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Johnson's Russia List
 

 

January 20, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4049 4050 4051 4052 4053



Johnson's Russia List
#4050
20 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow Times editorial: True Colors Of Duma Are Revealed.
2. Moscow Times: Andrei Zolotov Jr., Deal Puts Power In Putin's Hands.
3. Itar-Tass: Grigory Yavlinsky Nominated Candidate to Russian Presidency.
4. Declaration of the Council of the Fatherland Movement on January 18 events.
5. Jonas Bernstein: re: Seleznev, etc.
6. RIA Novosti: Georgy Arbatov, RUSSIA AND START-II TREATY IN 2000.
7. BBC MONITORING: MOSCOW NEWSPAPER EDITOR QUESTIONS MEDIA FREEDOM.
8. US ABSTRACTS: Leon Aron, CHECHNYA IN CONTEXT.
9. Summary of Dorenko's television program (ORT January 15).
10. BBC: Barnaby Mason, West quiet over Chechnya.
11. smi.ru: IS YELTSIN IMITATING IVAN THE TERRIBLE? 
12. APN: The President of Russia should be a tough guy who looks prettier than an ape - according to national polls.
13. Heritage Foundation conference: FROM YELTSIN TO PUTIN: WHAT DOES RUSSIA'S POLITICAL TRANSITION MEAN FOR U.S. POLICY?
14. Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (Monterey): A. Petrov, Gorbushka: Business School The Russian Way.]

*******

#1
Moscow Times
January 20, 2000 
EDITORIAL: True Colors Of Duma Are Revealed 

When the new Duma was elected in December, suddenly the talk was of a new 
"centrist" and "reformist" parliament, one that would be a breath of fresh 
air after the "Communist-controlled" and "obstructionist" one. At hand, we 
were told, was a new Golden Age of collegial law-making that would see a 
frenzied burst of good government - a clean new tax code, for example, that 
Holy Grail of Russian public policy. 

Instead, what do we see? The Kremlin's Unity provokes a row by getting behind 
Gennady Seleznyov (the only Communist we know of who smokes with a cigarette 
holder). The Communists, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's LDPR and the Kremlin join 
forces - as they always do, whenever the Kremlin cares enough - and the 
Kremlin ensconces a Communist as speaker. 

This is not necessarily a horrible event, or even a significant one. But what 
we would like to point out is that once again, reality has exploded the myth 
of the "leftist opposition" Duma. 

That the Duma is so often described as "Communist" or "leftist" or 
"obstructionist" - not just by the media, but also by Western governments - 
is a neurosis worthy of clinical study. 

After all, history shows that whenever it matters to the Kremlin - be it 
passing a national privatization program, adopting a "monetarist" budget or 
agreeing to install as prime minister a cuddly right-wing technocrat - then 
the Communists and the LDPR are on board. In other words, if the Kremlin had 
ever chosen to make it a priority, it could have rammed a tax code and other 
indispensable legislation through the Duma ages ago. 

Why do Russia-watchers doggedly insist on getting this wrong? 

We suspect because it blurs the hard edges of a story line that was adopted 
out of political expedience in 1993, when Boris Yeltsin shelled parliament. 
To justify supporting Yeltsin in that, the West had to buy into the fairy 
tale of a hard-line rogue elephant Communist parliament that could only be 
put down. And that's the story that has been stuck to up to the present day. 

The reality is more complicated: The 1993 parliament had good and bad 
elements; Yeltsin, by his own admission in his memoirs, decided he hated the 
Duman early on and wanted it gone; and that hard-line Kremlin position did 
much to strengthen extremism in parliament. 

Instead of recognizing this, we all subscribed to a caricature of reality - 
one that ignores that since 1993, the Kremlin has been opposed by the best 
democrats (Yabloko), while enjoying a distasteful yet easy understanding with 
the reds and browns. 

- Matt Bivens 

*******

#2
Moscow Times
January 20, 2000 
NEWS ANALYSIS: Deal Puts Power In Putin's Hands 
By Andrei Zolotov Jr.
Staff Writer

By forming a tactical alliance with the Communists to elect Gennady
Seleznyov speaker of the State Duma, acting President Vladimir Putin
appears to have won substantial control of the lower house of parliament. 

He did pay a price by annoying some of his supporters - but not a big one. 

The deal between the pro-Putin Unity bloc and the Communists resulted in a
noisy walkout by some of Putin's allies, especially the Union of Right
Forces, which joined Yabloko, Fatherland-All Russia and some of Russia's
Regions in protest. 

The four blocs have refused, so far, to take any committee or leadership
posts in the Duma. In particular, the liberals from the Union of Right
Forces said they might withdraw their support from Putin for president,
which could cost the front-runner votes in the March 26 election. 

But, given Putin's unprecedented high ratings, control of the Duma might be
worth it. In Seleznyov, he gets a speaker who has proved amenable to
compromise and generally friendly to the Kremlin. 

Meanwhile, Unity and the People's Deputy group, which is also seen as loyal
to the Kremlin, more than just got choice committee chairmanships from
their deal with the Communists. They are also positioned to form alliances
that would be politically expedient for the Kremlin at any given moment,
political analysts said Wednesday. 

For instance, one day they could join with the Communists and on another
with liberals in the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko, who have nowhere
else to turn despite their annoyance at being left out of the deal between
the Communists and the Kremlin. 

"Seleznyov definitely suits Putin and the Kremlin," said Yevgeny Volk,
director of the Heritage Foundation's Moscow office. "He is a known, tamed
person who is on a short leash. What is most important, he is not a
competitor for Putin in the presidential election." 

