February 2,
2000
This Date's Issues: 4083 4084
Johnson's Russia List
#4084
2 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: The Kremlin Is Looking For A Prime Minister For
The Future President. JUDGING BY REQUIREMENTS, IDEAL CANDIDATE IS A PERSON RESEMBLING ANATOLY
CHUBAIS.
2. AP: Albright Makes No Headway With Putin.
3. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: 3 Questions To Pose for The Kremlin.
4. Andrei Liakhov: RE 4082-DJ/Vote Fraud.
5. The Times (UK): Pyrrhic victory in a war without end. Giles Whittell
reports from Moscow on the cost paid in human lives for mastery of a ruined city.
6. BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE: David Fairlamb, Did You Hear the One about
Russia's Turnaround? New Moscow bigwig Mikhail Kasynov is talking up a rosy near-term scenario for the troubled nation. Could it be?
7. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Semen Vasechkin, The Usual Unusual
Yavlinskiy.(Yavlinskiy's Presidential Candidacy, Policies Viewed)
8. Moskovsky Komsomolets: Alexander Minkin, "DARK HORSE" TECHNOLOGY.
Why Hold Election if the Winner Is Known?
9. Ira Straus: Chechnya: Real conspiracies and wild conspiracy theories.]
*******
#1
Russia Today press summaries
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
2 February 2000
The Kremlin Is Looking For A Prime Minister For The Future President
JUDGING BY REQUIREMENTS, IDEAL CANDIDATE IS A PERSON RESEMBLING ANATOLY
CHUBAIS
Summary
Russian political life has become rather sluggish since President Yeltsin's
abduction on December 31. Nothing can excite the political elite - not even
the upcoming presidential election. Everyone seems to have put up with the
fact the Acting President Vladimir Putin will throw away the first word in
his title for the next four years.
In the two next months, the Kremlin will have to make a decision on its
candidate for prime minister - the number two post in the state hierarchy.
The requirements for a candidate are not that numerous. He has to be a young,
pragmatic professional who is known to the country and is able to conduct
tough and even unpopular reforms. And the new premier should be a politician.
The Kremlin gave the odds to Mikhail Kasyanov when he was appointed the only
first deputy premier in the government. Possibly, they wanted to see how he
performs in the post. And, in principle, Kasyanov satisfies the Kremlin’s
criteria, with one exception. In the past month, he has become a public
politician. The Kremlin doesn’t exclude his candidacy, but considers other
candidates as well. Among them are: the former deputy prime minister from
Yabloko Mikhail Zadornov and Duma budget committee chairman Aleksander
Zhukov. But the most serious contender for Kasyanov is RAO UES head Anatoly
Chubais - a multi-functional official, who has worked as first deputy prime
minister and head of presidential administration under Yeltsin. However,
Chubais will hardly be appointed from the beginning - his reputation with
Russian voters is far from being good.
*******
#2
Albright Makes No Headway With Putin
2 February 2000
By BARRY SCHWEID
MOSCOW (AP) - Throwing away his cue cards, acting Russian President Vladimir
Putin debated his military offensive in Chechnya and arms control issues for
nearly three hours today with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
Afterward, Albright described the new leader as a ``problem-solver,'' but
told reporters she had not swayed him to stop the pounding Russian forces are
carrying out in the rebellious republic.
Still, Albright said, he authorized Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to take up
with her a U.S. proposal to send a mission to Chechnya to make what Albright
called a ``humanitarian needs assessment'' and also ``took on board'' her
suggestion that more reporters be permitted to go there.
Overall, Albright described their meeting in Putin's Kremlin's office as
intense but pleasant.
Clearly impressed with the former KGB domestic intelligence chief, who was
named acting president by Boris Yeltsin in a surprise New Year's Eve
retirement announcement, Albright said: ``Everybody is engaged in
psychobabble about him. Everybody ought to watch what he does.
``He obviously is a Russian patriot,'' she said. ``He heard what I had to
say. It is not dispositive for them.''
For his part, Putin opened the session with a few remarks while their
pictures were being taken.
He described Russia's approach to Chechnya as resolute, and said his
government was being subjected to ``certain pressure'' - evidently referring
to the energetic U.S. campaign to get Russia to let up there.
``We have serious differences,'' Putin said. But, he said, ``At the same
time, we have our relationship as between great and important powers.''
A senior U.S. official who attended the meeting described Putin as ``soft
spoken and steely.'' He said the acting president promised to try to reform
Russia's tax code, which has been the target of complaints by President
Clinton, and Albright said he pledged to push for ratification by the Russian
parliament of the 1993 treaty to make deep cuts in U.S. and Russian
long-range nuclear warheads.
Albright appealed in the meeting and earlier in a speech, for Russia to do
more to control its export of nuclear technology. She told future Russian
diplomats at their academy that Russia had made a solid start, at least on
paper, with a new export control program.
``Far more needs to be done to address this serious problem - a commitment at
all levels to better implementation, better enforcement, better control of
exports,'' Albright said.
Specifically, she said Russia and the United States share an interest in
preventing the spread of nuclear and ballistic missile capability in the
Middle East and on the Korean peninsula.
