January 27, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4071 4072

Johnson's Russia List
#4072
27 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russians have political freedom but little else - ombudsman.
2. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, DEFENSE DOSSIER: Tactic Simply a War Crime.
3. Reuters: Swiss issue arrest warrant for Yeltsin ex-aide. (Borodin)
4. The Times (UK): Giles Whittell, Vodka worsens population crisis.
5. Voice of America: Andre de Nesner reports on Russia's new national security doctrine.
6. smi.ru: UTRO.RU: THE RIGHTISTS ARE NOT MATURE ENOUGH FOR PUTIN YET? 
7. RFE/RL: Paul Goble, Russia/Ukraine: Analysis From Washington -- Powers Divided, Powers Balanced.
8. Moscow Times: Yevgenia Albats, Thugs Occupy Power Vacuum In Chechnya.
9. New York Review of Books: Sergei Kovalev, Putin's War.]

********

#1
Russians have political freedom but little else - ombudsman

MOSCOW, Jan 27 (Reuters) - Political and religious freedom are possibly the
only rights Russia guarantees to its citizens, who suffer abuses in other
spheres, the human rights ombudsman said in a newspaper interview published
on Thursday. 

``There is suffering everywhere...In general I can say that the human
rights situation in Russia is unsatisfactory,'' chief commissioner on human
rights Oleg Mironov told Trud daily. 

He said no progress was likely before real economic development took place
in the country. 

``Possibly it is only political freedom which is not violated in Russia,''
Mironov said. ``If you want to create a party or hold a picket, you are
welcome to do it.'' 

``Also there is freedom of religion...one is free to worship in a mosque,
church or synagogoe even to join a religious cult,'' he said, adding he was
hard pressed to name a single other sphere which was not tainted by
flagrant abuses of human rights. 

A former Communist, Mironov, unlike his predecessor Sergei Kovalyov has
broadly approved the government's large-scale military campaign in the
rebel region of Chechnya. 

He outlined the lack of economic development, corruption and uncontrolled
reform as the main reason why most Russians were eking out a hand-to-mouth
living. 

Mironov cited enormous wage and pension arrears, failure to address the
issue of billions of rubles in savings lost to inflation in the early 90s,
and legal loopholes which prevent bilked investors from seeking justice as
typical examples. 

``This is a brutal violation of human rights,'' he said and urged citizens
to turn to the courts to enforce their rights. 

``Eveyone whose rights are violated must go to court,'' he said. ``In
Russia courts are linked with jails and criminals while in Europe they are
the way to demand your rights.'' 

He said that planned conciliation tribunals would hopefully simplify and
shorten the legal processes which usually daunt Russians from going to court. 

Russia's huge prison population of over one million is a cause for concern
as is the number of children in jail for petty crime, Mironov said. 

Thousands of people under trial are kept in overcrowded and insanitary
conditions with hardened criminals, and disease and malnutrition are common. 

``We need economic measures, not legal ones...When there is production,
profits and demand, there will be money as well,'' Mironov said adding that
at present the government was able to guarantee only those rights which did
not cost it money. 

*******

#2
Moscow Times
January 27, 2000 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Tactic Simply a War Crime 
By Pavel Felgenhauer 

Last month the Russian military issued an ultimatum to the rebels in Grozny 
saying that if the city did not surrender, "all will be killed." The 
ultimatum was angrily condemned internationally. U.S. President Bill Clinton 
and European Union leaders announced that the policy - killing everyone in a 
city where thousands of helpless civilians were holed up in basements - was 
totally unacceptable. 

In answering this crescendo of criticism, Russian authorities muttered 
something about being misunderstood by the outside world, that the ultimatum 
was not really an ultimatum, that it was not aimed at civilians and so on. 
But for all this apologetic posturing, the threat was never really officially 
renounced by military authorities in the Caucasus or by the Russian 
government - or by acting President Vladimir Putin. 

Today they are apparently making good on the "kill all" threat to Grozny. The 
Russian army is reducing Grozny to a heap of rubble by endless air 
bombardments and shelling as they attempt to soften Chechen defenses. 

Russian soldiers fighting in Grozny have told reporters that not only are 
"conventional" munitions being used, but they have also deployed a powerful 
incendiary weapon - the TOS-1 - which is a 30-barreled launcher for unguided 
missiles with aerosol warheads. Aerosol warheads release clouds of 
inflammable gas that are later ignited, causing massive explosions that can 
clear out buildings and basements with high temperatures and shock waves. 

The Russian army units in Chechnya are badly trained and badly commanded. The 
morale of the solders is at an all-time low. Last week one Russian general, 
Mikhail Malofeyev, couldn't get his troops to advance. They refused to move 
forward. In fact, they retreated and left Malofeyev behind to his fate. 

In Chechnya, Russian units often refuse to advance and instead wait for the 
air force and artillery to clear out the opposition. In the first months of 
the war, in the open plains of northern Chechnya, this tactic worked and 
Russian forces advanced slowly. In Grozny indiscriminate bombardments kill 
armed rebels from time to time, but cannot fully break their morale or 
provoke a retreat. 

