January 21, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4054 4055 4056

Johnson's Russia List
#5056
21 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Talbott Says Putin's Goals Unclear.
2. AP: Angela Charlton, Russian Church Gets Closer to State.
3. Interfax: Poll: Russians trust Putin but discontent mounting.
4. RFE/RL: Sophie Lambroschini, Putin Alliance Casts Clouds Over Economic Reform.
5. Trud: Konstantin Sretensky, WHAT'S UP THERE, ON THE LEFT FLANK?
6. Reuters: Russian parties keep up boycott of new Duma.
7. Chicago Tribune: Colin McMahon, Outgunned, not outfought. (Chechnya) 
8. Dale Herspring: Mark Kramer on Russia's New Strategic Concept.
9. THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM: Aleksandr Buzgalin, THE KING IS DEAD. LONG LIVE THE KING?
10. New York Times: Celestine Bohlen, Many Russians Questioning Official Toll in Chechnya.] 

*******

#1
Talbott Says Putin's Goals Unclear
January 21, 2000
By BARRY SCHWEID

WASHINGTON (AP) - Where Russia's acting president, Vladimir Putin, intends to 
lead the country ``is a genuinely open question,'' and there isn't much the 
United States can do to affect the outcome, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott said Friday. 

Having championed U.S. support for Russia in his seven years as a 
high-ranking State Department official with close ties to President Clinton, 
Talbott said ``we must use such influence as we have, even if it's at the 
margins, to encourage Russian democratization.'' 

But Talbott, in a speech at Oxford University, in England, said Putin has 
sent different signals to different audiences and all the United States and 
others can do at this point is to speculate about his maneuvers in the 
Russian parliament and where he intends to take the country. 

Talbott met last month with the new Russian leader, who was named by Boris 
Yeltsin as his acting successor three weeks ago. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright is planning her own firsthand assessment of Russian politics on a 
trip to Moscow next weekend. 

This week, Putin's supporters in the Duma struck a power-sharing dealing with 
the communists. 

The one theme Putin strikes consistently is a desire to see Russia regain its 
strength of national pride and its purpose, Talbott said. ``No country can 
succeed without those ingredients,'' he said. 

But, Talbott said, ``it all depends on how Russia defines strength, how it 
defines security. Will it do so in today's terms or in yesterday's?''' 

``This is the vexing question, not just about Mr. Putin but his country as a 
whole,'' he said. ``It's a genuinely open question.'' 

Albright on Tuesday hailed Putin, a former KGB intelligence chief, as ``one 
of the leading reformers'' in Russia and said he was ``determined to move 
reform forward.'' 

Albright also said the Clinton administration was not ``kind of starry-eyed'' 
about Russia, ``but also understands the importance of pushing and working 
with them and having it seen as being in our national interest.'' 

This fiscal year, the administration is backing up its support with an 
estimated $1.1 billion in assistance, including $200 million in humanitarian 
food assistance. 

Last year, U.S. aid amounted to almost $1.9 billion, including $1.1 billion 
in food aid. 

The administration is preparing to ask Congress to reduce most of the 
programs next year while increasing security assistance to help reduce 
nuclear stockpiles and induce scientists to remain in Russia. 

About 75 percent of U.S. aid bypasses Moscow and the central government, 
going directly to local projects. Four areas are targeted for special U.S. 
attention - Novgorod, Samarga, Tomsk and Sakhalin. 

*******

#2
Russian Church Gets Closer to State
January 21, 2000
By ANGELA CHARLTON

MOSCOW (AP) - Russian priests and churchgoers disagree over whether Vladimir 
Putin faithfully adhered to intricate Orthodox rituals during a Christmas 
liturgy this month. Did he touch his lips and genuflect at the right times? 
Did he face the proper direction upon entrance and exit? 

Yet even the purists aren't questioning why Russia's acting president 
attended church in the first place, despite his 15 years with the Soviet-era 
KGB, which mercilessly repressed religion and its followers for decades. 

Putin's perceived piety, which should work in his favor in the March 
presidential elections, reflects the increasingly visible role of the 
Orthodox Church in Russian politics - and in reforging Russia's long-lost 
national identity. 

Few Russians will forget the image of Orthodox Patriarch Alexy II, in his 
imposing gold-and-white cape, presiding over Boris Yeltsin as he resigned and 
handed over Russia's helm to Putin in a Kremlin ceremony on Dec. 31. 

Moscow's mayor has lavished money on rebuilding Orthodox cathedrals; Orthodox 
Cossacks are serving as auxiliary police and gaining political powers in 
areas with large Muslim minorities; and the patriarch recently received 
federally funded bodyguards. 

The tendency worries adherents of Russia's other religions, particularly its 
more than 20 million Muslims, whose brethren in Chechnya have been under 
Russian fire for months. 

But the church's expanding role is welcomed by believers such as Father 
Alexander, a priest whose mother hid her faith for years from the Soviet 
authorities. 

``We welcome it when politicians come to pray, whatever the reason,'' Father 
Alexander said after leading a service in the Holy Trinity Church overlooking 
Moscow's Sparrow Hills. Putin attended the green-and-white church on Orthodox 
Christmas on Jan. 7. 

It's impossible to gauge how much of Putin's faith is genuine. Some who saw 
Putin on Christmas say he touched an icon in the wrong place and didn't bow 
when he was supposed to, but they conceded what he did do was unprecedented 
for a modern Russian politician. 

