by 
emotional impression of a candidate.

*******

#7
INTERVIEW-Russian oil baron impressed by Putin
By Brian Killen

NEFTEYUGANSK, Russia, Feb 2 (Reuters) - Russian businessman Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, chief of the country's second biggest oil company, said on 
Wednesday he had a favourable impression of Acting President Vladimir Putin. 

But Khodorkovsky, executive board chairman of YUKOS YUKO.RTS, said in an 
interview Putin was ``more of a politician than an economist'' and much would 
depend on his choice of prime minister. 

Putin, an ex-KGB spy who is currently combining the posts of acting president 
and premier, is hot favourite to succeed Boris Yeltsin in a March 26 
election, called after the Russian leader stepped down on New Year's eve. 

Putin has vowed to pursue liberal reforms with strong state regulation of the 
market, but little is known about his economic policies as most of his public 
statements so far have focused on national security issues, especially the 
war in Chechnya. 

``The information we have received so far is encouraging,'' Khodorkovsky told 
Reuters aboard a YUKOS jet returning from the company's main Western Siberian 
production base. 

He said he wanted the new government to steer clear of politics. 

``I hope the new government which Mr Putin will form, considering his own 
interest in politics, will be apolitical because the presidential 
administration will be dealing with politics, and that suits us fine.'' 

LEGENDARY OLIGARCHS A MIXED BUNCH 

Khodorkovsky, who said he had met Putin twice to discuss oil industry issues, 
also said he hoped the new administration would put an end to talk of an 
elite group of well-connected ``oligarchs'' ruling the Kremlin roost. 

``I hope the legends about the oligarchs will die along with the changing of 
presidents,'' he said. 

The 36-year-old YUKOS chief said the so-called oligarchs, who built their 
industrial empires during Yeltsin's rule, acquiring valuable assets often at 
bargain prices, were a diverse group with different interests. 

``Among them you can see several politicians with certain business interests, 
in particular Mr Berezovsky,'' he said, referring to newly elected 
parliamentarian Boris Berezovsky who has held various political offices. 

``Anyone who calls him an entrepreneur is mistaken,'' said Khodorkovsky. 
``And it is also quite a mistake to see those involved in production as 
semi-politicians.'' 

He said the influence of big U.S. companies lobbying in Washington for 
legislation that affected their business interests was much greater than that 
of Russian industrial giants. ``We are like children by comparison,'' he 
said. 

YUKOS SEEKS TO BOOST EFFICIENCY 

Khodorkovsky said his main priority at YUKOS was to boost efficiency which he 
said was lagging behind Western standards. 

``In order to solve this problem we have to deal with training and corporate 
culture this year,'' he said, adding that experience in project management 
and marketing was also needed. 

Asked about expansion plans and possible acquisitions, he said these would be 
restricted by the anti-monopoly committee. 

``If we now have about 15-18 percent of market share in various areas, then 
the maximum we would like to take is another five percent,'' he said. 

YUKOS, which produced 44.5 million tonnes (895,000 barrels per day) of crude 
oil in 1999, announced last week that it had bought a 16 percent stake in 
regional producer Orenburgneft ORNB.RTS. 

Khodorkovsky said on Monday the company planned to increase its shareholding 
to over 25 percent. 

*******

#8
Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 
From: Dan Epstein <danevt@yahoo.com> 
Subject: Observations on Duma Election

I have been following the debate on the validity of Duma election results
and have the following to contribute. I worked as an international 
election observer in Petrozavodsk in northern Russia and visited nearly a 
dozen precincts in the course
of the day, watched the vote counting in one of them, and visited the
territorial election commission to see the precinct results reported there. 
While the precincts and territory I visited were of course not necessarily
representative, their structure of organization is supposed to be common 
to all 93,000 precincts and 2,700 territorial election commissions in 
Russia. This structure includes domestic observers from several parties 
who watch the entire process of voting and
then the counting of the votes in each precinct . Because of this, it 
appears that stuffing ballot-boxes on a large scale would be next to 
impossible without either attracting a great deal of attention or co-opting 
a very large number of people.