The Chechen infantry in Grozny is fighting hard and well. The rebels hide 
underground from Russian shells and their units are constantly on the move to 
avoid bombardments. The Chechen forces have no air force and no heavy 
artillery, but their defense in Grozny is staunch, their counterattacks 
resilient and their moral high. In private conversations, high-ranking 
Russian generals on active duty admit that, on the battle field, a Chechen 
company can match head for head a Russian brigade. 

The Russian armed forces have lots of guns, bombs and ballistic missiles, but 
they do not have the well-trained infantry to match the rebels. Because of 
this weakness and because of pressure to capture Grozny and declare "victory" 
at any cost, Russian generals are virtually forced to resort to illegal 
means, to commit war crimes and to substitute well-trained and motivated 
infantry with increasingly more powerful bombs. 

The indiscriminate bombardments of Grozny hit the civilian population much 
harder than the well-trained, mobile rebels. Such bombardments violate the 
Second Protocol of the Geneva Convention that protects civilians caught in 
internal armed conflicts. The use of TOS-1 in Grozny is a flagrant violation 
of the 1980 Geneva Convention restricting the use of air-delivered incendiary 
weapons. And, of course, TOS-1 endangers civilians hiding in Grozny's 
cellars. 

Hideous war crimes are being committed in Chechnya. The military command is 
implicated and Putin - who has publicly said he was personally involved in 
planning Russian tactics in Chechnya - most likely is a war criminal too. 
But, the international community is all but silent. U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright has actually said that Putin is "one of the leading 
reformers." 

Albright was, of course, one of the politicians directly involved in 
initiating NATO's aggression last year against Yugoslavia - a war in which 
hundreds of innocent civilians were killed by U.S. bombs. By reacting angrily 
to the Russian ultimatum, and by not reacting at all to mass killings in 
Grozny, the West is sending a powerful signal to Russia: Follow our example: 
It's politically expedient to kill civilians sometimes, but you should never 
threaten them in public. Then, once you've followed those guidelines, you can 
be a jolly good "leading reformer," a "liberal" or anything else you wish. 

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst based in Moscow. 

*******

#3
Swiss issue arrest warrant for Yeltsin ex-aide
By Elif Kaban

DAVOS, Switzerland, Jan 27 (Reuters) - Swiss authorities investigating a
Russian money-laundering affair have issued an international arrest warrant
for former top Kremlin official Pavel Borodin, a Swiss magistrate said on
Thursday. 

The arrest warrant for Borodin, who was a key aide to Boris Yeltsin before
the former Russian president resigned last month unexpectedly, has already
been sent to the Interpol police network, the magistrate told Reuters,
declining to be named. 

The bold and diplomatically unusual Swiss move is the first of its kind
against a serving Russian politician and an unprecedented accusation aimed
at an official who was at the heart of the Kremlin. 

The charges are part of an investigation by Geneva's judicial authorities
into alleged kickbacks paid to Russian government officials by Swiss-based
construction firm Mabetex. 

The Kremlin and Mabetex have denied any wrongdoing in the affair, in which
a number of Swiss accounts have been frozen. 

BORODIN NOT INFORMED DIRECTLY 

In Moscow, Borodin's spokesman said the Kremlin's ex-property chief had had
no word from Swiss authorities about an arrest warrant for him and knew
about it only from media reports. 

The Swiss magistrate told Reuters that international arrest warrants were
likely to be issued for two more suspects soon. 

The arrest warrant is the first to be issued in the Swiss investigation
into the multi-million-dollar web of Russian financial dealings and alleged
corruption. 

It underscores investigators' suspicions that Switzerland may have played a
central role in capital flight and potentially high-level corruption and
embezzlement in Russia. 

The Swiss move could have political implications for Russsia as well as the
United States, where the suspected diversion of massive Western aid to
Moscow has been a key issue in the presidential primaries ahead of November
elections. 

The Swiss magistrate said Geneva's chief prosecutor Bernard Bertossa issued
the warrant recently for Borodin, who presided over the Kremlin's vast
property empire of hotels, resorts, dachas and real estate worth hundreds
of millions of dollars. 

``I can confirm that the chief prosecutor, Bertossa, has issued an
international arrest warrant for Borodin,'' said the magistrate. ``The
warrant is for money-laundering.'' 

Swiss federal police sources said that once such a warrant is issued, the
suspect could not travel to the West without running the risk of being
arrested and extradited to Switzerland. 

BORODIN DEMOTED BY PUTIN 

Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin ousted Borodin from the Kremlin
administration in a reshuffle earlier this month. 

Putin demoted Borodin to a figurehead position in the Russian government as
state secretary of the Russia-Belarus Union that Moscow established with
the former Soviet republic. 

Swiss prosecutors have accused him of taking bribes from the Swiss company
Mabetex in return for giving the firm lucrative contracts to renovate
government buildings including the Kremlin, charges Borodin has previously
denied. 

Separately, Swiss authorities are also investigating Swiss connections in
an alleged money-laundering scandal involving the Bank of New York. They
are assisting U.S. investigators in the affair, in which two people have
already been indicted in the United States. 

*******

#4
The Times (UK)
27 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Vodka worsens population crisis
BY GILES WHITTELL

DRIVEN down by poor health, a low birth rate and a lack of immigrants, 
Russia's population fell by nearly three quarters of a million last year - 
the biggest annual drop since Soviet times and a sign that the country is on 
the verge of what one expert called a demographic crisis. 