``It didn't look forced or unnatural'' when Putin prayed, Father Alexander 
said. ``Yeltsin was never so smooth.'' 

Even Yeltsin, who was a Communist Party boss and rarely attended church as 
president, went to Bethlehem to celebrate Orthodox Christmas this year. 

``In the holy land, I feel holy myself,'' he said in Israel. 

Yeltsin's religious overtures were often seen as petty politicking. Putin, 
however, is of a younger generation, one less tainted by the Soviet years. 

``It shows that we have reached a new threshold of acceptance, when it's not 
a surprise when the president goes to church,'' Father Alexander said. 

A 1995 report on Soviet repression says 200,000 people were killed by the 
Communist regime for religious beliefs - shot, strangled, even crucified on 
church gates. 

Orthodoxy, the bedrock of Russian society for centuries, suffered massively 
but maintained the tacit support of some Soviet leaders. It is again the 
country's dominant faith, and while its leadership is officially apolitical, 
it has cultivated ties with today's Kremlin. 

The Orthodox Church is still struggling to regain the following it enjoyed in 
czarist times, and lobbied successfully in recent years for a law that 
restricts ``nontraditional'' religions, including foreign missionaries. 

The church's pro-Russia message is welcome at a time when nationalist 
sentiment is rising, driven by the Chechen war and souring relations with the 
West. Many Russians have turned to Orthodoxy to fill the ideological vacuum 
left by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Some, however, fear the church is assuming too great a role in Russian life. 

In an article titled ``Ordered to Believe,'' commentator Valery Kichin wrote 
in the liberal daily Izvestia earlier this month: ``Orthodoxy is 
unconditionally recognized as indisputable, and the concept is more and more 
identified with the concept of 'Russian.''' 

``In place of a red (Communist Party) card in your breast pocket you must 
carry a holy cross,'' he wrote. 

Muslims also feel threatened, and dispute Putin's insistence that the war in 
Chechnya is targeted not at Islam but at terrorists. 

``National patriotism is Putin's banner. If he is elected, the consequences 
will be very serious for all of Russia's Muslims,'' said Faud Yusupov, head 
of the Bait-Allakh Society, a prominent Russian Muslim organization. ``Life 
for Muslims is better than in Soviet times. But there are many things to 
worry about.'' 

Even today's Communist Party has stripped atheism from its charter and party 
chief Gennady Zyuganov - also a presidential candidate - calls Jesus Christ 
``the first real communist.'' 

While polls show about two-thirds of Russians call themselves Orthodox, just 
2 percent attend church regularly, according to Geraldine Fagan of the 
independent Keston Institute in Britain. 

``The church is trying to increase its public profile regardless of whether 
they have any real support among the public,'' she said. 

*******

#3
Poll: Russians trust Putin but discontent mounting

MOSCOW. Jan 21 (Interfax) - Three quarters of Russians believe
acting President Vladimir Putin's government will be able to win the
confidence of the bulk of the population but there is mounting
dissatisfaction with his Cabinet, pollsters said on Friday. Only 11% doubt
the Putin Cabinet's ability to win national confidence while 14% are
undecided, the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Studies (VTsIOM) said
in a poll taken between January 14 and 17. At the same time, 35% of
Russians, compared with 28% in mid-December, are sure the government
cannot curb inflation or stop incomes falling, according to VTsIOM.
Thirty-two percent think the Cabinet is powerless against the economic
crisis and declining production. 20% was the figure for December.
Twenty-nine percent, compared to 14% in December, accuse the government
of neglecting the population's social security. Another 29% believe the
government cannot beat unemployment, December's proportion being 18%.
Twenty-four percent, compared to 18% in December, believe the Cabinet
has no clear crisis program. And 18%, compared with 9% in December,
accuse the government of inability to guarantee people's safety against
crime. VTsIOM questioned 1,600 people in the survey, whose margin of error
was 4%, the center said in a report made available to Interfax.

******

#4
Russia: Putin Alliance Casts Clouds Over Economic Reform
By Sophie Lambroschini

Russian acting President Vladimir Putin has given conflicting signals on his 
plans for reforming the economy. Moscow correspondent Sophie Lambroschini 
reports that with this week's link-up between Putin's Unity party and the 
communists, forecasting the future of reform has become more difficult. 

Moscow, 21 January 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Since being named acting president at the 
end of last year, Vladimir Putin has been vague on his plans for reforming 
Russia's ailing economy.

In some comments, he's endorsed market reforms. In other comments, he seems 
to favor stronger central and state intervention.

Earlier this week, Putin's Unity party banded together with the communists in 
the lower house State Duma in a surprise alliance. This grouping adds another 
layer of uncertainty and investors aren't sure what to think.

Aleksei Zabotkin of the Russian brokerage house United Financial Group tells 
RFE/RL that Putin created worrisome uncertainty for investors by not 
defending the alliance outright.

Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov has said Putin was "surprised" by the 
alliance, and Putin did not comment publicly about it. Russian businessman 
and self-styled Kremlin insider Boris Berezovsky has said that he is the 
force behind the alliance.

Zabotkin says Putin's silence creates a negative atmosphere of "suspense." He 
says if Putin was behind the alliance, then it is a positive factor. But he 
says if it's true that it was Berezovsky's creation, then the alliance is 
"worrisome."

The head of the Moscow office of Morgan Stanley, Rair Simonyan, says Putin's 
role until now has been positive. He says last month's resignation of 
President Boris Yeltsin and the quick decision to hold early presidential 
elections helped end some political uncertainty in Russia.

