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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

February 2, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4083  4084

 

Johnson's Russia List
#4084
2 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: The Kremlin Is Looking For A Prime Minister For The Future President. JUDGING BY REQUIREMENTS, IDEAL CANDIDATE IS A PERSON RESEMBLING ANATOLY CHUBAIS.
2. AP: Albright Makes No Headway With Putin.
3. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: 3 Questions To Pose for The Kremlin.
4. Andrei Liakhov: RE 4082-DJ/Vote Fraud.
5. The Times (UK): Pyrrhic victory in a war without end. Giles Whittell reports from Moscow on the cost paid in human lives for mastery of a ruined city.
6. BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE: David Fairlamb, Did You Hear the One about Russia's Turnaround? New Moscow bigwig Mikhail Kasynov is talking up a rosy near-term scenario for the troubled nation. Could it be?
7. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Semen Vasechkin, The Usual Unusual Yavlinskiy.(Yavlinskiy's Presidential Candidacy, Policies Viewed)
8. Moskovsky Komsomolets: Alexander Minkin, "DARK HORSE" TECHNOLOGY. Why Hold Election if the Winner Is Known?
9. Ira Straus: Chechnya: Real conspiracies and wild conspiracy theories.]

*******

#1
Russia Today press summaries
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
2 February 2000
The Kremlin Is Looking For A Prime Minister For The Future President
JUDGING BY REQUIREMENTS, IDEAL CANDIDATE IS A PERSON RESEMBLING ANATOLY 
CHUBAIS

Summary
Russian political life has become rather sluggish since President Yeltsin's 
abduction on December 31. Nothing can excite the political elite - not even 
the upcoming presidential election. Everyone seems to have put up with the 
fact the Acting President Vladimir Putin will throw away the first word in 
his title for the next four years.

In the two next months, the Kremlin will have to make a decision on its 
candidate for prime minister - the number two post in the state hierarchy. 
The requirements for a candidate are not that numerous. He has to be a young, 
pragmatic professional who is known to the country and is able to conduct 
tough and even unpopular reforms. And the new premier should be a politician.

The Kremlin gave the odds to Mikhail Kasyanov when he was appointed the only 
first deputy premier in the government. Possibly, they wanted to see how he 
performs in the post. And, in principle, Kasyanov satisfies the Kremlin’s 
criteria, with one exception. In the past month, he has become a public 
politician. The Kremlin doesn’t exclude his candidacy, but considers other 
candidates as well. Among them are: the former deputy prime minister from 
Yabloko Mikhail Zadornov and Duma budget committee chairman Aleksander 
Zhukov. But the most serious contender for Kasyanov is RAO UES head Anatoly 
Chubais - a multi-functional official, who has worked as first deputy prime 
minister and head of presidential administration under Yeltsin. However, 
Chubais will hardly be appointed from the beginning - his reputation with 
Russian voters is far from being good.

*******

#2
Albright Makes No Headway With Putin
2 February 2000
By BARRY SCHWEID

MOSCOW (AP) - Throwing away his cue cards, acting Russian President Vladimir 
Putin debated his military offensive in Chechnya and arms control issues for 
nearly three hours today with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. 

Afterward, Albright described the new leader as a ``problem-solver,'' but 
told reporters she had not swayed him to stop the pounding Russian forces are 
carrying out in the rebellious republic. 

Still, Albright said, he authorized Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to take up 
with her a U.S. proposal to send a mission to Chechnya to make what Albright 
called a ``humanitarian needs assessment'' and also ``took on board'' her 
suggestion that more reporters be permitted to go there. 

Overall, Albright described their meeting in Putin's Kremlin's office as 
intense but pleasant. 

Clearly impressed with the former KGB domestic intelligence chief, who was 
named acting president by Boris Yeltsin in a surprise New Year's Eve 
retirement announcement, Albright said: ``Everybody is engaged in 
psychobabble about him. Everybody ought to watch what he does. 

``He obviously is a Russian patriot,'' she said. ``He heard what I had to 
say. It is not dispositive for them.'' 

For his part, Putin opened the session with a few remarks while their 
pictures were being taken. 

He described Russia's approach to Chechnya as resolute, and said his 
government was being subjected to ``certain pressure'' - evidently referring 
to the energetic U.S. campaign to get Russia to let up there. 

``We have serious differences,'' Putin said. But, he said, ``At the same 
time, we have our relationship as between great and important powers.'' 

A senior U.S. official who attended the meeting described Putin as ``soft 
spoken and steely.'' He said the acting president promised to try to reform 
Russia's tax code, which has been the target of complaints by President 
Clinton, and Albright said he pledged to push for ratification by the Russian 
parliament of the 1993 treaty to make deep cuts in U.S. and Russian 
long-range nuclear warheads. 

Albright appealed in the meeting and earlier in a speech, for Russia to do 
more to control its export of nuclear technology. She told future Russian 
diplomats at their academy that Russia had made a solid start, at least on 
paper, with a new export control program. 

``Far more needs to be done to address this serious problem - a commitment at 
all levels to better implementation, better enforcement, better control of 
exports,'' Albright said. 

Specifically, she said Russia and the United States share an interest in 
preventing the spread of nuclear and ballistic missile capability in the 
Middle East and on the Korean peninsula. 