The world's largest country is emptying: with 836,000 more deaths than births 
in the first 11 months of last year, its population on the eve of the 
millennium stood at 145.6 million. The figure is thought to be roughly six 
million lower than if birth and death rates had stayed constant since the 
fall of communism. 

Instead, Russian healthcare has been in permanent crisis and the average 
Russian's diet and alcohol consumption has remained as life-threatening as 
ever. With average adult vodka consumption at three bottles a week and a 
fatal fondness for high-fat food, Russian male life expectancy slumped in 
1995 to 57 and has stayed near there ever since. 

Russia's death rate for both sexes is boosted by an astonishing 35,000 deaths 
a year from accidental alcohol poisoning. The comparable figure for the 
United States, with a population nearly twice as large, is 350. Many younger 
Russians prefer beer to vodka. This may cut liquor-related deaths but infant 
mortality remains high and immigration from other former Soviet states is 
sliding. 

*******

#5
Voice of America
DATE=1/26/2000
TITLE=RUSSIA - SECURITY
BYLINE=ANDRE DE NESNERA
DATELINE=WASHINGTON
INTRO: Earlier this month, the Russian government 
adopted a new national security doctrine, replacing 
the one implemented in 1997. In this report from 
Washington, former Moscow correspondent Andre de 
Nesnera looks at the document and discusses what may 
have prompted senior Russian officials to come out 
with such a doctrine at this time.
TEXT: Russia's new security doctrine is the fruit of 
months of debate among Russia's military and political 
elite and provides the first indication of acting 
President Vladimir Putin's strategic thinking.
The more than 20-page document looks at Russia's goals 
in the economic and military spheres. It emphasizes 
the need to fight terrorism and organized crime, while 
talking about reversing adverse trends in the 
country's economy and boosting foreign investments.
The security doctrine also takes a more 
confrontational tone towards the West - and more 
specifically, the United States. It criticizes 
Washington for what it calls its unilateral military 
solutions to global problems by bypassing 
international law: a clear reference to the U-S-led 
NATO campaign against Yugoslavia. The document also 
says NATO's use of military force outside its 
boundaries - and without U-N Security Council sanction 
- could destabilize the entire global strategic arena.
Michael McFaul - from the "Carnegie Institute" - says 
the doctrine stems from Russia's perception that it is 
weak and is under assault from a hostile western world.
/// MCFAUl ACT ///
It is a recognition of Russia's weakness, and it 
is a rhetorical reassertion of Russia (Russia's 
strength). But realistically, a country with a 
Gross Domestic Product the size of (the U-S 
State of) Illinois, with an army in disarray, 
with many internal problems, security threats 
within Russia's borders - I don't think it is 
realistic to assume that Russia is now going to 
reassert itself on the global stage. That is 
the part that bothers me about the document: 
that there is that kind of language from the 
past that does not coincide with Russian 
realities today.
/// END ACT ///Over the past few years, 
Russia and the West have 
clashed over such issues as NATO's bombing of 
Yugoslavia, the alliance's eastward expansion, Iraq, 
arms control and Moscow's war against separatists in 
the Russian region of Chechnya.Bruce Johnson - Russia expert 
with the "Hudson 
Institute" - says the new security doctrine highlights 
Moscow's long-standing love-hate relationship with the West.
/// JOHNSON ACT ///
It has always been a country that has felt that 
as much as it desires a window on the West, it 
feels the West is a threat to the sovereignty 
and integrity of the Russian way of life - 
because it is very, very different from anything 
that the West knows or understands. It (the 
security doctrine) is also intended to frighten 
other republics within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (C-I-S) - or the old Soviet 
Union - from attempting to do what the Chechens 
are doing - and that is, I think, its most 
powerful effect.
/// END ACT ///
Russia's new security doctrine also represents a shift 
in Moscow's reliance on nuclear weapons. Previously, 
Moscow said it would only use nuclear weapons if 
Russia's sovereignty were threatened. The new 
document allows the use of nuclear weapons "to repel 
armed aggression" - a much broader interpretation.
Ariel Cohen - with the "Heritage Foundation" - says 
Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons has increased as 
its conventional forces have deteriorated. 
/// COHEN ACT ///
Russia has abandoned the concept of "no first 
use" (of nuclear weapons) that was formulated by 
(Soviet leader) Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980's. 
As Russia became a weaker power and as the 
Russian conventional forces demonstrate their 
lack of vigor in Chechnya - and before that, the 
Soviet defeat in Afghanistan - Russia tends to 
rely more on its nuclear weapons. This is not 
without precedent. In fact, NATO had a declared 
"first use" doctrine in its confrontation with 
the Soviet Union in Europe in the 1970's, when 
NATO was considered weaker conventionally. So I 
would say it is a "law of conventional 
imbalance": that party that has a weaker hand 
conventionally, would declare a reliance on a 
nuclear deterrent.
/// END ACT ///
Many analysts say Russia's new security doctrine is as 
much for domestic consumption as it is for western 
perusal. They say it is no accident the document was 
released during a presidential campaign, at a time 
when acting President Vladimir Putin is riding high in 
public opinion surveys. Analysts say such a document can 
only help his cause.
At the same time, analysts say the security doctrine 
is a non-binding document and does not force the 
Russian government to follow its precepts. But the 
document does provide a glimpse into the thinking of 
Russia's ruling elite. 