But he says the Duma alliance is disturbing because, in his opinion, there's 
no apparent logic behind it. 

He says the alliance seems to be guided solely by pragmatism, and he says too 
much pragmatism can compromise a politician's ability to carry out reform:

"Pragmatism can easily become cynicism. [In other words,] your actions are 
not the consequence of a system of values -- of a system of political or 
economic priorities. They're only tactical and can go into different 
directions. [Without a system] of clear values it is difficult to implement a 
course, all the more economic reforms. And that's a problem -- these things 
that look like [simple] tactical [steps] can have considerably more negative 
consequences. 

Until now, Putin has seemed to favor a "reform-oriented" economic policy -- 
but one with a reinforced role for the state as a regulator.

This week, in remarks before the Unity-Communist alliance was made public, 
Putin qualified his economic policy as "moderate liberalism." He said the 
state must create what he called "a good investment climate" by strengthening 
institutions such as the courts.

Putin's think-tank in Moscow, the Center for Strategic Research, appears to 
be advocating the same type of liberal-statist mix found in Putin's 
statements.

The center's director, German Gref, recently said the group is planning a 
"liberal" model with "quite a lot" of state regulation. The think-tank is 
supported by some of the economy's leading figures, including the head of 
Russia's gas monopoly Gazprom, Rem Vyakhiriev, and Anatoly Chubais, the head 
the electricity giant UES. 

One of Putin's first economic decisions was to raise wages for state 
employees by 20 percent. The plan has been criticized by a Russian newspaper 
as entailing spending of more than 9 billion rubles and possibly igniting 
inflation.

But Zabotkin says there are also strong signs Putin "will be listening more 
to market-reformers than to conservatives."

One of these signs is Putin's rejection Tuesday of a controversial measure 
favored by Central Bank to force exporters to convert their hard-currency 
revenue into rubles. That idea was strongly opposed by private companies as 
well as by the International Monetary Fund. 

Putin has also hinted that recently appointed Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov could be elevated to prime minister after the elections. Kasyanov is 
widely viewed as a reformer.

For both Zabotkin and Simonyan, Putin's first test will be to distance 
himself from the negative pressures of Russia's highly concentrated, 
"oligarchic" economic system. That will be the initial hurdle. 

*******

#5
Trud
January 21, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WHAT'S UP THERE, ON THE LEFT FLANK?
By Konstantin SRETENSKY

As was to be expected, the KPRF congress traditionally (or
by inertia) nominated Gennady Zyuganov for president. The
nomination of Kemerovo governor Aman Tuleyev was not a surprise
either. The leader of the miners' region, Kuzbass, and a veteran
of two previous presidential campaigns, he is regarded -- at
least by his supporters -- as a logical claimant to the top state
post.
Why did not Tuleyev coordinate his decision with the KPRF
leaders? Will he withdraw from the race before March 26, as he
did during the 1996 elections, in favour of Zyuganov? Those
Russian citizens who sympathise with the Left forces want to have
answers to these questions. 
It looks as if the substantially strong positions, which the
communists won in the 3rd Duma, provide them with a reliable
bridgehead for another "presidential leap" of the KPRF leader. He
can even repeat the relative success of 1996 and finish the race
second, thus reaffirming his prestige.
But the enthusiasm of rank-and-file party members is waning.
Practice showed that Zyuganov had a very limited possibility of
helping the governors, who had been elected with the support of
the Left. Moreover, many regional heads of the so-called Red belt
tried to get rid of the KPRF's ideological patronage. They needed
different things from the party, but the KPRF faction, which
dominated the previous Duma for four years, did not ensure the
approval of laws that would considerably raise the incomes of the
working people and veterans or create new jobs. 
You say Yeltsin prevented them from doing this? Possibly.
But now that he has retired, the Left flank should at long last
give a befitting answer. What will it be? Will it be a new wave
of propaganda rhetorics and denunciations of the "ruling regime"?
But the country and its authorities are changing. It needs
practical workers, rather than glib talkers, more than ever now.
It needs those who have proved their ability to work irrespective
of party membership. Society is sick and tired of wrangles and
division into opposing "camps." 
Judging by everything, the age of Zyuganov ended together
with the age of Yeltsin. The people have a more sceptical
attitude to the presidential claimants who had not worked a day
in the executive authorities. One proof of this is the recent
fiasco of Gennady Seleznev at the gubernatorial elections in the
Moscow Region.
The future of Gennady Zyuganov as the irreplaceable KPRF
leader looks dramatic. The old party guards are still supporting
him because there are no other bright figures in the movement.
Kuptsov, Melnikov and Seleznev cannot boast of mass public
support. But maybe we should cast a broader look at the problem?
There is no time to lose. We all saw that the irreconcilable
stand of the party on many problems proved to be counter-
productive, and sometimes even dangerous to society. This
irreconcilability was not the idea of the broad party masses, but
was provoked at the plenary sessions of the KPRF Central
Committee.
The influx of young people to the party stopped because of
the inability to influence the policy pursued by the party elite.
Rank-and-file communists often say that they do not even have the
right to information. Nobody told hundreds of thousands of party
members why Aman Tuleyev had not been elected to the top troika
of the bloc For the Victory last autumn. Although that old-timer
of the political struggle took part in the 1991 presidential
race, when Zyuganov was a second-rate functionary of the
agonising party. In 1996, Tuleyev ceded his votes to Zyuganov,
and in 1997 he won the Kuzbass elections, getting more than 90%
of the vote.
Apart from the heir apparent, Vladimir Putin, we see only
the old and battle-weary fighters of the Duma debates among the
presidential candidates. But the struggle at the forthcoming
elections will be waged for more than just the top post. A
responsible politician could well claim the post of premier or
even vice-president, whose expediency society has long been
discussing. Who knows, maybe a Right president with a Left
premier (or vice versa) could create that fragile balance that
Russia needs so badly now?