And, she said, both countries should eliminate their stockpiles of deadly 
chemical weapons, 

``I know we are going through a kind of strange period in U.S.-Russian 
relations,'' Albright said in a response to a question after the speech. 
``But I hope very much we will get through it.'' 

Albright also offered assurances that ``the United States is seeking 
partnership, not dominance,'' in its relationship with Moscow. 

Asked about Iran, she said the Clinton administration was trying to open a 
government-to-government dialogue but Tehran would have to stop its support 
for terrorism, end its opposition to peacemaking in the Middle Ease and cease 
trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. 

Sergei Ivanov, Russia's security chief, told Sandy Berger, security assistant 
to President Clinton, in December that Russia was doing all it could to 
prevent the proliferation of weapons and wants more constructive cooperation 
from the United States. 

``There can be no doubt that Russia is exerting maximum effort in observing 
its commitments in this sphere,'' Ivanov told Berger, according to the 
Interfax news agency. 

The United States has accused Russia of not doing enough to prevent weapons 
technology from leaking to countries such as Iran and Syria. 

Ivanov said criticism from the United States was not helping relations 
already chilled by Russia's military campaign in breakaway Chechnya, NATO's 
air campaign in Kosovo earlier in the year and U.S. desires to modify a 
missile defense treaty. 

``Our dialogue would be more beneficial if used to promptly identify and 
punish those who breach export control rules, instead of escalating tension 
in overall bilateral relations,'' Ivanov told Berger, according to Interfax. 

The United States this spring imposed sanctions on several Russian companies 
believed to have sold anti-tank missiles to Syria, which the State Department 
accuses of funding terrorists. 

Albright, winding up 2 1/2 days of talks, said the United States and Russia 
could overcome their disagreements and work together on both dangers and 
opportunities in the new century. 

``The logic of cooperation is powerful,'' she said. ``Both of our countries 
share an interest in preventing any nukes form becoming `loose nukes,''' she 
said. 

********

#3
Moscow Times
February 2, 2000 
EDITORIAL: 3 Questions To Pose for The Kremlin 

Acting President Vladimir Putin is someone who likes to know the details. He 
keeps informed about what is happening in Russia, he insists on being kept 
informed, and he is in charge. 

And when the public has sought Putin's stance on a matter, Putin has at times 
complied. Witness the furor over the Unity-Communist deal installing Gennady 
Seleznyov as Duma speaker: Putin eventually did come on national television 
with his opinions on that event. They may have left some unconvinced or 
unsatisfied, but the gesture in itself is important - particularly after 
years of Boris Yeltsin's long, erratic silences. 

With that in mind, we offer three questions that should be put to Putin: 

-What is the acting president's stance on the Swiss warrant put out for Pavel 
Borodin's arrest? 

Borodin used to run the murky Kremlin household affairs directorate - 
basically, that directorate administers former Soviet Communist Party 
property left in Kremlin hands. And Putin was briefly Borodin's deputy at the 
directorate. 

Now a major foreign power feels certain enough that Borodin is corrupt enough 
to seek his arrest, despite the obvious danger of provoking an international 
incident. What does Putin think? 

-What is his stance on the detention of Radio Liberty's Andrei Babitsky? 

Babitsky has offered courageous reports out of Grozny and other war zone 
areas. Two weeks ago he disappeared in Chechnya; he recently re-emerged, in 
reports that Russian authorities have detained him. The Russian government 
says it is contemplating formal charges against Babitsky for "participating 
in an armed formation"; some reports say Babitsky is being held in 
less-than-lovely conditions in an Urus-Martan basement. 

Radio Liberty is a U.S. government-funded organization, so to target Babitsky 
is to flirt, again, with provoking an international incident. What does Putin 
think? 

-What is his stance on the Interior Ministry's efforts to force Moskovsky 
Komsomolets journalist Alexander Khinshtein to undergo a psychiatric exam? 

Khinshtein has picked some nasty fights with Interior Minister Vladimir 
Rushailo. He is also the author of a now-famous MK article that purported to 
be a transcript of a telephone conversation between arch-oligarch Boris 
Berezovsky and Chechen rebels, in which the two sides conspire to conjure up 
an election-year war. 

Now Rushailo's men are, on the basis of a driver's license violation, 
apparently trying to institutionalize Khinshtein. What does Putin think about 
all this? 

- Matt Bivens 

*******

#4
From: "Andrei Liakhov" <liakhova@nortonrose.com>
Subject: RE: 4082-DJ/Vote Fraud
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 

I can confirm that I saw similar results, but as with your source for
various reasons I cannot reveal how I came into possession of figures very
similar to yours - here comes the table which I've been allowed to disclose:

Party/bloc Actual Adjusted 
Communists 33.4 24%
Motherland/All Russia 26.7 12%
Unity/Medved 15.7 21%
Yabloko 16.4 6%
Union of Right Forces 2.2 9%
Zhirinovsky 5.8 6%

The above proves that there is a wide spread belief most probably not
completely unfounded and based on the previous election experience that
these elections were substantially rigged. 
When I was in Moscow in late summer I was shown the opinion poll results of
the support for various groups/parties, which contained a completely
different picture from the one officially span by Russian media at the time
(before Unity was born):

KPRF and allies - 45.2%
M/All Russia - 35.4%
Yabloko - 12.0%
Zhirinovsky - 6.3%
Chubais/Kirienko- 3.1%

I doubt very much that Russian electorate is as dumb and manageable as the
official December 19 results suggest it is. The rigging practice
particularly on such a grand scale will do no good to promote the stability
in the country. The current situation is not dissimilar to the one Russia
had at the beginning of last century, when, as the historic evidence
suggest, results of the election to the IV Duma were rigged on the grand
scale too. We all know the consequences.....

