January 20, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4049 4050 4051 4052 4053

Johnson's Russia List
#4052
20 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Janet Guttsman, IMF archives paint grim Russia loan picture.
2. AP: Rights Council May Suspend Russia.
3. Washington Post: Mash Lipman, Putin's Only Choice.
4. New York Times: Letter from Marshall Goldman, Optimism on Russia? (Re Aslund)
5. Reuters: Putin wants economic reforms, but no welfare cuts.
6. Moscow Times: Yevgenia Albats, Speaker Deal Will Show Us Who Putin Is.
7. International Foundation for Election Systems meeting in Washington.
8. Obshchaya Gazeta: Petrakov Examines Economic Growth Strategies.
9. Andrew Miller: Shoigu's boo-boo.
10. Rafik Kurbanov: Russia on the Turkish path: Russian State-Nationalism as the State Ideology in post-Yeltsin Russia.] 

******

#1
IMF archives paint grim Russia loan picture
January 20, 2000
By Janet Guttsman

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Russia's ties with the International Monetary Fund
are a litany of broken promises, ambitious plans and missed opportunities,
according to once-confidential documents available under new IMF rules. 

The papers, covering the first three years of Russia's ties to the IMF from
1992 to 1994, show that Moscow repeatedly reneged on commitments to the
international lending agency as it sought to dismantle its Soviet-era
centrally planned economy and build a capitalist system modeled on those in
the West. 

The IMF complained time and again about Russian tax and monetary policies
but interspersed this criticism with three crucial decisions to loan Russia
billions of dollars. 

Fund lending -- Russia received some $4 billion of IMF money between August
1992 and April 1994 -- was underpinned by promises rather than by
performance and IMF staff often had to admit that economic targets had
fallen by the wayside as the government switched tack in an era of deep
uncertainty. 

"There are clear and tangible risks regarding the achievement of the
government's objectives," said a document summarizing IMF board discussions
on Aug. 5, 1992, the day Russia won its first $1 billion IMF cash injection. 

"Directors expressed particular concern about delays in the implementation
of some agreed measures, which added to concern about the risks," it said. 

LET'S BE NICE TO RUSSIA 

But the board, in comments that set the tone for IMF ties to Russia in the
years to come, also made clear it was ready to be kind to Russia as it
tried to build a market economy. "We should ... give the authorities the
benefit of the doubt," the statement said. 

The IMF made its papers available to bona fide researchers under new rules
that allow access to some IMF documents after five years. They give a
one-sided view of IMF ties with Russia: Executive board papers are
available but Russian statements to the fund will be released only after 20
years and the IMF has not released statements from individual executive
directors. 

These statements could provide clues to why the IMF acted as it did and to
what extent politics played a role. Russia inherited the Soviet Union's
nuclear arsenal and rich countries were eager to cement support for
President Boris Yeltsin and the reformist governments of his early years in
power. 

Russia, the world's largest country by area, has become the IMF's biggest
single borrower in the eight years since it joined the lending institution
once dismissed by its Soviet-era leaders as an exploitative tool of the
capitalist west. 

It currently owes the fund some $15.2 billion, down from a July 1998 peak
of $19.3 billion. 

The IMF archives from 1992-94 show the fund expected Russia to remain a big
borrower for many years, but IMF staff also envisaged a much faster
turnaround in the hard-hit Russian economy, which is only now recovering
from years of recession. 

"Staff remains optimistic about the prospects of achieving a successful
transition to a market economy in Russia," said an April 1993 report drawn
up for the annual IMF review of Russia's economy. 

"Important steps such as price liberalization and exchange rate unification
have been taken and in other areas, such as privatization, the direction of
policy is clearly right." 

FORECASTS HEDGED WITH UNCERTAINTY 

The fund, admitting its forecasts were hedged with uncertainties, predicted
Russian growth of 6-to-9 percent from 1994-96. Reality brought three more
years of a painful slump and frantic debates between reformers and
conservatives about how best to push on with the Russian economic
transformation. 

Themes running through the IMF documents show how difficult successive
Russian governments found it to stick to the targets they agreed with IMF
experts amid complaints from a hostile parliament and from an
anti-monetarist central bank, which had long said higher interest rates
would push inflation up. 

Early discussions centered on what the IMF viewed as lax monetary policy
and fund staff complained that subsidized credits and interest rates well
below inflation rates were contributing to higher inflation and damaging
capital flight. 

The focus later shifted to unattainable budget plans and government
attempts to meet deficit targets by sequestration -- simply not spending
money it had promised to spend. 

"Sequestration is a very blunt instrument but its use is indicative of the
critical need to act now to reduce the fiscal deficit to more manageable
proportions," said a July 1993 document summing up board discussions about
the second, $1.5 billion IMF cash injection to Russia. 

"The theme of this meeting has been implementation ... not in any way as an
expression of worry or mistrust but as an expression of support and due
recognition of the fact that the authorities will face a major task in
sticking to the policies of the program," the document said. 

OFF-TRACK AGAIN 

The meeting, delayed for weeks while the IMF waited for Russia to meet some
promises, took place just before the Group of Seven rich industrialized
countries met to discuss economic and monetary policies. Russia was high on
the agenda. 

Within weeks it became clear that the IMF had been right to worry about
whether the plans would work. 

"Russia's economic program has gone seriously off-track as the authorities
failed to abide by key commitments in the areas of monetary, fiscal and
trade policies," said a confidential document from September 1993. 

