January 22,
2000
This Date's Issues: 4057 4058
4059
Johnson's Russia List
#4058
22 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Putin aide says no Russian ``super-KGB'' planned.
2. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: World Bank's Stiglitz vs. Camdessus.
3. Nezavisimaya gazeta: The Distribution of the Duma Committees.
4. The eXile: N.I. Kimmelman, PUTIN'S ANAL-RETENTIVE
CHARACTERTERISTICS.
5. RFE/RL: Paul Goble, Another Forced Deportation? (Chechnya)
6. Moscow Times: Natalia Yefimova, A Woman of Principle (Interview with Yelena Bonner)
7. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS): Celeste
Wallander, Russian National Security Policy in 2000]
******
#1
Putin aide says no Russian ``super-KGB'' planned
MOSCOW, Jan 22 (Reuters) - A senior aide to Acting President Vladimir Putin
dismissed on Saturday media reports that the Kremlin plans to create a
monster domestic security service, similar to the Soviet-era KGB.
``The rumours about alleged plans to merge Russian special services or create
a kind of 'super-KGB' are groundless,'' Itar-Tass news agency quoted the
secretary of Putin's advisory Security Council, Sergei Ivanov, as saying.
Earlier this month several respected newspapers wrote that the Kremlin was
considering the creation of a new powerful domestic security agency,
controlled directly by the president, which would oversee other bodies.
One of the first steps of post-Soviet Russia was to split the KGB, one of the
symbols of communist party rule, into several agencies, including SVR foreign
intelligence, FSB domestic security service and several others.
Russia's first president, Boris Yeltsin, resisted several attempts to merge
back the security services saying it could threaten democracy.
Public interest in the latest rumours has been encouraged by the fact that
Putin, the front runner in early presidential polls called for March 26 after
Yeltsin's surprise resignation on New Year's Eve, had close links with the
security services.
Putin, Russia's most popular politician at the moment, started his career as
a KGB officer and later worked as a spy in communist East Germany. Before
becoming prime minister in September he headed the FSB.
Putin's few liberal opponents fear that the possible next Kremlin leader,
whose political views remain largely unknown, could move to restore
dictatorship based on the powerful role of the security services under
communism.
Putin has ruled out restoring any kind of dictatorship in Russia, but has
said the security services should be more effective in the country, which
faces a separatist rebellion in the southern republic of Chechnya and the
threat of terrorism.
``The trend towards increasing the role of the special services is
justified,'' Tass quoted Ivanov as saying. ``The progress in that direction
would continue.''
*******
#2
Moscow Times
January 22, 2000
EDITORIAL: World Bank's Stiglitz vs. Camdessus
When Michel Camdessus announced in November that he would step down after
13 years at the head of the International Monetary Fund, Russian elites
gasped. Grave Cabinet members spoke of Russia losing its best friend -
Camdessus was the last, best advocate of multi-billion-dollar loans to the
Kremlin.
Next month Camdessus will be gone, and it is the No. 1 pastime of
high-finance wonks and business journalists to speculate about his
successor.
Two weeks after Camdessus, Joseph Stiglitz was the next to announce that
he was stepping down, after less than three years as chief economist of the
World Bank. (The Bank is the IMF's Siamese twin - both pool the resources
of dozens of nations, then share them back out in the name of international
economic development.)
Stiglitz's resignation - far the more significant event - went virtually
unnoted in Moscow. This is all the stranger given that Stiglitz's departure
- he is finishing up this week, the BBC reports - actually provides a
clear answer to all the handwringing about what the post-Camdessus era
will be like.
That answer is: It will be the same. Provided it does not bring about its
own isolation, Russia in the 21st century will continue to get IMF and
World Bank money. That cash will come with the same strings attached to
loans, i.e. with Washington's Sermon on the Mount about tax collection and
the moral imperative of privatization.
As now, this advice will be flawed; but as now, Russia will be free to
ignore it (provided that it is sufficiently contrite about doing so).
That is the warning flare Stiglitz has sent up with his resignation. An
economist many mention as a Nobel Prize candidate, Stiglitz had launched a
blistering attack on World Bank and IMF economic advice to Russia (and to
other nations). World Bank President James Wolfenson would hold Stiglitz up
as evidence that his Bank was an intellectual hothouse - even as Stiglitz
himself was marginalized, and forced to stop speaking out against the
ruling orthodoxies. Declaring it hopeless, Stiglitz quit.
And so, like that other international bureaucracy in the midst of
disturbing mission creep, NATO, the World Bank and the IMF march inexorably
forward. None of these three organizations could be said to be
democratically accountable; all get bigger, more dogmatic and more
expensive every year.
This is a system that suits the nomenklatura, East and West. It is less
salutary for democracy or economic freedoms - values that would have been
advanced had the critiques of Stiglitz been heeded.