As to the current rigging round - from various conversations I can guess
that the responsibility for the "adjustment" was assigned to the governors
and in the absence of central co-ordination the resultant discrepancy
reflects local efforts - that allowed the federal election staff of Unity
to claim that the result was a complete surprise and unexpected. 
I was also told that the results actually reflect the support for Unity
among local governors, rather than general population. These results could
be expected as throughout the late summer and early autumn the principal
struggle was not for popular votes, but for local governors' support (as
widely reported by the Russian TV) and once a lot of governors defected from
Motherland to Unity the results became more or less predictable - the
governors needed to prove their loyalty to the new master and that was the
best way to do it.

Apologies for the fragmented remarks - I never thought the figures I was
quoted could be true (and apologies to some of my friends who provided the
information and who have the ability to read JRL) and as everybody else
attributed Unity's rise solely to the clever manipulation with the Chechen
events. It appears that we are not in the end of Act 1 of the great Russian
Tragedy, but rather in the very middle of it.....

*******

#5
The Times (UK)
2 February 2000
[for personal use only]
Pyrrhic victory in a war without end
Giles Whittell reports from Moscow on the cost paid in human lives for 
mastery of a ruined city 

THEY stared at us with a mixture of fierce pride, curiosity and amusement: 40 
or 50 rebel fighters armed to the teeth in the fortified courtyard of 
Grozny's Presidential Palace, welcoming a busload of journalists who, like 
them, could only guess at what the Russians had in store for Chechnya. 

That night, four months ago, President Maskhadov vowed to defend every inch 
of his country. Two days later, he warned that if Moscow continued its 
invasion, 'thousands will die". 

Thousands have. At a cost of at least 1,500 Russian lives, and probably many 
more on the Chechen side, including civilians, the battle for Grozny is all 
but over. 

Yesterday's sudden evacuation by most of Grozny's defence force may have been 
triggered by the deaths of two Chechen field commanders. 

Aslanbek Ismailov and Khunkar Pasha Israpilov were reported by the Chechen 
Government's website as killed in action, while the warlord Shamil Basayev, 
Russia's public enemy number one, was said to have had a leg amputated after 
stepping on a mine. 

Whatever prompted the withdrawal, it marks only a hollow victory for the 
Russian Army. 

Its top generals swore they would never "storm" Grozny, since the word 
recalled their devastating losses with that tactic in 1995. But, "obsessed 
with revenge", as one analyst put it, they have stormed the place again in 
all but name. 

In the process they have almost certainly ensured that the next chapter of 
the Chechen nightmare will be a long guerrilla war. 

The chapter now coming to an end began with the first Russian airstrikes last 
September 5. 

Within a month, bombs were tearing holes in the few buildings patched in 
three years of peace. The city was calm, but already emptying of all 
civilians who could afford to go. Only gunmen and the poor - including 
thousands of ethnic Russians - were left. 

The siege effectively started when Russian troops crossed the Terek River on 
October 21. The following day five guided missiles fired from North Ossetia 
ploughed into Grozny's central market, killing at least 137 civilians and 
fighters. 

The deaths galvanised Grozny's defenders, who were already turning its 
suburban blocks of flats into fortresses bristling with machinegun nests and 
sniper turrets, and linked by a maze of tunnels. 

In mid-November Chechnya's second city, Gudermes, fell with barely a shot 
fired. Journalists who had tried for weeks to break Moscow's information 
blockade were at last helicoptered in see "free' Chechnya - a place of 
miserable civilians nervously eyeing an army of occupation. 

We could also hear the constant artillery barrage from high ground over 
Grozny that yesterday yielded its bitter fruit. 

With solid public and political support, the generals issued a notorious 
ultimatum in the first week of December to all civilians left in Grozny. 
Those still there five days later "will be destroyed", they said. The 
international response was swift and outraged, and in response "safe 
corridors" were opened. 

Few dared to use them. I flew to the city's outskirts days later and talked 
to the survivors of a busload of refugees. Their vehicle was down the hill, 
strafed by machineguns and lying in a ditch. 

"The Russians won't leave here alive as they did in 1996," one Chechen 
spokesman, Movladi Udugov, told Anthony Loyd of The Times before the siege of 
Grozny began in earnest. "They may follow us, but they will find only their 
deaths." 

But the Russian Army has been wary of repeating old mistakes, bombing Grozny 
into oblivion before taking it. 

Aslan Maskhadov signalled their success by fleeing in December. To stay would 
have been "to sign his own death sentence", according to an aide. 

Since then, Chechen fighters had one task: to kill as many Russians as 
possible before pulling out. 

The level of their success remains to be assessed, but the true figure will 
be high. 

Russian casualties mounted steadily during the bitter, week-long battle for 
Minutka Square that appeared to have ended yesterday, and most Russian bodies 
were whisked swiftly away to morgues throughout the country. 

As Russian officials yesterday played down reports of the Chechen withdrawal, 
the cost may be unclear, but the one certainty is that in the mountains the 
war will drag on, possibly for years. 