********

#6
smi.ru
19:13 26.01.00
Government
UTRO.RU: THE RIGHTISTS ARE NOT MATURE ENOUGH FOR PUTIN YET? 
The Utro.ru Internet newsletter looks at the recent reactions, both at home
and in the West, to Vladimir Putin's political steps. "There are signals
coming from the West, more and more insistently, about its changing its
former tough position, including on the Chechen issue. In Russia, by
contrast, despite Putin's still high ratings, one can hear more and more
disappointed voices, among them complaints about his lack of an articulate
economic program. Why is this happening?" The answer lies in the objective
needs and expectations of the public. At the present moment, Putin finds
himself in a exceptional situation where, despite the hard economic
condition of the country, despite the Chechen crisis, despite the tense
state of affairs on the international arena, time, paradoxically though it
may sound, is working for him, not against him. Even is Putin does nothing
but keep silent, the circumstances will turn out in his favor by themselves. 

Comment: An awareness that the Acting President is full of determination to
carry the operation in Chechnya through to the end has made the West look
at Putin from a different angle and see him as a guarantor of stability, as
a leading reformer, as a market-oriented politician. Even the scandal with
the laundering of Russian money seems to be resolving by itself. The
situation is getting better and better on the developing markets and the
oil prices are growing and the American stock market is on the verge of
overheating: 
Chechnya is clearly not worth losing the entire Russian market. But the
West has also to save face and so must to do a little bargaining first.
Actually that's what is happening. What is more important to the West is
not Putin's individual likings or dislikings, but his ability to adequately
respond to the challenges of time, assigning primary importance to
considerations of expediency, pragmatism. In Russia, Putin's recent steps
have given rise to disappointment in the democratically-minded part of
society, but they have not affected his rating in any way. Putin is
adequate to the situation, he prefers not to make statements, but to act -
in accordance with the circumstances and with his own goals. "In a mature
politician, the quality of being principled consists in the ability to find
ways and means to translate one's principles into reality, not in messing
up the whole business just because this or that compromise seems
particularly unsavory. Putin is showing self-control and goes on patiently
explaining his positions". "Eventually, it will the best and the most
faithful people that will remain by his side, those who have been too
impatient will come back and as to dead weight, one should get rid of that,
sooner or later", Utro.ru.concludes. 
Utro: Putin is a Kindred Spirit for the West 

******

#7
Russia/Ukraine: Analysis From Washington -- Powers Divided, Powers Balanced
By Paul Goble

Prague, 26 January 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Parliamentary boycotts in the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine have created crises of power in both countries. But 
what may ultimately prove to be far more important is that each of these 
actions appears to represent another step along the road from the unitary 
power characteristic of communist states to the checks and balances that 
typically are part of more democratic ones. 

The way these two actions have created crises of power not surprisingly is 
far more obvious. In Russia, lawmakers from three reformist and centrist 
parties boycotted Duma sessions last week to protest a deal between acting 
President Vladimir Putin's Unity bloc and the Communist Party that divided 
committee chairmanships between the two and led to the election of Communist 
Gennady Seleznov as speaker.

Those leading the boycott -- the Fatherland-All Russia bloc, the Union of 
Rightist Forces, and the Yabloko party -- insist that they have taken this 
dramatic action to call attention to the ways in which the Unity-Communist 
deal has the effect of excluding them from participation in the parliament's 
lawmaking activities.

And their walkout, which Yabloko's leaders said would continue, has already 
led many in both Russia and the West to question Putin's commitment to 
democracy and market reforms, a process that several observers have suggested 
may reduce his chances to be elected president in his own right on the first 
ballot. That in turn has led even those generally supportive of Moscow to 
adopt a more critical line.

Meanwhile in Ukraine, another parliamentary walkout last week has led to an 
analogous crisis of power and to speculations about that post-Soviet 
republic's prospects for democracy and free market reforms. Last Friday, the 
pro-reform majority faction in the Ukrainian parliament not only withdrew 
from that body but held a separate meeting at which they voted to oust the 
hard left speaker of the country's legislature.

The center-right deputies took this move after parliamentary maneuvers by the 
left had blocked their attempt to remove Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko two days 
earlier. But Tkachenko's left-wing supporters denounced the subsequent vote 
as invalid because the balloting had not taken place in the parliamentary 
building as they insisted was required. 

Just as was the case of Russia, observers pointed to these Ukrainian events 
as a crisis of power in that country, a crisis which they said reflected 
continuing and deep divisions between those who want reform and those who are 
nostalgic for the Soviet past. 

But there are at least three deeper and potentially more long-lasting 
implications of what these boycotts mean for the future of Russia and 
Ukraine. 

First, both reflect struggles by parliamentarians over whether and if the 
legislatures to which they belong are to serve as a check on executive power. 
In the not so distant communist past, legislatures were a rubber stamp for 
the will of the executive. More recently, each represented a locus of power 
which acted with little regard to the other. But now, deputies in both 
countries are seeking to find ways to work with the executive branch, even as 
they insist on their own autonomous source of authority. 

In no established democratic country was the establishment of checks and 
balances of this kind easy. And in many of them -- including the United 
States -- boycotts by legislators over one issue or another helped to advance 
this arrangement of power between these two branches of the state.