- Matt Bivens
*******
#3
Nezavisimaya gazeta
January 21, 2000
The Distribution of the Duma Committees
[translation for personal use only]
On Wednesday evening, the distribution of the Duma committees became clear.
The CPRF faction acquired the following 9 committees:
- Economic Policy and Entrepreneurship (chairman - Sergei Glazyev)
- State-Building (Anatoly Lukyanov)
- Industry, Construction and High Technology (Yury Maslyukov)
- Labor, Social Policy and Veterans' Affairs (Valery Saikin)
- Federation Affairs and Regional Policies (Leonid Ivanchenko)
- Education and Science (Ivan Melnikov)
- Women, Family and Youth Affairs (Svetlana Goryacheva)
- Non-Governmental and Religious Organizations' Affairs (Viktor Zorkaltsev)
- Culture and Tourism (Nikolai Gubenko)
The Unity bloc obtained 7 committees:
- Property (Vladimir Pekhtin)
- Energy, Transportation and Communications (Vladimir Katrenko)
- Security (Aleksandr Gurov)
- Natural Resources and their Use (Aleksandr Belyakov)
- Environment (Vladimir Grachev)
- Local Self-Government (Vladimir Mokryi)
- Reglementation and Organization of the Duma Work (Nikolai Loktionov)
The "People's Deputy" group has 5 committees:
- Credit Organizations and Financial Markets (Aleksandr Shokhin)
- Defense (Andrei Nikolaev)
- Foreign Affairs (Dmitry Rogozin)
- Health and Sports (Nikolai Gerasimenko)
- Problems of North and Far East (Valentina Pivnenko)
The LDPR faction was given one committee -
- Committee on Information Policy (Konstantin Vetrov)
The Agrarian-Industrial deputies' group will head
- Agrarian Issues' Committee (Vladimir Plotnikov)
and the Nationalities' Committee (no chairman yet).
The remaining committees - on Budget and Tax, on Legislation, and on the CIS
Affairs and Russians Abroad - were offered to Russia's Regions, Union of
Right-Wing Forces and Fatherland-All Russia, but so far they have declined
to accept these committees. [No committee was given to Yabloko.]
[Footnote: Dmitry Rogozin, the new chairman of
the Foreign Affairs Committee, is a nephew of Georgy Rogozin, formerly a
high-ranking KGB official, expert on parapsychology and brain control in
Presidential Security Service in the 1990s. Rogozin Jr. was reported to be a
KGB resident in Cuba in the late 1980s. In 1998, he was briefly on board of
Luzhkov's Fatherland Movement, but later split off and denounced Luzhkov in
Berezovsky-controlled mass media. He ran for the parliament on a party list
that got less than 1% of the vote, but got elected in a single-member
district.]
*****
#4
From: Matt Taibbi <exile.taibbi@matrix.ru>
Subject: psychoanalysis
Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2000
Dear David,
Not sure if you'd be interested in this. The eXile hired a real
psychologist, a Dr. Naum Kimmelman, to psychoanalyze Russian political
figures. This is his first installment, on Putin. I think it's very
interesting-- perhaps your readers would find it a nice change of pace.
Dr. Kimmelman doesn't have his own e-mail address yet, but that's coming
soon. In the meantime, any questions or comments may be sent to me, at
exile.taibbi@matrix.ru
PUTIN'S ANAL-RETENTIVE CHARACTERTERISTICS
By N.I. Kimmelman
The eXile
These days, as many ponder Vladimir Putin's spectacular rise, we believe
that the instrument of psychoanalysis may provide a particularly fruitful
insight into the underlying mechanisms of his sudden popularity.
First, we must consider the psychodynamic implications the changes in
Russian society over the last decade had for public psyche. Of these
changes, the deprivation of the nourishing structure and feeling of
security offered by the Soviet regime had the most traumatic effect. It
resulted in Russian public's development of oral passive or, as observed
in leaders and supporters of some political parties, oral aggressive
character. This type of character in individuals stems form the trauma of
weaning, and weaning was precisely the symbolic essence of the collapse of
the Soviet nourishing structure. The needs of oral character are centered
around pleasures associated with mouth, and being fed is the most important
of such pleasures.
The combination of oral-passive character of the public with the phallic
character of the leadership (to be discussed in greater detail in later
issues) has resulted in a peculiar type of neurotic symbiosis. In this, the
quasi-paternal figures like Yeltsin or Luzhkov respond to the people's cry
for oral gratification by feeding them phallic symbols. This pattern has
survived since the Soviet time, and is manifest in the extreme social and,
at times, political importance of objects like kolbasa, cigarettes and
vodka (especially as drunk iz gorla).
This situation is not healthy, nor is it consciously gratifying for the
people. There is an overwhelming want for a new, non-phallic type of
leader. And Vladimir Putin may be the answer.