However, in the process of voting and counting, observers, domestic or
foreign, can only observe up to a certain point, the point when the 
protocols containing the vote tallies from each precinct are entered into 
the State Calculation Sytem of the Election (GAS Vybory) at the territorial 
election commission. On election night, I watched some of the precinct 
electoral commission heads bring their tally
protocols to the election officials entering the data. The precinct
commission heads watched as the officials entered the data, and if there 
was an inconsistency in any of the data (for example, the number of ballots 
issued and the number accounted for at the end of polling), the precinct 
head would be sent to check his
numbers again. If not, then the data was entered into the computer and the
official entering the data would dismiss the precinct head and take the
next one.

However, there was no way for any observers to verify where these numbers 
went after being entered into the computer. Presumably it went directly 
to the CEC in Moscow which duly announced the results. But there was no 
way for anyone watching
to be sure of this, or to be sure that no one had access to it in the
territorial election commission computers before being sent off to the 
CEC, or to know where the results came out at the CEC and who confirmed 
them. While the computer results were supposed to be only preliminary, 
and the official results announced
once the each precinct tally protocal had been sent to the CEC and the
computer count checked there, there did not appear (and again, I may 
be misinformed) to be any observation of this process either, to confirm 
whether it happened at all, much less whether there were any violations.

Thus any question of fraud could be an issue of complicity by anyone who had
access to the computer system at any level, or else of data and computer
security in the storage and communication of results, although the latter 
would have have been unsustainable when compared with the results calculated 
from the hard copies of the tally protocols, assuming that process took 
place. The sheer number of electoral workers involved at all levels below 
this (over one million Russians worked as election officials in this 
election) make falsification by stuffing ballot-boxes or through false 
mobile ballot-boxes seem unlikely. But as far as I
know (and if I am wrong, I invite correction), no one checked the computer
system on which the tallies depended.

- Dan Epstein
Henry Russell Shaw Fellow,
Harvard University

*******

#9
Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 
From: Alistair Stobie <AStobie@DELTACAP.RU> 
Subject: re: Fairlamb/Russia's Turnaround/4084

I am not sure that you have to publish this. I have lost faith in the
intellectual integrity of journalists and feel the need to vent. An honest,
non-sensationalist approach would be informative for all interested parties.

In 1997 and early 1998 those of us living in Moscow read stories of the
great economic wonderland Russia was about to become and did not believe
them - the numbers did not back them up.

Now the consensus is the other way around. No self-respecting journalist
will write a positive story on Russia. However the lack of a rigorous
analytical approach defies the text. For example: it is likely that
commodity prices, oil in particular, has saved Russia's bacon. Revenues are
sufficient to pay back the IMF loans without the IMF having to lend Russia
more to ensure no default. The IMF can therefore talk big about not lending
any more money without the nuclear blackmail card being played.

There is a real revival at grass routes level and it is reflected in the
earnings of Russian companies. 

Is it a robust recovery? No. Can it survive another crisis? Probably not.
Is the country in a better situation than 1997/98 when the enthusiasts were
trading the stock market to Never Never land valuations? Yes.

Working to resolve the issues at Lomonosoz Porcelain Factory makes me more
than a little sanguine as to the realities of doing business in Russia.
Notwithstanding, poking fun at Kasyanov without at least acknowledging the
data seems to me to lack the intellectual rigour we accuse Russia of.

*******

#10
Versiya
Feb. 1-7, 2000
Who Blew Up Russia? (Terrorists had been trained at G.R.U.)
A version of Pyotr Pryanishnikov
[excerpts in translation for personal use only]

The explosions of residential buildings in Moscow were perpetrated by
Shirvani Basayev's men, who had been kept on reserve in Moscow and other
Russian cities. The Basayev brothers - Shamil and Shirvani - had been
nurtured by Russian security services. Both were recruited as agents by the
Chief Intelligence Directorate (G.R.U., or GRU) in 1991-92.

The pre-recruitment work with Basayev began in the late 1980s, when he was
involved in low-scale commerce. Yet already then he knew Djohar Dudayev
[Chechnya's future first president]. They met each other in Moscow in 1985
or 1986, at the Airborne Troops Headquarters, where Shamil served as a
private. At the time, Dudayev was a commander of a Soviet heavy bombarders'
regiment in Afghanistan (where he was the first to use carpet bombing).