Preventing former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, leader of the
Fatherland-All Russia faction, from emerging as a compromise candidate for
speaker was the chief goal for the Kremlin, which views Fatherland-All
Russia as an arch-enemy, Volk said. 

If Primakov had become speaker, he could have presented a serious challenge
to the Kremlin whether or not he later used the post as a platform for a
presidential bid. 

The Communists, in turn, present less of a concern for the Kremlin.
Zyuganov is almost certain to come second in the presidential race and is
even useful to the Kremlin by legitimizing the election as a substantial
challenger who nonetheless has little chance of winning. 

At the same time, by making a deal with the Kremlin, the Communists have
further eroded their opposition image. "The Communists have swallowed the
bait," Yury Korgunyuk of the INDEM political research group said. 

It will be much more difficult for them now to form an alliance with
Fatherland-All Russia against the Kremlin. They will also have to be
cautious in their behavior because the Kremlin can always threaten to
reverse the deal, under which the Communists got a generous nine committee
chairmanships. 

Korgunyuk said the current Duma would be similar to Russia's
pre-revolutionary third and fourth Dumas, where the largest faction, the
centrist Octobrists, made alliances with both right and left wings
depending on the issue. 

Unity's faction leader, Boris Gryzlov, put it in almost the same terms
Wednesday. "The first step is done toward creating a two- or three-party
system," Gryzlov said. "We understood yesterday that there is the left,
there is the center and perhaps there is the right." 

One of the side effects of Tuesday's coup, perhaps not anticipated by the
Kremlin, was the consolidation of minority factions such as Yabloko, which
walked out of the session and protested loudly against what it considered
the neglect of its rights in distributing committee and leadership
assignments. 

But how much of a united front they would be able to present remains in
question. "So far, their consolidation is only that they walked out
together," Korgunyuk said of the four groups. "Each of them have their own
corporate interests." 

None of the analysts interviewed Wednesday questioned the fact that Putin
was behind Unity's deal with the Communists. But the alliance appears to be
tactical rather than strategic. Only votes on concrete bills will show the
true alliances in the Duma, and those are likely to shift. 

As for the walkout of the opposition factions, it was a necessary move to
be heard and be able to raise their bargaining position in the Duma. "If
they had swallowed their second-class role in the Duma, they would have
fixed their subordinate position," Volk said. "The walkout scandal was
vital for their political survival." 

The Duma reserved four committee chairmanships for the protesters
Wednesday, including such influential ones as the finance and legislation
committees - with more bargaining on the way. 

*******

#3
Grigory Yavlinsky Nominated Candidate to Russian Presidency.

MOSCOW, January 19 (Itar-Tass) - Leader of the "Yabloko" parliamentary 
faction Grigory Yavlinsky has been nominated a candidate to the Russian 
presidency by an initiative group of citizens on Wednesday. A public meeting 
to nominate Yavlinsky was held in a concert hall of the Central House of 
Journalists. Apart from around a 200-strong initiative group the meeting was 
attended by numerous representatives from the mass media. 

The organizing committee of the initiative group nominating Yavlinsky is 
headed by prominent human rights activist Sergei Kovalyov. Addressing the 
meeting, Kovalyov said that all those present quite realistically assess 
Yavlinsky's chances to win the presidential race and realize that although 
Yavlinsky has a chance to win he has no guarantees of being elected. 

Nevertheless, the initiative group decided to nominate Yavlinsky to the 
presidential post "because they feel their responsibility to the country," 
Kovalyov said. 

"It is necessary to create a strong opposition to the vector of political 
developments which dominates the country now," Kovalyov said. He expressed 
the opinion that "Yavlinsky might be the only alternative to that". 

The organizing committee includes a considerable number of first-wave Russian 
democrats, such as Arseny Raginsky, Yegor Yakovlev, Leonid Batkin, Yuri 
Afanasjev. 

Under the law elections, a candidate nominated by an initiative group has to 
give his consent to be nominated a candidate from this particular initiative 
group, which is what Yavlinsky is to do yet. 

*******

#4
January 19, 2000
otechestvo-news-owner@post1.luzhkov-otechestvo.ru
Declaration of the Council
of the Fatherland Movement

The events of January 18, 2000 have become yet another evidence of the
advance of authoritarianism in Russia, and a direct continuation of the
dirty information war of the last year. Today it is clear to anyone that a
united alliance of the nomenklatura is striving to take power in the
country. The parties to this alliance have no principles - neither
communist, nor anticommunist. They have one goal, which is a monopoly on
power.

"Democracy" is the slogan used by the newly-created Duma alliance of
Yeltsinists and communists. However, since the days of Stalin the world has
not seen a more perverse interpretation of democracy, than the one
formulated by Zhirinovsky and endorsed by deputies from the Unity and the
CPRF. They claim that democracy is the same as majority rule. We have to
remind them about the basics: democracy is a majority rule which guarantees
the rights of the minority. But do the deputies that have monopolized power
in the Duma represent the majority of the voters? In the conditions of a
dirty war of mudslinging a large part of the voters did not give their
endorsement to any political force. This means that only all the deputies
together represent the majority, that they can act in a democratic way only
by striving to achieve consensus. The monopolization of power which has
become the goal of the CPRF and the Unity is not democracy, but a way to
splinter society and a path to dictatorship.

We believe that the principles of genuine democracy will triumph.
Unprincipled politicians lose, sooner or later. The present minority will
sooner or later become a majority.

******

#5
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2000 
From: "jonas bernstein" <bernsteinj@hotmail.com> 
Subject: re: Seleznev, etc.