We believe that Putin is a perfect example of a purely anal-retentive
character. According to Freudian theory, this type of character results
from the conflict occurring at the potty-training phase. A child whose
parents are weak and submissive soon finds that he can effectively control
them by means of his bowel behavior. This produces the anal-expulsive
character (also represented on Russian political stage, as we will see
later). Meanwhile, a dominating father, who demands structure and
discipline in everything, including defecation, may at this stage lay
ground for an anal-retentive personality, for which the control of
holding-in and letting-go is of principal importance.
We know little, if anything, about Mr. Putin's childhood. However,
anal-retentive traits are clearly present in his behavior. This certainly
includes his fondness for structure and discipline, his reported admiration
of the German culture (an anal-retentive society par excellence) and his
recent Freudian slip when he promised to zamochit' banditov even when they
are v sortire, the loo here apparently having the meaning of sanctum
sanctorum for an anal personality. In fact, consider the symbolic
importance of retaining Chechnya, a task of vital importance for Putin.
The longing for an anal-retentive leader is deeply rooted in Russian
culture, starting from the invitation of varyagi, the Scandinavian
warlords, to rule Slavic tribes, to the adoption of the German bureaucratic
system in 17th-19th centuries. We believe that Mr. Putin's rule may offer
new hope for Russia, or at least break the neurotic oral-phallic dependence
of both Soviet and Yeltsin regime. There are certain dangers inherent,
however. Firstly, as its is known from clinical experience, when
significantly frustrated in his activities, an anal-retentive personality
may revert to anal-expulsive behavior, which would result in a rather
nauseating dependence pattern in combination with oral-passive character of
the public. On the other hand, Putin may be seduced into assuming phallic
traits in his rule. This is and even greater danger, since phallic
ambitions in an anal retentive individual are an ultimate recipe for
dictatorship.
*******
#5
Russia: Analysis From Washington -- Another Forced Deportation?
By Paul Goble
Washington, 21 January 2000 (RFE/RL) -- As Russian forces continue their
attacks on Grozny, Moscow appears to have decided as part of its broader
campaign to render a portion of Chechnya uninhabitable and to forcibly move
people living there to other locations.
At the end of last month, several Western journalists reported from Moscow
that the Russian government had decided to destroy the villages of highland
Chechnya in order to deny Chechen fighters any sanctuary and thus to speed
the end of the conflict.
But because such actions recall some of the worst features of the Stalinist
era, many Western analysts treated these reports with extreme skepticism.
Now, however, a document, apparently leaked in Moscow and circulating in the
West this week, suggests that Moscow has decided on even more radical
measures.
The document in question consists of a report on the December 15 meeting of
the Russian Security Council under the chairmanship of then-prime minister
and now acting President Vladimir Putin. Marked for official use only, the
two-page paper is addressed to Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev.
According to this report, which several Western analysts consider authentic,
the Russian Security Council on that date addressed two issues: strengthening
Moscow's influence over the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent
States and suppressing the Chechens.
If the decisions concerning the CIS are very much a continuation of Moscow's
recent policies, the Security Council's conclusions about how to deal with
Chechnya represent a major departure from what Russian officials have said in
public in the past.
According to this report, Russian forces have virtually completed the second
stage of what the document calls "the anti-terrorist operation for the
liquidation of bandit formations on the territory of Chechnya." And the
meeting thus had to decide what to do in the third phase.
The language of the report is stark: it says that participants in the
mid-December meeting agreed that Chechen settlements in the mountains do not
have "any economic or other value" and thus "must be completely liquidated."
All structures there -- "including cult and historical ones" -- must be
viewed as potential hiding places for bandit formations, the document
specifies, and thus they are to be subject to "total destruction." Such
actions, the report says, will effectively "liquidate forever the basis for
the rise of new bandits and terrorists."
The Security Council report provides additional details on what that will
mean: "the creation of conditions absolutely unsuitable for human habitation
in the future" and "the resettlement of peaceful residents from this part of
Chechnya either north of the Terek River or their assimilation into other
regions of Russia."
And the Security Council adds that "after the completion of military
operations all construction and other materials are to be removed from this
part of Chechnya," thereby making it impossible that anyone will ever be able
to live there again.
Such draconian measures not only represent a significant escalation of
Moscow's expressed aims of ending Chechen resistance but inevitably invite
comparisons with tsarist policies in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century
and Stalin's forcible deportation of the Chechens in 1944.
As tsarist forces marched into the northern Caucasus in the last century,
they routinely destroyed crops and deforested much of the region as part of
their effort to pacify the population. In most cases, the policy backfired
and left the local population more anti-Russian than before.
Then, in 1944, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin accused the Chechens of
collaborating with the Germans and deported more than 600,000 of them to
Central Asia.