*******

#6
Russian parties keep up boycott of new Duma

MOSCOW, Jan 21 (Reuters) - A row between Russian lawmakers over top 
parliamentary jobs remained unresolved on Friday and threatened to win 
powerful political enemies for Acting President Vladimir Putin. 

Three political blocs accounting for nearly a third of seats in the State 
Duma lower house are boycotting sessions in protest at a deal between the 
Communists and a pro-Putin party, Unity. 

The liberal Union of Right-Wing Forces (SPS), the social democratic Yabloko 
party and the centrist Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) bloc of former Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov are taking part in the boycott. 

"Our position regarding the boycott of sessions remains the same," the SPS's 
Boris Nemtsov told reporters. 

Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky was similiarly defiant. 

"Everything remains the same, there are no changes in our position. We are 
awaiting proposals from the so-called 'big factions'," said Yavlinsky, a 
rival of Putin for the presidency in an election set for March 26. The 
Communists and Unity are the two biggest groupings in the new Duma elected 
last month. 

The boycotters stormed out of the Duma on Tuesday saying the Communists and 
Unity had taken control of most of the Duma committees and collaborated in 
securing the election of Communist Gennady Seleznyov for a second term as 
speaker. 

On Friday Seleznyov mooted a possible compromise, saying several new 
committees might be created to increase the influence of OVR, SPS and 
Yabloko. They were offered only three of 27 Duma committees under the deal 
and declined the posts. 

"The Duma can work without the (boycotting) factions but it will be more 
difficult. As chairman of the Duma, I would like all the factions to take 
part in its work," said Seleznyov. 

But he added that there could be no question of redistributing control of the 
committees already in existence. 

Seleznyov added that he had spoken by telephone with Putin, who he said was 
also concerned about the quarrel and its effect on the Duma's work. 

Putin also discussed the Duma boycott on Friday with former prime minister 
Sergei Stepashin, now a deputy allied to Yabloko, and the speaker of Russia's 
upper house of parliament, the Federation Council, Yegor Stroyev. 

The row has exposed Putin to allegations that he brooks little opposition and 
is ready to do back-room deals with the Communists to achieve his aims. 

The SPS had said it would support Putin in the presidential race but that 
backing no longer looks certain. 

Putin has also found three former prime ministers -- Primakov, Stepashin and 
the youthful leader of the SPS, Sergei Kiriyenko -- ranged against him. 
Primakov may join Yavlinsky as a rival of Putin in the presidential race now 
gathering steam. 

******

#7
Chicago Tribune
21 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Outgunned, not outfought 
By Colin McMahon 
Tribune Foreign Correspondent 

MOSCOW--The Chechen military leader acknowledged that Grozny, the capital 
city of his breakaway republic, would eventually fall to Russian forces. But 
he could not resist a subtle dig with a clear warning.

"It would be naive to claim that the superbly equipped, numerically strongest 
army in the world will never be able to capture a city," said Mumadi 
Saidayev. "But it will do so by paying a huge price."

Nearly four months into its war in Chechnya, the once-vaunted Russian army is 
once again being bloodied by a minor foe. Relatively lightly armed Chechen 
separatists are inflicting heavy casualties on Russian soldiers backed by 
tanks, artillery and unchallenged air power.

Among the casualties, military sources Thursday told the Russian news agency 
Interfax, appears to be Maj. Gen. Mikhail Malofeyev. Malofeyev, who has been 
missing since Tuesday when his unit was ambushed in Grozny, was reportedly 
captured by Chechen rebels. Some reports said he had been shot dead.

The Chechens are holding out against the Russians because of two major 
factors: They are very good fighters. The Russians are not.

In the end, that disparity may not matter. The Russians have superior 
firepower and numbers. Thanks to Cold War stockpiles, they are unlikely to 
run out of artillery shells or bombs.

Russian troops blast away from a devastating array of tank and fixed 
artillery positions around Grozny and across battlefields in Chechnya's 
southern mountains. An aging but still potent fleet of bombers delivers 
payload after payload from altitudes out of reach of Chechen shoulder-mounted 
anti-aircraft weapons. When weather permits, Russian fighter jets and 
helicopter gunships sweep in lower for more precise attacks on rebel 
positions.

The firepower has taken a heavy toll.

A rebel spokesman said Thursday that 45 Chechen fighters died in the last 
four days in Grozny, more losses than the Chechens have acknowledged in the 
whole campaign so far. Like the Russians, the Chechens understate their 
losses and exaggerate those of the enemy.

The Russians acknowledge losing about 700 men since the Chechen ground war 
began in early October. That toll, on a monthly basis, is greater than the 
one the Soviet army suffered in its unpopular war in Afghanistan.

Despite the losses, the Russian people have supported the Chechen war as 
necessary to restore order to the Northern Caucasus.

The Russian people also have been heartened by the consistently good news 
from the battlefield, accurate or not, carried by Russian media.

But if the Russian people believe that their armed forces have been reborn as 
a creditable fighting force in Chechnya, they are mistaken.