In light of the "deal" (or, rather, the "conspiracy," as everyone in Moscow 
seems to be calling it) between Unity and the KPRF to give the speaker's 
post to Seleznev and divide up the committe chairmanships - a deal which 
appears to have had Putin's blessing - I think it's time to hand out some 
awards for expert prognostication. First place has to go to Anders Aslund, 
who only yesterday wrote on the New York Times op-ed page: "Unlike Boris 
Yeltsin, Mr. Putin also benefits from a reformist majority in Parliament. 
The old Duma featured a Communist majority, whereas the party now holds only 
25 percent of the seats." Second place should probably go to Martin Malia, 
who wrote in his Dec. 23, 1999, NYT op-ed, "Good News From Russia (Yes, It's 
True)": "The results of Russia's third post-Communist parliamentary 
elections on Sunday augur an improvement -- yes, improvement -- in her 
prospects. There will at last be a centrist, reform-oriented Duma able to 
work with the president." The bronze medal should go to Leon Aron, who wrote 
in in an article for the Weekly Standard ("Boris Yeltsin, Man of the 
Decade," Jan. 17, 2000/Volume 5, Number 17): "For the first time since the 
end of the Soviet Union, pro-reform parties, blocs, and independent 
candidates have come close to a majority in the Duma."

Perhaps these veteran anti-Communists have developed a strange new respect 
for the KPRF. In fact, Aron did write: "For the first time, all the major 
parties (including the Communists)have accepted the chief planks of 
Yeltsin’s economic agenda: privatization, integration into the world 
economy, lower inflation, tighter budgets, and a steady reduction of state 
control over the economy." While this may be hallucinatory, at least Aron 
left himself a hedge.

In any case, I'd love to know whether or not the above-mentioned esteemed 
Russia-watchers think that Tuesday's Duma session represents another great 
leap forward in Russia's "transition."

*****

#6
RIA Novosti - Moscow Diary
January 18, 2000
RUSSIA AND START-II TREATY IN 2000
Georgy ARBATOV, full-time member of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, honorary director, Russian Academy of Sciences' 
Institute of US and Canadian Studies 

Planet Earth can't enter the 21-st century, unless it 
resolves the arms-limitation issue. This places special 
responsibility on the world's two mightiest nuclear powers, 
e.g. Russia and the United States. They must step up their 
efforts in order to attain specific accords making it possible 
to impede the nuclear-arms build-up and to scale down nuclear 
arsenals. Unfortunately, one still has every reason to say that 
Russian-US dialogue in the given field has virtually ground to 
a halt.
The START-II Treaty, which stipulates the limitation of 
strategic offensive arms, and which has been signed by the 
Presidents of Russia and the United States, still remains to be 
ratified by the State Duma, e.g. the Russian Parliament's lower 
house. The START-II treaty sets equal strategic-weapons 
ceilings, which are seen as something acceptable by Russia.
This country has the right to maintain 3,500 nuclear warheads 
in line with that document's provisions. Nevertheless, quite a 
few State-Duma members have a negative opinion of the START-II 
treaty, noting that Russia won't apparently benefit from it, 
and that the United States merely wants to get rid of Russia's 
heavy-duty MIRV-ed ICBM-s. Incidentally, the US side claims 
that it would apparently be unable to cope with such ICBM-s in 
case of war. The negative attitude of State-Duma members toward 
the treaty's ratification became especially pronounced in 
connection with NATO's war against Yugoslavia, NATO's eastward 
expansion and the approval of that bloc's new aggressive 
concept. The West's current anti-Russian campaign, which 
denounces Moscow's anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya also 
tends to affect the deputies' mood. (Chechnya is one of the 
Russian Federation's North Caucasian republics -- Ed.) However, 
politicians should not guide themselves by emotions alone. One 
should keep in mind that Moscow regards the START-II treaty as 
increasingly important in the context of its deteriorating 
relations with NATO. However, that document should be modified 
to some extent; well, such an opportunity does exist. The 
Russian side can ratify the treaty, provided that it enters 
into force after the coordination of contentious issues. Both 
Russia and the United States should move to elaborate the 
START-III treaty right after the START-II treaty's 
ratification. The new treaty would be expected to bring 
strategic-arms ceilings down to 2,500 warheads.
As I see it, the third State Duma, whose line-up has 
already changed, will ratify the START-II treaty over the 
entire 2000 period. The Duma's different line-up favors such a 
forecast. The leftist opposition doesn't boast the majority of 
seats inside the third State Duma, which has already started 
working. It ought to be mentioned in this connection that the 
leftist opposition opposed the START-II treaty more actively 
than the rest. The third State Duma mostly comprises moderate 
centrist deputies, who, by all looks, will support the 
Government that consistently advocates the START-II treaty's 
fastest possible ratification. At any rate acting president 
Vladimir Putin, who is quite optimistic on this score, thinks 
that the START-II treaty's ratification process will, at long 
last, become completed before the year is out. Incidentally, 
the Russian military leadership also advocates the document's 
ratification, with the Russian Federation's Defense Minister 
Igor Sergeyev noting this more than once.
I'd like to note that Russia, which sincerely strives to 
attain concrete results within the framework of the disarmament 
process, is worried about the US side's attitude toward the 
1972-vintage Soviet-US ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. The 
United States has been lately noting the need for revising this 
highly important document on many occasions.
This doesn't boil down to conversations alone. For example, the 
Washington administration intends to decide on the deployment 
of a national ABM system already in the summer of 2000. It goes 
without saying that such a decision would deviate from the ABM 
Treaty's provisions, also creating a more pronounced disbalance 
between Russian and US arsenals.
Doubtless, this would entail yet another spiral of the arms 
race.
The Russian Federation's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has 
already said that the creation of a national ABM system and the 
violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty would automatically induce any 
other country, and not just Russia, to develop new-generation 
weapons systems, which would render similar ABM systems 
ineffective. Ivanov implies that Russia, China and other 
countries would begin to actively develop powerful offensive 
weaponry, also swelling their respective ICBM arsenals, which 
were being reduced for quite a while in line with the START-I 
treaty. Well, this doesn't meet Russian and US interests alike.
As one analyzes the results of that 50-year-long nuclear 
era at the turn of the century, one arrives at a rather 
paradoxical conclusion. Strange as it may seem, but 
arms-limitation talks have virtually stopped after the end of 
the Cold-War period. We have even got used to this situation.
Evidently, that dangerous confrontation between the two 
super-powers, namely the Soviet Union and the United States, 
had compelled them to search for compromises. By all looks, the 
United States, which believes that it has now been deprived of 
a worthy rival after the USSR's disintegration, no longer deems 
it necessary to conduct a constructive and equitable dialogue, 
which, nonetheless, is needed by the entire planet and all 
nations, which have been nurturing the idea of general and 
complete disarmament for a long time now.
US Senate's recent refusal to ratify the comprehensive test-ban 
treaty shows that we still have a long way to go, before 
completely banning and destroying all nuclear weapons.
In 1986 the then USSR president Mikhail Gorbachev had 
suggested eliminating all types of nuclear weapons. However, 
Gorbachev had stipulated an excessively short deadline, that 
is, until the year 2001. By all looks, Gorbachev's proposal was 
deliberately aimed at expediting bilateral talks, which have 
now ground to a halt. Such negotiations must be resumed and 
intensified. This constitutes the duty of two great powers, 
i.e. Russia and the United States, which are responsible for 
the world's destinies. Both countries possess tremendous 
potentialities, which must be used in the interests of all 
mankind.