That bitter experience that cost more than a third of them their lives and
left those who remained alive and their descendants even more determined to
return home and ultimately to escape Russian rule.
But neither the tsarist authorities nor Stalin's secret police resolved to
make an entire portion of Chechnya uninhabitable and to forcibly move the
population living there to other regions.
That is what Moscow under acting President Putin now appears prepared to do.
But unless this action leads to the total extermination of all Chechens, it
is likely to have an even more disturbing outcome than did the earlier
efforts of tsars and commissars.
It is likely to generate an even more radical Chechen national movement, one
defined by its hostility to everything Russian and prepared to engage in
precisely the kind of actions that the Russian authorities have claimed they
are acting to forestall.
*******
#6
Moscow Times
22 January 2000
A Woman of Principle
By Natalia Yefimova
For many years, Yelena Bonner, the widow of prominent Russian physicist
and human rights advocate Andrei Sakharov, has been an uncompromising
"voice of conscience" for Russia. Ms. Bonner was forced to turn her family
visit to the United States last summer into a protracted stay after
suffering a full-blown heart attack in September. She is unsure whether she
will be able to return to Russia in late March as planned, but she agreed
to speak by phone with Natalia Yefimova to comment on Russia's latest
political developments, the state of human rights and, of course, the war
in Chechnya.
Q:
In a survey by Time magazine, former Russian President Boris Yeltsin named
Andrei Sakharov "man of the century." How did you feel about this?
A:
Perhaps, [under different circumstances] I would have been happy about
this, but in light of the war in Chechnya and Yeltsin's course of
development - or, more precisely, degradation - toward an
authoritarian-military position (when we expected him to bring the country
closer to democracy), it strikes me as speculation. And I will stand for no
speculation using the name of Andrei Dmitriyevich.
Q:
It's been over 10 years since Sakharov's death. Do you feel that Russia
has made any progress in implementing the principles outlined in his draft
of the Constitution?
A:
None at all. You see, although that constitution had been written for the
Soviet Union, the Russia that remained after its disintegration was still
an enormous, multi-ethnic state. One of the key principles of Sakharov's
constitution was equal rights for all the country's ethnic groups,
regardless of their administrative status - oblast, republic, what have
you. He believed that if they truly had the right to self-determination, no
one would want to break away. He included a provision that each of these
administrative units would delegate whatever functions it deemed necessary
to the center ... and each would decide its own fate based on the will of
the people. Only after that did he propose there be a 10-year moratorium on
all border changes. So that things could settle down and emotions could
cool off before moving on to the next stage. Many people unfairly cite
Sakharov, saying that he called for a ban on altering borders.
Q:
It's been said that many of the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s had
never intended to get involved in politics, but after the fall of communism
the burden of political leadership was thrust upon them "by default," so
to speak ...
A:
People always ask, "Where have the dissidents gone?" Well, as for me, I'll
be 77 in a few weeks; I just don't have the strength to do as much as I
used to. Politics is far from everyone's calling in life. You can shower me
with money, for instance, but I still won't like [politics]. ... I have a
need - and have always had the need - to speak out on problems that concern
me. ... Some dissidents have returned to their original professions.
People choose what they want to do and, thank God, we live in a time when
we can choose a field that fulfills our own needs, not only the needs of
society. ... Many dissidents continue to be involved in human rights
advocacy. But - for now - this does not involve the threat of arrest; so
their work has lost its aura of romanticism. And that's why people ask,
"Where have the dissidents gone?"
Q:
What should average citizens do to help build civil society in Russia?
What's missing on their part?
A:
What's missing is independent thinking. As before, society succumbs to the
most base forms of agitation by those with power and money. And the results
are clear from the latest [Duma] elections. [There was] a lot of
demagoguery that people took for the truth. ... I mean both Unity and,
unfortunately, the Union of Right Forces [SPS], which, by supporting
[acting President Vladimir] Putin's ideology, ceased to be liberal and
democratic. Support for the idea of war rather than a peaceful solution in
Chechnya should have completely pulled the veil of democracy and liberalism
off SPS, but unfortunately people don't understand this.
Q:
What political alternative was there?
A:
Well, I can't force my views as a voter onto others, but I voted for
Yabloko and will vote for Yavlinsky and certainly not for Putin. The
military and police-like ideology preached by Putin does not suit me.
Society longs for the creation of a truly strong state, but a strong state
can have different ideologies. And I consider the ideology that comes with
Putin - and is supported by SPS and Unity - a dangerous one.
Q:
Moving on to Chechnya ... You've proposed the idea of "internationalizing"
the conflict ...