On August 19, 1991, after the first announcement about the anti-Gorbachev
hardline coup, Shamil Basayev, still a trade middleman, turned up at the
Russian parliament's headquarters with a bag full of grenades. At Boris
Yeltsin's assignment, he took part with many others in the "White House"
defense. After the suppression of the coup, he was offered an affiliation
with GRU.

In August 1992, with the start of the war between Georgia and Abkhazia,
Basayev was assigned the task of setting up a volunteer corps to fight on
the Abkhazian side. Soon, Shamil and his boys arrived on an Ikarus bus to
the Russian city of Mineralnye vody, hijacked two civilian airplanes and
flied without any obstacle across Karachaevo-Cherkessia to Abkhazia. At the
same time, GRU dispatched one of its officers, Anton Surikov, under a
different name to Sukhumi, the Abkhazian capital. There, he was appointed
councilor to Abkhazia's Defense Minister and put in charge of intelligence
and diversionary activities, just as Shamil Basayev became Deputy Minister
of Defense. Basayev and Surikov worked hand in hand. Soon, Shamil's junior
brother, Shirvani, was also recruited. His first exploit consisted of
blowing up two Georgian military posts in Sukhumi, in June-July 1993.

Simultaneously, Russian security services used Shamil Basayev in other "hot
spots". Thus, in early 1992 [sic] he was stationed for three months in
Nagorny Karabakh.

Finally, the Abkhazian conflict calmed down. Basayevs and their battalion
return to Chechnya - via border checkpoint in Adler. Border troops let these
guerilla fighters and plane hijackers go through peacefully.

Summer 1995: the Budyonnovsk hostage crisis. Journalists repeatedly asked
themselves how could it ever happen that forty armed guerilla soldiers
traveled in two heavy trucks across a large territory occupied by federal
troups, without being stopped at any of the checkpoints?

This was the game plan. A high-profile hostage taking was to become the
necessary pretext [for the Russians] to start the negotiations.

Back in 1991, the Basayev brothers built contacts with Hattab, a Wahhabi
ideologist, a Saudi agent, and an international terrorist. Soon, this
contact developed into a business relationship. Hattab was procuring money
in Saudi Arabia for the holy war. Shamil Basayev was dispensing the funds.
The higher the profile of the war, the larger is the funding. But then, you
need someone to wage a war with. Of course, this had to be Russia.
Therefore, part of the money had to go to Russian politicians and the
military, so that they kept waging war.

This mutual interest still exists to this very day. This is the reason why
Chechen commanders are alive and well.

The plan of incursion in Dagestan was designed to replenish the funds [from
abroad]. Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen president, warned the Kremlin about
the operation being planned [by Basayevs] both personally and through his
proxies. In the fall of 1999, on the eve of the incursion, Aleksandr
Voloshin, the Russian President's Chief of Staff, met with Shamil Basayev in
Bouille, a suburb of Nice, according to some sources, at the mansion of Adan
Hashoggie, an Arab arms' merchant. (Hashoggie himself, in a letter addressed
to Versiya, denied the allegation that the meeting occurred specifically at
his estate.) To set up the meeting, Voloshin resorted to the services of the
above-mentioned Anton Surikov.

As was recently reported in the media, not long before the events a military
brigade of the Interior Ministry that had been policing the
Chechen-Dagestani border, was relocated from Dagestan's Botlikh region.
Basayev's incursion hit an unprotected territory. Later, he used the same
road to quit Dagestan without any obstacles.
In fact, both the Kremlin and the whole of Russia were rescued by the
Dagestani people, who did not succumb to the guerilla army and did not
follow the Wahhabis.
Shamil Basayev was defeated in Dagestan. But the money for waging war had
already been received. Therefore, Shirvani Basayev spurred his reserve
fighters to action, prompting them to organize the explosions in Moscow,
Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. This was followed by another round of anti-Chechen
hysteria, by calls for revenge, and by another war.

Does this mean that now the Basayev brothers are out of GRU control? Why is
it that Vladimir Putin's stern promise "to rub them in" remains just a
promise? Why is it that Anton Surikov, who arranged the meeting between
Shamil and Voloshin, cannot arrange the arrest of the terrorists, who were
declared wanted at the international level? And why did Boris Berezovsky
suggest in his interview that the terrorists' chiefs should be allowed to
leave abroad?