******

#7
BBC MONITORING
MOSCOW NEWSPAPER EDITOR QUESTIONS MEDIA FREEDOM
Source: Centre TV, Moscow, in Russian 1400 gmt 18 Jan 00 

[Presenter] At the time when the acting president and the most probable 
candidate for the Russian presidency [Vladimir Putin] speaks about sticking 
to liberal values, open pressure is being put on the media. Today the Moscow 
branch of the Russian Interior Ministry's investigations committee attempted 
to forcefully bring `Moskovskiy Komsomolets' observer Aleksandr Khinshteyn in 
for interrogation. All this was done in spite of the fact that Khinshteyn was 
ill. The law says that no investigation procedures can be undertaken against 
a person on sick leave. 

[Correspondent] The mysterious criminal case which was started against 
Khinshteyn in 1997 got an unexpected follow-up today. ... 

[Khinshteyn] In October 1997 I presented an allegedly fake driver's licence. 
I will not go into detail now, saying that it was all not true. I want to 
speak about the legal side of it. The [criminal] article about using forged 
documents [which I was charged with] has a two-year limitation. If, as they 
claim, the crime was committed in October 1997, the charge term expired in 
October 1999 and now they are trying to charge me with this in January 2000. 
I don't quite understand the reasons for such a hurry. 

[Correspondent] Khinshteyn was not charged in 1997 and he is a witness in his 
own criminal case. Now the police are displaying strange activity, trying to 
call Khinshteyn to account for it. Now he is at home on sick leave. Today 
some policemen came to his home and tried to make him go to the investigator 
for interrogation as a witness. 

The policemen refused to tell us why they are trying to get this witness to a 
psychiatric asylum in the town of Vladimir. They told Khinshteyn and his 
lawyer that the investigator is working on another case in Vladimir and for 
some reason the interrogation of Khinshteyn cannot be postponed. 

The editor-in-chief of `Moskovskiy Komsomolets', Pavel Gusev, thinks that an 
attempt to get Khinshteyn to the Vladimir asylum was revenge carried out by 
police officials on Khinshteyn for a number of journalistic investigations. 
It is unlikely that Khinshteyn would get out of the asylum. 

[Pavel Gusev, captioned as the editor-in-chief of `Moskovskiy Komsomolets'] 
Now I am speaking not only as editor-in-chief but as head of the Moscow 
journalists union. We understand such actions only as persecution of 
journalists. It is obvious. In this situation it is clear that the struggle 
has just started. If the Russian Interior Ministry wants to take on the role 
of censor and dictator and stop journalists from speaking out, let the 
ministry take it on. Khinshteyn publishes articles that disclose corruption 
or other activities of the Interior Ministry or some police chiefs and they 
can sue him for it. 

[Correspondent] Gusev said that lately the whole editorial office of the 
newspaper has been feeling the pressure put on it by the authorities. They 
have also noticed special attention paid to the newspaper by the special 
services. 

[Gusev] What is going on now, unfortunately, is taking place when a new 
acting president, a president of a new type, has come to power. It started in 
the very first weeks of the new acting president's rule. The acting president 
spoke about guarantees for freedom of speech, saying that the media should 
have this freedom. Let's put it into practice then. 