And, she said, both countries should eliminate their stockpiles of deadly
chemical weapons,
``I know we are going through a kind of strange period in U.S.-Russian
relations,'' Albright said in a response to a question after the speech.
``But I hope very much we will get through it.''
Albright also offered assurances that ``the United States is seeking
partnership, not dominance,'' in its relationship with Moscow.
Asked about Iran, she said the Clinton administration was trying to open a
government-to-government dialogue but Tehran would have to stop its support
for terrorism, end its opposition to peacemaking in the Middle Ease and cease
trying to develop weapons of mass destruction.
Sergei Ivanov, Russia's security chief, told Sandy Berger, security assistant
to President Clinton, in December that Russia was doing all it could to
prevent the proliferation of weapons and wants more constructive cooperation
from the United States.
``There can be no doubt that Russia is exerting maximum effort in observing
its commitments in this sphere,'' Ivanov told Berger, according to the
Interfax news agency.
The United States has accused Russia of not doing enough to prevent weapons
technology from leaking to countries such as Iran and Syria.
Ivanov said criticism from the United States was not helping relations
already chilled by Russia's military campaign in breakaway Chechnya, NATO's
air campaign in Kosovo earlier in the year and U.S. desires to modify a
missile defense treaty.
``Our dialogue would be more beneficial if used to promptly identify and
punish those who breach export control rules, instead of escalating tension
in overall bilateral relations,'' Ivanov told Berger, according to Interfax.
The United States this spring imposed sanctions on several Russian companies
believed to have sold anti-tank missiles to Syria, which the State Department
accuses of funding terrorists.
Albright, winding up 2 1/2 days of talks, said the United States and Russia
could overcome their disagreements and work together on both dangers and
opportunities in the new century.
``The logic of cooperation is powerful,'' she said. ``Both of our countries
share an interest in preventing any nukes form becoming `loose nukes,''' she
said.
********
#3
Moscow Times
February 2, 2000
EDITORIAL: 3 Questions To Pose for The Kremlin
Acting President Vladimir Putin is someone who likes to know the details. He
keeps informed about what is happening in Russia, he insists on being kept
informed, and he is in charge.
And when the public has sought Putin's stance on a matter, Putin has at times
complied. Witness the furor over the Unity-Communist deal installing Gennady
Seleznyov as Duma speaker: Putin eventually did come on national television
with his opinions on that event. They may have left some unconvinced or
unsatisfied, but the gesture in itself is important - particularly after
years of Boris Yeltsin's long, erratic silences.
With that in mind, we offer three questions that should be put to Putin:
-What is the acting president's stance on the Swiss warrant put out for Pavel
Borodin's arrest?
Borodin used to run the murky Kremlin household affairs directorate -
basically, that directorate administers former Soviet Communist Party
property left in Kremlin hands. And Putin was briefly Borodin's deputy at the
directorate.
Now a major foreign power feels certain enough that Borodin is corrupt enough
to seek his arrest, despite the obvious danger of provoking an international
incident. What does Putin think?
-What is his stance on the detention of Radio Liberty's Andrei Babitsky?
Babitsky has offered courageous reports out of Grozny and other war zone
areas. Two weeks ago he disappeared in Chechnya; he recently re-emerged, in
reports that Russian authorities have detained him. The Russian government
says it is contemplating formal charges against Babitsky for "participating
in an armed formation"; some reports say Babitsky is being held in
less-than-lovely conditions in an Urus-Martan basement.
Radio Liberty is a U.S. government-funded organization, so to target Babitsky
is to flirt, again, with provoking an international incident. What does Putin
think?
-What is his stance on the Interior Ministry's efforts to force Moskovsky
Komsomolets journalist Alexander Khinshtein to undergo a psychiatric exam?
Khinshtein has picked some nasty fights with Interior Minister Vladimir
Rushailo. He is also the author of a now-famous MK article that purported to
be a transcript of a telephone conversation between arch-oligarch Boris
Berezovsky and Chechen rebels, in which the two sides conspire to conjure up
an election-year war.
Now Rushailo's men are, on the basis of a driver's license violation,
apparently trying to institutionalize Khinshtein. What does Putin think about
all this?
- Matt Bivens
*******
#4
From: "Andrei Liakhov" <liakhova@nortonrose.com>
Subject: RE: 4082-DJ/Vote Fraud
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000
I can confirm that I saw similar results, but as with your source for
various reasons I cannot reveal how I came into possession of figures very
similar to yours - here comes the table which I've been allowed to disclose:
Party/bloc Actual Adjusted
Communists 33.4 24%
Motherland/All Russia 26.7 12%
Unity/Medved 15.7 21%
Yabloko 16.4 6%
Union of Right Forces 2.2 9%
Zhirinovsky 5.8 6%
The above proves that there is a wide spread belief most probably not
completely unfounded and based on the previous election experience that
these elections were substantially rigged.
When I was in Moscow in late summer I was shown the opinion poll results of
the support for various groups/parties, which contained a completely
different picture from the one officially span by Russian media at the time
(before Unity was born):
KPRF and allies - 45.2%
M/All Russia - 35.4%
Yabloko - 12.0%
Zhirinovsky - 6.3%
Chubais/Kirienko- 3.1%
I doubt very much that Russian electorate is as dumb and manageable as the
official December 19 results suggest it is. The rigging practice
particularly on such a grand scale will do no good to promote the stability
in the country. The current situation is not dissimilar to the one Russia
had at the beginning of last century, when, as the historic evidence
suggest, results of the election to the IV Duma were rigged on the grand
scale too. We all know the consequences.....