Or is this the game plan? Follow the Versiya coverage.

*******

#11
Moscow Times
February 3, 2000 
Police Paint Grozny Native as Bomb Suspect 
By Simon Saradzhyan
Staff Writer

When Timur Dakhkilgov walked out of Lefortovo Prison on Dec. 10, he had 
survived three months of beatings, threats and the constant fear that he 
would be falsely convicted in the devastating Moscow apartment-block bombings 
that claimed 213 lives last fall. 

"I couldn't believe I would walk out free, even after signing all the 
papers," said Dakhkilgov, a 32-year-old Grozny native, sitting in the cramped 
dormitory room in central Moscow that he shares with his wife and two small 
children. 

To date, Dakhkilgov is the only person to be held at length and identified in 
connection with the bombings, which terrorized the nation and became the 
battle cry in Russia's protracted military campaign in Chechnya. Nearly half 
a year after the bombings, investigators have seemingly come no closer to 
finding their man: In late January, the Federal Security Service, or FSB, 
announced only that there were 14 suspects in the case, and that none were 
Chechen. 

But if the experience of Dakhkilgov, who is Ingush, is any indication, 
desperation to pin the crime on a credible suspect in the days following the 
bombings drove investigators to the point where they were willing to 
apprehend and detain suspects on even the flimsiest evidence. 

The first Moscow apartment bombing took place Sept. 8, when a blast ripped 
apart a nine-story block on Ulitsa Guryanova, leaving 94 dead. In its wake, 
Dakhkilgov - along with hundreds of fellow North Caucasians living in the 
capital city - submitted to involuntary police registration, fingerprinting 
and examination for possible residue from explosives. 

Dakhkilgov, an employee at the Krasny Sukonshchik textile mill, didn't escape 
unnoticed: His palms were stained with traces of hexane, a chemical material 
similar to hexagen, the substance police initially believed to have been used 
in the explosion. Just hours after the second blast claimed 119 lives on 
Kashirskoye Shosse on Dec. 13, Dakhkilgov was arrested and taken to the 
Severnoye Butovo district department of the Moscow police. 

Hexane is a standard component in the paints used by textile mills; nearly 
all the employees at Krasny Sukonshchik's painting facility were found to 
have traces of it on their hands. Still, the only mill worker arrested was 
Dakhkilgov, a fact his lawyer, Sergei Nikolayev, attributed to his ethnic 
background: "He was the only one from Chechnya," he said. 

A Krasny Sukonshchik employee, who confirmed that traces of hexane had been 
found throughout the mill's painting facility, said no one at the plant 
believed Dakhkilgov was guilty. "We are all fond of him, and there was never 
any doubt that he had nothing to do with this," said the employee, asking 
that her name not be used. 

Three days later, Dakhkilgov's brother-in-law Bekmarz Sauntiyev was also 
detained on suspicion of the crime. Prison footage of the two men was 
repeatedly shown during television news broadcasts, with anchors identifying 
the two as native Chechens and prime suspects in the two deadly blasts. 

Russia's law-enforcement chiefs were equally quick to trumpet the capture of 
the alleged criminals, a fact that Nikolayev said nearly sealed Dakhkilgov's 
fate. "After all those reports, investigators had no way to back out," he 
said. 

Sauntiyev was soon released. But despite a solid alibi, witness testimony - 
and, ultimately, a statement by Adolf Mishuyev, the head of the Explosions 
Proof Technical Center at the Moscow State Construction Institute, that the 
two bombs contained not hexagen but a mixture of potassium nitrate and 
aluminum powder - Dakhkilgov remained in detention, first with the Moscow 
police and then with the FSB at Lefortovo. 

"Enraged beyond sanity" when he learned he had been charged with the blasts, 
Dakhkilgov said what worried him most during his three-month ordeal was the 
fate of his pregnant wife, Lydia, and their son and daughter, 5-year-old 
Bagauddin and 3-year-old Tamara. 

"When I refused to confess, one of the [Moscow police] detectives told me he 
was going to have my entire family brought to the Ulitsa Guryanova site so 
that the crowd there could tear them to pieces," said Dakhkilgov, who fled 
with Lydia from Grozny to Moscow after Russian troops first entered the 
Chechen capital in 1994. 