A:
I continue to support the idea of bringing in international experts and
peace-keeping forces. The danger of this war's ideology lies precisely in
the fact that [Putin and the military] have closed off this conflict not
only to the international community but to Russia as well. This conflict
has already produced so many lies! We don't know the death tolls. We don't
know about the methods or weapons being used. We believe that certain
methods prohibited by the Convention [on Human Rights] have been put into
play. ... We still don't know who blew up those apartment buildings or how
the investigation is being conducted. ... We only hear the lies of
[General] Manilov and that created-specially-for-lying information center.
.. [The war] is horrible not only for Chechnya but for Russia as well.
Because Russia, blinded by militarism, is becoming a fascist state. The
methods being employed by the military are methods of genocide; the things
happening in Chechnya today are crimes against humanity and they deserve
their own Nuremburg.
Q:
How realistic do you think it is that the West would agree to provide the
manpower and money needed to interfere in Chechnya?
A:
Even though I'm a pessimist, I can not abandon my point of view. I
continue to insist that international experts and peace-keeping forces be
allowed into Chechnya. The bombing must stop and the negotiations must
begin.
And it's absolutely untrue that [Aslan] Maskhadov is not legitimate. He is
legitimate and has been recognized as such. ... Maskhadov is effectively
powerless because that lack of power was fostered and created by Moscow
during the war-free years. All those horrid [local] groups started
gathering momentum for their illicit activities on the groundwork laid
through deception by Moscow. ... Instead of bombs, Chechnya needs the
return of refugees and new elections.
Q:
Do you feel that the current military campaign may produce another
generation of psychologically traumatized young men? I mean the soldiers
who return from Chechnya. ...
A:
I think that since December 1979, all the Soviet and, later, the Russian
government has done is breed people whose psychological condition is known
in the West as the Vietnam complex. ... After all, the victims of war are
not only those who come home in zinc coffins; those who return [alive] will
also be victims. The only way to avoid this is not to fight. There are
psychiatrists and international organizations that work on adaptation
programs, but these are all just a drop in the ocean.
Q:
Your position on Putin is already quite clear. What was your opinion of
him before he gained prominence?
A:
I had no opinion of him. I have always believed the organization from
which he emerged [i.e. the KGB] to be "untransformable." Perhaps it must be
the way that it is, but it should not be the organization to develop
government strategy.
Q:
What is your opinion of the way the United States assesses the situation
in Russia?
A:
America is a stable democracy with its own flaws, but despite these flaws,
it will not suddenly go tumbling off a precipice, regardless of who gets
elected. ... It seems to me that, over the last 10 years, the U.S.
administration has constantly been wrong in its assessment of Russia. It
constantly mistakes words for deeds. ... In part this happens because it
makes it easier [for the United States] to defend its own political
interests. ... The Clinton administration put its money on a democratic
Russia and for Strobe Talbott to admit now that Russia is not [democratic]
at all would be to make a fool of himself.
Q:
You wrote an unusual and touching account of your childhood and
relationship with your family called "Daughters and Mothers"
(Dochki-Materi). Is there anything you would add to that book if you could?
A:
That book was written while Andrei Dmitriyevich was still alive. I had a
different sense of the world then. It was written for him. And I can not
recapture the way I felt about life then, before his death.
*******
#7
Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS)
Davis Center for Russian Studies * Harvard University
Memo No. 102
Russian National Security Policy in 2000
Celeste A. Wallander (cwalland@fas.harvard.edu)
Harvard University--January 2000
Although signing a decree granting the new National Security Concept the
status of law in January 2000 was one of acting president Vladimir V. Putin's
first official decisions in the area of security policy, this development
should not be misunderstood as tied solely to Putin's views or personal
leadership. The new national security policy has been developing for at least
a year, and is the result of debate and consensus across a substantial
portion of the Russian national security elite. The policy is a very
substantial change from the December 1997 National Security Concept, and is a
significant shift from liberal elements in former President Yeltsin's
political coalition. The reasons for the shift are partly internal, arising
from Russia's own domestic political and economic developments after the
August 1998 financial crisis, but they are also the result of NATO's war in
Kosovo and other difficulties in Russia's relations with the US. In this
memo, I explain the background to the new policy and the reason for the
change in thinking, analyze the main elements of the new policy, and assess
its implications for Russia's future security policies, defense priorities,
and relations with the United States.
The Sources of Russia's National Security Concept Until 1997
Russia's National Security Concept is not a binding document: it can be (and
has been) changed, amended, and even ignored. Yet the document is important
for understanding Russian security policy, because it is a reflection of the
priorities, assessments, compromises, and negotiations within the Russian
political and security elite. It is a statement of the government's
assessment of the international system, Russian national interests, sources
of threats to those interests, and the means by which Russia can secure its
interests.
Such an exercise, it must be understood, is fundamentally political.