As to the current rigging round - from various conversations I can guess
that the responsibility for the "adjustment" was assigned to the governors
and in the absence of central co-ordination the resultant discrepancy
reflects local efforts - that allowed the federal election staff of Unity
to claim that the result was a complete surprise and unexpected.
I was also told that the results actually reflect the support for Unity
among local governors, rather than general population. These results could
be expected as throughout the late summer and early autumn the principal
struggle was not for popular votes, but for local governors' support (as
widely reported by the Russian TV) and once a lot of governors defected from
Motherland to Unity the results became more or less predictable - the
governors needed to prove their loyalty to the new master and that was the
best way to do it.
Apologies for the fragmented remarks - I never thought the figures I was
quoted could be true (and apologies to some of my friends who provided the
information and who have the ability to read JRL) and as everybody else
attributed Unity's rise solely to the clever manipulation with the Chechen
events. It appears that we are not in the end of Act 1 of the great Russian
Tragedy, but rather in the very middle of it.....
*******
#5
The Times (UK)
2 February 2000
[for personal use only]
Pyrrhic victory in a war without end
Giles Whittell reports from Moscow on the cost paid in human lives for
mastery of a ruined city
THEY stared at us with a mixture of fierce pride, curiosity and amusement: 40
or 50 rebel fighters armed to the teeth in the fortified courtyard of
Grozny's Presidential Palace, welcoming a busload of journalists who, like
them, could only guess at what the Russians had in store for Chechnya.
That night, four months ago, President Maskhadov vowed to defend every inch
of his country. Two days later, he warned that if Moscow continued its
invasion, 'thousands will die".
Thousands have. At a cost of at least 1,500 Russian lives, and probably many
more on the Chechen side, including civilians, the battle for Grozny is all
but over.
Yesterday's sudden evacuation by most of Grozny's defence force may have been
triggered by the deaths of two Chechen field commanders.
Aslanbek Ismailov and Khunkar Pasha Israpilov were reported by the Chechen
Government's website as killed in action, while the warlord Shamil Basayev,
Russia's public enemy number one, was said to have had a leg amputated after
stepping on a mine.
Whatever prompted the withdrawal, it marks only a hollow victory for the
Russian Army.
Its top generals swore they would never "storm" Grozny, since the word
recalled their devastating losses with that tactic in 1995. But, "obsessed
with revenge", as one analyst put it, they have stormed the place again in
all but name.
In the process they have almost certainly ensured that the next chapter of
the Chechen nightmare will be a long guerrilla war.
The chapter now coming to an end began with the first Russian airstrikes last
September 5.
Within a month, bombs were tearing holes in the few buildings patched in
three years of peace. The city was calm, but already emptying of all
civilians who could afford to go. Only gunmen and the poor - including
thousands of ethnic Russians - were left.
The siege effectively started when Russian troops crossed the Terek River on
October 21. The following day five guided missiles fired from North Ossetia
ploughed into Grozny's central market, killing at least 137 civilians and
fighters.
The deaths galvanised Grozny's defenders, who were already turning its
suburban blocks of flats into fortresses bristling with machinegun nests and
sniper turrets, and linked by a maze of tunnels.
In mid-November Chechnya's second city, Gudermes, fell with barely a shot
fired. Journalists who had tried for weeks to break Moscow's information
blockade were at last helicoptered in see "free' Chechnya - a place of
miserable civilians nervously eyeing an army of occupation.
We could also hear the constant artillery barrage from high ground over
Grozny that yesterday yielded its bitter fruit.
With solid public and political support, the generals issued a notorious
ultimatum in the first week of December to all civilians left in Grozny.
Those still there five days later "will be destroyed", they said. The
international response was swift and outraged, and in response "safe
corridors" were opened.
Few dared to use them. I flew to the city's outskirts days later and talked
to the survivors of a busload of refugees. Their vehicle was down the hill,
strafed by machineguns and lying in a ditch.
"The Russians won't leave here alive as they did in 1996," one Chechen
spokesman, Movladi Udugov, told Anthony Loyd of The Times before the siege of
Grozny began in earnest. "They may follow us, but they will find only their
deaths."
But the Russian Army has been wary of repeating old mistakes, bombing Grozny
into oblivion before taking it.
Aslan Maskhadov signalled their success by fleeing in December. To stay would
have been "to sign his own death sentence", according to an aide.
Since then, Chechen fighters had one task: to kill as many Russians as
possible before pulling out.
The level of their success remains to be assessed, but the true figure will
be high.
Russian casualties mounted steadily during the bitter, week-long battle for
Minutka Square that appeared to have ended yesterday, and most Russian bodies
were whisked swiftly away to morgues throughout the country.
As Russian officials yesterday played down reports of the Chechen withdrawal,
the cost may be unclear, but the one certainty is that in the mountains the
war will drag on, possibly for years.
