January 17, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4042 4043

Johnson's Russia List
#4043
17 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russia's Putin faces scant opposition from new Duma.
2. Reuters: FACTBOX-Balance of power in Russia's new Duma.
3. The Russia Journal: Michael Heath, Anti-war Yavlinsky is Russia's real patriot.
4. Boston Globe: William Pfaff, The global cost of US hubris. (Joseph Stiglitz)
5. New York Times: William Safire, There's a War On.
6. Reuters: Russia's Putin asks West for understanding.
7. Izvestia: Andrei Stepanov, ASSESSING THE POPULARITY OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES.
8. Bloomberg: Russian President Putin's Rating Is Increasing, Poll Shows.
9. The Independent (UK): Patrick Cockburn, Russians losing the propaganda war in Chechnya.
10. The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts, Putin a child of war.
11. New York Times: Jane Perlez, U.S. Officials Pore Over Putin's Resume.]

*******

#1
Russia's Putin faces scant opposition from new Duma
By Michael Steen

MOSCOW, Jan 17 (Reuters) - Acting President Vladimir Putin may be hard
pressed to spot the opposition benches when he attends the opening session
of Russia's new State Duma lower house of parliament on Tuesday. 

In sharp contrast to the previous Duma's makeup, the chamber elected on
December 19 is dominated by parties which have pledged at least partial
support to Putin and the government. 

The Duma's backing will be crucial for the next president, widely tipped to
be Putin after a March 26 presidential election, who must win parliament's
approval in order to pass the budget, appoint a prime minister and approve
legislation. 

``I think the most interesting thing about the new Duma is that there's
neither a purely pro- nor anti-government majority,'' said analyst Sergei
Markov, head of the Institute for Political Studies. 

The largest single group, as in the last Duma, is the main opposition
Communist Party which won 67 seats on party lists and could eventually
control as many as 140. Half of the 450-seat Duma is elected on a single
constituency basis and many of these members have yet to declare whether
they will join a party. 

The pro-Kremlin Unity Party, created just two months before the election,
now has 64 seats and is expected to be bolstered to around 80 once members
elected as independents join it. 

That remains far short of the 226 seats needed for a simple majority but
several other parties have also said they will broadly support Putin both
as acting president and as potential future head of state. 

NEW DUMA COULD UNBLOCK KEY LEGISLATION 

Boris Yeltsin's last years in government were often mired in inactivity
because a hostile Duma repeatedly blocked his nominations for prime
minister and rejected or amended bills. Yeltsin quit on New Year's Eve
after eight years as president. 

For example, the old Duma refused to ratify the 1993 START-2 strategic arms
accord, which calls for Russia and the United States to reduce their
nuclear arsenals to 3,500 warheads each. The U.S. Senate has long since
ratified the treaty. 

Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev said last week he hoped the treaty
would be ratified by the new Duma before the March presidential election. 

Last week Unity said another priority for the new Duma would be land reform
-- an issue long blocked by the Communists and their allies but which could
now win enough support to pass. 

In a further sign of pro-Kremlin strength, two leading members of an
opposition party that lost out in the election were reported on Monday to
be defecting to the Unity party. 

Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and fellow Our Home Is Russia
(NDR) leader Vladimir Ryzhkov were taking the rump of their party with them
to join Unity, Russian news agencies said. 

Markov said the fact the Duma was not clearly demarcated could make for
unpredictable voting in the months ahead. 

``Every vote will be composed in a different way, supported by different
parties,'' he said. 

He added that approving the next prime minister and enacting legislation to
boost Russia's depressed economy were the new Duma's most important tasks. 

*******

#2
FACTBOX-Balance of power in Russia's new Duma

MOSCOW, Jan 17 (Reuters) - New members of Russia's State Duma (lower house
of parliament) meet on Tuesday for their first session since being elected
on December 19. 

The Duma is Russia's key legislative body, with powers to block the state
budget and reject the president's nominations for prime minister. But the
president has the upper hand because he can dissolve the chamber. 

Half of the Duma (225 seats) is elected on party lines and seats have
already been allocated to them. It is not yet clear exactly how many seats
parties and factions will gain from the single-member constitutiencies
which form the other half. 

Following is a list of the main parties and how much power they wield,
grouped according to whether or not they are likely to support the
government of Acting President Vladimir Putin, who is running for president
in a March 26 election. 

PARTIES LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT UNITY - This party was formed just
two months before the December parliamentary election and has no concrete
platform apart from its support of Putin. It is led by Putin ally and
long-serving Emergencies' Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was named a deputy
premier by Putin last week. 

Controls 64 party list seats, expected to be boosted to around 80 by
migrating independents. 

PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES - A loose grouping of independents who say the party list
electoral system is unrepresentative. They are generally pro-Putin and are
expected to command around 60 seats. 

RUSSIAN REGIONS - Another grouping of independents likely to support the
government. Expected to control around 40 seats. 

THE UNION OF RIGHT-WING FORCES (SPS) - This group of ``young reformers''
led by former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko did better than expected in
the election after Putin said he liked their economic plan. One of its
founders is former privatisation chief and Putin ally Anatoly Chubais. 

Controls 24 party list seats, expected to swell to around 30 once the Duma
gets going. 

LIBERAL DEMOCRATS/ZHIRINOVSKY'S BLOC - Despite eccentric nationalist
Vladimir Zhirinovsky's often belligerent rhetoric, his party has in the
past tended to support the government on most issues. Controls 17 seats. 