"They they appear to now have in mind a considerably less ambitious target
for inflation than that contained in their original program. ...
Unfortunately the targets set for December 1993 are now out of reach." 

Less than a month after that Yeltsin swept his conservative opponents aside
when he sent tanks against parliamentarians holed up in the Russian White
House. Six months later the IMF opened the lending taps again, approving a
$1.5 billion payment despite reservations about whether Russian policy was
tight enough. "There are significant risks," it said. 

Russia's fragile economy and falling ruble of 1999-2000, together with an
IMF decision last year to halt payments from the latest loan, show that
these risks have not yet gone away. 

******

#2
Rights Council May Suspend Russia
January 20, 2000
By ANGELA CHARLTON

MOSCOW (AP) - Russia's suspension from Europe's top human rights body looks
increasingly likely because of Moscow's offensive in Chechnya, the head of
a Council of Europe delegation said today after visiting the war zone.

Lord Russel-Johnston, president of the council's parliamentary assembly,
said his fact-finding mission to Russia this week had given him a deeper
understanding of the difficulties Moscow faces in dealing with lawlessness
in Chechnya.

But he urged a cease-fire and peace talks, saying that only a political
solution was possible, and he called for more international aid to refugees.

The 41-nation council, which Russia joined in 1996, was scheduled to debate
Russia's handling of the war on Jan. 27, and possibly vote on whether to
suspend Russia because of it. The suspension would be a major setback to
Moscow's post-Soviet attempts to integrate with the rest of Europe.

When asked today whether suspending Russia from the council was more likely
now that the delegation had conducted its visit, Russel-Johnston said:
``More so. It's more of an option than before we arrived.''

``Russia is in complete breach of the agreement she made when she joined
the Council of Europe,'' Russel-Johnston told a news conference.

Russia has received widespread condemnations ever since it began its
campaign in September, with accusations that it is using excessive force in
its artillery and jet bombardments and killing civilians.

Still, Russel-Johnston said: ``We appreciate more than we previously did
the complexities of the situation.''

``We learned more about the nature of the regime that had existed in
Chechnya, in particular the widespread criminality, which we condemn, and
the collapse of the social and economic fabric,'' he said.

Russia says the campaign is aimed at wiping out Chechen militants who
invaded neighboring Dagestan twice in August and are blamed for ensuing
apartment bombings elsewhere in Russia.

Russel-Johnston welcomed what he called a ``firm commitment'' from acting
President Vladimir Putin to consider an international presence in the region.

International organizations have been pushing Moscow for permission to set
up offices in or near Russian-controlled parts of Chechnya to monitor human
rights, the refugees' situation and reconstruction efforts.

``The basic concerns that I outlined when I came persist. They were
underlined by the situation we saw with refugees,'' Russel-Johnston said.

He and other delegation members expressed frustration that the Russians had
limited the group's movements during its two-day visit to Chechnya and the
neighboring Russian republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia.

``It wasn't a satisfactory visit'' to the refugee camps, he said. ``There
had been advance warning of our arrival. ... We didn't have talks with all
the people we wanted to meet.''

********

#3
Washington Post
January 20, 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin's Only Choice
By Masha Lipman
The writer is deputy editor of Itogi magazine. 

MOSCOW—What lies ahead for Russia is no longer the dramatic choice of back
to hell or ahead to a bright future. Rather, it is a long, unexciting,
painstaking trek toward economic improvement. The appearance of the
colorless figure of Vladimir Putin following Boris Yeltsin, who never
lacked color or character, seems symbolic of this transition from big
upheavals to tedious slogging.

Recent investigations by Russian and Western reporters have failed to come
up with anything remarkable about Putin's personal life or professional
record. People who knew him at various times in his career remember him
mostly as meticulous and unafraid of hard work. Those who have confronted
him in later years add that he is quick to grasp complex economic subjects.
(In a recent online article, Putin said that with luck Russia may hope to
reach the current economic level of Portugal in 15 years.)

The more that is written about Putin, the less the chance that he will be
found to harbor some sinister secret in his past of the sort that many in
my country (including myself) suspected because of his KGB background. But
just as there is nothing in the known record to suggest Putin is a bloody
villain, neither is there anything to indicate that he is a proponent of
liberal values. In fact, the democratically minded supporters of his
presidential candidacy, among them veteran reformers Yegor Gaidar and
Anatoly Chubais, have been clear about it: There are no guarantees that
democracy will be his first priority.

Putin was never engaged in the fierce struggle between Communists and
democrats that was the flesh and blood of Russian politics from the late
'80s through the mid-'90s, and he does not share Boris Yeltsin's visceral
hatred for the Communists. 

Putin's first priority is bound to be economic reform--not because he
understands the economy so well but simply because reform is the only way
to pull Russia out of its disastrous condition. There is no going back to a
state-controlled economy, if only because the state does not have the money
to provide for even a small elite group that can be trusted to run it.
Likewise, Putin must seek to repair relations with the West, because
isolationism would be deadly for the Russian economy and thus to his own
standing.

The risks are obvious. Meticulousness and hard work probably won't prove
sufficient to rescue such an economically devastated and corruption-ridden
country. Oil prices, instead of being mercifully high, may suddenly begin
to drop, thus dealing a fatal blow to an economy that relies on oil exports.

Foreign debt, and a clash with powerful domestic interests if Putin pursues
reform, might pose huge challenges and even raise the temptation to resort
to undemocratic methods. This is especially so in a country where the
constitution gives the president tremendous, barely checked authority.
Moreover, Putin does not seem to be the kind to resist the temptation too
strongly.