Russian troops in the region outnumber the Chechens by about 10 to 1. They 
have massive firepower in the form of tanks, armored personnel carriers and 
howitzers. The Chechens possess few armored vehicles and only a handful of 
mobile mortars. The Russians have enough warplanes to have flown 6,000 
sorties since the conflict began. The Chechen rebels do not possess a single 
aircraft.

Yet it has taken the Russians nearly four months to move across mostly flat 
areas. And still they have not captured Grozny.

"(The rebels) are extremely well prepared," a Russian officer in Grozny told 
the NTV network. "In our advance we have already had to cross three lines of 
defense. As we get closer to the center the defenses get stronger and 
stronger."

The last Chechen war ended in 1996 with a humiliating pullout of Russian 
troops. Some of the same things that cost the Russians then have been 
repeated.

Untrained troops are being put on the front line, despite a Kremlin edict 
that only soldiers with six months of training should be allowed into battle. 
Chechen fighters and civilians say they can bribe their way past checkpoints 
with a few rubles or bottles of vodka. Russian weapons are finding their way 
into Chechen hands.

Battlefield leadership is spotty. Russian officers are rotated in and out of 
combat zones at relatively short intervals that baffle Western military 
experts. Part of the goal is to give the officers battlefield experience, 
presumably to better train them for a potential invasion by a foreign power. 
But the net effect is that the rotations leave front-line troops rudderless. 
Soldiers complain of low morale, partly because they do not trust commanders 
new to the job. There have been reports of insurrections.

Such situations only add to the Chechens' advantages. The rebels are far more 
familiar with Chechnya's terrain than the Russians could ever hope to be. 
Grozny is a maze of narrow streets and bombed-out buildings, perfect for the 
hit-and-run tactics the Chechens rely on to neutralize the Russians' tactical 
advantages.

About 1,500 to 2,500 rebel fighters remain in Grozny. That number appears to 
fluctuate daily, despite Russian military claims that the capital is sealed 
off. At least that many fighters remain holed up in Chechnya's southern 
mountains, where the rebels have their bases.

Then there are untold numbers of partisan fighters living in areas already 
controlled by Russian troops. They are willing, and have already proven able, 
to launch raids on Russian installations behind the front lines.

The Russians, meanwhile, count about 100,000 troops in the Chechen theater.

"Don't get caught up too much in the numbers," said a Western military 
observer. "There are many who believe that, because of their experience from 
the war in 1994-96, the Chechens are the best small army in the world."

Some Russian officers and politicians believe they have an answer. They 
recommend leveling Grozny and any other part of Chechnya where rebels are 
holding out.

Kursk's governor, Alexander Rutskoi, who was among the governors who 
nominated Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to succeed Boris Yeltsin, said Russia 
could end the conflict in a week with "scorched-earth tactics."

"The longer we delay that moment, the more blood will be shed," Rutskoi said. 
"In a week Grozny and the whole of Chechnya should be turned into a Gobi 
desert."

The problems with that strategy are numerous. First, at least 20,000 and 
asmany as 40,000 civilians remain in Grozny. For many reasons--humanitarian, 
for example, or the fear of international censure--Putin would not want to 
obliterate that many non-combatants in a scorched-earth operation.

Moreover, that kind operation could still fail. Grozny is filled with 
basements and bomb shelters left over from Soviet days that protect the 
rebels from airstrikes. The mountains, too, offer countless hiding places.

Critics of the war suggest that Putin already has blundered by making, or 
allowing his generals to make, Grozny a goal of the campaign. Russian troops 
could have ended their assault months ago and set up a security ring around 
much of Chechnya, as some military commanders proposed. Moscow then could 
have declared victory and sent many of its troops home with relatively few 
losses.

Now declaring victory, without an outright surrender by the Chechens, would 
be more problematic. And many of the Chechen fighters, despite the pounding 
they are taking, are giving little sign that they will surrender soon, even 
when Grozny falls.

******

#8
Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2000 
From: Dale R Herspring <falka@ksu.edu>
Subject: Mark Kramer on Russia's New Strategic Concept/
CDI Russia Weekly-#85

Mark Kramer's analysis of the reasoning behind the new strategic
concept is well thought out and certaintly worthy of consideration by
policy makers as well as analysts.

The most important part of his commentary comes at the end -- "The more
confrontational outlook reflected in the new Concept is certainly cause
for conern in the West, but it should not be grounds for giving up
hope." Here he hit the nail on the head. The Russian military is going
through a period of deep depression and frustration. To wit, it has been
down-sized and down-sized again. No one seems to be taking it seriously
any more. It is clearly far behind the West when it comes to technology
and weapons systems -- and is falling further behind every day. It has
shown its military ineptness in Chechnya. Indeed, aside from the
casualties that are a consequence of the war, the main impact has been to
show the rest of the world just how incompentent it is.

Russian military doctrine has always been very important for everything
from acquisition to training and war fighting. What is often overlooked,
however, is that it is based on "predictability." This means that the
General Staff needs a clear understanding of what is available and what
will be available in coming months and years for it to construct a
meaningful doctrine. I doubt that anyone will question the premise that
we are dealing with a moving target when we look at events in Russia
today. What is real today may well be history tomorrow. Having said
that, I would not be surpised to see another military doctrine in a couple
of years -- indeed, I would suspect to see it modified over and over until
the country gets the kind of political stability that will permit the kind
of predictability that the General Staff needs to devise a meaningful
doctrine.