TOTAL PRO-GOVERNMENT SEATS: Up to 227 seats. 

PARTIES LIKELY TO OPPOSE THE GOVERNMENT 

THE COMMUNISTS - Still the largest single party, the Communists are
fielding their leader, Gennady Zyuganov, as Putin's main opponent in the
presidential race. The Communist Party won 67 party list seats, but is
likely to control as many as 140 in parliament once members who stood as
single-constituency candidates join it. 

YABLOKO - The social democratic party is fielding leader Grigory Yavlinsky
in the presidential race. But one of its other leading members, former
Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, has said the party should consider toning
down its traditionally critical stance towards the government. 

Yabloko has 16 party list seats, expected to grow to 25. 

TOTAL ANTI-GOVERNMENT SEATS: Up to 165 seats. 

UNDECIDED 

FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA (OVR) - The bloc won 37 seats in its
worse-than-expected election performance but is now splitting up into its
two constituent parties. All-Russia has said it will support the government. 

Fatherland, led by powerful Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, is still undecided.
Political analysts say Luzhkov, who needs government cooperation to run
Moscow, has little incentive to plough a strong oppositional furrow. The
bloc's other leader, former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, is expected to
be a candidate for the post of Duma speaker but is no longer expected to
run for the presidency, despite an earlier pledge to do so. 

*******

#3
The Russia Journal
January 17-23, 2000
Anti-war Yavlinsky is Russia's real patriot
By Michael Heath

To call for a halt to a hugely popular war in the midst of an election
campaign, as liberal Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky did late last year,
would normally amount to political suicide. 

And so it very nearly proved to be. 

Yabloko only just breached the 5 percent threshold requirement for the
State Duma (lower house of parliament) in December's elections, and the
poor performance was sheeted directly back to Yavlinsky's stance on Chechnya. 

To most observers, it was yet another example of Yavlinsky's political
ineptness in the high-pressure environment of an electoral campaign.

Yet now, as Chechnya descends into a bloodbath, it looks like an act of
great foresight. The Yabloko leader is the only Russian politician who can,
with both credibility and a clear conscience, run for president as an
anti-war candidate, as a leader who stood against the tide of public
opinion in an effort to protect the lives of young Russian men.

Of course, none of the war's cheer squad among the Yeltsin hacks, or Union
of Right-Wing Forces (SPS) as they call themselves – Sergei Kiriyenko,
Boris Nemtsov and so forth – will be running for the presidency. The rank
opportunism of the "liberal reformers'" position on Chechnya during the
Duma campaign paid dividends – allowing them to race past Yabloko in the
parliamentary vote. In the finest Bolshevik tradition of "the end justifies
the means," the young men dying today in Grozny served their purpose for
SPS in December.

Nemtsov recently cited SPS' patriotic stance as one of the key reasons for
the bloc's success. 

In contrast, Yavlinsky, for all his other faults, took an honorable stance
on Chechnya. In doing so, he sacrificed short-term electoral advantage for
the long-term credibility of his political movement – and, in a sense, for
the maintenance of pluralism in Russia.

Pluralism, because there have to be opposition voices in a democracy, and
if Russia is ever going to have a functioning civil society these voices
must be raised and the population given options at elections.

That was the scariest part of the recent Duma campaign. 

Almost no other voices of dissent from the Kremlin line were heard
(Yavlinsky, it must be said, was somewhat halting in his opposition to the
war, but it was a dissenting voice nonetheless). And positions like those
of the Yabloko leader will, in the end, help Russia really move from being
a country where the majority of the population is treated like subjects to
a situation where they are treated like citizens.

For that reason, Yavlinsky has proved a much greater Russian patriot than
the pro-war chest-thumpers like Anatoly Chubais and Kiriyenko. 

After all, Yavlinsky's call for a halt to the all-out military campaign was
hardly that of a "peacenik." He supported fighting off Shamil Basayev in
Dagestan; he supported taking the fight to Chechnya in order to establish a
security zone up to the Terek River inside the republic (to protect
neighboring regions). He then called for special operations against
terrorists inside Chechnya, rather than a full-scale military assault, in
order to minimize civilian casualties.

For that he was branded "a traitor" by Chubais, who proceeded to attack
Yavlinsky for his stance on Chechnya at every opportunity, riding on the
wave of pro-war hysteria through the course of the Duma campaign.

But now, the position that hurt Yavlinsky so much in December could provide
the Yabloko leader with an excellent opportunity in the forthcoming
presidential campaign.

As public opinion begins to turn against the mincing machine in Chechnya,
Yavlinsky is free to use his position on the war as a fundamental pillar of
his campaign for the presidency. Young men dying is a terrible thing to
have to use for political purposes – however, it was not the Yabloko leader
who unleashed the war as an electoral strategy but the pro-Kremlin forces.

Yavlinsky must now harness his principled stand on Chechnya as a political
weapon to fight his opponents. Doing so will not mean kowtowing to
hypocritical Western leaders – it will mean a platform of standing up for
the Russian people.

He will not win the presidency. He will not even make it into the second
round of the election (if one is required). But at least it will prevent
the presidential campaign from becoming a procession in which the acting
president will not have to answer any tough questions on his conduct in
government.

In taking such a course, Yavlinsky would be doing a further service to his
country.