*******

#6
BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE
February 2, 2000
[for personal use only]
Did You Hear the One about Russia's Turnaround?
New Moscow bigwig Mikhail Kasynov is talking up a rosy near-term scenario for 
the troubled nation. Could it be?
By David Fairlamb at the World Economic Forum in Davos

For a nation of pessimists, Russia produces surprisingly hopeful political 
leaders. Mikhail Kasyanov is the latest example. The new First Deputy Prime 
Minister admits that Russia's economic situation is "very fragile." But given 
the right policy mix and continued financial support from the International 
Monetary Fund, he says, growth could easily top 2% this year and accelerate 
strongly in 2001. 

The reasons behind Kasnayov's optimism? For the first time in more than a 
decade, Russia's macroeconomic fundamentals aren't panting on the floor. In 
1999, the economy expanded by 2%, and the government generated a primary 
budget surplus for the first time in years, partly because companies finally 
started paying their taxes on time. Moreover, Moscow actually met the 
financial targets laid down by the IMF. "The situation looks better than it 
has for years," asserts Kasyanov. "We've now got a stable base on which to 
grow."

DROLL HUMOR. Kasyanov, who is expected to become Prime Minister after 
Russia's presidential election in March, has been trying to drum up 
enthusiasm for a Russian recovery among the Western politicians and business 
leaders attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, this week. 
Fluent in English, he impressed most attendees at Davos with his droll humor, 
polished presentation, and strong commitment to shareholder rights. "Building 
a juridical framework in which investors are protected is an absolute 
necessity and a top government priority," he says. "The economy should be 
governed by the rule of law, not decrees put out by the Ministry of Finance." 

His ambitious program doesn't stop there. Kasyanov also says he wants to 
overhaul Russia's chronically inefficient banking system, improve the 
efficiency of personal-tax collection, clamp down on corruption, and make 
far-reaching structural reforms. At the same time, he pledges to improve the 
way economic policy is made and implemented. "We live in an Information Age," 
he says. "That means we've got to involve more people in policy formulation 
and to make policy more openly."

Russian Prime Ministers have committed themselves to reform before, of 
course. And their plans have usually come to nothing, because of widespread 
corruption and endemic political infighting. Why should it be any different 
this time? Kasyanov argues that Russia has turned a corner, claiming that the 
political situation is stable for the first time since the collapse of 
communism. 

POSITION OF POWER. Acting President Vladimir V. Putin is widely expected to 
win the presidency in March. And following last December's parliamentary 
elections, in which parties loyal to him strengthened their hand in the State 
Duma, Putin should be able to pass legislation with a minimum of conflict. 
"Putin will be in a far better position than Yeltsin ever was," says Sergei 
Kiriyenko, a former Prime Minister who's now a liberal member of parliament. 
"There has been a tremendous amount of political consolidation in Russia, and 
now there is strong parliamentary support for the government's economic 
policies."

Still, most Western executives remain skeptical. Rampant corruption, capital 
flight, widespread abuse of shareholder rights, and the brutality of the war 
in Chechnya have frightened away all but the staunchest Western investors. 
And the IMF seems unlikely to hand over more money in the short term, which 
could result in the Central Bank of Russia printing more money, thus fueling 
inflation and destabilizing the economy. "The situation is still very 
uncertain," says George Soros, chairman of Soros Fund Management, a hedge 
fund. "I think it would be a mistake to lend more until we know how things 
will turn out."

Perhaps. To hear Kasyanov tell it, however, a strong government with sound 
policies could soon restore Russia to favor with investors. It's a hopeful 
story, now it just needs the right ending. 

*******

#7
Yavlinskiy's Presidential Candidacy, Policies Viewed 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta
29 January 2000
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Semen Vasechkin under the "Elections" rubric: "The Usual 
Unusual Yavlinskiy" 

The presidential election race, which is getting 
into full swing, is increasingly attracting the attention of political 
scientists, who are trying to asses the attractiveness of various 
candidates in view of their gravitas and the soundness of their electoral 
programs. 

Society has already agreed that only the "Big Four" -- Vladimir Putin, 
Gennadiy Zyuganov, Yevgeniy Primakov, and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy -- can 
realistically take part in the race to win the Kremlin. 

As the Yabloko leader, who completes this list, aptly put it, the 
developing campaign will be a strictly technical one, since the name of 
the winner is known in advance -- Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. 
Yavlinskiy also emphasized that he considers his participation in the 
elections "absolutely vital, since a situation has been created today 
whereby we might have an uncontested election." 

The Yabloko leader is taking a clear-cut program to the election. He 
promises to create a "strong democratic state which will be able to 
protect every individual and will live by the Constitution and laws." In 
spite of being traditional and self-evident, this thesis has a clear 
underlying theme: In a situation where clans of oligarchs, which have 
piratized almost the whole country, are constantly trying to trample upon 
the lawfully elected authorities, the thesis on the state's 
constitutionality becomes particularly attractive. 

Another slogan of the "Number One Yabloko member" is equally obvious -- the 
construction of a socially oriented market economy. Such a slogan will 
undoubtedly be prominently displayed on the banners of the majority of 
contenders for the presidency, but coming from Grigoriy Alekseyevich, it 
is evidence of serious intentions. Let us recall that Yavlinskiy -- the 
author of the famous "500 Days" economic program -- has a serious 
reputation in financial and industrial circles. 