Second, both cases reflect the tensions, always present in democratic 
societies, between procedural and substantive concerns. 
Democracy is about procedures, about the ways in which the population governs 
itself. But it is also about making substantive decisions, about determining 
outcomes that reflect the will of the majority.

In established democracies, these two features are seldom in open conflict, 
but in emerging democracies, the situation can be very different. And the 
temptation to insist on substantive outcomes as a measure of democratic 
success inevitably tends to grow when one or another group of powerholders 
works to block the will of the majority. 

And third, and again in both Russia and Ukraine, these boycotts highlight the 
ways in which parliaments even more than presidents are dependent on the 
power of the media to advance their power and to block the actions of 
executive fiat. 

In both, the executive branch even now can sometimes act with little or no 
regard for the legislature. But legislators are learning that they have the 
ability to appeal to the press to build up their own power, thus confirming 
the dictum of the author of the American Declaration of Independence that a 
free press is more essential to democracy than even a free legislature.

Because democratic institutions remain relatively weak in Russia and Ukraine, 
these two crises may have the most unfortunate consequences at least in the 
near term. But they may have just the opposite effect over the longer haul. 
That is because each appears likely to end both the unitary power of the 
communist past and the fragmented power of recent years and thus to lead to 
the checks and balances typical of developed democracies.

To the extent that happens, these two boycotts may come to be seen not as a 
crisis in the existing system but as the birth pangs of a new one. 

********

#8
Moscow Times
Thursday, January 27, 2000 
POWER PLAY: Thugs Occupy Power Vacuum In Chechnya 
By Yevgenia Albats 

Just one trip to Chechnya makes it clear for any reporter who covered the 
last war in 1994-96 that Russian troops are trapped in the Northern Caucasus, 
and the conditions are even worse than during the last go-around. 

Chechnya no longer has any central authority, depriving Moscow of a dubious 
luxury it had during the last war, which was to retreat and leave the task of 
reconstructing the region to whoever was left. 

Even Chechen clan society is powerless to step in and fill the leadership 
vacuum. Its traditional structure, based on the authority of elders, was 
destroyed over these years of war and aggression. Without this social 
underpinning, the republic is fragmented and traditional clan law - however 
backward it may have been - has been buried in the rubble. 

Moscow's only option now is to assign duties previously fulfilled by 
Chechnya's clan elite - resolving internal conflicts and sustaining order 
among the youth - to criminal bosses who have taken the place of that elite. 
Moscow's hiring criteria, therefore, is limited to whether or not the thugs 
are loyal to the federal center. 

Consider Beslan Gantemirov. Once the mayor of Grozny, Gantemirov was 
convicted of corruption. Today, Gantemirov is a free man, not because he was 
pardoned - though he does defend his innocence - but because he brokered a 
deal with Moscow authorities just as the Chechen conflict was heating up. 

Now, under this semi-clemency, he is regaining his former position as an oil 
king in Grozny. His black, armored four-wheel drive Ford sport utility 
vehicle is well known around Chechnya. 

The Ford turned up in Mozdok once, and the reporters there had a chuckle at 
its license plates. They read "O 001 BG 95," BG stand for Beslan Gantemirov. 
The plates are homemade, Gantemirov's driver confirmed, and, if read 
correctly, are a sort of political ad as well. From the 001, we are to 
understand that everyone is to regard Gantemirov as Chechnya's No. 1 man. 

But these plates carry another less presidential message. On Russian license 
plates, the last two digits, in this case 95, indicate where the car was 
bought and registered. The number 95 is not Chechnya's registration code, and 
the fact that the car still bears plates from another region indicates it was 
never officially reregistered, a process required whenever a car owner 
changes his or her address. 

The majority of cars stolen in central Russia make their way to Chechnya. In 
fact, car smuggling, illegal oil-trading and kidnapping are Chechnya's three 
biggest businesses. 

There is no doubt that Gantemirov is fighting side by side with the Russians 
for the reward of oil. Other leaders in Chechnya are also eager to get their 
hands on the some 5,500 home-spun oil refineries across the republic. If 
Russian troops withdraw now, the region will collapse in an internal war of 
rival, oil-hungry gangs. Even if Russia's fragile victory comes off, 
Chechnya's gangs will remain as numerous as ever. Closed schools, a ruined 
social welfare system and unemployment will draw more and more teens into 
gangs. And in the battles that will come of that, God only knows what side 
loyal leaders-in-law like Beslan Gantemirov will fight on. 

Yevgenia Albats is an independent analyst and journalist based in Moscow. 

*******

#9
Excerpt
New York Review of Books
February 10, 2000
Putin's War 
By Sergei Kovalev
(http://www.nybooks.com/nyrev/WWWfeatdisplay.cgi?20000210004F)

In 1997 I published an article in these pages in which I tried to draw some
conclusions about the Chechen war of 1994-1996. In Moscow, the presidents
of Russia and Chechnya had just signed a pact that rejected the use or
threat of force and postponed a final resolution of Chechen-Russian
relations until the year 2001. It seemed to me that the war was finally
over and that the time had come to sum up recent events. 