So the risk of encroachment upon liberal freedoms under Putin is real. But
if that happens it will be a side effect, not an end in itself. Putin's
performance will depend to a large degree on who advises him and how bad
the situation is.

The question of his advisers became a burning issue this week when the
pro-Putin party Unity joined in a shameless deal with Communists in the
Duma over the posts of speaker and committee chairmen. The deal alienated
pro-reform parties, instantly turning them into an opposition.

Putin's deal-making with Communists in the Duma is a nauseating sellout of
reformers. But it does not mean that he believes in communism. Rather, this
is another sign that Putin believes in nothing, except maybe the idea of
smooth governance for the sake of goals that are not quite clear even to him.

Putin will be watched now to see how closely his concept of reform follows
that of the liberals who have been advising him. He could be overwhelmed by
Russia's all-but-insurmountable problems. He could do things that will be
stupid, dangerous and damaging. The atmosphere in Russia could become
unpleasant.

But it will not turn bloody. Nor will Putin seek to turn Russia into a
police state. Over the past decade the Russian people have learned to
cherish their private property and personal freedoms. The years of
Yeltsin's rule have made a return to totalitarianism not only pointless but
impossible.

*******

#4
New York Times
January 20, 2000
Letter from Marshall Goldman
Optimism on Russia?

To the Editor: 
The Russian economy has indeed improved, but Anders Aslund (Op-Ed, Jan. 18)
overdoes it. He says the pro-government parties would not have gained a
near majority in the recent elections if Russians had not felt better about
the economy. But the voters voted for parties backed by Vladimir V. Putin,
Russia's acting president, because of his attack on Chechnya, nowhere
mentioned by Mr. Aslund. 

How awkward that the same day Mr. Aslund insists the Communists will no
longer be able to obstruct market reforms, Mr. Putin joins with the
Communists to renominate a Communist as speaker of Parliament. As improved
as the economy may be, there is little indication that anything is being
done to clean up the corruption, stop the renationalization of factories or
attack corporate cheating, capital flight and money laundering. 

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN 
Cambridge, Mass., Jan. 18, 2000 
The writer is associate director, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard
University. 

*******

#5
Putin wants economic reforms, but no welfare cuts

MOSCOW, Jan 20 (Reuters) - Russian Acting President Vladimir Putin on
Thursday ordered reforms to keep the economy growing but told his cabinet
that social spending was sacred despite budgetary pressure, local news
agencies reported. 

"One has to face up to what is happening in the country and act
energetically in carrying out reforms. But reforms should be carried out
under strict control and with the government's active participation,"
Itar-Tass quoted him as saying at the weekly cabinet meeting. 

Putin, the favourite in a presidential election scheduled for March 26, has
not spelled out his economic programme or carried out any major reforms. 

But he said the tight $27 billion 2000 budget was realistic and
categorically ruled out social welfare cuts. 

Russia is having trouble getting foreign lenders to come up with nearly $6
billion in expected support, most of which is an International Monetary
Fund programme that has stalled. 

Putin lauded last year's economic performance, which saw industry grow at
its fastest clip in the post-Soviet period -- 8.1 percent after a fall of
5.2 percent the previous year. 

*******

#6
Moscow Times
January 20, 2000 
POWER PLAY: Speaker Deal Will Show Us Who Putin Is 
By Yevgenia Albats 

Moscow this week witnessed a rollicking premiere with the opening day of the 
new State Duma. No analysts, myself included, had foreseen at all what would 
come of the session: an alliance between the Communists and acting President 
Vladimir Putin's pet faction, Unity. 

The show's script went like this: Having lost the Moscow region gubernatorial 
elections, Gennady Seleznyov - the Communist speaker of the last Duma, the 
lower house of parliament - appeared to be the most convenient and the most 
controllable figure from the Kremlin's point of view to become the speaker 
for this Duma too. Seleznyov has lived his whole life in the offices of the 
nomenklatura and to keep his seat, he is willing to make deals. It was no 
surprise for those who know Russian politics that raging anti-Communist Boris 
Berezovsky supported Seleznyov in his bid for Moscow region governor. 

The play's directors also rose to the surface: They were the chief of staff's 
two deputies, Igor Shabduraslov and Vladislav Surkov, who both served in the 
previous administration as well. Shabduraslov was the one who whipped up the 
Unity bloc in the first place, and Surkov had been given the task of 
cementing close ties between the Kremlin and the Duma. So Tuesday, during the 
Duma sessions recess, Surkov gathered the leaders of the Communist Party, 
Unity and the People's Deputy in his office. During this meeting, they all 
decided to blow off the other parties and movements and demonstrate the rule 
of majority. 

The only question that remains, then, is who commissioned this play? Putin's 
opening speech for the session overflowed with words like "consolidation" and 
"it's time to stop the political battle of ambition," which makes it tempting 
to suggest that he ordered it all up himself. If that turns out to be true, 
those who predict apocalypse for Russia will have to line up to be 
congratulated. The war in Chechnya plus a union with the Communists lead to 
the gloomiest predictions for the future of democracy in Russia after the 
presidential elections, in which there are practically no alternatives to 
Putin. 