Like many other people, Yavlinskiy intends to "defend human rights and 
also secure the creation of a modern army and put an end to the war in 
Chechnya." At first sight these promises do not seem particularly 
original. Nevertheless, the most varied political forces have already 
started assembling around Yavlinskiy. And this is not just a question of 
Fatherland-All Russia and the Union of Right-Wing Forces, whose 
unexpected Duma alliance with Yabloko moved certain politicians to make 
optimistic forecasts about a single presidential candidate being put 
forward from the "new opposition." 

The organizational committee for Yavlinskiy's nomination is already 
headed by the famous human rights activist Sergey Kovalev, whose name is 
associated with a completely different political party -- Russia's 
Democratic Choice. Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the Socialist Party of 
Russia, is expressing support for him too, and notes: Out of all the 
candidates for the Russian presidency, only the Yabloko leader can gain 
the support of the younger and middle generations at present. 

Anyway, time will tell how accurate such forecasts are. Particularly since 
there is not much waiting time left.

*******

#8
Moskovsky Komsomolets
January 28, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
"DARK HORSE" TECHNOLOGY
Why Hold Election if the Winner Is Known?
By Alexander MINKIN

It is crystal clear to all that by his sudden resignation
Boris Yeltsin nominated Vladimir Putin Russia's next President.
In fact, the self-retired President cancelled presidential
election. All are sure that Putin will win. And this is to happen
because of his approval rating and also because he has
concentrated all power - executive as the acting President and
the Prime Minister, legislative (his control of the Duma), etc.
There is no need to name all the branches and twigs of power:
Putin is enthusiastically supported by the leaders of the "power"
ministries and departments, the artistic intelligentsia, the
frightened governors, such idols of the nation as Anatoly
Chubais, Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Dasha Aslamova, and so on, and
so forth.
Chubais, his face beaming because his plan came true, called
Yeltsin's descent from the throne at his own free will a
courageous and brilliant step by a man of genius.
Was it really courageous? By no means so. The step was
undoubtedly a manifestation of cowardice. The Kremlin was
frightened that Russians will elect a wrong president if they are
given a chance of an honest and careful choice at the election.
Yeltsin was cowed (some say that he "courageously struggled
against it") and he fled, nominating the right one.
Brilliant probably means impeccable and irresistible. Moral
impeccability is not counted. It was a low trick on Russians
which deprived them of the right to choose. It was the case of
something different from monarchial heritage; it was a step of an
absolute dictator: "You will be ruled by the one I will name!"
Irresistible? Unquestionably so as all agreed with it. The
majority are already kissing, licking and lauding him to the
skies.
Even the top leaders of the member countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) followed suit. They
pretended that they do not notice the irony of their own fate.
Over a dozen full-fledged presidents chose a president-in-waiting
as their chairman. What an outrageous manifestation of the lack
of self-respect and telltale flexibility at the same time! But,
then, Eduard Shevardnaze and Geidar Aliyev do not need to learn
flexibility. Their lips will never forget the taste of Leonid
Brezhnev whom they kissed with the passion and absorption of
children sucking fruit drops.
Those who called themselves the opposition also recognize
Putin as the future President. 
Sergei Stepashin (who is No. Two in Yabloko) said that he
will have the "honour" of supporting Putin. (What an ally Yabloko
has found?!)
Grigory Yavlinsky will "participate in the presidential
election so as it should not be an election without an
alternative." By these words he told his electorate that he will
run not to win but in the name of a damned technicality (which
may mean a lot to him but ordinary Russians don't care a damn).
Besides, there is no need to care about the formal keeping of the
election alternative. There will be more than enough rivals for
Putin - from Gennady Zyuganov to Lev Ubozhko.
The problem is that the presidential election will look
impeccable, legitimate and constitutional from the standpoint of
technicalities but in essence they will be the usurpation of
power. It is a peculiar kind of election technologies, the
highest, Kremlin, stage in the development of bureaucracy, which
is "correct in form but a malicious mockery in content," as
Vladimir Lenin aptly put it.
Ella Pamfilova is going to take part in the race "to
encourage women" and Yuri Skuratov "to have the floor to throw
mud at Yeltsin's family (for some reason this man thinks that the
more mud he throws at others the less will remain on him - which
is a sheer delusion).
Even Zyuganov can now count only on the second place in the
race, which is honourable in form but humiliating in content.
Isn't it humiliating to be just another sparring partner for the
regime?
So, is the Kremlin's technology of making a President out of
Putin brilliant and irresistible? No, it is not.
Isn't there a way to thwart the Kremlin's plot cleanly,
honestly, openly and comprehensively, a way which would allow
Russians to elect their President in good faith, calmly and with
deliberate intent, instead of humbly following anyone's
techniques, thereby agreeing to be a pawn in anyone else's game?
There is a very simple way: the presidential election 
should be postponed by eighteen months, till autumn 2001.
It seems that all agree that Putin will win the election in
March. So, there is no need to "elect." Let him work on. He is
already the President. The adjective "acting" does not diminish
his powers by an inch. Now that the other CIS Presidents have
made our "acting" President their chairman, the adjective
"acting" before his title does not prevent him from being the
most important among equals.
He is the President today and his victory is inevitable in
March. Why hold the election then? To elect the President a
President and do it only three months after he took office?
What's the use of holding such frequent elections?
Yeltsin already elected Putin on December 31, 1999. So, let
him work now, and we will elect him in 2001, when we calm down
and see how he works. Right now some people regard him as a "dark
horse." Let them have some time to take a closer look at him. An
eighteen-month probation term is not too long for the one holding
the office of the President of Great Russia. Putin has not been
trained for it. Let him have time for training and appraising his