*******
#6
BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE
February 2, 2000
[for personal use only]
Did You Hear the One about Russia's Turnaround?
New Moscow bigwig Mikhail Kasynov is talking up a rosy near-term scenario for
the troubled nation. Could it be?
By David Fairlamb at the World Economic Forum in Davos
For a nation of pessimists, Russia produces surprisingly hopeful political
leaders. Mikhail Kasyanov is the latest example. The new First Deputy Prime
Minister admits that Russia's economic situation is "very fragile." But given
the right policy mix and continued financial support from the International
Monetary Fund, he says, growth could easily top 2% this year and accelerate
strongly in 2001.
The reasons behind Kasnayov's optimism? For the first time in more than a
decade, Russia's macroeconomic fundamentals aren't panting on the floor. In
1999, the economy expanded by 2%, and the government generated a primary
budget surplus for the first time in years, partly because companies finally
started paying their taxes on time. Moreover, Moscow actually met the
financial targets laid down by the IMF. "The situation looks better than it
has for years," asserts Kasyanov. "We've now got a stable base on which to
grow."
DROLL HUMOR. Kasyanov, who is expected to become Prime Minister after
Russia's presidential election in March, has been trying to drum up
enthusiasm for a Russian recovery among the Western politicians and business
leaders attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, this week.
Fluent in English, he impressed most attendees at Davos with his droll humor,
polished presentation, and strong commitment to shareholder rights. "Building
a juridical framework in which investors are protected is an absolute
necessity and a top government priority," he says. "The economy should be
governed by the rule of law, not decrees put out by the Ministry of Finance."
His ambitious program doesn't stop there. Kasyanov also says he wants to
overhaul Russia's chronically inefficient banking system, improve the
efficiency of personal-tax collection, clamp down on corruption, and make
far-reaching structural reforms. At the same time, he pledges to improve the
way economic policy is made and implemented. "We live in an Information Age,"
he says. "That means we've got to involve more people in policy formulation
and to make policy more openly."
Russian Prime Ministers have committed themselves to reform before, of
course. And their plans have usually come to nothing, because of widespread
corruption and endemic political infighting. Why should it be any different
this time? Kasyanov argues that Russia has turned a corner, claiming that the
political situation is stable for the first time since the collapse of
communism.
POSITION OF POWER. Acting President Vladimir V. Putin is widely expected to
win the presidency in March. And following last December's parliamentary
elections, in which parties loyal to him strengthened their hand in the State
Duma, Putin should be able to pass legislation with a minimum of conflict.
"Putin will be in a far better position than Yeltsin ever was," says Sergei
Kiriyenko, a former Prime Minister who's now a liberal member of parliament.
"There has been a tremendous amount of political consolidation in Russia, and
now there is strong parliamentary support for the government's economic
policies."
Still, most Western executives remain skeptical. Rampant corruption, capital
flight, widespread abuse of shareholder rights, and the brutality of the war
in Chechnya have frightened away all but the staunchest Western investors.
And the IMF seems unlikely to hand over more money in the short term, which
could result in the Central Bank of Russia printing more money, thus fueling
inflation and destabilizing the economy. "The situation is still very
uncertain," says George Soros, chairman of Soros Fund Management, a hedge
fund. "I think it would be a mistake to lend more until we know how things
will turn out."
Perhaps. To hear Kasyanov tell it, however, a strong government with sound
policies could soon restore Russia to favor with investors. It's a hopeful
story, now it just needs the right ending.
*******
#7
Yavlinskiy's Presidential Candidacy, Policies Viewed
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
29 January 2000
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Semen Vasechkin under the "Elections" rubric: "The Usual
Unusual Yavlinskiy"
The presidential election race, which is getting
into full swing, is increasingly attracting the attention of political
scientists, who are trying to asses the attractiveness of various
candidates in view of their gravitas and the soundness of their electoral
programs.
Society has already agreed that only the "Big Four" -- Vladimir Putin,
Gennadiy Zyuganov, Yevgeniy Primakov, and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy -- can
realistically take part in the race to win the Kremlin.
As the Yabloko leader, who completes this list, aptly put it, the
developing campaign will be a strictly technical one, since the name of
the winner is known in advance -- Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
Yavlinskiy also emphasized that he considers his participation in the
elections "absolutely vital, since a situation has been created today
whereby we might have an uncontested election."
The Yabloko leader is taking a clear-cut program to the election. He
promises to create a "strong democratic state which will be able to
protect every individual and will live by the Constitution and laws." In
spite of being traditional and self-evident, this thesis has a clear
underlying theme: In a situation where clans of oligarchs, which have
piratized almost the whole country, are constantly trying to trample upon
the lawfully elected authorities, the thesis on the state's
constitutionality becomes particularly attractive.
Another slogan of the "Number One Yabloko member" is equally obvious -- the
construction of a socially oriented market economy. Such a slogan will
undoubtedly be prominently displayed on the banners of the majority of
contenders for the presidency, but coming from Grigoriy Alekseyevich, it
is evidence of serious intentions. Let us recall that Yavlinskiy -- the
author of the famous "500 Days" economic program -- has a serious
reputation in financial and industrial circles.