However, we shouldn't hurry in our conclusions. Putin is still a blank page. 
Before Dec. 31, he was never a self-sustained politician: He was always 
answering to someone else. Many in his entourage, which is divided between 
different and fiercely competitive clans and interest groups, are trying to 
write their own scripts. Putin's reaction to the Duma scandal will tell us 
whether he ordered the show or whether he is yet a student in politics who 
cannot help but be manipulated by those who have more experience on Russia's 
Byzantine scene. 

The latter option sounds bad, certainly, but it is more promising for 
democrats. If, however, Putin did commission the show, then Russia's 
democrats can congratulate themselves for unmasking the true face of Russia's 
future president 2 1/2 months before the March 26 election, instead of after. 
Voters will be able to judge Putin by real deeds then. 

And the second positive outcome of this repulsive situation is that for the 
first time there is hope for a coalition of right-of-center blocs that has a 
chance of becoming efficient opposition to the regime. Russia's democrats 
have gone through worse times. And the show isn't over yet. 

Yevgenia Albats is an independent political analyst and journalist based in 
Moscow. 

*******

#7
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2000 
From: "Amanda Lahan" <ALahan@CSIS.ORG> 
Subject: Russian Elections Study Group

THE ELECTIONS FOR THE DUMA AND FOR THE PRESIDENCY
Speaker: Lewis Madanick, International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)
Date: Tuesday, January 25, 2000
Time: 12:00-2:00 p.m.
Location: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1101 15th Street,
NW, Third Floor, Washington, D.C.
To Register, please contact Jeff Thomas or Amanda Lahan at 202-775-3240

*******

#8
Petrakov Examines Economic Growth Strategies 

Obshchaya Gazeta 
13 January 2000
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Nikolay Petrakov: "Time To Establish Points Of Growth" 

The country's current leadership, or rather that part of it which is 
generally called the executive branch, has developed an obvious desire to 
rid itself of its "fire brigade complex." If the Guinness Book 
of World Records had the appropriate category, the Government of Russia 
would surely be listed there. To spend 10 years engaged exclusively in 
mending holes in the budget and eliminating consequences of accidents at 
industrial facilities, disruptions in the schedule of &quot;Northern 
supply,&quot; non-payments, and untimely payment for state orders--all 
this is of course approaching a world record. Individual leaders have 
finally understood the obvious absurdity of such a situation, and this 
resulted in the ceremonious opening of the Russian Fund for Strategic 
Developments. Paraphrasing the well-known aphorism of Yevstigneyev from 
the film, "Look Out for the Automobile," our political 
producers seem to be saying: Is it not time for us to set our sights on 
the long-range perspective, so to speak? 
Of course, it has long been time to do so. Except that we must not 
forget one simple truth: In order to get something good in the end, one 
must do something correct and prudent at the beginning. 
Russian policy (especially economic policy) has always had a disparity 
between strategy and tactics--even their juxtaposition. Either we are 
digging a foundation for who knows what kind of building (how can we not 
recall Andrey Platonov), and are then surprised: "Somehow, our 
socialism does not seem to have a human face, or our capitalism is 
somehow thieving." Or else we rush into planning a wonderful future 
in great detail, forgetting what kind of a foundation we must lay under 
it today. This is why now is the time to call for a balanced approach. 
And it consists of precisely defining the potential points of growth for 
the economy of Russia, and of identifying the resources for the 
realization of this growth. 
In recent times, many economists cite the fuel-energy complex, 
aircraft construction, development of the space research potential, 
housing construction, etc. as the possible locomotive sectors of the 
economy. There is much to be said for this, but at the same time there 
is the lack of a systematic, general conceptual approach. 
Theoretically, any sector may be viewed as a point of potential 
growth. But today the task consists of relatively quick (3-5 years) 
development of the entire economy of Russia. And the number of such 
points may be counted on the fingers of one hand. These are primarily 
the export part of the raw materials sector. We should not be 
embarrassed by our natural riches, and we must know how to sell them. 
And not only gas and oil, but also ferrous and non-ferrous metals, timber 
and diamonds. For the present time, we are still as primitive as 
Africans in this sphere. First of all, we have no program for investment 
into preliminary processing of raw materials. And secondly, we have still 
not formulated a systematic political line for Russia's entry into the 
world markets. Having encountered the sharp elbows of our competitors on 
the world markets, the Russian state not only did not bristle up, not 
only did not demonstrate combatant qualities in the matter of defending 
the export interests of the national goods producer, but even showed 
itself to be pathetic and--most insultingly--incompetent in the field of 
international law. 
The second point of growth is the application of Russia's intellectual 
potential. This is primarily the world of dual application high 
technologies. But in order to revitalize this branch of economic 
development, we need a specific program for saving science and education 
in Russia. How long can we train highly skilled specialists for the USA 
and Western Europe without compensation in Russian VUZes [higher 
educational institutions], all the while paying our instructors poverty 
wages? The implementation of this program requires an immediate review 
of the current conceptions for financing fundamental science, general and 
special education. But, as we are told, there is no money in the budget 
for this, and none is expected. In all countries with a market economy, 
the budget serves primarily for ensuring the strategic goals of the 
country's development. The market itself earns enough to pay for current 
tasks. In our country, the budget is chronically empty. That means the 
talk about the strategy for the country's development will also remain 
empty. Call it what you will--a great power, or the eighth member of the 
G-7--without budget financing of strategic investment projects you will 
remain economically, and then also politically, provincial. These are 
not hypotheses, but an axiom from world history. What to do? There is 
only one answer: Replenish the income portion of the budget. Not by 
means of blindly increasing the tax burden, but at the expense of those 
sources which require political will and economic savvy. Let us recall 
some of them. 
First. The program for return of fleeing capital (the discussion here 
centers around a sum of $150-$200 billion). There is such a program. 
And it is not based on intimidating its current holders with Interpol or 
on amnesty for all--including the drug mafia and a like criminal element. 
It is a well-planned, civilized system of re-investment into the Russian 
economy on the basis of a combination of private and all-national 
interests. But this program is not being used. 
The second source is to attract domestic savings of the population. 
In foreign currency alone, Russians are keeping somewhere on the order of 
$60 billion under their mattresses. "There is no better bank than 
the 3-liter jar." The state is demonstratively not doing anything 
to at least somehow interest the population in placing these funds into 
economic circulation. At the same time, there are developments in this 
direction, but once again--they are not being used. 
The third source is moderate inflation. For some, this thesis is 
painful to hear. But income from inflation always has been and still is 
income for the state everywhere. Except in Russia. It has raised fat 
commercial banks and equally fat oligarchs on inflation, yet has 
reconciled itself to the fate of King Lear. Nevertheless, there is a 
conception for financing investment activity at the expense of the policy 
of moderate inflation. But again, it is not being used. 
So what economic ideas will be used in Russia? Or will the 
participants in the next presidential race once again feed Russians 
general slogans and assurances such as those given by Yeltsin: "You 
elect me, you understand, and then I will tell you what I am going to do 
with you." Well--we are waiting. 