own achievements.
It is one thing to raise everybody's pension or salary by
March, that is, by the election time, and it is an altogether
different thing to curb inflation next October. By next autumn we
will see both economic results and the results of the war.
This would be also better for Putin. Thus far, he has
displayed an aggressive, go-for-it, psychology and did not care a
bit about where it may lead: he is already the President for the
next four and, maybe, more years. Instead of governing the
country, he has been managing his public relations team (and it
is a big question whether it is he who has been really managing
it).
The looming election prompts Putin to make irresponsible
steps. If it is held in 2001, he will have to display wisdom and
statesmanship, rather than robust energy, and he has to do it as
soon as possible. He is to ensure a real economic recovery and
tangible improvements in people's well-being and safety. Given
the will, eighteen months are enough to arrest crime.
Yes, we will carry him to the Kremlin, shouting "Hurray!",
if he succeeds, at least to a slight degree, in doing that.
If he does not and if the war leads to a catastrophe and the
pension and wage hikes result in growing inflation and poverty
and turn out to be nothing but the continuation of lies, he
should not complain.
The Constitution is the only obstacle for postponing the
election. But after all, constitutions are written by people for
their country, and the Constitution of Russia should serve its
best interests. The State Duma needs only to decide to postpone
the election and the Federation Council -- to approve of its
decision. If it is possible to wage an illegitimate war, why
isn't it possible to legitimately move the election to a later
date?
We have a serious shortage of money. We need to pay three
billion dollars to the West right now and even much more shortly.
As Mikhail Kasyanov has had to admit, 5.5 billion rubles, instead
of the planned 3 billion, have been spent for the war in 
Chechnya out of the federal budget. (They who are at the top are
a peculiar kind of people. Even when they admit something, they
continue to tell lies: first, there have been no allocations for
the war in the federal budget, and, second, as much as 25
billion, not 5.5 billion, have already been shelled out for the
war, and it is not the end yet.)
And being in such dire straits, we are going to spend
billions of rubles for absurd elections! Inasmuch as we believe
that Putin will win them, let us leave him gratis what he already
is. Let him work, for he has been too busy kissing children,
presenting government decorations, planting trees, and rushing
from region to region and staffing his mouth with the bread and
salt on carpet-covered runways of gubernatorial aerodromes.
Dear leaders of the State Duma!
All of you expressed displeasure with Yeltsin's decision to
create a "no-alternative situation." Stand up for the people!
Don't allow mock elections to be imposed on them so as the
"brilliant and courageous" plot be implemented.
Postpone the election and give Putin some time to
demonstrate himself as a politician and a leader and Russians to
understand what he really is and whether he deserves to be the
leader of a great country which has been exhausted by lies and
plunder.
If you, esteemed leaders, do not support this plan, ordinary
citizens can think that you are traitors and your indignation is
false, that you all play as one team in the same game in which
all the moves of the winners and the suitable "oppositionists"
alike are determined in advance. But such a team cannot exist for
a long time. After the election we will see stand-bys become
redundant and dismissed from the team.
There are no objections to the postponement of the election
from the standpoint of honour and reason. Any objections that
might be raised will be prompted by considerations of greed,
cowardice and bureaucratic servility -- no matter how they are
disguised.
Messrs. Zyuganov, Yavlinsky and other presidential hopefuls!
It looks like the offered method suits you, too. It is the rare
occasion when your personal interests coincide with the interests
of the country. How will you explain it to people that you have
not supported the idea to postpone the election? The only
argument you can come up with is faithfulness to the
Constitution. But you cannot deceive people. They know that 
(a) it is not our first Constitution;
(b) you have already violated it; and
(c) the present Constitution stipulates the mechanism of
amendments; and
(d) the required amendment is purely technical, and it would
only concern the term without affecting either liberties
or the foundations.
My fellow citizens! Imagine only one question on the
postponement of elections put on the agenda of the day. Imagine
how this would make spin doctors with their envelopes run from
office to office. They will need several million dollars to
defeat this newspaper article. Because what is offered is honest
technology, as distinct from the dirty one imposed on us. 
Let's assume that the technology of envelopes will make the
Duma majority turn down the postponement of the elections. But
the discussion of this question in the Duma will lay bare venal
deputies, and not only them. The very fact of a dirty struggle
against a clean proposal can have decisive influence on the
outcome of the election, because the present leader is
undoubtedly to be at the head of this struggle.
We see how nervous with impatience the spin doctors are.
They wished the election was already a thing of the past. The two
months that are left to it seem too long a period of time to them
and a very dangerous period, too. What if something happens in
Chechnya? What if the public withdraws its approval and it will
once again be necessary to blow up apartment buildings so as fear
(the horrible fear of people that they may fall asleep in their
apartment not to wake up ever again, the fear for their children
and relatives) justified any military failures and any
casualties?
Chernomyrdin, Kiriyenko, Primakov, Stepashin... In what way
is Putin different from them? Why in terms of popularity rating
has he outpaced all his predecessors and rivals? He succeeded in
that only thanks to the war. His high rating is not based on
anything else.
One and the same important thing is clear from televised
reports from Chechnya almost each day. But we either do not
notice or do not wish to notice it. Every now and then a soldier
lets the truth out of his mouth: "This must be over by the
election, but we will hardly be able to do so." It means that the
inhuman bloody tradition "to seise a town by the holiday" is
very much alive, even if the acting President tells us that
"there is no time schedule and the military decide everything,
proceeding from circumstances."
Do you, Mr. Putin, mean military or political circumstances?