Like many other people, Yavlinskiy intends to "defend human rights and
also secure the creation of a modern army and put an end to the war in
Chechnya." At first sight these promises do not seem particularly
original. Nevertheless, the most varied political forces have already
started assembling around Yavlinskiy. And this is not just a question of
Fatherland-All Russia and the Union of Right-Wing Forces, whose
unexpected Duma alliance with Yabloko moved certain politicians to make
optimistic forecasts about a single presidential candidate being put
forward from the "new opposition."
The organizational committee for Yavlinskiy's nomination is already
headed by the famous human rights activist Sergey Kovalev, whose name is
associated with a completely different political party -- Russia's
Democratic Choice. Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the Socialist Party of
Russia, is expressing support for him too, and notes: Out of all the
candidates for the Russian presidency, only the Yabloko leader can gain
the support of the younger and middle generations at present.
Anyway, time will tell how accurate such forecasts are. Particularly since
there is not much waiting time left.
*******
#8
Moskovsky Komsomolets
January 28, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
"DARK HORSE" TECHNOLOGY
Why Hold Election if the Winner Is Known?
By Alexander MINKIN
It is crystal clear to all that by his sudden resignation
Boris Yeltsin nominated Vladimir Putin Russia's next President.
In fact, the self-retired President cancelled presidential
election. All are sure that Putin will win. And this is to happen
because of his approval rating and also because he has
concentrated all power - executive as the acting President and
the Prime Minister, legislative (his control of the Duma), etc.
There is no need to name all the branches and twigs of power:
Putin is enthusiastically supported by the leaders of the "power"
ministries and departments, the artistic intelligentsia, the
frightened governors, such idols of the nation as Anatoly
Chubais, Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Dasha Aslamova, and so on, and
so forth.
Chubais, his face beaming because his plan came true, called
Yeltsin's descent from the throne at his own free will a
courageous and brilliant step by a man of genius.
Was it really courageous? By no means so. The step was
undoubtedly a manifestation of cowardice. The Kremlin was
frightened that Russians will elect a wrong president if they are
given a chance of an honest and careful choice at the election.
Yeltsin was cowed (some say that he "courageously struggled
against it") and he fled, nominating the right one.
Brilliant probably means impeccable and irresistible. Moral
impeccability is not counted. It was a low trick on Russians
which deprived them of the right to choose. It was the case of
something different from monarchial heritage; it was a step of an
absolute dictator: "You will be ruled by the one I will name!"
Irresistible? Unquestionably so as all agreed with it. The
majority are already kissing, licking and lauding him to the
skies.
Even the top leaders of the member countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) followed suit. They
pretended that they do not notice the irony of their own fate.
Over a dozen full-fledged presidents chose a president-in-waiting
as their chairman. What an outrageous manifestation of the lack
of self-respect and telltale flexibility at the same time! But,
then, Eduard Shevardnaze and Geidar Aliyev do not need to learn
flexibility. Their lips will never forget the taste of Leonid
Brezhnev whom they kissed with the passion and absorption of
children sucking fruit drops.
Those who called themselves the opposition also recognize
Putin as the future President.
Sergei Stepashin (who is No. Two in Yabloko) said that he
will have the "honour" of supporting Putin. (What an ally Yabloko
has found?!)
Grigory Yavlinsky will "participate in the presidential
election so as it should not be an election without an
alternative." By these words he told his electorate that he will
run not to win but in the name of a damned technicality (which
may mean a lot to him but ordinary Russians don't care a damn).
Besides, there is no need to care about the formal keeping of the
election alternative. There will be more than enough rivals for
Putin - from Gennady Zyuganov to Lev Ubozhko.
The problem is that the presidential election will look
impeccable, legitimate and constitutional from the standpoint of
technicalities but in essence they will be the usurpation of
power. It is a peculiar kind of election technologies, the
highest, Kremlin, stage in the development of bureaucracy, which
is "correct in form but a malicious mockery in content," as
Vladimir Lenin aptly put it.
Ella Pamfilova is going to take part in the race "to
encourage women" and Yuri Skuratov "to have the floor to throw
mud at Yeltsin's family (for some reason this man thinks that the
more mud he throws at others the less will remain on him - which
is a sheer delusion).
Even Zyuganov can now count only on the second place in the
race, which is honourable in form but humiliating in content.
Isn't it humiliating to be just another sparring partner for the
regime?
So, is the Kremlin's technology of making a President out of
Putin brilliant and irresistible? No, it is not.
Isn't there a way to thwart the Kremlin's plot cleanly,
honestly, openly and comprehensively, a way which would allow
Russians to elect their President in good faith, calmly and with
deliberate intent, instead of humbly following anyone's
techniques, thereby agreeing to be a pawn in anyone else's game?
There is a very simple way: the presidential election
should be postponed by eighteen months, till autumn 2001.
It seems that all agree that Putin will win the election in
March. So, there is no need to "elect." Let him work on. He is
already the President. The adjective "acting" does not diminish
his powers by an inch. Now that the other CIS Presidents have
made our "acting" President their chairman, the adjective
"acting" before his title does not prevent him from being the
most important among equals.
He is the President today and his victory is inevitable in
March. Why hold the election then? To elect the President a
President and do it only three months after he took office?