******

#4
Boston Globe
17 January 2000
[for personal use only]
The global cost of US hubris 
By William Pfaff

PARIS. The departing chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, has 
provided as his valedictory a pitilessly fair analysis of ''one of the most 
important experiments in the history of economics,'' which went ''wildly 
wrong.''

The experiment, to make Russia into a market economy, conceived mostly by 
Americans and underwritten by the US government, affected millions of people 
over the past decade. Most saw their lives worsened, stripped of private and 
public assets. A handful were enriched beyond measure.

The political consequences of that experiment now block the reconciliation of 
post-communist Russia with the West. They seem likely, in the longer term, to 
reinstate hostility.

There has been a second Western experiment upon other societies inspired by 
the same ideas and carried out with the same misplaced confidence: the drive 
to globalize the international economy.

The Russian experiment has been analyzed by Stiglitz for the forthcoming 
World Economic Forum in Davos, published in a special issue of Newsweek. The 
unfortunate ''big bang'' program for turning the former communist countries 
into capitalist ones devastated the Russian economy and badly damaged other 
former communist societies.

In 1990, when it all began, Stiglitz says, ''the West's leading economists'' 
offered clear and hopeful forecasts of the future of the former communist 
bloc. ''After a short period of hard times during which these economies 
reallocated the resources they had squandered under central planning, output 
would increase significantly. The `transition recession,' it was hoped, would 
be short.''

Unfortunately, Western economists and officials were divided over how this 
should be accomplished. The experts who dominated Washington policy and the 
international financial institutions believed in shock therapy - ''fast 
privatization, liberalization, and macroeconomic stability.'' They prevailed 
over the analysts, who said that the once-communist societies must develop 
the institutional and political infrastructure capable of regulating 
capitalism before their existing economies were willfully dynamited by shock 
treatment. These people ''believed there was more to a market economy than 
`free markets.'''

Essentially, the debate was between people who understood the political 
nature of the transition and those who believed in a simple, one-dimensional 
economic model, attributing to the untrammeled market the ability to solve 
all problems, including political and social ones. The latter program was 
applied with dispatch, its authors congratulated and rewarded for their speed 
and success in dismantling the command economy.

However, the patient was ruined. Boris Yeltsin spoke to the victims when he 
said on New Year's Eve, ''I ask pardon for having failed the hopes of those 
who believed that in one vault, a single bound, we could pass from a gray, 
totalitarian, stagnant past, to a brilliant, rich, and civilized future. I 
believed it myself.''

The lesson of what was going wrong in Russia, evident fairly early in the 
decade, was nonetheless ignored in the globalization program subsequently 
adopted by the Western governments and lending agencies and applied to Asia 
and Latin America.

Once again, the social stability and political balance of nations were 
ignored, even though they already were experiencing the crisis of 
modernization. Powerful international pressure was once again applied to open 
these states to still another ''big bang'' transition to the deregulated 
marketplace.

The result was social upheaval and a huge and regressive redistribution of 
wealth. When the predictable crisis came, the foreign investors fled. Once 
again, vast numbers of people were left with worsened lives - and the 
conviction that they had been swindled.

Take the case of Indonesia, which now is threatened with disintegration 
because radical deregulation of the nation's finance and trade disregarded 
the brittleness of its authoritarian political structure. If it comes apart, 
there will be serious political consequences elsewhere.

Indonesia is naturally prosperous and rich in resources. It commands the sea 
routes from the Far East to the Mideast and Europe. Strategically speaking, 
for Japan and the other great powers, it is the most important country in 
South Asia.

The striking thing about these Western interventions into the affairs of 
other countries is that they have combined so much self-righteousness with so 
much naivete. They undoubtedly have been well-intentioned. Globalization was 
driven by Western investors' search for profits but was also believed the 
next step toward global prosperity.

Those Western analysts who believed they knew how to transform Russia wanted 
to build personal and institutional reputations, but they also wanted to do 
good. Some thought they might go into history as Russia's benefactors.

Their lack of elementary prudence, their hubris, is what astonishes. Surely a 
basic counsel of prudence says one does not destroy when there is nothing to 
take the place of what is destroyed.

As Stiglitz writes, it all has been ''a damning indictment of those who rely 
on simple textbook models or naive ideology.'' He adds that in the Russian 
case, ''a wealth of research devoted to key issues'' already existed in the 
universities and government offices, which was ''too often ignored.'' The 
fatal factor in both these affairs was intellectual arrogance. It is, in 
policy circles and the academy, a quality still among us.

William Pfaff is a syndicated columnist.

*******

#5
New York Times
January 17, 2000
[for personal use only]
ESSAY / By WILLIAM SAFIRE
There's a War On

Acting President Vladimir Putin's campaign to wipe out all Chechen resistance 
to Moscow's authority is no longer a triumphal parade. Russian casualties 
have begun to mount. 

This is not good for a political campaign whose candidate's sudden popularity 
depends solely on a cost-free victory over the despised Chechens. The 
election was moved closer in a Yeltsin-Putin deal so it could be conducted 
during the war fever, but body bags dampen jingoistic spirits. 

For that reason, the leaders of Chechnya's independence movement are bracing 
themselves for a morale-boosting stunt by the former K.G.B. man who heads 
Russia's government. 