*******

#9
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2000 
From: "andrew miller" <andrewmiller@mail.ru> 
Subject: Shoigu's boo-boo

Russia's Independence Hall is the Cathedral of the Assumption ( Uspensky
Sobor ), located in the center of the Moscow Kremlin. That is, it's Russia's
most important building if something really important happened in
Russia s formative days, it happened in the Uspensky, and to boot it s the
final resting place of the Russian popes. Certainly, it s one of the most
beautiful buildings in the world, inside and out.

It was built in 1480 by the Italian architect Alberto Fioravanti, who had
been brought to Moscow because Russian building techniques, a century
behind the times then as now, had lead to the collapse of a structure on
the spot a few years before (for those in Petersburg, this brings painfully
to mind the incident last year when a concrete overhang on a subway
entrance collapsed, killing many).

When Fioravanti finished his project (in record time and under budget),
the Russian pope was so pleased with it that he decreed it serve as a model
for all future churches throughout Russia, which it indeed became (Russia
has since grown quite famous for the architectural style of its many
breathtaking houses of worship, the ones Vladimir Putin's KGB didn t get
around to blowing up or turning into whitewashed movie houses or
warehouses). When Fioravanti then asked permission to return to home and
family abroad, he was promptly jailed for his unpardonable temerity by Tsar
Ivan III (whom Russians call the Great ). He languished in prison for six
years and then died a miserable death. Ever since then, it s been part of
Russian tradition to win friends and influence people in this way: do it,
give it to me, or I ll knock your lights out. Views differ concerning how
well this has worked out over time.

As a foreigner resident in Russia, I take some comfort in knowing that as
I haven t made any timeless contribution to Russian civilization
(comparable to that of a Fioravanti or a Solzhenitsin) I may, should I
desire to, actually be allowed to leave the place without facing
imprisonment. What's more, I m so insignificant already that Russia
probably won't try to relegate me to obscurity, which means I may in fact
still have a decent chance of becoming more famous than, say, Isaac Babel.

But still, I can't help wondering, What is different in Russia five
centuries later?

Or five decades. Or even, for that matter, five years.

In 1995, for example, the Communist Party collected 22.3% of the direct
party vote in a free and fair election, twice as much as its nearest
competitor. In 1999, their share of the party vote INCREASED to 24.3%, but
this time it had competition. It s take was nearly matched by that of the
new pro-Kremlin party called Yedinstvo ( Unity ) and founded by Yeltsin
cabinet minister Sergei Shoigu. This resulted in fewer party seats for the
Communists even though their share of the vote increased (see FOOTNOTE
below if you don t understand how this works).

The question, then, is whether this resultant loss of seats for the
Communists represents progress in Russia, progress away from the dark days
of Communism state-enforced (which, according to a forth of the population,
weren t actually so dark after all), even though the party retains its
plurality in the parliament ( Duma ) by a wide margin. Who, we must ask,
is Sergei Shoigu.

Recently, Shoigu wrote about his party's victory in The Washington Post,
defending it from criticism that the Yeltsin regime had used undue, perhaps
illegal, favoritism and state help to boost the party at the polls.

Shoigu wrote that criticism of his Unity-Bear party's extensive support
from the Yeltsin-Putin administration (and the mass media it controls or
owns) was curious . . . particularly when advanced by Americans [whose]
high school textbooks tell them how Thomas Jefferson and a few associates
artfully assembled what is now the Democratic Party before the 1800
elections put him in power. 

Wow.

Shoigu's fundamental ignorance of the basic facts of U.S. history
bodes ill for U.S.-Russian relations, to say nothing of Russia s future
generally, should he come to power (just now, of course, Unity itself
controls only 76 of 450 seats in the Russian parliament or 17%). His
attempt to compare himself with Thomas Jefferson is both grotesque and
comical, and if it were not so easily attributable to nescience it would
cry out for being called a neo-Soviet lie.