What's the use of holding such frequent elections?
Yeltsin already elected Putin on December 31, 1999. So, let
him work now, and we will elect him in 2001, when we calm down
and see how he works. Right now some people regard him as a "dark
horse." Let them have some time to take a closer look at him. An
eighteen-month probation term is not too long for the one holding
the office of the President of Great Russia. Putin has not been
trained for it. Let him have time for training and appraising his
own achievements.
It is one thing to raise everybody's pension or salary by
March, that is, by the election time, and it is an altogether
different thing to curb inflation next October. By next autumn we
will see both economic results and the results of the war.
This would be also better for Putin. Thus far, he has
displayed an aggressive, go-for-it, psychology and did not care a
bit about where it may lead: he is already the President for the
next four and, maybe, more years. Instead of governing the
country, he has been managing his public relations team (and it
is a big question whether it is he who has been really managing
it).
The looming election prompts Putin to make irresponsible
steps. If it is held in 2001, he will have to display wisdom and
statesmanship, rather than robust energy, and he has to do it as
soon as possible. He is to ensure a real economic recovery and
tangible improvements in people's well-being and safety. Given
the will, eighteen months are enough to arrest crime.
Yes, we will carry him to the Kremlin, shouting "Hurray!",
if he succeeds, at least to a slight degree, in doing that.
If he does not and if the war leads to a catastrophe and the
pension and wage hikes result in growing inflation and poverty
and turn out to be nothing but the continuation of lies, he
should not complain.
The Constitution is the only obstacle for postponing the
election. But after all, constitutions are written by people for
their country, and the Constitution of Russia should serve its
best interests. The State Duma needs only to decide to postpone
the election and the Federation Council -- to approve of its
decision. If it is possible to wage an illegitimate war, why
isn't it possible to legitimately move the election to a later
date?
We have a serious shortage of money. We need to pay three
billion dollars to the West right now and even much more shortly.
As Mikhail Kasyanov has had to admit, 5.5 billion rubles, instead
of the planned 3 billion, have been spent for the war in
Chechnya out of the federal budget. (They who are at the top are
a peculiar kind of people. Even when they admit something, they
continue to tell lies: first, there have been no allocations for
the war in the federal budget, and, second, as much as 25
billion, not 5.5 billion, have already been shelled out for the
war, and it is not the end yet.)
And being in such dire straits, we are going to spend
billions of rubles for absurd elections! Inasmuch as we believe
that Putin will win them, let us leave him gratis what he already
is. Let him work, for he has been too busy kissing children,
presenting government decorations, planting trees, and rushing
from region to region and staffing his mouth with the bread and
salt on carpet-covered runways of gubernatorial aerodromes.
Dear leaders of the State Duma!
All of you expressed displeasure with Yeltsin's decision to
create a "no-alternative situation." Stand up for the people!
Don't allow mock elections to be imposed on them so as the
"brilliant and courageous" plot be implemented.
Postpone the election and give Putin some time to
demonstrate himself as a politician and a leader and Russians to
understand what he really is and whether he deserves to be the
leader of a great country which has been exhausted by lies and
plunder.
If you, esteemed leaders, do not support this plan, ordinary
citizens can think that you are traitors and your indignation is
false, that you all play as one team in the same game in which
all the moves of the winners and the suitable "oppositionists"
alike are determined in advance. But such a team cannot exist for
a long time. After the election we will see stand-bys become
redundant and dismissed from the team.
There are no objections to the postponement of the election
from the standpoint of honour and reason. Any objections that
might be raised will be prompted by considerations of greed,
cowardice and bureaucratic servility -- no matter how they are
disguised.
Messrs. Zyuganov, Yavlinsky and other presidential hopefuls!
It looks like the offered method suits you, too. It is the rare
occasion when your personal interests coincide with the interests
of the country. How will you explain it to people that you have
not supported the idea to postpone the election? The only
argument you can come up with is faithfulness to the
Constitution. But you cannot deceive people. They know that
(a) it is not our first Constitution;
(b) you have already violated it; and
(c) the present Constitution stipulates the mechanism of
amendments; and
(d) the required amendment is purely technical, and it would
only concern the term without affecting either liberties
or the foundations.
My fellow citizens! Imagine only one question on the
postponement of elections put on the agenda of the day. Imagine
how this would make spin doctors with their envelopes run from
office to office. They will need several million dollars to
defeat this newspaper article. Because what is offered is honest
technology, as distinct from the dirty one imposed on us.
Let's assume that the technology of envelopes will make the
Duma majority turn down the postponement of the elections. But
the discussion of this question in the Duma will lay bare venal
deputies, and not only them. The very fact of a dirty struggle
against a clean proposal can have decisive influence on the
outcome of the election, because the present leader is
undoubtedly to be at the head of this struggle.
We see how nervous with impatience the spin doctors are.
They wished the election was already a thing of the past. The two
months that are left to it seem too long a period of time to them
and a very dangerous period, too. What if something happens in
Chechnya? What if the public withdraws its approval and it will
once again be necessary to blow up apartment buildings so as fear
(the horrible fear of people that they may fall asleep in their
apartment not to wake up ever again, the fear for their children
and relatives) justified any military failures and any
casualties?