His wife, who together with Sauntiyev was brought in for police questioning 
Sept. 16, said she was taunted with similar threats before being released the 
following morning. 

Dakhkilgov spent just over a week in Moscow police custody before his case 
was taken over by the FSB. During these nine days, spent in three different 
city detention centers, he says he was savagely beaten by a trio of police 
detectives intent on extracting a confession on the Moscow police clock. 

Dakhkilgov says he was forced to sit for hours, doubled over with his hands 
cuffed under a chair, to the point where his kidneys malfunctioned. The 
detectives also forced a plastic bag over his head until he fainted, reviving 
him only in order to repeat the ritual again, he said. 

The worst beating, he said, came on Sept. 22, when the detectives learned 
that Dakhkilgov was due to be transferred out of their reach, to the FSB, 
later that day. 

"I left my cell at around midnight and didn't come back until the next 
morning," he said. "They beat me all night ... it was their last chance to 
wrestle something from me and claim they were the ones who solved the case. 
Even my lawyer didn't recognize me." 

Nikolayev confirmed that on the morning of Sept. 22 Dakhkilgov's face was so 
swollen that he initially believed the police had brought in another man 
altogether. An attempt to sue the police for abuse in a Moscow court failed 
due to insufficient proof, despite a statement from a physician detailing 
Dakhkilgov's litany of injuries. 

Moscow police spokesman Vladimir Zubkov, who said he was not aware of the 
identity of the three detectives involved in Dakhkilgov's case, denied that 
police officers resort to torture but admitted that beating of suspects 
"happens." 

He also said less qualified detectives who fail to prove someone's guilt by 
"legal means" can "find it easier to beat out a confession." 

At Lefortovo, Dakhkilgov said, his treatment was radically different. 
"Investigators there were so polite that at first I even thought it was some 
sort of trick, to make any future beatings an even bigger shock," he said, 
adding that the beatings never came. 

Mikhail Chaika, the senior FSB investigator in charge of his case, also began 
his first interrogation with a promise to release him if his innocence was 
proven, he said. Nearly three months later, Dakhkilgov was finally released. 

In a phone interview Tuesday, a colleague of Chaika's confirmed that the FSB 
was satisfied that Dakhkilgov was not involved in either of the bombings. 
"There was no case against him; he's a good guy," said the investigator, who 
asked that his name not be used. 

"There was no crime committed ... we just corrected the police's mistakes," 
he added. 

Dakhkilgov, who had all charges dropped less than three weeks after his 
release, said now he wants only to work and live in peace. Even earning less 
than $80 a month at a dangerous job, living in a dormitory with just one 
shower per floor, and unable to return to Grozny where the war rages on, he 
said he is glad to return to his normal life. 

"Now when I look back I can't even say how grateful I am to the FSB for 
proving my innocence," Dakhkilgov said. 

The only thing he wishes for now, he said, is to "simply look into the eye of 
those" really behind the two blasts: "If they ever get caught, of course." 

*******

#12
Izvestia
February 2, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
EXCESSIVE SOVEREIGNTY IS NO LONGER IN VOGUE
The Kremlin Is Going to Clamp Down on Regional Leaders
By Alexander SADCHIKOV

"What can we expect from Putin?" is the question which,
judging by all signs, worries regional leaders most of all.
Some rather popular regional leaders are actively engaged in
convening press conferences and briefings, organising
journalists' visits to their regions and seeking to
demonstrate the positive aspects of their rule.