*******

#9
Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 
From: IRASTRAUS@aol.com (Ira Straus)
Subject: Chechnya: Real conspiracies and wild conspiracy theories

It is likely that Sergei Stepashin is telling the truth when he says that 
part of the war in Chechnya (taking back the largely Russian-populated part 
in the north) was planned long before the invasion of Dagestan took place. 

It is also likely that Stepashin is telling the truth when he says that the 
fighting in Dagestan created a delay of several weeks in the launching of the 
war, thus skewing the military timetable to Russia's disadvantage. And that 
taking Grozny and the south was not part of the earlier plan.

Conspiracy theorists quote Stepashin's first point but ignore his other 
points. This is understandable. The first point gives some ground for feeling 
that somelike like a conspiracy took place; the other points undermine the 
ground for believing in a conspiracy. If the Dagestan fighting delayed and 
screwed up the intended timetable of the war for Russia, then it becomes 
pretty illogical to believe that the Dagestan incursion was a plot arranged 
by the Russians for the sake of starting the war. Yet the latter belief is 
the logical cornerstone for most of the conspiracy theories about the war. 

Also, if the war that Russia has conducted after the incursion and bombing 
events has different objectives than the war that had been intended, then 
this is evidence, albeit not conclusive evidence, that those events were 
perceived by Russian leaders as genuine external events, not as manipulations 
from within their own conspiracy, and had a major impact on Russian 
intentions. 

Indeed, Stepashin asserted in the same commentary that it is nonsense to 
think that the bombs in Moscow were Russian staged events, and that he knows 
what he is talking about on this matter. This comment is also ignored in the 
conspiracy theories.

There is a striking lack of consistency in the treatment of Stepashin's 
comments. Stepashin's comments are treated as gospel truth in some parts 
where they can serve to encourage the impression that there was some kind of 
conspiracy. They are simply ignored on the points where they are incompatible 
with that impression. This is suggestive of a will to believe something.

Stepashin's statement also leaves uncertain whether starting the war was a 
settled commitment shared by all the powers that be. In light of what we know 
about the functioning of bureaucratic systems, it is likely that some parts 
of the power structure were unaware of it, and other parts accepted it only 
as a contingency plan by some of the parts of the power structure. In light 
of the fact that the actual war has goals different from the limited ones in 
the plans discussed by Stepashin, it is likely that those plans had to some 
degree a status of contingency plans, and the reason the war started in a 
manner compatible with those plans is simply that those were the best plans 
that were immediately available when the incursion and bombing events took 
place.

For every real conspiracy, there are a thousand conspiracy theories. The 
revelation of any real conspiracy on the part of Russians leads nowadays to 
the spreading of the thousand other conspiracy theories, each one of them in 
a tone as if it were the revelation of the true story. It's somewhat like
the 
way every real conspiracy revealed in Watergate times seemed to give people 
license to believe every other kind of wild suspicion against the Nixon 
Administration and the U.S. Government that might have already been floating 
around in their minds.

In the present case, we have had the probably accurate statement that there 
was something like a conspiracy in the Russian military to re-initiate the 
war with Chechnya. I'm using the word "conspiracy" a bit loosely here; I mean 
a publicly undisclosed military plan which goes beyond mere contingency 
planning to be an actual intention on the part of at least some of the power 
structures, and that runs contrary to the public rhetoric about the policy of 
the government. What makes the war plans seem especially conspiratorial now, 
after the fact, is what in the interim: there was the fighting in Dagestan 
and bombings in Moscow, and these were treated as official reasons for a war, 
whereas now we know that in reality these probably ended up just providing an 
excuse for something that was already intended. This shows that Russia is 
displaying public relations dishonesty in making use of pretexts for war. 
However, such behavior is an all-too-normal thing; it is not the same thing 
as a conspiracy to create the pretexts.

The widely-quoted portion of Stepashin's statement is not much corroborated. 
If it tends to have some credibility, this is due at best to circumstantial 
evidence. It is at least believed that the war was well-planned; although 
some people are beginning to doubt this, as it drags on and Russian 
casualties mount, and as the objectives keep shifting. People in the West -- 
especially those who have been Russia-friendly -- have tended to trust Mr. 
Stepashin and haven't subjected him to the kind of suspicion that they dole 
out so liberally to others; even though it is at least conceivable that he 
could have his own political motives. 

Anyway, let's assume that what he said was true about a re-opening of the war 
having been planned in advance. That'll be step one for this analysis. So far 
so good. 

The next step is that this statement of Stepashin gets treated as a license 
to believe every conspiracy theory in the book; even theories that would be 
impossible if Stepashin's statement were true. Some of these conspiracy 
theories are at least half-plausible, like the one that says that Russian 
intelligence arranged the bombings in Moscow, even if they are contrary to 
Stepashin's other assertions. Others are highly implausible, like the one 
that says that Russian intelligence arranged the Chechen incursions into 
Dagestan. 