******

#8
US ABSTRACTS: CHECHNYA IN CONTEXT
The Wall Street Journal 19-Jan-2000 

Leon Aron, director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 
writes that Western analysts might be going too far in their vociferous 
condemnation of Russia's offensive in Chechnya. George W. Bush, for example, 
is fond of mentioning communist China and Russia at the same time, as though 
they are equally threatening. If the misconstrued analysis of the conflict 
continues, rhetoric will build an agenda of resentment that will be reflected 
in Russo-American relations. Commentators seem unable to come to terms with 
the fact that, despite its severe flaws, Russia is a nascent democracy, which 
is pursuing a war widely backed by the Russian people. In contrast, the 
Russian public opposed the war in 1996, which led to an ignominious 
withdrawal of the Russian military. The Chechen invasion of Dagestan, and 
unproved allegations of Chechen separatists planting bombs in Moscow were 
enough to swing public opinion behind the latest war. Democracies have a 
history of engaging in bloody conflicts to protect themselves from terrorism 
and secessionism. Western policymakers should remember this when they condemn 
Russia. 

******

#9
Summary of Dorenko's television program.
Prepared by Olga Kryazheva (okryazhe@cdi.org)
Research intern, Center for Defense Information

>From Russian state television station ORT
Sergey Dorenko’s Analytical Program
Saturday, January 15, 2000

Sergey Dorenko started with the remark that this was the first release of his
program since Yeltsin resigned. Dorenko said: “Yeltsin has left, but he still
has the country under control. Appointing Putin as acting president, he
determined the future of the country for the next eight years… Again, Yeltsin
dictates the rules of the game.”

Dorenko included interviews with military officers and soldiers in the field,
their summaries of the Chechen events, and brief coverage of the Christmas
attack. He interviewed Vladimir Putin to get the opinion on events in Chechnya
from “high state officials.” On the question about how he feels on the new
position of acting President Putin replied that he does not feel any
different:
"the amount of work is about the same, but the responsibility and expectations
are higher.” He noted that Chechen events are going according to plan, except
the short break during Christmas holidays, when the opposition asked for a
break in the military actions. However, Chechens did not use it for religious
purposes. They used it to unexpectedly attack in Shali and Argu. Even though
this attack was absolutely unexpected, professionalism of the Russian military
officers resolved the situation. There were no victims on Ministry of Defense
side, but there were victims among soldiers on the field. Putin admitted that
military officials made some mistakes, and the “terrorists” were sometimes
smarter, but he empathized the fact that position of Russians in Chechnya did
not change, and the situation is still under the control of Russian military.
Putin stated that in this war Russians act according to Russian laws, whereas
Chechens use methods of terror. This war is just an anti-terrorist operation
on the territory of Russian State. He concluded his interview by saying that
people welcome this action, because they are tired of disorder and chaos and
want stability everywhere in the country, including North Caucasus. According
to Putin, one of the purposes of the war is protecting Russian and Chechen
citizens from terrorists. Even though Maskhadov requested a meeting with
Russian officials, Putin will accept his request only if Maskhadov releases
the hostages and give up the certain known terrorists. 

Next followed an interview with Kasyanov, first Vice President of Russian
Federation, who assured the audience that more attention would be paid to the
Russian economy, debts would be paid off, and with the help of foreign
investments and support he would bring Russia into a new stage of developed
economy.

S. Dorenko concluded his show by presenting a number of episodes of Boris
Yeltsin’s private and political life.

********

#10
BBC
19 January, 2000
Analysis: West quiet over Chechnya 
By Diplomatic Correspondent Barnaby Mason 

The Russian assault on the Chechen capital, Grozny, is attracting little 
public criticism from western governments which have in the past condemned 
the use of disproportionate force. 

A delegation of European parliamentarians from the Council of Europe is in 
the north Caucasus and was expected to visit a Russian-controlled part of 
Chechnya. 

The bitter conflict which in December provoked a row at the European security 
summit in Istanbul has faded from diplomatic view. 

For the moment western governments are leaving it to the Council of Europe, 
which promotes democracy and human rights, to voice low-key criticism. 

The delegation has expressed concern at the suffering of innocent civilians 
but has also endorsed Russia's right to contain terrorism. The prospect of 
its being suspended from the Council was raised but later played down. 

The Council of Europe delegation is concerned at civilians' plight

Suspension would be taken by some as a signal that Russia had forfeited its 
place as a civilised parliamentary democracy. 

But it is not a sanction with real bite; it could indeed be exploited by the 
Kremlin as demonstrating resistance to western pressure. 

For its part, the Russian Government is taking care to stay diplomatically 
active to try to head off criticism: the Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, is 
expected to address the Council of Europe later this month; and the acting 
President, Vladimir Putin, has had telephone conversations this week with the 
German and French leaders. 

The West is hoping Mr Putin will be a reforming president

Mr Putin expressed the hope to President Jacques Chirac that France would 
show greater understanding of what he called Russia's action to crush 
international terrorism and banditry. 

But remarks like that emphatically do not imply any Russian flexibility. 

The same day, the Chinese Defence Minister was in Moscow emphasising China's 
support for Russia's military campaign. 

He voiced identical opposition to separatism and extremism - Islamic 
militancy, in other words, which looms large as a potential threat in 
Beijing's mind. 

Russia is too important as a partner, potential rival and none too stable 
nuclear giant for the West to contemplate an open breach

The United States did raise a few Russian hackles by holding a meeting in 
Washington with the man the Chechens regard as their foreign minister. But it 
did not take part at the State Department and involved only lower level 
American officials. 

To set against this diplomatic pinprick, western diplomats are emphasising 
the need to keep up contacts with Russia and consolidate strategic relations. 

In the end, Russia is just too important as a partner, potential rival and 
none too stable nuclear giant for the West to contemplate an open breach. 

Relief 

The Russian presidential election due in March is also a factor inhibiting 
criticism, since western officials hope that the favourite, Mr Putin, will 
turn out to be a reformer, at least economically. 