The new doctrine is more confrontational -- to be sure. But it is in the
West's best interest not to take things too seriously at this point. From
a policy standpoint, I would suggest that we continue to offer an open
hand rather than reacting with a mailed fist. For my money, this latest
doctrine is just one more piece of evidence indicating how fluid and
confused Russian military matters are at present.

******

#9
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM
A MONTHLY ON THE POST-SOVIET STATES
January 2000 Vol. VI No. 1 Part 

THE KING IS DEAD. LONG LIVE THE KING?
By Aleksandr Buzgalin
Aleksandr Buzgalin is a doctor of economics and a professor
at Moscow State University. He is a leader of Russia's
Democratic Socialist Movement.

There was a special present for the people of Russia on
December 31, 1999: President Boris Yeltsin finally announced
his resignation, which analysts had been forecasting for so
long. Few were taken by surprise: Most politicians and
political scientists had predicted that the powers of acting
president would be transferred to Putin in order to maximize
his chances of winning before too much time goes by (and
before he loses the image of the hammer of the Chechens and a
tough guy capable of "roughing up bandits in the john"). The
only thing there was any doubt about was whether he would
agree to go himself, as a concession towards protecting the
interests of the Kremlin "family." But one way or another
he's gone.

AMBITIOUS VANDALS SHOULD BE FORGOTTEN

People just want to forget about Yeltsin, to dismiss him as a
bad dream or a delirium that overcame most Russians (as well
as the overwhelming majority of the Western establishment).
What can he actually be credited with? The triumph of
democracy, human rights, freedom?

First, under Yeltsin all the basic democratic rights and
freedoms--appointment by election, a real multiparty system,
freedom of speech, let alone human rights--were less well
developed than under Gorbachev.

Second, even those rights and freedoms that did exist were
repeatedly violated: The constitution was trampled over by
Yeltsin himself in the autumn of 1993; election results were
repeatedly falsified; the media were either bought or were
administratively subordinate--not even to the state, but to
the president's "team." Human rights were frequently
violated, and, on a large scale, especially one so
fundamental as the right to life: When a few dozen people
were beaten and injured in Tbilisi (Georgia) under Gorbachev,
there were howls of condemnation right across the Soviet
Union; when thousands of people were being killed in
Chechnya, for the second time around, there was silence
across the Russian Federation.

Third, the increased corruption and criminalization of
society and the break-up of the state had the unprecedented
effect of democratic values becoming discredited to such an
extent that at the end of the Yeltsin regime, Russia was in a
state of universal longing for a "firm hand" (which under
Gorbachev looked like a specter that had gone forever).

Perhaps, then, the economic reforms were successful?

Possibly the only thing that has really changed for the
better here is the fact that shortages are a thing of the
past. But at what price? A fall in production of almost 50
percent, which has only just given way to hope for growth on
the eve of the new century--and this is only forecast to be
short-term growth which can be put down to favorable
conditions. The standard of living fell by one-third. It is
also common knowledge that the country underwent mass de-
industrialization, while technology and scientific research
are in a pitiful condition.

And then there is the break-up of the Soviet Union. For the
West, this was a symbol of the fact that the "Evil Empire"
had self-destructed. For the vast majority of citizens of the
former USSR, this resulted not so much in the liberation of
union republics from rule by Moscow, but rather in the
destruction of technological, economic, cultural and even
family ties which had existed for many years. What should
have happened was the formation of a new, voluntary
confederation based on the Soviet system; indeed this is
where we were heading before Yeltsin came to power.

Yes, most people do not want a return to shortages and
totalitarianism. But people wanted--and still want--to find a
way out of the blind alley, without losing, at every turn,
what has already been achieved. Yeltsin's Russia managed to
preserve the main defects of the past (from rampant
bureaucracy to, more recently, an aggressive foreign policy
and super-power ambitions) without building on the merits of
the old system (good social security, stability, progress in
science and high culture). The path which Yeltsin's Russia
followed took it out of one blind alley--which was a
monstrous parody of socialism--and straight into another--a
monstrous parody of capitalism (perhaps even feudalism).
Ambitious people prepared to cause havoc for the sake of
going down in history should be forgotten. But we should not
forget about their tragic mistakes and crimes, because
forgetting them is fraught with the danger that the worst
aspects of the past may return.

PUTINISM?

At the start of 2000, as these lines are written, Putin's
victory in the early presidential elections would seem to be
a foregone conclusion. There are indeed a number of good
reasons for this. Let us remind ourselves of them, adding
some thoughts about Putin the acting president to those
impressions the reader already has of the roots of Putin's
strength as prime minister and the strength of Unity, the
pro-government bloc.

First, the most important factor in Putin's current
popularity and his potential victory in the elections is that
people are tired of "reforms," changes and instability--hence
the dream of a "firm hand" to protect them. Such social
behavior is closely related to that of the serf who dreams of
a strong lord in times of strife and trouble (in Russia the
tendency for history to move backwards is very powerful--in
economics, politics and ideology). Six months ago it appeared
that Luzhkov and Primakov would be best placed to impose
order, prior to this hopes were pinned on Lebed, and so on
and so forth. Putin is just the latest figure in this chain,
differing only perhaps in his tendency to be more
dialectical, combined with flexibility (in relation to
Yeltsin's "family") and the appearance of firmness (in
relation to those who need roughing up in the john). For the
time being, then, Putin is coping better than anyone else
with the main task facing any candidate hoping for victory in
the election campaign: Creating the impression that he is the
"party of power."