I was cruelly mistaken. However, at the time no one in his worst nightmare
could have dreamed that there would be politicians in Russia who, being of
sound mind and memory, would resume the Chechen war on an even greater
scale than before. It was even more difficult to imagine not only that the
war itself would be supported by the Russian public, but that it would
result in unprecedented political dividends for the Russian leaders who
presided over it, particularly Vladimir Putin, who owes his accession to
the presidency largely to his backing of the war. 

For American readers to fully understand how unthinkable a metamorphosis
has taken place, let them imagine for a moment that in, say, 1978, the
president of the United States resumed the war in Vietnam. And furthermore
that this action was applauded by all Americans, from miners and farmers to
university professors and students. Inconceivable? Of course it's
inconceivable. Nonetheless, this is precisely what has happened in Russia
today. 

First, I must make it clear that a huge share of the guilt for what has
happened lies with the Chechen people and its leaders. 

In the first months after the military action ended in 1996, it seemed that
there was an opportunity to establish a democratic regime in postwar
Chechnya, one that would act according to the rule of law. If that had
happened it would not, in my view, have mattered whether Chechnya remained
part of the Russian Federation or not. In January 1997, Aslan Maskhadov was
elected president of Chechnya. Maskhadov was a moderate and responsible
leader, a man who definitely preferred a secular model of development to an
"Islamic state." 

Of course, there were serious concerns about Chechen behavior at that time.
The extortion and violence against the remaining local Russian-speaking
population, including kidnappings for ransom or enslavement, not only did
not cease with the end of the war but increased many times over. And the
new Chechen authorities made absolutely no attempt to stop this criminal
activity, although in a country as tiny as Chechnya, with a population of
fewer than one million people, everyone knew perfectly well which of
Maskhadov's former associates were making money on the slave trade, where
the captives were held, how the ransom was extorted, and so forth. Yet
after every reported kidnapping of a well-known victim, the president of
Chechnya made public statements in which he explained events, in vague and
extremely unconvincing terms, as "provocations by the Russian secret
service." There were hardly any attempts to rescue prisoners. There were no
attempts to track down or to punish the organizers of these crimes. 

The kidnapping of numerous journalists was particularly repugnant. These
were people who for two years, at serious risk to their lives, had told
Russia and the world the truth about the last war. Chechens were as
indebted to them for the peace as they were to the military victories of
the Chechen militia. 

The result was not long in making itself felt: correspondents stopped
traveling to Chechnya, and a completely new, diametrically opposed attitude
toward the republic formed among Russian journalists. It is hard for me to
reproach the journalists for hostility toward Chechnya. 

Furthermore, the norms of Islamic law were introduced in Chechnya in a
particularly harsh form, including corporal punishment, the amputation of
limbs, and public executions broadcast on local television. All of this
forced people friendly to Chechnya to doubt the sincerity of Maskhadov's
intentions to defend the secular nature of the state, intentions that he
never stated publicly, by the way or, at the very least, to doubt his
resolve. 

Unfortunately, the fears that I expressed about Chechnya's future in my
1997 article turned out to be well founded. During the last three years,
the president and government of Chechnya have not been willing to risk
taking decisive measures to bring order to the republic. Their reasons are
obvious, they were afraid that the first firm step they took would lead to
an uprising and civil war. But Maskhadov's timidity led to the worst
possible outcome: almost complete loss of control over the country and the
transfer of real power into the hands of the so-called "field commanders,"
among whom are such people as the slave traders Arbi Barayev and Ruslan
Khaikhoroyev, the terrorists Salman Raduyev and Shamil Basayev, and the
Jordanian Islamic fanatic Khattab, who many assert is an ally of Osama bin
Laden. The last vestiges of the system of state authority disappeared in
the confrontation between the government and the field commanders. 

In other words, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria never actually came into
existence, even as an "Islamic republic." Instead, a black hole was formed
on the world map out of which bearded people driving Kamaz trucks and
carrying Kalashnikovs descended from time to time on the neighboring
regions of Russia. Sometimes they would seize livestock and disappear with
them, sometimes people. No one knows with any accuracy what actually
happened within the territory of Chechnya itself. 

What we do know is that Basayev and Khattab mounted in August a "liberation
crusade" into neighboring Dagestan. Apparently, they and the other
commanders of the Chechen units that invaded Dagestan saw themselves as
"internationalist warriors for Allah," Islamic Che Guevaras, one might say.
They were certain that fellow believers on the other side of the border
would greet them with open arms. They were mistaken: the Dagestanis met
them with weapons. Even some Chechens, both in Dagestan and, it is said, in
the border regions of Chechnya itself, attempted to stop the insane raid.
They understood what the consequences would be. "You will pass only over
our dead bodies," they are said to have told Basayev's and Khattab's
people. "No problem," replied "Allah's warriors." So the informal Chechen
rural patrols in the border regions let them through. 

I have no right to judge peaceful peasants who yielded to heavily armed
Islamic thugs. But had they known all the consequences of the Dagestan
venture, many of them would, I believe, have preferred to risk death rather
than let the Islamists cross the border. And if President Maskhadov could
have foreseen all the consequences (and it was his job to do so), he would
have done everything he could to prevent an incursion into Russia from the
territory of Chechnya, even at the risk of civil war. 