Obvious facts, like that the Russian leadership made opportunistic use of the 
bombings and incursions and saw them as convenient, get twisted into saying 
that Russians planned them. Inevitable facts, like that the Russians 
unavoidably had contact over the last several years with Chechen criminal 
gangs, kidnappers, radicals like Basayev, etc., make for availability of 
numerous bits of information about Russian involvement with these people, 
which can easily be presented in an incriminating style. 

The Chechen incursions into Dagestan had precursors going back some time 
before the plans for re-invading Chechnya even got started under Stepashin's 
timetable. It's pretty unlikely that those precursors were sponsored or 
encouraged by the Russians. That puts any later "conspiracy" the resume the 
war in a different color. The earlier incursions into Dagestan, coupled with 
the kidnapping industry and criminality, are likely to have been real 
motivations, even if the later incursions were only confirmation of this not 
the original motivation.

Did the Russians count on the likeihood of a recurrence of some such events 
in Dagestan, as something that would give them an excuse to attack? Maybe so, 
but that would not be a conspiracy. Did some Russians prepare themselves to 
make good use of it in case some Chechen extremists did once again make an 
incursion? Quite likely. 

Did Russians stop taking their normal precautions against such attacks, or 
even lure the Chechen extremists to repeat the adventure, so that Russia 
would have something to seize upon? This is possible, and it really would be 
a conspiracy of sorts, although not in the way the word is usually 
understood, i.e. a situation in which Russia was holding all the strings and 
set all the puppets into motion by its own will. 

Meanwhile, it has also been called a conspiracy, that Russia did not respond 
militarily the first time there was such an incursion into Dagestan. And it 
has been called a folly, that it did respond militarily the more recent time. 
Damned if they do, damned if they don't. The normal explanation -- an 
historical evolution in the conflict, in which there is restraint and 
unpreparedness in face of the first provocations, less restraint and greater 
preparedness in face of later provocations -- gets lost in favor of speaking 
always in the accusatory case. Everything becomes a conspiracy, and every 
contradictory conspiracy theory gets treated as truth, once people feel that 
some kind of moral authorization has been created to treat all Russian 
actions in the region as a conspiracy.

Staging of repeats of an original tragedy is not unusual these days. It was 
true that Muslims staged a few of the massacres of themselves in Bosnia, to 
dramatize better the many authentic massacres that were not on camera vividly 
enough at the right moment to get an international response. This does not 
mean that the whole business was a conspiracy, or that the conspiracy was the 
most important thing, or that the victimization of Bosnian Muslims was 
unreal. Appearing as the Victim is an indispensable part of public relations 
nowadays, and unfortunately, this has led on a number of occasions to staging 
of victimization events. That leaves it a complex matter for the outside 
world to determine whether, in the longer sweep of things, something like the 
stated victimization did occur and really was the main motivation for the 
conclusion drawn by the alleged Victim, even if the dramatized event itself 
comes under suspicion of being staged by the Victim him/herself.

It is also curious that a cluster of conspiracy theories is always built 
around a single enemy-conspirator. Of course, there can be a similar cluster 
of conspiracy theories on the other side, reversing the enemy/target of 
suspicion.

Thus, one could easily spin out all kinds of theories about Chechen 
conspiracies. There would be ample evidence for these theories, probably more 
than for the Russia-as-conspirator theory. One could also spin out theories 
about Western conspiracies to encourage the Chechens into fighting; since the 
West is widely believed by people in the region to be supporting the rebels, 
and since Maskhadov himself has described the rebels as serving the interest 
of the West, it would be easy to believe such theories. One could also talk 
of Western conspiracies to lure the Russians into this war which will ruin 
Russia, thus having it both ways. 

All these opposite-side conspiracy theories are popular in Russia. It is not 
hard to see how dangerous it is to world peace that Russians should have 
started believing such damned-both-ways conspiracy theories -- that the war 
in Chechnya is both a Western conspiracy to break up the Russian Federation 
by encouraging the Chechens to split off, and simultaneously a Western 
conspiracy to tear Russia apart by luring Russians into a losing war in 
Chechnya. It should alert us to the dangers inherent in anyone giving 
careless credence to any and all conspiracy theories directed against some 
selected boogeyman.

Recent treatments of Stepashin's statement might lead one to think that it 
was a pure revelation from on high, and an opening of a crack through which 
we can see a hidden universe that operates by phantasmagorical laws and 
purposes. It isn't such a revelation. It's a statement by an ordinary human 
being. Probably mostly a true statement. But subject to the normal laws of 
consistency, contradiction, and connection to the real world.

Critical intelligence has to be maintained. The incompatibility between the 
wilder conspiracy theories and Stepashin's own statement needs to be noticed. 
The internal contradictions within and amongst those wilder theories 
themselves also need to be noticed. None of this is conclusive proof against 
the wilder theories, but it is makes it clear that Stepashin's statement adds 
nothing to their probability, if anything the opposite. 

Some of the wilder conspiracy theories might nevertheless be true. Their 
truth or falsity is an important matter. Which is why it is important to 
evaluate the evidence on them accurately. And to have evidence for them that 
goes beyond the mere desire to believe them.

*******

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