Different individuals and groups in Russian society will have different
priorities and seek different kinds of internal and external political,
economic, and social arrangements to pursue their own interests. The
definition of Russia's priorities and opportunities means there will be
winners and losers. Reflecting the turbulent and contentious nature of the
post-communist transformation, Russia lacked an official national security
policy until December 1997. Russian policy emphasizing partnership with the
West and the need for Russia to become a member of the "civilized" Western
international system reflected the view of a very narrow elite around
Yeltsin. As competition in Russia's domestic political and economic arenas
developed in the period 1993-97, multiple views of Russia's national security
policy based upon diverse sets of political, economic, and societal interests
emerged. By 1997 a synthesis had emerged which still emphasized cooperation
and integration, but with a strong measure of Eurasianism and great power
thinking lending the policy a more traditional cast. This consensus view was
the result of the domestic coalition that had successfully supported
Yeltsin's presidential election in 1996, consisting of the liberals who had
been the core of the government since 1991 along with the
cooperation-oriented centrists who expanded Yeltsin's political base and
opposed a return to the Soviet past.
The National Security Concept of December 1997
The compromise security policy was clear in Russia's December 1997 National
Security Concept. It stated that the most important threats to Russian
security lie not in the international system but in Russia's internal
conditions. Since Russia's internal threats arise from economic decline,
instability, and societal problems such as poor health and unemployment, they
must be addressed through economic reform. Although economic reform is
primarily an internal matter, it can be supported by a non-threatening
international environment and by Russian integration into international
economic institutions.
This liberalism was tempered, however, by insistence that Russia does not
come to the international community as a subordinate member, but as one of
the major players whose active participation is necessary for solving
problems in political, economic, and military spheres. The 1997 Concept
acknowledged difficulties for Russian participation and
involvement--particularly the problem of NATO enlargement--but held that
effective multilateral means for cooperation and coordination of
international affairs ultimately could be achieved only with Russian
involvement in organizations such as the OSCE. It based this confidence on
Russia's status as the only truly Eurasian power. This centrist view--often
referred to as "statist"--characterized the moderate middle of Russian
national security debate in the 1990s.
It was truly astonishing that the national security policy of a such a large
and important country considered internal threats to security more
significant than external threats. Traditional international security threats
were noted, but these were secondary to the internal threats. Similarly
striking, the means for achieving Russian security at the international level
was "partnership" with the West, and while Russian defense capabilities were
mentioned, it was in the context of "reasonable expenditures," rather than
the kind of dedicated investment required for any ambitious military reform
and restructuring.
Kosovo, Chechnya, and Russia's New Environment
The 1998-99 period was a turning point for Russian assessment of its
international environment, and for the composition of its governing
coalition. The liberal-statist balance of political elite interests was upset
in 1998 and 1999 by the August financial crisis and, more importantly, by the
Western war in Kosovo. The August crisis undermined liberal views by exposing
Russia's vulnerability to the international economy and financial markets.
The fundamental sources of the crisis were internal policy failures and
economic weakness, but it was precipitated by the vulnerability of the ruble
to speculative international financial markets. At the same time, because
Russia's economy has done so well in the aftermath of the decision to devalue
the ruble and implement limited debt defaults, the crisis reinforced statist
arguments that a less Western-dependent, more state-directed policy of
economic reform could be Russia's path to stability and eventual prosperity.
Even more significant for Russia's national security policy, however, were
the implications of the American use of NATO to impose a military solution
for Serbia's violation of Kosovar political and human rights. Russia's uneasy
acceptance of NATO's membership enlargement was based in part on the
assumption that Russia held a veto over NATO missions beyond collective
self-defense of members' territories. The Russian leadership believed that
the US and NATO had committed themselves to adopting non-collective defense
missions only with a United Nations mandate. This would mean that as a
permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia would have influence over
any such mission.
The US and NATO proved unwilling to live by this restriction in Kosovo. The
issue of the expansion of NATO's membership was difficult enough for Russia:
with Kosovo, it faced the expansion of NATO's mission, unrestrained by the
UN. The expansion of NATO's mission to encompass unilateral intervention to
settle an internal ethnic conflict and enforce Western human rights
priorities creates the potential for something deemed even worse than
membership enlargement. Given instability on and within Russia's borders in
the Caucasus, Caspian, and Central Asia--areas in which the US has expressed
both economic and geostrategic interests--the expansion of NATO's mission
could threaten Russia's territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
The US might not agree, but it is important to understand that Russians
consider Chechnya in light of Kosovo, Western policy and priorities, and
NATO's mission expansion. Many factors played a role in the decision to
"solve" the problem of Chechnya's separatism, instability, and threat to
Russian territory, and it is unlikely that Kosovo was the most important. The
war in Kosovo, however, undermined the liberal argument for "partnership" in
order to gain Western support for Russia's international economic
integration. The lesson appeared to be that the US would be constrained by
its international commitments only when convenient, and that it would act
unilaterally in important security matters when Russia did not agree with
American policies. Kosovo signaled that American and Russian priorities were
not in sync and that the US was more willing than the 1997 Concept had
assumed to use military force closer to Russian borders for a wider variety
of purposes. In short, Kosovo helped to undermine the liberals' security
argument for partnership and reinforced those who had been arguing that the
West's intentions toward Russia were not benign.