It would in short be a profound relief to the western powers if Moscow were 
to win enough of a military victory, without too many civilian casualties, 
for the Chechen conflict to fade out of the media spotlight. 

Russia has made it clear that western condemnation will not change its 
policy; only military failure or intense domestic opposition could do that. 

******

#11
smi.ru
17:33 19.01.00
Government
IS YELTSIN IMITATING IVAN THE TERRIBLE? 
"Nezavisimaya Gazeta" editor-in-chief Vitaly Tretyakov does not believe that 
the scheme "the candidate proposed by Yeltsin becomes President" does not 
have a built-in reserve scenario. "What will happen if the Acting President 
(supposing his ratings take a sudden downward plunge) voluntarily resigns? 
Whom is he to transfer his powers to?" The Constitution does not provide for 
such a situation. "In that case, why not ask the only person in the country 
legally elected to the presidency and bearing the title of "the first 
President of the Russian Federation" to return to carrying out his 
responsibilities? If the secret services, the "force" ministries and the 
Speakers of both parliamentary Chambers have nothing against it, then there 
will be nobody to call into question the hypothetical decree of the Acting 
President returning the ex-President into office". 

Comment: As usual with Victor Tretyakov, he looks at things from an 
unexpected angle. Indeed, it is completely unclear to whom the state power is 
to be handed over in case the Acting President resigns. In theory, Tretyakov 
says, the person upon whom the supreme state power should logically devolve 
is the Chairman of the Federation Council, the third ranking official in the 
power hierarchy. But in practice, it will go to whoever the Acting President 
hands it over to. In any case, while the Constitutional Court will be 
deciding whether such a decision is in accordance with the law or not, "the 
Acting President's appointee" will continue in office. If one admits the 
unbelievable and believes that Yeltsin is really cherishing plans of "going 
into reverse", then even his resignation will be eclipsed by such a move in 
terms of stage effect. Russian history knows of only one such precedent. "In 
the autumn of 1575, a radical change took place in the life of the Tartar 
murza (prince) Simeon Bekbulatovich, a change he must have regretted bitterly 
many times afterwards. It was then that Ivan the Terrible abdicated in favor 
of Simeon. Overnight, the Tartar Khan found himself elevated to the position 
of the Czar of the "Third Rome", while Czar Ivan the Terrible became Prince 
Ivan of Moscow, humbly left the Kremlin and went to live in Arbat Street, 
beyond the Neglinnaya River, in the former Oprichny Yard".

********

#12
APN
19 January, 2000
The President of Russia should be a tough guy who looks prettier than an ape
- according to national polls
Elena BASHKIROVA,
Director of ROMIR,
Natalya LAYDINEN,
PR manager

As is well known, any person, including presidential candidates, has not only 
positive, but socially tolerable negative sides of personality. In January 
ROMIR agency made an all-Russian research on a random basis (N=2000) in 41 
subjects of the Russian Federation (207 polling stations). In the course of 
this work the Russians were asked the question which of the President’s 
negative sides of character they could live with. The results were as follows.

The Russians are least concerned with the supposed president’s looks: 40.2 % 
of the respondents will condone with any looks. If he has no charm 31 % of 
the respondents are ready to put up with it. And 17.1 % are ready to tolerate 
such habits as drinking, smoking, using drugs.

If the candidate is of reserved disposition 12.2 % would put up with it, 11.4 
percent would put up with him being old and 9.4 percent - with him getting 
seriously ill.

Only 3.7 % of the respondents would put up with his egoism, just 2.6 % - with 
indecisiveness, and to his not being able to form a good team - 1.7 %. The 
same number of the respondents would tolerate his passivity. 1.3 % would put 
up with incompetence, and only 1 % of the respondents would tolerate 
dishonorableness. 22.4 percent of the Russians couldn’t give an answer to 
this question.

So, the Russians are more likely to put up with the president’s superficial 
negative features: bad looks and lack of charm. The gap between the high 
level of tolerance to these two qualities and the low level of tolerance to 
other qualities is quite noticeable. The results of this research are proved 
in practice. It is unlikely for former RF president Yeltsin or acting RF 
president Putin, or for so popular in the past presidential candidates 
Gennady Zyuganov and Alexander Lebed to be considered handsome.

The shortcomings which the Russian mentality is most tolerant to should be 
studied. Those are: dishonorableness, incompetence, passivity, being unable 
to form a team, indecisiveness and egoism. They form quite a defined group of 
characteristics. It is remarkable that the Russian soul, still believing in 
fairytales, seeks for an «honorable» candidate. This also concerns egoism of 
the candidate - it is an absolutely unacceptable quality for Russian 
political mythology.

The root of the problem is mentality, with the people believing the 
presidential candidate should put the interests of the country, the interests 
of his people - before his own.

Other qualities mentioned above, which the public opinion denounces, have to 
do with the candidate’s private life and his skills. The Russians do not want 
to have a passive and indecisive president.

In this context we should regard intolerance to incompetence: the challenger 
has to be advanced in politics to be able to take necessary actions. As for 
being unable to form a team, the reasons for being unable to tolerate this 
should also be looked for in the social conscience.

The concept of collective community is still very strong in the social 
conscience. That’s why being unable to surround oneself with adequate 
advisors, partners and colleagues, which is closely connected with the 
concept of «incompetence», is looked upon negatively.

Now we can analyze the shortcomings which the Russians are ready to put up 
with to some extent under certain circumstances. The old age and sickness of 
the challenger are not seen as characteristics of a presidential candidate 
which are absolutely incompatible with political ambitions.