In Dagestan, for the first time since the end of World War II, the Russian
army carried out a genuine mission of liberation. It protected the
inhabitants of Dagestan from outside attack. The army did its work badly:
it suffered losses from its own artillery fire and its own air strikes. For
weeks it could not take several small mountain villages that had been
captured by Basayev and Khattab; and it failed to warn the peaceful
populations of these villages about its impending use of artillery and
bombing. The Russian troops engaged in pillaging and violence against
people in the liberated areas, although, in comparison with the previous
war, their behavior was fairly moderate. In the end, however, the army
fulfilled its mission. Some of the Islamist invaders were dispersed; others
were forced back into Chechnya. 

Apparently, at this point a monstrous idea was born in the heads of the
army generals and Moscow politicians: to use the momentum of the Dagestan
victory to unleash a new war with Chechnya. 

It is easy to understand what the generals wanted. They wanted revenge for
their shameful defeat in the previous war. The motives of the politicians
are far more complex. I recently tried to describe some of them in the
Berlin paper Die Welt: 

For reactionary Russian politicians the resumption of the war is also a
form of revenge, revenge against the "vile liberals" and the "irresponsible
loudmouths" who in 1994-96 roused public opinion against the bloody
demonstration of Russian state power. But I am afraid that this
interpretation was far too simplistic. I underestimated the level of
cynicism pervading contemporary Russian political life. Of course, the
"reactionary Russian politicians"supporters of nationalist-patriotic groups
and various factions of the Communist Party, would have been happy to
dispose of the "vile liberals" as well as the decrepit Kremlin tsar, who
authorized the cease-fire agreement at the town of Khasavyurt on August 31,
1996, and signed the pact in Moscow in May 1997. But they didn't get the
chance to do this. 

The new Chechen war was used as political ammunition by other people, above
all by Vladimir Putin, and others close to the Kremlin. At the very height
of the military action in Dagestan last summer, Yeltsin fired Prime
Minister Stepashin and replaced him with Putin. Moreover, the President
publicly named Putin his "heir for the year 2000"an announcement which at
the time provoked only laughter. And indeed, it seemed ridiculous. First,
how was it possible that the current president could "appoint" the future
president, are we living in Haiti or some such place? 

Second: Putin, a man with a professionally nondescript face, previously the
director of the FSB (the KGB's successor organization), was virtually
unknown to the public at large. It seemed that he had absolutely no chance
of winning in a campaign against such experienced politicians as Evgeny
Primakov, the former prime minister, Yury Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, or
Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Russian Communist Party. Third: after
the financial crisis of August 1998, Yeltsin's own reputation was such that
his public support of any candidate seemed to mean disaster for the person
he backed. 

Putin, however, was not fazed. Without missing a beat, he confirmed that he
did indeed intend to run for president, but that at the moment the most
important thing was the war in Dagestan. This impressed the public and, in
fact, seemed a correct judgment: Could there be anything more important for
the government than military action on its own territory? 

After the Chechen forces left Dagestan and returned to Chechnya in August,
Putin announced that the current state of affairs in Chechnya could no
longer be tolerated, which was true. The government could not stop now, he
said; it had to strike at the Chechens' bases, "even," he said, "if they
are on the territory of Chechnya." (This logic is understandable, too, but
leaves unmentioned a basic problem: How do you distinguish a "terrorist
base" from a normal Chechen village?) 

Putin began to send troops to the borders of the Chechen Republic. Many
people took his words and actions as merely a demonstration of military
power for the benefit of Maskhadov and the other official Chechen leaders,
a move meant to force them to turn, at last, from mere verbal condemnation
of the Islamic extremists to active measures against them. For attentive
observers, however, his motives were obvious: the new prime minister had no
intention of limiting himself to threats. He never even tried to initiate
contacts with the legitimate government of Chechnya. He didn't consider it
necessary to present Maskhadov with an ultimatum. He wanted war, and it was
clear why he wanted it. 

The parliamentary elections were coming up in three and a half months, a
dress rehearsal for the presidential elections of June 2000. It was quite
likely that the movement called "FatherlandAll Russia" (consisting largely
of former Soviet business managers and strong regional bosses), which
opposed Yeltsin and the Kremlin establishment, would bring off a
significant victory in these elections. And the newly anointed presidential
candidate would be competing with the leaders of this movement, the most
popular politicians in the country: Yury Luzhkov and Evgeny Primakov. 

The only way Putin could manage a political victory over his Moscow
competitors was to achieve a military triumph. And Dagestan was not enough.
But would public opinion support renewed military action in the Caucasus?
After all, only three years had passed since the Russian public expressed
relief when the Khasavyurt agreement of 1996 was signed. True, since then
the Chechens had done much to undermine any sympathy the Russians might
have had for them. However, even the armed incursion into Dagestan had not
sufficiently strengthened the anti-Chechen mood in Russian society for it
to approve a new military venture. As recently as the end of August the
prospects for popular support of a new campaign in Chechnya seemed more
than doubtful. 

Putin moved cautiously. He announced that the government was talking about
nothing more than sealing the border with Chechnya. (He was lying, of
course; only two weeks later a large-scale invasion began and operations
such as this cannot be planned in two weeks.) Then he said that in order to
guarantee the troops' safety they would have to occupy a few, just a few,
hilltops on Chechen territory. Of course, it went without saying that no
one was really talking about a war, God forbid; the government was only
trying to ensure the safety of the neighboring regions. 