Regional leaders have always been in a hurry to count on
a certain politician in the centre, and this often put them in
an awkward situation. As one of the leaders of the deputy
group the Union of Right Forces (SPS) said, "many joined 
Fatherland in July, since they did not know there would be
Unity in August." Finally, some of them had to change their
affiliation. Among them were the president of Tatarstan
Mintimer Shaimiyev, the St. Petersburg mayor Vladimir
Yakovlev, and several other regional leaders.
In the corridors of the State Duma, the Federation
Council and the president's administration it is heard more
and more often that after the elections the Kremlin will start
a radical reform of the Federation. One of the deputy chiefs
of the presidential administration admitted: "Of course, we
shall 'centralise' the Federation, reduce everything to a
common denominator, but we shall do it gradually and
carefully, without any excesses."
The whole arsenal of the prosecutors' offices overseeing
the purity of law could be used in the struggle against the
arbitrariness of "local princes." The thing is that many
regional norm-setting acts are contrary to federal laws. For
instance, 47 bilateral treaties on the division of powers and
several hundred agreements on minor issues have been signed by
the regions. The treaty with Tatarstan says that the
republican bodies of state authority may engage in foreign
economic activity. The treaty with Kabardino-Circassia is even
stronger: among the republic's powers is the introduction of a
state of emergency. For justice's sake, we can say that not
only the national republics are at odds with the law, but some
rather prosperous regions (the Arkhangelsk, Volgograd,
Voronezh, Rostov, Saratov and other regions), too. Regional
lawlessness is a good pretext for the centre's interference.
The situation could be improved not only by the abolition
of a regional law, but also by the replacement of the governor
who violated the law, provided the public prosecutor contests
the powers of the regional head in the Supreme Court. A formal
pretext for the centre's initiative could be the law "On the
Principles and Procedure for Dividing the Competence and
Powers Between the Bodies of State Authority of the Russian
Federation and the Bodies of State Authority of the Russian
Federation's Subjects". This means that after March 26, sweet
dreams of Ruslan Aushev, Mintimer Shaimiyev, Murtaza Rakhimov
and Kirsan Ilyumzhinov might be disturbed by the public
prosecutor.

*******

#13
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
Speech at the Diplomatic Academy
Moscow, Russia, February 2, 2000
As released by the Office of the Spokesman
U.S. Department of State 

[Text as prepared for delivery] 
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Rector Fokin, faculty and students; distinguished 
colleagues, guests and friends. It is a humbling experience to speak at the 
preeminent diplomatic academy in a nation whose diplomatic history dates back 
twice as far as the entire history of the United States. I was surprised to 
learn that I am one of only a few women ever to address this venerable 
institution. I trust that if I earn passing marks from you this morning, I 
will not be the last.

It has been a decade now since the Cold War ended. That no longer seems like 
only yesterday. To the contrary, enough time has passed for the shape of the 
post-Cold War world to have become clearer: new realities, new problems, new 
opportunities. A world ever less defined by being "post"-anything; a new era 
in its own right.

I was particularly struck by this a few days ago in Davos, where I 
participated in the meetings of the World Economic Forum. Here were gathered 
many of the world's leading political, corporate and intellectual figures -- 
a globalized international society on display. (I heard lots of Russian, 
incidentally, being spoken in the corridors.)

Foreign and economic policy discussions blended seamlessly together. Treasury 
Secretary Lawrence Summers and I actually shared the same platform, talking 
about each other's issues. This kind of joint public discussion by foreign 
and finance ministers would have been hard to imagine in past eras. 

And my colleague made a mind-bending prediction -- that two centuries from 
now, historians will view the Cold War's end as only the second most 
important event of the late 20th Century. The first, in his view, being the 
explosion of economic growth across borders and around the world.

To many of the high-tech participants, it seemed that international borders 
hardly mattered. Their cyberspace realm is inherently global, and the 
Internet on which they do business is inherently democratic and decentralized.

This is the kind of world that might even be called "multipolar" -- a term 
with which you here in Russia are, I know, familiar. On this multipolar 
stage, the actors are advancing not only national goals, but also corporate, 
individual, and organizational agendas based on economic and other interests.

Now I have heard it said -- sometimes in Russia -- that the strategy of the 
United States is to establish and enforce a "unipolar" world. But it is hard 
to pay attention to the trends and forces of globalization without observing 
the many "poles" that affect the way the world now works. 

This is unprecedented. And from the American perspective, it is a positive 
and welcome development.

Of course, if advocates of a multipolar world envision a 19th rather than 
21st Century way of conducting our affairs, then we do have a disagreement. 
The issue is whether the "poles" that give the world its structure are in 
conflict or work in concert. The latter -- a multipolar world of diversity 
and creativity among cultures, nations, and economies -- is the world we 
believe we can build, one that will enrich our lives, and thrives on habits 
of peace and creative competition.