"Putin will have to boost the anti-Chechen feeling," says Ilyas Akhmadov, the 
39-year old former philosophy student whom the Chechen separatists have named 
their foreign minister. "They may stage another apartment-house bombing." Mr. 
Akhmadov was in Washington last week to meet the lowest-level employee our 
State Department could find, at a location not too close to Foggy Bottom. 
Even so, Russia's foreign minister denounced the U.S. for paying any 
attention at all to him. 

Bombings that killed 300 civilians -- whether by Chechen terrorists, as 
Moscow claims, or by K.G.B. provocateurs, as many Chechens believe -- 
frightened and infuriated the Russian public. Whoever was behind the 
bombings, the one who benefited most from the terror was Putin. 

"You will note that none of the elite died in the apartment houses," says 
Akhmadov. "Only poor people. We have no proof that the F.S.B. [new name for 
the K.G.B.] did this, but they have no proof that we did. And consider what 
happened at Ryazan." 

Just before Christmas at that town not far from Moscow, internal security 
forces rounded up Caucasian "terrorists" and displayed a trove of explosives. 
But Russian police, say the Chechens, inconveniently found that the planters 
of explosives were K.G.B. men; a cover story was put out that it was all an 
F.S.B. "training exercise." 

Russian generals keep announcing the imminent fall of Grozny, which they keep 
pounding with artillery. But several generals have been hastily replaced 
after their predictions fell flat. "In close combat, we do better," says the 
Chechen. "If we lose Grozny, we'll fight elsewhere, and then we'll take back 
Grozny." 

Who is supplying the resistance? "We cannot do without the Russian Army for 
our supplies," says Akhmadov. "After a few weeks in the field, they will sell 
us any weapon. That's why they keep rotating their soldiers back after a 
short time." 

The Chechens' most useful weapon? "The RPG-7 grenade launcher. We call it 
'the Chechen nuclear bomb.' The price is supposed to be $800, but our men get 
it from the Russian soldiers for 20 bottles of vodka." 

The youthful spokesman makes a good impression, but there's no denying that 
Chechnya, after humiliating Russia's army a few years ago, became a lawless 
land. Kidnappers, mafiosi and nogoodniks -- called by Akhmadov "irresponsible 
elements manipulated by the F.S.B." -- abound. Chechen self-rule is not an 
easy cause for outsiders to embrace. 

But that offers no excuse for the Russian generals and their Kremlin 
political allies to try to pulverize a whole people. The war going on now is 
Stalinesque: "We are fighting to save ourselves from extermination because a 
military coup is taking place in Russia." 

Maybe. Whatever the motive for the bombardment-massacre, the civilized world 
cannot allow the all-out war on the Chechen people to continue without 
consequences. For Russia's unelected new leader to order the breakup of 
families trying to escape the bombs -- detaining all males from 10 to 60 -- 
is barbaric; for us to shrug it off would be heartless and feckless. 

We cannot intervene because -- as we were warned again last week -- Russia is 
a nuclear power. As embattled Chechens begin to bleed the invaders in 
guerrilla war, we can help -- not with guns or money, but with heavier media 
attention and unrelenting diplomatic pressure. And by not jumping to 
conclusions on the identity of terror bombers. 

"Why do you honor them as part of a Group of Eight?" asks the Chechen 
spokesman. And why do we let the World Bank shower money on Russian 
enterprises? Some people in Washington just do not realize that there is a 
shooting war on. 

********

#6
Russia's Putin asks West for understanding
By Elizabeth Piper

MOSCOW, Jan 17 (Reuters) - Acting President Vladimir Putin appealed for 
Western understanding over Russia's military offensive in breakaway Chechnya 
on Monday, adopting a new softer line in talks with a top European official. 

As the two sides talked, shells and bombs crashed into Grozny, in what some 
commanders called the decisive phase of its campaign to gain control of the 
Chechen capital, where up to 40,000 civilians are cowering in cellars with 
almost no food. 

Putin, whose tough stance on Chechnya has made him Russia's most popular 
politician, hosted a delegation from the Council of Europe, the first talks 
on Chechnya with the West since he became acting president after Boris 
Yeltsin's New Year resignation. 

``We understand the concern of the international community over the events in 
the North Caucasus,'' Putin told Lord David Russell-Johnston, president of 
the parliamentary delegation at the Council, at a meeting with other top 
Russian officials. 

``But we want the international community to show an understanding of our 
position, by relying on facts about the real situation from truthful 
information and not from propaganda,'' Putin said in televised comments. 

Putin has criticised some aspects of the war's coverage, particularly media 
reports about the plight of about 200,000 refugees in the impoverished 
Ingushetia region, which has prompted widespread Western concern. 

COUNCIL OF EUROPE CALLS FOR END TO CAMPAIGN 

Russell-Johnston reiterated demands for a halt to the more than three-month 
campaign, but weakened an earlier threat that Russia could face expulsion 
from the Council of Europe if it persisted with the offensive. 

``We expressed the views that have already been set out by the assembly in 
resolutions concerning a ceasefire, concerning negotiations, concerning the 
free movement of refugees and access to humanitarian organisations,'' 
Russell-Johnston told reporters after meeting Yegor Stroyev, speaker of 
Russia's upper house of parliament. 

``We are looking for some way of ending the conflict...soon,'' he said, 
adding it was too early to speak about Russia's expulsion from the Council, 
which promotes human rights and democracy. 

After meeting Putin, the Council's delegation is expected to make a 
fact-finding trip to the North Caucasus, including Russian-controlled parts 
of Chechnya, on Tuesday and Wednesday. 