Jefferson, JRL's many Russian readers may not know, was indeed a member of
the U.S. government when he formed the Democratic-Republican party in the
run-up to the 1800 presidential elections, but there the analogy between
him and Shoigu ends. Because the purpose for which Jefferson formed his
party, while serving as vice president, was to unseat then president John
Adams, Jefferson's mortal political foe, and to reverse Adams' policies.
In the election he successfully did just that.

Shoigu, on the other hand, is seeking to perpetuate the regime of Boris
Yeltsin by establishing a party of power to serve the interests of Yeltsin
s hand-picked successor, his underling and former KGB spymaster Vladimir
Putin. When Jefferson defeated Adams in 1800, it marked the first of what
have now been 18 peaceful, legal transfers of power between political
adversaries in the 212-year history of the U.S.A. Russia, in its eight
centuries, has yet to accomplish this feat even once and, one daresay,
never will if Shoigu and his ilk have their way.

Jefferson was not chosen by Adams to be his running mate (as, of course,
both Shoigu and Putin were chosen by Yeltsin). In those days the vice
president was the runner-up in the electoral race one of the many devices
in the U.S. Constitution designed to assure limited and divided government
(and hence the absence of dictatorship) by encouraging the division of
executive power between competing parties (a measure so extreme in its
defense of liberty that it later proved unworkable and was abolished by
constitutional amendment. Jefferson and Adams had diametrically opposed
political views and hated each other personally. How much use, then, of
the miniscule facilities of the then-tiny U.S. government does Mr. Shoigu
imagine Jefferson was allowed to make by Adams in 1799? 

Of course, there was none as if any were needed. Indeed, the suggestion
that Thomas Jefferson manipulated the resources of the U.S. government for
political advantage is flatly wrong and libelous. In 1799 Jefferson was
not the insignificant political cipher that Shoigu was before December of
this year. As the author of the Declaration of Independence and a key
player in the American Revolution and the formation of the government,
Jefferson was a self-made political superstar who did not need the pulpit
of the vice presidency to hold sway with the American public. Even had he,
the U.S. government was infinitely small then, and even today does not own
or control newspapers or television stations as does its Russian
counterpart. Indeed, the U.S. government did not even have the power to
tax personal incomes until 1913!

It might also be interesting for Mr. Shoigu to know that Jefferson's
party was the party opposed to powerful central government. It was Adams
party, the Federalists, which supported that concept. Jefferson was the
author of the of Second Amendment to the Constitution, which guaranteed the
right of the people to keep and bear arms for the purpose of armed
insurrection against the state if needed (as Jefferson had declared this a
natural right of man in his Declaration). So the proper legatees of his
party are today s anti-government Republicans, not today s pro-government
Democrats as Shoigu wrongly wrote. 

If I'm not mistaken, Mr. Shoigu learned his U.S. history about the time
the U.S. was boycotting the Moscow Olympics over Afghanistan from teachers
who thought (convicted criminal) O. Henry and (avowed socialist) Theodore
Dreiser were American s great writers and that somebody named Lodigin
invented the electric light bulb. From personal experience, I know I'm
correct when I say that even today no important Russian State University
allows an American professor to guide its teaching of U.S. history, which
is still taught by Russians who know very little about it.

This persistent ignorance, even at the highest levels of power, is truly
terrifying. What is even more terrifying is that Shoigu knows the truth
full well, and his article was a malignant manipulation of it to serve
pecuniary ends.

More unnerving still is that this sort of thing doesn't stop with Shoigu.
In a recent letter to the New York Times, then Prime Minister Putin implied
that American criticism of Russia s war in Chechnya was also curious and
most especially rash because Americans didn't understand the meaning of war
on their own territory (an idea that was repeated ad naseam by many
Russians during the NATO invasion of Yugoslavia). In fact, four wars have
been fought on U.S. soil, and more Americans died in those wars than in all
foreign wars combined. Many, many more. Perhaps, one day, it will happen
that Mr. Putin will visit Gettysburg.

Putin then explicitly stated that Americans could only imagine the horror
of buildings full of innocent people being blown up by terrorists, and
therefore should think before they speak on Chechnya. He was shockingly
unaware that on April 19, 1993, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, U.S.A., was blown up by a terrorist, leaving 168 people dead
including 19 innocent children. But America didn't, as it happens, find it
necessary to respond with random document checks or other suspensions of
liberty, nor any of the extreme violence employed by Putin in Chechnya.

Russia's inability to deal constructively with America, because of this
ignorance, is palpable. Its policy failures, from Yugoslavia to the IMF,
are legion. Russia ought to send Mr. Shoigu back to school.

It's something to be said in Russia s favor, however, that the Russian
people in their wisdom haven't seen fit to grant Shoigu even a fifth of
their legislature or a quarter of their party vote. Not yet, anyway. But
it s also true that people who actually do represent change or progress,
such as Yabloko s Grigori Yavlinsky, have been squashed like annoying bugs
in the voting (Yavlinsky got 6% of the direct party vote),and that the
leading candidate for president is a former KGB field operative.

So things still look bleak.

Andrew Miller
St. Petersburg

FOOTNOTE: Russians elect half of their legislature voting for individual
candidates and half by voting directly for parties, which can then assign
anybody they like to fill the seats they win (though they have to make a
list of possibles beforehand), as the Electoral College theoretically can
do with the U.S. presidency. In 1995, only 50% of the direct party vote
went to parties collecting 5% or more of the poll. Since only parties
collecting 5% or more get seats, and since all 225 of the party seats must
be distributed in each election, there is a windfall effect if only a few
parties break the 5% barrier. The Communist s 22.3% of the vote, thus, was
actually worth 39.6% of the 225 seats in 1995. In 1999, 70% of the party
vote went to over-5% parties, so the windfall was reduced dramatically and
the Communists 24.3% of the vote was worth only 27.3% of the Duma seats,
rough partity with the vote.