Chernomyrdin, Kiriyenko, Primakov, Stepashin... In what way
is Putin different from them? Why in terms of popularity rating
has he outpaced all his predecessors and rivals? He succeeded in
that only thanks to the war. His high rating is not based on
anything else.
One and the same important thing is clear from televised
reports from Chechnya almost each day. But we either do not
notice or do not wish to notice it. Every now and then a soldier
lets the truth out of his mouth: "This must be over by the
election, but we will hardly be able to do so." It means that the
inhuman bloody tradition "to seise a town by the holiday" is
very much alive, even if the acting President tells us that
"there is no time schedule and the military decide everything,
proceeding from circumstances."
Do you, Mr. Putin, mean military or political circumstances?
*******
#9
Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000
From: IRASTRAUS@aol.com (Ira Straus)
Subject: Chechnya: Real conspiracies and wild conspiracy theories
It is likely that Sergei Stepashin is telling the truth when he says that
part of the war in Chechnya (taking back the largely Russian-populated part
in the north) was planned long before the invasion of Dagestan took place.
It is also likely that Stepashin is telling the truth when he says that the
fighting in Dagestan created a delay of several weeks in the launching of the
war, thus skewing the military timetable to Russia's disadvantage. And that
taking Grozny and the south was not part of the earlier plan.
Conspiracy theorists quote Stepashin's first point but ignore his other
points. This is understandable. The first point gives some ground for feeling
that somelike like a conspiracy took place; the other points undermine the
ground for believing in a conspiracy. If the Dagestan fighting delayed and
screwed up the intended timetable of the war for Russia, then it becomes
pretty illogical to believe that the Dagestan incursion was a plot arranged
by the Russians for the sake of starting the war. Yet the latter belief is
the logical cornerstone for most of the conspiracy theories about the war.
Also, if the war that Russia has conducted after the incursion and bombing
events has different objectives than the war that had been intended, then
this is evidence, albeit not conclusive evidence, that those events were
perceived by Russian leaders as genuine external events, not as manipulations
from within their own conspiracy, and had a major impact on Russian
intentions.
Indeed, Stepashin asserted in the same commentary that it is nonsense to
think that the bombs in Moscow were Russian staged events, and that he knows
what he is talking about on this matter. This comment is also ignored in the
conspiracy theories.
There is a striking lack of consistency in the treatment of Stepashin's
comments. Stepashin's comments are treated as gospel truth in some parts
where they can serve to encourage the impression that there was some kind of
conspiracy. They are simply ignored on the points where they are incompatible
with that impression. This is suggestive of a will to believe something.
Stepashin's statement also leaves uncertain whether starting the war was a
settled commitment shared by all the powers that be. In light of what we know
about the functioning of bureaucratic systems, it is likely that some parts
of the power structure were unaware of it, and other parts accepted it only
as a contingency plan by some of the parts of the power structure. In light
of the fact that the actual war has goals different from the limited ones in
the plans discussed by Stepashin, it is likely that those plans had to some
degree a status of contingency plans, and the reason the war started in a
manner compatible with those plans is simply that those were the best plans
that were immediately available when the incursion and bombing events took
place.
For every real conspiracy, there are a thousand conspiracy theories. The
revelation of any real conspiracy on the part of Russians leads nowadays to
the spreading of the thousand other conspiracy theories, each one of them in
a tone as if it were the revelation of the true story. It's somewhat like
the
way every real conspiracy revealed in Watergate times seemed to give people
license to believe every other kind of wild suspicion against the Nixon
Administration and the U.S. Government that might have already been floating
around in their minds.
In the present case, we have had the probably accurate statement that there
was something like a conspiracy in the Russian military to re-initiate the
war with Chechnya. I'm using the word "conspiracy" a bit loosely here; I mean
a publicly undisclosed military plan which goes beyond mere contingency
planning to be an actual intention on the part of at least some of the power
structures, and that runs contrary to the public rhetoric about the policy of
the government. What makes the war plans seem especially conspiratorial now,
after the fact, is what in the interim: there was the fighting in Dagestan
and bombings in Moscow, and these were treated as official reasons for a war,
whereas now we know that in reality these probably ended up just providing an
excuse for something that was already intended. This shows that Russia is
displaying public relations dishonesty in making use of pretexts for war.
However, such behavior is an all-too-normal thing; it is not the same thing
as a conspiracy to create the pretexts.
The widely-quoted portion of Stepashin's statement is not much corroborated.
If it tends to have some credibility, this is due at best to circumstantial
evidence. It is at least believed that the war was well-planned; although
some people are beginning to doubt this, as it drags on and Russian
casualties mount, and as the objectives keep shifting. People in the West --
especially those who have been Russia-friendly -- have tended to trust Mr.
Stepashin and haven't subjected him to the kind of suspicion that they dole
out so liberally to others; even though it is at least conceivable that he
could have his own political motives.
Anyway, let's assume that what he said was true about a re-opening of the war
having been planned in advance. That'll be step one for this analysis. So far
so good.