In Chechnya, Interfax news agency reported that Russian warplanes flew more 
than 110 sorties over the last 24 hours, targeting Grozny and gorges in the 
regions of Argun and Vedeno. 

Russian troops, stepping up pressure on Grozny, forced rebels back into 
cellars after Chechen fighters made six attempts to leave the besieged 
capital, Itar-Tass reported. 

Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev was quoted as saying by Interfax that the 
campaign was going well. 

Commanders have said they believe the devastated Chechen capital will soon 
fall under Moscow's control. 

KREMLIN WANTS ELECTION WITHOUT WAR 

Putin has said time does not matter in the operation, in which Russia wants 
to minimise casualties among its troops and local civilians. 

But the Kremlin would clearly like to wrap up the campaign before Russia's 
March 26 presidential election and on Saturday said the offensive, on which 
Putin's popularity largely rests, was going according to plan. 

Despite the expressions of Russian optimism, the rebels continued to send a 
clear message of defiance. Their Internet website kavkaz.org.com said they 
had repelled Russian attempts to force them out of gorges near Argun and 
Vedeno. 

It said fighters had killed up to 60 Russian troops. 

The Chechens also scored a minor diplomatic coup on Sunday by winning formal 
diplomatic recognition from Afghanistan's ruling Taleban Islamic movement. 

Afghanistan is the first country to recognise Chechnya as an independent 
state but the Taleban is itself still struggling for international 
recognition. 

Chechnya has claimed full independence from Moscow since 1991 but until now 
no foreign state has recognised it. Moscow says Chechnya must stay within the 
Russian Federation. 

*******

#7
Izvestia
January 15, 20000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
ASSESSING THE POPULARITY OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
By Andrei STEPANOV

Presidential candidate Gennady Zyuganov, who runs on the
KPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) ticket, was
supported by an additional 4 percent of all respondents last
week, with the All-Russian Public Opinion Institute (Russian
acronym, VTsIOM) reporting that his popularity totalled 18
percent by January 10. This seems to be the most important
piece of sociological news. Quite possibly, Zyuganov's rising
popularity can be explained by the fact that the KPRF has
nominated him as its candidate. However, this is also
apparently connected with the fact that those particular
voters, who were captivated by Yevgeny Primakov for a while,
have now started rallying around Zyuganov once again. The
former prime minister has lost 2 percent of his supporters
last week, with VTsIOM estimating his popularity at 8 percent.
It turns out that various rumors concerning Primakov's
alliance with the Kremlin didn't benefit him.
Meanwhile Vladimir Putin is still supported by 55-56
percent of all Russian voters, who are ready to cast their
ballots in his favor during the next few days. In principle,
Vladimir Putin doesn't require any additional popularity for
the sake of scoring a convincing victory throughout the first
election round. However, opinion polls don't always provide an
objective picture; consequently, it's still too early for
Vladimir Putin's public-relations experts to rest on their
laurels.
Looks like, those not very successful Chechen combat
operations won't drastically reduce the acting president's
popularity, thus turning him into an unelectable candidate.
ROMIR, e.g. an independent research center, estimates that
only 19 percent of all Russian citizens expect the Chechen
campaign to be crowned with a complete victory pretty soon. 
50 percent of the pollees are sure that such combat operations
will last for a very long time to come. Another 19 percent
believe that a stalemate will ensue after presidential
elections. At the same time, 75 percent in the same respondent
category noted that they have a rather positive or completely
positive opinion of Vladimir Putin's activities as Russia's
acting president. The people of Russia are so glad to see a
new face on the national political scene that they are ready
to wait for concrete results. Evidently, the repayment of wage
arrears and back pensions has convinced quite a few people
that one can also live fairly well without socialism. The
Agency of Regional Political Studies (Russian acronym, ARPI)
estimates that only 19 percent of all Russian citizens deem it
necessary to revert to the Communist system. 50 percent of all
respondents want the reforms to go on, provided that the
Government ensures adequate social security. Another 13
percent are ready to endure the continued present-day line.
All Putin has to do is to prove that he alone embodies the
non-traumatic reform line. However, the Russian electorate
will have an opportunity to find out, whether such reforms are
possible, or not, about six months later, that is, after
presidential elections.
Meanwhile about 33 percent of all Russians believe that
Boris Yeltsin's resignation and the appointment of Vladimir
Putin to the post of acting president will facilitate the
development of Russian democracy. 11.5 percent of all
respondents are afraid that a totalitarian regime (?!) will be
established as a result. Thank God, this country still has
enough sober-minded people -- about 38 percent say that
nothing will change as a result of this reshuffle (ROMIR
statistics).
Russian citizens still view their former president (whose
cause is to be continued by Vladimir Putin) with restrained
skepticism. Few people believe in his organizational prowess.
Only 11 percent of all respondents think that Boris Yeltsin
can be entrusted with the post of the Belarussian-Russian
union's leader. 73 percent emphatically disapprove of such
prospects. Still one shouldn't think that the people of Russia
are a dull-witted and callous bunch. Despite the fact that 73
percent of the pollees have a negative opinion of president
Boris Yeltsin's performance, another 10 percent believe that
his rule did have some positive aspects. Meanwhile 17 percent
of all respondents said DK (Don't Know), while replying to
this question. Time alleviates all grudges -- as compared to
the previous week, the number of people, who approve the
ex-president's deeds, has soared by an impressive 6 percent;
and the number of respondents, who don't want to judge the
retired Russian leader, has increased by 10 percent.