And then, in September, explosions tore through Moscow and Volgodonsk,
nighttime explosions in apartment buildings that killed well over two
hundred people. 

Those explosions were a crucial moment in the unfolding of our current
history. After the first shock passed, it turned out that we were living in
an entirely different country, in which almost no one dared talk about a
peaceful, political resolution of the crisis with Chechnya. How, it was
asked, can you negotiate with people who murder children at night in their
beds? War and only war is the solution! What we want--so went the rhetoric
of many politicians, including Vladimir Putin--is the merciless
extermination of the "adversary" wherever he may be, whatever the
casualties, no matter how many unarmed civilians die in the process, no
matter how many Russian soldiers must give up their lives for a military
victory, just as long as we destroy the "wasp's nest of terrorists" once
and for all. And it doesn't matter in the least who this "adversary" is,
the fighters Basayev or Khattab, the elite guard of President Maskhadov
(who had nothing to do with the raid into Dagestan, or, of course, with
blowing up apartment buildings in Russian towns), or simply a member of a
local militia who is defending his native villagers from Russian troops
that suddenly swoop down on them. 

Russian politicians began to use a new language, the argot of the criminal
world. The recently appointed prime minister was the first to legitimate
this new language by publicly announcing that we would "bury them in their
own crap." It was after saying this that Putin's rating in the polls began
to rise astronomically: finally there was a "tough guy" at the wheel. 

Old terms took on a completely new meaning. Thus, the word "terrorist"
quickly ceased to mean someone belonging to a criminal underground group
whose goal was political murder. Now the word came to mean "an armed
Chechen"anywhere. Military reports from Chechnya put it plainly: "A group
of three thousand terrorists has been surrounded in Gudermes"; "two and a
half thousand terrorists were liquidated in Shali." And the war itself came
to be called nothing less than the "antiterrorist special operation of the
Russian troops." 

In Moscow this autumn a huge roundup of people from the Caucasus region
took place and the harassment continues today; there was talk of setting up
"temporary holding points" in the Moscow suburbs "for individuals living in
the capital without appropriate documentation"i.e., for people from the
Caucasus who don't have enough money to buy off the police. It seems that
these "temporary holding points," or, to put it more simply, internment
camps, were not set up after all though the intention to do so was telling.
But apart from a handful of human rights activists, no one was shocked by
these barbaric ideas.... 

Putin, in turn, doesn't conceal his sympathy for the rightists, his
interest in their economic program, and particularly his desire to have
Anatoly Chubais work on his coming election campaign. (Chubais is widely
credited with much of the success of Yeltsin's 1996 campaign.) And this is
understandable, you can't go shopping for an economic program in the ranks
of Unity, which was created by the government solely to get its own
hand-picked, controllable deputies into the Duma. Nor, certainly, can you
do so among the Communists.

For this reason a deal between Putin and the rightists seems highly likely.
Putin's administration will accept the liberal program of economic reform
that the rightists insist on. The rightists will refrain from excessive
criticism of the authoritarian and police features of Putin's government.
And perhaps they will even support more stringent police measures, as they
have already supported the second Chechen war. There is nothing new under
the sun. Something similar happened in Chile during Pinochet's dictatorship. 

Such, in my view, are the political prospects. As for the war in Chechnya,
which has been central to the recent political strategy, a military victory
there is possible and even likely. It seems clear that the military command
has firmly resolved not to worry about casualties among unarmed civilians;
they are capable of wiping out any part of Chechnya, including Grozny, in
order to destroy "terrorists." The result of this victory will in all
likelihood be a drawn-out, vicious guerrilla war in the mountains and in
the foothill regions. As is well known, moreover, there is only one way to
destroy guerrillas: to make no distinctions between them and the unarmed
people among whom they hide. In other words, a campaign of ethnic genocide
must be carried out in the regions controlled by the guerrilla movement. 

The Russian army is quite prepared for genocide. This was demonstrated in
the previous war; it was proven again recently by events in the village of
Alkhan-Yurt, where professional soldiers shot around forty unarmed
inhabitants for no reason. It has already been confirmed by official
announcements that vacuum bombs are being employed in Chechnya, terrible
weapons that kill every living thing over a wide area, including people
hiding in shelters. 

What is new this time around is that Russian society as a whole is prepared
to carry out genocide. Cruelty and violence are no longer rejected. But is
Russia ready for a protracted terrorist campaign in its own towns and
cities? I have no doubt that if even a few thousand Chechens are left alive
somewhere after this war, there will be such a terrorist campaign, and that
it will go on for a long time. 

In my article of two and a half years ago I wrote that the visions of
catastrophe evoked by government propaganda in order to justify the war in
Chechnya, including violence and the advent of Islamic extremism in fact
materialized after the war, and as the direct result of the war. Today the
Russian public is being frightened with the specter of Chechen terrorism.
What phantom will materialize as a result of these new incantations?
Unfortunately, the answer, in my view, is all too predictable. It is also
clear that, given our traditions, such developments will make the prospects
of a victory of democracy in Russia improbable any time soon. 

Instead, I fear, it is very likely that the year 2000 will someday be
referred to as the "twilight of Russian freedom." 

*******

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