In this new world, governments may not be the sole or even the dominant 
forces in international relations that we once took for granted. And yet they 
continue to have special responsibilities. Because many of the positive 
trends on which globalization is based -- maintaining the peace; 
strengthening democratic institutions; preserving an open international 
economic order -- depend on how well governments meet their responsibilities.

Likewise, some of today's most worrisome international trends are in part a 
consequence of the difficulties governments face in finding the right 
strategies for dealing with them. Our Attorney General, Janet Reno, who 
visited here in October, has noted that in dealing with international 
organized crime, we are still heavily reliant on national tools.

Pessimists about this new world argue that many of the positive trends I 
mentioned will in fact break down, because states face too many conflicting 
interests and too many irreparable rivalries to be able to cooperate even 
against problems that threaten them jointly.

I do not agree with that defeatist assessment. And I would like to explain 
why I believe we must not -- and ultimately will not -- allow it to define 
the relationship between Russia and the United States. 

I am convinced that America and Russia have enough major interests in common 
to surmount our disagreements and work together in dealing with the biggest 
dangers and opportunities we face in the new century. 

As we look ahead to the first years of this new century, I hope that this is 
the practical approach we will bring to bear on three key sets of issues: 
nonproliferation; arms control; and regional stability. 

As to the first, the convergence of interests is clear. The Cold War's end 
lessened one great danger, but spawned others. One is that international arms 
dealers and shady middlemen would seek ways to sell nuclear materials, 
technology or expertise to dangerous clients. 

This has placed enormous pressure on all governments to enact and enforce a 
strict, modern system of export controls. Russia's new export control regime 
-- on paper -- is a solid start. But far more needs to be done to address 
this serious problem -- a commitment at all levels to better implementation, 
better enforcement, better control of exports. 

The logic of cooperation here is powerful. For in the parlance of our 
mainstream media, both of our countries share an interest in preventing any 
nukes from becoming "loose nukes." 

We both have an interest in preventing the spread of nuclear and 
ballistic-missile capabilities in the Middle East. The same is true on the 
Korean Peninsula and elsewhere.

We both have an interest in eliminating the deadly stockpiles of chemical 
weapons that remain on Russian and U.S. soil. 

We both have an interest in an NPT Review Conference this April that makes 
this bedrock treaty a stronger instrument than ever against the spread of 
nuclear arms. 

We both have an interest in walking India and Pakistan back from the nuclear 
precipice, and in reinforcing the global norms that were challenged by those 
countries' nuclear blasts.

We both have an interest in bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into 
force, and in maintaining our respective moratoria on testing until we do.

The list could go on; the logic is compelling. Russia and the United States 
have a host of powerful reasons to work together to prevent the spread of 
mass weapons and the missiles that can carry them. On many issues, we have 
done so. If we can continue to do so, we will make a major contribution to 
the security of both countries. But it will be a troubling sign that we see 
the world in very different ways if we don't. 

Even the most assiduous nonproliferation efforts will not be perfect. That 
reality obliges us also to consider how we respond to the emergence of new 
weapons capabilities.

Here we must begin by acknowledging that the strategic environment has 
changed greatly over the past quarter-century. And we know that the 
technology required to launch longer-range missiles is spreading despite our 
best efforts to stop it.

The U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals provide overwhelming deterrence against 
direct attack by any rational adversary. The problem is how to deal with 
threats from sources that are neither rational nor interested in complying 
with global norms.

That is why discussion of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and 
America's plans for a National Missile Defense have figured prominently in my 
meetings here.

An American decision on deploying a limited National Missile Defense system 
-- let me stress the word "limited" -- could be made as early as this summer. 
It has not yet been made. But for deployment to occur under the ABM Treaty, 
certain changes would be necessary. We have been discussing these changes 
with Congress, our allies and with you.

Not long ago, a Russian defense official declared that your nation has the 
ability to overwhelm the missile defense system we are planning. That is true 
-- and part of our point. 

The changes we are contemplating in the ABM Treaty are modest. They simply 
would not permit us to undermine Russia's deterrent, and we do not seek to do 
so. And because Russia and the United States are vulnerable to the same 
threats -- even if we sometimes perceive them differently -- we are prepared 
to cooperate with your government on missile defense. 