Table One

6-10, and Who Were Ready to Vote for Vladimir Putin
During Presidential Elections 
------------------------------------------------------
1. August ................................ 2 percent
2. September ............................. 4 percent
3. October ............................... 31 percent
4. November .............................. 45 percent
5. December 3-9 .......................... 45 percent
6. December 10-12 ........................ 48 percent
7. December 17-20 ........................ 50 percent
8. December 24-27 ........................ 49 percent
9. December 31 -- January 4 .............. 56 percent
------------------------------------------------------
x) Source: VTsIOM 

*******

#8
Russian President Putin's Rating Is Increasing, Poll Shows

Moscow, Jan. 17 (Bloomberg)
-- Russian Prime Minister and Acting President Vladimir Putin's 
popularity is continuing to rise, according to the latest opinion poll from 
Russia's Public Opinion Fund. If the presidential election, set for March 26, 
took place next week, Vladimir Putin would win in the first round with 55 
percent, scoring a simple majority and avoiding a runoff. Gennady Zyuganov 
came in second with 13 percent, based on the results of the poll carried out 
on Jan. 12 by the independent polling agency established in 1991. 

The poll carries a margin of error of 4 percent based on 1,500 respondents. 
Findings of the previous poll (Dec. 20-21, 1999) are in parentheses. 

If the presidential elections took place next Sunday, for which of the 
following politicians would you vote? 

Vladimir Putin 55% (49%) 
Gennady Zyuganov (Communist Party leader) 13% (13%) 
Yevgeny Primakov (former Prime Minister) 7% (9%) 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR) 3% (5%) 
Grigory Yavlinsky (Yabloko) 3% (4%) 
Yuri Luzhkov (Moscow Mayor) 2% (2%) 
Others 9% (8%) 
Wouldn't vote 3% (4%) 
Difficult to answer 5% (6%) 

(Public Opinion Fund www.fom.ru) 

*******

#9
The Independent (UK)
17 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Russians losing the propaganda war in Chechnya 
By Patrick Cockburn in Moscow 

The conflict in Chechnya is confirming the saying that the first casualty of 
war is truth. During the fighting last month in the capital Grozny, a Russian 
armoured reconnaissance unit sent to locate Chechen firing positions was 
ambushed and suffered heavy losses as it entered Minutka square in the heart 
of the city. 

Foreign news agencies in Grozny reported that 115 Russian soldiers were lying 
dead amid the wreckage of their armoured vehicles. Russian defence officials 
denied that any battle had occurred at all. 

"In fact the agencies got it a little wrong," said Captain Jury Gladkevich of 
the independent Military News Agency in Moscow. "Our losses were 52 dead and 
wounded. It wasn't an attempt to storm Grozny. The Russian commander wanted 
to draw Chechen fire to find out where they were, but he underestimated their 
defences." 

The incident explains why Russia is doing so badly in the information war in 
Chechnya. No setback is ever admitted, however strong the evidence to the 
contrary. A Russian general speaks of 7,000 Chechen fighters killed – yet 
even a pro-Moscow Chechen politician says the real figure is 200. Official 
spokesmen lose credibility by the month. 

After four months in which the Russian high command trumpeted a trouble-free 
advance through Chechnya, the ability of guerrillas to strike at the towns of 
Gudermes, Shali and Argun shocked the Russian media and public. "Suddenly it 
turned out that no defence was organised against potential strikes," wrote 
the daily newspaper Izvestia last week. "The troops were scattered all over 
the territory and mobile armoured units had no unified command." 

None of this was a surprise to General Vladimir Kosarev, a dapper middle-aged 
officer who last year set up the Military News Agency (known by its Russian 
initials as AVN) just before the start of the latest Chechen war. He had 
resigned from the army in frustration at its refusal to tell the truth. 

"There was always a high wall between journalists and the army," said Gen 
Kosarev as he recalled his last years in uniform. "I thought I could destroy 
it, but I failed." 

Now is trying again. In a Moscow office he has gathered the former military 
journalists he considers the best in the field, all of whom were once in the 
armed forces, none below the rank of captain. 

Gen Kosarev and his journalists do not oppose Russia's war in Chechnya, but 
they are keen to see it properly reported. Capt Gladkevich, a specialist on 
Chechnya, said that, for example, "the number of Russian casualties is three 
or four times the official figure". The numbers are massaged to keep them low 
by various means, such as not reporting numbers of missing soldiers, most of 
whom are dead. 

Capt Gladkevich admits that he does not have an exact figure for Russian 
losses, despite repeated efforts to find out. It is, he said, a closely 
guarded secret. "When a senior medical office at the Ministry of Defence 
asked about our casualties, he was immediately cross-questioned about why he 
needed to know." 

Few of AVN's reports have gone down well with the official spokesmen for the 
army or the Defence Ministry. With some glee, Gen Kosarev records how one 
such spokesman accused AVN of helping the Chechen rebels by revealing in 
advance that two senior Russian generals in operational command in Chechnya
– 
Vladimir Shamanov and Gennady Troshev – were to be moved from their posts. 
Gen Kosarev promptly got up at a press conference and attacked the spokesman 
"for misleading the Russian public". 