The next step is that this statement of Stepashin gets treated as a license
to believe every conspiracy theory in the book; even theories that would be
impossible if Stepashin's statement were true. Some of these conspiracy
theories are at least half-plausible, like the one that says that Russian
intelligence arranged the bombings in Moscow, even if they are contrary to
Stepashin's other assertions. Others are highly implausible, like the one
that says that Russian intelligence arranged the Chechen incursions into
Dagestan.
Obvious facts, like that the Russian leadership made opportunistic use of the
bombings and incursions and saw them as convenient, get twisted into saying
that Russians planned them. Inevitable facts, like that the Russians
unavoidably had contact over the last several years with Chechen criminal
gangs, kidnappers, radicals like Basayev, etc., make for availability of
numerous bits of information about Russian involvement with these people,
which can easily be presented in an incriminating style.
The Chechen incursions into Dagestan had precursors going back some time
before the plans for re-invading Chechnya even got started under Stepashin's
timetable. It's pretty unlikely that those precursors were sponsored or
encouraged by the Russians. That puts any later "conspiracy" the resume the
war in a different color. The earlier incursions into Dagestan, coupled with
the kidnapping industry and criminality, are likely to have been real
motivations, even if the later incursions were only confirmation of this not
the original motivation.
Did the Russians count on the likeihood of a recurrence of some such events
in Dagestan, as something that would give them an excuse to attack? Maybe so,
but that would not be a conspiracy. Did some Russians prepare themselves to
make good use of it in case some Chechen extremists did once again make an
incursion? Quite likely.
Did Russians stop taking their normal precautions against such attacks, or
even lure the Chechen extremists to repeat the adventure, so that Russia
would have something to seize upon? This is possible, and it really would be
a conspiracy of sorts, although not in the way the word is usually
understood, i.e. a situation in which Russia was holding all the strings and
set all the puppets into motion by its own will.
Meanwhile, it has also been called a conspiracy, that Russia did not respond
militarily the first time there was such an incursion into Dagestan. And it
has been called a folly, that it did respond militarily the more recent time.
Damned if they do, damned if they don't. The normal explanation -- an
historical evolution in the conflict, in which there is restraint and
unpreparedness in face of the first provocations, less restraint and greater
preparedness in face of later provocations -- gets lost in favor of speaking
always in the accusatory case. Everything becomes a conspiracy, and every
contradictory conspiracy theory gets treated as truth, once people feel that
some kind of moral authorization has been created to treat all Russian
actions in the region as a conspiracy.
Staging of repeats of an original tragedy is not unusual these days. It was
true that Muslims staged a few of the massacres of themselves in Bosnia, to
dramatize better the many authentic massacres that were not on camera vividly
enough at the right moment to get an international response. This does not
mean that the whole business was a conspiracy, or that the conspiracy was the
most important thing, or that the victimization of Bosnian Muslims was
unreal. Appearing as the Victim is an indispensable part of public relations
nowadays, and unfortunately, this has led on a number of occasions to staging
of victimization events. That leaves it a complex matter for the outside
world to determine whether, in the longer sweep of things, something like the
stated victimization did occur and really was the main motivation for the
conclusion drawn by the alleged Victim, even if the dramatized event itself
comes under suspicion of being staged by the Victim him/herself.
It is also curious that a cluster of conspiracy theories is always built
around a single enemy-conspirator. Of course, there can be a similar cluster
of conspiracy theories on the other side, reversing the enemy/target of
suspicion.
Thus, one could easily spin out all kinds of theories about Chechen
conspiracies. There would be ample evidence for these theories, probably more
than for the Russia-as-conspirator theory. One could also spin out theories
about Western conspiracies to encourage the Chechens into fighting; since the
West is widely believed by people in the region to be supporting the rebels,
and since Maskhadov himself has described the rebels as serving the interest
of the West, it would be easy to believe such theories. One could also talk
of Western conspiracies to lure the Russians into this war which will ruin
Russia, thus having it both ways.
All these opposite-side conspiracy theories are popular in Russia. It is not
hard to see how dangerous it is to world peace that Russians should have
started believing such damned-both-ways conspiracy theories -- that the war
in Chechnya is both a Western conspiracy to break up the Russian Federation
by encouraging the Chechens to split off, and simultaneously a Western
conspiracy to tear Russia apart by luring Russians into a losing war in
Chechnya. It should alert us to the dangers inherent in anyone giving
careless credence to any and all conspiracy theories directed against some
selected boogeyman.
Recent treatments of Stepashin's statement might lead one to think that it
was a pure revelation from on high, and an opening of a crack through which
we can see a hidden universe that operates by phantasmagorical laws and
purposes. It isn't such a revelation. It's a statement by an ordinary human
being. Probably mostly a true statement. But subject to the normal laws of
consistency, contradiction, and connection to the real world.
Critical intelligence has to be maintained. The incompatibility between the
wilder conspiracy theories and Stepashin's own statement needs to be noticed.
The internal contradictions within and amongst those wilder theories
themselves also need to be noticed. None of this is conclusive proof against
the wilder theories, but it is makes it clear that Stepashin's statement adds
nothing to their probability, if anything the opposite.
Some of the wilder conspiracy theories might nevertheless be true. Their
truth or falsity is an important matter. Which is why it is important to
evaluate the evidence on them accurately. And to have evidence for them that
goes beyond the mere desire to believe them.
*******
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