A lot of it comes from the fact that historically the Soviet Union was ruled 
by old sick people, and also from the traditional Russian humanism. Besides, 
the structure of the Russians’ priorities tolerates old age and sickness 
better than passivity and indecisiveness.

The Russians are rather tolerant towards challenger’s closeness and bad 
habits, which is also traditional for the Russian mentality.

It is noticeable that quite a lot of respondents found difficulty in 
answering. There is a phenomenon to idealize the leader, that`s why many of 
those who were at a loss which answer to give think that presidential 
candidates have no right to have any shortcomings. There is also a problem of 
respondents building an hierarchy of shortcomings, which results in 
difficulties finding an answer as well.

There are certain differences between male and female electorate. In general 
women are more tolerant to various shortcomings of presidential candidates: 
illnesses, bad habits, being reserved. Women`s tolerance to such 
characteristics as selfishness (62.5 percent against 37.5 percent in men) and 
passivity (84.6 percent against 15.4 percent in men) is most indicative.

Among different age groups the 50-59-year-old group is the most intolerant to 
candidate`s shortcomings. This group is more intolerant to such quanlities as 
incompetence, unpleasant appearance, lack of charm, illnesses, passivity, 
indecisiveness, harmful habits. The percentage of those who found difficulty 
answering among this group of population is very low comparatively (14.3 
percent.)

The oldest age category (older than 60) is tolerant to such challenger’s 
shortcomings as incompetence, old age, passivity, inability to make a team. 
But compared to other groups very high is intolerance to egoism (6.3 
percent), dishonorableness (10 percent) and harmful habits (17.5 percent). 
This group showed also the highest number of those who were at a loss how to 
answer – 37.3 percent.

The group of youth from 18 to 29, as the polls demonstrate, is tolerant to 
candidates` shortcomings. This group exhibits the highest index of tolerance 
to inability to make up a team (36.8 percent), unpleasant appearance of a 
candidate (22.6 percent), restraint and reserve (39.1 percent) and 
dishonorableness (30 percent).

The youth is not quite indulgent, though, towards passivity of a candidate 
(14.3 percent) and his or her indecisiveness (16.7 percent.)

The dependence of candidate`s estimation on the level of respondent`s 
education is as follows: people with higher education are more exacting 
regarding candidates, therefore, less tolerant to their shortcomings. Persons 
with primary and beneath primary education, and with incomplete secondary 
education are quite intolerant to candidates` shortcomings. The group of 
Russians with complete secondary education is most tolerant, the group with 
secondary special education is quite tolerant.

As to social status, the group of employed persons is most tolerant to 
shortcomings of presidential candidates. This group shows the most tolerance 
to all shortcomings of candidates. Those unemployed who are not seeking 
employment, housewives and students are less tolerant.

While analyzing citizens` tolerance to election campaign’s participants in 
viewpoint of voter`s income the least tolerant group is that of people with 
highest income (from 5,000 rubles ($176) per month and higher), as well as 
persons who refused to disclose their income or who found it difficult to 
define their income. The group of voters with monthly income from 801 ($28) 
to 1,500 ($53) rubles and a group with income from 1,501($53) to 3,000 ($106) 
rubles per month are most tolerant to shortcomings.

Thus, the level of tolerance to presidential candidates` shortcomings is 
highest among women, 30-40-year-old persons with secondary and special 
secondary education, who are employed and have monthly income from 801 ($28) 
to 3,000 ($106) rubles.

Women are traditionally more flexible and lenient than men and are willing to 
reconcile themselves with main part of presidential candidates` shortcomings. 
With growth of the level of education and income there is a tendency towards 
increasing of demands to candidates and criticism of candidates` 
shortcomings. Incompetence, inability to set up a team, passivity, restraint, 
reserve, selfishness are particularly unpopular with these groups of 
population. These groups are more tolerant to defects in appearance, illness 
and old age.

All three groups to a greater or lesser degree are intolerant to passivity 
and indecisiveness, in other words, a strong, active, resolute leader whose 
other shortcomings can be forgiven is a determinant of today`s political 
preference in various groups of voters.

*******

#13
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2000
From: "Ariel Cohen" <ariel.cohen@heritage.org> 
Subject: Heritage conference 

YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED TO A PANEL DISCUSSION ON
FROM YELTSIN TO PUTIN:
WHAT DOES RUSSIA'S POLITICAL TRANSITION MEAN FOR U.S. POLICY?

FEATURING
ARIEL COHEN
Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies, The
Heritage Foundation
CHARLES FAIRBANKS
Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
THOMAS GRAHAM
Senior Associate, Russian/Eurasia Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace 

The December 19, 1999 parliamentary (Duma) elections and the resignation of
Boris Yeltsin on the eve of the Third Millennium raise questions about US
policy towards the new Russian democracy. The Russian parliamentary
elections were seen as free and fair by international observers, while the
Russian Constitution was observed in the transfer of power from Yeltsin to
Acting President Vladimir Putin. Does this mean Russian democracy is out of
the woods? What should US policy be towards the new Russian leader?

Since his assuming office of the Prime Minister in August of 1999, Acting
President Vladimir Putin has prosecuted a popular war against the Chechen
separatists. What does this war mean for Russia's Southern neighbors and for
the US policy towards the Caucasus and Central Asia?