In fact, said Capt Gladkevich, the background to the apparent firing of the 
two generals – who are now to be promoted – had nothing to do with any 
feeling in Moscow that the war was going badly, although Gen Shamanov was in 
bad odour with President Boris Yeltsin for making political statements.This 
was confirmed by acting President Vladimir Putin at the weekend; he said the 
authority of both Gen Shamanov and Gen Troshev was to be "expanded, not 
diminished". 

Many Russian generals and defence officials approve of the AVN's record of 
accurate reporting on military and security affairs. Gen Kosarev proudly 
showed off a congratulatory letter from the air force commander. But, on more 
mundane business matters, he concedes that "it is too early to tell if the 
agency will ever be profitable". 

The agency may also benefit from a growing willingness by the Russian media 
to admit that so far the official account of the war in Chechnya has been 
grossly misleading. The army announced the capture of villages and towns as 
soon as local Chechen leaders agreed to run up the Russian flag, but never 
really controlled them. 

The ability of AVN to tap into so many sources inside the armed forces shows 
that there are plenty of Russian soldiers who believe there is no danger in 
revealing what is happening.Still, the overall picture of victorious advance 
in Chechnya is unlikely to change. As the daily newspaper Moskovsky 
Komsomolets points outs: "While losing soldiers and losing the war, the word 
will be that we are winning, at least until the presidential elections." 

******

#10
The Russia Journal
January 17-23, 2000
Putin a child of war
By Alexander Golts

Russia is one of the few countries where the term "election campaign" can
be taken literally – with a military action carried out. I wouldn’t go as
far as to say that the Kremlin deliberately launches a war every time
elections come round, in an attempt to influence voters, but the campaign
managers certainly take the "military factor" into account when developing
their candidates’ strategies. 

Acting President Vladimir Putin, whose victory in the presidential election
now looks assured, is a prime example of how the military factor works. The
former intelligence officer was plucked from obscurity to head the
government as the first shots were fired in Dagestan. 

His unprecedented popularity is entirely fueled by war. And it is not just
a matter of shows of force or pledges – designed for theatrical effect – to
"crush the vermin" and "wipe [the terrorists] out while they’re on their
toilets."

Putin has shown a decisiveness unheard of for a Russian politician.
Formally, he had no authority to run the security ministries but
nonetheless took upon himself responsibility for the "anti-terrorist
operations." To understand how serious this is, it is enough to remember
that in 1994, then-President Boris Yeltsin, afraid of such responsibility,
decided to undergo surgery right at the time the troops were sent into
Chechnya. 

This time, fortunately for the generals, Putin gave them no tasks such as
"restoring constitutional order," which cannot be achieved by military
means. Putin, who de facto took on the responsibilities of commander in
chief half a year before he became acting president, defined the aim of the
military operations in Chechnya as being to "liquidate the terrorists."
This gave the generals the green light to use all means at their disposal,
including combat aviation and barrel and volley fire artillery. 

The military was happy to see that Putin kept to his hard line, not giving
in to the West’s demands that he scale back the offensive in Chechnya and
enter negotiations with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. 

Putin gave the army more than just verbal support. Despite financial
difficulties, the government gradually paid off its debts to the armed
forces. Soldiers fighting in Chechnya are paid good money by Russian
standards. Finally, the military budget for this year has been considerably
increased. All of this gives Russia’s officers, who’ve led a rather
miserable existence over the last decade, some hope for better prospects in
the future.

This kind of moral and material support met with an according reaction from
the security ministries, previously remembered by the Kremlin only in times
of crisis. For the first time, the army gave its votes to the "party of
power," the hastily put together Unity (Yedinstvo) bloc. Sociologists,
going by data from several closed polling stations, found that while 23
percent of voters in general voted for Unity, the figure was 48 percent in
the military. This result was undoubtedly only obtained because Putin gave
his support to Unity.

But this idyllic relation between the security ministries and the acting
president and commander in chief will not necessarily last. The more time
goes by, the more dependent Putin becomes on success in Chechnya – and the
generals are fully aware of this dependence. In November, Putin didn’t risk
pulling up one of the main heroes of the current Chechnya campaign — Maj.
Gen. Shamanov, who openly blackmailed the government, saying that he would
tear off his stripes if he were ordered to halt military operations.

But Putin’s PR people know that the war will bring popularity only so long
as it is short and victorious. The victorious phase lasted only until
December. As many observers (including myself) predicted, the quick and
relatively bloodless advance of federal troops came to a halt when faced
with separatist resistance in Grozny and the mountain regions. This most
difficult stage also coincides with winter, when bad weather conditions
make it difficult for federal forces to make use of their prime advantage —
aviation and artillery.

With federal troops concentrated in Grozny and the mountain regions, the
separatists have taken advantage of the situation to try and retake Argun
and Shali — towns in federal hands. Federal forces fought them off, but not
without incurring losses. Now there’s a traditional search for scapegoats.
Top military officials have grown increasingly nervous, too, since
Yeltsin’s resignation. They would like to be in line for top jobs under the
new president and have only weeks in which to prove their worth.

Some blame Interior Ministry troops for not doing their job properly in
filtering the population in federal-controlled areas of Chechnya. Others
are already blaming Putin’s entourage, saying it is responsible for
persuading Putin to halt the offensive on Grozny and remove Generals
Troshev and Shamanov, who disagreed with the decision. But there was no
truce in reality, and the two generals were removed from their commanding
posts because they failed to take the Chechen capital within a month. 