POST SCRIPT: Can you imagine America jailing Frederick Bartholdi when he
dropped off Lady Liberty in 1876? More interesting, can you imagine
President Clinton, even on his worst day, giving a sit-down interview on
network TV in prime time, to Matt Drudge? The Russian equivalent of that
happened on January 15 at 9:30 when Russian president Putin sat down for 30
minutes with Sergei Dorenko (on ORT). Can you imagine David Duke in a top
hat and tails singing and dancing his way through a New Year s special on
network TV in prime time opposite, say, Babs Streisand? That would be
the American equivalent of what happened on the other channel, RTR, as
Vladimir Zhirinovsky joined an all-star cast including Alla Pugachyova and
her family to ring in the Russian Orthodox New Year.

*******

#10
From: "Rafik Kurbanov" <rkurbanov@hotmail.com>
Subject: Russia on the Turkish path
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2000 

Russia on the Turkish path: Russian State-Nationalism as the State Ideology
in post-Yeltsin Russia 
By Rafik Kurbanov 
Rafik Kurbanov, Ph.D., is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of
Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Sudden departure of Boris Yeltsin means the end of an important chapter of
Russian history. Evidently, Vladimir Putin, a new Russian leader will face
a challenging task of keeping Russia on the road of transformation. His
recent statements in many respect indicate that Russia will take a road of
a strong government, focusing its attention on internal issues and
importantly, Russian patriotism. A strong government needs strong ideology
and, according to Mr. Putin, "a strong state for Russians is not an
anomaly, not something that must be fought for or against, but on the
contrary is the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and driving
force of all change. Importantly, he added "if we lose patriotism and
national pride, we would lose ourselves as a nation." This emphasis on
patriotism (state-nationalism) is an evidence of a new turn in Russian
dynamics that in many instances reminds of the genesis of post-imperial
Turkey. Similarly to Russia, it was reborn under the flag of Turkish
nationalism after long and painful process of national building. The
thesis of this article is that Russia will likely repeat this pattern with
Russian state-nationalism becoming a national ideology. 

Surprisingly enough evident Russian parallels with the Turkeys dynamics in
this century were largely ignored. Contrary to the historical realities,
especially in early 1990s, genesis of new Russia was compared with the
Western Europe or even with the United States, a society with a completely
different history. Among the probable reasons was excitement about Russia
ceasing to be a main threat to Western democracies. Major political
changes led a significant number of Western observers to believe that
Russia would soon become Western type democracy. In its turn, Russian
political and academic elite traditionally considered Turkey as a backward
state and a historical enemy with seemingly no useful parallels or
experiences. 

However, the closeness in social dynamics in post-imperial period for
Turkey (after 1920s) and Russia (1990s) is difficult to ignore. Indeed,
both countries are remains of the huge continental empires with diverse
multiethnic populations. Both nations had strong cultural influence in
ethnic regions, and imperial mentality had been an important social
factor. In both cases, empires demise led to major cultural shock and
social misbalance and long process of soul searching for both nations. Not
surprisingly 10 years after Russia became independent state, no text had
been written for Russian national anthem. 

In Soviet times, Russian nationalism had some presence within Communist
ideological constructs in a very mild form: Russians were "elder brothers"
among other ethnic groups of the USSR. However, Russian identity as such
was suppressed due to the necessity of imperial ideology, which is
supposed to be super-national. The idea of a "Soviet man," supposedly a
new national identity had been introduced. That policy led to widespread
complaints among Russian intellectuals, who believed that Russians are not
represented in the power structures properly, that development of the
non-Russian parts of the USSR are made at the expense of the Russian
proper, that no Russian branch of the Communist Party and no Russian
Academy of Science existed, etc. Futility of the "Soviet man" concept
became evident as soon as ethnic nationalism emerged in late 1980s.
However, while most of the former Soviet republics were quick in
developing national states and ideologies, Russian society had serious
problems in adjusting to the new realities. 

Such suppression of the national identity of the imperial nation is very
similar to a Turkish case, where rulers of Ottoman Empire faced a
challenging task of controlling a huge territory with an ethnically
diverse population. So, attempts were made to create an artificial
"Ottoman" identity. Moslem unity was underlined as well. For example, an
artificial Ottoman language was imposed which was purposely filled with
Arab and Persian words, while attempts to advance Turkish language were
severely suppressed. This by default led to suppression of Turkish
identity, since the official ideology was aimed at creating a
super-national one, and the word "Turk" was almost an offence (meaning
"backward person"). So, Turkish population was complaining that there were
not enough Turks on power positions in the Center and Turkish language is
being downplayed. 

Similarly to the "Soviet man," creation of the "Ottoman" super-national
identity eventually failed largely due to development of ethnic identity
among non-Turkish population. This in combination with the long-term
policy of suppression of Turkish identity led to the situation when an
emergence of non-Turkish states with strong nationalistic mentality
coincided with the severe problems in national self-identification among
Turks in the new Turkish state created, after Ottoman empire collapsed. 