Please join us for a highly informative event featuring leading Washington
area experts.
MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 2000
12:00 noon
REFRESHMENTS SERVED
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION'S LEHRMAN AUDITORIUM
214 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NE
RESERVATIONS REQUESTED
PLEASE CALL (202) 675-1752
OR SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO: lectures.seminars@heritage.org
VIEW THIS LIVE ON THE INTERNET AT www.heritage.org

*******

#14
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2000 
From: esokova@miis.edu (Elena Sokova) 
Subject: new essays from CRES

The Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies continues to publish its essay
series on contemporary politics and society in Russia.

The latest addition from January 14th is on Gorbushka - one of the largest
open-air markets in Moscow. 

Best regards,
Elena Sokova
Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
esokova@miis.edu
http://cns.miis.edu/cres.htm 


Gorbushka: Business School The Russian Way
A.Petrov
January 10, 2000
Moscow

"Gorbushka is only 15 Minutes From Downtown," says the sign on the subway
doors. It reminds passengers that Moscow's largest outdoor market for
electronics, home appliances, and audio-video products is still functioning
and
awaiting customers. It survived several attempts by Moscow authorities to
close
it down or to put under strict control. These moves were understandable and
well justified. Gorbushka is Moscow's largest center of unlicensed, often
illegal, retail trade. It emerged in the early 90's as a partially indoor,
partially outdoor shopping center on Moscow's west side.

Foreigners would be surprised to see snow falling on rows of unpacked TV sets
and microwave ovens simply placed on the ground. For Russian customers,
though,
prices are what really counts. The prices at Gorbushka are usually 1.5 times
lower than in stores because merchandise is brought directly from the United
Arab Emirates, South Korea, or China, with no import tax or warehousing costs.

Gorbushka, which initially existed as a small commercial center in Soviet
times, has become a sort of backlash to distorted market conditions that wild
capitalism brought to Russia eight to ten years ago. At that time, many
specialty stores in Moscow were closed, waiting for an efficient owner to buy
them. Others, like the giant shopping centers GUM and TsUM, were privatized
and
rented by respected foreign firms such as Chanel, Sony, Seiko, Pierre Cardin.
But with the majority of population struggling to make ends meet, few could
afford to shop in these stores. For several years they barely had any
customers, until financial stabilization in the mid-1990s brought about their
gradual resurgence.

Meanwhile, Gorbushka and other similar markets in Moscow took advantage of the
situation by filling the niche. Small trading companies and the so-called
chelnoki (individual entrepreneurs who traveled abroad to purchase small
quantities of inexpensive goods, which they brought into Russia as their
personal baggage) often suffered from the lack of space for doing business, so
they simply started to occupy parks, sidewalks, or underground passageways.
City authorities, concerned that such widespread free trade might get out of
control, succeeded only in limiting it to certain places like outdoor markets.

One drawback to this free trade is the spread of unlicensed goods and illegal
commercial operations. This is very difficult to cure. Illegal sales of
pirated
CDs, video tapes, software, and computer games outnumber legally produced and
imported items.

In 1997, Moscow authorities, under a certain amount of pressure from the
owners
of big department stores and foreign firms, started a campaign against "black"
markets including Gorbushka. Police raids, confiscation of knockoffs, and
arrests of illegal entrepreneurs took place on a routine basis. This could not
have happened earlier, because until recently pirating and intellectual
property rights violations were a gray area that was poorly regulated by
Russian laws. As a result of the city government's actions, many traders and
producers were purged from the market; some law-abiding businessmen even
boasted that they did not stock pirated CDs or tapes.

But strong economic imperatives worked against these attempts to establish law
and order, as did the widespread vocal campaign in defense of this free
market. After the August 1998 financial crisis, when Russian ruble lost nearly
3/4 of its value, many legally imported goods were unaffordable for a many
consumers

In 1999, before the mayoral elections, Moscow authorities did not wish to
spoil
relations with numerous voters who were also regular customers at outdoor
markets. So Gorbushka survived. Some believe this was due to the simple fact
that it meets the needs of millions of Russians eagerly looking for goods that
are cheap and serviceable, rather than state-of-the-art.

Though Russian officials want to promote the image of Russia as a country that
protects intellectual property rights, the average Russian simply doesn't
care.
Igor, the experienced owner of a CD kiosk at Gorbushka, explains his
philosophy: "Yes, I admit that I sell pirated products. CDs usually go for 2-3
dollars, videotapes for 3-4. Yes, I know that it is against the law, both
foreign and domestic. But a consumer here does not and cannot pay 15 or
even 10
dollars for a US-made product. If you stick to the rules, you are out of
business. CDs and videos are now part of our everyday life, like coffee or
beer, and many people cannot live without them. Why should someone pay a
week's
salary for a new Santana album? And why should we comply with American
standards? As for Russia...our authorities, police, and lawyers work very hard
to protect the copyright of foreign artists who earn millions of dollars. Why
don't they protect my rights, my money that disappeared first in a financial
pyramid and then in a state-sponsored bank after the 1998 default? In the last
case I had shares guaranteed by the government. They should defend the rights
of Russian citizens first. But look how many crooks and bandits go
unpunished."

It is quite typical in Russia to neglect the law and disregard the rights of
others if your rights are violated. This demonstrates a fundamental concept of
fairness that goes beyond legal regulations. There is a real need to define
the rules of commerce in Russia, including such places as Gorbushka. Some
entrepreneurs at Gorbushka have already taken the first step: at some point
they realized that consumers need to be protected against faulty and
substandard goods and that when a customer has difficulty obtaining a
refund or
repair services, it limits the entrepreneur's ability to expand his or her
business. In this sense, Gorbushka serves as a business school that teaches
only through hands-on experience. Acknowledgement of intellectual property
rights is the next lesson to be learned.

********

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