Second, much of the hierarchy of state power is already
working for Putin, and will go on to work doubly hard for
him. Alongside money and the informal power of the tycoons
serving the family, this is the decisive force required for
victory--as long as most of the hierarchy does not decide for
some reason to defect to another candidate who numbers some
equally rich and influential tycoons among his allies.

Third, the media is working for Putin and will continue to do
so. Here I must note the wonderful image suggested by one
television presenter. He said that every Russian citizen has
a television set implanted in his head like a laboratory
mouse, creating sensations of happiness (at the successes of
the Russian army in Chechnya for example) and horror (at the
stories of the evil deeds of Luzhkov) and so on.

Fourth, paradoxically enough, hatred of the Yeltsin regime is
also "working" for Putin. Putin's image (created not without
his own input) is simultaneously anti-Yeltsin (he is young,
sober, businesslike) and post-Yeltsin, representing as his
heir the continuation of his best qualities (the image of
official successor and continuer of the "reform program"
implies that there will be no radical changes, and that he
will be decisive as Yeltsin himself once was).

And, fifth, Putin embodies the dream of the common man,
uniting what could not be united. In Putin, the common man
can now support both the opposition, with its dreams of a
strong state, and the authorities (by voting for the
authorities, the common man insures himself against the
hardships involved with change).

So what else is required? Just the little matter of being
able to lead the country out of its system crisis. Or to be
more precise--being able to help people get themselves out of
the crisis. Can Putin do this?

A SEMBLANCE OF ORDER

When, on New Year's Day, the new acting president decided to
speak to the people for the first time in his new role, he
said that he was planning to defend basic constitutional
rights, spoke about the freedom of the press and about
property rights, but said nothing about social rights. This
"forgetfulness" is typical. Putin and the Kremlin family
which backs him are capable of creating the illusion of order
in the country, but as far as social achievements and the
quality of life of most of the population are concerned, this
leader is unlikely to achieve real, long-term results, just
as he is unlikely to ensure real order (as opposed to
illusory order, supported by the mutual tacit consent of the
media and by a population eager for peace and quiet, even if
it is a false peace and quiet).

The reasons for this are the same--everything is rotten in
the country. Facilities and infrastructure are so old that
they are on the point of collapse. Officialdom is corrupt and
bound up with organized crime. Most of the population have
become accustomed to living and working semi-illegally. Most
of those in authority have been corrupted by colossal incomes
derived from preying on the crisis. A situation like this can
only be changed by a majority of the population, united by an
organization which is truly powerful and which is dedicated
to the rebirth of the country. But Putin does not have these
capabilities. This is why the acting president's aspirations
to the role of a Russian Margaret Thatcher are overdone: The
"iron lady" was the protegee of the "iron" alliance of state
and capital. Here the dog-fights between the clans are far
from over for purely objective reasons (the author has
already written on the subject of Russia's "Wild West
capitalism").

Apart from this, Putin is a hostage not only to the Kremlin
family and the clans grouped around it. He is heavily
dependent on the West--more so even than Yeltsin. Putin has
inherited a country with massive outstanding debts, and
Russia's budget has been squeezed to a pitiable size: Should
world oil prices fall, Putin will face a financial disaster.

IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE?

"There is no other way." This is what we have been hearing
from the "reformers" for more than ten straight years now.
This despite the fact that there always has been and can be
"another way." Yet within the "party of power" there is
probably no alternative to Putin. And now voters will not
support someone who cannot prove real strength by deed. This
does not mean that there is in fact no alternative; it means
that it is too early to draw any conclusions. The problem is
not only Russia's unpredictability as a Eurasian
civilization--one gripped by crisis to boot. There are other
factors.

The first is that Russia's power structures and financial and
industrial structures are not yet fully established. The pro-
Luzhkov and pro-Zyuganov groups are biding their time. At the
first serious failure of Putin's team (and the situation in
Chechnya, for example, is not nearly as rosy as the Russian
press and television make out), the vassals will try to find
themselves a different lord. There is no shortage of
candidates.

The second factor is much more important. Russia is seeing
the gradual formation of a real opposition outside the
system. Slowly and tortuously, working people (particularly
the "ordinary" intelligentsia and skilled workers) are
beginning to sense--though as yet it is just an indistinct
rumble--that none of those currently in power can solve the
country's problems. If he becomes president, the best Putin
will be able to do is use the temporary growth stimulated by
current conditions to create, for a short time, the semblance
(let us stress again) of improvement, order and firm power.
But this semblance is unlikely to last for long.

*******

#10
New York Times
January 21, 2000
[for personal use only]
Many Russians Questioning Official Toll in Chechnya
By CELESTINE BOHLEN

MOSCOW, Jan. 19 -- After four months of war in the north Caucasus, serious 
doubts have been raised about the Russian military's official death count -- 
by the media, by experts, by soldiers' families and by Russian soldiers 
themselves, who have taken to yelling out higher death tolls to reporters 
visiting sites of recent battles. 

At this sensitive phase in the latest Chechen war, when popular support is 
being tested by the letdown that comes from a delayed but still anticipated 
victory, new voices are joining the usual chorus of skeptics challenging the 
truth of Moscow's accounts of the war. 

Aleksandr V. Rutskoi, a hawkish former Soviet general who as Russia's vice 
president, lead a mutiny against the Kremlin in 1993, said that "judging by 
what is happening there, the losses are much greater" than reported. 