The Russian National Security Concept of 2000
The National Security Concept signed into law by Putin's decree in January
2000 has been in the works since the spring of 1999. A draft of the concept
was approved by the Russian Security Council in October, and published in
November 1999. At the same time, a draft military doctrine was being
developed to supercede the doctrine of 1993: the draft was published in
October 1999 and an official version is expected soon.
The development of these compromise political statements of Russian security
assessments, interests, and policies was therefore a long-term process
reflecting the concerns and conclusions of a substantial range of political
figures. The process has been affected by events and problems such as NATO
enlargement, Kosovo, Chechnya, and disagreements on offensive and defensive
nuclear weapons, but its roots lie deep within Russia's political and
security establishment. Were Russia to suffer another of its leadership
shuffles, the basic outlines of the policy would remain.
The most important aspect of the new Concept is that it elevates the
importance and expands the types of external threats to Russian security. The
document still devotes a great deal of attention to internal threats to
Russian security, arising primarily from the difficulties of its
post-communist transition and its unsuccessful economic reforms. In contrast
to the 1997 version, however, the new analysis emphasizes terrorism, societal
discontent and disharmony, the uneven benefits of economic reform, the
criminalization of Russian society, and the lack of a rule-based state to
guarantee the safety and well-being of Russian citizens to a greater degree.
Unlike the 1997 Concept, which appeared to call for staying the course of
political-economic reform, the characterization of internal threats in the
2000 document justifies a reform policy with greater emphasis on the role of
the Russian state in shaping the economy, safeguarding stability, and
regulating social and political life.
Even more substantial changes have been made in Russia's assessment of its
external environment and external threats to Russian security. The Concept no
longer states that there are no external threats arising from deliberate
actions or aggression. It provides a substantial list of external threats,
including:
the weakening of the OSCE and UN;
weakening Russian political, economic, and military influence in the world;
the consolidation of military-political blocs and alliances (particularly
further eastward expansion of NATO), including the possibility of foreign
military bases or deployment of forces on Russian borders;
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery;
weakening of the CIS, and escalation of conflicts on CIS members' borders;
and territorial claims against Russia.
In several places the Concept emphasizes that the natural tendency of
international relations after Cold-War confrontation is toward the
development of a multipolar world in which relations are based upon
international law and a proper role for Russia. It argues that the United
States and its allies, against this tendency, under the guise of
multilateralism have sought to establish a unipolar world outside of
international law. The document warns that NATO's policy transition to the
use of military force outside its alliance territory without UN Security
Council approval is a major threat to world stability, and that these trends
create the potential for a new era of arms races among the world's great
powers. The Concept links the internal threat of terrorism and separatism
(clearly with Chechnya in mind) to external threats: it argues that
international terrorism involves efforts to undermine the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Russia, with the possibility of direct military
aggression.
Given the greater significance accorded to external threats in the new
assessment, it is not surprising that the new Concept calls for a greater
emphasis on traditional security instruments. The main task of Russia's
security policy in the external realm, it says, is to secure the country's
territorial integrity, especially in preventing terrorism and threats to
Russia's international borders. To deal with America's unilateralism, the
Concept sets Russia the task of consolidating its position as one of the
great powers and influential centers in the world. It is here that the
Concept drops Russia's earlier use of the term "partnership" with the West
and replaces it with the more limited "cooperation." Within that cooperation,
the emphasis is on international measures to prevent proliferation and cope
with the spread of international terrorism and crime.
In military defense terms, the policy focus is on preventing "scientific and
technological dependence" and achieving a level of military capability
sufficient to prevent aggression in local wars and prevail against groups of
opposing forces in regional wars. Russia must keep its nuclear weapons as a
guarantee against aggressors or coalitions of hostile states, and may resort
to nuclear weapons to defend itself and its allies against nuclear-armed
states or their allies.
Yet the good news is that the Concept preserves the fundamental argument that
Russia's national interests and security will be achieved primarily through
international law and "can only be achieved by the development of Russia's
economy" in connection with its longer-term integration into the world
economy. The economic reform this leadership has in mind appears to differ
from previous policy: it places greater emphasis on support for the
scientific, technological, and defense sectors of the economy. It appears to
prescribe a stronger state role in facilitating equity and social stability
and in regulating as well as creating market conditions. And it emphasizes
that the goal of Russia's international economic integration is to open
foreign markets to Russian products.