In response, I hope Russia will do more than just say "Nyet." It is in our 
mutual interest to find a way to preserve the essential deterrent structure 
of the ABM Treaty, while responding to the new dangers we both face.

One reason is the historic opportunity we have today to make further 
reductions in strategic arsenals. Almost three years ago, Presidents Clinton 
and Yeltsin agreed on the outlines of a START III Treaty that would cut our 
arsenals by 80 percent from their Cold War peaks. This was one of the 
subjects I discussed in this visit to Moscow.

I hope we succeed, for such a treaty would be in both our nations' interests. 
It would make us safer by maintaining parity at lower levels. Moreover, 
nuclear weapons are expensive to maintain and safeguard. We should find ways 
openly to destroy and dispose of every one we don't need. 

This brings me to a third set of problems and interests common to both our 
countries: potential instabilities in the Balkans, the Middle East, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. In each, the sources are similar: ethnic hatred, 
fanaticism, economic hopelessness and too little democracy. And the tensions 
they spawn create fertile breeding grounds for many forms of organized 
thuggery -- from trafficking in drugs and guns and women, to outright 
terrorism.

In avoiding such developments, U.S. and Russian interests clearly coincide. 
We both have a clear stake in stability in Kosovo; in a Middle East 
transformed by peace; and in a lasting settlement of the dispute over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. In each of these areas, Russia and the United States have 
worked together to seek sound solutions.

Once, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East seemed all but unthinkable, in 
part because the United States and Russia were adversaries. Almost thirty 
years ago, we came all too close to war in this region. Yesterday, Foreign 
Minister Ivanov and I co-hosted the Multilateral Steering Group Ministerial. 
Our cooperation was easy because our interests coincide. 

In Kosovo, we had very strong disagreements but our nations knew they had an 
interest in ending conflict and ushering in an era of stability in the 
Balkans. Today, our soldiers serve alongside one another to give peace the 
best possible chance. 

On the diplomatic front, our two governments have been working through the 
OSCE Minsk Group to find a lasting solution to the very difficult problem of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. With our help, the leaders have made progress. 

Such cooperation illustrates how the United States and Russia can also work 
together with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These sovereign 
states face the quadruple challenge of protecting their independence, 
creating modern political institutions, building prosperity, and maintaining 
stability. The fact that many of them border on a region to the south that 
has been an exporter of extremism and terror adds to the challenges they 
face. 

Russia and the United States have much to gain, and nothing to lose, from the 
success of the strategies that these states have chosen. These countries 
believe they need access to international markets for their exports, 
especially energy and natural resources; they want to be part of 
international institutions like the WTO and OSCE; and they seek normal, 
mutually beneficial relations with their neighbors.

In summary, in each of the vital policy areas that I have just discussed, 
Russia and the United States have common interests. This means that there is 
a basis for true cooperation in each, even if differences seem at times to 
occupy center stage. 

That is why our disagreement over Chechnya is so troubling. No one questions 
Russia's responsibility and even obligation to combat insurgency and terror 
within its borders. But the world increasingly has questioned doing so at 
such a high cost in innocent human lives and suffering, and such a high cost 
to Russia's international standing. 

These tactics will not set the stage for building a peaceful, prosperous 
Chechnya within the Russian Federation. Only a political resolution of the 
conflict will do that. As long as the fighting continues, it will serve as a 
magnet for extremism that could one day risk the stability of the entire 
region. 

The Middle East peace process that we have so successfully advanced here in 
Moscow carries a powerful lesson. A commitment to political solutions 
empowers the peacemakers. Military operations encourage the extremists. 

The Russia that chooses to pursue the political solution is the Russia that 
we hope to work with well into the 21st Century. This is a secure Russia with 
strong political institutions; a rock of stability in Europe and Asia; an 
engine of prosperity in the global economy; a vibrant and varied contributor 
to a multilateral world; and a source of inspiration to all who admire 
Russia's remarkable culture and history and believe in the power of human 
beings to change their individual and collective destinies.

These may seem like dreams; but I am speaking to you of interests. For it is 
this Russia which will benefit most in world markets and international 
institutions. 

And it is this Russia with which the United States can work most effectively 
to meet the many challenges that confront both our nations. 

Thank you very much.

*******

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