Officially, the death toll stands between 740 and 800, including both 
soldiers and militiamen serving under the Ministry of the Interior. But a 
detailed analysis, conducted by a former Defense Ministry press secretary and 
recently published in Komsomolskaya Pravda, a major Russian newspaper, claims 
that the real figure is almost twice that, or 1,300. 

And then there is the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers, which is a 
tireless advocate for Russian conscripts and says the real number of Russian 
dead in this Chechen war is more like 3,000. The defense ministry says that 
figure is absurd. 

But says Valentina Melnikova, spokesman for the mothers committee, the worst 
is that no one will probably ever know the truth. 

"Even in peacetime, soldiers' casualties are hidden," she said. "This is how 
our system works." 

On a television interview broadcast on Sunday, Gen. Anatoly Kulikov, the 
former commander of federal troops during the 1994-96 war, said a recent 
surge of behind-the-lines attacks by guerrilla forces had surely produced 
more losses than had been officially reported. 

"When I see on a TV program one official saying, 10 killed and 15 wounded, 
and another saying 5 killed and 12 wounded, as a professional, I can tell 
this is not true," said General Kulikov, a former interior minister. 

If anyone knows how casualty figures can be camouflaged, it would be General 
Kulikov. According to the Komsomolskaya Pravda article, a declassified report 
put the total number of dead in the first Chechen war at close to 4,000, both 
army and Interior Ministry troops, but the author, in an interview, said he 
reckons that even that figure is low by as much as 1,500. 

General Kulikov, in his interview, even named various techniques, like 
listing dead soldiers as missing, or spreading out casualties over a long 
period, so as to hide devastating losses from a single day of fighting. 

Some underreporting is built into the military's accounting system. For 
instance, wounded soldiers who later die in hospitals are not counted as 
killed in action. And soldiers whose bodies are not recovered also go 
uncounted. 

But as General Kulikov said, there is a danger to playing games with the 
numbers for too long. "At the first attempt to analyze the situation, heads 
may roll at the very top," he said. "This should not happen. By no means 
should the real situation with losses be concealed from society." 

Although much of the Russian media have been supportive of the war in 
Chechnya, some newspapers have published articles critical of the military, 
its strategy and its information policy. Early on in the war, the newspaper 
Izvestia challenged official denials of rocket attacks against a marketplace 
in Grozny. 

NTV, Russsia's largest privately owned television channel, often uses 
interviews with soldiers, in the field or in hospital wards, to give viewers 
a different, more brutal picture of the war than that painted by media more 
closely tied to the Kremlin. 

In a recent report describing the misery of Russian soldiers crouching in the 
rubble of Grozny, the Chechen capital, firing artillery at Chechen snipers, 
an NTV correspondent concluded laconically that "everything is going 
according to a plan." That is Acting President Vladimir V. Putin's favorite 
phrase about the course of the war. 

The official version of the war has also been challenged by a new 
nongovernment news agency dedicated to military affairs, run by a former army 
general who once headed the Defense Ministry's press and information 
department. 

When he left the ministry job in 1995, halfway through the last Chechen war, 
Gen. Vladimir Kosarev realized that his hopes of bringing the military's 
information policy in line with modern, international standards was a losing 
battle. "When I came to the ministry, I saw that there was a wall between the 
army and society that was higher than the Chinese Wall," he said. "It is 
still there." 

General Kosarev's Military News Agency, which employs 16 correspondents, all 
former military officers, and dozens of stringers inside the armed forces, 
has collected evidence in scattered cases where the official death count and 
reports from the field do not tally. 

According to Yuri V. Gladkevich, the agency's Caucasus specialist, a recent 
report listing 26 dead and 30 wounded during a day's fighting in Chechnya was 
in fact the death toll from a single guerrilla attack on a single column of 
Interior Ministry troops near the village of Dzhkalka. The total number of 
deaths in other fighting around Chechnya that day was not known, he said. 

Lt. Viktor Baranets, a correspondent for Komsomolskaya Pravda and former 
press secretary to a defense minister, has been following the official 
casualty figures since the troops first went to fight the Chechen guerrillas 
in Dagestan in August. The invasion of Dagestan by Chechen fighters was 
eventually repelled by federal forces, which then moved onto Chechen 
territory. 

According to Lieutenant Baranets, official casualty figures, reported twice 
daily by both the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry, never quite add 
up and in some cases, were obviously stretched over several months to 
minimize losses from specific battles, particularly in Dagestan. 

"When big losses are reported, then heads fly, and our generals want to be 
able to eat well," he said. ''I look at all these things with a great deal of 
cynicism." 

To come up with his own figures, Lieutenant Baranets collated thousands of 
statistics drawn from draft boards, hospitals, the military insurance 
company, and even from orders for the zinc coffins used to transport dead 
soldiers. The research, which took months, produced the figure of 1,300 dead 
and almost 5,000 wounded. 

Spokesmen for the Defense Ministry, reached this week, refused to comment on 
the Komsomolskaya Pravda report. But Gen. Valery Manilov, first deputy chief 
of the Russian general staff, has on other occasions attacked those who have 
challenged the official figures. 

"Such data misinform the Russian and international public with regard to 
parameters of the operation for eliminating hot spots of international 
terrorism in the North Caucasus," he said on Jan. 14, using the official 
parlance that portrays this war overwhelmingly as a fight against Islamic 
insurgents. "Moreover, it might alter the vector of support for the Russian 
troops' actions." 

*******

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