Putin also has his reasons to be unhappy with the military. His PR people
calculated that three months is just the amount of time at his disposal if
he is not to lose his military capital. It was enough to fly to Chechnya at
New Year and send Christmas greetings to the troops. And the military was
not asked to provide a total and definitive victory, just to take control
of Grozny, even if only symbolically.

The progress of the war ruined these plans. The logic of political survival
now demands that Putin distance himself from a war that is clearly not
going to end anytime soon. Putin’s emotional statements about "Russia not
abandoning such generals" do not detract from the fact that those very
generals could become extra political ballast for Putin the presidential
candidate. And that would give the military the possibility of saying that
it has been betrayed.

******

#11
New York Times
January 17, 2000
[for personal use only]
U.S. Officials Pore Over Putin's Resume
By JANE PERLEZ

WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- In contrast to his predecessors as leader of Russia, 
Vladimir V. Putin appears to be a modern decision-maker who knows how to make 
things happen, Clinton Administration officials say. What remains unclear is 
whether his political instincts match that style of action. 

"He can get the trains running on time, but the question is where the trains 
are going," said one senior policymaker. "We may be looking at a modern 
decision-maker but the question is whether he has progressive values." 

As the Administration pieces together its assessment of Mr. Putin, who 
replaced Boris N. Yeltsin a little more than two weeks ago, Washington is 
battling two factors. First, the United States knows much less about Mr. 
Putin than it did about Soviet leaders during the cold war. Second, the 
Clinton Administration must deal with him during volatile political seasons 
in both Russia and the United States, with a war in Chechnya souring 
relations between them. 

Mr. Putin, who became prime minister of Russia only last August, has suddenly 
come to power from relative obscurity at the young age of 47. His résumé's 
bare bones -- including his service in the K.G.B.'s foreign intelligence arm 
and his role as director of its successor, the Federal Security Service -- 
are known. 

But the meaning of Mr. Putin's résumé, and where his instincts really lie, 
are not understood, officials said. Did Mr. Putin's experience in the 
security services form him? Or is he, as he describes himself, a nationalist 
who wants a strong state sector with the benefits of democracy? 

"We're scrambling," said one intelligence official. 

In the short term, much of Mr. Putin's activities will be driven by Russia's 
March 26 presidential election, which polls suggest he is almost certain to 
win. So far, Mr. Putin has shown himself to be astute at garnering the 
support of the Russian people by encouraging the military in Chechnya and by 
pledging to reinvigorate the central powers of authority, officials said. 

In Washington, President Clinton, who as a candidate attacked President Bush 
for "coddling" dictators in China, must try to ensure that Vice President 
Gore is not vulnerable to attack from the Republican presidential candidates 
for policies considered too lenient toward Russia. 

For the remainder of the Clinton Administration, the major policy matters 
with Russia will be negotiations over arms control, continuation of loans 
from the International Monetary Fund and the war in Chechnya, where the 
Clinton Administration has accused Moscow of using indiscriminate force. 

Efforts are now underway to reach an agreement with the Russians on changes 
to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty that would allow the Administration 
to proceed on a limited nuclear missile defense system, but are not expected 
to reach a serious level until summer, after the Russian election, officials 
said. 

>From their early dealings with Mr. Putin in telephone conversations and 
face-to-face meetings, senior Administration officials describe him as a 
serious negotiator who is precise, well prepared and does what he promises. 

The initial take on Mr. Putin is that he sees Russia's future as a fairly 
democratic one, with a market economy of some kind and participation in the 
world community, the officials said. 

His Kremlin advisers, they noted, run the gamut from economic reformers to 
little-known intelligence operatives. 

Mr. Putin made clear his intention to restore the state's authority in an 
article, "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium" that was posted on his 
government's Internet site and has been read by Administration officials. 

Under the heading "Statism," Mr. Putin wrote: "It will not happen soon, if it 
ever happens at all, that Russia will become the second edition of, say, 
Britain, in which liberal values have deep historic traditions. Our state and 
its institutions and structures have always played an exceptionally important 
role in the life of the country and its people." 

Shortly after he became Prime Minister, Mr. Putin met with President Clinton 
in Auckland, New Zealand, and in Oslo, where Mr. Clinton gave him a stern 
lecture about pushing too hard in Chechnya, White House officials said. 

Mr. Putin has said he will not attend the gathering of world leaders and 
economists at Davos, Switzerland, later this month, depriving Mr. Clinton of 
a chance to take another measure of the Russian. 

Before his appointment as Prime Minister, Mr. Putin was Mr. Yeltsin's 
national security adviser, putting him in contact with the White House 
national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger. 

Mr. Putin was helpful on the telephone with Mr. Berger in setting the stage 
for a resolution of the crisis last June when Russian troops based in Bosnia 
marched across Serbia into Kosovo just as NATO troops were deploying there as 
part of an international peacekeeping force, officials said. 

In another matter, Mr. Putin managed to engineer passage of legislation that 
put controls on the export of nuclear materials from Russia to Iran, the 
official said. But whether the export controls were actually working or 
whether the inspectors installed by Mr. Putin at the nuclear institutes were 
effective was an open question, the official said. 

Administration officials said they will be watching in the next several weeks 
for what Mr. Putin does in Chechnya, where he has told Administration 
officials there needs to be a political solution at some point, whether he 
pushes legislation on bankruptcy, tax reform and money laundering and his 
pledge to get the Start II arms control treaty ratified by the newly elected 
Russian Parliament. 

******

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