This seems to signal that the emphasis at home will be on greater state
involvement and an economic policy closer to an industrial policy, focusing
on the advanced defense sector and export promotion. This surely means a
stronger state and greater state involvement in society. Nevertheless, it
must be emphasized that a strong priority remains market reform and
international integration, although of a type that will be less subject to
Western blueprints and priorities.
Putin's statements since becoming president have reinforced this mix of
views. He has emphasized that Russia's future lies in economic reform and
international economic integration. He has called for progress on Russian
membership in the World Trade Organization, has cut back on restrictions of
important Russian raw materials exports, and taken steps against Russian
energy firms have not paid taxes or for government services. He has called
for private ownership of land, an overhaul of the Russian tax system, and
ratification of START II. At the same time, Putin leads a government that has
prosecuted the brutal war in Chechnya and issued a revised, tougher security
policy that identifies the United States as a potential threat to Russia.
As my analysis has suggested, however, there is no contradiction between
economic reform and a tougher line on the Russian state and its national
security policy. Putin is a Russian statist, and his leadership reflects a
broad elite consensus that supports integration and cooperation with the
West, but not at any price. He is willing to seek international integration
and prosperity, but not at the price of territorial integrity and national
sovereignty, nor at the price of the West's complete dominance in the nuclear
and conventional military spheres. Russia's leadership has not abandoned
internal reform and international integration, but it does not trust the West
to protect Russia's interests.
Implications for the United States
The most important implication for the US of new Russian security policy is
that the potential for cooperation on important security issues such as
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and conflict management are at least as
good as and probably better than in the 1990s. The current Russian leadership
has a broader and more stable base of support, and will probably implement
measures to increase the competence and capacity of the Russian state. That
means Russia can be a reliable partner in controlling weapons of mass
destruction, missile technology, and international crime. This is an
improvement over the 1990s, when it was far from clear that Russia could
control the actions of its citizens and agencies, even if the government
wished to do so.
Second, it is extremely important to understand that the door remains open
for Russian internal economic reform and international integration. This is
not the time to be closing off access to the opportunities and benefits the
international economic system holds for Russia's most important economic and
political actors. Russia must be expected to play by the international
economic rules of the game because those rules can have long-term effects in
encouraging the kinds of transparency, competition, and prosperity which
nudges Russia to a more liberal system. Cutting off access reinforces the
position of those in Russian society who would profit from isolation, state
control, and a Soviet-style defense economy.
Nevertheless, Russia is not going to be as easy to deal with as it was in the
1990s. Elements of an industrial policy and greater state regulation of the
economy will make trade negotiations and financial transactions more
complicated, and will cause problems in American domestic politics for
certain sectors in which Russia can compete, such as steel. Russian defense
spending will increase, partly in order to stem the crisis in Russia's
conventional forces, partly in connection with the defense sector portion of
the economic development policy. In order to prosecute the war in Chechnya,
the Putin leadership found one billion dollars: unlimited funds are not
available, but a shift in priorities can support increased levels of defense
spending over those we saw in the 1990s. This increased defense spending is
not a direct threat to US security in itself, but it has indirect
implications for American security policy, including an increase in Russian
efforts to sell arms on the international market, the shift in military
balances that will concern Russia's neighbors, and the effects on Russian
democracy and the state itself.
Most problematic will be negotiations in the area of nuclear arms control,
particularly concerning American hopes for modification of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty in order to deploy a form of national missile defense. Given
the heightened threat assessment in the new security concept, and the
increased emphasis on the importance of Russia's nuclear deterrent to cope
with threats against itself or its allies, Russian defense officials have
become very sensitive to any developments that might erode the strength of
that deterrent capability. In addition, Russia's experience with US policy on
NATO (that enlargement of membership and of mission violated assurances and
agreements the Russian government believes the US made) makes Russian defense
officials skeptical that the US would abide by any negotiated restrictions
that proved inconvenient in the future. Russian analysts do not fear that
American plans for NMD to cope with "rogue state" threats erode Russia's
deterrent, but they do believe that such systems will provide the US with a
"break-out" capability that may prove tempting in the future, given the
trends toward American unilateralism in international affairs. No one knows
(perhaps not even the Russian leaders themselves) whether there is an
ABM-modification deal Russia can live with, and what the price might be in
terms of a START III agreement. But it is certain that this will be a very
difficult and bitter issue at a time when many Russian analysts believe that
bilateral relations are approaching Cold War levels of mistrust.
The most important implication for US policy is the need to understand that
the Russian security leadership links national sovereignty and territorial
integrity, terrorism and WMD, instability and conflict in the
Caucasus/Caspian region, NATO's membership and mission enlargement, and US
unilateralism. We may not agree that these elements are connected. However,
we will not be able to devise a successful Russia policy unless we understand
that the Russian political leadership will base its security policy on this
assessment into the 21st century.
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