That is why one of the most significant achievements of Ataturk, a founder
of the modern Turkish state was the creation of a new national identity
"Turk. Ataturks ideology was based on ideas of Zia Gokalp, a prominent
Turkish thinker who repeatedly argued against futile attempts to create a
super-national "Ottoman" identity and for the development of Turkish one
"Turkization," due to lack of any other viable alternatives. This was
combined with modernization of the society --"Europeanization." This
example of merging into one "Turkization" and "Europeanization" processes
may show the way of combining together two traditional Russian schools of
social thought "Slavyanophils" and "Zapadniks" ("Westerners"). 

Importantly, the pan-Turkism (an idea that "Turkey should be where Turks
live") was rejected by the new Turkish leaders, who argued that Turkey
should be developed within the borders recognized by the world and those
borders should be defended fiercely. Interestingly, Solzhenitsyns ideas of
separating Russia from Northern Caucasus and keeping Ukraine and Northern
Kazakstan are close to rejected concepts of pan-Turkism. Modern Turkey
mostly followed Ataturks policy of non-engagement in foreign disputes and
the principle of "peace at home, peace in the world." 

Similar factors work in Russia, increasing Russian national mentality and
decreasing imperial one. After about 10 years following the USSR demise,
new generations in Russia (as well as in former Soviet states) no longer
see each other as a part of the same community of people. Russian is no
longer taught in schools in Central Asia or Caucasus, young males from
there do not serve in the Soviet Army. In Soviet times, the latter factor
increased Russian use throughout the USSR tremendously. As a result,
Russian is slowly ceasing to be the common language for former USSR
populations. An introduction of new visa requirements for citizens of
Georgia and Azerbaijan and, probably, for Central Asian nations by Russian
authorities is just a matter of time and would mean an effective end of
CIS. 

Altogether these processes may indicate that Russian society no longer sees
former Soviet nations a part of the single state with Moscow as a capital
in foreseeable future. It does not preclude Russia's attempts to dominate
regionally, but this is conceptually different. 

Ferocity of Russian assault in Chechnya and its wide public support is
another important factor. Indeed, many in the West wonder why Russia needs
Chechnya, after easily giving up much larger and strategically important
Baltics or Ukraine. Among other things, it may be explained by radical
change of Russians vision of Chechnya as a Russian territory in a sense
that the existing borders are the borders of a new Russian state and no
easy surrender will happened any more and any such sort of separatism will
be dealt with brutal and indiscriminate force. This was not the case
during first Chechen war of 1994-96, when many in Russia were ready to
support Chechnya independence. 

This is very similar to public support in Turkey for its Kurdish campaign.
In both cases only a forceful detachment of the territory in question by
some overwhelming foreign power may force surrender. However, in
Russian-Chechen case, no outside force will fight nuclear power. Guerilla
war may continue for years, however, producing no change of policy as in
Kurdish case. For Chechens perhaps it means that in order to avoid total
destruction of their homeland, the idea of independence should be put
aside. Long-term military campaign in Chechnya (similarly to Kurdistan)
will serve as catalyst of national feelings, increase standing of the
national armed forces which fulfill a popular task. 

The growing military influence within Russian political elite creates an
atmosphere even more conducive to state-nationalism ideology. Military
needs ideology more than other social institutions, while military officer
corps is overwhelmingly ethnically Russian. Turkish example, where the
military is very politically strong, may serve as another useful parallel,
pointing what role Russian military will play in national politics in
future. 

While many observers tend to see Russian nationalism only as an extreme
Nazi type ideology and consider it a mortal danger for future of Russian
democracy, history shows that nationalism has many varieties from mild to
extreme. Indeed, Turkish nationalism is the core of ideology of the modern
Turkish state for the last 70 years or so, however few would argue that
Turkey has a fascist government. Russian nationalism may be moderate in
nature while serving its purpose as a state ideology. 

Still, the gradual change in ideology will likely produce potentially
serious conflicts with ethnic minorities and especially with ethnic
autonomies, which received wide political powers in early 1990s. Popular
and strong central government may significantly curb the wide rights of
ethnic autonomies. However, more than 85% of Russian Federations
population are ethnic Russians, which means that Russian nationalism can
hardly be resisted by relatively small minorities, which are to lose in
terms of political rights. 

In best case scenario, it may be compensated, however, by providing more
support for cultural rights of ethnic groups, which currently are more and
more territorially dispersed. This aspect of cultural rights may decrease
attachment of ethnicity to the particular territory thereby making
separatism less likely. Similarly, political advancement may be allowed
for non-Russian within the Russian state structures at the extent that the
Russian state supremacy is not challenged. Similarly, Turkey's government
does not discriminate against Kurds' advancement within Turkish state
structures as long as they stay loyal to the state (Minister of Foreign
Affairs Chetin was Kurd as well as some generals in Turkish Army). 

Still, these developments will be of Western concern, especially from the
point of view of minority rights issues. This, however, does not preclude
good relations with the West (as in Turkish case). In its turn, the West
may play positive role in keeping an eye on human rights and not allowing
nationalist trend to make an extreme turn by engaging Russia into a
cooperation. 

The Turkish path provided Turkey internal stability and economic
development in the county with almost no natural resources located in
unstable Middle East region. Russia has more potential than Turkey has had
it enjoys abundant natural resources, while nuclear shield provides
external security, so Russia may concentrate on its internal problems
after 10 years of soul-searching. While, the suggested parallels of
Turkish and Russian development may be challenged due to unique historical
experiences of each nation, they nevertheless may be quite useful for the
better understanding Russian developments in the years to come. 

*******